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Home , Cult of the offensive, Deep operation, French army, Military organization, Military service

On Creativity

By Milan Vego DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo)

AdmiralAdmiral Nimitz,Nimitz, commandercommander ofof EasternEastern Pacific,Pacific, briefsbriefs PresidentPresident Roosevelt,Roosevelt, AdmiralAdmiral Leahy,Leahy, andand GeneralGeneral MacArthur,MacArthur, commandercommander ofof thethe WesternWestern Pacific,Pacific, onon operationsoperations advancingadvancing towardtoward JapanJapan DOD

n the public mind, creativity is usually What Is Creativity? behavior on the part of the individual that associated with the works of the Creativity is perhaps one of the most is atypical or unusual.5 A creative idea must famous painters, sculptors, musicians, significant but least understood areas of be useful and satisfy some need.6 Unique- I philosophers, and scientists, but not of human endeavor.1 A great deal has been ness means that a certain idea or a product those in the military. Yet the success in a mil- written about what constitutes creativity, but contains characteristics having nothing alike itary domain in both peacetime and in is no theory is completely accepted. One reason or equal in existence.7 A person could have an hardly possible without considerable creativ- is that different fields of knowledge require idea that is unique for him but in fact might ity on the part of the military institutions as different factors in combination.2 Creativity be very common. The final result must be whole and the and their staffs at can be defined as one’s ability to bring some- something new and uncommon in relation to all levels. War is largely an art, not a science. thing new into existence—to generate novel a particular problem being studied.8 Hence, it is inherent that military command- ideas that are valued by others.3 It involves ers and their staffs must be highly creative one’s ability to properly evaluate and present Military Environment in planning, preparing, and employing already existing ideas or processes in a differ- The military is a unique profession. their forces for combat. While technological ent way. It is characterized by the commitment of innovations should never be neglected, focus In , to be creative and novel, a its members to unlimited service, extend- should be clearly on those aspects of creativ- product or the idea behind it must transcend ing to the risk of life itself. As in no other ity most directly related to leadership. That is previous concepts or views. A creative product where the outcomes of military actions were should have a high intrinsic value due to its Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the determined in the past and it is where they essential originality and uniqueness.4 Origi- Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval will be determined in the future. nality is generally defined as any response or War College.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 83 FEATURES | On Military Creativity organization, the military trains its members ence and execution of orders. Leaders are Hart wrote in his Memoirs that “if a soldier to perform tasks they hope will never need to usually selected without consultation with advocates any new idea of real importance, be performed.9 It has a strong sense of subordinates. The peacetime environment he builds up such a wall of obstruction— identity, and its highly specialized missions encourages breeding of officers who rigidly compounded of resentment, suspicion and and functions have led to a culture that is follow rules. Such officers conform to the inertia—that the idea only succeeds at the vastly distinct from society as a whole. A wishes of superiors and sacrifice their own sacrifice of himself. As the wall finally yields military culture is defined as the sum of intel- of action by first ascertaining to the pressure of the new idea, it falls and lectual, professional, and traditional values the preferences of their leaders and basing crushes him.”14 possessed by an officer .10 their own conduct on those.12 This problem is Like any other large organizations, In contrast to their civilian counter- compounded in a military where the officer military institutions are often heavily parts, military artists must work within a corps is highly politicized—where ambitious bureaucratized. They force their members rather narrow framework and are subject to officers try to cultivate personal connections to apply numerous fixed techniques and numerous rules and regulations that must be with politicians, which often leads to political procedures in the erroneous belief that this factored in. All organizations, and the mili- interference in military promotions, espe- would enhance effectiveness. Yet it has just tary in particular, tend to be wasteful. They cially at the highest levels. the opposite effect because the rank-and-file are also subjected to various pressures, both The highly centralized and hierarchi- relies on a fixed routine instead of using external and internal. These pressures tend cal command organization reinforces the judgment and experience. The mission of to reduce potential leaders to mediocrity.11 authoritarian tendencies on the part of the the institution is increasingly forgotten or Military culture is generally not conducive higher commanders. Authoritarianism is ignored. The chiefs of various departments to finding a drastic solution to some new a obstacle to the creativity of both or sections create veritable fiefdoms of challenge. It tends rather either to resist any individuals and the military institution as power and influence and try to devise ways changes or, in the best case, slightly modify a whole. Often, higher commanders are to protect and expand their authority and the existing situation. reluctant or unwilling to acknowledge their power. They are also often resistant to any The main obstacles to military creativ- own failings openly or tacitly. They try to change because change is considered a threat ity are posed by the military’s inherent hier- keep the image of infallibility. They also often rather than an opportunity. Hence, any novel archical command structure—an authoritar- refuse to learn from their errors.13 Finding idea is usually dismissed as impractical, irre- ian, bureaucratized system—and its thinking, someone to blame for errors and accidents is sponsible, or absurd. The existing rules and which is exemplified by conformity, group- a common occurrence in a military organiza- regulations became the ends in themselves. think, parochialism, dogmatism, intolerance, tion. Authoritarian structures allow pressure Another problem associated with and anti-intellectualism. The military is a only to be applied top-down, not bottom-up. bureaucratized thinking is reliance on highly stratified organization, and its leaders Yet in practice, it is from the bottom that cre- various checklists and matrices for planning require prompt and unquestioning obedi- ative ideas are usually generated. B.H. Liddell instead of relying on the intelligent judgment

American in tanks advance in I U.S.

84 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO and experience of the commanders and their appropriately reconcile these contradictory War (1861–1865), Russo-Turkish War of staffs. For example, the U.S. military widely requirements. Experience shows that military 1877–1878, Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), uses the so-called universal joint organizations that succumb to conformity and Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was list, universal naval task list, naval tactical eventually decline. The enemy essentially simply ignored. These showed enor- task list, and Marine Corps task list. These only delivers the final blow, as the case of the mously increased capabilities for defense.24 lengthy documents aim to replace thinking French army in 1940 illustrates.20 Around In , the cult of the with ready-made tasks that simply have to , the Japanese naval academy was glorified. Alfred von be listed. They are the antitheses of creative increasingly emphasized rigorous regimenta- Schlieffen wrote that “attack is the best thinking. For example, the U.S. military has tion and memory work at the expense of defense.”25 Similarly, the French army was so lost its way in writing concisely, clearly, and originality, individuality, and creativity; the obsessed with the offensive that it spread to using plain language by its overuse and unimaginative emphasis on cramming and civilians. Marshal (1852–1931), of various buzzwords.15 The use of buzzwords rote memory ended any original thinking.21 chief of the General , wrote that the can be intended to impress the audience or Parochialism within the Services can French army “no longer knows any other law readers, win arguments, or grossly inflate sometimes be a serious obstacle to creativity. than the offensive . . . . Any other concept the importance of unimportant ideas. By Each Service has a distinctive organization, ought to be rejected as contrary to the very using vague or opaque words, one can give a culture, tradition, and way of warfare. The nature of war.”26 The British military and positive connotation to questionable proposi- individual beliefs of Servicemembers are some other European also believed tions. Bureaucratized thinking is directly institutionalized through education, training, in the superiority of offense over defense. responsible for this sad state of affairs. and socialization.22 Service parochialism is Many officers in and Britain also Conformism is a major obstacle to cre- reflected in the resistance to close cooperation believed that superior would overcome ativity in a , especially during peacetime. A given military force experience shows that military organizations that succumb to has the need for stability, which is ensured by conformity. Within a group, conformity conformity are eventually doomed pertains to members changing their personal attitudes and beliefs to align with the beliefs with other Services during planning, prepara- superior enemy firepower.27 Yet after the of a group as whole. It is most often the tion, and execution of military action. One of on the Marne in August 1914 and on result of a peer pressure. The most extreme the most pernicious effects of strong parochial until the final Allied offensive in the fall of manifestation of conformity is so-called views is that the Services often do not fully 1918, the clash on the Western degener- groupthink, which exists in small or large agree on a certain organizational options. ated into a war of attrition. The high com- organizations when members mimic the This, in turn, has highly adverse effects on the manders on both sides tried over and over to thinking of their superiors. Groupthink is the performance of a joint force in combat. achieve limited tactical successes and in the antithesis of creativity.16 Many militaries are characterized by process suffered huge casualties. The very structure of the military is rigid if not outright dogmatic views on many In the 1920s, there was considerable aimed to ensure the maximum conformity of aspects of their activities in peacetime and in debate and flexibility about the French army’s its members. This tendency is further aggra- combat. This is often the case with . However, that essentially disap- vated by the conditions of peacetime service doctrine. Optimally, doctrine should be peared in the 1930s in part because regression and of human weaknesses.17 The military descriptive, not prescriptive. It should be was seen by the French high command as an organization uses myriad standard operat- highly flexible, allowing its application to fit attack from the left—an infiltration of the ing procedures and regulations to ensure in different physical environments and differ- army ranks by communist agitators. The this high degree of conformity. The selec- ent fundamental warfare areas. Despite great French army became more rigid by applying tion and promotion process is often biased potential value, doctrine can easily slide into the rules of its doctrine almost without excep- against officers who think and act outside dogma. It can become a substitute for creative tion, regardless of circumstances.28 In 1935, the box.18 Moreover, many military theorists thinking about warfare. That is especially General Maurice Gamelin (1872–1958), com- and practitioners are uncomfortable with the the case in an era of rapid technological mander in chief of the French army, tightened notion that warfare is largely an art and not a change. A military doctrine can narrow one’s the control of military writings and required science. They consider warfare as destructive vision by dictating the questions and thereby that all publications receive prior approval; and grim while art is beautiful and creative. imposing certain answers.23 only official views could be presented. In 1934, To allow too much creativity would invari- Prior to World War I, the cult of the (later General) Charles de ably lead to anarchy.19 offense was dominant in Germany, France, Gaulle (1890–1970) was refused permission The military needs the stability of and Great Britain. The prevalent view, based to publish an article in the Revue militaire conformity so it can successfully function in on the experiences of the wars for German française, and after his pubic campaign for peacetime and in war. Yet at the same time Unification (1864, 1866, 1870–1871), was armored offensive tactics, he was taken off the it also has a paramount need for creativity; that new gave a decisive advantage promotion list. Those who challenged official otherwise, it is doomed to failure when a to the attacker. Consequently, a future war doctrinal views were silenced. Endorsement of supreme test of war comes. One of the most would be short and decisive. The contrary official views was the rule. There was no lively demanding tests for any military leader is to evidence as provided by the American Civil debate. Consider, for instance, the Spanish ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 85 FEATURES | On Military Creativity

Civil War. Both German and Soviet military those of superiors. Higher military officers Experience shows many examples in journals devoted enormous attention to the and commanders should avoid setting the which independently thinking and creative study of that conflict. The Revue militaire tone of professional debate, as it was during officers were forced to change or even française rarely covered it, and when it did, it the heyday of U.S. military transformation in abandon views because of open or hidden provided little analysis.29 the early 2000s, and thereby stifling contrar- opposition from their superiors. For example, French army doctrine was based on a ian views. Higher authorities should create Patton and Eisenhower began to seriously carefully orchestrated attack, rigidly con- an environment that encourages and furthers think about armored warfare in 1919–1920. trolled divisional boundaries, and a slow, reasoned debate. Critical thinking should be Patton wrote articles for Journal and phased advance in which air, armor, and the norm and not the exception. No military Eisenhower for Journal. Eisenhower functioned in tightly controlled organization can be successful or even survive was summoned by Charles harmony. That was exactly the opposite of without a free and open debate on important Farnsworth, chief of infantry, and told that the German concept of air-land battle professional matters. his ideas were not only wrong but dangerous. Eisenhower was warned that in the future, his writing should be in conformity with higher commanders should avoid setting the tone of doctrine.37 professional debate and thereby stifling contrarian views In Britain, the prevailing attitude in the 19th century and interwar years of the 20th century was a deliberate spirit of amateurism (), which stressed individual initia- Another serious factor detrimental to that valued honor, physical courage, skill in tive, opportunistic exploitations of unex- creativity in the military is the anti-intellec- field sports, and, above all, one’s pected openings, and local vulnerabilities tualism often generated by an overly authori- while deprecating professionalism, school- in the French lines.30 Prior to the German tarian command structure. An officer with ing, and intelligence. The British military in May 1940, the French believed the an impressive academic pedigree and/or was traditionally against book studies. The Germans could not and would not ultimately a scholarly approach to a given problem is preference was character over intellect. This perform radically differently than their own often considered a threat because he or she preference has always taken the form of forces. They refused to see that the enemy makes the aura of infallibility upon which denigration of the graduate38 had other options. The sense of infallibil- the prestige of authoritarianism is built and apotheosis of that splendid chap, the ity was aggravated by an institutional bias dubious. Yet the necessity for intelligent, regimental officer.39 For example, General against feedback that contradicted existing independent, and creative thinking in war J.F.C. Fuller, while chief instructor at the doctrine or preparations. There was little is obvious. At the same time, the cultural British Staff College at Camberley in late learning because the high command had all obstacles to dislodging the all-pervasive 1923, requested permission to publish his the answers.31 assumption of the infallibility of higher book on the foundations of the science of In the 1930s and until the raid on commanders are often very high. Lip service war. His request was refused on the ground Schweinfurt in August 1943, the U.S. Air is paid to the need for independent and cre- that the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Corps embraced the theory of strategic ative thinking, while it is given short shrift Lord Cavan, objected to staff officers writing bombing as dogma despite growing empirical in practice.34 For example, British Prime books. Lord Cavan told Fuller that author- evidence that this theory was based on false Minister David Lloyd George (1916–1922) ship is contrary to discipline for serving premises. In 1937, the U.S. military attaché in observed, the “military mind . . . regards officers because it might call the validity of suggested that high-altitude bombing thinking as a form of mutiny.” Bernard field manuals into question. He also told was ineffective and that small tactical Brodie wrote that soldiers have always Fuller not to publish books while he was an and fighters offered the best combat cherished the image of themselves as men of instructor. Hence, Fuller asked to reduce his capability. The Air Corps, then in the midst of action rather than as intellectuals.35 time on the staff from 4 to 3 years in order to a funding debate concerning the B-17 , In most militaries, there is consider- publish his work.40 brushed aside the report, arguing that such able prejudice against those who seem views contradicted the existing doctrine and excessively intellectual. There is the widely Organizational Creativity hence could not be accepted.32 held belief that fighting depends more upon In generic terms, organizational cre- Often, military organizations lack muscle than brain and that any display of ativity is best defined as the “creation of a tolerance of views that diverge from the so- education is not only bad form but also inca- valuable, useful new product, service, idea, called mainstream. Yet without tolerance no pacitating.36 Yet the most successful military procedure or process by individuals working creativity is possible.33 Intolerance usually leaders such as I, Helmuth von together in a complex social system.”41 In a stifles the discussion of professional topics Moltke, Sr., , George military context, organizational creativity in peacetime, as was the case in the British Patton, Douglas MacArthur, Ernest King, pertains to significantly enhancing combat and French militaries in the interwar years. Chester Nimitz, and Raymond Spruance effectiveness of one’s forces through inventing Ideally, officers and the rank-and-file should were excellent thinkers and practitioners. a novel and unique way of arranging levels of be free to express their opinions on profes- The lack of solid professional education and command and their constituent elements and sional matters. They should not be ostracized self-education has been one of the underly- thereby opening the way for a nontraditional or punished for having views that differ from ing reasons for military incompetence. employment of one’s forces in combat.

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Perhaps the most novel and effective ing tactical actions and major operations/ The U.S. Marine Corps developed way of organizing naval forces for combat campaigns regardless of the enemy and the an innovative and ultimately highly suc- is the U.S. ’s task force concept, used place where these actions would occur. cessful operational concept for conducting extensively from 1941 to 1945 and still in The Soviet was the leader in major amphibious landings. The document, use today. A task force (TF) was a provi- the development of theory of operational art in Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, sional organization composed of ships and/ the interwar years. The Soviets developed the was issued in January 1934. After a series of or and aircraft from different so-called deep battle (dubokoy boy) concept fleet landing force exercises, it was officially administrative units (squadrons, divisions). in 1935, which envisaged forces no larger adopted by the U.S. Navy as Fleet Training It was usually dissolved shortly after the than corps attacking the enemy simultane- Publication 167, Landing Operations. All U.S. mission was accomplished. The main aim of ously over the entire depth of fielded forces.43 amphibious landing operations in World the TF concept was to enhance operational A year later, the Soviets developed and put War II were based on that manual. flexibility. A TF was in turn broken down into their doctrine an even bolder concept The highly successful and novel into several task groups (TGs), and each of of deep operations (glubokaya operatsiya) to German air-land battle concept of the late these was divided into task units (TUs) with be applied at the operational level of war.44 1930s was relatively simple and highly the latter composed of several task elements This concept was at the heart of planning and flexible. The key was using air and ground (TEs). Each TF was assigned a two-digit execution of (major) operations conducted reconnaissance to locate gaps in the enemy’s number (for example, TF 38). TGs, TUs, and by the and fronts (army groups) and defenses. Then the weight of main effort TEs were identified by decimal numbers (TG supported by air and to launch (Schwerpunkt) would be in that area. The 58.1, TU 58.1.1, TE 58.1.1.2). simultaneous blows throughout the enemy’s second key element was concentration at the Fast carrier groups created in both entire operational depth.45 was weight of main effort (Schwerpunktbildung). the Japanese and U.S. in the interwar successfully applied in the Soviet offensives on Speed, mobility, surprise, and utilization years are another example of how integration the Eastern Front in 1944–1945. of windows of opportunity were central of high-strategic mobility and firepower can lead to qualitatively new capabilities through innovative command organization. Carrier groups were capable of -wide or U.S. Army operational employment. Another example of successful organizational creativity was the establishment of the first Panzer divisions in the German in 1935. These divisions included not only tanks but also motorized infantry, artillery, engineers, and signal troops.42 This concept was not emu- lated by the French. The Germans continued their innovative approach in the late 1930s by using Panzer units in close cooperation with the Luftwaffe. In March 1940, the Germans also created the first army-size Panzer forma- tion, Panzer Group Kleist, composed of one Panzer corps and two motorized infantry corps and capable of conducting independent major operations in cooperation with the Luftwaffe. Panzer Group Kleist was part of A and spearheaded the thrust through the Ardennes in May 1940.

Combat Concepts In time of peace, various tactical/opera- tional concepts are created for the employ- ment of combat forces in case of hostilities. A tactical concept is aimed to employ combat forces to accomplish tactical objectives, while an operational concept aims to accomplish operational or, in some cases, partial strategic General Eisenhower, objectives. These concepts form the heart of Supreme Allied the respective tactical and Service/joint doc- in Europe during World War II trine. They are used in planning and execut- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 87 FEATURES | On Military Creativity elements in the concept. The Panzer forces notions. 52 The best test of creativity is to execution.58 MacArthur had the rare gift of would penetrate deeply into the enemy rear. achieve surprise. One of the main methods recognizing the importance of geography They would have little regard for open flanks. is a highly innovative deception plan and its and planning his campaigns accordingly. He The initial aim was to destroy not enemy skillful execution. Commanders should put was well known for his ability to integrate troops but command posts and supply lines themselves in the enemy’s shoes and think both military and nonmilitary aspects of the and to threaten lines of retreat. The key to what course is the least likely the enemy will situation into his campaign plans. He had the success was the psychological effect of the foresee or forestall.53 The art of warfare rests demonstrated ability to think broadly and fast-moving Panzer forces. Often, entire on the freest application of its fundamentals far ahead. In the initial phase of the Korean sectors of a front would collapse even though under constantly changing conditions.54 War, for instance, his actions were instru- the Panzers penetrated the front at just a Making a decision and executing it mental in saving from falling single point.46 presumes the need for some degree of cre- under communist rule. After initial setbacks, The Air-Land Battle concept of 1981 ativity on the part of military commanders. MacArthur proposed to the Joint Chiefs was an example of an innovative way to A military decision is the result of creative of Staff a bold and innovative idea to land employ the U.S. Army’s and thinking. A military decision is often unique United Nations forces deep in the rear of the North Korean army at Inchon. The plan was a creative intellect allows commanders to surprise enemy strongly opposed by many officials in Wash- ington because of its high risks. In arguing counterparts and thus render them impotent for his plan to the Joint Chiefs, he stated that he was firmly convinced an early and in a major offensive. It envisaged and is based on a specific situation that is strong effort behind the enemy’s front would offensive initial blows carried out from mul- rarely repeated. Successful commanders sever his main lines of communications and tiple and unexpected directions by both land should possess a great deal of good common enable U.S. forces to deliver a decisive blow. and air forces against forces deployed in the sense, logical thinking, and rational decision- The alternative was a frontal attack from operational depth of the enemy’s defenses. making skills. No plan, no matter how sound, the Naktong line that could only result in a It would be followed by actions aimed at could survive the first contact with the enemy protracted and expensive campaign to slowly preventing the enemy from recovering. The without creativity. Hence, commanders and drive the enemy north of the 38th Parallel.59 main idea was to shatter the coherence of subordinates must have the mental agility to In the end, MacArthur’s views prevailed; the enemy forces.47 Air-Land Battle remained the react quickly when facing unforeseen situa- amphibious landing at Inchon (Operation mainstay of the U.S. Army’s doctrine until tions or to take advantage of fleeting oppor- Chromite), some 150 miles behind the North the late 1990s. tunities in order to make new decisions based Korean forces then besieging the Pusan on running estimates of the situation. perimeter, was carried out on September 15, Creativity in Combat The most successful commanders were 1950. The landing was brilliantly executed, Creativity of commanders refers to their well known for their unique and creative style and it quickly led to the collapse of the North ability to find workable, novel solutions to in planning and the employment of forces Korean forces at the Pusan Perimeter. problems—to be innovative and adaptable in in combat. Moltke, Sr., was renowned for Any plan or order should revolve fast moving, potentially confusing situations. thinking broadly in planning and executing around an overarching idea, known generi- All exceptional military leaders have had a his campaigns in three victorious wars (1864, cally as the concept of operations (CONOPS), large measure of creative skills.48 A creative 1866, and 1870–1871). The key elements in suggesting how to employ combat forces most intellect allows commanders to surprise his operational thinking were focusing on decisively to accomplish a given military enemy counterparts and thus render them meticulous deployment planning, seeking objective. In operational warfare theory, the impotent.49 Moltke, Sr., believed that in war, the destruction of the enemy army, giving term operational idea (scheme) pertains to the as in art, there are no generally valid norms. maximum freedom of action to subordinates, concept for a major operation or campaign. In both war and art, rules cannot replace and concentrating forces at the weight of the CONOPS is the heart of any sound plan for talent.50 Success in combat at all levels requires main effort to effect large envelopments and the employment of forces. It is developed from imagination on the part of commanders, who encirclements.55 Like Napoleon I, Moltke, Sr., the most optimal friendly course of action should possess a high degree of creativity in insisted on quick deployment and achieved and is included as an integral part of the com- thinking and a readiness to take risks.51 the greatest victories by concentrating his mander’s decision. A sound CONOPS idea Creative thinking and mental agility armies on the battlefield.56 Moltke, Sr., also requires ingenuity and creativity on the part refer to commanders’ ability to see the whole had a surprising ability to foresee how a situ- of the commander and staff. picture from its individual parts. Leaders ation would develop and to take the right A sound CONOPS should describe should be bold and innovative; they should measures, as he demonstrated in his brilliant in broad terms, concisely and clearly, what not use forces in a traditional manner. This victories at Koeniggraetz on July 3, 1866, and each force element will do to accomplish means not being fixated on the mechanical Sedan on September 1–2, 1870.57 the ultimate objective. Among other things, or schematic employment of combat forces. General MacArthur was one of the CONOPS should avoid traditional patterns. To preserve versatility and variability of deci- most successful Allied commanders in World It should be bold and novel and be speedily sions, commanders should not act according War II. He was known for his thorough executed. It should pose multidimensional to conventional views and preconceived planning, boldness of vision, and energetic threats the enemy has little or no chance of

88 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO countering successfully. It should surprise Not all Allied concepts of operations Godfroy, director of naval intelligence, later and deceive the enemy, further complicating were creative. In fact, many were quite became known for his James Bond novels.64 his response. Most importantly, it should be ordinary. For example, in both the Pacific In addition to Fleming, Godfroy’s naval directed at the destruction or neutralization and European theaters in World War II, the intelligence department employed a school- of the enemy’s center of gravity.60 Allies used similar and highly predictable master, journalist, collector of books on An example of a creative operational operational ideas for their amphibious land- original thought, Oxford classical don, bar- idea was the German campaign in ings. That made it considerably easier for rister clerk, and insurance agent along with and in April 1940 (Unternehmen the enemy to deduce Allied intentions. It did two regular naval officers, two stockbrokers, Weseruebung—Weser Enterprise) and not lead to defeats largely because the Allies and several women acting as assistants and preceding the first phase of the German had enormous superiority on the ground, typists. 65 campaign in the West from May to June 1940 at sea, and in the air in most of the land- (Plan Gelb-Yellow). For example, the German ings conducted. For example, the Japanese, Conclusion operational idea for the invasion of Denmark by closely observing and analyzing U.S. Creativity is the key element in the suc- and Norway in April 1940 was innovative. amphibious landings, changed their method cessful planning, preparation, and execution Never before had anyone attempted to of conducting antiamphibious defense from of a combat action and ultimately in winning seize positions separated by a wide sea area defending the beaches to digging in and a war. It is directly linked to the art side of without obtaining first. establishing several defensive lines farther warfare, so it requires thorough knowledge The Germans envisaged simultaneous and from the beaches. In that way, they coun- and understanding of the true nature of multiple thrusts by ground, sea, and air ele- tered superior U.S. firepower and maxi- war. Creativity in peacetime is essential to ments to quickly seize southern Norway and mized their own advantages. For example, developing sound military organizations, then move north under the protective shield after U.S. troops landed on Okinawa in operating concepts, and doctrine, and to of the Luftwaffe. The operational idea was April 1945 (Operation Iceberg), the Japanese educating and training future commanders also bold, and the Germans took rather high offered stubborn resistance in the interior and their staffs. The need for technological risks to mount such a large-scale effort in the of the island. By the time the last resistance creativity should not be confused with the face of British superiority at sea and its ability to react quickly to any German landing in CONOPS should pose multidimensional threats the enemy has Norway. At the same time, the Germans maintained a high degree of operational little or no chance of countering successfully security, using deception and concealment.61 In the first phase of their campaign in ended in late June 1945, the Japanese had cognitive aspects of creativity. Experience the West in May 1940, the Germans used lost 110,000 men in combat, but they also shows repeatedly that novel technologies by combined penetration and single-sided envel- inflicted heavy losses on the attacker: U.S. themselves are insufficient to win victories opment maneuvers to cut off and destroy the battle casualties were 49,000 including and ultimately wars. New technologies major part of the Allied forces deployed in 12,500 killed or missing.63 must be followed by creative, corresponding northern France and . It was General Deception is one of the most important changes in force organization. Erich von Manstein’s idea to combine single- supporting plans. Successful deception is the The single most important factor is sided envelopment with penetration. He product of an imaginative story: a series of sound integration of new technologies and selected the Sedan-Dinant sector as the point actions and measures aimed to manipulate creative operating concepts and doctrine; for a tactical penetration maneuver. This enemy intelligence channels so the deception otherwise, ultimate success will be wanting. would be followed by an operational single- target—the enemy commander—believes In contrast to the environment for artists and sided envelopment maneuver extending all what one desires him to believe. Building scientists, the military environment poses the way to the French Channel coast. The a story is one of the most complicated yet formidable obstacles to creativity at all levels. aim was to avoid making a frontal attack on critical parts of deception planning. The Thus, it is incumbent at the highest levels of the Allied forces as they moved into Belgium, most effective deception story reinforces the military and political leadership to create a and rather to cut them off in the rear of the enemy’s belief in what he already expects, climate and provide adequate resources for Somme River.62 underscoring the critical role of detailed creativity and experimentation. Only through The Allied campaigns in the Pacific and accurate knowledge of the enemy’s the open and vigorous struggle of competing during World War II were successful because perceptions and beliefs that is obtained by ideas is it possible to develop and apply sound they included, among other things, some intelligence. Experience has shown the great operating concepts and doctrine. A military highly creative ideas. In the so-called island- value of using the work of artists such as organization that restricts or, worse, does not hopping approach, as exemplified by the playwrights or novelists in providing ideas allow free professional discussion is doomed New , Solomons, and Central Pacific for a deception story. Artists often have more to stagnate in peacetime and to eventually fail campaigns, the Allies attacked enemy weak- fertile and imaginative ideas than profes- in combat. Finally, the German-style mission nesses and avoided enemy strengths. That, in sional officers. For example, many members command should be adopted and applied turn, greatly enhanced the Allied operational of the British wartime intelligence apparatus in both letter and spirit so as to educate and tempo and thereby never allowed the Japa- were unorthodox personalities. Ian Fleming, train commanders and staffs to think and act nese to recover from their losses. personal assistant to Sir John H. creatively. 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29 Notes Cited in ibid., 86. Army Europe, Foreign , Bundesar- 30 Irving B. Holley, Technology and Military chiv/Militaerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg, i.Br., 10. 51 1 Jeffrey Maitland, “Creativity,” The Journal Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34, no. 4 (Summer (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 25. Arbeitspapier (working paper), Operative Fuehrung 31 1976), 397. Murray, 57. (Hamburg, 1992), 18. 32 52 2 Marshall Dimock, “Creativity,” Public Admin- Robert F. Gass, Theory, Doctrine, and Ball Ibid. 53 istration Review 46, no. 1 (January–February 1986), 4. Bearings: Adapting Future Technology to Warfare B.H. Liddell Hart, (New York: F.A. 3 Cited in Ronald D. Daniel, Creativity and Stra- (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Mili- Praeger, 1954), 348. 54 tegic Vision: The Key to the Army’s Future (Carlisle tary Studies, January 1996), 31, 33. Friedrich von Bernhardi, of To-Day, 33 Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 4–5. Edwin R. Micewski, “Creativity and Military vol. 2, Combat and Conduct of War, trans. Karl von 4 Harold H. Anderson, “The Nature of Cre- Leadership in Postmodern Times,” paper presented Donat (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1914), 413. 55 ativity,” Studies in Art Education 1, no. 2 (Spring at the International Conference for Interdisciplin- John English, “The Operational Art: Devel- 1960), 10. ary Creativity in Science and Technology, Bucha- opment in the Theories of War,” in The Operational 5 Norman E. Wallen, “Creativity—Fantasy and rest, February 25–26, 2005, 5. Art: Developments in the Theories of War, ed. B.J.C. 34 Fact,” The Elementary School Journal 64, no. 8 (May Nazareth, 44. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, 9 (Westport, 35 1964), 439. Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intel- CT: Praeger, 1996). 56 6 Irvin Summers and David E. 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Mittler & 39 Taylor, Jr., “The Military Man in Academia,” Correlli Barnett, “The Education of Military Sohn, 1993), 263. 58 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Elites,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Social Sciences 406 (March 1973), 130. (July 1967), 18. Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in 40 10 Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Nazareth, 45. Korea 1950–1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), 30. 41 59 Future,” Joint Force Quarterly 12 (Summer 1996), 54. Richard W. Woodman, John E. Sawyer, and Ibid., 162. 60 11 Nazareth, 39. Ricky W. Griffin, “Toward a Theory of Organiza- Walter A. Vanderbeek, The Decisive Point: 12 Ibid., 41. tional Creativity,” Academy of Managerial Review The Key to Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School 13 Ibid., 43. 18, no. 2 (April 1993), 293. of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), 39. 42 61 14 Cited in ibid., 45. Cited in Williamson Murray, “Armored Olivier Desarzens, Nachrichtendienstliche 15 Kate Bateman, “War on (Buzz)Words,” Pro- Warfare: The British, French, and German Experi- Aspekte der “Weseruebung” 1940 (Osnabrueck: ceedings 134, no. 8 (August 2008), 22. ences,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Biblio Verlag, 1988), 173; T.K. Derry, The Campaign 16 Charles D. Allen and Stephen J. Gerras, Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millett, in Norway (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery “Developing Creative and Critical Thinkers,” Mili- 42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Office, 1952), 232. 43 62 tary Review, November–December 2009, 80. Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of Guenter Roth, “Operatives Denken bei 17 Nazareth, 41–42. War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Lawrence: Uni- Schlieffen und Manstein,” in Operationen und ihre 18 Charles D. 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Oldenbourg Verlag, Books, 2010), 11. 65 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 163. 1995), 419–420. Ibid., 30. 47 22 Brooks L. Bash, “Leadership and Parochial- Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations ism: An Enduring Reality, Joint Force Quarterly 22 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the (Summer 1999), 64. Army, August 1982), 2-1. 48 23 Jay Luvaas, “Some Vagrant Thoughts on FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Doctrine,” Military Review, March 1986, 60. Senior Levels (Washington, DC: Headquarters 24 Stephen van Evera, “The Cult of the Offen- Department of the Army, July 31, 1990), 30. 49 sive and the Origins of the First World War,” Inter- Mitchell M. Zais, Generalship and the Art of national Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984), 58–59. Senior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspec- 25 Ibid., 59. tives (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced 26 Ibid. Military Studies, 1985), 49. 50 27 Ibid., 61. Hans Speth, Auswahl, Erziehung und Aus- 28 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and bildung der Generalsbsoffiziere im Frieden und im British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princ- Kriege 19, MS # P-031b, Part 19, ZA/1 1867, Studien eton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 83. der Historical Headquarters, United States

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