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Congressional Update: Week Ending April 28Th Congressional Update: Week Ending April 28th ACW Research and Analysis Unit April 28, 2017 Congressional Update; Week Ending April 28th ACW Research and Analysis Unit I. Budget Issues Syrian civilians, mostly women and children, has outraged many in Congress and has been By Friday, April 28, Congress was set to pass the the impetus for the scheduled markup. Continuing Resolution (CR) to fund the US Government at Fiscal Year 2016 levels through In a related development, on April 12, May 5, when Congress hopes to pass another Representatives Brendan Boyle (D- CR to fund the government through the end of Pennsylvania) and Ruben Gallego (D-Arizona) FY 2017 (September 30, 2017). Meanwhile, the sent a letter to President Trump urging him to Appropriations Committee is putting the clarify “whether it is now his Administration’s finishing touches on an FY 2017 supplemental policy to seek the removal from power of Syrian that will fund crucial defense department President Bashar al-Assad.” expenditures, and then it will begin work on the FY 2018 budget, which President Donald IV. Hearings and Briefings of Interest Trump is expected to submit on May 18. The Crisis in Libya: Next Steps and US Policy II. Update on Iran Sanctions Legislation Options: On April 24, the SFRC gathered to hear assessments on the current state of affairs The Iran sanctions bill, S. 722, is pending before in Libya. It has been six years of instability and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tension since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi. The (SFRC). The Committee is expected to mark up witnesses who appeared before the committee the bill before Congress adjourns for the are experts on the ongoing conflict and gave Memorial Day Recess. The House bill, H.R. sober analyses of the options available to restore 1698, Iran Ballistic Missiles and International stability and ease tensions. Sanctions Enforcement Act, is significantly different from the Senate bill, and the House Dr. Frederic Wehrey of the Carnegie Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) is not Endowment for International Peace laid out two expected to mark it up before the Iranian imperatives that the United States should focus elections on May 19. on when formulating a strategy in Libya: thwart the growth and spread of terrorist groups, and III. Update on Syria Sanctions Legislation help the locals develop a stable and inclusive government. As of now, any support militant The HFAC is scheduled to mark up H.R. 1677, groups find in Libya appears to be simply the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2017, on transactional among historically neglected May 3. Following approval by the full populations. An even distribution of oil committee, the bill may be quickly considered revenues as well as Libyan-led dialogue in by the full House later next week. The pursuit of inclusive governance should be horrendous use of chemical weapons against 1 Arab Center Washington DC April 2017 enough to root out any further support of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace militant extremists, according to Dr. Wehrey. noted that Sisi’s regime is fostering instability and pressuring the population in such a fashion The Honorable Deborah K. Jones, who spent that civil unrest could rise in the near future. She two years in Tripoli as an ambassador, assessed pointed out that in a number of economic the conflict in Libya as unlike the traditional metrics, the Egyptian population—particularly civil wars in the Middle East and North Africa. the younger generation—scores uncomfortably Libyan society is extremely fractured—a fact high on the misery index that assesses how that predates Qadhafi himself—but it is not people view their personal financial state. divided along secular-Islamist lines like many President Sisi’s economic strategy is geared suggest. Rather, this is a war of attrition toward lining the pockets of the Egyptian between a side that is trying to uphold the status military, a fact that the United States should quo of power and centralized wealth, and the take that into consideration when issuing other side that seeks democratic, inclusive economic aid. As such, Dr. Dunne suggested governance and wealth distribution. In order to that the United States should not give Egypt stabilize the country, the United States and its cash or any funding that can disappear quickly, allies should support the Libyan people’s goals but extend aid that fosters strong investment and ensure that local populations take and spending practices. accountability, starting at the municipal level. Second, Elliott Abrams of the Council on A Review of the United States’ Assistance for Foreign Relations flatly suggested that the Egypt: On April 25, the Senate Appropriations United States rethink its aid to Egypt. Abrams Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, noted that the US aid package afforded to Egypt and Related Programs held a hearing to assess is based on a strategy developed after former how US assistance is being used by Egypt and if President Anwar Sadat participated in the lawmakers should reconsider the aid that has Camp David Accords, and it is sorely outdated. historically been afforded to successive regimes. He argued that Egypt’s stated goal is fighting With concerns about President Abdel Fattah el- domestic terrorism, but it invests strictly in Sisi’s human rights abuses and consolidation of traditional military forces that are rigid and power in an undemocratic system, Chairman capable only of conducting traditional state-on- Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) suggested state warfare. Because Egypt is not focused on the United States needs to better understand combatting domestic terrorism efficiently and where its investment is used in Egypt. has little to no role in calming regional instability, Abrams argued US aid is better Each of the three witnesses presented different spent elsewhere. assessments and recommendations for US aid to Egypt. First, Dr. Michele Dunne of the 2 Congressional Update; Week Ending April 28th ACW Research and Analysis Unit The Honorable Tom Malinowski—a former East Institute, and Dr. Dafna Rand of the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, National Defense University. Each of the Human Rights, and Labor—echoed many of witnesses brought different perspectives, but Elliott Abrams’s points about Egypt no longer the three seemed to agree that President Trump holding the same position of influence in the does need to formulate and clearly articulate a greater Middle East. Additionally, he noted that strategy for Syria. Each provided over President Obama’s years in the White recommendations for US policy in Syria. House, positive engagement and conditional aid did little to change Egypt’s priorities. Mr. Singh suggested three objectives for the Therefore, Malinowski argued that Washington United States to pursue: 1) ensure that the should focus on coercing Egypt to change one conflict in Syria does not spread through the thing in particular: how it treats US citizens. He region to fragile arenas like Iraq, Jordan, or recommended the United States force Egypt to Lebanon, or to allies like Israel; 2) counter Iran’s relax its strict laws against nongovernmental influence in Syria and its attempt at building a organizations and to cease the anti-American link to proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere in the sentiments that are spread through state-run region; and, 3) defeat the Islamic State of Iraq media. and the Levant (ISIL), deny terrorist groups safe haven in Syria generally, and ensure that Syria After the Missile Strikes: Policy jihadist groups do not return after Raqqa is Options: On April 27, the HFAC held a hearing liberated. to assess US policy towards Syria and President Bashar al-Asad after the tomahawk missile Mr. Lister recommended similar points strike President Donald Trump authorized. regarding Iran. However, his main There was overwhelming support by committee recommendation addressed the issue of members for President Trump’s decision to counterterrorism (CT) efforts in Syria. While launch a limited strike in response to Asad’s ISIL is the most pressing threat in Syria, Mr. chemical attack. However, several members Lister noted that CT efforts must be extended to called upon the White House to formally submit combatting Iranian-backed Shiite militias and a request to Congress for an authorization for the resurgent al-Qaeda affiliates that have the use of military force (AUMF). A majority of embedded in the opposition forces. Lastly, he committee members in attendance were urged the United States and its allies to enforce concerned about the Trump Administration’s zones of calm in distinct areas of Syria, which seemingly absent strategy for Syria. would allow some reconstruction and reconciliation efforts to begin. The panel of witnesses for the hearing included Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Finally, Dr. Rand proposed several goals for the Near East Policy, Charles Lister of the Middle United States to pursue. Like the witnesses 3 Arab Center Washington DC April 2017 before her, she emphasized the need to liberate Iran’s Persecution of the Baha’i Community ISIL-held territory in Syria. In the long term, she (H.Res.2747): An identical resolution was also advocated for a political solution to the introduced in the House on April 25 by conflict that excludes Bashar al-Asad and Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R- incorporates a new, inclusive governing body. Florida), Ted Deutch (D-Florida), Steve Chabot Lastly, she told the committee that top priorities (R-Ohio), Eliot Engel (D-New York), Chris in the present are to guard against the Smith (R-New Jersey), Jan Schakowsky (D- proliferation of chemical weapons and to ensure Illinois), Lynn Jenkins (R-Kansas), and Brad the safety of civilians, promote accountability, Schneider (D-Illinois). The resolution has been and provide humanitarian relief. referred to the HFAC.
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