The Unfulfilled Promise:The Development of Operational Art in the U.S. Military, 1973-1997
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Title Page THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART IN THE U.S. MILITARY, 1973-1997 By © 2012 Francis Joon Hong Park B.A., History, The Johns Hopkins University, 1994 M.A., International Relations, Saint Mary’s University of San Antonio, Texas, 1999 M.M.A.S., Theater Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007 Submitted to the graduate degree program in History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Dr. Theodore Wilson, Chairperson Dr. Jeffrey Moran Dr. Jacob Kipp Dr. Robert Baumann Dr. Brent Steele Date Defended: July 12, 2012 Acceptance Page The Dissertation Committee for Francis Joon Hong Park certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART IN THE U.S. MILITARY, 1973-1997 Dr. Theodore Wilson, Chairperson Date Approved: July 12, 2012 ii Abstract THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE: The Development of Operational Art in the U.S. Military, 1973-1997 By Francis J. H. Park Department of History, University of Kansas Professor Theodore A. Wilson, advisor This study examines the theory, doctrine, and practice of operational art in the U.S. military starting in the early 1970s after the end of the Vietnam War to the mid 1990s after Operation Desert Storm. Using a model of operational art based on strategy, campaigning, force flow, and logistics, it traces the development of Active Defense and AirLand Battle in the U.S. Army, the emergence of a culture and doctrine of maneuver warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps, the Air Force’s efforts to institute centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower in the tactical air forces, and their confluence in the Persian Gulf War. Operation Desert Storm marked the practice of three discrete schools of operational warfare, and provided an impetus to establishing joint doctrine, which built on reforms of professional military education that happened in the late 1980s. The gains made in the doctrine, education and training for the practice of operational warfare gave way to a more pervasive focus on tactics that characterized Joint Vision 2010, the Department of Defense’s future vision of warfare, which influenced service concepts away from the effective practice of operational art. iii Acknowledgments First, to two former bosses, Bill Wunderle and Tom Donovan, for getting me really interested in operational art as a very junior captain in the 82d Airborne Division Plans section in 1999. To Kevin Benson for generously sharing his own research from his own dissertation, and giving me the first push towards actually starting this degree program. To Jake Kipp and David Glantz for their help with the study of Russian and Soviet operational art theory. A special thanks goes to Bruce Menning for providing me his translation of G. S. Isserson’s The Evolution of Operational Art. To Rusty Rafferty, Kathy Buker, and Elizabeth Dubuisson of the Combined Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, for their time and assistance with the archives there, even in the midst of a library renovation. At the U.S. Army Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College, circulation librarians Steve Bye, Terry Foster, and Carol Funck, and reference librarians Rich Baker, Rodney Foytik, and Shannon Schwaller. To Harold Bittner, Mike Wyly, John Schmitt, and Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) for their assistance and perspectives on the development of maneuver warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps. Special thanks go to Bruce Gudmundsson, who truly went out of his way to help me out at my visits to Quantico. At Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, Jim Ginther, Mike Miller, Greg Cina, John Lyles, and the entire staff of the Archives and Special Collections Branch at the Archives and Special Collections Branch, Alfred M. Gray, Jr. Research Center, and Annette Amerman, Beth Crumley, Kara Newcomer, and Paul Westermeyer at the Marine Corps History Division, and Colonel Michael Morris and Dr. Brad Meyer at the School of Advanced Warfighting. At Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Archie DiFante, Tammy Horton, Sly Jackson, and Lee Morris at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. I am particularly indebted to Dennis Drew, Hal Winton and Colonel Mike “Meter” Kometer of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Woody Parramore of the LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education. At Hurlburt Field, Florida, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Lyle at the 505th Combat Training Squadron, 505th Command and Control Wing. To Britt McCarley, Carol Lilly, Karen Lewis, and Benjamin King at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command History Office. To Mike Dugre, Jeff Seiken, and Nick Waller at the Air Combat Command History Office. At the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Colonel Jeffrey Springman, Chuck Zaruba, Dan Hodges, Dwayne Wagner, Tim Hentschel, Gary Hanson, Jeff Kubiak, and especially my teaching partners: Neal Bralley, Bill Knight, Gary Cordes, and Rich Berkebile. Far away from Kansas, to Steve Sledge for invaluable peer review. At Kansas, to Professor Ted Wilson, who applied gentle corrections to my many bad habits, and to Professor Kim Warren for teaching me the historical tradecraft without which I could not have written this dissertation. Finally, Mark Calhoun, Chris Carey, Randy Masten, Mary McMurray, Chris Rein, and Nick Sambaluk as fellow compatriots in the path towards the inexorable end of the degree. This dissertation was partially funded by a George C. Marshall/Baruch fellowship grant from the George C. Marshall Center, Lexington, Virginia. iv Table of Contents Acceptance Page ......................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................v Table of Figures ...................................................................................................................... viii Notice ..................................................................................................................................... viii Dedication ................................................................................................................................. ix Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 The theory, rhetoric, and practice of contemporary American operational art ..........................2 Why operational art? ............................................................................................................. 11 Chapter 1: Toward a Normative Definition of Operational Art ................................................. 14 Terms of reference ................................................................................................................ 15 Instruments of national power ............................................................................................ 15 Levels of War .................................................................................................................... 17 Tactics ............................................................................................................................... 17 Strategy ............................................................................................................................. 17 Strategic Art ...................................................................................................................... 19 Studies of operational warfare and operational art ................................................................. 20 The Practice of Operational Art ............................................................................................. 34 A Normative Definition of Operational Art ........................................................................... 37 Purpose ............................................................................................................................. 38 Elements of Operational Art .............................................................................................. 39 Some propositions on operational warfare ......................................................................... 42 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 47 Chapter 2: Soviet Operational Art: A Revolution Unfinished ................................................... 49 Divisions within the Ranks .................................................................................................... 56 In Pursuit of a Unified Military Doctrine and Science: Soviet Theorists before the Great Patriotic War ......................................................................................................................... 61 The Revival of Operational Art in the Great Patriotic War..................................................... 75 Soviet Operational Art in the Nuclear Era ............................................................................