ON MILITARY CREATIVITY By MILAN VEGO DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo) AdmiralAdmiral Nimitz,Nimitz, commandercommander ofof EasternEastern Pacific,Pacific, briefsbriefs PresidentPresident Roosevelt,Roosevelt, AdmiralAdmiral Leahy,Leahy, andand GeneralGeneral MacArthur,MacArthur, commandercommander ofof thethe WesternWestern Pacific,Pacific, onon operationsoperations advancingadvancing towardtoward JapanJapan DOD n the public mind, creativity is usually What Is Creativity? behavior on the part of the individual that associated with the works of the Creativity is perhaps one of the most is atypical or unusual.5 A creative idea must famous painters, sculptors, musicians, significant but least understood areas of be useful and satisfy some need.6 Unique- I philosophers, and scientists, but not of human endeavor.1 A great deal has been ness means that a certain idea or a product those in the military. Yet the success in a mil- written about what constitutes creativity, but contains characteristics having nothing alike itary domain in both peacetime and in war is no theory is completely accepted. One reason or equal in existence.7 A person could have an hardly possible without considerable creativ- is that different fields of knowledge require idea that is unique for him but in fact might ity on the part of the military institutions as different factors in combination.2 Creativity be very common. The final result must be whole and the commanders and their staffs at can be defined as one’s ability to bring some- something new and uncommon in relation to all levels. War is largely an art, not a science. thing new into existence—to generate novel a particular problem being studied.8 Hence, it is inherent that military command- ideas that are valued by others.3 It involves ers and their staffs must be highly creative one’s ability to properly evaluate and present Military Environment in planning, preparing, and employing already existing ideas or processes in a differ- The military is a unique profession. their forces for combat. While technological ent way. It is characterized by the commitment of innovations should never be neglected, focus In general, to be creative and novel, a its members to unlimited service, extend- should be clearly on those aspects of creativ- product or the idea behind it must transcend ing to the risk of life itself. As in no other ity most directly related to leadership. That is previous concepts or views. A creative product where the outcomes of military actions were should have a high intrinsic value due to its Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the determined in the past and it is where they essential originality and uniqueness.4 Origi- Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval will be determined in the future. nality is generally defined as any response or War College. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 83 FEATURES | On Military Creativity organization, the military trains its members ence and execution of orders. Leaders are Hart wrote in his Memoirs that “if a soldier to perform tasks they hope will never need to usually selected without consultation with advocates any new idea of real importance, be performed.9 It has a strong sense of group subordinates. The peacetime environment he builds up such a wall of obstruction— identity, and its highly specialized missions encourages breeding of officers who rigidly compounded of resentment, suspicion and and functions have led to a culture that is follow rules. Such officers conform to the inertia—that the idea only succeeds at the vastly distinct from society as a whole. A wishes of superiors and sacrifice their own sacrifice of himself. As the wall finally yields military culture is defined as the sum of intel- independence of action by first ascertaining to the pressure of the new idea, it falls and lectual, professional, and traditional values the preferences of their leaders and basing crushes him.”14 possessed by an officer corps.10 their own conduct on those.12 This problem is Like any other large organizations, In contrast to their civilian counter- compounded in a military where the officer military institutions are often heavily parts, military artists must work within a corps is highly politicized—where ambitious bureaucratized. They force their members rather narrow framework and are subject to officers try to cultivate personal connections to apply numerous fixed techniques and numerous rules and regulations that must be with politicians, which often leads to political procedures in the erroneous belief that this factored in. All organizations, and the mili- interference in military promotions, espe- would enhance effectiveness. Yet it has just tary in particular, tend to be wasteful. They cially at the highest levels. the opposite effect because the rank-and-file are also subjected to various pressures, both The highly centralized and hierarchi- relies on a fixed routine instead of using external and internal. These pressures tend cal command organization reinforces the judgment and experience. The mission of to reduce potential leaders to mediocrity.11 authoritarian tendencies on the part of the the institution is increasingly forgotten or Military culture is generally not conducive higher commanders. Authoritarianism is ignored. The chiefs of various departments to finding a drastic solution to some new a major obstacle to the creativity of both or sections create veritable fiefdoms of challenge. It tends rather either to resist any individuals and the military institution as power and influence and try to devise ways changes or, in the best case, slightly modify a whole. Often, higher commanders are to protect and expand their authority and the existing situation. reluctant or unwilling to acknowledge their power. They are also often resistant to any The main obstacles to military creativ- own failings openly or tacitly. They try to change because change is considered a threat ity are posed by the military’s inherent hier- keep the image of infallibility. They also often rather than an opportunity. Hence, any novel archical command structure—an authoritar- refuse to learn from their errors.13 Finding idea is usually dismissed as impractical, irre- ian, bureaucratized system—and its thinking, someone to blame for errors and accidents is sponsible, or absurd. The existing rules and which is exemplified by conformity, group- a common occurrence in a military organiza- regulations became the ends in themselves. think, parochialism, dogmatism, intolerance, tion. Authoritarian structures allow pressure Another problem associated with and anti-intellectualism. The military is a only to be applied top-down, not bottom-up. bureaucratized thinking is reliance on highly stratified organization, and its leaders Yet in practice, it is from the bottom that cre- various checklists and matrices for planning require prompt and unquestioning obedi- ative ideas are usually generated. B.H. Liddell instead of relying on the intelligent judgment American troops in tanks advance in World War I U.S. Army 84 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO and experience of the commanders and their appropriately reconcile these contradictory War (1861–1865), Russo-Turkish War of staffs. For example, the U.S. military widely requirements. Experience shows that military 1877–1878, Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), uses the so-called universal joint task force organizations that succumb to conformity and Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was list, universal naval task list, naval tactical eventually decline. The enemy essentially simply ignored. These wars showed enor- task list, and Marine Corps task list. These only delivers the final blow, as the case of the mously increased capabilities for defense.24 lengthy documents aim to replace thinking French army in 1940 illustrates.20 Around In Germany, the cult of the offensive with ready-made tasks that simply have to World War I, the Japanese naval academy was glorified. Field Marshal Alfred von be listed. They are the antitheses of creative increasingly emphasized rigorous regimenta- Schlieffen wrote that “attack is the best thinking. For example, the U.S. military has tion and memory work at the expense of defense.”25 Similarly, the French army was so lost its way in writing concisely, clearly, and originality, individuality, and creativity; the obsessed with the offensive that it spread to using plain language by its overuse and abuse unimaginative emphasis on cramming and civilians. Marshal Joseph Joffre (1852–1931), of various buzzwords.15 The use of buzzwords rote memory ended any original thinking.21 chief of the General Staff, wrote that the can be intended to impress the audience or Parochialism within the Services can French army “no longer knows any other law readers, win arguments, or grossly inflate sometimes be a serious obstacle to creativity. than the offensive . Any other concept the importance of unimportant ideas. By Each Service has a distinctive organization, ought to be rejected as contrary to the very using vague or opaque words, one can give a culture, tradition, and way of warfare. The nature of war.”26 The British military and positive connotation to questionable proposi- individual beliefs of Servicemembers are some other European militaries also believed tions. Bureaucratized thinking is directly institutionalized through education, training, in the superiority of offense over defense. responsible for this sad state of affairs. and socialization.22 Service parochialism is Many officers in France and Britain also Conformism is a major obstacle to cre- reflected in the resistance to close cooperation believed that superior morale would overcome ativity in a military organization, especially during peacetime. A given military force experience shows that military organizations that succumb to has the need for stability, which is ensured by conformity. Within a group, conformity conformity are eventually doomed pertains to members changing their personal attitudes and beliefs to align with the beliefs with other Services during planning, prepara- superior enemy firepower.27 Yet after the of a group as whole.