The Saban Forum 2006

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The Saban Forum 2006 The Saban Forum 2006 A U.S.–Israel Dialogue America and Israel Confronting a Middle East in Turmoil Washington, DC December 8–10, 2006 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 202-797-6462, Fax: 202-797-2481 www.brookings.edu/sabancenter The Saban Forum 2006 A U.S.–Israel Dialogue America and Israel Confronting a Middle East in Turmoil Washington, DC December 8–10, 2006 Speakers and Chairmen Shai agassi martin S. indyk haim SaBan ami ayalon ted koppel david SatterField howard Berman william kriStol StroBe talBott william J. Clinton tom lantoS yuli tamir hillary rodham Clinton avigdor lieBerman yoSeF vardi roBert danin JoSeph lieBerman JameS wolFenSohn e. J. dionne Jr. amnon lipkin-Shahak david welCh giora eiland tzipi livni ehud yaari thomaS l. Friedman Shimon pereS amoS yadlin Jane harman kenneth m. pollaCk daniel yergin Letter from the Chairman . 5 List of Participants . 8 Executive Summary . 13 Program Schedule . 19 Proceedings . 23 Participant Biographies . 75 Each Saban Forum has garnered increasing public and media attention because of the expertise and experience of the participants who gather to candidly debate the challenges facing the United States and Israel . A feeling of trust and respect has developed which has strengthened the dialogue . A Letter from the Chairman When we established the Saban Forum in 2004, we designed it as a high-level dia- logue between the political, intellectual and societal leaders of two vibrant democ- racies, the United States and Israel. The third annual Saban Forum in December 2006 was a momentous event in this regard. Convened for the second time in Washington DC, this unique dialogue has quickly become part of the American and Israeli political calendar. We met after a year in which the Middle East descended further into crisis. Iraq turned to seemingly endless sectarian violence, prompting public question- ing of the way forward. The Iranian President repeatedly threatened to destroy Israel. Iran’s ally, Hizballah, provoked a full-scale war with devastation and loss of lives in both Israel and Lebanon. The Hamas Palestinian Government continued to reject international demands that it recognize Israel. By the end of the year, however, there were hopeful signs that the United States, the moderate Arab states and Israel might find common cause against extremism and in favor of ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In keeping with the nature of developments in 2006, the theme for the Saban Forum was “America and Israel Confronting a Middle East in Turmoil.” As is now traditional, our sessions were conducted under the “Chatham House Rule,” which allows participants to use the information shared in the Forum, but not to reveal the identity of speakers. Consistent with this rule, we have presented summaries of the discussions without attributing the opinions and judgments to any particular individual. Because of the troubled times Israelis and Americans are confronting, a candid exchange of views is vitally important. I am delighted that this annual dialogue has now achieved critical mass. I hope that through these proceedings you will experience the value of these exchanges. I am very grateful to the staff at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution whose hard work makes the Saban Forum possible. haim sabaN Chairman, The Saban Forum AMERICA AND ISRAEL CONFRONTING A MIDDLE EAST IN TURMOIL S a b a n F o r u m 2 0 0 6 American Participants m i C h a e l a d l e r , Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, t e d k o p p e l , Managing Editor, Discovery Channel. Adler Group, Inc; member, International Advisory Council, w i l l i a m k r i S t o l , Editor, The Weekly Standard. Saban Center for Middle East Policy. t o m l a n t o S , United States House of Representatives a l a n B at k i n , Vice Chairman, Kissinger Associates; (D-12th Congressional District of California). Trustee, the Brookings Institution. S a m u e l l e w i S , Board Member, Institute for the Study of S a m u e l B e r g e r , Chairman, Stonebridge International; Diplomacy, Georgetown University and Partners for former National Security Advisor. Democratic Change; former U.S. Ambassador to Israel. h o w a r d B e r m a n , United States House of Representatives J o S e p h l i e B e r m a n , United States Senate (D-28th Congressional District of California). (D-Connecticut). S t e p h e n B r e y e r , Justice, Supreme Court of the n i ta l o w e y , United States House of Representatives United States. (D-18th Congressional District of New York). C h a r l e S B r o n F m a n , Chairman of the Andrea and C a r l o S p a sc u a l , Vice President and Director of the Charles Bronfman Philanthropies. Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Brookings Institution; d a n i e l B y m a n , Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center former U.S. Department of State Coordinator for for Middle East Policy; Director, Center for Peace and Reconstruction and Stabilization. Security Studies, Georgetown University. t o d d p at k i n , founder, Todd G. Patkin Companies. h i l l a r y r o d h a m C l i n t o n , United States Senate n o r m a n p e a r l S t i n e , Senior Advisor, The Carlyle Group; (D-New York). former Editor-in-Chief, Time Inc. w i l l i a m J. C l i n t o n , 42nd President of the United C h a r l e S p e r e z , Co-Founder, Paul Davril Inc; States; member, International Advisory Council, Saban member, International Advisory Council, Saban Center for Center for Middle East Policy. Middle East Policy. r o B e r t d a n i n , Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of k e n n e t h p o l l a C k , Director of Research, Saban Center Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. for Middle East Policy; former Director for Persian Gulf J a C k S o n d i e h l , Deputy Editorial Page Editor, Affairs, National Security Council. The Washington Post. B r u C e r i e d e l , Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle e.J. d i o n n e , J r ., Senior Fellow, The Brookings East Policy; former Senior Director for Near East and North Institution; Columnist, The Washington Post. African Affairs, National Security Council. d a v i d F i S h e r , Chairman of Capital Group International, C a r l a a n n e r o bb i n S , Assistant Editorial Page Editor, Inc. and Capital Guardian Trust Company; member, The New York Times. International Advisory Council, Saban Center for d e n n i S r o ss , Counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Middle East Policy. Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; h a r o l d F o r d J r ., formerly United States House of former U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator. Representatives (D-9th Congressional District of Tennessee). h a i m S a B a n , Chief Executive Officer, Saban Capital d a v i d F r e u d , Chief Executive Officer, The Portland Trust. Group, Inc.; Chairman, International Advisory Council, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. t h o m a S l. F r i e d m a n , Columnist, The New York Times. d a v i d S at t e r F i e l d , Senior Advisor to the Secretary of J a n e h a r m a n , United States House of Representatives (D-36th Congressional District of California). State and Coordinator for Iraq. C h r i S t o p h e r S h ay S , United States House of m i C h a e l i g n at i e ff , Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Canada. Representatives (R-4th Congressional District of Connecticut). m a r t i n i n d y k , Director, Saban Center for Middle East J a m e S S t e i n B e r g , Policy; former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and Assistant Dean and J.J. “Jake” Pickle Regents Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Chair in Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin; former Deputy a n d r e a k o p p e l , Congressional Correspondent, CNN. National Security Advisor. THE SABAN FORUM: A U . S . –ISRAEL DIALOGUE S a b a n F o r u m 2 0 0 6 American Participants (continued) d a v i d S t e i n e r, Chairman, Steiner Equities Group; J. r i C h a r d w at e rS, Director for Israel, Palestinian, member, International Advisory Council, Saban Center for Jordanian and Egyptian Affairs, National Security Council. Middle East Policy. C. d a v i d w e l C h, Assistant Secretary of State for Near a n g e l a S t e n t, Director of the Center for Russian, Eastern Affairs. Eurasian and East European Studies, Georgetown t a m a r a C o F m a n w i t t e S, Director of the Arab University.
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