July 2015 Olume 4, No.2 V
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On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites
On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites Sergi Oms Sardans Aquesta tesi doctoral està subjecta a la llicència Reconeixement 3.0. Espanya de Creative Commons. Esta tesis doctoral está sujeta a la licencia Reconocimiento 3.0. España de Creative Commons. This doctoral thesis is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0. Spain License. On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites Sergi Oms Sardans Phd in Cognitive Science and Language Supervisor: Jose´ Mart´ınez Fernandez´ Tutor: Manuel Garc´ıa-Carpintero Sanchez-Miguel´ Department of Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy University of Barcelona CONTENTS Abstract iv Resum v Acknowledgements vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Truth . 1 1.2 The Liar . 3 1.3 The Formal Liar . 6 1.4 The Sorites ............................ 10 1.5 Forms of the Sorites ....................... 12 1.6 Vagueness . 17 1.7 This Dissertation . 18 2 The notion of Paradox 20 2.1 A Minor Point . 20 2.2 The Traditional Definition . 22 2.3 Arguments and Premises . 25 2.4 The Logical Form . 28 2.5 A First Attempt . 29 2.6 The Notion of Paradox . 31 2.7 Two Consequences . 35 2.8 Two Objections . 36 3 Solving Paradoxes 39 3.1 Solving One Paradox . 39 3.2 Solving more than One Paradox . 45 3.3 Van McGee: Truth as a Vague Notion . 47 i CONTENTS ii 3.3.1 The Sorites in Partially Interpreted Languages . 47 3.3.2 The Liar and vagueness . 49 3.3.3 Solving the Paradoxes . 54 4 Why a Common Solution 56 4.1 Why a Common Solution? . -
List of Paradoxes 1 List of Paradoxes
List of paradoxes 1 List of paradoxes This is a list of paradoxes, grouped thematically. The grouping is approximate: Paradoxes may fit into more than one category. Because of varying definitions of the term paradox, some of the following are not considered to be paradoxes by everyone. This list collects only those instances that have been termed paradox by at least one source and which have their own article. Although considered paradoxes, some of these are based on fallacious reasoning, or incomplete/faulty analysis. Logic • Barbershop paradox: The supposition that if one of two simultaneous assumptions leads to a contradiction, the other assumption is also disproved leads to paradoxical consequences. • What the Tortoise Said to Achilles "Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down...," also known as Carroll's paradox, not to be confused with the physical paradox of the same name. • Crocodile Dilemma: If a crocodile steals a child and promises its return if the father can correctly guess what the crocodile will do, how should the crocodile respond in the case that the father guesses that the child will not be returned? • Catch-22 (logic): In need of something which can only be had by not being in need of it. • Drinker paradox: In any pub there is a customer such that, if he or she drinks, everybody in the pub drinks. • Paradox of entailment: Inconsistent premises always make an argument valid. • Horse paradox: All horses are the same color. • Lottery paradox: There is one winning ticket in a large lottery. It is reasonable to believe of a particular lottery ticket that it is not the winning ticket, since the probability that it is the winner is so very small, but it is not reasonable to believe that no lottery ticket will win. -
The Books on Philosophy, but None of Them Could Tell Him the Real Reason Why There Is Something Instead of Nothing
Also by RaymondM Smullyan THEORY OF FORMAL SYSTEMS FIRST ORDER LOGIC THE TAO IS SILENT �&1�mTIl@ITilcQl JF!{lo�mTIlTIll n n�<IDm1 I The Riddle of Dracula and Other Logical Puzzles PRENTICE-HALL, INC., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey WhatIs the Name of This Book?-The Riddle of Dracula and Other Logical Puzzles, by Raymond M. Smullyan Copyright © 1978 by Raymond M. Smullyan All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, except for the inclusion of brief quotationsin a review, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printedin the United States of America Prentice-HallInternational In c., London Prentice-Hall of Australia, Pty. Ltd., Sydney Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Toronto Prentice-Hall of India Private Ltd., New Delhi Prentice-Hall of Japan, Inc., Tokyo Prentice-Hall of Southeast Asia Pte. Ltd., Singapore Whitehall Books Limited, Wellington, New Zealand 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Smullyan, Raymond M. What is the name of this book? 1. Puzzles. I. Title GV1493.S63 793.7'3 77-18692 ISBN 0-13-955088-7 Dedicated to Linda Wetzel and Joseph Bevando, whose wise counsels have been invaluable. Contents Part One ilLOGICAL RECREATIONS 1. Fooled? 3 2. Puzzles and Monkey Tricks 7 Solutions 14 3. Knights and Knaves 20 Solutions 26 4. Alice in the Forest of Forgetfulness 36 Solutions 46 Part Two. PORTIA'S CASKETS AND OTHER MYSTERIES 5. The Mystery of Portia's Caskets 55 Solutions 62 6. From the Files of Inspector Craig 67 Solutions 74 7. -
Paradoxes: Feature Part 2 of 2
Of Art and Mathematics Paradoxes: feature Part 2 of 2 This is not the first sentence of this article. Punya Mishra & Gaurav Bhatnagar sentence of this sentence!The above But sentence because can this be isboth part true 2 of and our false. article It onis clearly Paradoxes, the first if we regard both parts article. as one So article, it is false, it is becausetrue! We it leave says it isto notyou the to resolvefirst this paradox. mathematicalIn the first part truth, of this the two-part problems exposition with circular on paradoxes proofs and in explored Zeno’smathematics, Paradox. we In introduced this part we the delve idea deeperof self-reference, into the challenges the nature of of visual paradoxes and more. determining the 'truth value' of pathological self-referential statements, Self - Reference and Russell’s Paradox There is a class of paradoxes that arise from objects referring to themselves. The classic example is Epimenides Paradox (also called the Liar Paradox). Epimenides was a Cretan, who famously remarked “All Cretans are liars.” So did Epimenides tell the truth? If he did, then he must be a liar, since he is a Cretan, and so he must be lying! If he was lying, then again it is not the case that all Cretans are liars, and so Keywords: Paradox, Circular proof, Zeno's paradoxes, Russell's paradox, Epimenides liar paradox, Self-reference, Contradiction, Escher, Penrose, Jourdain's paradox, Triangle, Necker's Cube Vol. 4,4, No.No. 2,2, JulyJuly 20152015 || AtAt RightRight AnglesAngles 9 Figure 2: Rotational ambigram that reads “False” one way and “True” the other. -
Truth Is a One-Player Game: a Defense of Monaletheism and Classical Logic Benjamin Burgis University of Miami, [email protected]
University of Miami Scholarly Repository Open Access Dissertations Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2011-11-29 Truth is a One-Player Game: A Defense of Monaletheism and Classical Logic Benjamin Burgis University of Miami, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations Recommended Citation Burgis, Benjamin, "Truth is a One-Player Game: A Defense of Monaletheism and Classical Logic" (2011). Open Access Dissertations. 677. https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/677 This Open access is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Scholarly Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI TRUTH IS A ONE-PLAYER GAME: A DEFENSE OF MONALETHEISM AND CLASSICAL LOGIC By Benjamin A. Burgis A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the University of Miami in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Coral Gables, Florida December 2011 ©2011 Benjamin A. Burgis All Rights Reserved UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy TRUTH IS A ONE-PLAYER GAME: A DEFENSE OF MONALETHEISM AND CLASSICAL LOGIC Benjamin A. Burgis Approved: ________________ _________________ Otávio Bueno, Ph.D. Terri A. Scandura, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy Dean of the Graduate School ________________ _________________ Edward Erwin, Ph.D. Risto Hilpinen, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy ________________ Hartry Field, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy New York University BURGIS, BENJAMIN (Ph.D., Philosophy) Truth is a One-Player Game: A Defense of Monaletheism and (December 2011) Classical Logic Abstract of a dissertation at the University of Miami. -
Logic A-Z from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Chapter 1
Logic A-Z From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Chapter 1 Antepredicament Antepredicaments, in logic, are certain previous matters requisite to a more easy and clear apprehension of the doctrine of predicaments or categories. Such are definitions of common terms, as equivocals, univocals, etc., with divisions of things, their differences, etc. They are thus called because Aristotle treated them before the predicaments, hoping that the thread of discourse might not afterwards be interrupted. 1.1 References • This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chambers, Ephraim, ed. (1728). "*article name needed". Cyclopædia, or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (first ed.). James and John Knapton, et al. 2 Chapter 2 Apophasis Not to be confused with Apophysis (disambiguation), Apoptosis, or Apophis (disambiguation). Apophasis is a rhetorical device wherein the speaker or writer brings up a subject by either denying it, or denying that it should be brought up.*[1] Accordingly, it can be seen as a rhetorical relative of irony. Also called paralipsis (παράλειψις) – also spelled paraleipsis or paralepsis –, or occupatio,*[2]*[3]*[4]*[5] and known also as prae- teritio, preterition, antiphrasis (ἀντίφρασις), or parasiopesis (παρασιώπησις), apophasis is usually employed to make a subversive ad hominem attack, which makes it a frequently used tactic in political speeches to make an attack on one's opponent. Using apophasis in this way is often considered to be bad form. The device is typically used to distance -
A Bibliography of Recreational Mathematics, Volume 3. INSTITUTION National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, Inc., Washington, D.C
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 087 631 SE 017 302 AUTHOR Schaaf, William L. TITLE A Bibliography of Recreational Mathematics, Volume 3. INSTITUTION National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, Inc., Washington, D.C. PUB DATE 73 NOTE 187p. AVAILABLE FROM National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 1906 Association Drive, Reston, Virginia 22091 EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC Not Available from EDRS. DESCRIPTORS *Annotated Bibliographies; Classroom Games; *Games; Geometric Concepts; Instructional Materials; *Literature Guides; Literature Reviews; *Mathematical Enrichment; *Mathematics Education; Number Concepts; Probability; Reference Books ABSTRACT This book is a partially annotated bibliography of books, articles and periodicals concerned with mathematical games, puzzles, tricks, amusements, and paradoxes. Because the literature in recreational mathematics has proliferated to amazing proportions since Volume 2 of this series (ED 040 874), Volume 3 is more than just an updating of the earlier monographs. The overall organization of the book has been retained, although there has been a notable rearrangement of subtopics in the interest of economy and clarity. Major changes include (1) the addition of two new sections on classroom games and recreational activities which will be quite useful for teachers; (2)a chronological synopsis of Martin Gardner's popular column in Scientific American; and (3)a glossary of terms related to recreational mathematics. The main topic headings are: Arithmetic Recreations; Number Theory as Recreation; Geometric Recreations; Topological -
EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social
This page intentionally left blank EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES This book is an expanded and revised edition of the author’s critically acclaimed volume Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. In twenty-six succinct chapters, Jon Elster provides an account of the nature of explanation in the social sciences; an analysis of the mental states – beliefs, desires, and emotions – that are precursors to action; a systematic comparison of rational-choice models of behavior with alternative accounts; a discussion of what the social sciences may learn from neuro- science and evolutionary biology; and a review of mechanisms of social interaction ranging from strategic behavior to collective decision making. He offers an overview of key explanatory mechanisms in the social sciences, relying on hundreds of examples and drawing on a large variety of sources – psychology, behavioral economics, biology, political science, historical writings, philosophy, and fiction. In accessible and jargon-free language, Elster aims at accuracy and clarity while eschewing formal models. In a provocative conclusion, he defends the centrality of quali- tative social science in a two-front war against soft (literary) and hard (mathematical) forms of obscurantism. Jon Elster is Professor (Chaire de Rationalite´ et Sciences Sociales) at the Colle`ge de France. A Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, he is a recipient of fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation, among many others. Dr. Elster has taught at the University of Chicago and Columbia University and has held visiting professorships at many universities in the United States and Europe. -
Binding Religions
Binding religions Volume 3, Issue 3 CHELSEA WAVELENGTH 1 MESSAGE Message from the Principal and Founder Director various social affairs including many students in Chelsea and community service have helped across Nepal to achieve their goal them to understand and realize and become a good citizen. We their social responsibilities. always encourage our students Their involvement in community to blossom into a complete and service, in every respect, has good human being. amplified their overall personality Likewise, in this fast growing and growth. Our students' high-tech world, one of our involvement in social affair has student Master Himal Shrestha been recently flourished in a way represented Nepal and achieved of a profound mission; they have 1st Position in the Microsoft begun a project of establishing Office Specialist (MOS) “World libraries in different remote part Championship 2013” which was of Nepal under the campaign held in Washington DC, USA. I "Nepal Library Campaign". The also congratulate both the college project has been inaugurated and school students who won the Sudhir K. Jha with a grand ceremony amidst of the presence of various towering (MOS) “Nepal Championship I hope this new edition 2013” of Wavelenth has once again personalities in the premise of scintillated a proper creative and CIA. We firmly believe that our We are justly proud of all our literary ambience of our students. students' commitment to the students’ accomplishments! I This is pretty exciting scenario that society, in the long run, will be a hope our present students will has been helpful to spawn a proper corner stone in nation building consider following a similar path academic fervorin the institution. -
Moore's Problem and the Prediction Paradox: New Limits for Epistemology
LV :2 VI p THESiS ' r- ‘fi 4 I‘M“ ' it, ,. 3—4”- , .J. 6 .. This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Moore's Problem and the Prediction Paradox: New Limits for Epistemology presented by Roy A. Sorensen has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph . D. degree in Eggs—QM!— 5. Major professor Date 18 May 1982 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 WRE'S PROBLEM AND THE PREDICTION PARADOX: NEW LIMITS FOR EPISTEMOImY By Roy A. Sorensen A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DCXYI'OR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy 1982 ABSTRACT HERE'S PRDBLEN AND THE PREDICPICN PARAIIDX: NEW LIMITS FOR EPISTEMOLCEY By Roy A. Sorensen Ludwig Wittgenstein once exclaimed that the nost inportant philosophical discovery made by G. E. Moore was of the oddity of sentences like 'It is raining but I do not believe it'. This dissertation can be viewed as a partial vindication of Wittgenstein's enthusiasm. However, my direct target is the prediction paradox. In the first chapter, the history of the prediction paradox is covered in detail. With the help of some new variations of the prediction paradox, I then argue in Chapte II that the paradox has not yet been solved. Chapter III contains my solution to Moore's problem. My concept of an epistemic blindspot emerges from this chapter and is used to establish new kinds of limits on knowledge in Chapter IV. In the following chapter I argue that the prediction paradox is a symptom of our unfamiliarity with these limits.