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Home , Aedesius, Amida (Mesopotamia), Eusebia (empress), Mardonius (philosopher), Maximian, Mediolanum

LET’S MAKE GREAT AGAIN!

The Emperor and His Ill-Fated Persian Campaign

Matthew Williams

History 409 | Professor DeForest | 5/10/17 The emperor Julian is a legendary figure. A popular topic of historians throughout the ages due to his extensive firsthand accounts and his calculating demeanor, his undertaking and actions throughout the Persian campaign remain an enigma. This paper aims to dissect Julian’s actions in an attempt to understand why he undertook the Persian campaign. While there are many factors that played into the initiation of the campaign, including military and political goals, Julian’s desire to be great and leave a legacy upon Rome are paramount in understanding the Persian invasion and why it soured so quickly.

Background Christian to Pagan, Scholar to Soldier

Julian “the apostate” was born in 331 (or 332 according to some sources) in

Constantinople.1 His parents, and Basilina were both Christians and therefore they raised Julian to be a Christian as well. Unfortunately, his mother died in 333 of unknown causes and his father, caught up in a power grab, was killed in 337.2 Julian’ life was spared due to his age and the interjection of .3 After the death of his parents, Julian was sent to live with his maternal grandmother in Bythnia until the age of seven, when he was taken in by

Eusebius of , who was the Bishop of Nicomedia. During this time, he was taught by

Mardonius, a gothic , who educated him. After died in 342, Julian was exiled to

Macellum in .4 He remained there until he was eighteen, when, in 349, his exile was repealed and he began his adult life.

1 Robert Browning, The Emperor Julian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 32. 2 Flavius Julianus, "Misopogon." (, 363), 352. 3 Constance Head, The Emperor Julian (Boston: Twayne, 1976), 15. 4 Head, 20.

1 It was at this point that Julian decided to study . At first, he studied philosophy under Aedesius but then began studying under Maximus, who would become a close friend to Julian. In 354, he was recalled to the court of Constantius in , where he spent a year. In 355, he was granted permission to study in , which he did joyfully.

Julian’s time in Athens was crucial, as it formed him into the Pagan he was known to be. While he was there, he dabbled in Pagan circles and was even initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries, a cult based on the Greek , Demeter and Persephone. Later in 355, Julian was again called to Mediolanum, this time to be appointed of the Western empire by Constantius.

Typical of the customs of the time, Julian married Constantius’ sister, to solidify the arrangement. Constantius fully intended Julian to be figurehead, rather than wielding any real power of his own. Initially, Julian wanted nothing to do with government life. Soon, however, he found himself going to great lengths to be involved in ’s government. This is when he learned not only how to be a soldier, but a leader as well.5 As he began to successfully lead skirmishes against Germanic tribes who were living in the area surrounding the river. The success of these attacks solidified Julian’s reputation as a good commander.

In 360, Shapur II, King of the , decided to invade . After seventy-three days of heavy siege, he took the city of Amida. Constantius, still intent on seeing

Julian as a figurehead, bypassed his authority and ordered half of the Gallic army to his Eastern field army. This very well may have been a tactic to try and keep Julian from becoming more popular than Constantius. Nevertheless, in Paris, Julian’s troops declared him to be and an unofficial campaign was undertaken to secure allegiance to the new emperor. While initially,

5 David S. Potter, The at Bay: AD 180-395 (New : Routledge, 2004), 499.

2 Julian was reluctant to refer to himself as Augustus so as to not compete with or offend his cousin, however by November of 360 he was using the term openly6.

In the Spring of 361, Julian took this a step further, leading his army into Allamanni territory and capturing King Vadomarius after Julian had come to believe that Vadomarius was in cahoots with Constantius.7 A civil war between cousins was imminent, but only prevented by

Constantius’ death on November 3, 361, leaving Julian as the sole emperor of Rome.

Antioch The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back

Julian arrived in Antioch in July of 362, having spent the previous five months in

Constantinople.8 Upon his arrival, Julian became aware that merchants were stockpiling food and selling it for much more than it was worth, causing widespread food shortages in the city.9

Julian, placing his faith in the local government, assumed the would address the issue, yet no action was taken to solve the problem.10 As a solution to the problem, Julian fixed the grain prices and ordered grain to be sold, despite the landholders’ argument that they were not receiving fair prices in a time of bad harvest. In addition, he ordered grain to be imported from

Africa to supplement the local grain.

The other issue in Antioch was that of Julian’s ascetic nature. Many Antiochenes wanted an Emperor who placed himself above all others. They were not not accustomed to a down-to- earth emperor such as Julian, as David S. Potter explains:

6 Ibid., 506. 7 Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey. The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume XIII: The Late Empire, A.D. 337-425 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 58. 8 Glenn Warren Bowersock, Julian the Apostate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 95. 9 Ibid., 96. 10 Ibid.

3 [The Antiochenes] expected a man who was both removed from them by the awesome spectacle of imperial power, and would validate their interests and desires by sharing them from his Olympian height…. He was supposed to be interested in what interested his people, and he was supposed to be dignified. He was not supposed to leap up and show his appreciation for a that it was delivered, as Julian had done on January 3, when was speaking, and ignore the chariot races.11

Julian addressed these criticisms in the Misopogon shortly before he departed Antioch.

Disillusioned and unhappy with his experience in Antioch, Julian departed on March 5, 363 for

Persia against the advice of his advisors. He was determined to make Rome great again by doing the impossible: conquering the Persian Empire.

“The Best Laid Plans of Mice and Men Often Go Awry” The Ill-Fated Persian Campaign

Antioch left a bad taste in Julian’s mouth and he wanted nothing more to do with the city.

Julian had spent much of his time in Antioch planning the Persian campaign and he was eager to take action.12 Setting out on the Aleppo road for to rendezvous with his army, Julian was accompanied by his bodyguard as well as the city council and leading citizens of Antioch, in addition to a group of citizens wishing to see the emperor off.13 They marched thirty-five miles to Litarbae, where they spent the first night.14 From there on, Julian was accompanied only by his bodyguard as well as Maximus, , and Oreibasios, Julian’s personal physician.15 They reached Hierapolis on March 9, 363. As the procession entered Hierapolis, tragedy struck. A colonnade collapsed with roughly fifty soldiers beneath it, killing all of them. This was an ominous start to the campaign.16 Julian seems to have been undeterred, however, underscoring

11 Potter, 515-516. 12 Browning, 191. 13 Ibid., 195. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Head, 161.

4 his confidence in a letter to Libanius written a few days later.17 Once in Hierapolis, Julian’s plan was to send eleven-hundred river boats south-east down the , while he and his army marched northeast in an attempt to confuse Shapur II and his forces.18 Key to Julian’s strategy was “secrecy of planning, surprise, and swiftness”19 By this point, Julian was regularly having nightmares, as he was fully aware he may not survive the campaign.20 Julian met with his cousin

Procopius in Carrae and reportedly gave him one of his purple cloaks to solidify his intention to have succeed him were he to be killed in the campaign. He also gave Procopius command of twenty to thirty thousand auxiliary troops.21 Julian requested that they patrol east of

Carrae, as there had been reports of enemy skirmishes.22 Yet another ominous event took place just as Julian was about to leave Carrae. Constance Head recounts:

Julian’s favorite horse was named “Babylonius” for one of Persia’s great cities. That morning just as the Emperor was preparing to mount, one of the Roman archers shot Babylonius and the horse fell to the ground in terrible pain, shaking off its gold and jeweled ornaments. “Babylon has fallen, stripped of all its adornments,” Julian cried out.”23

Julian, being optimistic, interpreted this as a positive sign that he would defeat Persia, and continued on with the campaign. On March 27, 363, Julian’s army reached Callinicum, where they were to rendezvous with the coming the next day. The next stop on the campaign was Circusium, a “frontier fortress” which was several days from Callinicum.24 From

17 Browning, 195. 18 R.T. Ridley, "Notes on Julian's Persian Expedition (363)." Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 22, no. 2 (1973): 317-330, 318. 19 W.E. Kaegi "Constantine's and Julian's strategies of strategic surprise against the Persians." Athenaeum 59 (1981): 209. 20 Head, 161 21 Walter R. Chalmers, ", , and on Julian's Persian Expedition," The Classical Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Nov 1960): 9 22 Head, 161. 23 Ibid., 162. 24 Head, 162.

5 Circusium, the entire army had to cross the Abora River on pontoons, which required a few days.25 Once the entire army had moved across the river, they marched approximately twenty miles downstream to the tomb of Emperor Gordian where Julian stopped to pay respect to his fallen predecessor.26 It was here that Julian addressed his troops. It was a significant occasion, as it had been nearly seventy years since the last time a had been active on Persian territory.27 A notable part of the speech:

By the assistance of the eternal , I, your emperor, will be always among you as a leader and a comrade, relying, as I well believe, on favourable omens. But if variable fortune shall defeat me in battle, it will still be sufficient for me to have devoted myself for the welfare of the Roman world, like ancient Curtii and Mucii, and the illustrious family of the Decii. We have to abolish a most pernicious nation, on whose swords the blood of our kindred is not yet dry…. I promise you all, that when our affairs have met with success, without entrenching myself behind my imperial prerogative, so as to consider all my own decisions and opinions irrefragably just and reasonable because of my authority, I will give, if required, a full explanation of all that I have done, that you may be able to judge whether it has been wise or not.28

While the speech can, for the most part, be viewed as one of motivation, it does in certain parts, reflect Julian’s military goals for the Persian campaign. He aims to secure the eastern provinces by way of “a limited victory followed by a treaty.”29

On April 6, 363, the Roman army traversed the Persian frontier.30 After four days of marching along the Euphrates, the army came across its first defended Persian city, Anatha, a

25 Adrian Murdoch, The Last Pagan: Julian the Apostate And the Death of the Ancient World, (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2008), 170 26 Head, 163. 27 Browning, 198. 28 Ammianus Marcellinus, The Roman History of Ammianus Marcellinus During the Reigns of the Emperors Constantius, Julian, Jovianus, Valentinian, and . Translated by Charles D. Younge. (: Henry G. Bohn, 1862), 23.5.19. 29 Browning, 199. 30 Ibid.,

6 small city on an island in the river. After a small skirmish between the Anatha defense garrison and Prince Hormizd’s troops, the garrison surrendered. Following the surrender, another interesting episode occurred. One of the citizens of Anatha was a centenarian who had been a soldier under seven decades earlier. He had been left behind in Persia and settled down and created a vast family.31 He was jubilant to see Roman troops yet again. He resolved that he always knew he would die on Roman soil.32 This helped raise troop morale and further convinced Julian that he was doing the right thing.

Continuing southward along the Euphrates, the army came across the next fortified position, Thilutha. The city refused to surrender to Julian, but conceded to swear allegiance to the Romans if they were successful in conquering Persia.33 Farther down the river, another town,

Achaiachala did the same thing.34 Many towns they passed were abandoned; the citizens anticipating the Romans’ arrival. As such, these towns were razed by the troops. The Roman army practiced “scorched-earth” policy very commonly on this campaign. Up to this point, the

Roman military had not yet encountered any organized Persian resistance. That is, until one morning the Roman army awoke to see “glittering helmets and bristling armour.”35 The Roman army was able to successfully ward off the attackers and made their way toward the city of

Pirisabora.

Pirisabora was a large, fortified city with large walls surrounding it.36 Getting into the city would prove to be a challenge. The city could not be bypassed, however, due to its tactical

31 Head, 164-165. 32 Browning, 199. 33 Head, 165. 34 Ibid. 35 Marcellinus, 24.2.5 36 Chalmers, 159.

7 significance as a supply depot and stronghold.37 “The emperor having ridden all round the walls and reconnoitred [sic] its position, began to lay siege to it with great caution, as if he would make the townsmen abandon its defence from mere terror.”38 The first day of siege did little to penetrate the defenses. On the second day, Julian “commanded all his Men [sic] to mind their bufinefs, [sic] and carry on the Siege [sic] with all their vigour.”39 Roman battering rams were able to break through the city walls. Once Roman soldiers made it into the city, the townspeople retreated to the citadel, which was fortified in itself. Roman soldiers tried in vain to break down the door, but it was clad with iron, and thus impenetrable by their methods.40 It was then that

Julian ordered a siege engine known as a helepolis to be used, which was essentially a huge wooden tower with soldiers in it. Ammianus Marcellinus details the response:

The garrison, anxiously viewing this engine, which was to exceed the height of their lofty towers and considering at the same time the determination of the besiegers, suddenly betook themselves to supplications, and spreading over the towers and walls, imploring the pardon and protection of the Romans with outstretched hands.41

After their surrender, approximately 2,500 civilians and soldiers were allowed to leave the city.

Once they had left, the Romans set the city and its citadel on fire.42

The following day, on April 30, 363, three Roman squadrons guarding the outskirts of Pirisabora were ambushed by a Persian cavalry force led by the Surena. There were a few deaths, and a standard was stolen.43 While the ambush had a negligible effect on the campaign, Julian was furious and reacted somewhat extremely. He ordered “decimation” to be

37 Murdoch, 172. 38 Marcellinus 24.2.9 39 Zosimus. New History: Book III. (London: Green and Chaplin, 1814), 180 40 Marcellinus 24.2.14 41 Ibid., 24.2.19 42 Browning, 201. 43 Ibid.

8 carried out against the surviving troops.44 Decimation was an ancient Roman practice usually reserved for cases of treason. It involved killing ten Roman soldiers who were involved in the ambush.45 The next few days were spent tugging through a flooded irrigation plain. On May 8,

363, Julian and his army reached the city of Maiozamalcha. It was well-fortified. Being up on a rocky cliff. Edward Gibbon describes it as “defended by sixteen large towers, a deep ditch, and two strong and solid walls of brick and bitumen.”46 Julian initially offered the city a chance to surrender, but all offers were rejected. Julian saw no other way forward except direct assault. The

Romans gave it their all. Siege engines, such as catapults and battering rams were utilized, but to no avail. An attempt to dig a hole under the wall was also begun. A group of soldiers attempted to get to the city gate in testudo (“turtle”) formation, wherein a group of soldiers interlock their shields overhead, similar to a turtle shell. All the while, Maiozamalchians were hurling down projectiles from the walls.47 That evening, Julian received word that one of the tunnels under the wall had been completed. He had his main troops mount an attack on the exterior wall, while a core group of soldiers went through the tunnel. When they emerged from the tunnel, they were in a room where a woman was grinding corn. The soldiers killed her and then killed many Persian soldiers. The Romans were on a rampage. They killed every person they saw, ignited every building they passed; there were no holds barred.48 By the next day, the city lay in ruins, destroyed by the Romans.

44 Murdoch, 173. 45 Browning, 202. 46 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Volume 2. (London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell), 1781), 436. 47 Browning, 203. 48 Browning, 204.

9 The Romans stayed in the vicinity of Maiozamalcha until mid-May. It was an arduous journey, as the Persians had many canals in this region, which all needed to be bridged so the army could cross them. After a two-day march, the troops set up camp near Seleuceia. Along the way, the army came across Shapur’s hunting lodge and, rather than burning it down, admired it for its Roman architecture.49 They were to camp here for two days. Julian rode ahead to gather intelligence about the situation at Ctesiphon. Julian saw no signs of an organized military resistance. Suddenly, Julian’s party was attacked by Persian soldiers from a small town nearby.

Julian was almost killed in the ambush. He fixed to destroy the town from which they came, however, during the night, yet another ambush took place, this time inflicting heavy casualties on

Julian’s troops. He severely punished the survivors of the attack and took personal command of the attack against the town. Julian ultimately won this battle, at the cost of several days and many of his men’s lives. All the while, Shapur, with his massive field army, was closing in on them.50

After a two-day rest, the army broke camp for Ctesiphon. There were a two obstacles to overcome, however. First, there was the River, which had to be crossed. Second, on the opposite bank of the Tigris, a large Persian force was waiting. The Romans could see their glittering armor in the distance. With them, were the Persian’s ultimate weapon of war; the fourth-century equivalent of the Nazi Regime’s “Tiger” tank: war elephants. Most Romans had never seen, heard, or smelled an elephant before, and were mortified by them.51 Their thick hides made them difficult to bring down, and if a soldier came too close, they very well could be crushed. To deal with this situation, Julian, again acting contradictory to the advice of his

49 Michael H Dodgeon and Samuel N.C Lieu, The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (AD 226-363): A Documentary History, (New York: Routledge, 1991), 235. 50 Browning, 205. 51 Browning 206.

10 generals and advisors, ordered his army to cross the river on the night of May 26.52 He spent the days leading up to the maneuver enacting a clever deception upon the watching Persians. He had a racetrack made for the cavalry to race their horses, offering winners prizes. As well, he had food and supplies offloaded from ships in the river. He intended to make the Persians think he was staying there a while.53 To everyone’s surprise, the distraction worked. The Persian forces let their guard down. Thus, on the night of May 26, 363, Julian ordered several of his largest ships across the river, laden with troops. The Persians detected the invasion and began fiercely defending the bank of the river. A few of the ships had been ignited by Persian firebrands, and the troops in the boats were struggling. To preserve morale, Julian told his troops that the fires they saw in the distance was a “prearranged Roman victory signal.”54 With that, he ordered the rest of his troops across the river, despite the fact that no bridgehead had yet been created. The quantity of Roman boats and soldiers was able to overwhelm the Persian defenses, and before long, the entire army was on the right of the Tigris, heading for Ctesiphon.55

It was not long before the Roman army encountered the Persian army, led by the Surena.

On May 29, 363, Julian gave the order to charge, and a hail of Roman arrows and rained down upon the Persians, covering the advance of the Roman soldiers. Julian was in the middle of the action, giving motivation to his troops and surveying the situation. “The Battel [sic] continu’d [sic] from twelve a Clock at Night till twelve a Clock at noon next Day.”56 It was then that the Persian defensive line began to crack, and they retreated to the safety of the walled city of Ctesiphon. A hot pursuit followed, until Count interjected, making the argument that

52 Head, 169. 53 Murdoch, 176. 54 Head, 169. 55 Browning, 206. 56 Zosimus,194.

11 “if the soldiers allowed themselves to be hurried within the walls without any order, and could then find no means of returning, they might be overwhelmed by the mass of their enemies.”57

Ultimately, less than seventy Roman soldiers were killed, whereas nearly 2,500 Persians had been killed.58

The council of war was called to discuss their options. The majority opinion was that a siege against Ctesiphon would end in disaster, but a of ten bulls to , the god of war, was undertaken for reassurance. Ammianus Marcellinus recalls the sacrifice:

Ten most beautiful bulls were brought for the purpose, nine of which, even before they reached the altars, lay down of their own accord with mournful countenances, but the tenth broke his bonds and escaped, and was with difficulty brought back at all; and when sacrificed displayed very unfavourable omens.59

Julian was outraged by the result of the sacrifice, and vowed never again to sacrifice to Mars.

This negative , as well as many other logistical and practical concerns supported the decision to avoid an invasion of Ctesiphon. Among these were the facts that they were in a desert and, being it was May, the heat of summer was approaching quickly. Most members of the council of war wanted to retreat from Persia as quickly as possible.60 Another factor that influenced the decision was the arrival of two Persian nobles, who had their noses cut off, reportedly as a result of the “tyranny of King Shapur.” They claimed they escaped Ctesiphon and wanted to help the Romans avenge their mutilated faces.61 They apparently knew of a quick land route that would reconnect them with the other Roman army, south of Armenia. Convinced a land retreat would be the best option, and knowing the river fleet could not sail upstream, Julian

57 Marcellinus, 24.6.13. 58 Marcellinus, 24.6.15. 59 Marcellinus, 24.6.16. 60 Browning, 208. 61 Browning, 208.

12 ordered the fleet to be burned, so as to not allow it to fall into enemy hands. Suspect of the

Persian noblemens’ story, a Roman officer ordered them to be tortured. As it turned out, they had voluntarily had their faces mutilated so as to deceive the Romans into destroying their fleet and taking a land route deep into Persian territory, where King Shapur’s army would likely be waiting to ambush them.62 While they claimed to be traitors to their king, in actuality they were loyal to the point that they would allow their noses to be removed. Orders were given at once to extinguish the fleet, but it was too late: the boats were damaged beyond repair. The decision to march overland into Persia still won out as the best, and preparations for the march continued.

Most sources from the period indicate that there was no clear direction, and Julian himself probably did not really know what he should do.

On June 16, the Roman army set out, marching up the left bank of the Tigris River.63

There were constant light skirmishes with Persian forces, but nothing of significance. After marching for four days, with supplies dwindling and morale low, the army made camp at

Maranga. They remained there until June 26, taking time to rest, bury their dead, and formulate a plan. Just before dawn on June 26, Julian requested the advice of Etruscan haruspices to determine his next move. They warned him that he must not go into battle, and recommended the army remain at Maranga for one more day. Julian brushed aside these objections, and decided to proceed north towards Samarra. As soon as it was light enough, camp was broken and the army set off. They were under constant attack from Persian forces. Julian was at the front of the column of troops when he received word that the back of the column was under heavy attack.

Without thinking, he rode to the back of the column, not taking a moment to put on his armor or

62 Ibid., 209. 63 Ibid., 210.

13 assess the situation adequately. On his way to the back of the column, he was informed that the left flank of the army was also being attacked by and were retreating. Julian rushed there to see what he could do. He made an attempt to rally the soldiers and push the

Persians back. While all this was happening, his bodyguard unit had been dispersed, leaving

Julian completely unprotected. His men desparately shouted for him to return, but it was to no avail. Suddenly, a came out of nowhere and grazed his arm and pierced the side of his torso. He tried to remove the spear, but severely cut his hand on the sharp blade. Moments later he fell from his horse and laid on the ground in shock.64 His bodyguard unit reconvened and rushed Julian to his tent on the back of a shield.65 Julian initially thought he would survive, and requested his horse and shield be brought to the tent right away. He was, however, too weak to walk, and certainly could not fight. Oreibasios, his physician was busy treating his wounds. It was realized that the spear had gone deep into Julian’s body and likely punctured his liver.66 The doctors managed to stop the bleeding, but they knew it was only a matter of time before he would die. Julian asked where he was, and was informed the place was called Phrygia. Julian once consulted an oracle who told him he would die in a place called Phrygia. Julian was stunned by the realization that he would die. Julian somberly addressed everyone present, including

Ammianus Marcellinus, who records the speech:

The seasonable moment for my surrendering this life, O comrades, has now arrived, and, like an honest debtor, I exult in preparing to restore what nature reclaims; not in affliction and sorrow, since I have learnt, from the general teaching of philosophers, how much more capable of happiness the mind is than the body; and considering that when the better part is separated from the worse, it is a subject of joy rather than of mourning. Reflecting, also, that there have been instances in which

64 Browning, 212. 65 Zosimus, 199. 66 Head, 175.

14 even the gods have given to some persons of extreme piety, death as the best of all rewards.67

After he made his farewell address, Julian distributed his private property among his friends.

Everyone around him was weeping, and he reminded them that it was humiliating to mourn for an emperor who has been united with heaven. He lay for a while discussing the nature of the soul with Maximus and Priscus. At around midnight, the wound in his side burst open, bleeding profusely. Julian, gasping for breath, asked for a cup of water. He took a drink, and then quietly passed away. He was thirty-one years old.68

Analysis: Why the Persian Campaign?

There are many theories to explain why Julian initiated the Persian campaign in the first place. Libanius asserts that it was a retaliatory act against the Persian government for their recent invasion into the Roman eastern provinces, stating “[Julian] thought it tantamount to treason to desire peace and to refrain from exacting punishment.”69 Ammianus Marcellinus argues that “he was eager to add to his other glories the of Parthicus.”70 Historian Constance Head argues that Maximus had convinced Julian that he was a reincarnation of Alexander the Great and that “[Julian thought] he would succeed where many of his predecessors failed, and would unite the Hellenic and Persian worlds under one ruler as Alexander of Macedon had done nearly seven centuries before.”71 Historian John Browning is partially in agreement with this, but adds that prior to the campaign, the military had gone a while without a victory and the ability to collect spoils, and as a result “morale was low, their loyalty suspect. They might be persuaded to

67 Marcellinus, 25.3.15. 68 Ibid., 25.3.23. 69 Libanius. Libanius: Selected Works . Translated by A.F. Norman. Vol. I. III vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 17.19. 70 Marcellinus, 22.12.2. 71 Head, 159.

15 support a rival candidate for the imperial throne. The sooner Julian led them in a victorious campaign the better, both for him and for them.”72 David S. Potter argues that Julians main goal

“appears to have been “regime change,” the replacement of Sapor with his brother Hormisdas, who would accompany Julian on the campaign.”73 Adrian Murdoch concurs, stating “The primary reason [for the campaign was] the need for some morale boosting PR. Although the

Persian king’s actual gains over the previous two years had been minor in the grand scheme of things—the destruction of Amida and Singara, and the capture of Bezabde—they had had a disproportunate effect on the Roman psyche.”74

It is hard to say what the exact motivation may have been for Julian. Clearly, Julian thought very highly of himself and desired to leave a great legacy. He admired previous great rulers and conquerors such as Alexander the Great and he desired to be like him. To an extent, he was able to do this, being a popular philosopher and a worthy soldier, Julian was the embodiment of a good emperor. Like all good emperors, however, he needed something to be known for.

Julian’s ambition led him to try the impossible, conquering Persia. The way Julian saw it, conquering Persia would be a cure-all for the empire and himself. Not only would it secure the eastern provinces, but it would add Persian territory to the Empire, punishing the Persians for their invasion of Roman territory. In addition, he would earn the title “Parthicus” and be forever known to history. It would also raise the morale of the Roman military and increase their loyalty to Julian as the emperor, ultimately solidifying his chances of reigning for a long time. In addition to all that, it would help him legitimize his religion. had grown out of fashion,

72 Browning, 191. 73 Potter, 517. 74 Murdoch, 157.

16 and if a Pagan emperor was able to accomplish everything he wanted to, then people might feel inspired to be Pagan.

Julian’s Persian campaign remains the hallmark of his reign. It was a bold military undertaking with the world’s main superpower invading the other main superpower. It is unsurprising that it did not succeed, but the fact that it went so far, and Julian was so determined sheds light on his true character. There were many potential reasons for the undertaking:

Reputation, political power, religion, even ego, among others. It really cannot be pinpointed, but the reasons must be understood in a multi-faceted manner. Julian yearned for a Rome of yesteryear, a militaristic, Pagan with sprawling trade and an unstoppable expansionist military ideal. He wanted to renew the glory days of Rome, and reinvigorate cities such as Antioch and Constantinople. He wanted to continue the Pagan traditions, customs, and holidays that he read about in his studies. In short, Julian wanted to make Rome great again.

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Potter, David Stone. The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180-395. New York: Routledge, 2004.

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