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FM 100-30

i FM 100-30

ii FM 100-30

iii FM 100-30

iv FM 100-30

v PREFACE

In the past, Soviet-styled armored echeloned formations were the primary threat to the (US). In response to this threat the US designed and stockpiled tactical nuclear . Today’s threats consist of regional instabilities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- tion (WMD). However, the US, as well as many other nations, actively pursues a policy of nonproliferation. Despite this, the number of nations who have, or are developing, nuclear weapons continues to grow. Therefore, the US may some day find itself confronted by an opponent who possesses nuclear weapons. Because of the continuing reduction in the size of US forces, the US could also find itself opposed by an overwhelming conventional threat. Either scenario could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the US must concern itself with countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Despite the continuing drawdown of US military forces, the current national military includes fighting and winning two near-simultaneous regional with conventional forces. Any US threat of employing nuclear weapons is to deter a potential adversary’s use of such weapons. If deterrence fails. the goal is to end hostilities on terms acceptable, at the lowest level of conflict, to the US and its allies. However, the US unilaterally reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary. Use would be restricted, of course, with tight limits on the area and time of use. This would allow the belligerent to recognize the "signal" of limited response and to react accordingly. The Army describes battlefield (BNW) in terms of being able to conduct continuous operations in a nuclear environment. The presence of any nuclear-capable system, before, during, or after nuclear-weapons employment by either friendly or enemy forces, creates a nuclear environment. The implications of their very presence creates the nuclear environment. Before 1991, the US Army had custody of tactical nuclear weapons which were to be employed, on Presidential release, by organic Army field units. In September 1991, the Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) removed the organic nuclear responsibility from the US Army. Today the Army neither has custody of nuclear weapons nor do corps and divisions employ them. The US or the US Navy are now responsible for delivery of nuclear weapons in support of Army operations. The Army retains its role in nominating nuclear targets and is also responsible for nuclear force protection. This manual establishes Army doctrine for operations in a nuclear environment and details the doctrine for integrating nuclear considerations into all other aspects of the battlefield. It also describes the Army’s role in nominating targets at corps and above levels and protecting the force from the effects of nuclear weapons detonation. Nuclear operations may occur at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of . Nuclear employment in a of operations has theater strategic, operational, and tactical results; execution has national strategic implications. The corps’ role is to function at either the tactical or operational levels of war. At the tactical level, the corps accomplishes missions as Field Manual (FM) 100-15 describes. At the operational level, when directed and augmented, the corps functions as either the Army force (ARFOR), the joint force land component command (JFLCC), or a joint task force (JTF). By viewing the corps in its many possible roles, the reader can also discern nuclear procedures for echelons above corps (EAC) and joint missions. This manual can help educate and train commanders and staffs at corps and operational levels in nuclear operations and educate and train divisions in nuclear force protection. It is used with Joint Publications (JP) 3-12.1, 3 -12.2 (SRD), or 3-12.3, and serves as the bridge between joint and vi FM 100-30

Army doctrine. It is also used with FM 25-50, which contains training doctrine for nuclear survivability. The proponent of this publication is (HQ), US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Submit changes and suggestions, on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028, to the Commanding , US Army, Combined Arms Center (CAC), ATTN: ATZL- SWW-L, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027. The reader should review the glossary to become familiar with terms and definitions used in this manual. Masculine pronouns apply to both men and women.

vii Chapter 1 TRANSITION FROM JOINT NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

THE NUCLEAR weapons into other systems to achieve the greatest operational advantage. Nuclear-weapons use will ENVIRONMENT not change warfare fundamentals. However, it will A nuclear environment exists if either adversary create conditions that could significantly affect how in a conflict possesses nuclear capabilities and if any commanders apply them. of the following elements are present: There is a capability by a belligerent to deliver LEVELS OF WAR weapons of mass destruction. The levels of war—strategic, operational, and A nuclear is in the tactical—help clarify activities by echelons within (AOR). the theater across the full range of military opera- There is a possibility of deployment or employ- tions. They provide a useful framework within ment of nuclear weapons into an AOR. which a CINC can order activities within his area of responsibility. The levels of war also help com- In a nuclear environment decisive might manders visualize a logical flow of operations, an be greatly compressed. The course of campaigns allocation of resources, and the assignment of tasks. could be radically altered or accelerated. The threat Each level of war is defined by the extent of com- of, and the lethal consequences of, nuclear-weapons mand authority, scope of perspectives, designated use can greatly influence military operations and responsibilities, and the intended outcome. increase the battlefield’s complexity. The Army, supported by joint assets, must be capable of con- At the strategic level of war, the perspectives are ducting all operations in such an environment. worldwide and long-range. At the operational level of war, military forces attain theater strategic objec- Nuclear operations fall into two basic categories: tives through designing, organizing, and conducting immediate nuclear support and preplanned nuclear campaigns and major operations. The concern at the support. Both terms define the use of nuclear weap- tactical level of war is the execution of battles and ons against hostile forces in support of friendly air, engagements. land, and naval operations (nuclear support). Should the employment of nuclear weapons become neces- The CINC normally operates at the theater stra- sary, the commander in chief (CINC) and/or joint tegic level of war. The corps commander could be forces commander, after receiving release permis- the senior Army commander subordinate to the sion from the President through the National Com- CINC. In this capacity he may operate at the opera- mand Authorities (NCA), can use either of these two tional or tactical levels. In this situation the corps forms of support—— commander may also be responsible for the nuclear target-nomination process and the nuclear, biologi- To alter the balance between firepower and ma- cal, and chemical (NBC) protection process. neuver. Concerns and views regarding nuclear employ- To affect the tempo and destructiveness of ment differ at each level of nuclear operations. operations. Battlefield nuclear operations support the opera- To respond to the enemy’s use of weapons of tional-level commander’s concept and intent. Corps mass destruction. and EAC commanders are normally responsible for nuclear target nominations. Commanders at divi- Using nuclear weapons at the proper time and sion and lower levels normally operate at the tactical place can create conditions for decisive results. level of war and are responsible for the NBC defense Commanders at corps and above integrate nuclear process.

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DETERRENCE A modern nuclear force. Although the US military force’s overriding mis- The capability and flexibility to support a spec- sion is to deter war, especially nuclear war, the intent trum of response options. behind the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative A deployable defensive system for theater (PNI) was to enhance national security through protection. arms reduction while preserving the capability to regenerate selected forces if required. Recent arms The threat of nuclear escalation is a major concern control agreements and unilateral initiatives provide in any involving the armies of for real reductions in the arsenals of nuclear powers. nuclear powers. Controlling escalation is essential However, even with the most optimistic outlook, the to limiting a rational threat’s incentive for nuclear sheer number of remaining weapons is formidable. response. Escalation control involves a careful se- An increasing number of potentially hostile states lection of options to convey to the enemy that, are developing or have the capability to develop although the US is capable of escalating operations weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the US to a higher level, it has deliberately withheld strikes. must maintain a modem, reliable, and fully capable The US views in the use of nuclear strategic deterrent as its number one defense weapons as an important way to control the escala- priority. tion of warfare. Restraint provides leverage for a Deterrence is the product of a nation’s military negotiated termination of military operations. How- capabilities and that nation’s willingness to use ever, the US cannot assume a potential enemy will those capabilities. The US’ policy is to terminate view restraint in the same way, or that he will not conflict at the lowest possible level of violence employ weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the consistent with national and allied interests. The US must be capable of deploying those forces nec- ability to conduct operational- and tactical-level essary to defeat aggression, provide coercion, and nuclear activities enhances US deterrent policy. bring the war to a speedy termination on terms favorable to the US and its allies. Commanders and The potential employment of nuclear weapons at staffs at all levels must continue to be familiar with theater level, when combined with the means and nuclear-weapons effects, the actions required to resolve to use them, makes the prospects of conflict minimize such effects, and the risks associated with more dangerous and the outcome more difficult to using nuclear weapons. predict. The US’ position is that it can achieve deterrence if any potential enemy believes the out- come of nuclear war to be so uncertain, and the THE THREAT conflict so debilitating, that he will have no incen- tive to initiate a nuclear attack. The resulting uncer- The era’s definitive threats to American tainty reduces a potential aggressor’s willingness to security were nuclear surprise attack and the possi- risk escalation by initiating conflict. ble of . The new threat is worldwide regional instability (including the possi- At the same time, a credible defensive capability, ble regional use of nuclear weapons) coupled with which would include the threat of employing nu- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. clear weapons, could bolster the resolve of allies to resist an adversary’s attempts at political coercion. Developing countries as well as regional powers For example, the US’ capability of responding to are gaining the ability to manufacture nuclear arse- biological and chemical attacks with nuclear weap- nals. The current threat from developing nations ons would likely reduce or eliminate such attacks. primarily consists of short- and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft capable of Nuclear weapons contribute to but do not by carrying nuclear weapons and other weapons of themselves ensure deterrence. To have a credible mass destruction. Other threats, such as terrorists nuclear deterrent requires a nation to have the groups, may also possess nuclear weapons. means, the ability, and the will to employ nuclear weapons. The nation must also have— A nation that has the capability of using ballistic or cruise missiles and high-speed aircraft to deliver A reliable warning system. weapons of mass destruction at extended ranges

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significantly increases those weapons’ effective- The Department of Defense’s (DOD) counterpro- ness as instruments of terror. Such capability also liferation initiative recognizes the goal of prevent- enhances the possibility of conflict escalation be- ing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction yond a hostile region’s boundaries. and their associated delivery systems. It also recog- nizes that the US must continue to expand its efforts The use of, or the threat of using, weapons of mass to protect forces, interests, and allies. The initiative destruction within a campaign or major operation has two fundamental goals: can cause large-scale shifts in objectives, phases, and courses of action (COA). Nuclear weapons To strengthen DOD’s contribution to govern- make it possible to drastically change the effective mentwide efforts to prevent, or diplomatically ratio of regional forces and equipment and to create reverse, the acquisition of weapons of mass conditions favorable to a threat’s operations. Con- destruction. sequently, if a potential adversary is not successful To protect US interests and forces (as those of its conventionally, he might consider using weapons of allies) from WMD effects by assuring that US mass destruction. forces have the equipment, doctrine, and intelli- The most accepted enemy employment method- gence needed to confront, if necessary, any future ology to destroy critical targets is surprise. A poten- opponent who possesses weapons of mass tial enemy might try to destroy massed units and all destruction. other critical targets using various nuclear-weapons The Department of Defense marshals its unique burst options (space bursts, air bursts, surface technical, military, and intelligence expertise— bursts, below-surface bursts). Such attacks might be single attacks or part of a group of massed nuclear To improve arms control compliance. strikes. Therefore, retaliation or escalation would To control exports. result in the likelihood of nuclear use against friendly forces. Or, retaliation or escalation could To inspect and monitor the movement of nuclear be used in response to an enemy’s first use of materials. weapons of mass destruction. To interdict shipments for inspection during One element of the commander’s critical infor- crises. mation requirements (CCIR) is determining if the To strengthen the norms and incentives against theater threat is capable of using weapons of mass WMD acquisition. destruction. The answer dictates future command actions. The Department of Defense’s acquisition strategy in the areas of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), operations, ac- tive defense, and passive defense address the fol- PROLIFERATION, lowing critical counterproliferation challenges: NONPROLIFERATION, AND Detecting and destroying WMD capabilities from COUNTERPROLIFERATION production through storage to deployment. Proliferation is the process by which one nation Conducting military operations in a WMD envi- after another comes into the possession of or attains ronment. the right to determine the employment of nuclear Dealing with consequences of WMD use, includ- weapons, each potentially able to launch a nuclear ing medical treatment, clean-up, and recovery. attack upon another nation. Nonproliferation efforts focus on preventing the spread of missiles and Coping with the diffusion of new . weapons of mass destruction through arms and ex- NOTE: This manual concerns the nuclear part of port controls beyond the scope of corps and EAC interest. Counterproliferation strategy focuses on weapons of mass destruction. military measures centering both on how to deter or Although nuclear weapons are an element of de- discourage as well as how to defend and attack terrence, potential regional adversaries might or against the possible use of such weapons. might not understand the deterrence value of the

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US’ nuclear weapons. If the goals of promoting 2. Train junior leaders to think and operate peace, deterring war, and resolving conflicts fail, independently. deterrence fails. Therefore, fighting and terminating hostilities become paramount. United States doc- 3. Develop small-unit cohesion. trine assumes that if the potential foe is capable of Commanders and staffs must fully understand the using weapons of mass destruction, then US forces potential of nuclear-weapons use by both an adver- must act accordingly. sary and by a US joint force. They must also have a working knowledge of— NUCLEAR FORCES Nuclear-weapons effects. Nuclear-capable forces (Navy and Air Force) are Employment doctrine. instruments of national power in regional conflicts. Survivability measures necessary to preserve They contribute to theater deterrence or provide a combat power. war-fighting option to the NCA. Medical requirements as a result of a nuclear Because the Army no longer has an organic nu- explosion. clear capability, the Navy or Air Force will provide nuclear support. The Army can now only nominate The psychological impact of nuclear warfare on nuclear targets, usually at no lower than the corps soldiers and units. - level. The normally is limited to NBC As commanders plan and fight successive battles protection activities. involving actual or possible nuclear operations, they The capability of the US to deploy nuclear forces must continually assess their soldiers’ psychologi- into a theater significantly complicates the enemy’s cal and physiological stresses. Commanders must planning process. The alert status of nuclear forces emphasize situations in training, exercises, and is a function of the world situation at any given time leadership which will help soldiers accomplish their and, thus, enhances their responsiveness. missions.

LEADERSHIP TRAINING Battlefield stress in a nuclear environment will be On a nuclear battlefield every soldier will con- higher than US forces have ever experienced. Only new and strange circumstances and be under disciplined, well-trained, and physically fit units can constant danger of attack. Nuclear weapons will function well in such an environment. Commanders quickly cause many casualties as well as interme- who understand this and who provide soldiers with diate and long-term effects. Soldiers will strong, positive leadership; good mental and physical be exposed to death and destruction of a magnitude preparation; and clear, comprehensive plans will en- far beyond imagination and may have to operate in sure soldiers are in a better position to survive and win. widely dispersed, isolated, and semiindependent groups. Everyone must understand and practice sur- Units may have to operate with reduced mutual vival and mitigation techniques. Such techniques support and fire support, with degraded electronic will give soldiers direction and confidence in a communications abilities along extended lines of confusing, frightening situation. communications (LOC), and possibly without cen- tralized control or continuous communications. The large and sudden losses that a nuclear attack Therefore, to improve (C2) will cause will shock and confuse inadequately leaders must work toward three general goals trained or psychologically unprepared . Reac- (which take on added importance in nuclear tion times will be slower, and the ability to respond operations): to leadership and the desire to perform at peak proficiency may be degraded. The violence, stress, 1. Instill an aggressiveness in their units that will and confusion can easily divert attention from bat- transcend the shock and stress of the nuclear tlefield objectives. Extraordinary discipline and environment. leadership are vital to overcoming distractions,

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maintaining the mission’s focus, and pressing the SUMMARY fight. This chapter describes the transition of joint nu- Training, the cornerstone of success, technically clear doctrine to Army-oriented nuclear doctrine. A and psychologically prepares soldiers for the nu- nuclear environment exists if either adversary in the clear environment. Successful nuclear operations conflict possesses nuclear capabilities. The levels of require expanded combat training that includes— war clarify simultaneous activities Army forces Mitigation techniques against nuclear effects. conduct in the theater. Each level supports the next higher level of war. Radiation monitoring. The overall mission of military forces is to deter Decontamination techniques. war—especially nuclear war. If deterrence fails, the Operations exploiting nuclear-weapons use. US must be capable of deploying the forces neces- sary to defeat aggression, provide cohesion, and Recovering and regrouping after an attack. bring war to a speedy termination on terms favor- Handling mass casualties. able to the US and its allies. Having to use degraded resources to accomplish The threat is worldwide regional instability (in- the mission. cluding possible use of nuclear weapons) coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- Nominating nuclear targets. tion. Proliferation occurs when nations acquire and Soldiers will fight as well or as poorly as they have the ability to use nuclear weapons against have been trained. Clear, concise policies and guide- another nation. Nonproliferation activities attempt lines provide control and direction. Commanders to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruc- must emphasize the fact that aggressive maneuver, tion. Counterproliferation centers on how to deter, even by relatively small units, will have a high defend, and attack against possible use of nuclear probability of success in the confused aftermath of weapons. a nuclear attack. In the event of either friendly or enemy nuclear- NOTE: See FM 25-50 for in-depth discussions of weapons use, commanders must provide soldiers these topics. with strong positive leadership, good mental and physical preparedness, and clear comprehensive plans. Positive leadership will ensure soldiers sur- vive and win. Training is the cornerstone for success.

1-5 Chapter 2 EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

WEAPONS EFFECTS AND THE Hills may decrease dynamic pressure and offer some local protection from flying debris. However, COMBAT ENVIRONMENT small hills or folds in the ground are considered Nuclear weapons add significantly to the physical negligible for target analysis. Wooded hills lessen and psychological environment of combat. They dynamic pressure, but do not significantly affect cause intense, violent effects which severely affect overpressure. Wooded hills will also produce sig- unit movement, employment, and protection. Com- nificant wood splintering, tree blowdown, and manders at all levels must understand the opera- forest fires. tional and tactical implications of the nuclear The reflecting nature of a surface over which a environment and its effect on operations. weapon detonates significantly influences the dis- The basic effects of a nuclear detonation are blast, tance to which blast effects extend. Smooth, reflect- thermal radiation, residual , initial ing surfaces such as ice, snow, sand, moist soil, and radiation, and (EMP). These water reflect most of the blast energy, maximizing effects can destroy or neutralize targets as well as its effects. Conversely, surfaces with thick, low, impair, through physical injury, the operational ca- combustible vegetation; dry soils with sparse vege- pability of personnel. Flash blindness, radiation tation; and desert sand minimize such effects. sickness, eardrum rupture, and second-degree burns Built-up areas do not significantly affect a blast are some of the injuries persons might experience. wave’s effects. And, even though urban structures Weather, terrain, surface conditions, and man- may provide some local shielding from flying de- made structures modify nuclear-weapons effects. bris, they can also increase pressures by channeling Also, conditions existing naturally on the battlefield a blast wave. at any given moment can enhance or mitigate such effects. Therefore, commanders must adequately Weather conditions also affect blast damage. prepare and train their units for all possibilities. Rain and fog lessen the force of the blast wave by increasing air density and moisture. These condi- NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) (for US military forces tions help dissipate the energy of the blast wave as only), JP 3-12.3, and DA Pamphlet (Pam) 50-3 for it moves through the heavier air. in-depth discussions of nuclear effects. Thermal Radiation Blast A fireball’s intense heat possesses high thermal The blast wave (static overpressure and dynamic energy that, as thermal radiation, is transmitted from pressure) from a nuclear mostly causes the point of detonation over a wide area. Thermal materiel damage. Surface and subsurface bursts radiation travels at wavelengths from ultraviolet to generally produce less air-blast damage and more infrared. The atmosphere absorbs some of the ultra- cratering. violet radiation; therefore, the prime source of ther- Most data on blast effects describe blasts as ob- mal radiation is the infrared. served on flat or gently rolling terrain. There is no quick and simple method for calculating changes in Thermal radiation can ignite materiel and cause blast pressures in hilly, mountainous, or forested serious burns. However, the effect of thermal radia- terrain. In general, compared to the same distance tion on a target is influenced by many factors, on flat terrain, pressures are greater on the forward including the state of the atmosphere and the target’s slopes of steep hills and lower on reverse slopes. thermal absorption qualities (color, thickness, con- sistency, and reflective properties). For example, Line-of-sight (LOS) shielding is not dependable; when a weapon detonates below an overcast sky, blast waves can bend or diffract around obstacles. the underside of the cloud layer acts as a reflector.

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The reflected energy is then added to that coming rainout. Residual ionizing radiation could be a lin- directly from the point of explosion. gering and widespread operational hazard. The differing levels of energy released from the Within the first minute after a nuclear-weapon various-yield weapons further complicates the use detonates, initial radiation, in the form of x-rays, of thermal effects for targeting. The level of energy gamma rays, and , is emitted. Initial radia- released is not the only effect; the rate at which it is tion travels at nearly the speed of light and can released also has impact. Smaller weapons release penetrate and damage materiel and injure personnel. thermal energy relatively quicker than larger ones. Initial radiation can help defeat the enemy, but it can Also, larger weapons generate heat more slowly, also endanger friendly forces and the local civilian taking longer to dissipate or be conducted away. population. Therefore, the total amount of thermal energy avail- able for a given type of weapon is directly propor- Denser air at sea level absorbs more initial radia- tional to its yield. tion than thinner air at higher altitudes. As the height of burst (HOB) or the temperature of the air in- Although not a basic effect, flash blindness is a creases, the air density decreases. This allows initial phenomenon that soldiers might experience from radiation to extend farther because it is less absorbed the thermal effect from a . Flash by air molecules. blindness takes two forms—dazzle and retinal burns. An important factor influencing the amount of initial radiation a target receives is shielding. For Dazzle is the most common form of flash blind- example, the surrounding ground, acting as an ab- ness. Its effect is similar to the temporary blindness sorber or shield, will sharply reduce the initial ra- that camera flash bulbs or bright car headlights at diation from surface and subsurface bursts. Terrain night cause. The difference is in intensity. Dazzle features can greatly influence initial radiation ef- effects from a flash bulb are a temporary inconven- fects. Minor irregularities, such as ditches, gullies, ience. Effects from a nuclear burst are prolonged and small folds in the ground, offer some protection. and cause far greater loss of vision. Looking directly Major terrain features, such as large hills and forests, at a burst causes severe impairment of vision for can provide significant protection for equipment and from 2 to 3 minutes by day to over 10 minutes at personnel, depending on the height of burst. night when the pupils are fully dilated. Two minutes is a long time on a battlefield and seems longer to People inside buildings, tanks, or individual fight- pilots fIying high-speed aircraft. ing positions receive lower initial radiation doses than people in the open and at the same distance The second and more serious form of flash blind- from the nuclear detonation. How much less de- ness results from retinal burns received when the pends on how much initial radiation the intervening lens of the eyes focus the image of the fireball onto material absorbs. All material absorbs some nuclear the back of the eyes. Estimates of the risk of retinal radiation. However, because of the high penetrating burns vary. Small pinpoint retinal burns may heal in power of neutrons and gamma rays, the shielding time, but greater damage is unlikely to do so and material must be quite thick to provide significant will leave a permanent blind spot in the affected eye. protection. Some sources believe that only a small percentage of troops will receive such injuries; others believe Dense materials such as armored vehicles offer this could be a more serious threat. excellent protection against gamma rays. Some readily available low-density materials offer the best protection against neutrons. Depending on its Residual Ionizing Radiation, Initial moisture content, soil may also be a good Radiation, and the Operational Exposure shield. For example, an individual fighting position Guide (OEG) with 1 meter of overhead soil protection will shield its occupant from as much as 98 percent of the Residual ionizing radiation typically occurs after . the first minute of detonation. It primarily consists of energized impurity particles and debris falling Material sufficient to protect against gamma rays back to earth because of air movement and/or also provides some protection against neutrons. As

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a general guideline, soldiers can construct shields of Electromagnetic pulse directly injures personnel minimum thickness meant to absorb both neutrons only if they are physically touching metallic collec- and gamma rays by either alternating layers of high- tors, such as cables, at the time of an EMP surge. to low-density materials or by thoroughly mixing Hazards may also exist from indirect or secondary such materials. EMP effects. For example, damaged electronic Units may encounter nuclear contamination from equipment might catch fire. Also, pilots may receive sources other than weapons detonation. Possible incorrect information from digital instruments upset sources include caused by the destruction of by EMP. Appropriate standing operating proce- an enemy’s nuclear weapons production facility, dures (SOP) help mitigate secondary effects. enemy stockpiled weapons, and nuclear energy re- Both EMP and TREE can burn out electronic actors (both friendly and enemy). components or upset system operations. Upset con- Another source of contamination would be the ditions can occur at low signal levels because per- deliberate spread of radioactive materiel over manent damage occurs when currents induced by friendly forces or terrain. A nuclear environment EMP and TREE exceed the capacity of a particular can be created without the introduction or detona- circuit within a system. Shielding sensitive electri- tion of a yield-producing weapon. Therefore, com- cal and electronic components is the best protection manders at all levels must be aware of this against burnout. For example, disconnecting an- possibility as well as the possibility of the contami- tenna cables when the equipment is not in use is a nation from non-weapons sources that could signifi- recommended mitigation technique for EMP in cantly affect operations. field operations. NOTE: See FM 3-15 and the FM 3-series manuals High-altitude nuclear bursts ionize the atmos- for a description of actions to counter these events. phere and cause serious widespread blackout of high-frequency (HF) shortwave and synchronous The operational exposure guide (OEG), ex- satellite relay communications. Blackouts can last pressed in terms of negligible or emergency risk from a few minutes to several hours. criteria, is the key to nuclear contamination avoid- ance. The OEG gives the commander a flexible In highly ionized regions caused by low-altitude system of radiation exposure control. The com- bursts, blackout interference generally decreases as mander specifies OEG for his unit’s level of radia- EMP frequency increases. (Most EMP energy is at tion. The level of exposure must be kept as low as frequencies below 100 megahertz.) Blackouts from possible. Based on the stated OEG, leaders can low air bursts are usually not significant. Dust-laden select units with low radiation exposure to perform clouds from low air bursts cause blackout effects necessary missions. lasting from a few seconds to several minutes at most, and then only when a fireball or dust cloud Establishing and using OEG procedures helps blocks transmission paths. Actual interference de- leaders successfully employ units on a radiologi- pends on how many nuclear bursts occur, the alti- cally contaminated battlefield while keeping expo- tudes at which they occur, and the areas over which sure to the minimum extent possible consistent with they occur. the mission. Ignoring exposure control would be disastrous. Units can reduce blackout by— Using wire communications systems. (However, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) a system with wires, especially long wires, is On impact with the earth’s atmosphere or with more susceptible to EMP.) solid materials, initial radiation liberates free elec- Routing radio communications through a retrans- trons. The free electrons create two additional ef- mission station or manual relay to bypass the fects: the EMP and the transient radiation effects on blackout region. electronics (TREE). The EMP can severely degrade and destroy unprotected command, control, com- Assigning alternate frequencies. (If the signal munications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) operations (SO) officer suspects that an ionized operations. region is producing interference, he tries higher

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1. Any system that employs high-speed, integrated (such as personal computers) are considered vulnerable to EMP and TREE if operated in an unshielded environment. 2. Older equipment that uses discrete components of semiconductors and transistors are less likely to be susceptible to EMP damage than state-of-the-art equipment. 3. Equipment with large collectors is more susceptible to EMP damage than equipment with smaller collectors because the EMP energy collected is a strong function of the surface area exposed to EMP. 4. Unhardened radios operating at frequencies of 100 megahertz or below, such as HF systems, have a higher probability of EMP damage than communications equipment which operates at higher frequencies. NOTE: None of these rules apply to EMP-hardened equipment. The hardness, or vulnerability level, of specific items of equipment is classified. For more information, see JP 3-12.2 (SRD).

UNIT SURVIVABILITY Survivability operations take on increased impor- tance in a nuclear environment. The destructive power of nuclear weapons requires new measures to reduce vulnerability and to increase survivability. The commander must employ appropriate collec- tive NBC protective measures given the unit’s mis- sion and the threat it faces. NOTE: See also JP 3-12.1. The commander also promotes survivability, at least to forward elements of close combat forces, by closing with the threat. Commanders should use a scheme of maneuver that contributes both to the combat objective and to survivability; for example, frequencies first. When it appears dust is the infiltrating at multiple points and conducting spoil- problem, he tries lower frequencies.) ing attacks. Figure 2-1 shows the range of vulnerability Commanders must rapidly assess nuclear effects (which varies significantly within each category) and determine appropriate actions and responses. for some common types of equipment. Communi- The immediate impact on combat power can de- cations equipment operators use the following gen- grade the forces’s ability to accomplish current and eral rules to make rough estimates of the electronic future missions. The commander must also deter- equipment’s EMP vulnerability: mine long-term effects on future operations. Con- cerns at all levels are—

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Restoration of C2, intelligence, and logistic sys- Mass Versus Dispersion tems and capabilities. Because measures that enhance survivability re- How the enemy exploits the nuclear strike. duce combat power, the commander must carefully Decontamination of personnel and equipment. manage active and passive protection measures. (Dispersion is an example of the former, camou- Combat health support (CHS) response flage of the latter.) Protective measures contribute requirements. to battlefield success, but they cannot ensure it. Massing effects on a target rather than massing Radiation exposure levels of subordinate units. forces significantly reduces the risk to the Contaminated areas. command. Craters and obstacles created by blast and radia- When a threat possesses nuclear weapons, US tion effects. forces conduct operations in anticipation of their use. The commander maintains his ability to dis- Protecting the force by adhering to OEG. perse forces as rapidly as he massed them or he will NOTE: See FM 3-4, Chapter 4, for a detailed dis- present a lucrative nuclear target. This is the mass cussion of individual protection. versus dispersion dilemma. Survivability operations, using sound active and NOTE: See FM 3-3-1 for tactics, techniques, and passive protective measures and practices, are in- procedures (TTP) on solving the mass versus dis- tended to protect friendly forces from the effects of persion dilemma. enemy weapons systems. Sound survivability prac- tices reduce a force’s vulnerability to detection, to attack (if detected), and to destruction (if attacked). Countermeasures However, measures to reduce vulnerability to one An antagonist having sophisticated intelligence form of attack may increase vulnerability to other systems is a great threat because it can— forms of attack and might detract from the overall effectiveness of the force. For example, dispersion Monitor friendly communications. may reduce vulnerability from nuclear attacks but See the battlefield from overhead. increase vulnerability to infiltration and invite de- feat in detail. Positioning (dispersion), mass versus Locate emitters and control agents deep in rear dispersion, countermeasures, and mitigation tech- areas. niques all lead to unit survivability. Countermeasures employ devices or techniques to impair the operational effectiveness of an en- Positioning (Dispersion) emy’s activities. Countermeasures might include— Positioning or dispersion can enhance survivabil- Operations security (OPSEC), which can prevent ity. However, dispersing combat units in direct pro- the enemy from obtaining information about portion to a threat’s nuclear weapons and yields is Army operations. neither possible nor desirable. The degree of disper- sion possible should be that which permits mission Deception, which can prevent the enemy from accomplishment while not subjecting the force to an obtaining unit location and activity information. unacceptable risk from attack. The difficulties with Information security, which can prevent disclo- dispersion include movement of equipment, coordi- sure of information about unit locations and ac- nation, and supportability. tivities from written, verbal, and graphic Although dispersion can enhance a unit’s sur- communications sources. vival, it can also restrict tactical flexibility and in- Physical security, which can prevent equipment hibit mobility. Dispersion reduces vulnerability, but 2 signatures, profiles, and patterns. dispersion beyond the range of effective C reduces combat power and increases the possibility of Signals security (SIGSEC), which can protect mission failure. nuclear operational information by using

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communications security (COMSEC) and elec- cluding one with residual ionizing radiation, with- tronic security (ELSEC) techniques. out losing the ability to accomplish its mission. Analysis of information gathered through intelli- The Army’s goal is for soldiers who survive gence operations to predict enemy intentions. exposure to nuclear-weapons effects to retain their mission-essential equipment in a condition which would enable them to complete their missions. Mitigation Techniques Equipment failure must not disarm soldiers who could otherwise continue their missions. Mitigation techniques are expedients the force accomplishes using only equipment and material available on the battlefield. Mitigation techniques Methods and Techniques to Enhance will not totally overcome nuclear vulnerability. Survivability However, used wisely, they can lessen the vulner- ability of personnel and equipment to nuclear-weap- Units can ensure the survivability of their equip- ons effects. Techniques may be as simple as using ment by— anchors, tiedowns, and outriggers to build shelters; using equipment at hand to dig shelters; or using Avoidance (using mobility, concealment, and de- tracked vehicles as overhead cover. Techniques ception to avoid attack). may also include wetting down or compacting de- Redundancy (proliferating so many systems or fensive positions to enhance . components on the battlefield that the loss of a Measures that provide security against detection few would not affect the mission). also often provide some protection against nuclear Reconstitution (possessing the ability to repair or attack or can minimize nuclear-weapons effects. replace equipment on the battlefield in enough One measure is terrain shielding, which minimizes time to complete the mission). the risks of detection as well as reducing the extent and severity of nuclear-weapons effects. Mitigation (employing field-expedient tech- niques which soldiers and units can readily ac- Any cover, including natural vegetation, signifi- complish using only what is available. cantly reduces thermal radiation effects and may even diminish the intensity of nuclear radiation. Hardening (designing equipment to withstand ex- Hills and folds of ground between the unit and the posure to nuclear-weapons effects). detonation can somewhat reduce nuclear effects. Natural and man-made terrain features (individual The best approach to equipment survivability is fighting positions with overhead covers or but- usually some combination of these means. The com- toned-up armored vehicles) can also modify blast mander should consider all of them. Some means waves and lessen nuclear effects. increase survivability against conventional as well as nuclear threats, Nonetheless, given the unique and often far-reaching effects of nuclear weapons, EQUIPMENT some degree of nuclear hardening is the best ap- proach in most instances. SURVIVABILITY Balanced survivability is the essence of the Equipment survivability in a nuclear environment Army’s philosophy. Survivability of mission-essen- begins with the materiel-acquisition process before tial equipment must be balanced with that of crew hostilities begin. Equipment must be able to with- survivability. It implies specific requirements to stand the initial effects of a and still make crew-served equipment or systems as surviv- accomplish its mission. able as the crew—but no more survivable than the crew—and only in environments of tactical signifi- The commander should not confuse nuclear sur- cance. vivability with NBC-contamination survivability. The latter is the capability of a system and its crew NOTE: See FM 3-3-1 for detailed TTPs for nuclear- to withstand an NBC-contaminated battlefield, in- contamination avoidance.

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ons greatly increase a force’s warfighting potential, but they can also present new operational challenges and dilemmas. Figure 2-3, page 2-8, describes how each of the basic effects of a nuclear weapon affects the four dynamics of combat power. NOTE: See FM 100-15 for an in-depth discussion on the dynamics of combat power. Possibly the greatest, and least understood, chal- lenge confronting the Army is how to accomplish the mission following nuclear-weapons use. This challenge is difficult but not impossible; the key is the quality of leadership and the capability to oper- ate in a nuclear environment. Leadership and training may prove to be the deciding factor in future conflicts. Knowledge of the special physical and psychological hazards of the nuclear battlefield, and doctrinal guidance and train- ing to counter these hazards, greatly improves the Army’s ability to operate successfully.

Nuclear Environment Arrival Times SUMMARY The commander must also be aware of the arrival Commanders and their staffs understand that, times of different nuclear effects on the battlefield. when planning operations, the use or possible use This knowledge is critical to a system’s response of nuclear weapons has specific, tangible implica- and survivability. Nuclear effects fall into three tions that go beyond the actual effects of a detona- general time frames: tion. Nuclear weapons are highly destructive and have harmful effects that other weapons do not 1. Effects which almost instantaneously arrive have. Commanders must plan for and implement after detonation. measures to mitigate such effects. 2. Effects which arrive within the first few seconds Commanders must also know how nuclear-weap- to minutes. ons effects can affect personnel, equipment, and the 3. Effects which typically take from minutes to dynamics of combat power. They must plan for and hours or even days to arrive. implement survivability measures and techniques. Their confidence and leadership may be the decid- NOTE: See Figure 2-2. ing factor in how their soldiers survive and succeed in a nuclear environment. DYNAMICS OF NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) for a more in-depth discussion of nuclear-weapons effects and re- COMBAT POWER sponses. Additional detailed, unclassified data is in DA Pam 50-3. Additional classified data is in the The dynamics of combat power—maneuver, fire- Defense Nuclear Agency Effects Manual (DNA power, protection, and leadership—are vital. Nu- EM-1) (SRD), Chapter 17, Section IV. clear-weapons use by either side adds another dimension to each of these elements. Nuclear weap-

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2-8 Chapter 3 PLANNING NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

JOINT NUCLEAR Aggressive interface between intelligence and acquisition systems, nuclear planners, operations OPERATIONS planners, and delivery systems in the joint environ- Joint and multinational operations become more ment ensure targets are struck at the decisive point risky with the threat of the enemy’s use of weapons and time. This is the essential element of successful of mass destruction. The likelihood of an enemy joint operations. Considerations for nominating nu- using weapons of mass destruction decreases as US clear weapons in a theater of operations include— and coalition forces demonstrate their ability to Enemy use of NBC weapons. defend against such effects and to react to attacks with nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear-weap- Lack of conventional of enemy ons use creates unacceptable risk to the enemy. forces. That, combined with the will to react if necessary, Survival of the force from mass attack. is the basis for US nuclear deterrent policy. Support of other strategic options. Countries that cannot protect themselves against nuclear weapons may become the primary targets The corps commander and his superiors amplify of an enemy whose aim is to disintegrate a coalition the following points when nominating nuclear force. If necessary, the US armed force reserves the weapons: right to employ all of its assets, including nuclear weapons, to support coalition needs. Therefore, nu- That the enemy has used, or there are indications clear warfare is most likely during a major regional that he will immediately use, nuclear weapons. crisis versus a lesser conflict. That the friendly force is facing overwhelming Commanders must consider the aforementioned enemy conventional forces and cannot survive possibilities in all strategic, operational, and tactical unless it uses nuclear weapons. planning. They must also evaluate— That the friendly force might require nuclear weapons to accomplish the campaign plan. The availability of joint nuclear resources. The decision to authorize nuclear-weapons em- Ways of attaining military objectives. ployment is the exclusive prerogative of the Presi- The ability to credibly threaten an enemy’s high- dent. The theater CINC requests the release of payoff targets (HPT). nuclear weapons from the NCA if he determines the situation requires their use. The NCA’s control and The risks of enemy nuclear . constraint of nuclear weapons include seven elements: Any potential change in a regional military bal- ance of power. 1. A decision to use nuclear weapons. The consequences of a nuclear-nomination 2. The number, type, and yields of weapons. denial. 3. The types of targets to be attacked. Any reduction in a threat’s ability to conduct operations or opportunities to prevent him from 4. The geographical area of employment. undertaking future military action. 5. Timing and duration of employment. The consequences of failure in the execution of a nuclear strike. 6. The level of damage to be inflicted on the enemy. The results of nuclear effects on the target. 7. Target-analysis methodology.

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All nuclear weapons are bound by the same US The highest level Army headquarters in theater is nuclear policy constraints. Moving nuclear weap- the focal point for Army nuclear-target ons from peacetime locations to a theater that does nomination. not have nuclear weapons requires NCA approval. Moving weapons within a theater is limited by Continued operations in a nuclear environment. guidance set forth in a positioning-approval Force protection, which is imperative in a nuclear document. environment; units can survive the enemy’s use A nuclear-warfare battlefield requires command- of nuclear weapons by anticipating employment. ers to conduct continuous operations before, during, or after nuclear-weapons detonation. Army nuclear operations have mostly operational and tactical im- The Deliberate-Planning Process plications; execution has strategic implications. Planning Guidance Characteristics of Army nuclear operations include— The nuclear deliberate-planning process is the series of actions planners take to develop nuclear A lack of Army organic nuclear fire support. support that sister services will provide. Planners use the Joint Operations Planning and Execution Dependence on Air Force and Navy assets to System (JOPES) in the deliberate-planning process provide nuclear support to Army operations. to develop nuclear support plans (Figure 3-1). An

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example of deliberate planning is the process the The targeting selection can come directly from commander and use when contemplating the the continental US (CONUS) based on the possible use of nuclear forces in force projection. CINC’s requirements. During the deliberate-planning process, the com- batant command staff develops the concept plan The Crisis-Action Planning Process (CONPLAN) and coordinates it with the various subordinate commands and services. When di- Nuclear planning begins during peacetime. Dur- rected, the combatant command staff develops an ing a crisis, Army commanders use the crisis-action operation plan (OPLAN). (Subordinate commands planning process to modify or expand existing plans develop and coordinate supporting OPLANs.) as needed. For the Army, the nuclear crisis-action planning process includes determining require- During the process, the staff coordinates the nu- ments and developing options for support. clear appendix of the operation annex to the OPLAN with corps and various commands. The When contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, corps, through the joint force land component com- based on threat and operational considerations, the mander (JFLCC), Army forces (ARFOR), or joint CINC decides whether the JFLCC needs nuclear task force, provides input to Appendix 1 (Nuclear) support. He then directs the appropriate air or mari- to Annex C (Operations) of the OPLAN. The joint time component commanders to develop a crisis- force maritime component commander (JFMCC) action plan. USSTRATCOM assists the CINC in and the joint force air component commander the crisis-action planning (CAP) process. He then (JFACC) also provide input to Appendix 1. The issues his OPORD. This phase is the execution- product of this coordination is the theater OPLAN. planning phase. The JFLCC and the corps develop supporting plans to enhance the nomination process NOTE: Both the CONPLAN and the OPLAN must (Figure 3-2, page 3-4). conform to current procedures. See JP 5-03.1, Vol- ume (Vol) I, for more information. Force Projection While developing the OPLAN, planners consoli- The Stages of Force Projection date nuclear requirements into a separate, stand- alone, time-phased force and deployment data Force projection operations are inherently joint (TPFDD) document. The Army and the other serv- and usually begin as a contingency operation in ices participate in this process to make sure they response to a crisis situation. Force projection has have considered all reasonable options and have met eight stages: mobilization, predeployment activi- all requirements. ties, deployment, entry operations, and postconflict operations, redeployment and re- Echelons below the CINC may or may not par- constitution, and demobilization. (See FM 100-7 ticipate in the nuclear decision-making process. and FM 100-15 for details.) When Army echelons subordinate to the CINC are involved, the procedures in this manual apply. Entry Operations Targeting There are two types of entry operations—unop- posed and opposed. Before either entry operation Within the theater, the targeting of nuclear weap- begins, the G2 determines the enemy’s WMD capa- ons may happen in one of three ways: bility. This knowledge, as well as the degree of opposition the commander can anticipate, influ- The theater CINC can conduct planning, target- ences the selection of which type of entry operation ing, and execution without consulting the subor- he will use. dinate commander. Unopposed entry operations have specific mean- The theater CINC can inform the functional com- ings to a corps that this manual does not discuss. ponent commander of what nuclear weapons are Opposed entry operations may often be the initial available and provide planning guidance for tar- phase of a campaign. Commanders make maximum get nomination. use of joint capabilities to ensure early lethality and

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force security. Opposed operations occur in one of coup de main is the preferred means of conducting three ways: raids, lodgements, or by coup de main. opposed operations. Using overwhelming combat Raids are small-scale operations and should not power against a foe means rapid mission accom- require nuclear use. plishment, fewer casualties, and minimal collateral Lodgement operations require forces to seize an damage. airhead or beachhead. The intent is to create maneu- The main objective of nominating nuclear weap- ver room and to provide for the continuous entry of ons during coup de main operations is to destroy the forces and materiel for subsequent operations. Dur- enemy’s weapons of mass destruction. Additional ing a lodgement, the commander would normally nuclear weapons are nominated against facilities nominate targets (such as enemy counterattack and major concentrations. forces or C2 facilities) based on a low minimum safe distance (MSD) corresponding to negligible risk to Nuclear-weapons use during a coup de main en- unwarned exposed personnel. Applying safety and hances strategic objectives rather than tactical ob- collateral-damage preclusion data to the operations jectives. The nuclear weapons nominated might be maps depicting the forward line of own troops further from the FLOT than in lodgement (FLOT) helps ensure troop safety. Combined with operations. the target-analysis process, the data ensure that the Stage five is the operations stage. It consists of targets which commanders nominate are truly HPTs missions that lead to or directly contribute to accom- and that the force meets troop and civilian safety plishing the CIN’s campaign objective. (See requirements. The NCA makes the political deci- Chapter 5.) sion if the loss of the lodgement is more acceptable than is the use of nuclear weapons. Stage six is war termination and postconflict op- erations. The fundamental differences between a NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) for more information potential nuclear war and previous military con- on the target-analysis process. flicts involve the speed, scope, and degree of de- struction inherent in nuclear weapons employment A coup de main, as used in this manual, is an as well as the uncertainty of negotiating opportuni- operation that capitalizes on surprise and ties and enduring control over military forces. simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. For example, a Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear coup de main combines entry and combat opera- war and how and under what conditions it is brought tions to achieve the opposed entry aspect of theater to a conclusion may be quite different from previous strategic objectives in a single major operation. The wars. The objective of termination strategy should

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be to end a conflict at the lowest level of destruction Identifies requirements, nominates targets, and possible consistent with national objectives. United employs maneuver control and fire support coor- States nuclear forces supporting command, control, dination measures (FSCM) to facilitate joint communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) operations. systems and employment planning must provide the capability to deny enemy war aims, even in a con- The JTCB— flict of indefinite duration. Reviews target information. (Each echelon of Stage seven is redeployment and reconstitution. command consolidates, evaluates, and passes up See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the nuclear aspects the chain of command proposed targets for re- of reconstitution. See FM 100-15 for a discussion view, which are subsequently forwarded for ap- of redeployment aspects. proval.) Stage eight is demobilization. In this stage NBC Deconflicts targets among members. defense units that mobilized during stage one demobilize. Develops priorities on guidance. NOTE: See FM 100-17 for a detailed discussion. Prepares target lists. Allocates resources to weight the main effort. THE CORPS AS A JOINT Synchronizes the delivery of joint fires to support TASK FORCE the OPLAN. When the corps commander is the commander of the joint task force (CJTF), he— JOINT NUCLEAR-WEAPONS Passes guidance for joint nuclear support to sub- EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT ordinate commanders. Defines and implements a methodology for joint The Planning and Execution Cycle planning. When the corps and/or EAC plan nuclear-target Prioritizes missions and targets. nomination, planners go through a joint nuclear- weapons employment support planning and execu- Allocates resources to accomplish the mission. tion process (Figure 3-3, page 3-6). A typical Through his concept of operations, specifies the scenario might be as follows: required objectives. The corps and/or EAC plan targets for nuclear- Task-organizes the joint force to accomplish the weapons nomination. mission. The US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency Establishes communications and automation ar- (USANCA) maintains nuclear employment aug- chitecture to support joint fire support activities. mentation teams (NEATs) that will deploy to Establishes constraints and conditions for nuclear augment the nuclear-weapons planning staff of employment. Army headquarters at corps or EAC during peri- ods determined by the senior Army commander. Decides whether or not to create a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and what it will in- The NEATs (one per major regional clude. contingency)— When the corps commander is not the CJTF, he— – Provide expert advice to the commander on all Nominates nuclear targets. aspects of nuclear operations. Ensures that corps representation on the JTCB – Work closely with the strategic liaison assis- (when established) is adequate to meet the needs tance team (STRATLAT) to ensure an of all subordinate corps elements. Army/joint interface in theater nuclear matters.

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– Generally deploy at approximately the same The JFLCC provides the corps with— time as STRATLAT deployment (but always — at the senior Army commander’s request). The numbers, types, and yields of nuclear weapons available for target planning and tar- – Are available at all times to assist Army plan- get nomination. ning staffs at corps level and above in nuclear — matters (including orders preparation, exercise Geographical areas for nominating targets. participation, OPLAN development, and other — Duration of employment time. staff assistance as required) at the com- mander’s request. — Types of targets to nominate. – Depend on the supported unit for logistic sup- The echelons above corps (JTF, JFLCC, AR- port, communications, and integration into the FOR) consolidates, deconflicts, and refines the unit’s reconnaissance, selection, and occupa- corps’ nomination and incorporates the desired tion of position (RSOP) plan and the unit’s target into its own plans as options, then forwards deployment plans.

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the options to the theater CINC to consider during information to the NCA (via USSTRATCOM) employment planning. for presidential approval. Each headquarters integrates nuclear options into – To provide adaptive planning and analysis ca- its OPLAN to maximize all available combat pability, as well as all other requisite ; commanders at each level merge, purge, requirements, to the theater CINC. and coordinate the options to deconflict and optimize the effects of nuclear nomination The NCA, which provides controls and con- (Figure 3-4). straints for nuclear-weapons use in theater, re- turns the approved plan to the CINC. The US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) CINC is the supporting commander to the theater The CINC passes the approved plan down to the CINC in the area of nuclear operations and pro- JFLCC and corps commander and may provide vides, at the theater CINC’s request, a them with controls and constraints for option STRATLAT— planning and target nomination. – To perform all nuclear functions for the theater The theater CINC coordinates with JFLCC head- CINC, including preparing the nuclear portion quarters for target-location refinements and to of all orders. provide information for nuclear strike warnings (STRIKWARN). – To process the nominated targets and, with the theater CINC’s approval, transmit the The air component commander (ACC) passes strike information through the battlefield coordi- nation element (BCE) to Army elements.

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The BCE, which is the Army’s coordination ele- nominations based on the campaign plan and the ment at the JFACC’s air operations center operational situation. (AOC)– The execution of a sister service nuclear mission – Monitors and analyzes the land . within each corps is based on theater guidance. Corps and JFLC commanders augment this guid- – Provides interface for exchanging current in- ance with their own planning cycle. A sample thea- telligence and operational data between air and ter nuclear-weapons nomination sequence begins at land components. corps and processes up through the chain of com- The air defense artillery (ADA) and Army air- mand to the NCA and back down to the JFACC space command and control (A2C2) sections of and/or JFMCC (Figure 3-5, page 3-9). Figures 3-6 the BCE support Army and Air Force interface as and 3-7, page 3-10, show a sample of a corps needed. 96-hour planning cycle. The NCA must approve all political decisions before this process is initiated. The airspace control authority (ACA) (normally the JFACC) ensures deconfliction of other air NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) for detailed delivery assets for the proposed nuclear strike. and weapons data. The publication also contains classified sister service systems capabilities and Air and naval delivery systems require airspace employment considerations such as accuracy data coordination to ensure control of friendly air de- and reaction times. It also provides nuclear-target- fense (AD) assets and to ensure the suppression ing guidance. Joint Publication 3-12.1 provides the of enemy air defense (SEAD) assets. advantages and disadvantages of using the various To minimize friendly casualties, all commanders weapons systems. tasked with execution planning— – Deconflict force locations. Coordination – Plan around effects on communications. Coordinating actions and responsibilities is ex- tremely important in nuclear operations. Specific – Ensure they have the means to keep all other functions and activities involve forces from two or commanders informed of unit locations. more services or two or more forces of the same The Navy amphibious liaison element (NALE) service. Therefore, coordination must begin imme- collocates with the AOC and coordinates Navy diately after mission receipt and continue through- and Marine components. out the operation. The special operations liaison element (SOLE) Coordination is essential because subordinate coordinates the other elements with the special commanders and staffs must share pertinent infor- operations forces (SOF). mation and have as much time as possible to prepare and rehearse plans. (See Chapter 4.) Units at every The special operations coordination (SOCOORD) level must have time to conduct route reconnais- clement, if they are to be affected, because of their sance, rehearsals, and multiple activities to adjust possible proximity to the desired coordination details and timing and the synchroni- (DGZ), receives advance notice of an impending zation plan accordingly. When properly done, sub- nuclear strike. ordinate commanders’ intents and concepts of Sister services (Air Force and Navy) provide the operations support and complement the higher com- delivery means and weapons systems (aircraft mander’s plan. and missiles) that support land forces during nu- clear operations. Coordination for nuclear-weapons nomination closely follows established interdiction procedures This planning cycle is continuous and dynamic. for conventional support. In multinational opera- Employment planning may change as weapons, tions, agreements may require modifications of es- threat arrays, and population centers change. For tablished US Army doctrine. In joint operations, the example, during wartime, the JFLCC and corps JFLCC and corps commander integrate nuclear- commander continue to refine and update target weapons nomination into conventional operations

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3-9 FM 100-30

without using special phases and transitions or cre- ating a signature for a threat to observe. The corps commander provides input to the CINC for any nuclear operations within his area of opera- tions. Therefore, he must be aware of all aspects of nuclear strikes within the CINC’s area of responsi- bility. Strikes require control agreements between the corps commander and the JFLCC and the JFACC. The JFACC informs the corps commander through the BCE of the timing and locations of strikes as they affect Army operations. Lateral coordination between units is as impor- tant as vertical coordination. The corps nuclear, biological, and chemical center (NBCC) transmits lateral troop-safety information to adjacent corps. If time is limited, the corps fire support cell transmits safety information to the adjacent divisions first. The NBCC then notifies the adjacent corps. Figure 3-8 depicts an example of this safety in- formation. The diagram assumes a linear battlefield and is for illustration only. It shows the X Corps passing information to the VII Corps on its left. Using the same methodology, Figure 3-9, page 3-11, depicts a noncontiguous battlefield. Both bat- tlefields would be on the nuclear overlay to the operations map. weapons employment within the contingency force’s area of operation. Coordination of fires must Contingency Operations follow established joint procedures. Contingencies require plans, rapid response, and The CJTF develops plans, including those for special procedures to ensure the safety and readi- nuclear weapons, during the early stages of hostili- ness of personnel, intelligence, and equipment. The ties. Plans must be flexible enough to support the CINC can direct a corps commander to deploy his contingency mission. However, employing nuclear forces as part of a contingency force. The corps weapons early in an operation may not be feasible, commander may then become the CJTF of the con- desirable, or necessary. As the theater matures, the tingency force. The CJTF coordinates all nuclear- CINC may time-phase nuclear weapons to arrive at

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would affect political, economic, informational, and military operations. The senior US combatant commander in a multinational command gives guidance and publishes directives on nuclear-weap- ons use by US forces in such commands. His guid- ance includes— Tasking responsibilities across countries. Resolution of conflict between multinational forces. Target selection. Despite sustained efforts in the field of arms control, there is firm evidence of a continuing, worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass de- struction and their associated means of delivery. Therefore, future world leaders must plan, conduct, and support multinational operations against a background of a continued risk of hostile forces employing such weapons. the optimum time to support combat operations or Principal factors affecting multinational opera- for deterrence. tions under a threat, or following the use of nuclear weapons, include— Regardless of the area into which the unified commander deploys a contingency force, some Intelligence. The intelligence officer makes a multinational operations are inevitable. When current, comprehensive, and accurate intelli- authorized by the NCA and/or the CINC, the CJTF gence assessment of nuclear threat in the theater advises coalition and alliance force commanders of of operations. plans to deploy nuclear weapons to the area of operations or of plans to employ them. Availability of NBC defense equipment. Com- manders must be aware of the NBC equipment available to multinational forces. MULTINATIONAL Training standards. Commanders must be aware OPERATIONS of any limitations in their forces’ training and of any experience that units have had in operating Multinational operations are operations that two under real or simulated NBC threat conditions. or more forces or agencies of two or more nations acting together conduct to accomplish a single mis- Updating threat assessments. Multinational com- sion. Existing alliances, established over a long manders constantly review the NBC threat and period of time, or ad hoc coalitions, formed as a promulgate regular, updated threat assessments rapid response to unforeseen crises, might have to so subordinate commanders can make informed undertake multinational operations to protect their decisions on the minimum protective measures common interests. Liaison officers from nuclear- needed. capable allied countries advise the commander of the joint force on their nation’s stated nuclear pol- NOTE: See also Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) icy. 35A. See JP 3-12.3 for a description of the analysis process. Standardization agreements (STANAGs) The key to successful multinational operations is and understood terms are used in multinational op- mutual trust and confidence. United States com- erations. For example, the term "nuclear safety line" manders who work with allied or coalition forces is not used in US doctrine, but may be used by a must understand how the use of nuclear weapons multinational headquarters.

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PLANNING JOINT Intent of nuclear-weapons nomination (a state- ment of the desired results). NUCLEAR OPERATIONS Synchronizing the scheme of maneuver and other At the operational level of war, the commander means of attack such as conventional fires and must consider several factors as early as possible electronic attack. when planning multinational operations. He must— Target priorities. Have a reasonable understanding of his ally and coalition forces’ equipment, doctrine, and Delivery systems, weapons, and yields available capabilities. for planning. Ensure that the force understands NCA controls Acquiring targets through all available means, and constraints and the commander’s intent for including national assets. nuclear-weapons nomination. Troop-safety limitations and civilian-preclusion Ensure that OPLANs clearly state controls and criteria. constraints. Fallout restrictions. Work closely with J3 or G3 operations personnel Collateral-damage preclusion criteria. to prevent fratricide or collateral damage. Impact of nuclear-weapons effects on future Work with other staff sections to prevent viola- operations. tion of any political or military restrictions on nuclear-weapons employment. Counterstrike targets considerations. Integrate conventional-weapons employment, in- Decision points (DPs) for recommending nuclear cluding air and naval systems and operations with targets. nuclear-weapons nomination. (Combining both STRIKWARN transmittal to friendly units. weapons types, as well as varying operational options, creates a synergistic effect.) Contingency planning. The planning process is continuous and congru- Deconfliction. ent. Planning factors include— Post-strike damage assessment requirements. The strategic situation (the ability of friendly Based on the nuclear weapons damage assess- forces to defeat targets using available conven- ment, the commander can— tional means). Continue the operation as planned. The type and extent of operations (the numbers and types of individual targets). Reallocate combat assets to continue the opera- tion. Damage-limitation measures (target vulnerabil- ity). Recommend another nuclear strike. The environmental impact (low-air burst versus Implement a contingency plan if the tactical situ- surface burst). ation dictates. Alert posturing (weapons availability either in or Determine obstacles that will affect the scheme out of the theater). of maneuver. The enemy’s ability to reconstitute or regenerate Protect the force by adhering to the operational his forces. exposure guide. Commanders may amplify or modify guidance (within NCA and/or higher headquarters guidance) Command Guidance when the evolving battlefield situation calls for a Command guidance is the focus of nuclear plan- change in plans. Nuclear-weapons use should be ning at any level. It includes- restrictive, with tight political limits so the enemy

3-12 FM 100-30

will recognize the controlled escalation "signal" and The strategic objectives. not assume that we have moved to general war. The following are considerations that accomplish this The size and structure of the theater of war. "signal": The number of forces involved. Tight limits on the area of employment. The intended purpose, not the level of command, Timing and duration of employment is short. determines whether the unit functions at the opera- A specific geographic area is selected. tional level. Armies normally design major ground operations of a subordinate campaign, while corps Complete destruction of enemy forces is not re- and divisions fight tactical battles and engagements. quired to achieve a desired objective. A corps commander might also be a joint force land Yield limitation is medium to very low. (See component commander or the commander of a joint Glossary for definitions.) tactical force. Collateral-damage constraints are stringent. Commanders of unified commands conduct thea- ter campaign planning with subordinate headquar- Targets are military. ters. The subordinate command and its staff consult Aircraft and/or missile delivery platforms are in with sister services throughout the planning process. the theater. (They are not launched from the US In turn, tactical commanders help develop the initial or from one theater to another, but from within concept of operations and subsequent campaign the theater.) plans. Subordinate commanders prepare supporting plans to meet the requirements of the theater plan. Commanders at corps and above modify plans as The Operational Level of War necessary to attain operational objectives so long as they still achieve the theater’s strategic intent. Com- At the operational level of war, joint and multina- manders of joint and combined forces develop com- tional forces within a theater of operations (TO) prehensive plans which integrate aspects of each plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major service commander’s operational plans. operations to accomplish theater strategic objec- tives. The operational-level commander focuses nu- clear-weapons planning largely on one or more of Airspace Coordination three general tasks: When a CINC requests nuclear-weapons release, 1. Facilitating maneuver. he must consider how he will manage airspace, 2. Isolating the battlefield. airspace priorities, communications instructions, and special joint airspace requirements. Since all 3. Destroying critical enemy facilities or functions. components of the joint force use the airspace above surface areas, the CINC must issue airspace control The operational level of war is the vital link measures to deconflict the space. between national- and theater-strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield. The The CINC will appoint an airspace control focus at this level is on conducting joint operations. authority, who is normally also the joint force air Joint operations include employing multiservice component commander. Use and control of airspace military forces to attain theater-strategic objectives must be coordinated with the airspace control in a theater of war. authority. Combatant commanders usually plan and execute campaigns. They have theater-strategic intents, con- Nuclear Targeting cepts, and objectives. Service or subordinate joint commanders have operational intents, concepts, and Identifying Enemy Targets objectives in support of the combatant commanders. The level of command varies with— This section supports the doctrine of counterforce targeting strategy as JP 3-12 describes. Army nu- The nature of warfare. clear targeting utilizes the targeting methodology in

3-13 FM 100-30

the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) effectiveness over nonnuclear fires. Advantages of process— using nuclear weapons vary with— To identify enemy high-value targets. The weapon type, yield, and accuracy. To determine friendly high-payoff targets. The nature and disposition of the target. To prioritize targets for attack by the most effec- The terrain and weather. tive means. The operational or tactical objectives. To nominate or deliver selected weapons. Commanders must also integrate nuclear-weapons To assess the effects of attack against surface use into conventional fires and maneuver. targets. 3 A commander would normally nominate a NOTE: The D A process is discussed in more depth weapon capable of a low air burst rather than one later in this chapter. See also FM 6-20-10. that has a surface burst. This would optimize basic The most likely enemy nuclear targets are— nuclear effects and reduce militarily significant fallout. Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities. Another consideration is the unpredictable time Troop concentrations. requirements for nomination of nuclear weapons. Command, control, communications, and intelli- Advanced planning is absolutely critical. When gence facilities. commanders nominate targets, destruction of the targets should radically alter the situation to the Logistics considerations. user’s advantage. Commanders must know the Underground facilities containing HPTs. strengths and weaknesses of each course of action in order to nominate targets which present the high- Targets which would severely impact the cam- est payoff. Therefore, it is imperative that com- paign plan. manders conduct continuous planning. Using Air defense facilities. real-time intelligence assets in determining and up- dating targets is essential. Timing and accuracy are Weapons of mass destruction. major factors in nuclear-weapons nomination Mobile land battle targets. success. At operational and tactical levels of war, com- The requirement to deconflict duplicate targeting manders use targeting methodology to identify and complicates targeting. Different forces or different prioritize targets. The CINC gives first priority to echelons within the same force may have the same operational targets. The corps translates operational needs. Therefore, synchronizing attacks between guidance into specific tactical targeting priorities. echelons is absolutely necessary. The corps commander uses his priorities to nomi- nate targets. The JFLCC nominates targets to the Troop Safety JTCB, if there is one. The corps commander must take into consideration the time it takes to process Targeting considerations must also include troop his nomination up the chain of command, over to safety such as— the sister services and their targeting process, then to final execution. (Refer to Figures 3-3, 3-5, and Collateral-damage avoidance. 3-6.) He must also plan conventional operations as Personnel safety. contingency operations. Preclusion damage avoidance. Targeting Considerations Commanders must limit nuclear strikes near friendly forces and the civilian populace. However Nuclear weapons are not equally suited for all proximity can vary according to— battlefield requirements so there is no reason to employ them if they produce only marginal gains in The protection available for friendly units.

3-14 FM 100-30

The location of the civilian populace. Before setting target priorities, operations, intel- ligence, and fire support officers conduct target- The availability of weapons yield. value analyses (TVA). They consider the— The weapons systems used. Perceived importance of the target. The deconfliction with SOF, long-range surveil- lance units (LRSU), and other friendly locations Ease and accuracy of locating targets. across the FLOT. Relative ease of destroying the targets (hardness Nuclear targets in support of maneuver units are and mobility). normally deep, but early warning and protection measures are important for all units. Normally there Probable length of time target destruction will is no requirement to warn units when the risk will disrupt a threat force. not exceed negligible levels and when insufficient time exists to warn all personnel. The initial detection and tracking of designated threat units with intelligence sensors should not Obstacles created by nuclear weapons can inhibit always be the attack trigger event. Tracking selected movement of future operations. Principal obstacles targets keeps them visible while the corps validates are tree blowdown, fires, area contamination, and them in the nomination process. rubble in built-up areas. Commanders nominating nuclear weapons must consider how such obstacles The deliver step totally depends on sister services will restrict maneuver. They must also consider the reacting to the needs of operational-level and corps degrading effects of nuclear weapons on both friendly commanders. For them to respond quickly, they and enemy communications and fire control systems. must have as much lead time as possible. Therefore, commanders must consider timing and other events while war-gaming. Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) Targeting Methodology During the assessment phase, a battle damage 3 assessment (BDA) gives the commander feedback The D A targeting methodology enables the com- on the effectiveness of the nuclear weapon. During mander and staff to take the initiative in selecting the decide step, planners determine the requirement HPTs before they actually present themselves in the for battle damage assessment for specific high-pay- target array. Each function occurs both simultane- off targets and/or counterproliferation targets. ously and sequentially. Although not a separate function, target tracking is inherent throughout the targeting process. Target tracking must be planned Defeat Criteria simultaneously with the development of the intelli- gence collection plan (decide). It is executed during No single statement of damage criteria covers the targeting function of detect and supports both all situations. The appropriate nuclear appendix to targeting functions of deliver and assess. the OPLAN includes defeat criteria for nuclear- weapons nomination. General guidelines include Decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting the following: methodology helps maximize the effectiveness of the limited number of nuclear weapons available. At lower yields, initial radiation, not blast or The decision to recommend attack of a target pro- thermal radiation, is the foremost defeat mecha- vides the focus and priorities for intelligence collec- nism for mobile land battle targets. tion and fire planning. The commander orients the attack after analyzing— The targeting officer subdivides large targets into smaller targets to reduce the size of the targeted The intelligence estimate of the situation. area. The commander’s mission analysis. The minimum safe distance for friendly units Battlefield planning (which projects future should be one of negligible risk to unwarned, operations). exposed soldiers.

3-15 FM 100-30

Collateral-Damage Prevention The enemy. The commander must always seek to avoid civil- The terrain. ian casualties from nuclear weapons in the cam- paign area. The G5 determines civilian population Nearby population characteristics. centers and produces population overlays depicting Desired target effects. their locations. The fire support element (FSE) uses preclusion overlays to minimize damage consistent Nuclear-option planning begins with mission re- with the commander’s guidance. The USANCA ceipt and includes four phases: NEAT uses these overlays during analysis. 1. Pre-wartime contingency planning that is based The commander can reduce most collateral dam- on the type of operation and constraints. age by— 2. Wartime planning that supplements peacetime Recommending a weapon that fits within collat- planning based on limiting requirements, terrain, eral-damage preclusion criteria. and actual threat intelligence. Using damage-preclusion criteria. 3. Refinements to wartime planning that meet changing situations and which update options Recommending a low air height of burst. based on the latest threat intelligence. Placing a DGZ away from the area to be pro- 4. Refinements to approved options that are based on tected. the situations just before target nomination. NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) for procedures to Planners develop each option along with the cam- calculate collateral-damage avoidance. paign plan and transmit both to higher headquarters for approval. Commanders up the chain of com- Options mand, starting with the corps, treat the option and the plan as a single entity. An option is a discrete grouping of nuclear weap- ons and is the basic element for providing nuclear To provide the control and flexibility the NCA support to the Army component. It ensures political requires and needs, commanders at strategic, opera- authorities retain control of nuclear-weapons em- tional, or tactical levels must impose a time frame ployment. on each option. The time frame must be of sufficient length to accommodate uncertainties in intelligence An option has specific yields. It is based on the and friction in battlefield conditions. Specifying a mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, and time frame helps maximize a nuclear option’s time available (METT-T); collateral-damage guid- benefits. ance; and constraints. Commanders must synchronize the necessary NOTE: See JP 3-12 and 3-12.1 for more time frame with the campaign plan. The NCA might information. constrain the time frame for options at the opera- Operational-level and corps commanders plan tional or tactical levels based on changes in the and recommend options for specific geographical strategic environment. As a result, the nomination areas, during short time periods, and for specific time for an option starts about 96 hours before purposes. However, an option’s area varies with the execution. echelon of command and its objective. At the op- During both offensive and defensive operations, erational level of war, the area of employment may each command echelon provides to their subordi- cover several corps. In a corps this may extend from nates more detailed nuclear planning guidance the corps FLOT to the limit of the area of operations. based on METT-T factors. Within the limits of this The numbers and types of weapons in an option will guidance, the operations officer and the fire support vary depending on— coordinator (FSCOORD) refine the planned option The level of command that develops it. to support the scheme of maneuver. This is not a one-step decision, but a continuous, dynamic proc- The mission. ess of adapting plans to meet operational require-

3-16 FM 100-30

ments, constraints, and option parameters to pro- Conducting intelligence preparation of the battle- vide the best effect before target nomination. field (IPB) to facilitate the targeting process. Before refinement, the nominating commander Developing the situation by determining if a must understand the intent of his next higher com- threat is nuclear-capable. mander. The commander can recommend— Developing suitable nuclear targets Updating target information. Protecting the force by disrupting a threat’s nu- Adjusting individual aiming points within the clear operations. option area. Performing the battle damage assessment. Exchanging higher yield weapons for lower yield weapons. In nuclear operations reliable and rapid collec- tion, assessment, evaluation, and dissemination of Identifying and prioritizing aiming points. target information is critical to the nomination proc- Coordinating nonnuclear fires with nuclear fires. ess. Intelligence collection— The commander nominating the option has the Identifies a threat’s intent to employ nuclear flexibility of selecting aiming points in the option weapons. area. This maximizes the effectiveness of the option and helps attain operational objectives. However, Locates his nuclear-capable delivery systems. the commander must always consider troop safety Identifies targets vulnerable to nuclear fires. in final aiming-point refinement, using updated col- lateral-damage overlays with troop-safety contours The intelligence officer uses and the nuclear-weapons template. Higher com- support measures (ESM) to determine a threat’s mands normally state collateral-damage preclusion intentions and to discover lucrative nuclear targets criteria in generalized terms and gross numbers. The for exploitation. Electronic warfare support meas- nominating commander may impose more restric- ures include search, interception, identification, and tive employment constraints. location functions.

BATTLEFIELD OPERATING Maneuver SYSTEMS (BOS) Maneuver is movement relative to the enemy to put him at a disadvantage. Commanders maneuver The basic BOS (intelligence, maneuver, fire sup- forces to create conditions for tactical and opera- port, mobility and survivability, combat service tional success. Maneuver enhances the friendly support, command and control, and air defense) are force’s ability to destroy the enemy or hinder his the same whether commanders employ nuclear movement through the direct or indirect application weapons or not. There is no doctrinal transition of lethal power or the threat thereof. Conversely, period from conventional to nuclear warfare. How- maneuvering large forces invites attack. The com- ever, commanders may have to make some changes mander must always consider this issue during op- in planning techniques and procedures to accom- erational planning. plish these functions on the nuclear battlefield. Maneuver and firepower are inseparable and complementary elements. While one might be Intelligence more important in one phase of an operation, both Intelligence operations are the organized efforts are characteristic of all operations. The com- of a commander to gather and analyze information mander combines them to maximize relative com- about the enemy’s activities. Intelligence supports bat power. Nuclear weapons greatly enhance the operations by— flexibility of maneuver. They also have the poten- tial to be the principal means of destroying a Providing early indications and warnings of a threat’s will to fight. When a commander nomi- threat’s intention to employ nuclear weapons. nates nuclear weapons, maneuver exploits their

3-17 FM 100-30

effects. The commander can also nominate nuclear active survivability measures. Chapter 2 explains weapons— this in greater detail. To support his scheme of maneuver. Corps and division commanders can anticipate To mass combat power rapidly without shifting higher losses throughout the battlefield when the maneuver forces. enemy uses nuclear weapons. Mass casualties and few available replacements will require that the To delay, disrupt, or destroy a threat’s forces in commander develop plans and procedures to depth. efficiently reconstitute combat power. This, in turn, will impact reconstitution planning. Fire Support Fire support is the integration and synchroniza- Combat Service Support (CSS) tion of fire and effects to delay, disrupt, or destroy As the scale and complexity of Army operations enemy forces, combat functions, and facilities in increase, the importance of combat service support pursuit of operational and tactical objectives. The to their success increases as well. Combat service flexibility of nuclear-weapons nomination makes it support to the nuclear battlefield includes providing possible to rapidly shift the focus and concentration support to sister services. Coordination is vital. of combat power over wide areas. Combat service support units operate at all levels of war. Chapter 6 explains this in greater detail. Operational-level and corps commanders can nominate nuclear weapons— To support their scheme of maneuver. Command and Control To mass effects rapidly without shifting maneu- Command means visualizing the current and fu- ver forces. ture states of friendly and enemy forces then formu- lating concepts of operations to accomplish the To attack a threat’s forces in depth. mission. Command occurs from wherever the com- mander is, whether at a command post (CP) or in a tank moving with the main effort. Mobility and Survivability Control monitors the status of organizational ef- Mobility operations preserve the friendly force’s fectiveness and identifies deviations from set stand- freedom of maneuver. Mobility missions include– ards and corrects them. Commanders acquire and Breaching enemy obstacles. apply means to accomplish their intents. Ultimately, commanders provide a means to measure, report, Increasing battlefield circulation. and correct performance. The corps commander Improving existing routes or building new ones. must be able to make the final decision on nomi- nated target locations before passing the informa- Providing bridge and raft supports for river crossings. tion to his higher headquarters. Identifying routes around contaminated areas. Reliable communications are central both to bat- Nuclear weapons will cause extensive damage tle command and to control. This is particularly true and may drastically alter the military aspect of when nominating nuclear weapons. Being able to terrain. Therefore, commanders must determine if quickly pass orders is critical. Therefore, command- using such weapons would create so many obstacles ers must establish methods to ensure positive that units would spend more effort breaching them command and control (such as using EMP mitigat- than would be worthwhile. ing measures, alternative nets, communications, and so on). NOTE: See DA Pam 50-3 for a detailed discussion of nuclear-weapons effects on terrain. Survivability operations protect friendly forces Air Defense from the effects of enemy weapons systems. Hard- Air defense units are particularly susceptible to ening facilities and fortifying battle positions are the effects of nuclear weapons detonations. Missiles

3-18 FM 100-30

and their associated launchers are vulnerable to accumulation should not be assigned to units whose blast and thermal radiation. Radars, control vans, members have low doses. This helps and and missile electronics are vulnerable to EMP. Re- companies retain equal radiation states. fer to Chapter 2 for survival mitigation techniques. NOTE: See also FM 100-9, FM 100-10, FM 12-6, FM 63-3, FM 100-7, and FM 100-16. RECONSTITUTION Regardless of measures taken to enhance force survivability, some close combat forces will suffer The ASCC plans and conducts operational and severe losses. The nuclear environment does not tactical reconstitution operations. Timely reconsti- allow the luxury of long personnel and materiel tution in terms of people, organizations, command pipelines and the and rehabilitation of structure, and materiel is essential to continuing the units. Therefore, at least initially, the commander mission. Reconstitution is a total process. Its major accomplishes force reorganization, reconstitution, elements are reorganization, assessment, and regen- and restoration from residual assets. eration. Weapons system replacement operations facilitate the receipt of bore-sighted equipment and qualified crews to units undergoing reorganization or regeneration. SUMMARY Reorganizationis the action the commander takes The Army’s role in planning nuclear operations to shift internal resources within a degraded unit to is the heart of Army nuclear doctrine. Planners increase its . It may include conduct the planning process of joint nuclear opera- such measures as cross-leveling equipment and per- tions in a deliberate manner, but in a crisis they may sonnel, matching operational weapons systems with undertake whatever actions are necessary. crews, or forming composite units. The latter in- The Army also participates in force-projection volves joining two units reduced in number to form operations as part of a joint force. This may include a single full-strength unit. Commanders should multinational forces as well. The corps headquarters maintain as much squad, crew, or team integrity as can also function as a joint task force headquarters. possible under the circumstances to contribute to In this role the corps takes on additional responsi- unit cohesion and to provide a base for rebuilding bilities. The corps can use the guidance in this if regeneration is required. chapter when the CINC requires target nomination. Assessment measures a unit’s capability to per- The Army at corps and above is supported by form its mission. USANCA NEAT during the planning and execu- Regeneration is incremental and involves the re- tion cycle. The CINC is supported by STRATLAT building of a unit through— from USSTRATCOM. Knowledge of their actions is important to Army planners for coordination and Replacing personnel, equipment, and supplies on interface. a large scale. (The commander can combine per- sonnel, equipment, and supplies to return the Planning nuclear operations begins with the com- degraded unit to the specified level of combat mander’s guidance and ends with nuclear targeting effectiveness.) and collateral-damage preclusion. The mechanism for articulating the nominated targets is an option. Reestablishing or replacing essential command Specific nuclear combat functions describe particu- and control. lar requirements in a nuclear environment. Conducting mission-essential training for the newly rebuilt unit. Reconstitution and reorganization of decimated units in a nuclear environment is accomplished by Commanders must consider individual RES dur- shifting elements in order to increase effectiveness. ing unit regeneration. Personnel with high dose Regeneration is the rebuilding of decimated units.

3-19 Chapter 4 COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES

RESPONSIBILITIES ing to its functional area. The following discussion lists staff elements and functions by event sequence. This chapter discusses the sequence of actions The G2 staff’s considerations include— (and the personnel responsible for those actions) that the senior Army commander conducts after Current or anticipated high-value targets, includ- receiving controls and constraints to nominate nu- ing ballistic and/or cruise missiles that have a clear targets. Because the division does not nor- variety of munitions (for example, weapons of mally nominate nuclear targets, its warfighting tasks mass destruction). are normally force protection and NBC defense from nuclear-weapons effects. Current threat antiballistic missile and/or anti- delivery systems. Procedures and actions for theater nuclear-weap- Weather data to facilitate weapons selection and ons nomination are part of the command and staff fallout prediction and to evaluate effects on future action process. The commander and his staff con- operations. sider factors and events unique to nuclear operations during the process. The NEAT from USANCA The G3 staff's considerations include— assists the Army commander. If the corps is a joint force land component command or a joint task Existing CONPLANs, OPLANs, OPORDs, and force, responsibilities expand to include joint SOPs for nuclear nomination. considerations. The initial coordination between the FSCOORD and the BCE for nuclear-weapons status. The senior Army commander’s concern is the nu- clear-nomination process and nuclear-force protec- Constraints that higher headquarters imposes on tion. The division commander’s concern is how the number and yields of nuclear weapons. enemy use of nuclear weapons will affect the divi- sion’s scheme of maneuver when executing the corps The G1 staff’s considerations include— commander’s intent and when protecting the force. Plans for handling mass casualties in the event of the enemy’s use of weapons of mass destruction. Coordinating with the medical brigade and or THE DECISION-MAKING medical group for help with planning and han- PROCESS dling contaminated patients. (See the FM 3-series manuals and FM 8-10-7 for handling biological The decision-making process includes mission and chemical casualties.) analysis; commander’s guidance; COA develop- ment, analysis, and the decision; publishing the Battlefield nuclear warfare (BNW) implications OPORD; and execution. The process is also used in on current personnel strengths. organizing nuclear operations staff procedures. The current radiation exposure states (RES) of NOTE: See Chapter 3 for a discussion of coordina- -size units. tion and execution. The G4 staff’s considerations include resupply and reconstitution requirements based on enemy Mission Analysis nuclear-weapons use. The G5 staff’s considerations include— During mission analysis each staff agency main- tains current day-to-day information necessary for Identifying population centers and preclusion preliminary nuclear-weapons considerations relat- data which would warrant preclusion from blast,

4-1 FM 100-30

radiation, and thermal effects based on higher Commander’s Guidance headquarters’ constraints. Once the commander receives or deduces his Determining the current locations of civilians in mission, he conducts mission analysis. He restates the operational area. the mission and expresses his clear intent on how to Conducting psychological operations (PSYOP) conduct the operation to support the campaign plan. and providing information to civilian popula- Once he has been directed to nominate nuclear tions. targets, he will need supplemental command guid- ance from higher headquarters. He will then pass Determining the status of noncombatants. the following elements of command guidance to his staff for conducting planning: The FSCOORD staff’s considerations include— The desired results of nuclear-weapons nomina- Conducting nuclear planning. tion. Nuclear-option planning criteria as stated from higher headquarters, plans, and SOPs. The priority and types of targets to be nominated. Integrating nuclear nomination plans with con- Identification of tactical contingencies that might ventional operational plans and the scheme of require nuclear-weapons nomination. maneuver. The desired degree of damage to enemy forces. Integrating USANCA NEAT’s analysis. Collateral-damage criteria for civilian protection. Advising on the impact of US nuclear weapons on the enemy. Restrictions on fallout from surface bursts. The NBC chemical center (NBCC) staffs con- Constraints from higher headquarters. siderations include— Other necessary constraints, such as troop safety Identifying contaminated areas. or preclusion of damage to equipment and aircraft. Assisting in nuclear planning. The commander and staff must also consider Conducting nuclear vulnerability analyses. troop safety at all times in terms of degrees of risk Maintaining the current assessment of threat ca- and vulnerability. They must consider the risks as- pability to employ weapons of mass destruction. sociated with using a lower category of protection for each situation and weigh these against the Developing a radiological monitoring and sur- achievable payoff (for example, a status of "emer- veying plan. gency risk to warned protected" instead of "negli- Predicting fallout hazards and how they might gible risk to unwarned exposed" personnel). affect operations. Advising on the impact of enemy use of nuclear Course of Action weapons on the civilian population. Development The G6 staffs considerations include— Based on guidance for nuclear planning, each staff agency conducts its own estimate in support of Advising on how EMP will affect communica- the operation. The information the staff collects is tions equipment. then used in COA development. Each staff element Advising on the availability and vulnerability of checks its data for suitability, feasibility, accept- digital equipment. ability, and distinguishability within its own area of expertise. Advising on mitigation against EMP effects. The G2 staff— Ensuring communications links are secure and operable for transmission of high-priority Identifies potential enemy nuclear targets based messages. on event templates and current intelligence.

4-2 FM 100-30

Determines an enemy’s nuclear capabilities and The FSCOORD staff— his vulnerabilities to attack by any means. Formulates nuclear options for each contingency Evaluates friendly vulnerabilities to enemy nu- the G3 identifies. clear-weapons use and how they would affect operational plans. Determines nuclear planning parameters. The G3 staff— Receives preclusion data from the G5. Integrates nuclear and conventional weapons into Develops and refines nuclear analysis based on a COA analysis. input from the USANCA NEAT and the corps Modifies target-defeat criteria based on opera- targeting officer. tional considerations. The targeting officer provides current operational Identifies NBC defense considerations. information to the USANCA NEAT. Develops nuclear-nomination decision points for The NBCC staff— both offensive and defensive operations. Prepares the NBC estimate. Determines collateral-damage criteria. Provides expert information on nuclear effects, Determines requirements for unit replacements. vulnerability analysis, and mitigation of enemy The G1 staff— use. Develops an estimate of casualties expected from Coordinates the NBC warning and reporting sys- an enemy nuclear-weapons attack. tem throughout the NBCC. Estimates the impact of mass casualties on com- Details passive measures to reduce friendly vul- bat health support and mortuary operations. The nerability. medical brigade, medical group, and command surgeon’s staff provides input to the G1 on the At this time— impact of mass casualties on combat health sup- port. Based on the information they exchange, the G1, G4, and G5 redefine their estimates. Determines the commander’s guidance for radia- tion casualties to enter medical channels. The G2 completes the intelligence estimate, in- cluding an analysis and listing of the enemy’s Identifies personnel issues with respect to nuclear current nuclear-weapons capabilities, and up- operations. dates the target-collection plan. The G4 staff specifies COAs for logistics. The G3 completes the operations estimate speci- The G5 staff— fying the desired damage and determines how nuclear-weapons effects will impact courses of Develops the civilian population center overlay. action. Develops the collateral-damage and preclusion- area overlays or lists. The FSCOORD completes his estimate and de- termines targets to be nominated (supported by a The G6 staff— targeting officer and the USANCA NEAT) after Develops an estimate of the situation for signal considering— support. – The importance of the targets in priority. Establishes requirements for voice, data, and broadcast traffic. – The safety criteria for the weapons to be nominated. Provides the concept and visualizes signal sup- port for the battlefield after the commander – The specific limiting requirements within the chooses a course of action. recommended course of action.

4-3 FM 100-30

Course of Action Compares troop-safety criteria with the OEGs of Analysis battalion task forces and other battalion-size The staff conducts a quick initial staff analysis to units. identify COAs that are infeasible or not supportable. Analyzes vulnerabilities to an enemy’s nuclear After discarding these, the staff conducts a detailed attack based on mass versus dispersion of battal- COA analysis that consists of— ion-size units. War-gaming COAs. Assesses the impact of nuclear-weapons employ- ment on an enemy’s COAs. Comparing COAs to determine which will best accomplish the mission. Compares various conventional alternatives to Presenting a recommendation to the commander. the nuclear-nomination process. Compares the effectiveness of nuclear and non- The G2 staff— nuclear weapons. Examines how nuclear weapons will influence Coordinates with other staff members to create the enemy. the decision support template (DST). Searches for indications of an enemy’s intent to War-games COAs for nuclear operations. use nuclear weapons. Advises the commander on operational aspects of Determines an enemy’s likely reaction to the reconstitution. Army’s nomination of nuclear weapons. The G1 staff— Determines damage-assessment alternatives. Assesses the potential for mass casualties. (The Analyzes any indication of an enemy’s intent to medical brigade and/or medical group and the use weapons of mass destruction against friendly command surgeon’s staff provides input to the operations. G1 on the impact of mass casualties on combat Analyzes an enemy’s probable reaction to the use health support.) of nuclear weapons against him. Reviews law-of-land-warfare considerations and Analyzes the terrain based on friendly or enemy requirements. use of nuclear weapons and on the weather and Provides personnel input to the G3’s reconstitu- how it will affect nuclear-weapons employment tion plans. or mitigation. The G4 staff— Analyzes damage assessments after nuclear detonation. Reviews the logistic implications of battlefield nuclear warfare. Prepares an assessment of the enemy’s capability to employ other weapons of mass destruction. Provides logistic input to the G3’s reconstitution plans. The G3 staff— Examines the effect of nuclear weapons on logis- Reviews and analyzes nuclear implications for tic operations for each course of action. the mission. Conducts operational analysis and risk assess- Integrates nuclear weapons into COAs. ment, determining ways to minimize loss of lo- Examines friendly nuclear capabilities and vul- gistics personnel and equipment. nerabilities. The G5 staff— Formulates troop-safety, OEG, and collateral- Determines the effects of BNW on civil-military damage factors. operations (CMO). Formulates defeat criteria. Reviews civilian casualty and collateral-damage Determines nomination decision points. parameters.

4-4 FM 100-30

Prepares the preliminary collateral-damage The situation and the course of action. overlay. The commanders’ estimate. Compares information with each of the opera- tional COAs on the locations of civilians. The G2’s and FSE’s target-value analysis. The G6 staff— The G3’s analysis of nuclear-weapons effects. Compares digital support required to support The commander’s and staffs comparison of each course of action. COAs. War-games actions when digital support is lost The decision. because of EMP effects. The statement of the commander’s intent. The FSCOORD staff— Examines nuclear-weapons effects of the THE COMMANDER’S mission. DECISION Examines the target analysis that the USANCA NEAT provides. Based on the staff’s recommendation, the com- mander decides if a situation warrants nuclear- Examines collateral-damage requirements. weapons nomination to accomplish a mission that might otherwise be infeasible. He must also deter- Examines nuclear operations and planning. mine the adverse impact on the mission by nuclear Recommends target nominations to the weapons. commander. NOTE: See Chapter 5. Recommends nuclear targets by military impor- Considerations affecting the situation and the tance and priority. course of action include— Specifics the impact of nuclear operations on fire - The area of operations (terrain and weather support COAs. effects). The targeting officer assists the USANCA NEAT The enemy’s situation (his vulnerability to US in target analysis. nuclear weapons and the assessment of his capa- The NBCC staff— bility and intent to use nuclear weapons). Prepares fallout predictions required for nuclear Readiness. (The ability of sister services to rap- nomination. idly deliver nuclear weapons and to maneuver combat power.) Provides the G3 with technical data needed to develop vulnerability of friendly forces to fallout. Vulnerability. (Friendly vulnerability to nuclear weapons is a function of time and space; the Estimates predicted fallout effects on operations commander must consider the degree of risk he in respective areas of interest. is willing to accept.) Assists the G3 in force-protection planning. Relative combat power (comparison of friendly and enemy nuclear weapons and maneuver com- Evaluates friendly decontamination capabilities. bat power). After the staffs briefing, the commander reviews Courses of action (defined in terms of what, their analyses, evaluates all estimates, and when, where, how, and why). determines how nuclear-weapons use would affect the scheme of maneuver. This course of action Reconstitution assessment of units. comparison, which leads to a staff recommendation and the commander’s decision, includes— During the commander’s estimate, the com- mander and staff war-game each COA against the The mission. selected enemy capability. The commander

4-5 FM 100-30

war-games each COA from start to finish and re- The commander’s and staffs comparison of hearses the plan. The G3 and FSCOORD update COAs weighs the advantages and disadvantages nuclear targets for nomination during this process. that emerge during the analysis. They make realistic The commander and staff must be alert for likely assessments of the risks of probable enemy reac- times and areas where the enemy might use nuclear tions during each phase of the operation. weapons. After comparing COAs, the commander deter- During , the commander and his mines which will best accomplish the mission. He staff continuously reassess the vulnerability of the announces his decision. The commander amplifies force to enemy nuclear strikes. The planner looks at his statement of intent with respect to conducting the target he presents through the eyes of an enemy operations. (It is a critical requirement that subordi- target analyst to answer such questions as— nates must operate within the intent of the senior Does my force present a target that the enemy will commander.) The commander’s statement of intent decide is worth expending a nuclear weapon to includes— destroy? The effects he desires from the nuclear weapons Does the enemy have time to locate, analyze, and he nominates (such as halting the enemy) or his attack my force? decision not to nominate nuclear weapons. Will my force move at such a high rate of speed Constraints placed on the senior Army com- that an enemy cannot attack it? mander by the operational-level commander. Will my force be so close to the enemy that he (The senior Army commander reviews the nu- will have to violate his own doctrinal constraints clear option to ensure it follows the campaign in order to strike’? plan.) What type of weapon with what yield will the Nuclear-nomination decision points. enemy use to attack my force? The commander must identify decision points as Will a nuclear-capable enemy’s use of nuclear early as possible because it is imperative that the weapons at this location restrict his maneuver? G3, G2, and FSCOORD know where such decision Will my nomination of nuclear weapons at this points might occur. They must also know the turn- location restrict my maneuver? around time for the decision process. There are two examples of discussion points in the planning se- The G2’s and FSE’s target-value analysis quence. One is at the operational level when nuclear determines– weapons would be required to ensure the success of The perceived criticality of the targets. the campaign plan. The second is at a time when the command lacks significant maneuver forces and The case of locating the targets. conventional combat power to accomplish a The relative ease of destroying the targets. mission. The relative length of time of disruption of forces The commander’s statement of intent also in- that could be expected from destroying the target. cludes— The G3’s analysis of nuclear-weapons effects Collateral-damage avoidance requirements, if includes— different from the SOP. The probable enemy reaction. Damage assessment, if different from the SOP. Critical events and how to achieve success. The number of weapons recommended to accom- Nuclear recommendation of decision points. plish the mission. The advantages and disadvantages of nuclear- A statement of the desired level of troop-safety weapons nomination. risk. If the risk is not the same as in the SOP, it Troop-safety constraints. must be so stated.

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PROCEDURES Specifies noncombatant casualty and collateral damage parameters. Plans (Orders) Preparation Identifies aspects of BNW to exploit by PSYOP. Based on the commander’s decision, each staff agency coordinates and writes its portion of the The G6 staff— OPLAN or OPORD and submits it to the com- mander for his approval. Provides the signal annex that integrates commu- nications considerations into the OPLAN. The G2 staff— Develops plans for positioning communications Integrates enemy nuclear capabilities intelli- assets. gence into the OPLAN. Identifies an enemy’s BNW capability in the enemy The FSCOORD staff— situation intelligence annex of the OPLAN. Creates and publishes nuclear support plans with Defines vulnerabilities to the enemy’s nuclear nuclear options. capability. Identifies joint service nuclear planning coordi- Defines enemy strengths against nuclear nation requirements. employment. Develops plans to prevent collateral damage. Integrates nuclear operations requirements into the OPLAN. Passes force-protection guidance to the divisions Defines the nuclear aspect of the mission and and to the analysts who determine WMD concept of operations. vulnerability. Specifies nuclear C2 requirements. The NBCC staff— Defines nuclear troop safety. Develops plans for monitoring fallout from friendly delivered nuclear weapons. Develops plans for aerial radiation survey and monitoring assessments. Initiates planning to minimize effects. The G1 staff— Advises on contaminated areas. Identifies procedures for handling BNW mass casualties. Advises on decontamination. Identifies personnel replacement and unit reconsti- Passes STRIKWARN messages to the next lower tution requirements and priorities under BNW con- echelon. ditions (assisted by the medical brigade and/or medical group and the command surgeon’s staff). Prepares fallout predictions required for nuclear nomination. Identifies alternative administrative procedures in the event of automated data processing (ADP) capability loss. Approval and Issuance of the OPLAN The G4 staff— (OPORD) Integrates logistic considerations into the The corps commander approves plans (orders) OPLAN. and the nuclear option for each contingency in the plan. The option is then transmitted through the Provides logistic input to reconstitution plans. operational-level commander to the CINC for The G5 staff— inclusion in his OPLAN. The CINC passes the option to the NCA for final approval and execution. Publishes noncombatant demographic data and The G3 is responsible for issuing the approved overlays. OPLAN (OPORD) to subordinate units.

4-7 FM 100-30

SUPERVISION Monitors the effects of nuclear weapons on the terrain and coordinates with engineers. Both the commander and his staff supervise the execution of the nuclear operation. To ensure that The G1 maintains casualty statuses, replace- options follow the intent of the nuclear portion of ments, OEG, and RES. His staff— the campaign plan, command supervision is con- Maintains BNW-related personnel operations tinuous. Command supervision also— data on information displays. Continuously assesses the situation and updates Monitors the casualty situation and coordinates the mission analysis and the concept of operations BNW-related combat health support and mortu- with respect to nuclear operations. ary operations. Assimilates nuclear nominations information and instructions from higher headquarters. The G4 maintains BNW-related logistic data on information displays. Updates nuclear guidance to commanders and staffs. The G5 maintains up-to-date information on ci- vilian locations and status. His staff— Facilitates nuclear-planning coordination. Maintains data on noncombatant information dis- Staff supervision occurs at each staff level and plays. each staff member supervises nuclear operations within his own area. The G2 maintains the status of Updates and coordinates population density in- an enemy’s nuclear systems and updates target formation with respect to collateral-damage nominations for potential inclusion in the nuclear parameters. option. He coordinates and tasks intelligence-col- lection assets to provide BDAs. His staff— The FSCOORD updates targets. His staff— Coordinates nuclear-specific intelligence-collec- Coordinates options planning efforts. tion efforts. Coordinates with the BCE and NALE to receive Develops and publishes intelligence summaries information concerning the nuclear weapons to on the enemy’s nuclear capabilities. be delivered. Provides detailed intelligence on nuclear target Coordinates with the G2 to recommend poststrike parameters. target analyses. Updates vulnerability assessments. The NBCC staff— Maintains nuclear data on intelligence overlays. Maintains records concerning the RES of units and coordinates with the G1. The G3 supervises the dissemination of strike warnings by NBC elements. His staff— Receives, collates, evaluates, prepares, and dis- tributes NBC reports. Coordinates nuclear planning. Reviews the poststrike analysis damage Assimilates and integrates all BNW data into assessment. information displays, including the radiation status, the effects of nuclear weapons on signal The signal officer advises the commander on operations, mass casualty information, reconsti- protective measures taken against EMP effects. tution efforts, and NBC reporting and dissemina- tion data. The surgeon advises the commander on the medi- cal effects of the nuclear weapons environment. He Coordinates BNW situation updates. recommends initial nuclear triage criteria. The sur- Synchronizes nuclear command and control. geon provides information to the G1 on CHS personnel requirements to maintain the support Monitors an enemy’s BNW activity. mission.

4-8 FM 100-30

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT at any time. Both the commander and the staff have responsibilities to accomplish and procedures to AND FEEDBACK follow. Their responsibilities range from target Mission accomplishment is the successful em- nomination to force protection. The framework the ployment by sister services of nuclear weapons in commander and staff use to accomplish the mission support of Army operations. It is based on command is the decision-making process. Each staff officer and staff actions leading to the nomination of has certain considerations in the initial mission targets. analysis. The commander and staff action process is con- Once the commander receives or deduces his tinuous. Based on current operations and the com- mission he conducts his mission analysis and issues mander’s intent, the commander and staff refine the his command guidance. Based on the guidance for nuclear-weapons nomination process to ensure its nuclear planning, each staff agency conducts its optimal use. The commander’s primary means of own estimate and participates in COA development. monitoring the battle is the feedback he receives After developing and analyzing each COA, the staff from forces in contact with the enemy and from identifies which to recommend to the commander. intelligence-gathering capabilities. Based on the staff’s recommendation, the com- mander decides if the situation warrants nuclear- The command and staff action sequence ensures weapons nomination. He then approves the nuclear that the commander has the necessary up-to-date option to be submitted to the CINC. information to make sound judgments on nuclear- weapons operations. The key is the feedback re- These procedures result in the preparation of ceived from the BCE for nominated targets and the plans and orders. The commander approves the NBC defense reports received from adjacent and OPLAN (OPORD) and the G3 issues the OPLAN subordinate units. (OPORD) to subordinates.

SUMMARY The Army commander must be prepared to inte- grate nuclear nominations into his planning process

4-9 Chapter 5 NUCLEAR SUPPORT TO COMBAT OPERATIONS

TENETS OF ARMY Because targets and operational or tactical consid- erations or both vary with each operation, com- OPERATIONS manders must consider nuclear-weapons operations The Army’s success depends on its ability to throughout the depth of the battlefield. operate within five fundamental tenets: initiative, Forces in immediate contact with the enemy, in agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility. (See the offense or defense, are conducting close opera- FM 100-5). In nuclear operations these tenets take tions. In corps close operations, as with other opera- on added meaning. Isolation of units, mass casual- tions, the theater CINC controls nuclear weapons. ties, and loss of C2 capabilities will necessitate Close coordination by the corps commander, with semiindependent operations and decentralized con- the CINC, is essential to ensure successful execu- trol. Therefore, unit commanders must fully under- tion. If required, the corps commander recommends stand the higher commander’s intent. a yield that fits within troop-safety criteria and nominates the target with the highest payoff. Continuing the mission under adverse circum- stances requires initiative. When units can no longer NOTE: See Chapter 3. (Although nuclear-weapons adequately perform their traditional roles, leaders use in close operations is not the norm, it cannot be must have agility; that is, they must have the ability totally ruled out.) to quickly adapt to a new situation in order to Commanders direct deep operations at all levels accomplish combat tasks without changing task with fires and maneuver against enemy forces and organization. Adding depth to a battlefield gives all functions beyond close operations. Deep operations forces the space in which to disperse. Depth enables affect the enemy through either attack or threat of forces to take actions to minimize vulnerability to attack. They expand the battlefield in space and time nuclear attack and nuclear effects. Commanders at to the full extent of friendly capabilities. Effective corps and above synchronize nuclear operations by deep operations further overall mission success and deconflicting targets, maneuver forces, and nuclear enhance force protection. weapons to prevent collateral damage (fratricide) and to enable commanders to determine, through a In a nuclear environment, a corps commander trade-off analysis, whether or not to nominate nu- nominates targets to be struck with nuclear weapons clear targets. Loss of digital communications links in support of corps deep operations according to because of EMP damage places stress on CSS units campaign plans. Doing so— and will affect their ability to provide adequate Creates a window for future offensive action. support functions. Therefore, CSS units must retain as much versatility as possible to continue the mission. Destroys, slows, or reduces reinforcing forces. Creates the time and space for maneuver against attacking echelons. AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO) Destroys high-payoff targets. Three closely related sets of activities—deep, Forces dispersal of enemy units. close, and rear operations—are characteristic of an area of operations. Commanders conduct opera- Creates obstacles which canalize, delay, and dis- tions in AOs simultaneously throughout the depth rupt enemy forces. of the battlefield and mass both effects and forces Destroys enemy staging areas. when and where necessary to accomplish the mission. A variety of systems deliver nuclear strikes in support of deep operations. Corps- and operational- United States operations must appear to the en- level commanders integrate these nuclear strikes emy to be one continuous operation against him. with other deep attacks (maneuver, fires, or both).

5-1 FM 100-30

The importance of near-real time target acquisi- tion in deep operations dominates tire planning. It calls for speed from target acquisition to target engagement. Rear operations help provide freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics, and battle com- mand. Their primary purposes are to sustain the current close, as well as deep, fights and to position the force for future operations. Therefore, com- manders operating in a nuclear environment must make every effort to reduce the effects of an en- emy’s use of nuclear weapons by implementing actions to ensure dispersal, survivability, and force protection. NOTE: See Chapter 2 for discussion of rear opera- tions mitigation techniques.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS highest priority normally are those which are most The main feature of an offensive battle is out- likely to affect the campaign’s outcome. Nuclear flanking or bypassing the defender; that is, taking weapons quickly break down enemy resistance and the initiative. Surprise, concentration, tempo, and help the attacking force achieve maximum audacity characterize offensive operations and are penetration. components of initiative. While strategic, opera- NOTE: See FM 100-15. tional, or tactical considerations may require de- fense, the defeat of an enemy force at any level may In the offense, the corps commander can nomi- require shifting to the offense. nate nuclear targets— NOTE: See Figure 5-1 to determine the effects of To create opportunities for deep attacks. nuclear weapons on the four characteristics of the To weight the main effort. offense. To destroy or neutralize supporting forces. The offense is the decisive form of war—the commander’s ultimate means of imposing his will To sustain the fight. on the enemy. Nuclear weapons can help the com- To protect exposed flanks. mander achieve his aim and can greatly enhance offensive operations. They help achieve surprise, create confusion, and enable a commander to exe- Forms of Tactical cute his attack vigorously while minimizing risks Offense elsewhere. Operational-IeveI and corps command- ers may nominate nuclear weapons to seize the The four general forms of tactical offense are initiative, maintain the momentum, attack movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pur- strengths, and destroy threats. Maneuver forces can suit. Different forms of attack (simultaneously oc- then exploit the shock the nuclear attack causes. curring throughout the operational area in closely However, a nuclear environment increases the risks aligned phases that shift back and forth) take new to attacking forces as well, and requires enhanced forms and offer increasing options for development. security and survivability projections. For example, as part of an offensive campaign, the corps might be given a mission which could require The lowest level of offensive theater nuclear integrating theater nuclear fires with maneuver to nomination occurs at the corps level. Targets of achieve success. When the corps commander rec-

5-2 FM 100-30

In a nuclear environment, as in conventional combat, the commander can achieve advantages in maneuver only through continuous planning and swift execution. The considerations of MSD, CDD, and crossing NIGA-contaminated areas dictate the placement of the DGZ. Figure 5-3 depicts various nuclear-weapons effects on the forms of maneuver.

PLANNING THE ommends nuclear weapons to support the offense, he must consider— OFFENSE Nominating the highest payoff targets. Planning for nuclear-weapons use in support of The minimum safe distance for troop safety. corps operations is continuous and congruent with all other planning; it does not depend on the quantity The least separation distance for key man-made of nuclear weapons nominated. The planning con- features. siderations are appropriate to offensive operations. The commander and his staff must consider The collateral-damage distance for the protection METT-T factors when nominating nuclear targets. of civilians. The effects of nuclear weapons on forms of tactical offense affect each differently (Figure 5-2). Mission Offensive operations normally allow subordinate commanders the greatest possible freedom. They Forms of Maneuver focus on their mission and the commander’s intent The forms of maneuver are frontal attack, pene- and make appropriate preparations for anticipated tration, envelopment, infiltration, and turning actions, including likely developments and oppor- movement. Commanders use these to orient on the tunities for nuclear-weapons use. However, when enemy, not the terrain. The commander’s concept nominating nuclear weapons, the commander as- of operations details how he will use fires to support sumes greater control over subordinate command- whatever form of maneuver he selects. ers to ensure adequate coordination.

5-3 FM 100-30

Enemy CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE Anticipating and planning against the effects of OPERATIONS enemy nuclear-weapons use against friendly forces is critical to campaign design. Commanders must The commander plans and coordinates force ask, “Does the enemy have nuclear capability?” If movement in detail to avoid confusion and delay the answer is no, the question is moot. If the answer and to gain surprise. He concentrates his forces is yes, commanders must address issues such as quickly, making maximum use of cover and con- dispersion, type, yield, delivery means, availability cealment, signal security, and deception while of weapons, doctrine, tactics, and the likelihood of avoiding or masking actions that would alert the use. enemy to the coming attack. He then conducts the attack rapidly and violently with concentrated fire- power to disrupt enemy positions and hit deep in the Troops enemy rear. Nuclear weapons can enhance and sup- The number and type of troops available could port such plans by providing— greatly affect the tactical plan. Nuclear weapons can Destructive firepower. Nuclear weapons, even rapidly and decisively enhance combat power. when limited, can help friendly forces cause great Smaller forces possessing nuclear weapons can ac- destruction of enemy positions with a minimum complish the mission of larger forces not possessing concentration of forces. nuclear weapons. The unit’s RES determines its fitness for duty. The lower the RES, the healthier Surprise. Because delivery of nuclear fires re- the soldiers. quires little visible unit preparation, surprise can be complete. However, OPSEC within the stock- NOTE: See FM 3-3-1. pile-to-target sequence is essential. Forces must avoid a great display of preparation before nu- Terrain and Weather clear strikes to prevent the loss of surprise. Terrain and weather can affect nuclear-weapons Shock. Nuclear-weapons use disorganizes, de- operations and influence offensive maneuver. For moralizes, and freezes enemy forces in place. example, tree blowdown in a heavily forested area However, these effects will only be temporary; would obstruct the forward movement of friendly exploitation must be immediate. forces. Flexibility. As maneuver forces develop the situ- Normally, tactical fallout will not be significant ation, the commander can nominate nuclear in a low air burst. However, weather conditions weapons to develop a major operation. He might could cause rainout in the area of operations. There- also substitute nuclear weapons for maneuver fore, if rain or snow falls through a nuclear cloud, forces, allowing a smaller force to succeed in its significant tactical fallout may occur. Rain and fog attack against a stronger force. can also lessen the blast wave as it travels through dense air. Obstacles. A nuclear weapon can alter terrain to create obstacles such as fallen trees, fires, craters, rubble, and radiation. This nearly instant creation Time Available of massive obstacles will allow a smaller force to succeed where a larger force might ordinarily be Offensive actions become harder to conduct required. Creation of obstacles slows and canal- when the enemy has had time to organize his de- izes and denies terrain to the fense. The friendly commander can nominate nu- threat. But, like shock and surprise, obstacles are clear weapons to effect surprise, prolong confusion, temporary. Conversely, obstacles can impede and sustain disorganization. Conversely, the nomi- forward maneuver if the commander has not con- nation process can erode friendly units’ available sidered least-separation distances. time because of the necessity of having to relay information and requests up through the chain of Nuclear weapons can provide the commander command and back down again. with a unique advantage. However, he equally

5-4 FM 100-30

realizes that the advantages of surprise and shock Commanders must consider the enemy’s poten- are fleeting and only initially effective. tial nuclear-weapons use and protect their forces accordingly. The possible use of US nuclear weap- NOTE: The trade-off matrix in Figure 5-4, page 5-6, ons can also strongly influence a commander’s al- is a decision-making tool to help commanders de- ternate plans and help strengthen the usefulness of termine whether or not to nominate nuclear weap- reserve forces. The senior Army commander can ons in the offense. nominate nuclear targets without shifting maneuver forces. Since he retains a reserve of forces to allow for flexibility in responding to an attack, using CHARACTERISTICS OF nuclear weapons in support of or in lieu of a reserve DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS provides additional combat power to enhance con- tingency plans. Nuclear weapons are significant force multipli- ers. Their primary roles are to significantly defeat Time is the basic ingredient of a successful de- enemy forces and help friendly forces seize the fense. The corps commander can integrate nuclear initiative and transition to offensive operations, as targets into the defense— previously discussed. The most effective use of To destroy assault forces and echelons before nuclear weapons in the defense is to destroy the they penetrate the main battle area (MBA). enemy’s synchronization by— To blunt or stop a penetration. Breaking the tempo of his operation. To destroy forces in a penetration. Preventing him from concentrating his strength 2 against key portions of the defense. To disrupt enemy C . Separating his forces. To destroy or disrupt enemy logistic support for- mations. Attacking and neutralizing his artillery. To protect forces during counterattacks Interdicting routes and disrupting or destroying critical deep facilities. To create opportunities for offensive actions. Interrupting his fire support, logistic support, or The corps’ defensive pattern depends on C 2. METT-T. There are two defense patterns–-mobile defense and area defense. Regardless of which de- The defender can nominate nuclear weapons to fense a commander chooses, he uses nuclear-option enhance combat power and to reduce his risks in methodology to nominate nuclear targets. sectors which require economy of force operations. In addition, the threat of or actual use of nuclear weapons puts amassed enemy attacking force at risk Mobile Defense and presents him with a dilemma. For example, the Mobile defense is the defense of an area or posi- purpose of corps and JFLCC-nominated nuclear- tion in which maneuver is used with organization of weapons use would be to disrupt an enemy’s con- fires and utilization of terrain to seize the initiative centration and flexibility. (Whether nuclear from the enemy. That is, it orients on the enemy weapons are nominated or not, the possibility of (either his defeat or his destruction) by employing their use will significantly influence how the enemy a combination of fire and maneuver, offense, de- operates.) As enemy units advance toward the fense, and delay tactics. Characteristics of mobile FLOT, they become committed to specific attack defense are that it— avenues, leaving fewer maneuver alternatives. The threat of nuclear-weapons use can force an aggres- Orients on the enemy’s defeat or destruction. sor to stay dispersed, inviting defeat in detail (that Requires allocation of the minimum force to the is, units can engage these smaller individual units defense. by conventional means nearer the FLOT). When used in this way, threatening to use nuclear weapons Requires maximum combat power to the mobile becomes a deterrent. striking force (MSF).

5-5 FM 100-30

Strikes at the decisive moment. the striking force and on the location of nuclear DGZs. In addition, the strking force may have to Occurs simultaneously throughout the depth of cross areas contaminated by fallout and initial radia- the battlefield. tion. (See FM 3-3- 1.) The commander uses the Uses lethal and nonlethal systems. trade-off matrix in Figure 5-4 to recommend the final delivery time. Requires greater mobility than the enemy’s. NOTE: The trade-off matrix is a decision-making Requires considerable depth of terrain. tool to help commanders determine GO or NO-GO when nominating targets in either mobile or area Trades terrain for maximum effect in order to defense. overextend the enemy that the striking force is to attack. Sets up large-scale counterattacks. Area Defense In a mobile defense, timing the execution of nu- clear weapons by EAC and the execution of the Commanders conduct area defense to deny the striking force is critical. Nuclear weapons can sig- enemy access to designated terrain or facilities for nificantly offset the size of the striking force if a specified time. Commanders, seeking to destroy nuclear weapons are employed on the enemy just enemy forces with interlocking fires, organize an before the mobile striking force crosses the line of area defense around a static framework that defen- departure (LD). Specific C2 techniques (such as sive positions (forward and/or in depth) provide. In graphically depicting the minimum-safe distance some cases an area defense can be part of a larger (MSD), the least-separation distance (LSD), and the mobile defense. Commanders employ local coun- collateral-damage distance (CDD) on the opera- terattacks against enemy units penetrating between tions overlay) can deconflict planned movements of defensive positions.

5-6 FM 100-30

The depth of the defense varies according to the Enemy situation. Commanders position their forces on suitable terrain with specific orientation and direc- The commander must determine if the enemy tion of fire or in sectors. Positioning of nuclear does or does not have nuclear capability. Because targets allows the commander to deploy his forces of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this deter- in greater depth and compels the enemy to retard mination becomes increasingly critical to all com- mass to achieve a penetration. After an enemy at- manders. When planning the defense, the tack, defending forces can use mobility to exploit commander analyzes the enemy’s doctrine, equip- the effects of nuclear weapons on the enemy to seize ment, recent or past tendencies, intent, and probable the initiative and transition to the defense. COAs. From this information he determines critical points in time and space for enemy and friendly vulnerabilities during the battle. PLANNING THE The foundation of a defensive plan is locating, DEFENSE containing, and defeating the enemy’s main and sup- porting efforts. In particular, commanders must antici- pate the enemy’s use of indirect approaches and his Planning the defense begins when commanders ability to project combat power into the rear area by receive a mission or perceive a requirement to de- long-range fires, infiltration, air mobility, unconven- fend. The results of the defense should satisfy the tional warfare, and WMD, especially nuclear weap- intent of the next two higher commanders and set ons. Based on this anticipation, the force can employ the terms for future operations. The planning proc- mitigation techniques to enhance survivability. ess begins while the target is still deep.

Commanders may need to modify original plans Troops as the situation changes. Therefore, tactical forma- tions must be able to modify their direction of When assigning missions during planning, com- movement or reorient defenses during operations. manders should consider their forces’ composition, the level of teamwork, the state of training, and their The defense, no less than the offense, should leaders’ experience. The mobility, protection, mo- achieve surprise. Commanders must consider rale, and training of troops determine to some extent METT-T factors when conducting their estimates how they will perform. of how to meet mission requirements. On the nuclear battlefield, corps and lower com- manders must also consider subordinate units’ RES Mission levels when determining which units will be avail- able for defense operations. Commanders must also The mission is the first consideration in planning consider troop-safety levels for defending units and the defense. Is the mission an area or a mobile troop-safety criteria for forces left in place. defense? If it is an area defense, nuclear weapons can help attrit and defeat the enemy’s main effort. If it is a mobile defense, nuclear weapons can en- Terrain and Weather hance the striking force’s combat power. The defender must decide where he can best stop the enemy, then plan accordingly. Studying the The commander must make his intent clear as to terrain the enemy must traverse gives valuable in- the type of defense he will conduct and for the formation and may decisively influence the posi- nuclear targets he plans to nominate. He must make tioning of defense forces. The defending force must his intent known as early as possible in order to exploit any aspect of terrain that would impair en- integrate nuclear nominations into either defense. emy momentum or make it difficult for him to Nuclear-weapons use would stop the momentum of achieve mass or to conduct maneuver. the attacker or shock and confuse him, making him susceptible to an attack by the reserve. Defenders can use the effects of nuclear weapons to take advantage of the terrain-tree blowdown, NOTE: See also Chapter 4. rubble, and fires. Such obstacles, when combined

5-7 FM 100-30

with poor weather, can isolate the battlefield or slow The corps commander normally nominates nu- or canalize enemy movement or protect friendly clear targets in deep-operations areas and as excep- positions and maneuver. tions in close operations. The results of rear operations must ensure the corps’ freedom of action. Terrain effects can also complicate exploitation The corps reserve operates in both area and mobile of a counterattack by reserve forces. The defender defenses. can modify terrain to provide protection from nu- clear-weapons effects to his advantage. For exam- ple, a fortifying rear-slope position of - or Deep Operations platoon-size units can mitigate initial nuclear-weap- ons effects. Deep operations— Weather and visibility affect how a defender or- Can disrupt the enemy’s preparation and move- ganizes his forces on the terrain. Commanders must ment. anticipate and plan for the impact of adverse weather or limited visibility on weapons systems Destroy high-payoff targets. and optical devices. However, a defensive plan that Inhibit or deny vital enemy operating systems succeeds in clear conditions may be less effective 2 in periods of bad weather. Contingencies to the (C , logistics, air defense). basic plan should address necessary modifications Create windows of opportunity for future ma- to the defense during periods of reduced visibility. neuver operations. NOTE: See also Chapter 2. The commander can nominate nuclear targets to achieve these ends, concentrating on destroying, delaying, and disrupting high-payoff targets. Time Available Massed units, headquarters, and logistics areas are The amount of time to allot for preparation is lucrative enemy targets. Corps commanders may crucial. The defense is far more effective when time include transportation networks and LOCs as high- is available to conduct necessary planning. Small payoff targets because their destruction would slow units train to defend with minimal preparation; how- the forward movement of armored forces. ever, strong defenses take time to organize and prepare. For example, the CINC and the opera- The corps fights the while it tional-level commander must provide enough time monitors and supports the corps’ close operation. to the corps commander for proper preparation. The division’s deep and close operations consti- Tactical commanders must have enough time to tute the corps’ close operation. The deep opera- prepare defensive plans. Corps commanders must tion isolates the battlefield and allows the corps have time to conduct the decision-making process to deal with a larger force than if nuclear weapons to nominate targets. were not used. Lack of time may compel commanders to main- tain a larger than normal reserve force or to accept Close Operations greater risks than usual. They must avoid this. They and their battle staffs should take advantage of all The corps commander positions forces in the available time in preparing the defense. MBA to control or repel penetration. The most demanding missions will be against enemy units close to US ground forces because those missions require effective strikes against mobile targets with- CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE out causing nuclear-induced friendly casualties. OPERATIONS The ability to deliver nuclear weapons close to the FLOT contributes to— Commanders should use all available combat power in a unified and synchronized plan for con- The deterrence of nuclear strikes against US and ducting defensive operations. The plan should also allied ground forces because of the assured capa- include nuclear planning considerations. bilities to answer in kind.

5-8 FM 100-30

Creating a nuclear shield for US and/or allied SUMMARY theater buildup. A hedge against conventional failure. The tenents of Army operations, combined with the activities in the area of operations, express Commanders must anticipate the need to nomi- where nuclear support applies to combat operations nate nuclear weapons no less than 96 hours away in both the offense and the defense. The nomination from the delivery time. The overriding factor will of nuclear weapons enhances the characteristics of be troop safety and preclusion of collateral damage. offensive weapons. Weapons effects influence the Therefore, nuclear weapons delivered in the close various characteristics of the offense. In the forms battle, by necessity, will be in the lower yield of tactical offense, the probability of the nomination spectrum. Weapons with low circular-error prob- of nuclear weapons ranges from very low to high. abilities (CEPs) ensure higher accuracy. The discussion also includes nuclear-weapons ef- fects on forms of maneuver. Such effects range from fixing the defender during an envelopment to having Rear Operations little to no applicability during infiltration. The corps commander must plan rear operations Nuclear characteristics of defensive operations to retain freedom of action and to sustain the force. focus on target nomination against attacking enemy Unit and individual nuclear mitigation techniques forces and compare application of nuclear weapons help maintain this freedom of action. in both the mobile and the area defense. Planning NOTE: See FM 100-15 for more information on for either defense must include consideration of rear operations. METT-T factors. Planners can use a trade-off ma- trix to determine the feasibility of nominating nu- clear targets when compared to the basic effects Reserve Operations such weapons emit. This process leads to how the Nuclear weapons can greatly enhance the flexi- force will conduct defensive operations. This chap- bility of reserve units for both mobile and area ter discusses them in terms of deep, close, and rear defenses. The commander can use the reserves to— as well as reserve operations. Exploit vulnerabilities to counterattack. The threat tying the defense discussion together is the nomination of nuclear targets. The objective Create opportunities for a counterattack. of defensive operations is to defend only until the Destroy isolated threat forces. defending force has gained sufficient strength be- fore it attacks. Prevent enemy counterattacks against his flanks. This chapter also discusses planning for offensive At the corps level and above, small counterattack- operations in terms of METT-T factors. Finally, the ing forces supported by nuclear weapons can trade-off matrix is used to determine the feasibility achieve the results of a much larger conventional of conducting offensive operations. force. This leads to a transition to conduct offensive operations.

5-9 Chapter 6 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT

THE COMBAT SERVICE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SUPPORT PROCESS OPERATIONS Combat service support is the essential capabili- The destructiveness of nuclear weapons will ties, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to place an extremely high value on CSS operations. sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at Consequently, successful CSS operations must be all levels of war. It includes the functional areas of effective and efficient. There are five characteristics supply, transportation, maintenance, combat health of effective, efficient CSS operations: anticipation, support, personnel, support, and field services. integration, continuity, responsiveness, and In a nuclear environment large CSS facilities (less improvisation. medical facilities) and activities are prime targets. Therefore, CSS commanders must integrate protec- Anticipation tive measures and procedures into daily operations to ensure CSS functions will continue. To maintain Anticipation means developing versatile and mo- combat capability, commanders must sustain their bile CSS capabilities that can accommodate events forces with self-sufficient and well-trained CSS in a nuclear environment. Combat service support units. planners must consider the impact of nuclear-weap- ons use by either enemy or friendly forces. With the dramatic changes nuclear warfare will cause, the CSS process will become more difficult Protective measures and procedures to mitigate to execute and even more critical to mission accom- nuclear-weapons effects must be a routine part of plishment. In a nuclear environment— operations. Even though the other effects of a nu- clear detonation may not affect CSS logistic units, Combat service support techniques and proce- EMP effects could destroy digital and communica- dures will require changes. tions equipment. Combat service support com- The depth of the operational area will increase. manders must ensure their units are well-trained and know how to protect themselves and their equip- The CSS system will become more widely dis- ment. persed, forcing support units farther away from supported units. Lines of communications will become long and Integration erratic. Tactical and operational success depends on fully Equipment and supply stockpiles will have to be integrated support. However, integrating CSS ac- smaller and more widely dispersed. tivities will be more difficult after nuclear-weapons use by either enemy or friendly forces because— Digital and communications equipment used for managing CSS functions will be vulnerable to The tempo of battle will increase. EMP effects. Response times may be shorter. Training of CSS personnel will need to include Support requirements may be greater. how to construct overhead cover and how to monitor, decontaminate, and coordinate obstacle There will be greater than normal losses of per- clearance. sonnel and equipment. NOTE: See FM 3-3 and FM 3-3-1 for specific Distances will be greater because of the disper- techniques. sion of the force.

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Continuity changing situations. Combat service support per- sonnel must be able to react to emergencies, impro- Continuity of support is the lifeblood of combat vising if necessary to continue operations. operations. Forces on the battlefield require con- tinuous CSS to sustain fighting strength and agility. Improvisation methods and supply sources can help maintain CSS continuity when standard proce- To maintain continuous operations in a nuclear dures fail. For example, planners and operators may environment, CSS units must avoid radiological have to improve a support system after it has been contamination, increase their mobility with more disrupted by an enemy nuclear detonation. How transportation, and mitigate initial and residual ra- well they react to such a challenge will be key to the diation effects. Mitigation techniques include force’s survival. using— Unit dispersion consistent with operational re- quirements to increase nuclear survivability. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Overhead shelter, shielding materials, nuclear- FUNCTIONS hardened materials and shelters, and protective covers to lessen initial and residual radiation effects. Personnel Support Nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance The systems of personnel readiness management, assets. casualty management, replacement management, and personnel accounting and strength reporting Adequate decontamination capabilities. meet Army personnel requirements from mobiliza- NOTE: Contaminated units must faithfully follow tion and deployment through redeployment and decontamination procedures to ensure the maxi- demobilization. mum effectiveness of available assets. See also Personnel readiness managers prepare requisi- FM 3-5 and FM 3-100. tions in advance of hostilities based on projected losses linked to the command’s vulnerability analy- sis. The commander updates battlefield require- Responsiveness ments and casualty reports during hostilities. The CSS system must rapidly react to crises. As a rule, CSS commanders and staffs tailor and adapt Casualty operations managers require increased units to fit mission requirements, often on short support to be able to accurately report the large notice. The CSS response requires units to reestab- numbers of immediate casualties nuclear weapons lish an uninterrupted support system or redirect an will cause and the increased casualties that will entire operational effort as a result of enemy WMD occur from intermediate and long-term radiation use. Combat and combat support (CS) units that effects. There will be extremely high losses of man- perform high-priority missions receive priority CSS power and materiel; rapid replacement will be support. essential. Critical supplies will be temporarily prestocked Replacement management provides replacement near points of anticipated consumption to aid ongo- personnel (individuals, crews, and teams) based on ing operations. However, planners must emphasize existing and projected losses. The theater replace- the need to reduce excessive buildup of stocks in ment system must be responsive to the Army service areas subject to nuclear attack. When possible, re- component commander’s (ASCC) priorities in or- supply operations should occur at night. der to provide replacements for soldiers most se- verely disabled by nuclear effects. To sustain the force, CSS planners must carefully Improvisation coordinate with maneuver and fire support planners Improvisation is the talent to make, invent, ar- to locate, prestock, and stage supplies and equip- range, or fabricate what is needed out of what is at ment well forward. They must be prepared to relo- hand. Successful logistic operations adapt to cate unused supplies and support, or if this is not

6-2 FM 100-30

possible, destroy them (except medical supplies) to wide discretionary authority to repair, cannibalize, prevent their capture. It is vital to return critical evacuate, or destroy unserviceable equipment. equipment to units as rapidly as possible. Performing maintenance in a contaminated envi- When the commander decentralizes tactical units, ronment requires balancing several conflicting re- CSS units must also assume dispersed, decentral- quirements. The prime objective will be to rapidly ized, and possibly forward positions to increase return equipment to the user in a mission-capable their capability to support the force. However, this condition. decentralization must be balanced with the ability to provide responsive, uninterrupted support to the The commander issues guidance as to whether to force. repair or abandon damaged equipment or to recover and evacuate it to an uncontaminated area. He bases Class VI, personal demand items, are normally his guidance on— sold through the exchange system. Combat service support units issue only essential Class VI items The tactical situation. along with Class I supplies in an active nuclear How critical the equipment is. environment. The type and extent of contamination. Maintenance The time and resources available. Maximizing equipment availability is a necessity Maintenance units in contaminated areas use col- in supporting a force-projection army. The differ- lective protection shelters and existing fixed facili- ence between success and failure may be in— ties to provide as much protection as possible for critical personnel and work areas. As soon as the Having sound maintenance practices in all units. tactical situation permits, units decontaminate inop- Positioning maintenance capabilities forward. erable equipment before it is recovered or evacuated to the support maintenance unit. If units cannot Ensuring that units well-understand priorities for determine the degree of contamination, they mark recovery and repair. the materiel using appropriate NBC markers. Having quickly accessible repair parts. To operate in the same environment as combat Overcoming the absence of repair parts normally elements, maintenance elements in the forward requisitioned from CONUS depots via digital combat area use maintenance element vehicles communications. whose mobility, protection, survivability, and com- munications are compatible with those of the sup- The commander may restrict maintenance sup- ported force. Maintenance units are to salvage only port to emergency or short-term repairs because of critical items in short supply. Upon command ap- the high volume of vehicles a nuclear detonation proval, they might possibly need to salvage critical would damage. When battle conditions permit, contaminated items in order to return major weap- maintenance support teams (MST) can perform ons systems to operation. more thorough on-site maintenance. Decontamina- tion teams must assist MSTs before repair. The Class IX, repair parts and components, includes MST’s performance will be degraded and repair kits and assemblies and items required for mainte- times may increase when performing maintenance nance support of all equipment. Units store and on contaminated vehicles. transport Class IX repair parts in specially designed transporters for ease of movement and to reduce In the initial stages of nuclear conflict, maneuver exposure to contamination. Combat service support elements must rely on organic maintenance capa- units issue contaminated Class IX items only during bilities. They will need to perform battle damage emergencies. assessment and repair (BDAR). They must separate vehicles into categories such as light damage, mod- Supply units widely disperse repair parts in the erate damage, or severe damage even though they corps rear area to reduce vulnerability to nuclear might not have access to testing, measuring, and weapons. Units store critical items in repair parts diagnostic equipment. The commander should grant vans to reduce contamination and to ease

6-3 FM 100-30

decontamination. Combat service support units is- cies. Army and Air Force aviation units conduct sue repair parts in containers to protect the parts emergency resupply of isolated units. from becoming contaminated in transit. They issue all uncontaminated items before issuing decontami- Combat service support units should disperse pe- nated items. They check repair parts, especially troleum storage locations and activities to reduce sensitive electronic parts, for damage before issue. vulnerability and to prevent catastrophic losses. They must protect back-up equipment to the same degree as primary equipment and regularly practice Transportation fire-fighting and other safety procedures. Soldiers, patients, equipment, and supplies must Whether performing combat, CS, or CSS func- be moved rapidly and in sufficient quantities to tions, all units require uninterrupted fueling to per- support combat operations. Tactical actions require form effectively. Commanders must ensure the timely concentration of units and materiel and often protection of fuel-storage facilities because such are demand short-notice movement of large forces and extremely vulnerable to blast and thermal effects. major shifts in direction of movement. Units making survivability moves or exploiting There are a large number of factors which hinder nuclear-weapons effects will consume more fuel efficient operations in a nuclear environment (tree than anticipated. This, coupled with the possible blowdown, supply route closings, contamination loss of large amounts of fuel, makes the CSS avoidance, EMP effects on vehicle ignition systems function key. and aircraft electrical components and systems, and refugee movements). Therefore, all plans and op- NOTE: See FM 3-4 for mitigation techniques. erations must be flexible enough to allow successful execution in a nuclear environment. Transportation units will require greater flexibility in selecting Combat Health Support (CHS) routes, marshaling areas, convoy configurations, and, particularly, designating communications Although combat health support on the nuclear means. battlefield follows the basic principles of field medi- cine, the independent, dispersed nature of combat Alternative route planning is essential. Move- complicates this effort. Nuclear-weapons use will ment control elements in a nuclear environment are cause delays in treatment and increases in mortality an important link to effective transport operations. and morbidity. The principles in appropriate medi- cal field manuals will still be valid but will need to Class III, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), be modified for specific situations. includes petroleum fuels, hydraulic and insulating oils, chemical products, antifreeze compounds, Centralized command with decentralized execu- compressed gases, and coal. These items are highly tion characterizes medical operations. Medical or- critical in a nuclear environment. Frequently con- ganizations must establish CHS away from ducting survivability movements increases con- potential nuclear targets and anticipate extreme sumption of petroleum products and delivery surges in patient workload from mass casualty requirements. This need may require an increase in situations. bulk-fuel storage capacity in the corps area and the addition of more petroleum companies. Storage Triage is the medical process of classifying pa- tanks and storage bladders used for bulk petroleum tients into four priority groups in which patients are vulnerable to the effects of thermal and blast. receive medical treatment: immediate, minimal, de- Units must take special care to reduce or prevent layed, and expectant. Triage ensures the maximum contamination of tanks and bladders. benefit to the largest number of patients. Medical personnel use different triage priorities for patients When situations allow, corps petroleum units with radiation, conventional, or combined injuries. may provide throughput support to the forward The consequences of radiation injury are potentially support battalion (FSB). The units can deliver severe. Medical personnel use radiation dose infor- supplies directly to tactical units and to forward mation during the triage process if it is available. arming and refueling points (FARPs) in emergen- Also, commanders and leaders monitor their

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soldiers’ radiation levels and provide that informa- Combat health logistic personnel ensure that tion to medical personnel upon evacuation. medical supplies are protected from contamination Commanders, leaders, and soldiers can help and are as free of contamination as possible before medical personnel as much as possible to ensure the issue to user units. best care possible for the mass casualties expected Class VIII, medical material, includes medicine, from nuclear-weapons use. They can identify radia- stretchers, surgical instruments, and soon. Resistant tion casualties, decontaminate and evacuate casual- coatings, packaging material, or protective cover- ties, and perform self-aid, buddy-aid, and combat ings protect medical supplies and equipment from lifesaver (CLS) procedures. radiological contamination. Combat health support Commanders should use medical advice and in- personnel pre-position selected critical supply items formation to weigh the options of keeping soldiers and provide them on a preplanned resupply basis. with radiation injuries in the field or sending them Medical personnel issue all uncontaminated to CHS facilities. As well as handling radiation medical supplies and equipment first. They issue injured patients, the nuclear medical science officer, contaminated items to a medical facility only after a staff officer of the medical brigade, and a staff decontamination. They disperse stocks of medical officer of the medical group help determine radia- supplies to prevent or reduce the damage or con- tion exposure levels. tamination nuclear weapons cause. Dose rate information is valuable in determining who can return to duty. For example, soldiers who have transient, initial symptoms that are not life Field Services threatening or too disabling or who have minor Field service support (FSS) consists of food injuries and low RES can return to duty. This main- preparation and water purification, laundry and tains the force’s capabilities while ensuring that shower services and clothing exchange and repair; soldiers only enter the medical system when neces- mortuary operations; and airdrop services. Combat sary or when they become ineffective. service support units in a nuclear environment pro- vide FSS according to existing doctrine, with minor Medical units do not have special hardened pro- changes. In a nuclear environment, FSS generally tection from blast, thermal, or radiation effects. consists of only those services which directly affect They also do not have an organic decontamination health and sanitation as well as such critical services capability. Therefore, unit commanders must pro- vide this support to preserve and extend medical as airdrop and mortuary operations. capabilities. Changes in Army doctrine require more mobility, Commanders cannot hold medical units in re- responsiveness, and flexibility in Army field feed- serve. They must plan and continue operations even ing operations. The new Army Field Feeding Sys- after medical support is lost, relying only on self-aid tem-Future (AFFS-F) improves Army field feeding and buddy-aid. Therefore, commanders must en- operations; provides efficiency in labor, water, and sure soldiers have proper training. fuel requests; and increases mobility. Mental health and/or combat stress control person- Elements organic to the corps support command nel help soldiers cope with the increased stress of (COSCOM) and the division support command operating in a nuclear environment. Preventive medi- (DISCOM) provide water purification for the corps cine (PVNTMED) personnel help commanders and and divisions. The supply company (in direct sup- quartermaster water production personnel evaluate port (DS)) provides water purification for nondivi- the effects of nuclear contamination on drinking-water sional elements at the tactical and operational levels supplies. PVNTMED personnel determine if the on an area basis. These DS capabilities are normally water is safe for consumption and provide guidance sufficient for providing the requisite water. How- on disposal of contaminated water. ever, a general support (GS) capability, in the form of quartermaster water purification detachments, Veterinary personnel inspect and evaluate the may be necessary in a nuclear environment. Water safety of food supplies. They also determine when demands will be high and the likelihood of contami- it is safe to slaughter animals for consumption. nation great.

6-5 FM 100-30

Laundry and shower services and clothing ex- Supply change and repair units may not be available in an active nuclear environment. However, if units are General supply support encompasses the provi- available they will be as close to affected areas as sion of clothing, water, barrier material, and major possible. Unit NBC teams and medical specialists end items in support of the force. These classes of will conduct radiological monitoring of all person- supply include all the systems that support the nel before they shower to detect and segregate con- soldier. taminated personnel. Contaminated personnel Combat service support units conduct supply op- follow the decontamination procedures in FM 3-5. erations according to current doctrine when the The unit will also check clothing for contamination potential for nuclear-weapons use is not likely. As before it is laundered and monitor waste water for nuclear risk increases, supply stockage for non- radiological contamination. essential items will dwindle. This improves mobil- ity and lessens the division’s vulnerability to nu- On a nuclear battlefield all units, when author- clear attacks. In an active nuclear environment, CSS ized, will perform hasty burials of contaminated units will reduce stockage to a level sufficient for remains at an interim site as close to the place of mission accomplishment. Units must reduce stock- death as possible. They are to mark the entire site ages by the most expedient means in order to en- with the standard NATO NBC markers. Recovery hance mobility and dispersion and to avoid and decontamination of remains occurs after hos- contamination. tilities end (earlier if the tactical situation, time, and other resources permit). Decontamination of re- Combat service support units should issue the mains is a last priority. most critical supply items on an automatic basis using the position locator reference system (PLRS) Airdrop requirements significantly increase in a or a similar system. Forward units ensure that full nuclear environment. Airdrop expedites resupply basic loads of supplies are on hand and protected and allows swift bypass of contaminated areas. against contamination so they can accomplish their Units and airlift assets must consider the following missions until CSS can resupply them. (Command- when planning air movements or airlifts in a nuclear ers should consider emergency resupply by air.) environment: Combat service support units should disperse Protective NBC clothing degrades aircrew per- their stocks to avoid presenting lucrative targets and formance and increases mission time. to minimize risks of destruction or contamination. They should always issue uncontaminated stocks Navigators may have to rely on their own vision first so they can decontaminate stocks without in- if they lose air and ground navigational aids. terrupting supply support. (Using containers with Avoiding contaminated areas requires planning protective overwrap enhances decontamination.) air corridors on alternate routes. Combat service support units do not normally issue contaminated stocks. Units keep contami- Loss of available airfields, aviation maintenance nated stocks segregated from clean stocks until they facilities and/or stores, and refueling facilities can be fully decontaminated. However, units may will reduce aircraft available for CSS missions. issue certain contaminated supplies in emergency Off-loading cargo and servicing aircraft under situations when insufficient uncontaminated sup- contaminated conditions will increase mission plies are available, but only if the supplies will time. provide a decisive tactical advantage to the receiv- ing unit. Contaminated aircraft, cargo, and personnel will require special handling procedures in uncon- If units must use contaminated supplies, CSS taminated locations. Ideally, only uncontami- units should first issue such supplies to similarly nated aircraft will support uncontaminated units. contaminated units. Only under the most dire cir- cumstances should commanders issue contami- Air movement operations may require the use of nated stocks to uncontaminated units. In such dire alternate airfields and landing sites to avoid cases, the issuing and receiving commanders must contamination. jointly decide to use contaminated items, basing

6-6 FM 100-30

their decision on the tactical situation, the criticality Class V, ammunition, includes small-arms of the items, the type and extent of contamination, rounds, artillery rounds, hand grenades, , and the resources available for decontamination. mines, fuzes, detonators, missiles, and bombs. Combat service support units store ammunition at Class I, subsistence items, includes gratuitous dispersed sites to minimize nuclear vulnerability issue health and welfare items. Upon issue, units and to complicate the enemy’s target-acquisition should store rations under protective covering or in efforts. Class V supplies are as mobile as circum- containers to prevent or reduce contamination. stances permit. Combat service support units do not normally pro- vide preplanned Class I resupply to units in or near Large-scale decontamination operations may re- radiologically contaminated areas. Combat service quire additional support. If the situation requires supply personnel replace contaminated stocks on a units to use contaminated stocks, CSS personnel priority basis up to authorized levels. affix standard NATO NBC markers to the items. After issue, the user completes decontamination Class II, items of equipment other than princi- procedures, if required. pal items, includes individual equipment, clothing, tents, tools, and administrative and housekeeping Ammunition support elements at every echelon supplies. Selected Class 11 items, such as NBC de- take appropriate defensive measures to minimize fense equipment, receive priority of issue to se- the effects of and exposure to nuclear hazards. lected units. Combat service support units give the Using protective covers lessens exposure. highest priority support to–- Class VII, major end items, includes such things Units in contaminated areas. as vehicles, self-propelled artillery pieces, missile Units that have recently departed contaminated launchers, and major weapons systems. Heavy ma- areas. teriel supply companies maintain stockage of Class VII items and, with assistance, are responsible for Units in forward areas. decontamination and affixing standard NBC mark- ers before issue. If at all possible, they must not Combat service support personnel— abandon radiologically contaminated Class VII Pack protective clothing in consolidated pack- items. ages to expedite shipment, reduce handling, and Class X, material required to support nonmili- protect it from nuclear contamination. tary programs, includes items such as agricultural Pre-position decontamination items at all DS unit and economic-development project supplies. supply locations for resupply of stock held at the NOTE: See also FM 10-1. unit level. Issue preconfigured push packages to all units Miscellaneous items do not fit into any of the requiring decontamination supplies. other classes. Items include bulk water (as a field service item), classified maps, captured enemy ma- Class IV, construction and barrier materials, teriel, salvage material, and so on. Water is the most includes lumber, sand bags, barbed wire, and so on. important. Large quantities of water are likely to be In an active nuclear environment, the DISCOM and required for decontamination operations. Personnel other units stock only high-demand, mission-essen- must not issue or use radiologically contaminated tial, Class IV items in the division area. The corps water. provides all other Class IV support. Water from local sources, such as lakes, ponds, Combat service support provides selected high- and water systems, can become contaminated. It is usage Class TV items. They issue contaminated or essential to test local water sources for contaminates partially decontaminated Class IV items only after before use. Frequent testing is required and continu- they properly mark and identify them. The user ous testing is recommended. If quartermaster units completes decontamination, if required. Large- suspect a water source is contaminated, they mark scale decontamination operations may require ad- it with appropriate NATO NBC contamination ditional support. markers. Units must not use water until

6-7 FM 100-30

quartermaster units test it; treat it, if necessary; and grate protective measures and procedures into medical specialists determine that it is safe to use. daily operations to ensure necessary functions are capable of continuing their missions. The five When water becomes contaminated and cannot characteristics of logistic operations are anticipa- be treated for drinking, quartermaster or unit per- tion, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and sonnel dispose of it in a way that will prevent improvisation. secondary contamination. They also mark the area appropriately. Quartermaster units monitor all Sustaining soldiers and their equipment takes on water treatment, storage, distribution, and associ- additional meaning in a nuclear environment. Of all ated equipment, such as pumps and filters, for pos- the PSS functions, chaplain activities will be one of sible contamination. the most critical. However, the most important sus- taining function will be combat health support. Tri- Large-scale purification of water from contami- age will be the most demanding. Injuries ranging nated water sources to supply drinking water and from severe wounds, loss of limbs, burns to radia- other purposes is limited to units equipped with tion sickness will clog the medical facilities. reverse-osmosis water purification units (ROWPU). A standard contamination-level system Field service support will also be critical. There- allows flexibility in purification operations. Units fore, the and the of the indi- must only drink uncontaminated water but can use vidual soldier must be maintained at as high a level water decontaminated to an acceptable level of risk as possible. Relief from the tension of combat and for external purposes. the ravages of war rejuvenates a soldier’s ability to continue to fight. To that end, general supply sup- port provides clothing, protective equipment, water, barrier material, and major end items in support of SUMMARY the force. The logistic process in a nuclear environment The classes of supply are the various items con- changes drastically from how it is normally con- sumed on the battlefield. In a nuclear environment ducted. Logistic commanders will have to inte- the consumption of each class will be amplified.

6-8 GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND CDD collateral damage distance ABBREVIATIONS CEP circular-error probability cGy centiGray Acronyms 2 2 CHS combat health support A C Army airspace command and control CINC commander in chief AAP allied administrative publication CJTF commander, joint task force ACA airspace control authority CLS combat lifesaver ACC air component commander CMO civil-military operations AD air defense COA course of action ADA air defense artillery COMSEC communications security ADP automated data processing CONPLAN concept plan AFSCC Air Force service component commander CONUS Continental United States AFFS-F Army Field Feeding System-Future COSCOM corps support command AMD air movement distance CP command post AMedP Army medical publication CS combat support AO area of operations CSS combat service support AOR area of responsibility CTOC corps tactical operations center ARFOR Army Force ASCC Army service component command DA Department of the Army D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess ATO air tasking order ATP allied tactical publication DF Department of the Army form ATTN attention DGZ desired ground zero DISCOM division support command BCE battlefield coordination element DNA Defense Nuclear Agency BDA battle damage assessment DOD Department of Defense BDAR battle damage assessment and repair DP decision point BNW battlefield nuclear warfare DS direct support BOS battlefield operating system DST decision support template DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency (C) classified CAC Combined Arms Center EAC echelons above corps 2 C command and control ELSEC electronic security 3 C I command, control, commmications, and intelli- EM effects manual gence 4 EMP electromagnetic pulse C I command, control, communications, comput- ESM electronic warfare support measures ers, and intelligence CCIR commander’s critical information requirements FARP forward arming and refueling point

Glossary-1 FM 100-30

FLOT forward line of own troops LD line of departure FM field manual LOC lines of communication FSB forward support battalion LOS line of sight FSCL fire support coordination line LRSU long-range surveillance unit FSCM fire support coordination measures LSD least separation distance FSCOORD fire support coordinator MACOM major Army command FSE fire support element MARFOR Marine forces G1 assistant chief of staff, personnel MBA main battle area G2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence METT-T mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, and time available G3 assistant chief of staff, operations and plans MSD minimum safe distance G4 assistant chief of staff, logistics MSF mobile striking force G5 assistant chief of staff, civil-military operations MST maintenance support team G6 assistant chief of staff, communications GMD ground movement distance NALE Navy amphibious liaison element GS general support NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical GSS general supply support NBCC nuclear, biological, and chemical center NCA National Command Authorities HF high frequency NEAT nuclear employment augmentation team HOB height of burst NIGA neutron-induced gamma activity HPT high-payoff target NSCC Navy service component command HQ headquarters HVT high-value target OEG operational exposure guide OPLAN operation plan IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield OPORD operation order J3 joint assistant chief of staff, operations and plans OPSEC operations security JAOC joint air operations center pam pamphlet JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff PLRS position locator reference system JFACC joint force air component command PNI Presidential Nuclear Initiative JFLCC joint force land component command PSS personnel services support JFMCC joint force maritime component PSYOP psychological operations command PVNTMED preventive medicine JOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution System RAD radiation dose JP joint publication REM roentgen equivalent man (mammal) JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan RES radiation exposure state JTCB joint targeting coordination board ROWPU reverse-osmosis water purification unit JTF joint task force RSOP resource and selection of positions

Glossary-2 FM 100-30

SEAD suppression of enemy air defense required for the actual deployment of allocated SGEMP system-generated electromagnetic pulse weapons to locations desired by the commander to support his war plans. Expenditures of these SIGSEC signal security weapons are not authorized until released by SO signal operations/signal officer proper authority.) SOCOORD special operations coordinator Battlefield Nuclear Warfare (BNW): (As used in SOF special operations force this manual.) The requirement to conduct con- SOLE special operations liaison element tinuous combat operations in the environment created by the presence of any nuclear capable SOP standing operating procedures systems before, during, or after nuclear weap- (SRD) secret restricted data ons employment. STANAG standardization agreement Combat Health Support (CHS): Replaces Health STRATLAT strategic liaison assistance team Service Support. STRIKWARN strike warning Coup de main: (As used in this manual.) An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise TM technical manual and simultaneous execution of supporting op- TNT trinitrotoluene erations to achieve success in one swift stroke. TO theater of operations Counterproliferation:(As used in this manual.) TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data Military measures centering both on how to deter or discourage, as well as attack and de- TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine fend, against the possible use of weapons of Command mass destruction. TREE transient radiation effects on electronics Deconfliction: (As used in this manual.) The pro- (TS) top secret cedure to prevent interference of one weapon’s TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures effects with another. The desired DGZs of nu- TVA target-value analysis clear weapons are separated in time or distance. Degree of Risk: (From JP 1-02.) As specified by (U) unclassified the commander, the risk to which friendly US United States forces may be subjected to the effects of the USANCA Nuclear and detonation of a nuclear weapons used in the Chemical Agency attack of a close-in enemy target; acceptable degrees of risk under differing tactical condi- USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command tions are classified as emergency, moderate, and negligible. See also Emergency Risk (Nu- vol volume clear); Moderate Risk (Nuclear); Negligible WMD weapons of mass destruction Risk (Nuclear). WSRO weapons system replacement operations NOTE: JP 3-12.2 (SRD) does not include mod- erate risk tables. The user can compute moder- Definitions ate risk by using JP 3-12.2. Allocation (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) The appor- Emergency Risk (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) A tionment of specific numbers and types of nu- degree of risk where anticipated effects may clear weapons to a commander for a stated time cause some temporary shock and casualties and period as a planning factor for use in the devel- may significantly reduce the unit’s combat ef- opment of war plans. (Additional authority is ficiency. See also Degree of Risk; Moderate

Glossary-3 FM 100-30

Risk (Nuclear); Negligible Risk (Nuclear); and Minimum Safe Distance (MSD): (As used in this Troop Safety. manual.) The minimum distance in meters from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): (From JP 1-02.) the DGZ at which a specific degree of personnel The electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear risk and vulnerability will not be exceeded with explosion caused by Compton-recoil electrons a 99-percent assurance. The sum of the radius and photoelectrons from photons scattered in of safety and the buffer distance. the materials of the nuclear device or in a sur- Mitigation Techniques: (As used in this manual.) rounding medium. The resulting electric and Mitigation techniques are procedures to lessen magnetic fields may couple with electri- the vulnerability of personnel and equipment to cal/electronic systems to produce damaging nuclear weapons effects. These techniques are current and voltage surges. It may also be intended to be field expedients that can be ac- caused by nonnuclear means. complished readily by individuals and units Executing Commander (Nuclear Weapons): using only such equipment and material that are (From JP 1 -02.) A commander to whom nuclear available on the battlefield. weapons are released for delivery against spe- Moderate Risk (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) A de- cific targets or in accordance with approved gree of risk where anticipated effects are toler- plans. See also Releasing Commander (Nuclear able or, at worst, a minor nuisance. NOTE: JP Weapons). (For the purpose of this manual the 3-12.3 does not include moderate risk. executing commander is either the Air Force service component commander (AFSCC) or Negligible Risk (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) A the Navy service component commander degree of risk where personnel are reasonably (NSCC).) safe, with the exception of dazzle or temporary loss of night vision. (For this manual, negligible Fallout: (From JP 1-02.) The precipitation to earth risk should not be exceeded unless significant of radioactive particulate matter from a nuclear tactical advantage will be gained. Expressed in cloud; also applied to the particulate matter terms of risk to unwarned exposed personnel itself. and/or warned protected personnel.) Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL): (From JP 1-02.) A line established by the appropriate Noncontiguous Battlefield: (As used in this man- ground commander to ensure coordination of ual.) An area of operations subdivided by fire not under the commander’s control but boundaries which delineate responsibility and which might affect current tactical operations. facilitate control. The area of operations is non- The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air, linear; therefore, the intermingling of opposing ground, or sea weapons systems using any type forces is likely. ammunition against surface targets. The FSCL Nonproliferation: (As used in this manual.) Efforts should follow well-defined terrain features. Es- focused on preventing the spread of missiles tablishing the FSCL must be coordinated with and weapons of mass destruction and arms con- the appropriate tactical air commander and trol and export control. other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the FSCL without Nuclear Damage: (From JP 1-02.) prior coordination with the ground force com- 1. Light Damage: Damage which does not mander provided the attack will not produce ad- prevent the immediate use of equipment or verse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. installations for which it was intended. Some Attacks against surface targets behind this line repair by the user may be required to make full must be coordinated with the appropriate ground use of the equipment or installations. force commander. 2. Moderate Damage: Damage which pre- vents the use of equipment or installations until extensive repairs are made.

Glossary-4 FM 100-30

3. Severe Damage: Damage which prevents headquarters affected by the attack. The NBCC use of equipment or installations permanently. also sends the STRIKWARN to the next higher Nuclear Operations: (As used in this manual.) See headquarters when units not under the control Battlefield Nuclear Warfare. of the executing commander may be affected by the attack. STRIKWARNs are disseminated Nuclear Weapon Option: (As used in this man- as rapidly as possible and, insofar as possible, ual. ) A discrete grouping of a specific number over secure networks. of nuclear weapons by specific yield planned for employment in a specific area for a desig- Thermal Radiation: (From JP 1-02) nated time for a specific purpose employed at 1. The heat and light produced by a nuclear corps level and higher. explosion. 2. Electromagnetic emitted from a Nuclear Yield: (From JP 1-02.) The energy re- heat or light source as a consequence of its leased in the detonation of a nuclear weapon temperature; it consists essentially of ultravio- measured in kilotons or megatons of trinitro- let, visible, and infrared radiations. toluene (TNT) required to produce the same energy release. Yields are categorized as— Time on Target: (From JP 1-02, as modified for Very low: less than one kiloton. this manual.) The time at which a nuclear deto- Low: 1 kiloton to 10 kilotons. nation is planned at a specific DGZ. Medium: over 10 kilotons to 50 kilotons. Transient Radiation Effects on Equipment High: over 50 kilotons to 500 kilotons. (TREE): (From TM 39-4-1, as modified for Very high: Over 500 kilotons. this manual.) The effect of initial radiation, Operational Exposure Guide (OEG): (As used in neutron and gamma, on material. The effects this manual. j The maximum amount of nuclear can be either temporary or permanent. Semi- radiation which the commander considers his conductors and other electronic components are unit may be permitted to receive while perform- especially sensitive to transient radiation ef- ing a particular mission or missions. fects. Radiation Dose Rate: (From JP 1-02.) The radia- Troop Safety (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) An ele- tion dose (dosage) absorbed per unit of time. A ment which defines a distance from the pro- radiation dose rate can be set at some particular posed burst locator beyond which personnel unit of time (for example, H + 1 hour) and meeting the criteria described under degree of would be called H + 1 radiation dose rate. risk will be safe to the degree prescribed. (As System-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse used in this manual, it includes the com- (SGEMP): (As used in this manual.) The mander’s guidance and is divided into three gamma rays and, in some instances, x-rays from degrees of risk: negligible, moderate, and emer- a nuclear burst that may interact with materials gency. Degree of risk is used to express person- in systems and produce free electrons and elec- nel vulnerability as unwarned exposed trical current that generate an electromagnetic personnel and warned protected personnel. pulse in the system itself. Weapons of Mass Destruction: (From JP 1 -02.) In Strike Warning (STRIKWARN): (As used in arms control usage, weapons that are capable of this manual.) Warning given in advance of a a high order of destruction and/or of being used friendly nuclear attack to ensure that friendly to destroy large numbers of people. They can forces are able to protect themselves from its be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiologi- effects. The nuclear, biological, and chemical cal weapons, but the means of transporting or center (NBCC) transmits the message to subor- propelling the weapons is excluded where such dinate units likely to be affected by the attack. means are separable and divisible parts of the It also sends it to adjacent land, air, and naval weapons.

Glossary-5 FM 100-30

Weapons System Replacement Operations Nuclear Collateral Damage. (WSRO): The integration of personnel, equip- Nuclear Damage Assessment. ment, and training to maximize the number of operational weapons systems. Weapons sys- Nuclear Safety Line. tems managers coordinate with the operations Nuclear Surface Burst. staff, materiel managers, Class VII supply units, transportation managers, maintenance Nuclear Underground Burst. elements, and personnel managers to replace Nuclear Vulnerability Assessment. lost weapons systems. Nuclear Warning Message. NOTES: Nuclear Weapon. 1. See JP 1-02 for the complete definitions of the following terms: Overpressure. Collateral Damage Distance. Planned Target (Nuclear). Contamination. Proliferation (Nuclear Weapons). Decontamination. Radiation Dose. Desired Effects. Radiation Exposure State. Electronic Security (ELSEC). Radiation Sickness. Flash Blindness. Rainout. Heights of Burst (HOB). Releasing Commander. Immediate Permanent Ineffectiveness. Residual Radiation. Immediate Transient Ineffectiveness. Unwarned Exposed. induced Radiation. Warned Exposed. Initial Radiation. Warned Protected. Latent Ineffectiveness. Weapon Debris (Nuclear). Least Separation Distance. 2. The following publications contain specific Nuclear Air Burst. nuclear definitions that should be used in conjunc- tion with this manual: JP 1-02, JP 3-12, JP 3-12.1, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense. JP 3-12.2 (SRD), JP 3-12.3, DA Pam 50-3, and Nuclear Bonus Effects. TM 39-4-1.

Glossary-6 REFERENCES

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.

Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam) 50-3 The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

Field Manuals (FM) 3-Series Includes all FM 3-series manuals. 3-3 Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. This manual discusses in detail the four stages of contamination avoidance: implementation of passive defensive measures, oral reporting of attacks, location and identification of hazards, and limitation of exposure to hazards. 3-3-1 Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. This is the tactics, techniques, and procedures manual for nuclear contamination avoidance. 3-4 NBC Protection. This manual addresses unit and individual protection measures. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of individual protection. 3-5 NBC Decontamination. This manual defines and clarifies the entire process of NBC decontamination. It shows how contaminated forces can survive, sustain, or restore their combat potential. 3-15 Nuclear Accident and Incident Response and Assistance. This manual contains guidance for training, equipping, and utilizing emergency teams for contamination control. It covers procedures and techniques for limiting radiation hazards. 3-100 NBC Operations. This manual provides leaders with the basic information they will need to help units survive and accomplish their missions on a nuclear battlefield. 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. This manual describes D3A targeting processes. 10-1 Quartermaster Principles. 12-6 Personnel Doctrine. 25-50 Nuclear Survivability Training. 63-3 Corps Support Command. 100-5 Operations. This is the Army’s keystone operations manual. 100-7 The Army in Theater Operations. 100-9 Reconstitution. 100-10 Combat Service Support.

References-1 FM 100-30

100-15 Corps Operations. This manual contains operational-level doctrine to corps command- ers and staffs. 100-16 Army Operational Support. 100-17 Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.

Joint Publications (JP) 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 3-12 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. This publication sets forth doctrine for the combatant commander to use for the conduct of joint nuclear operations. It guides the joint planning and employment of US nuclear forces. 3-12.1 Doctrine for Joint Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Employment. This publication pro- vides guidance for nuclear-weapons employment. Doctrine and guidance apply to the commander of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. 3-12.2 (SRD) Nuclear Weapons Employment and Effects Data (U). This publication sets forth doctrine and selected TTP for joint operations and training. It is the accepted joint standard for nuclear target analysis, employment procedures, and the source for nuclear effects data. 3-12.3 Nuclear Weapons Employment and Effects Data.

Department of Defense Nuclear Agency Effects Manuals (DNA EM) 1 (SRD) Chapter l0 Electromagnetic Pulse. Chapter 14 Effects of Personnel. Chapter 15 Damage to Structures. Chapter 17 Damage to Military Field Equipment. Chapter 21 Damage to Missiles.

NOTE: DNA is now known as the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DWA).

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.

Allied Tactical Publications (ATP) 35A Land Force Tactical Doctrine. This publication establishes common NATO doctrine for the use of land force commanders in military operations when NATO forces are placed under their command.

References-2 FM 100-30

45 Reporting Nuclear Detonation, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas. This publication contains procedures for reporting nuclear detonations, radioactive fallout, biological and chemical attacks, and for predicting associated hazards.

Army Medical Publications (AMedP) 6 NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. 7 Concept of Operations of Medical Support in an NBC Environment. 8 Planning Guide for the Estimation of Battle Casualties (Nuclear).

Field Manuals (FM) 3-7 NBC Handbook. This manual provides information on the NBC warning and reporting system, contamination avoidance, and protection and decontamination. 5-103 Survivability. This manual integrates survivability into overall operations. It is for com- bined arms and engineer commanders. 8-9 NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. 8-10-7 Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment.

Joint Publications (JP) 5-03.1, Vol I Joint Operations Planning and Execution System(JOPES). 6, Vol II (SRD) Standing Operating Procedures for the Coordination of Atomic Operations (U).

(TS) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans Annex C Nuclear Operations.

Technical Manuals (TM) 39-4-1 Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material and Related Terms.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS Allied Administrative Publications (AAP) NATO Standardization Agreements and Allied Publications. This publication lists STANAGs and other publications of interest to NATO.

Department of the Army Forms (DF) 2028 Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

References-3 FM 100-30

Field Manuals (FM) 6-20 Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations. This is the keystone manual containing the principles of fire support. 34-1 Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations. 34-40 Electronic Warfare Operations. 44-100 Air Defense Operations. 71-100 Division Operations. This manual describes how armored and mechanized divisions and brigades are organized and how they fight. 100-1 The Army. This manual covers the roles, principles, and precepts governing the employment of Army forces in support of national security objectives.

SUGGESTED READINGS

Suggested readings are significant works for additional study and reflection.

Standardization Agreements (STANAG) 2002 Warning Signs for Marking of Contaminated or Dangerous Land Areas, Complete Equipment, Supplies, and Stores. 2047 Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack only). 2083 Commander’s Guide on Radiation Exposure of Groups. 2103 Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas. (See also ATP-45.) 2104 Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning. 2111 Target Analysis—Nuclear Weapons. 2112 NBC Reconnaissance. 2150 NATO Standards of Proficiency for NBC Defense. 2352 NBC Defense Equipment Operational Guidelines. 2353 Evaluation of NBC Defense Capabilities. 2358 First Aid and Hygiene Training in NBC Operations. 2367 NATO Glossary of NBC Terms and Definitions. 2435 NBC Protection Measures for Commodities Within Supply Channels. 2500 NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defense Operations. 2874 Planning Guide for Estimation of Battle Casualties (Nuclear). 2910 Nuclear Casualties and Damage Assessment for Exercises.

References-4 Index-1 FM 100-30

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Index-16 FM 100-30 29 OCTOBER 1996

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMER General, United States Army Official: Chief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 02529

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 115477, requirements for FM 100-30. PIN: 074964-000