-RKQ%ROHQ‡2SHUDWLRQDO$UW*RHV'LJLWDO subordinated to strategy, making any discussion “The totality of maneuvers and battles of operational art impossible without a solid on a given sector of a theater of military foundation in Russian strategic thought. operations directed toward achieving the It is often unclear as to what is meant by overall aim established as the ultimate one 7 “strategy.” In Russia, the realm of strategy in a given period of a campaign.” extends beyond military affairs. Alexander Interwar theorists were mainly concerned 6YHFKLQLQGH¿QHGVWUDWHJ\DV with the application of operational art to the unique conditions of the Soviet Union. “the art of combining preparation for war and a grouping of operations to achieve Accounting for quantitative and qualitative the aim put forth by the war for the improvements in mechanized, aerial, and armed forces. Strategy decides issues communication equipment, theorists such as associated with the employment of the 7XNKDFKHYVN\ 7ULDQGD¿OORY DQG ,VVHUVRQ armed forces and all the resources of a developed the concepts of deep battle and country for achieving ultimate war aims… deep operation. These became fundamental the strategist must take into account the components of Soviet military doctrine.8 entire rear, both his own and the enemy’s, During World War I, opposing armies often represented by the state with all its sought to suppress their opponents’ frontline economic and political capabilities.”4 defense only, this still allowed their enemy Svechin understood strategy to encompass freedom to maneuver beyond the tactical the political, economic, social and other level. The result was the rapid movement of characteristics of a state that affected its operational reserves to sectors of penetration, ability to wage war. This is similar to the preventing breakthrough beyond the tactical U.S. concept of grand strategy. The Russian level. Deep battle sought the simultaneous suppression of an enemy throughout his GH¿QLWLRQLGHQWL¿HVPDMRUQRQPLOLWDU\IDFWRUV entire operational depth, thus preventing the DVLQÀXHQFLQJWKHRSHUDWLRQVRILWVIRUFHV,Q maneuver of reserves.9 FRQWUDVW WKH 86 GH¿QLWLRQ SODFHV PLOLWDU\ strategy between the two, indirectly relating Deep battle utilized artillery, aviation and strategy and operations. Russian theorists’ paratroopers to attack the enemy up to sixty understanding of strategy guided their kilometers beyond its frontlines. The key to development of operational art. the success of deep battle was the commitment The operational level of war was not of the mobile group, which consisted of always distinct in the hierarchy of warfare. mechanized, armored and cavalry forces, into breaches in the enemy line created by Soviet 6YHFKLQ GH¿QHG RSHUDWLRQDO DUW LQ D  lecture entitled, 7KH ,QWHJUDO 8QGHUVWDQGLQJ ULÀHGLYLVLRQV5LÀHGLYLVLRQVZHUHFRPELQHG arms units as well, but were composed mostly RI 0LOLWDU\ $UW.5 Upon realizing the waning importance of the decisive battle due to the of infantry. increasing size of armies and industrialized Deep battle transitioned to deep operation rear areas, Svechin theorized a series of with the commitment of the mobile group. The military operations would instead bring task of the mobile group was the exploitation of victory in future wars. These operations were tactical success by pursuing enemy forces and to be mutually-supportive, simultaneous and destroying rear areas. Deep operations could continuous.6 push over 200 kilometers into an opponent’s The role of operational art became directing depth. A single operation concluded when the operations of large military formations, Soviet logistical limits were reached, after armies, and army groups to strategic objectives. which preparation immediately began for the next attack.10 ,Q  9DUIRORPH\HYGH¿QHG RSHUDWLRQ DUW as:

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