Issue 50 September 2015
Dayton +20 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement
plus articles on: safe shelter, asylum adjudication, assisted voluntary return, resettled refugees, and the landscape of protection
FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION ONLY Forced Migration Review issue 50 • www.fmreview.org/dayton20
Dayton +20 37 Interpretations of Annex 7: assessing the impact on non-returnees in the UK 4 Foreword: Addressing the legacy of violence Gayle Munro Valentin Inzko 39 The role of remote voting in encouraging return 5 Map of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina Djordje Stefanovic and Neophytos Loizides 6 Annex 7: why are we still discussing it? 42 Home after Dayton: IDPs in Sarajevo María del Pilar Valledor Álvarez Gruia Badescu 7 Political and social consequences of continuing 44 The compound effects of conflict and disaster displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina Lana Pašić Wesli H Turner 9 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years on from Dayton 46 Prijedor: re-imagining the future Andrew Mayne Damir Mitrić and Sudbin Musić 12 Resolving a protracted refugee situation through 48 Mass evacuations: learning from the past a regional process Caelin Briggs Olga Mitrovic 49 Bosnia revisited: a retrospective on the legacy 16 Voices in displacement of the conflict Claudia Meyerhoefer Brad K Blitz 18 Property rights and reconstruction in the Bosnian return process General articles Inmaculada Serrano 21 Resolving protracted displacement through 52 Inconsistency in asylum appeal adjudication social housing Nick Gill, Rebecca Rotter, Andrew Burridge, Marc D’Silva and Sanela Imamovic Melanie Griffiths and Jennifer Allsopp 24 Asking the right questions in research on 55 Sheltering displaced persons from sexual and psychosocial well-being gender-based violence Selma Porobic Julie Freccero 26 Wartime division in peacetime schools 58 Changing how we measure success in Valery Perry resettlement 28 Their last name is ‘refugee’: return and local Justin S Lee, Suzie S Weng and Sarah Ivory activism 60 Young Afghans facing return Peter Lippman Kim Robinson and Lucy Williams 32 Human rights shortcomings of the Dayton 62 A fragmented landscape of protection Peace Agreement Roger Zetter Lisbeth Pilegaard and Jasminka Dzumhur 66 News from the Refugee Studies Centre 34 If women are left out of peace talks Gorana Mlinarević, Nela Porobić Isaković and 68 Still worth reading... Madeleine Rees
Front cover Local musician Vedran Smailović – who became known as ‘the Cellist of Sarajevo’ – plays inside the partially destroyed National Library in Sarajevo during the Bosnian war. 12th September 1992. Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev www.evstafiev.com Vedran Smailović was a cellist in the Sarajevo String Quartet, the Sarajevo Opera, the Sarajevo Philharmonic Orchestra, the Symphony Orchestra RTV Sarajevo and the National Theatre of Sarajevo. He regularly played his cello in ruined buildings and at funerals during the siege of Sarajevo, frequently performing Albinoni’s Adagio in G Minor. He left the city in 1993. In April 2012, Smailović returned to Sarajevo, 20 years after the beginning of the war: https://vimeo.com/39846516. Forced Migration Review (FMR) provides a forum for the From the editors regular exchange of practical wenty years on from the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November experience, information and ideas T1995, the consequences of conflict – including the long-term effects of between researchers, refugees displacement – are still being felt in the Western Balkans. and internally displaced people, and those who work with them. This issue of FMR focuses largely on the question of return. Some of those who It is published in English, Arabic, were driven from their homes have been unable to return; others have returned Spanish and French by the but have struggled to rebuild their lives. The Agreement may have brought an Refugee Studies Centre of the end to war but its implementation has not yet put an end to human suffering Oxford Department of International and social crisis. Development, University of Oxford. As one of our authors says, “Twenty years on, the return project is ready for Staff review.” This is an appropriate moment to examine the particular case of people Marion Couldrey & who were displaced from and within Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of Maurice Herson (Editors) the 1992-95 war, and to reflect on the lessons that may be drawn from the Andonis Marden (Finance and Promotion Assistant) successes and failures of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These lessons have Sharon Ellis (Assistant) resonance for current crises – such as in Syria or Ukraine – and merit attention. Forced Migration Review We would like to thank Selma Porobic (Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, Refugee Studies Centre University of Sarajevo) and Erin Mooney (United Nations Protection Capacity/ Oxford Department of International ProCap) for their assistance as advisors on the feature theme of this issue. Development, University of Oxford, We are also grateful to Catholic Relief Services-USCCB, the Swiss Federal 3 Mansfield Road, Department of Foreign Affairs and UNHCR’s Regional Bureau for Europe for Oxford OX1 3TB, UK their financial support. [email protected] FMR 50 also includes a number of ‘general’ articles on: safe shelters for Skype: fmreview survivors of SGBV, inconsistencies in asylum appeal adjudication in the UK, Tel: +44 (0)1865 281700 assisted voluntary return of young Afghans, refugees’ perspectives on successful resettlement in the US, and the fragmentation of the protection landscape. www.fmreview.org (Please note that all our ‘general’ articles are also now gathered together online, Disclaimer at www.fmreview.org/general-articles.) Opinions in FMR do not necessarily The full issue and all the individual articles in this issue are online in html, pdf reflect the views of the Editors, and audio formats at www.fmreview.org/dayton20. Please help disseminate the Refugee Studies Centre or the University of Oxford. this issue by circulating to networks, mentioning it on Twitter and Facebook and adding it to resources lists. Copyright Any FMR print or online material This issue (and its accompanying expanded contents summary) will be available may be freely reproduced, online in English, Arabic, French, Spanish and Bosnian (both Latin and Cyrillic provided that acknowledgement alphabets). However, due to shortage of funds, FMR 50 will be available in print is given to ‘Forced Migration in English, Arabic and Bosnian only. Review www.fmreview.org’. See website for more details. Please email us at [email protected] if you would like printed copies. Forthcoming issues: ‘Destination: Europe’ – Due out December 2015. This issue will discuss the complexities of the European asylum debate, placing it in its broader context. ISSN 1460-9819 ‘Thinking ahead: displacement, transition and solutions’ – Due out May 2016. Designed by For more details, see www.fmreview.org/forthcoming. Art24 www.art24.co.uk Join us on Facebook or Twitter or sign up for our occasional email alerts at www.fmreview.org/request/alerts. Printed by Oxuniprint Marion Couldrey and Maurice Herson www.oxuniprint.co.uk Editors, Forced Migration Review 4 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Foreword: Addressing the legacy of violence Valentin Inzko
The devastation orchestrated by political, robustly to end this obstruction. But military and paramilitary leaders a something else was also at play: an effort generation ago continues to exert a to cement ethnicity as a single social and malicious influence on the Western political building block. This is a policy Balkans region long after many of those we must continue to push back on. responsible have been convicted for their In many cases, those who have crimes. Just as the legacy of rape, murder tried to consolidate the results of forced and genocide committed during the migration appear to believe that their conflict has left the region deeply scarred, efforts are principled. They have accepted so has the ideology of ethno-territorial the argument that people with different nationalism poisoned its societies. customs and beliefs cannot live peacefully This is the complex subject explored together. They are wrong. Their vision, their in this issue of Forced Migration Review. narrative, runs counter to the conclusive Contributions reflect lessons learned and evidence from other parts of the world insights gained from practitioner and that societies that encompass complex and researcher engagement in the Western intermingled identities can and do thrive. It Balkans over the last 20 years. This also flies in the face of the historical record practice-oriented approach offers us a in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a society which tool to be more effective in tackling the for centuries was a model of successful problems the international community – often fruitful – coexistence among faces in this region and beyond, and this different religions and cultural traditions. is why this work has my strong support. I believe that the irrational acceptance of a principle of divisiveness underpins Combating ethnic division many of the problems discussed in the In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aim of following pages. The forced migration creating ethnically homogeneous statelets – ‘ethnic cleansing’ – conducted in the was curbed at Dayton but the dominance Western Balkans during the 1990s has not of ethnic politics was not. In many ways it been fully and universally understood as a was entrenched. While the Dayton Peace moral as well as a political failure, and its Agreement explicitly provides for the return legacy of suspicion and spite continues to of all refugees and displaced persons to their frustrate efforts to reverse the demographic pre-war homes and requires the authorities distortions created by violence. This to uphold and facilitate this process, it core challenge is one that will need to also relies on the goodwill of authorities be faced ever more directly in future. who often perceive their political interest Many of the people of Bosnia and to be in maintaining ethnic division. Herzegovina, working with the active Substantial numbers of people have support of the international community, exercised their right to return – it is are determined to address this political important to remember this success. But challenge and we owe it to them and to it is also true that powerful elites have the victims of the war and of course to continued to resist the reintegration of future generations to continue to support the country, clearly acting outside the them. It is a long hard struggle but one provisions of the constitutional settlement. that, I am certain, will in the long term Public officials – from municipal clerks see reintegration triumph over division. to those in high office – have obstructed Valentin Inzko, High Representative to Bosnia return. Indeed, in the decade after the war, and Herzegovina. For more information, please High Representatives had to intervene contact [email protected]. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 5 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina The General Framework Agreement, also known as the Dayton Accords, Dayton Peace Agreement, Paris Protocol or Dayton-Paris Agreement, is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, in the United States, in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. This Agreement put an end to the Bosnian war that had started in April 1992. The political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) created by the Dayton Peace Agreement comprise two ‘entities’ – the Federation of BiH, with mostly Bosniaks and Croats as its ‘constituent peoples’, and the Republika Srpska, with mostly Serbs – plus, since 1999, Brčko District as a self-governing administrative unit under the sovereignty of BiH. The text of the Agreement is online at www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379
Original: Rainer Lesniewski/Shutterstock.com 6 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Annex 7: why are we still discussing it? María del Pilar Valledor Álvarez
Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement was designed to address the displacement of 2.2 million people during the Bosnian war of 1992-95. Its job is not yet done.
The clash of separatist and ethnic interests Sarajevo, would be responsible for settling in the Balkans led to a war that began in early property and compensation claims. But four 1992 and in which the use of violence against years of war had left a legacy of distrust civilians shocked the world. It was during that ended the hope that those who had this conflict that the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ been displaced would easily or readily was coined to describe the use of torture, return to live side by side in peace. rape, indiscriminate killings, internment in prison camps and the expulsion of thousands Continuing discrimination and of civilians from their homes and towns displacement in order to achieve ethnic ‘purity’. It is This climate of mistrust and fear between estimated that 263,000 people died and more different ethnic groups continued, and than two million people – out of a pre-war many refused to return home. Of those who population of 4.4 million – were displaced. did return, many suffered discrimination Of the displaced, about a million in trying to access the labour market or remained in the country and up to 1.2 million other public services such as health or fled to other countries. Germany received education. The protection of returnees some 350,000 refugees, Croatia about 300,000 and their homes, especially in the case and Austria 80,000, followed by Slovenia with of minorities, was essential to ensure the more than 33,000 and Switzerland with almost initial success of the repatriation, and more 27,000. The Netherlands and Denmark took active involvement of the multinational in some 23,000 refugees each, and the United peacekeeping force (SFOR) deployed after Kingdom and Norway 12,000 and 13,000 the war could have been instrumental in respectively. Some 610,000 of the refugees increasing the number of returnees at this were Bosniaks, 307,000 Bosnian Croats, early stage. To all these difficulties was added 253,000 Bosnian Serbs and 23,000 others. the pressure on some European countries The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed to repatriate hundreds of thousands of on 21st November 1995, brought the war to Bosnian refugees despite the shortage of an end. funds to rebuild damaged homes, build Annex 7 to the Peace Agreement was new ones or finance compensation claims. designed to be key to the future stability of The limited success of the implementation the region as it recognised the right of all of Annex 7 has its origin in the Dayton displaced people to return to their homes Peace Agreement itself, in the negotiators of origin, or to receive compensation for and signatories who entrusted the security property to which, for whatever reason, of return of minorities to the same they could not return. Furthermore, the authorities who had ordered their ethnic parties to the Agreement were required cleansing during the war. The signing of to implement a repatriation plan to be the Peace Agreement ended the war but drawn up by the United Nations High after twenty years thousands of people Commissioner for Refugees. They had to are still displaced and solutions to the commit to provide the necessary assistance legacy of the war are still needed. and take the necessary political, economic María del Pilar Valledor Álvarez and social measures to ensure the voluntary [email protected] return of refugees and displaced persons. Doctor of Law from the Universidad Rey An independent commission, based in Juan Carlos. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 7 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 Political and social consequences of continuing displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina Lana Pašić
Twenty years after Dayton, failures to facilitate effective refugee and IDP return have had a social and political impact at both community and state level.
The 1990s wars in the Balkans triggered to social and health services. They may large-scale displacement within the region. not be able to finance their return or the Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia hosted reconstruction of their pre-conflict homes; about 40% of the refugees from Bosnia and furthermore, finding a job and reintegrating Herzegovina (BiH), while Austria, Germany, into the economy where there already is Canada, the United States and Australia a staggeringly high unemployment rate also received large numbers. One hundred is particularly difficult for a person from thousand people died in the conflict and two a minority ethnic group. When returns million people – almost half the population occur, it is often the older and economically of BiH – were displaced, one million of inactive population that moves back, which whom were internally displaced. Although affects the dynamic of community life and the peace agreement signed in Dayton, in turn hampers the potential for economic Ohio, on 21 November 1995 made provision activity and development in the area. for the return of refugees and IDPs to their Refugee and IDP return is also likely to be place of origin, 20 years on the impact of discouraged by the nature of the restructured displacement still affects the social fabric, state whereby, for example, the education political context and economy of the country. system is divided ethnically, following the The first two years following the war majority ethnic curriculum for subjects such saw large numbers of people returning as history, language and religious studies. from abroad – but mainly to the areas Finally, most of the IDPs, particularly the where their ethnic group was dominant younger ones, have by now re-established (known as ‘majority returns’). ‘Minority their lives and livelihoods and have built returns’ – displaced people who would now social capital in new areas of residence, be ethnically in the numerical minority and no longer have connections with their in their areas of origin – only picked up place of origin or a desire to return there. in the early 2000s, and by the mid-2000s it was clear that most of the ‘returns’ were Political and social consequences fictional. People returned and registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina was ethnically the their place of origin solely for the purpose of most mixed state in the former Yugoslavia, reclaiming and then selling their property, with a high degree of mutual respect, after which they moved back to areas where tolerance and coexistence. The displacement their ethnic group was in the majority. of large numbers of people during the This was particularly clear in the case of conflict, however, causeddemographic Serbs in Sarajevo, who tended to re-settle changes in the ethnic composition of in the predominantly Serb part of the city, towns and villages. Although Annex 7 of which is part of the Republika Srpska. the Dayton Peace Agreement attempted to Some of the displaced choose not to return restore the multi-ethnic character of BiH, the because of past traumas and a continuing ‘entity’ lines1 followed war-time divisions feeling of insecurity, others because of and when the displaced populations did an absence of economic opportunities. not, on the whole, return to their pre-war Displaced populations often experience residence, ethnic homogeneity was further high rates of poverty and limited access embedded. The result was the creation of 8 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 UNHCR/R LeMoyne
Sarajevo, 1996. separate, almost mono-ethnic communities politics and potential secession, generating with little intermingling of the population. renewed political instability in the country. These entity lines pose not only Although Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace institutional and structural borders but Agreement created a legal and policy also emotional and psychological barriers. framework for the return of refugees and Heterogeneous, mixed communities were the IDPs with the goal of re-building inter- places of the most vicious fighting, and return ethnic trust and respect, the subsequent to these areas has been slow and difficult. policies and approaches did not succeed in In cases where it has occurred, the high ensuring long-term returns and, with that, levels of mistrust and in some cases ethnic long-term stability and community building. intolerance remain, with little potential for Although the majority of the population of building strong and integrated communities. BiH simply wishes to see progress and better In turn, mistrust, intolerance and lack of opportunities, the approach to refugee and community-level integration have resulted IDP return has instead perpetuated political in the failure of reconciliation efforts at both and economic instability by entrenching the community and national level. Even in ethnic divisions. The absence of inter-ethnic cases where there have been minority returns, community integration which could have these did not necessarily facilitate the process happened through returns also resulted in of reconciliation; simply sharing living space missed opportunities for reconciliation. does not imply that the ethnic groups have resolved the issues of the past and forgiven Lana Pašić [email protected] @Lana_Pasic each other. And as people from different Writer and development consultant from Bosnia ethnic groups continue to live separately from and Herzegovina, and regular contributor to and each other, the divisions are being fomented editor of Balkanalysis.com.
and used by those promoting nationalist 1. The Dayton Peace Agreement divided BiH into two ‘entities’: the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 9 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years on from Dayton Andrew Mayne
The coming two-and-a-half years represent what is possibly the last window of opportunity to accomplish what the Dayton Peace Agreement’s Annex 7 set out to achieve.
The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the the most acute needs. It is estimated that war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 84,5002 persons still holding IDP status and on 14 December 1995, and its Annex 7 on 47,000 ‘minority returnees’ (those displaced ‘Agreement on Refugees and Displaced who now found their ethnicity to be in the Persons’ established that: “All refugees and numerical minority in their areas of origin) displaced persons have the right freely to are still in need of support to obtain a return to their homes of origin […] to have sustainable solution. The challenge for BiH restored to them property of which they were today is thus to be able to identify and select deprived in the course of hostilities since the families who most need the assistance 1991 and to be compensated for any property that is available, and to make sure that that cannot be restored to them.”1 In the assistance does actually go to these people. following ten years, over one million of the While this sounds simple enough, five main 2.2 million people displaced by the conflict in recurrent problems typically hinder progress: BiH returned and/or recovered their pre-war fragmentation in the institutional setup of property; more than 200,000 properties were BiH that prolongs decision making and restored to their pre-war owners through a hinders coordination Property Law Implementation Plan; and some 317,000 housing units were reconstructed. the absence of updated information on the Progress then slowed, as most of the persons remaining in need and the severity remaining population of concern were of the problems they face – information vulnerable, had no property to reconstruct or that is necessary in order to facilitate were reluctant or too frail to return and unable needs-based prioritisation and to counter to achieve solutions without special help. the widely shared political conviction that Recognition of this led to the Revised Strategy members of all three constituent peoples for implementation of Annex 7, adopted by should receive an equal share of assistance both houses of the BiH parliament in June the lack of readiness and capacity of local 2010, in which for the first time national authorities to assume responsibility for political stakeholders agreed that extremely integration of minorities and for the vulnerable people who were unable to return social-welfare needs of vulnerable IDPs and should be allowed to find a solution in their returnees place of displacement. This in turn enabled the BiH authorities to start planning projects insufficient acceptance of the role that civil specifically addressing the needs of the society needs to play in securing social remaining vulnerable households, including justice for the vulnerable by consistently rehousing around 8,600 residents from the representing their interests to local remaining 156 collective centres by providing authorities non-profit social housing solutions and the tendency of administrative bodies to other specialised types of accommodation. measure impact in terms of numbers of Now, almost 20 years since Dayton, an housing units rebuilt, rather than numbers array of projects is in place; these projects, of displaced families gaining access to however, only have the capacity to assist a rights, livelihoods and services. maximum of 11,000 families out of the total of 40,000 estimated to be either in need or In the worst-case scenario, these problems considered entitled, and can only address could defeat efforts to implement the Annex 10 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
7 Revised Strategy. Projects could take too Representative (OHR)3, the Organization for long to implement, could assist people who Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), no longer need help and leave stranded those UNHCR, the United Nations Mission in still in need. The projects could risk building BiH and the authorities. houses that then stand empty, using up the In some municipalities, returnees were available resources while leaving the problem denied access to employment and other basic unsolved. Vulnerable displaced people, rights by those opposing return. Almost women victims of violence and minority 14,000 houses, including whole villages, returnees could continue to live in destitution were destroyed a considerable time after the and may pass on their marginalised status war had ended, often to discourage the new and sense of injustice to the next generation. minorities from returning. In some places, Deep-seated accusations would continue to where minority returnee communities be traded between the entities and among were left to fend for themselves, life got their constituent peoples, and twenty years progressively worse. Many families were of progress and investment in reconciliation unable to stay while many more struggled and restitution of justice could be put at risk. to survive on subsistence farming. On the other hand, the substantial projects and resources that are now in place
provide a window of opportunity. The UNHCR challenge is to engage municipalities, reach the neediest beneficiaries and overcome those obstacles that block realisation of rights and normalisation of status.
Stages of response When the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was called on, through Annex 7, to take the lead in BiH on developing a plan for addressing the problem of wartime displacement, it turned out that not one plan was needed but three in succession – though with the authorities progressively assuming the lead. The first plan resulted in the return of more than 500,000 people to their places of origin in the first five years (1996 to 2000) after the war. When it was widely recognised in 1999 and 2000, however, that most of these were ‘majority returns’ (people who now found themselves in the ethnic majority in their place of pre-war residence), the second plan was drawn up, rallying international efforts behind minority returns. Conditions of return were often far from conducive and in some cases violent resistance by local authorities had to be overcome. Some 470,000 persons returned and/or had their property returned or reconstructed in this phase, including through the mechanism of the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) overseen by the Office of the High High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres visits returnees waiting for reconstruction assistance, Srebrenica, August 2009. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 11 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
The third and final plan began with the RHP include building the capacity the formulation of the Revised Strategy for of partner countries to manage these implementation of Annex 7, recognising major projects, including the selection the hard-won acceptance of all stakeholders of beneficiaries. This entails cooperation that many of the most vulnerable remaining between the four countries to enable cross- displaced families would be unable to border verification of overall eligibility, return and should therefore be assisted vulnerability and intention to return, to find a solution in their current place of and persuading municipalities to plan displacement. This policy shift led to the and deliver complementary measures to development of several major projects: improve access to roads, electricity, water, The Sarajevo Process is a regional livelihoods, basic rights and services – none dialogue initiated by UNHCR in 2005 to of which are funded by the RHP itself. look for solutions to protracted problems A priority for BiH is to provide of refugees and displacement in Serbia, permanent accommodation for those in BiH, Croatia and Montenegro – the four ‘alternative’ accommodation or in collective countries affected by the 1992 to 1995 centres. Alternative accommodation conflicts. In BiH this coincided is temporary housing provided by with the end of large-scale municipalities to displaced families who return movements. The had been occupying abandoned houses Process, involving UNHCR, but had to return them to their owners the OSCE, the European under the property restitution programme. Union and the United States, Collective centres were meant to provide initially made slow headway. temporary accommodation for internally It was revived in 2008 by displaced people driven out of conflict the intervention of UN High zones and were either purpose-built Commissioner for Refugees or were pre-existing structures such as António Guterres who, with workers’ barracks, abandoned offices, specially appointed Personal apartment blocks or hospital buildings. Envoy for the Western Balkans Most of these ‘temporary’ dwellings have Anne-Willem Bijleveld, since deteriorated to the point of being succeeded in garnering donor uninhabitable, with their residents among support and persuading the most destitute in the country. the four countries to sign The solution devised for the remaining the Belgrade Declaration in residents of collective centres is a project by November 2011. This in turn the name of CEB II (CEB: Council of Europe led to a Donor Conference Development Bank), funded by a CEB loan and the birth of the Regional plus the state’s own contribution, which Housing Programme in April formally began in November 2014. Forty- 2012 (which raised almost two municipalities submitted schemes to €300 million for housing) rehouse the residents of all of their collective to be implemented by the centres in non-profit social housing. The four country governments. planned social housing facilities will The Regional Housing comprise new apartments for the residents Programme (RHP) aims to – but will require payment of rent and assist 73,600 beneficiaries utilities, which presents a major challenge to through providing some vulnerable families with little or no income. 27,000 housing units in the Through the EU’s Instrument for Pre- four countries combined, Accession Assistance (IPA)4, UNHCR with BiH planning to assist was requested to receive and manage 14,000 persons (some 5,400 €7 million to support the coordination families). Challenges for of the Annex 7 Revised Strategy in an 12 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
initial ten priority municipalities through coordination mechanism and problem- capacity building to local authorities as solving body currently in formation5) well as individual assistance. UNHCR joint action plans, balancing quality and co-financed this action with an additional speed of implementation, centred on €1.1 million. Related projects run by greater assumption of responsibility by UNHCR and the UN Country Team local authorities and civil society, and cover a further ten municipalities. focusing on systematically identifying and Lastly, under a Joint Declaration addressing the most acute of the remaining signed in June 2013, BiH’s Ministry for needs Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR), the continuity of funding to allow the needs- entity ministries, the EU Delegation, the driven approach to be extended to more UN Resident Coordinator and UNHCR municipalities and mainstreamed into committed to a strategy of support for Annex programmes for social inclusion and 7 implementation through a three- to five- development. year process of social inclusion targeting a range of socially vulnerable groups. Andrew Mayne [email protected] UNHCR Representative in Bosnia and Conclusion Herzegovina and Regional Representative for The coming two-and-a-half years to the South-Eastern Europe. www.unhcr.org
end of 2017 represent what is possibly 1. Text online at www.refworld.org/docid/3de497992.html. the last window of opportunity to get 2. Source: BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, 31 solutions on track and move effectively December 2013; subsequently adjusted by MHRR to 100,300, through the completion phase. The five confirmation pending. recurrent problems highlighted earlier 3. The High Representative for BiH and the Office of the High Representative created in 1995 to oversee the civilian continue to put this desired outcome at risk. implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. What is needed now more than ever is: 4. The means by which the EU supports reforms in countries strong leadership by the new government wanting to join the EU with financial and technical help. http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm strengthening of existing national- 5. By the new Minister for Human Rights and Refugees, Minister international partnerships (by a Semiha Borovac.
Resolving a protracted refugee situation through a regional process Olga Mitrovic
Protracted refugee situations are usually a result of political deadlock, and their resolution demands the involvement of a range of actors and a multifaceted approach focused on leveraging political will. Despite its shortcomings, the Regional Process in the Western Balkans offers a number of lessons for resolving such situations.
In 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), to provide durable solutions to the 74,000 Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia signed the most vulnerable displaced persons. Joint Declaration on Ending Displacement This was the end result of a Regional and Ensuring Durable Solutions for Process to find durable solutions that was Vulnerable Refugees and Internally developed with strong support from the Displaced Persons.1 A year later a donor UN High Commissioner for Refugees fund was established to implement a multi- (UNHCR), the Organization for Security year Regional Housing Programme (RHP) and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 13 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
European Union (EU) and the United States. awareness that the problem could only Despite the slow and imperfect progress be resolved fully at a regional level. of the Regional Process, and despite the specifics of the EU that cannot be replicated Regional process elsewhere, the fact that countries have An important breakthrough came with the addressed a political deadlock that existed 2005 Sarajevo Declaration when Croatia, BiH, for sixteen years can provide valuable Serbia and Montenegro agreed to cooperate insights for future policy responses to in identifying and removing obstacles to protracted refugee situations in general. durable solutions by developing national road maps that would later be merged Return policies in post-war BiH and Croatia into a joint programme, with the OSCE, In BiH, refugee return was incorporated UNHCR and the EU assisting them in this into the peace agreement. The resolute endeavour. Though some moderate progress commitment of the international community was achieved, the process soon reached a to enforce Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace standstill due to Croatia’s refusal to further Agreement, with the idea of reversing the discuss issues of social security, pensions effects of ethnic cleansing, facilitated the and OTR. The Sarajevo Declaration lacked return of more than one million people, of the necessary political backing, and the whom almost half were ‘minority returns’ international stakeholders at the time had (returnees who would ethnically now no consolidated approach or clear vision be in a minority in their place of origin/ as to how to overcome this impasse. return). Implementation of the Property The opportunity to reinvigorate efforts Law Implementation Plan led to property came in December 2008 at the Second High restitution in BiH on the unprecedented scale Commissioner for Refugees’ Dialogue on of 99% (although it is significant that this did Protection Challenges when Serbia was not in fact result in sustained mass return). listed under the High Commissioner’s Conversely, in Croatia, where there Special Initiative on Protracted Situations was significantly less pressure from the as one of the five countries in the world international community, the government with a protracted refugee situation that hindered minority return in a variety of demanded urgent attention. The Executive ways, blocking the possibility of unlocking Committee of the High Commissioner’s the protracted refugee situation for Programme promoted a two-pronged years. Impediments to return included approach: provide incentives for the countries discrimination, ethnically motivated in question to ensure their commitment to violence and inadequate access to housing finding comprehensive solutions, and bring and employment. The largest issue affecting on board members of the international return was the government’s decision to community with strong leverage capacity. deprive in absentia 40,000 former residents Delegations from Serbia and Croatia of state-owned apartments (referred to confirmed their commitment to resolve the as ‘OTR’ – occupancy and tenancy right refugee problem and the Serbian government – holders) of their property rights. moved to re-launch the Sarajevo Process. In 1996, Serbia hosted the largest refugee International efforts resulted in the population in Europe: 617,700 people from 2010 Belgrade Conference at which the BiH and Croatia. By 2008, despite mass local four countries’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs integration and granting of citizenship, adopted a communiqué reaffirming their Serbia still hosted 97,000 refugees. For commitment to resolving the region’s years bilateral relations between Serbia protracted displacement situation; in this they and Croatia were plagued with refugee- highlighted the priority for assistance to be related problems whereas BiH developed given to vulnerable persons, primarily those positive bilateral cooperation with both in collective centres, and stated that opting Croatia and Serbia. Yet there was a constant for return or for local integration would 14 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
remain the individual choice of each refugee. UNHCR, the EU and the OSCE issued a Joint Statement, extending their full support to the Regional Process, while frequent meetings between Croatia’s newly elected President UNHCR/H Kralj Josipović and his Serbian counterpart Tadić allowed the refugee problem to become prominent on the political agenda. These presidents, both considered moderate pro- European leaders, expressed their readiness to tackle sensitive issues – such as border demarcation, missing persons and mutual lawsuits for genocide – which had created an impasse with their predecessors. The 2010 Belgrade Conference marked the start of a two-year period of intensive negotiations and work. Small working groups were established for each area of concern, their size and frequent meetings being considered the best mechanism for building trust among participants. The joint approach of the international community Bosnian refugees return from Kuplensko camp in Croatia to Velika Kladuša in BiH, December 1995. was an invaluable feature of the Regional enlargement context, the political leadership Process. UNHCR and the OSCE provided of Serbia and Croatia could not afford to continuous assistance and technical waste this chance. The EU and UNHCR expertise to the groups while the EU instilled repeatedly conveyed that this was the last commitment to regional cooperation. The push to collectively address the remaining HC’s appointment of a Personal Envoy to lead concerns, and the High Commissioner’s the process, and the transparency introduced Special Initiative in 2008 brought the in negotiations and video conferences, international spotlight back on the Balkans. ensured that the international community In 2010, Croatia still did not want to offer spoke ‘with one voice’ to the countries. compensation to OTR holders but because Finally, an agreement on the Regional of its EU accession hopes it had to improve Housing Programme was followed by a its housing provision programmes and Ministerial Declaration and later a donor commit to the Regional Process. Serbia conference where €261 million were accepted the needs-based approach that pledged to finance the first phase. was offered, while still insisting that the question of refugees’ tenancy rights Preconditions for success should continue to be pursued. When the What was possible in Belgrade in 2010 compromise on OTR was reached, other that was not possible in Sarajevo in problems could be addressed: pensions, 2005? The answer lies in three factors: validation of documents, and restoration a pragmatic approach by all stakeholders of destroyed and damaged property. to addressing the needs of the most The final key factor was the EU accession vulnerable and not repeating the failure policy. Once displacement was incorporated from 2005 into the wider EU enlargement package and the Regional Process came to be the political will of Serbia and Croatia evaluated as part of the countries’ overall the strong leverage of the EU. accession progress, the EU became a game- In other words, the approach to refugee issues changer and no country could afford to was transformed because, within the EU jeopardise the regional cooperation: Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 15 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
durable solutions in many respects. It was the first time that the Special Initiative was launched to prioritise resolving a particular PRS. It was the first partnership of UNHCR and the EU in this field. And it was the first, and probably the only time, that resolution of a protracted refugee stituation coincided with the eve of accession to the EU of one of its parties. This conjunction of favourable factors may be impossible to replicate elsewhere but many instruments of the Regional Process can be replicated in other settings. The first lesson is for UNHCR to act as a catalyst for mobilising international support and getting the right actors on board. In the former Yugoslavia the OSCE was the obvious choice due to their mandate and expertise. In a crisis where self-reliance of refugees is the primary challenge, UNDP or IOM would be more suitable partners. However, more than choosing agencies with appropriate mandates, Bosnian refugees return from Kuplensko camp in Croatia to Velika Kladuša in BiH, December 1995. a strong push from a political actor is needed. “We recognise that the successful resolution of While the EU’s elaborate conditionality these issues is vital to the further enhancement mechanism cannot be replicated, other of positive and productive relations among our regional actors – such as the African Union, countries and citizens and underpinning of our ECOWAS or ASEAN – could find economic respective bids to join the EU.” 2011 Joint or political incentives to offer to countries Declaration [emphasis added] affected by protracted refugee crises. The second lesson is for return to Conclusion be addressed early on and embedded Progress on numerous issues has slowed in the rule of law and recognition of down since the donor conference. The delay rights; if this does not happen, injustice in implementing the RHP – with construction and grievances will remain. works only starting in July 2014, two years Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the after the donor conference – has met with Regional Process, the fact remains that BiH, much criticism. Once Croatia joined the EU, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia have secured state funding for reconstruction and housing joint, comprehensive durable solutions to programmes was cut drastically, and there is the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the a stalemate also in the areas of pensions and Second World War. To that end, the Regional return of agricultural property. Furthermore, Process should be recognised for the real declaring that the circumstances that led to tangible solutions it has brought about. displacement in Croatia no longer exist, in Olga Mitrovic [email protected] 2014 UNHCR recommended the cessation of Expert for Migration and Development, refugee status for 49,506 refugees; although IOM Belgrade. www.iom.int the decision on the cessation of status remains with host countries, the recommendation This article is drawn from the author’s Master’s potentially jeopardises momentum. thesis completed at the London School of Despite all its shortcomings, however, the Economics and Political Science, 2013-14. The achievements of the Regional Process cannot opinions expressed in this article are those of be ignored. The Regional Process proved the author and not necessarily those of IOM. to be an effective mechanism for pursuing 1. www.osce.org/pc/85049 16 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Voices in displacement Claudia Meyerhoefer
“These people are as if lost in time and space.” Still displaced after 20 years, residents of collective centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina share their frustration. They need to be listened to.
The Bosnian war ended in 1995 but many many IDPs are still dependent on assistance of those displaced during the war still live today. in a situation of protracted displacement, As many IDPs are elderly, some of them neither adequately protected by the state receive pensions. However, pensions usually nor fully able to access the basic rights do not suffice for even basic needs. This is of their citizenship. As of 2014, around an issue particularly for women, due to their 8,500 internally displaced people still longer life expectancy and lower number live in about 100 collective centres in of years worked in formal employment. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).1 The housing conditions are appalling. The buildings are old and fragile; some “If you would have asked me 15 years ago, I would residents do not have heating or water; the not have believed that we would end up … still space is inadequate for families; and other having such problems.” facilities such as telephones are often lacking. I visited Mihatovici Collective Centre “These houses that we live in, you have to come and which is the largest in the country, with see them. They are completely destroyed….” several hundred residents, located about 10km from the city of Tuzla and built in Education is another major concern. 1993 with Norwegian aid. Mainly displaced Mihatovici has an elementary school, funded women and children from Srebrenica and by NGOs and providing school materials, eastern BiH reside there, by now including meals and afternoon projects for the children. second- and third-generation IDPs. The A senior staff member made it clear to second centre I visited, Hrasnica, was me that, in his view, educating children established in 1998 and is located outside sufficiently so that they could “get out of Sarajevo in a former hotel. Since many here” was the only effective way to assist families resettled, there are only 32 people them. However, in order to go on to middle still living there. Conversations with and high school, the children have to attend centre residents reflect how poverty and schools in nearby towns, and many parents work are the main concerns of daily life. are unable to pay for public transport. In addition to the physical health “I don’t have anything. Do you know what that problems many displaced people face means? Absolutely nothing.” (due to malnutrition, violence during “We don’t have any salaries, we don’t have any the war, etc), many also suffer from financial help. […] I am just managing as well as mental health problems. Clearly, the I can. I have some cattle. I do whatever work I can, violence experienced during the war and that’s how I earn some money.” their displacement often have serious repercussions, such as depression, post- The IDPs in BiH have been dependent traumatic stress disorder, drug abuse and on aid for up to twenty years. Humanitarian violent behaviour. I encountered alcoholism, aid provided essential support for IDPs who depression, neurosis and the regular found themselves poverty-stricken after taking of sedatives. Furthermore, residents they fled their homes. However, donors and told of frequent conflicts in the centre: organisations have since shifted their focus, and programmes were terminated after the “They fight a lot. They hit each other like in the end of the emergency phase. Nonetheless, Wild West.” Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 17 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 UNHCR/L Taylor
Collective centre in Hrasnica, 1995. Yet IDPs face difficulties in accessing women to compete for jobs, in part due to health services, partly because of lack the priority placed on the recruitment of of financial means and partly because demobilised soldiers or family members of of poor and patchy provision by the deceased soldiers and injured veterans. I fragmented state apparatus. found that although a few women residents of collective centres find agricultural work, Particular challenges for women most have no such opportunities. Lack of Displaced women experience additional, access to land is a common problem. Also, gender-specific obstacles in rebuilding many women displaced from rural parts of their lives after displacement. BiH are not sufficiently educated to compete in other sectors. “As a displaced women, you’re not just displaced, you carry [an] additional [burden].” “There should be crafts, workshops, things like that for women. Something should be organised so Women took responsibility for the that we can contribute and produce things and sell survival of and provision for their families them. We need jobs. We need ways to earn money.” under the worst conditions during the war. Displaced after the war, they faced poverty Income-generating programmes (not and powerlessness, often left wondering only in BiH but globally) tend to put an about the fate of husbands or children. emphasis on activities such as handicrafts Many women are now the sole head of a and sewing, because they are traditionally household. During the war, women were viewed as female activities. This might mean pushed into new positions of influence and independence for some women; however, leadership, as well as income provision and these are often marginal economic activities. decision making in the household. Several A better approach would be a more holistic respondents confirmed these changes in one, which would support displaced women gender roles and indicated that when the war with skills training to access new markets ended, men took over leading positions in and with opportunities such as micro-credit communities and politics again, and women loans but which would also address their were pushed back into the domestic space. needs in other areas, such as psychosocial In a country where jobs are scarce in support. Catholic Relief Services, for example, general, it is very difficult for displaced provides individual help depending on 18 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
the needs of a family, such as livelihood “This is the first meeting that we have been opportunities, kitchen gardens, scholarships, invited to.” agricultural machinery, housing and Yet giving displaced people a chance to psychological support. Meanwhile, a positive be heard and to participate in decisions example of providing an opportunity for affecting them is crucial for building 2 self-employment is BH Crafts. However, effective support programmes and finding a more skills training projects are needed. sustainable solution for them. In addition, it Participation and consultation would do more than just give them a voice. Many IDPs feel hopeless in the face of a It would strengthen their sense of personal government that gives the impression worth, and their sense of community that it has turned its back on them. The and of belonging in their own country. lack of tangible success in assisting Claudia Meyerhoefer IDPs to find a solution over the past two [email protected] decades has left them disillusioned and Social worker in refugee shelters in Germany. resentful, feeling ignored and forgotten: 1. In 2014, while studying for an MA in Intercultural Conflict “These people are as if lost in time and space.” Management I undertook qualitative research into the current challenges facing IDPs in BiH (in cooperation with CESI, the “Social workers never come here.” Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies in Sarajevo) and conducted 20 in-depth interviews with IDPs and local and international actors. “Whenever someone comes, they visit the manager. All quotes in this article come from these interviews. We don’t know who came, for what reason; we are 2. BH Crafts provides women with tools and material for knitting clothes, which the company then sells. The programme is now never informed about anything, and we are not open to all women seeking additional income but was started as a really asked.” project for residents of the Mihatovici Collective Centre and many of the beneficiaries are displaced women.
Property rights and reconstruction in the Bosnian return process Inmaculada Serrano
Sidelining a rights-based approach in the area of property restitution and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in an unequal impact on rural versus urban displaced populations.
Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement a clear tension with the human rights represented a breakthrough in the history of language in which it was anchored, which conflict settlement. It stated for the first time emphasised the individual’s right to choose that displaced persons should be able not just their destination (i.e. whether to return or to repatriate to their country of origin but not), and their right to property restitution or to return to their actual pre-war homes. The compensation (Article I.1 and 4 of Annex 7). rationale for this was the perceived moral Many properties had been destroyed imperative to reverse the ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the war. Access to many other that had occurred during the war (and that properties, mostly in urban areas, was the international community had been unable impeded because they had been occupied to stop), and the success of Annex 7 was by other displaced persons of a different clearly viewed as directly related to ‘minority ethnicity, and restitution was fiercely returns’ – that is, the return of those among opposed by all sides. In response, in 1999 the displaced who now found their ethnicity the international community conceived to be in the numerical minority in their areas and implemented the Property Law of origin. Nonetheless, this aim presented Implementation Plan (PLIP1), overseen by the Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 19 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC). With restitution of the 200,000 occupied housing units increasing from 21% in the UNHCR/L Taylor first year to 92% in the fourth,2 PLIP constitutes one of the biggest successes of the implementation of Annex 7 and restitution of rights. However, it is frequently overlooked that reconstruction was an even more critical issue than property restitution. UNHCR estimated the number of housing units that were partially or completely destroyed to be 459,000 (more than double the Refugees return from Kuplensko camp in Croatia to Velika Kladuša in BiH, December 1995. number of repossession claims filed by CRPC). 60% of the housing stock was Agreement and the moral (and political) partially destroyed and 18% was completely imperative of reversing ethnic cleansing destroyed, not only during the fighting but becomes clearer when considering the also after the signing of Dayton by those position in which (mostly) rural returnees trying to prevent people from returning. were put. In many cases, following By 2008 only approximately half of these implementation of PLIP, families were evicted units (some 260,000 houses) had been rebuilt, before their houses were reconstructed, mainly because of a lack of funding.3 The because of the shortage of reconstruction stark contrast between the robust and decisive funds. Whereas in the initial years after role of the international community in the the end of the war there were plenty of implementation of property rights and its funds available, donor fatigue and a serious much more deficient role in the reconstruction reconstruction funding gap were evident process had to do mostly with the costs of by 1999, and in 2002 the funding gap the latter. It is significant that while PLIP between demand for reconstruction and was obviously anchored in the language of available funds amounted to €600 million. rights, reconstruction assistance was largely People holding IDP status and under specified as humanitarian assistance. a certain income threshold were entitled to temporary alternative accommodation. Rural versus urban But with time, they risked losing their PLIP is considered a success not only IDP status (and access to alternative in terms of rights restitution but also accommodation) if they did not commit because it facilitated a breakthrough themselves to reconstruction. And once in the minority returns process by the reconstruction assistance was granted, year 2000 when properties were finally the right to alternative accommodation made available to their owners. It is less was lost. In short, PLIP effectively pushed frequently emphasised, however, that this people, mostly of rural origin, to return. involved evicting the people occupying This is not to say that there were not these properties, a large proportion of genuine cases of voluntary return among whom were people of rural origin for whom rural returnees; on the contrary, many of the main housing problem upon return these returns had been greatly longed for. was reconstruction, not repossession. Some of the local people I interviewed, The tension between the rights-based however, characterised the process of approach implied in the Dayton Peace return in three main stages. First came 20 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
the ‘pioneers’ – or “the crazy ones” – who of the majority ethnic group that had been returned spontaneously, without any external displaced mostly to towns and cities. This support or backup. Then there was a wave made it possible for urban dwellers to sell of returns once reconstruction assistance these properties or to exchange them. This started being available. Those returning after option was not available in rural areas where that point were, in their own words, mostly the only benefit that displaced people could “people who were left with no other choice”.4 derive from their reconstructed properties Wealthier households who did not (as was actually making use of them. yet) wish to return were able to rent or buy The international community went property where they lived now. But this was to great lengths to provide the necessary
not the case for poorer families for whom security conditions, as well as the UNHCR/G Gordon the only available assistance, besides the harmonisation of health-care systems and support they received as registered IDPs, was pension funds and the reconstruction reconstruction assistance. Since a condition of infrastructure to provide the basic for receiving reconstruction assistance was conditions for return. But the main issue being present in the area of return, many was – and remains – the lack of employment did opt to return even if they had to live opportunities and widespread discrimination in tents, partially reconstructed houses or in accessing the very limited opportunities improvised shacks. This situation lasted that do exist. In this regard the international for months and even years in some cases. community also failed to meet the promise made in Article I of Annex 7 about the Sidelining the right to choose right to restitution of, or compensation for, There is no doubt that the international any property of which individuals were community faced a fundamental dilemma deprived during the conflict. In practice, regarding minority returns in BiH but, properties other than houses – such as in pursuit of the goal of reversing ethnic business premises and usurped land – cleansing, people’s right to choose was, did not receive similar attention in the to a large extent, sidelined. This requires repossession or compensation process. All a profound re-thinking within the of this undoubtedly inhibited people from international community, particularly returning, and contributed to the fragile so considering the relatively poor results nature of the minority return process overall. achieved in terms of reversing ethnic cleansing. A policy which took into Inmaculada Serrano [email protected] account individual motivations and Associate Researcher, Institute Carlos III-Juan constraints, and adjusted its time-frame March, Carlos III University. accordingly, might have been more effective www.march.es/ceacs
in enabling return, as well as more in 1. http://tinyurl.com/OSCE-PLIP line with the recognition of people’s 2. Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons right to choose enshrined in Annex 7. and Refugees (CRPC) End of Mandate Report (1996-2003) (includes Minority returns have in fact taken recommendations for future post-conflict property commissions) http://tinyurl.com/CRPC-end-of-mandate-2003 place largely to rural areas, with towns 3. See Mooney E (2008) ‘Securing Durable Solutions for Displaced registering much lower numbers. But the Persons in Georgia: The Experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ reasons for this asymmetry also have to http://tinyurl.com/Mooney-BiH-2008; International Crisis Group (2000) ‘Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International do with security considerations, given the Community Ready?’ Europe Report N°95 www.tinyurl.com/ICG- larger ethnic segregation in the countryside, Bosnia-May2000; Global IDP Project (2003) Protecting internally as well as with economic factors, since displaced people in the OSCE area. A neglected commitment http://tinyurl.com/NRC-IDPs-OSCE-2003 agriculture and cattle-breeding provide a 4. Serrano I (2011) Return after violence: rationality and emotions in means of subsistence in an environment of the aftermath of violent conflict. Instituto Juan March de Estudios widespread discrimination and a depressed e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias economy. In addition, repossessed houses Sociales, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. http://tinyurl.com/SerranoI-thesis in urban areas were in demand by members Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 21 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 Resolving protracted displacement through social housing Marc D’Silva and Sanela Imamovic
A social housing methodology recently introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates the need for certain key components in any strategy to address the shelter and livelihoods needs of vulnerable citizens.
By 2011 – 16 years after the signing of the Roma, readmitted asylum seekers,2 persons Dayton Peace Agreement – the return process with disabilities, and the elderly.3 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was considered successful by many standards. Social housing principles Of the 2.2 million citizens displaced during Through social housing, a community can the war, over 91% had returned to their help provide affordable housing for those communities of origin or integrated into of its citizens who are unable to meet their new communities. Over 320,000 housing housing needs independently. It can take units had been reconstructed and repaired. the form of new multi-unit, multi-storey And yet there were still 193,000 displaced structures or of individual units constructed persons and refugees in need of durable on top of or rehabilitated within existing housing solutions. In particular, 8,734 housing stock. Whatever the type of social displaced persons were still living in poor, housing, three principles are essential. Firstly, unhealthy conditions in the country’s 160 ownership needs to be clearly defined and collective centres, which for the most part registered with local government. Secondly, were never designed for residential use.1 management and maintenance responsibilities These 193,000 people were unable must be clearly articulated and organised. or chose not to take advantage of earlier And, thirdly, eligibility criteria and apartment housing reconstruction programmes allocation procedures need to be clearly for a variety of reasons, including: defined and communicated from the outset. lack of certification of land mine clearance CRS’ social housing strategy at or near their property includes the following components: lack of utilities and basic community Formal working group: This needs to be infrastructure established from the outset to facilitate insufficient employment opportunities collaborative partnerships with local ineligibility of tenants who had never government officials, while also building owned property municipal capacity to assume management and maintenance responsibilities after tenants inability to prove legal title to property move in. unwillingness to return to a place of trauma. ‘Book of Rules’: This articulates the key Given this, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) principles of social housing and defines the decided in 2007 to refocus its strategy away roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder. from individual house reconstruction and Official registration of this document in the towards the introduction of a new social local courts guarantees that future politicians housing methodology. This would help will be unable to misuse or sell the units for at to build the capacity of local government least 25 years. authorities to provide durable housing solutions for collective centre residents and Affordable rents: Rents need to be below other vulnerable displaced groups including market rates. Although this can be a challenge 22 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Fuad Fočo Fuad
This social housing in Potočari near Srebrenica was built in the last six years (with funding from the Governments of BiH and the Netherlands) and provides 58 apartments. Most tenants are returnees. (Potočari was the location of the Srebrenica massacre and it is here that the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide is located.) for some chronically displaced persons used to communities of return is important for receiving free housing, it can promote dignity providing appropriate support to returning and reduce dependency, and generates the families. resources needed to manage and maintain the buildings. Mixed-use developments: Promoting mixed use of buildings allows minority returnees, Family ‘socio-economic card’: This card Roma, persons with disabilities and other documents the eligibility criteria of each family marginalised groups to integrate physically, and then serves as a baseline against which economically and socially with members of the future improvements in household income majority community. In some circumstances, and standard of living can be compared. Those special provision can be made to attract families whose incomes subsequently rise professional and technical cadres for which above the official poverty line will have their there is a demand in the community; in rents readjusted closer to the market rate. other situations, part or all of the ground floor of a housing development can be made Sustainable livelihood component: Each available for commercial purposes to provide family receives a form of assistance to help employment and marketing opportunities. cover monthly rent/utility payments and to rebuild household assets lost during the war. A management system: CRS provides a Livelihood options are tailored for each family specially designed management information and may include agricultural equipment, computer software programme (and training/support for selling produce, or training in its use) for the relevant municipal subsidies to local companies to encourage the departments to enable them to: compile key hiring of minority returnees. information and data on all social housing buildings; track rent payment and arrears; Social linkages and networks: The organise maintenance schedules; and generate involvement of local government authorities, reports for municipal, entity and state-level NGOs and other stakeholders in the purposes. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 23 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
Alignment with international standards: This will be constructed.5 In 2015, the MHRR is in order to help BiH comply with any new adopted CRS’ Social Housing Manual6 as requirements associated with possible future the official guidance for all municipalities accession to the European Union. participating in these two programmes. After initial efforts to establish legislation The BiH government has learned the at the state level stalled as a result of a broader risks of omitting one or more of these key political stalemate, CRS decided to engage components from its own social housing key officials at the municipal, canton and projects, and of focusing only on the entity level, where there is the political will building construction aspect. An assessment to develop and pass social housing strategies of the social housing constructed by the and legislation. In 2013, CRS succeeded in government between 2009 and 2012 concluded helping two cantons (BPK Goražde and that failure to clearly define from the Zeničko-dobojski) develop and pass the outset issues of ownership, management, country’s first ever social housing legislation. maintenance and tenancies had resulted Another five municipalities (Srebrenica, in no-one fulfilling those responsibilities; Prijedor, Goražde, Mostar and Banja Luka) furthermore, the lack of legislation and have developed social housing strategies policy framework governing social housing that provide a common framework for all was preventing both government and current and new initiatives. And in 2013, the tenants from fully realising its benefits. MHRR incorporated social housing into the second phase of its initiative to support the Key results to date return and integration of asylum seekers By the end of 2014, 762 displaced persons in ten targeted municipalities and Brčko and returnees in nine municipalities around District, demonstrating that the Government the country had secured safe, dignified of BiH now understands the value of living conditions in 273 social housing units social housing in helping municipalities constructed by CRS. Six years after signing to address the shelter and livelihoods tenancy contracts, 93% of families were needs of their most vulnerable citizens. still living in the social housing units.4 Of the 7% no longer present, over half of them Marc D’Silva [email protected] had had a positive reason for leaving, e.g. Sanela Imamovic [email protected] marriage, voluntary emigration or securing Catholic Relief Services in Bosnia and employment in another town. Only 3% Herzegovina. of social housing units were vacant. This www.crs.org/countries/bosnia-herzegovina stability is an important factor contributing 1. Data taken from BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees to the social and economic growth of their (2011) Joint Regional Programme on Durable Solutions for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Framework Programme. communities. Furthermore, 22% of family http://tinyurl.com/MHRR-framework-prog-2011 members living in the social housing units 2. Persons from BiH who had sought asylum in other (mostly were under 18 years of age, demonstrating the EU) countries in Europe and have been returned via one of the formal agreements signed between the governments. About 70% methodology’s effectiveness in attracting the of these readmitted asylum seekers are Roma whose lack of birth type of young, working-age families needed or registration documents makes it difficult to prove that they to revitalise war-affected communities. previously lived in BiH. Promising early results led the BiH 3. CRS’ social housing initiative was cited as one of two best practices for integration of Roma in the Western Balkans. See government in 2010 to include social Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2014) housing as a preferred element in its Revised Best Practices for Roma Integration: Regional Report on Housing Legalization, Settlement Upgrading and Social Housing for Roma in the Strategy for the Implementation of Annex 7. Western Balkans. www.osce.org/odihr/115737 In the years that followed, the Ministry 4. Monitoring data from CRS/BiH staff, May 2015. of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) 5. See article by Mayne A ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years on incorporated social housing as a key strategy from Dayton’, pp8-11. in two nationwide programmes through 6. www.crsprogramquality.org/publications/2015/8/25/manual- which more than 2,900 social housing units for-non-profit-social-housing.html 24 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Asking the right questions in research on psychosocial well-being Selma Porobic
New research is attempting to address the lack of empirical grounding for much of the psychosocial programming in post-war trauma in the Western Balkans.
Psychosocial work by local and international is higher in these countries than the EU mental-health professionals became a average, with the causes related to two standard and widespread dimension of decades of stresses such as war, ethnic the humanitarian response to war trauma tension and poverty – and the lack of in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia organisation in the mental health sector. and Kosovo during the 1990s. Generally, Recognising this and the lack of international programmes in the region scientific research into the current state of promote the belief that all those displaced psychosocial well-being among marginalised by war are traumatised and that external social groups, a multidisciplinary research psychosocial interventions are essential. The team of 18 scholars in three countries efficacy of these interventions is taken for (Serbia, Kosovo, BiH) headed by the team granted and yet empirical research on the at the University of Sarajevo2 and funded subject is scarce. by the University of Fribourg’s Regional During the war, shortage of research Research Promotion Programme (RRPP) is resources left little room for data collection conducting a study on psychosocial health or impact studies. In the aftermath of among women displaced by the war. The hostilities this trend mainly continued. In research aims to provide insights into the addition, attempts to conduct comprehensive connections between migration and mental research in the field of mental health often health in a post-war society also undergoing failed due to local people’s increasing a broad socio-political transition. distrust, especially of foreign agencies and On the whole, work on improving non-governmental organisations. Post-war mental health in post-war BiH has been treatment and mental health services in BiH involving many different stakeholders at therefore rarely focused on war-displaced and various levels and working with various returnees as specific target groups. Rather, target groups but it is not yet integrated the whole civilian population was viewed as with the state-run mechanisms of service vulnerable, traumatised and incapacitated provision. Specific groups like women but without any systematic investigation raped during war, some of whom were into resilience and general well-being. displaced, have been targeted but the formal In the same way, studies addressing system largely ignores forced migrants. the mental health of people displaced by Added to that are the huge problems in war in the region have mainly focused on funding and in conducting research and whole populations, rather than sections of assessing evidence-based practice. populations, and have ignored questions Following the ongoing reform of the of resilience. mental health sector, new strategies of work aim to involve social services in protecting Mental health of war displaced and and promoting the mental health of citizens returnees in general and of returnees and displaced Questions of mental health are still salient persons in particular (as a marginalised, in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo. According to vulnerable group).3 Improving social EU project UP.S.TREA.M1, the number of inclusion is one of the key requirements persons with mental health difficulties for harmonising the social development of Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 25 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
BiH with EU standards. Social inclusion programmes? Which good practices (if requires partnership at all levels between any) could the competent authorities and governments, public institutions and civil different national, regional and international society but this is proving very challenging stakeholders build on to improve the practice in a country which has a plethora of political of and access to psychosocial services? and administrative decision-making centres (14 levels of national decision making Conclusion which are subject to conditions imposed Sound and effective policies require a strong by external actors such as the World Bank, evidential basis. Only with this, and the the International Monetary Fund and the in-depth insights that will emerge from the EU). However, the new centres for mental evidence, does it become possible to: identify health (resulting from the reform) have the how government policies and programmes potential to provide more adequate mental can best assist targeted populations; health services as they aim to work, more monitor how effectively resources are being appropriately, through multidisciplinary used; foster learning and development teams and inter-sector cooperation.4 in the area; and support stakeholders in their roles and responsibilities. The broader societal context In addition, the network building Bearing in mind the complexity of BiH’s that such research involves among socio-economic situation, the RRPP-funded stakeholders of different professional and research5 is shifting the emphasis from academic backgrounds across the region the individual clinical health perspective and internationally helps establish and to the more complex social dimension develop an inter-and trans-disciplinary of understanding the affected displaced platform for the long-term benefit of persons’ and returnees’ reintegration forced migration studies in the region. process, in relation both to their war Much of our experience from post-war experiences and to the country’s prevailing BiH underlines how psychosocial service socio-economic situation. In this way provision for displaced and returnee important generational differences, gendered populations should always be based on patterns and urban/rural discrepancies are extensive evidence-based research. Only emerging, and mental health assessments then will it have a direct bearing on are being studied in the broader societal the quality of life for women returnees, context that inevitably has an impact on a internally displaced persons and refugees. person’s overall psychosocial well-being. Through empirical cross-case analysis Selma Porobic [email protected] in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo, the project is Director, Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, addressing the following research questions: University of Sarajevo. How does the experience of inter-ethnic www.cesi.fpn.unsa.ba/en/
violence, large-scale war displacement and 1. ‘UPdate of Socializing and TREAtment in Mental health’ – protracted transition affect the psychosocial involving Caritas Italiana in Serbia and Association Fenix in BiH. health of female forced migrants in each of 2. In partnership with Serbian and Kosovo research teams. the three environments? What is the state 3. Social Inclusion Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008-13). of their psychosocial well-being, including The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently working on two strategic documents: the Country Development Strategy both distress and resilience factors, in these and Mid-term Review of the Social Inclusion Strategy. challenging social environments? What is 4. The Mental Health Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nature of psychosocial support, both supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the Swiss Cantons of Geneva, Jura, Bern and Fribourg has public and non-governmental, formal and completed its first phase (2010-13) and has now entered its second informal, provided to this population? phase. What should be done to address the 5. Entitled ‘Engendering Forced Migration, Socio-political psychosocial needs identified and to Transition and Mental Health in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo’. For more information see www.cesi.fpn.unsa.ba fill gaps between existing policies and 26 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Wartime division in peacetime schools Valery Perry
An ethnically divided educational system in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to limit sustainable return, and to hamper reconciliation and the reconstruction of society.
The inclusion of Annex 7 in the Dayton celebrations and, in effect, the active and Accords was seminal in many ways but, ongoing cultivation of different and often while the return of property to the original mutually incompatible worldviews.2 rightful owners was enormously successful, the return of people to their pre-war homes Different methods, same results was not such a success. This was particularly Where there are sufficiently mixed so in the many cases in which a returnee communities of Bosniaks and Croats in the would now be in a demographic minority in Federation to make the simple imposition their pre-war community. There was little of one curriculum impossible, this has led or no effort by political leaders to create a to over 50 cases of ‘two schools under one genuinely welcoming environment for the roof’. In these cases school buildings are return of pre-war inhabitants or to jump-start ‘shared’, with different groups of students post-war political reconciliation. Minority taught either the Bosniak or Croat curriculum return remained a daunting prospect, in different wings, floors or shifts. In the with returnees having difficulty finding handful of communities in the Republika work in their pre-war communities, and Srpska (RS) that have seen sufficient return facing significant discrimination in terms of non-Serbs, non-Serb students (primarily of social relations and in terms of access to Bosniaks) study the RS curriculum unless public services such as health care, police there is a sufficient number of minority protection, social welfare – and schools. students to allow them to follow ‘their’ The education system in Bosnia and national group of subjects (NGS), including Herzegovina (BiH) is a logical consequence history, geography, mother tongue and of both the lack of meaningful and religion, at which point they separate from systemic political reconciliation over their Serb peers for these subjects. Whether the past two decades, and the practical in homogenous or mixed areas, children are public policy implications of the power- confronted with and taught mono-perspective sharing state structure agreed at Dayton. narratives, and whether the divisions are The country’s education infrastructure visible (as with the ‘2-in-1’ schools) or more was not immune from the new devolved, subtle, the result is the same – a generation of fragmented and, some would say, convoluted young citizens with a meagre sense of their structure. Schools continued providing shared future in, or vision for, their country. instruction with the same ethnically There was a period of time, particularly exclusive character as during the war.1 between 1999 and 2007, when educational In the absence of any state-level reforms began to take shape. The needs Ministry of Education to coordinate or drive of returnee children were explicitly educational policy, the entity- and canton- recognised in the Interim Agreement on level Ministries of Education worked along Accommodation of the Rights and Needs of separate and unequal paths. As a result, Returnee Children, signed in 2002, which virtually every school in BiH continues aimed to end the most blatant practices that to have its own dominant ethnic ‘flavour’ prevented sustainable return. An effort to representing the majority population in remove explicit hate speech from history that community. This is manifest in the textbooks began, and the most ethnically different curricula and textbooks for Bosniak, exclusive school names and symbols were Croat and Serb schools, different holiday removed. The 2-in-1 schools (themselves Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 27 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
an ‘interim’ solution) were in some cases Conclusion improved through a number of attempts at In the absence of international pressure or administrative unification. The state-level grassroots demands to revisit the country’s Ministry of Civil Affairs developed a small divisive educational system and policies, education portfolio; a state-level Education there is no reason to believe that the country’s Agency was developed including an advisory schools will improve or become more capacity to ensure consistent curriculum broadly inclusive; the status quo suits the standards and learning outcomes; and a ruling nationalist political parties who are Conference of Ministers of Education was resistant to more civic options that could established to advise, consult and coordinate. weaken their own hold on power. In the However, in the absence of either a legal long term this will both threaten the return commitment to increasingly harmonise that has occurred to date and effectively and integrate educational systems, or the close the door to any future returns. political will to press for such an inclusive Inclusion of the right to return in the agenda, these bodies have been greatly Dayton Peace Agreement was a noble ideal limited in their work, and such reforms failed that in many ways fell victim to the Realpolitik to touch the core problem of the divided of the post-war Dayton state. Those persons curricula and the broader continued policy displaced by the war who have remade of ethnification of public life in BiH.3 their lives elsewhere have little incentive In such a system, minority returnees to return to a country that remains in a have remained minorities, forced to choose state of frozen conflict, exemplified by its to assimilate, to study separately (if there are divided education system. Twenty years sufficient numbers of returnees) or, perhaps, after Dayton, this state of affairs should be to move, giving up on the idea of return. In of concern not only to people interested in the past few years, reforms have stopped the Balkans but also to those working to and there are even signs of regression. stabilise diverse post-war states in other parts For example, in the RS, in 2013, parents in of the world. Far from being a ‘soft’ policy the village of Konjević Polje (not far from matter, education in a post-war state is a Srebrenica) pulled their children out of school security issue that it is perilous to ignore. and organised demonstrations in Sarajevo Valery Perry [email protected] (including an ad hoc tent city where some Independent researcher and consultant based of the protestors slept) in protest against RS in Sarajevo; Senior Associate, Democratization policies and practices that required their Policy Council; lecturer in conflict analysis and children to study the RS curriculum. resolution, Sarajevo School of Science and The Bosniak parents were not, however, Technology. www.democratizationpolicy.org demanding a more inclusive school approach for both Bosniak and Serb students but their 1. Donia R (2000) ‘The Quest for Tolerance in Sarajevo’s Textbooks’, Human Rights Review, Vol 1, Issue 2, pp38-55. own Bosniak curricular subjects – thereby http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12142-000-1003- also buying into the dominant separation 1#page-1 narrative. This case exemplifies the dynamics 2. The District of Brcko is a partial exception, with children of exclusionism and extremism that have studying together somewhat more than they do elsewhere. See Perry V ‘Democratic Ends, (un)Democratic Means? Reflections on come to dominate policy debates. The RS Democratization Strategies in Brcko and Bosnia-Herzegovina’ in authorities did not take steps to accommodate Innes M (Ed) (2006) Bosnian Security After Dayton: New Perspectives. these demands, and have instead reinforced Routledge, pp. 51-70. http://tinyurl.com/PerryV-2006-Routledge 3. Perry V ‘Classroom Battlegrounds for Hearts and Minds: Efforts division and ethno-national tensions by to Reform and Transform Education in Post-war Bosnia and insisting that those few schools that do offer Herzegovina’ in Listhaug O and Ramet S P (Eds) (2013) Bosnia- the NGS option (around 20 schools) refer to the Herzegovina Since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values. Longo Editore Ravenna. pp225-246. http://tinyurl.com/PerryV-2013-Listhaug-Ramet “language of the Bosniak people” rather than 4. Jukić E ‘Hundreds of Bosnian Pupils Fail to Start School’, Balkan the “Bosnian language”, further reinforcing Insight. 1 September 2014. the problems of a country that consists of www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hundreds-of-pupils-in-bosnia- ‘constituent peoples’ rather than citizens.4 did-not-start-school 28 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Their last name is ‘refugee’: return and local activism Peter Lippman
Sustainable refugee return can only take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina when ordinary people and human rights activists are included as full participants in the recovery process.
As a result of the 1992-95 war, over two In the eastern Bosnian city of Goražde, million people – fully half the population Bosniaks who had been displaced from of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – were the industrial suburb of Kopači and from displaced. Of that number, well over a million nearby Višegrad were crowded within the people fled to dozens of countries around city limits. In the northwestern part of the the world. The rest – internally displaced country, displaced Bosniaks from Prijedor persons – ended up in collective centres, and Kozarac had returned from Croatia but in abandoned houses belonging to other were still internally displaced. Many of them displaced persons, or staying with relatives in came back to Sanski Most – not far from their the entities controlled by their ethnicity: Serbs homes but still on the far side of the IEBL. to the Republika Srpska (RS), and Croats and Displaced Srebrenicans who had not fled Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) to the Federation. abroad were living in poor conditions in Tuzla Although the Croats and Bosniaks and the outskirts of Sarajevo. Meanwhile, were formally allied at the end of the war, Croats who had been expelled (by Serb or, the Federation was ethnically divided as later, by Bosniak forces) from their ancestral well. Territory that ended up under the homes in central BiH were displaced to control of Bosnian Croat forces amounted to western BiH or to parts of Croatia. There, about 20% of BiH, with another 30% under they occupied homes owned by Serbs who Bosniak control. Bosnian Serbs controlled had been expelled. And Serbs from Mostar, the other half of the country. The ethnic Sarajevo and central BiH had been resettled homogenisation of these territories was in parts of the Serb-controlled entity. nearly complete and, for the first time, Croats, All of these ethnically re-concentrated Bosniaks and Serbs were each designated populations now formed homogeneous as ‘minorities’ in those areas where their voting blocs that leaders on all three sides own ethnicity did not hold power. could rely on for support. Those leaders therefore had little or no interest in helping “Poor people, poor people. All split up, all spread them return to their pre-war homes. There out everywhere.” (Raba, aged 70, Sarajevo) ensued a period wherein, at best, many Assessing the wreckage at ground level politicians paid only lip service to refugee The displaced persons I encountered in BiH return; much more common was open after the war1 were living in collective centres obstruction to return in any direction. (schools, barracks and hotels, temporarily “Most of us would like to return home. As for converted for this use) and in the homes of myself, every morning when I wake up, I ask relatives, or in abandoned houses and flats. myself, ‘What am I doing here?’ The people of While they may have been residing in a Tuzla have become tired of us. We are second-class ‘temporary’ home for quite some years – citizens here. Our last name is ‘refugee’.” and often this was the pre-war home of (Zehra, displaced from Bratunac to Tuzla) someone now displaced to the other side of the inter-entity borderline (IEBL) – very It was left to the ordinary people, few of the displaced were comfortably championed by grassroots activists, to fight settled, and a large number were living against the post-war geographic and political in wretched conditions. This, combined divisions that kept them powerless. Quite with homesickness, was the impetus for soon after the end of the war, thousands going home. of displaced people mobilised to return Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 29 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 Peter Lippman Peter
Writing on arch reads: ‘Returnee settlement Sućeska’. Sućeska is a village in the municipality of Srebrenica, and was the first return settlement in the municipality. June 2000. to their pre-war homes but it was to be an there … sent me a message that I would never get uphill battle. These local activists formed my apartment back. I went to the police and told organisations to promote their own return them about that person. They said to me, ‘And what and that of their communities. Many such should we do, throw him out? We can’t help you.’ I organisations were supported both by local went to the municipal offices and to the ministries people and by the international community, – I knocked on every door, everywhere, and nothing but potential returnees faced obstruction happened. Everyone supposedly filled out forms and intimidation from local authorities and and wrote letters but they just lied to me. I went from others who covertly sabotaged return around and around for almost a year trying to get efforts. Damaged homes were rebuilt only my apartment back. …they were kicking me around to be bombed again, and returnees were like a ball.” assassinated or intimidated into giving up and leaving once again. Mines were planted Tent encampments on roads in Gacko and Stolac. In late 1999, The grassroots activists who led dozens an early returnee to Srebrenica who was of local associations campaigning for an employee of the municipal council was return persisted in their efforts. When stabbed and left for dead in the municipal they were rebuffed by local authorities and building. In that same period, dozens of ignored by international agencies, they rebuilt homes in Srebrenica were torched. set up tent encampments in or near the The most effective deterrent to return, villages where they wished to return. however, was non-violent, with massive One of the first organised returns was ‘obstruction at the office window’ perpetrated that of Bosniaks to the village of Jušići, not far by all three sides. Slavenka, who had been from Zvornik in eastern RS. In October 1996, displaced from Sarajevo, described the with the encouragement of the prominent ordeal she faced when she tried to return: return activist Fadil Banjanović,2 dozens of returnees set up tents and got to work “When I returned, I found out that there was clearing rubble from their demolished someone in my apartment. The man who was living farmhouses. They had to repair an access 30 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
road to the village and watch out for mines, which hampered the planting of their first crops. During that month “there were more policemen than returnees, to show that we were not wanted, even among the ruins,” one villager reported. Despite threats and occasional gunshots, the returnees persisted. By the spring of 1998 more than half of the pre-war population of Lippman Peter this village had returned. Sign on tent reads: ‘Kopači is the key to Annex 7 for all of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Tent At that point, return to encampment on the edge of Goražde, above the village of Kopači. November 1999. numerous villages was underway in that They promulgated laws against obstruction part of the Republika Srpska. In Jušići, and removed some of the worst offenders. By returnees began to install telephone poles the end of the 1990s, return picked up, and in in order to access electrical power from the the next couple of years it peaked and several Federation but the RS authorities ordered hundred thousand displaced people managed the poles to be removed. Returning children to return to their pre-war homes. Not only did were bussed across the IEBL to attend Bosniaks return to parts of the Serb-controlled schools in the Federation. With time, the entity and western BiH; Serbs and Croats security situation around Jušići improved returned to their pre-war homes as well. but transportation and water supply However, the fact that the warlords and remained a problem for several years. their political heirs remained in power meant Activists for return found ways to attract that return did not happen on a greater the attention and support of international scale. In some places, such as Višegrad, no officials, demonstrating in front of embassies significant return took place, and in others, and near the headquarters of the Office such as Prijedor and Zvornik municipalities, of the High Representative. In the snowy at its peak return only amounted to some months of late 1999 the establishment of a 50% of the pre-war displaced population. tent settlement, hard by the IEBL separating Goražde from the RS, prompted criticism Difficulties with recovery on the part of some international officials. In the period since return levelled off, the The tent encampment, housing dozens of demographic map of BiH has hardened with would-be returnees, was perched on a hill some 10-20% of returnees living in their pre- above Kopači; on the tents, hand-painted war homes. The age of the returnees is skewed signs read “Kopači is the key to Annex 7” towards the older part of the population. and “Kopači is the key to return”. In his office Younger people who spent a significant part in Tuzla, Fadil Banjanović told me, “There of their formative years in their new homes is no alternative to return. We are for return found ways to remain there, and thousands in all directions. We won’t call it two-way have left the country altogether since the war. return, or minority return – just return. We Preliminary results from the autumn 2013 are an organisation that doesn’t hold panel national census point to a current population discussions, or publish lofty declarations.” of 3.7 million, compared to the pre-war In response to pressure like this, population of 4.4 million.4 Thus, in the last international officials finally began to make decade and more, public discussion of return significant changes to support return in 1999.3 refers to the sustainability of return that has Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 31 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
most effective where returnees can unite with young members of the majority ethnicity. Instances of young people expressing their conscience have increased in recent years; Odisej in Bratunac, although now no longer in operation, was one example of cross- ethnic collaboration,6 and in Prijedor, the organization Kvart7 boasts exemplary collaboration between Peter Lippman Peter intelligent, sincere young Communal building above Kopači, used by inhabitants of the Goražde tent encampment for Serbs and returnee activists. return. November 1999. It is difficult to be already taken place, rather than to significant hopeful in BiH, where the Dayton straitjacket additional return. But there are three notable reinforces separation and the country’s problems that confound recovery in Bosnia. leaders continue to implement their The most salient problem is the lack predecessors’ war goals by quasi-legal means. of economic recovery, with the official Ultimately, recovery will come when a new unemployment rate among all ethnicities generation of domestic leaders applies itself remaining upwards of 40%. In places where to the well-being of the ordinary people. there is a returnee population, the returnees Just as important, change will not happen are the last to receive the few jobs that are without the involvement of the mass of available, and those who would establish ordinary people, led by activists they can a business of their own face prohibitive trust. With increased cooperation between red tape and fees for permits. Where local returnees and open-minded local people of development projects are implemented, all ethnicities, true recovery can take place. priority is given to the dominant ethnicity. Discrimination in education is an Peter Lippman [email protected] additional, serious problem. In the Human rights activist and an independent Federation, Croat and Bosniak pupils researcher specialising in the former Yugoslavia. are taught separately in the ‘two schools http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal.htm
under one roof’ system in more than 50 1. I lived in BiH from mid-1997 to mid-1999, and have visited the locations.5 In Croat-dominated Stolac, country for extensive periods since then, as a researcher focusing Bosniak pupils enter through the back on grassroots human rights campaigns – the campaign for return, and then other campaigns such as those for memorialisation and door, and Croats through the front. against discrimination. The separation between ethnicities that 2. Then director of Tuzla Canton’s Office for Return of Displaced speak the same language and have nearly Persons. the same history and customs keeps tension 3. Under the Bonn powers decreed in December 1997 by the Dayton-established Peace Implementation Council, the Office of simmering, and it is in this atmosphere, the High Representative was empowered to promulgate laws for prevalent throughout BiH, that activists BiH, as well as to remove domestic politicians from office. endeavour to unite people in the cause of 4. As of August 2015, the final results had still not been released. citizens’ rights and against corruption. 5. See article by Perry V ‘Wartime division in peacetime schools’, During the period of refugee return, the pp26-7. most effective activists collaborated across 6. See http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/journal2008-4.htm ethnic lines and advocated for return in 7. http://centarzamladekvartprijedor.blogspot.co.uk/ (Bosnian only) all directions. Today, the struggle against corruption and discrimination is likewise Jane McAdam 32 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Human rights shortcomings of the Dayton Peace Agreement Lisbeth Pilegaard and Jasminka Dzumhur
When a peace agreement guarantees the rights of certain groups but not all, limitations to the enjoyment of human rights are inevitable.
The Dayton Peace Agreement which ended Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Freedoms and the Protocols thereto, or established the rights of the country’s b) alleged or apparent discrimination on any ‘constituent peoples’: Bosniaks, Croats and ground such as sex, race, color, language, Serbs. The result of this has been that anyone religion, political or other opinion, national who does not identify themselves with these or social origin, association with a national groupings is highly limited in their exercise minority, property, birth or other status of rights, leading to the marginalisation arising in the enjoyment of any of the rights of specific categories of the population. and freedoms provided for in the international The United Nations (UN) Committee agreements… where such violation is alleged or on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination appears to have been committed by the Parties, highlighted this in 2006, expressing including by any official or organ of the Parties, its concern that “the State and Entity Cantons, Municipalities, or any individual Constitutions allocate certain authority acting under the authority of such official or to, and confer specific rights exclusively organ. on, members of the ‘constituent peoples’ (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs), and that The institution of the Ombudsman works to persons not belonging to one of these provide equal accessibility for all vulnerable, ethnic groups are formally referred to as marginalised groups, and its annual reports ‘Others’.” The Committee urged “that the indicate that IDPs still have difficulties State Party ensure that all rights provided accessing social protection and welfare, by law are granted, both in law and in face, creating obstacles to their sustainable return.4 to every person on the territory of the State The division of responsibilities among Party, irrespective of race or ethnicity.”1 different levels of government (state, entity, The country is still witnessing a canton and municipality) in the area of number of returns, yet there are continued economic and social rights obstructs access concerns for the security situation of to those rights, with a lack of clarity as to ‘minority returnees’,2 with allegations of where responsibility lies. The consequence harassment, intimidation and other forms is that progress in the protection of human of violence, including murder.3 Politicians rights, in establishing rule of law and also continue to use nationalist rhetoric, in improving governance and economic often directed against minority returnees. development has remained static in BiH. At the same time, although the difficult Annex 6 and equality of access economic situation in BiH affects the country Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement as a whole, it has a more severe impact on established a Commission on Human Rights vulnerable groups such as minority returnees, comprising a Human Rights Chamber and the Roma and female-headed households. an Office of the Ombudsman. Together, The lack of sustainable solutions for IDPs these two are obliged to investigate: and returnees continues, as does widespread discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights gender and political affiliation. Furthermore, as provided in the European Convention for the post-war reforms of governance instruments Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 33 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
and national legislation have been undertaken entities the specific needs of these categories with little or no public and expert consultation are almost entirely neglected. Psychosocial and without sensitivity to the needs of support and counselling are only provided vulnerable groups, including IDPs. Laws by the NGO sector, which is not able to cover have often been pushed through without all the needs. Monthly support allowances sufficient budgetary planning, with the result can be shamefully low, and for some this that rights are de jure prescribed but not able can be a source of re-victimisation. to be realised in practice.5 There is concern The situation of the group labelled that many of the measures undertaken have ‘women war victims of sexual violence’ actually resulted in an increase in poverty illustrates how multiple vulnerabilities are and slower economic development, which not adequately dealt with and thus how again will have more serious consequences the state is failing to provide adequate for the most vulnerable groups. reparation to victims. These are women who are additionally disadvantaged as female Inadequate protection for heads of household and IDPs and who were vulnerable groups or are facing eviction from accommodation Various UN treaty bodies (charged with they were provided as IDPs. Due to the monitoring implementation of the core provisions of the Law on Refugees from BiH international human rights treaties) have and Displaced Persons in BiH they were (or pointed out – in regard to access to economic are) under pressure to return to their pre- and social rights by vulnerable groups – the war places of residence – where they may be lack of direct application of Conventions; exposed to additional trauma, including the the lack of programmes for reduction of possibility of having to face the perpetrators.6 unemployment, particularly among women; The burden is placed on IDPs to show and inadequate mechanisms for monitoring they have grounds for refusing to return, and redress. Their recommendations, since the Law prescribes that they lose however, have not been taken into serious their IDP status if the conditions exist for consideration by the BiH government. safe and dignified return to the pre-war As a result, injustice and inadequacies place of residence. However, the law does in protection and fulfilment of the rights not define conditions for safe and dignified of these groups remain one of the main return, nor does it take into consideration challenges in transitional justice in BiH. that safe and dignified return for survivors Victims of torture, including survivors of torture can require significantly different of sexual violence, are granted only conditions from those for IDPs not suffering minimal protection under the umbrella from multiple vulnerabilities. Moreover, category of ‘civilian victims of war’ in every time the survivors face a new eviction entity laws. Female victims of sexual they are additionally re-traumatised, and violence are even more vulnerable, and their marginalisation is reinforced. face serious economic, housing, social and psychological issues; their often multiple Conclusion vulnerabilities are not adequately recognised There is a pressing need for a comprehensive by laws (e.g. on health care, IDPs, social assessment of the effects of implementation protection, etc) nor addressed in practice. of the Dayton Peace Agreement on IDPs, Two of the causes are the absence of with particular attention paid to the state-level legislation regulating the rights implementation of the recommendations of victims, and the lack of harmonisation of of the UN treaty bodies and the Universal those relevant laws that do exist. Access to Periodic Review.7 A human rights-based health care for survivors of torture, including approach should be used in all spheres sexual violence, is limited to basic services of life in BiH, focusing on the needs of (in the Federation) or connected to IDP vulnerable groups and ensuring that status (in the Republika Srpska) but in both returnees can access their rights relating 34 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
to social protection, health care, education, recommendations www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_ doc_2012111310235235eng.pdf; European Commission against housing, employment and security. Racism and Intolerance (February 2011) ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (fourth monitoring cycle) Lisbeth Pilegaard [email protected] www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/bosnia_ Consultant and Humanitarian Adviser to the UN herzegovina/BIH-CBC-IV-2011-002-ENG.pdf 4. (March 2015) Annual Report on the Results of the Activities of High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing. the Institution of the Ombudsman for Human Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2014 www.ombudsmen.gov.ba/Dokumenti. Jasminka Dzumhur aspx?id=27&tip=1&lang=En [email protected] 5. The best example for this assertion is the Gender Law (text Ombudsperson for Bosnia and Herzegovina. at http://tinyurl.com/BiH-Gender-Law-2003), which states that: “competent authorities shall undertake appropriate measures on 1. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial all levels in order to implement provisions of the Gender Law,” Discrimination, 2006. Supplement No 18 A/61/18, para 31. including “the adoption of planned measures designed to achieve www.refworld.org/pdfid/45c30ba90.pdf gender equality in all fields and at all levels of governance”. This 2. Displaced persons returning to areas of origin where their has not happened yet. ethnic group is now in the minority. 6. www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/laws-and-policies/ 3. OSCE (November 2012) Tackling Hate Crimes: An analysis bosnia of bias-motivated incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 7. www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BASession20.aspx
If women are left out of peace talks Gorana Mlinarević, Nela Porobić Isaković and Madeleine Rees
The exclusion of women from the process of making peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina has diminished the prospects for sustainable peace. When will we learn that no peace can be sustainable and just without the active and meaningful participation of women?
The narrative of war commonly portrays BiH is paralysed by the disfunctionality of women as victims only, taking away their the central state apparatus and the ethno- agency and leaving them voiceless in the nationalistic politics that are the common reconstruction of their country. However, drivers for the two entities created by women’s experiences as victims of violence Dayton.2 There has been no serious attempt and women’s active participation in peace by the domestic political elite to include making and peace building are not mutually women’s perspectives in discussions exclusive, and both aspects need to be regarding constitutional reforms, nor recognised when negotiating peace. were women able to get support from During the peace process that preceded the international community involved in the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement facilitating these talks. The rationale – or in 1995 not a single woman participated, excuse – is that women are de facto included whether as lead mediator, witness, member through participation in BiH political of the negotiation team or signatory.1 This and institutional life, including their absence of women in the formal peace membership of political parties. However, process has had concrete consequences the reality is different, and women are not both for the society as a whole and also sufficiently or adequately represented. for women as a distinct group in the The absence of women during peace society and their ability to be recognised negotiations is not unique to BiH. In 2012 as agents of change in later processes. UN Women published a review of 31 peace In Dayton, the space at the negotiating processes, showing that only 4% of peace table was open only to men who had the agreements had women as signatories. More power of armed forces behind them. Under recently, at the Geneva II peace talks for Syria, the pretence of securing human rights, despite support from states and international those male elites succeeded in agreeing the NGOs and the existence of UN Security formula for the division of territory. Today, Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 35 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 Midhat Poturović/mojprijedor.com Midhat Poturović/mojprijedor.com
‘Mothers of Prijedor’ at a demonstration marking International Day of the Disappeared, 30th August. women, peace and security,3 Syrian women 2013 a number of women’s organisations were kept out of the peace talks. Not only and women activists in BiH, facilitated by is this patently an affront to international the Women’s International League for Peace legal obligations but it is also quite simply a and Freedom, started to work to counteract tragic waste. Yet, when prominent women’s the exclusionist mentality of the political international and local Syrian organisations elites through an initiative called ‘Women asked the UN to ensure the inclusion of organizing for change in Syria and Bosnia women in the Syrian peace negotiations and Herzegovina’. The starting idea was in 2014, they were told that the “political that the hard lessons learned by Bosnian situation is complicated”. We know that. women – both during the war and afterwards But the solution is not to perpetuate the – need to be analysed and used to develop divisiveness that led the country into war in new, improved strategies for the active and the first place. Research clearly shows that meaningful participation of women in peace the only peace treaties that have brought processes. This knowledge could be shared sustainable peace are those which have been with other women in similar situations so that drafted with the participation of women mistakes can be avoided and good practices and with the clear inclusion of a gender considered and contextualised. At the same analysis in drawing up the framework for time, the opportunity is being used to find the conclusion of conflict, for transition, new paths towards the creation of a women’s and for the future path of the nation.4 movement grounded in feminist principles in BiH that will be able to act beyond the Creating space for inclusion and ethno-nationalistic politics of division.5 participation The women activists from BiH identified Sharing women’s experiences concerning successful stories but also many failures peace negotiations and post-war life has over the past 20 years. Most of the failures become an imperative for feminist peace can be traced to two things: firstly, a flawed activists in order to create spaces for peace agreement, the purpose of which was women’s meaningful inclusion and active to end the armed conflict but which did not participation in the making of peace. Since contain the necessary elements for creating 36 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
sustainable peace, and, secondly, the fact the different ethno-nationalist elites at that women and civil society had no part in Dayton, without addressing any of the negotiating that peace. discriminatory or gendered aspects of these. During the war, women were actively On the other hand, the issues recognised engaged in addressing the consequences as exclusively ‘women’s issues’ – and therefore of the violence and in activities vital to the not of particular importance for power or survival of communities; they provided resources redistribution – were ignored at assistance to internally displaced people Dayton and left to be dealt with by women’s and to women victims of sexual violence; organisations. The classic example is they went to work – braving snipers and domestic violence, the least ethno-politically shelling – to keep factories working; and some sensitive issue. BiH women were given worked on cross-community dialogue in the space to tackle this, and the male political midst of war. Yet there was no mechanism elite did not interfere substantively given to carry those experiences across into the that domestic violence portrays women as formal peace negotiations. The UNSCR 1325, victims not as power holders or decision which called for the active and meaningful makers; although the causes of domestic participation of women in all phases of peace violence were not addressed adequately, new building and peace making, was adopted and improved laws on domestic violence five years after the end of the war in Bosnia. were passed, driven by women NGOs and After the war women continued carried into parliament by women MPs. organising, some to demand the truth about The issue of wartime sexual violence, missing family members, others to demand however, remains a heavily politicised inclusion of women in formal politics. Some question. Nationalisms seek to profit from women also led the difficult process of return, a narrative of the atrocities committed by often to sites where many of them had lost others to “their women”. This objectification their close family members or been victimised and commodification were reflected in the themselves. They were the ones with hands- way in which the peace process evolved, on experience of what it would take to make in particular in relation to access to justice. the return a sustainable one – not just the Instead of embracing an approach to return of property (which was the main focus address and ameliorate the situation of of the international community) but also survivors that seeks also to have a broader, access to economic, social and political rights. transformative impact on society, the reaction of parts of the elite has been at best Failure to engage with gender issues ambivalent, at worst co-optive. Some of the Many of the problems that arose after the issues raised by the women’s groups related war could have been avoided had there been to the question of transformative redress. more serious political engagement – involving The response, however, was to ‘grant’ a women’s civil society representatives and form of compensation that was more a gender-competent advisors – during the peace social support benefit than reparation to talks. Domestic violence, trafficking, health address wartime abuses, effectively forcing care, education, employment – these are all women into becoming dependent on social gender-related issues and should have been welfare. Even this form of compensation factored into a carefully planned transition was not given to all survivors but only in post-war BiH. Instead, issues recognised to those who live in the Federation and as being ‘serious’ and of ethno-national who fulfil a set of (problematic) criteria. interest (such as education) or of particular Consequently, over the past 20 years importance for the political economy (such Bosnian NGOs have had to develop as employment and health care) were used considerable expertise when it comes to consolidate both ethno-nationalistic and to provision of services such as medical neoliberal positions. Jurisdiction over these assistance and psychosocial support. Official issues had already been divided between institutions, meanwhile, such as centres Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 37 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
for mental health care and centres for of women made the failure inevitable. social welfare, have done little or nothing This continues to pose a challenge, as to improve their capacity for provision of the space lost at the negotiating table support and services. As a result, survivors has proven impossible to regain. today get support only through the NGOs, which remain dependent on foreign donor Gorana Mlinarević [email protected] support to continue their vital work. Researcher, Gender of Justice Project, There is an inherent link between Goldsmiths, University of London. the way in which such services have www.gold.ac.uk/genderofjustice been ‘outsourced’ and the achievement Nela Porobić Isaković [email protected] of real justice. The formal justice aspects Project Coordinator, Women organising for of post-war BiH that were created (the change in Syria and BiH, Women’s International International Criminal Tribunal for the League for Peace and Freedom. former Yugoslavia, the Court of Bosnia http://womenorganizingforchange.org/en and Herzegovina, etc) have provided a framework for criminal accountability Madeleine Rees [email protected] but have failed in terms of providing General Secretary, Women’s International comprehensive justice. The understanding of League for Peace and Freedom. justice has been too narrow, confined to the www.wilpfinternational.org prosecution and conviction of perpetrators (and in the beginning these were also the 1. UN Women (2012) Women’s participation in peace negotiations: Connections between presence and influence, p4 demands from the victims themselves). http://tinyurl.com/UNWomen-peacenegotiations-2012 Establishing these formal justice 2. The Dayton Peace Agreement created a decentralised Bosnia mechanisms, however, should have been and Herzegovina, dividing the country between two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, complemented by paying real and serious with a weak central government. attention to social and economic rights, and 3. www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4672e.html the post-war reconstruction of BiH should 4. See for example Paffenholz T (2014) ‘Civil Society and Peace have been supported by a transformative Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy’, transitional process. The identification Negotiation Journal, Vol 30, Issue 1, pp69-91. of what was needed could only be done 5. The reports from all discussions can be found at http://womenorganizingforchange.org/en/events/retrospective- by an inclusive process, and the absence exercise/ Interpretations of Annex 7: assessing the impact on non-returnees in the UK Gayle Munro Emphasising the crucial role of refugee returns to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina risks minimising the agency of those who choose not to exercise their rights under Annex 7.
The majority of people from Bosnia and group made up of 1,000 people who had Herzegovina (BiH) living in the United been identified by the United Nations High Kingdom (UK) today made the decision Commissioner for Refugees or the Red Cross to leave their home country and make a as being particularly vulnerable, many of temporary or permanent new home in whom were former concentration camp the UK as a direct result of the 1992-95 detainees); those making their journey war in BiH. Those coming to the UK in independently; or medical evacuees. the 1990s would have been part of one of The reliability of quantitative data on three groups: those arriving as a part of migration to the UK prevents any accurate the UK government’s Bosnia Project (a estimates on the numbers of people from BiH 38 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
still resident in the UK, although community for causing so much pain have not been representatives estimate the number to be brought to justice. In that sense, the insistence approximately 10,000. Many of those who on refugee return as being the lynchpin of a fled the conflict will have since returned – successful Dayton,3 while ostensibly aiming and it is of course entirely appropriate that, to ensure the protection of returning refugees, following a violent conflict, those who want could be interpreted as having a more subtle to return ‘home’ should be able to exercise and insidious sub-text. In post-conflict the right to do so. However, the question of BiH and its neighbours, where meaningful choice or agency on the part of those who reconciliation measures on the part of the have had so much taken from them already is perpetrators are few and far between, Annex one which is interesting to explore, especially 7 places the weight of expectation on the given the wider rhetoric on migration and victim. Survivors of the war are already very asylum in the European (and wider) context.1 familiar with the guilt of the living. In placing such an emphasis on their return and the Insistence on return return of others like them, there is the danger There are many who argue that the ‘success’ of increasing the emotional burden on those of Dayton rests on the implementation of who may have already had their resilience Annex 7 and refugee return, and indeed the tested not only by the horror of the war international community is keen to emphasise itself but also by the sometimes considerable the importance of the return of IDPs and stresses of the experience of migration. refugees. But it is interesting to consider the Of those refugees from BiH whom potential motivation(s) behind the insistence I interviewed during the course of my on the importance of refugee return. research,4 the average length of wait for Is such insistence, as some have pointed a decision on their migration status was out, motivated by the desire to emphasise that seven years, with the longest wait being the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not to be thirteen years.5 Interviewees spoke of the rewarded with territorial gains?2 Could part of feeling of intense physical and emotional the desire for ‘successful’ refugee return be an displacement on realising that, after leaving attempt to assuage any residual guilt over the homes shelled or burned to the ground or catastrophic results of the collective failure having been forced to renounce any rights of the international community to intervene to their properties, what was on offer in the positively in BiH at an earlier stage in the war? country of ‘refuge’ was temporariness and There is increasing reluctance on the uncertainty; they faced years in limbo without part of many European governments to offer the right to work or the documentation permanent refuge to those fleeing conflicts, necessary to facilitate temporary return and the practice during the 1990s was to offer without potentially jeopardising the ‘temporary protection’ to refugees from the outcome of their asylum claim. Bosnian war (Germany and the UK being It could be argued that the belief that two examples). The international community refugee return is essential for the future presents return as crucial not only for the of BiH paradoxically risks overlooking the long-term success of the peace treaty but also rights of some of those most vulnerable for the eventual emotional well-being of those refugees. It would after all be difficult to who were displaced. Is there a possibility, underestimate the accumulated and corrosive however, that the increasingly unforgiving effect on the mental and emotional health of immigration legislation of some European a refugee who, after surviving the war and its governments is contributing to the rhetoric aftershocks and the UK immigration system, around the importance of refugee return? is then subjected to the emotional guilt-trip It is inevitable that discussions around which the pressure of the ‘refugee return is reconciliation will be, to say the least, essential for Bosnia’ argument could trigger. politically and emotionally charged, in a While implementation of Annex 7 country where so many of those responsible is crucial for the protection of the rights Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 39 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
of those refugees and IDPs who do wish 2. Dahlman C and Tuathail G Ó (2005) ‘The legacy of ethnic cleansing: The international community and the returns process in to return, it is also important that the post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Political Geography 24(5): 569- rights of those who have chosen to make 599. www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629805000223 their homes elsewhere are recognised. 3. For example, see ‘Albright urges Bosnian refugee return’, BBC News, 31 August 1998 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ Acceptance of the decision of these refugees europe/161970.stm and ‘Bosnia: Dayton will collapse unless not to return would be a positive step refugees return’, November 1997 towards recognising and celebrating that http://refugeenews.tripod.com/nov97bosnia.htm refugee ‘agency’ so often lamented as 4. The research on which this article is based was carried out in 6 2008-13 while the author was a doctoral candidate at University missing in studies of forced migration. College London’s Department of Geography. Research participants had been living in the UK for an average of 15 Gayle Munro [email protected] years at the time of the project; the vast majority had arrived Research Manager, The Salvation Army. between 1990 and 1995. www.salvationarmy.org.uk 5. Some were granted refugee status while others had their temporary protection extended and then were eventually given The content of this article does not necessarily leave to remain permanently. reflect the position of The Salvation Army. 6. Turton D (2003) ‘Conceptualising Forced Migration’, RSC Working Paper No 12, Refugee Studies Centre, University of 1. See Forced Migration Review issue 51 (forthcoming December Oxford. 2015) on ‘Destination: Europe’. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/conceptualising-forced-migration www.fmreview.org/destination-europe
The role of remote voting in encouraging return Djordje Stefanovic and Neophytos Loizides
Once there is a genuine possibility of going home, what influences a forced migrant’s decision to return to a pre-conflict residence, often in the face of very difficult conditions? What role can remote voting play?
Victims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ have returned This article combines findings of fieldwork home in significant numbers all over Bosnia conducted in Drvar region in 2011 with and Herzegovina (BiH) but no municipality data collected in BiH in June and July 2013,2 has been as successful in peacefully reversing including data on both currently displaced ethnic cleansing as the Drvar region in people and returnees. Survey-focused work western BiH. In 1991, 97% of Drvar’s 17,000 on displaced persons is relatively rare, for a inhabitants were Serbs. After the September number of reasons. It is frequently risky in 1995 offensive by Croat forces, the only terms of the personal security of interviewees, original inhabitants who remained were 83 is politically sensitive and is difficult to carry older people in isolated villages. However, out with a representative sample of displaced by 2000, Serb returnees represented 70% respondents. In conflict zones, forced of the local population, making Drvar the migrants represent vulnerable but mobile first municipality in which the pre-war populations; while their vulnerability makes majority was restored via peaceful returns.1 them extremely important for social science Not only did former residents from Drvar enquiries, their mobility makes it equally region start returning in large numbers before challenging to determine representativeness the country-wide turn of the tide in 1999-2000 in the sampling procedures. Such studies but they won municipal elections, gained consequently often focus on available significant representation in the police force populations in designated refugee camps and local administration, and recovered the or neighbourhoods, overlooking those demographic majority status they had had displaced persons who are more integrated before the war. This was achieved despite within the broader population. In the end, bitter resistance to return from some quarters. governments, international organisations 40 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
and NGOs are often forced to make decisions without consulting vulnerable groups. Reflecting the importance both of security concerns and of memories of home in making decisions about return, our data indicates that women and those who experienced wartime victimisation are less likely to return. Likewise, older Bosnians with positive memories of pre-conflict inter-ethnic relations are more likely to return than younger persons or those with negative memories. Better-educated forced migrants are less likely to return, which is probably related to their easier economic integration in their new place of residence. Young women are the least likely to return, which might be related to greater opportunities for women in urban Bosnia (or Western countries of exile) compared to small-town or rural Bosnia. Finally, persons displaced from areas experiencing high levels of return are more likely to return themselves. The Bosnian return experience points to several limitations of internationally sponsored peacekeeping. Even in the townships where community effort led to successful returns, the mass return was generally not followed by well-designed and well-funded local economic development
programmes. Consequently, many returnees Mixed groups of Serb and Croat returnees living in Bukve village, 2001. left again but this time primarily for economic reasons – to find jobs. While BiH’s cities were Annex 3 Article IV of the Dayton Peace once genuinely multi-ethnic, they are now Agreement stipulates that “a citizen who overwhelmingly mono-ethnic. However, no longer lives in the municipality in which there have been examples of successful he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general returns in smaller, mono-ethnic townships or rule, be expected to vote, in person or by villages, most notably in the Drvar region. absentee ballot, in that municipality.”3 This electoral provision permitted refugees and The Coalition for Drvar internally displaced persons (IDPs) to cast The Drvar association of displaced absentee ballots in their pre-war home persons (the Coalition for Drvar) was formed cities and in 1997, for example, Mile Marčeta when it became clear to those wishing was elected by absentee ballot as mayor to return that the authorities in different of Drvar. Described by the international parts of BiH were not truly interested in media as a “symbol of hope in a land of implementing the right of return. One of hate”, the mayor convinced around 1,600 the first achievements of the Coalition for to 2,000 displaced persons to accompany Drvar’s leaders was to convince followers him back to the municipality. Despite Croat to vote in their pre-war hometowns, against resistance, the assassination of two elderly the wishes of those who were counting returnees and an assassination attempt on the votes of displaced Serbs in order to against Marčeta himself, forced migrants consolidate their own control in the parts of managed to re-establish themselves on BiH which were now predominantly Serb. their land. The Coalition for Drvar not only Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 41 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
rights was a key element of the Dayton architecture – in contrast to other UN-led peace mediations such as the Annan Plan for Cyprus which included significant restrictions on the political rights of displaced persons. To prevent situations arising in post- conflict societies where municipal authorities represent exclusively either new or old inhabitants but not both, peace settlements should combine remote voting with – what was missing from Dayton – power-sharing systems at the local level.5 Such institutional mechanisms could allow refugees and IDPs to maintain financial, institutional and political ties with their home region. Could cases of successful return in BiH be replicated in other post-conflict societies? While some conditions appear to be unique to Bosnia and hard to replicate – such as the massive presence of the international agencies in a de facto protectorate – others might work elsewhere. If a post-conflict settlement enables forced migrants to vote in local elections in the place of displacement (by a remote voting mechanism), forced migrants might be able to peacefully regain a stake in local political UNHCR/R Chalasani institutions and be encouraged to return.
Mixed groups of Serb and Croat returnees living in Bukve village, 2001. Djordje Stefanovic [email protected] helped reverse ethnic cleansing but also Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology played a leading role in mobilising support and Criminology, Saint Mary’s University. from the international community as well as www.smu.ca locally among the multi-ethnic country-wide Coalition for the Return of the Expelled. Neophytos Loizides [email protected] Reader in International Conflict Analysis, School The theme poster of the Coalition for Drvar was a of Politics and International Relations, University large yellow map of all Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Kent. www.kent.ac.uk a picture of a house with a little chimney. “Hocu kuci,” it says. “I want to go home.” 1. International Crisis Group (May 2000) Bosnia refugee logjam breaks: is the international community ready? ICG Balkans, Report No 95. http://tinyurl.com/ICG-Bosnia-May2000 The Drvar experience highlights the 2. The data collection was done by Sarajevo-based Ipsos BH, with funding provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research importance of remote voting for successful Council of Canada, as part of ‘The Way Home: Peaceful Voluntary returns. In Drvar many IDPs have Return Project’. For an earlier study focusing on community returns see Stefanović D and Loizides N (2011) ‘The Way Home: continued to have a vote in their pre-conflict Peaceful Return of Victims of Ethnic Cleansing’, Human Rights municipalities, even while in exile. As per Quarterly, 33 (2): 408-430. Article 20.8 of the Bosnian Election Law, 3. See www.refworld.org/docid/3de495c34.html distant voting for displaced persons will 4. See www.izbori.ba/Documents/documents/English/Laws/ remain in place until decided otherwise Election_Law_of_BiH-eng.pdf by the UN High Representative or the 5. See www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e84.html Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.4 Voting 42 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Home after Dayton: IDPs in Sarajevo Gruia Badescu
The experiences of displaced people in Sarajevo show that living in a place that people perceive to be safe and to provide opportunities can be more desirable than returning to one’s place of origin. Participatory urban projects can help foster the sense of community which is still missing.
It is estimated that about 90,000 current was also linked to a view that people are residents of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia rooted in a particular place. This is what and Herzegovina (BiH), lived elsewhere in Roger Zetter calls the “myth of home”, where BiH before the war. Some came to Sarajevo the emphasis is on the geographical location to seek work in the years after the war but of a place that is considered to remain for many life in Sarajevo began as a result of ‘home’ no matter what. As a result, in post- displacement during the war. In many places Dayton BiH, there was an emphasis on the around the world, urban IDPs as a category restitution of property and return. At first with a specific profile are ignored by local glance, this was successful, as many people authorities or in some cases are singled out reclaimed their property and BiH witnessed negatively. The experience of displaced people over a million returns. In practice, however, who now live in post-Dayton Sarajevo can many recovered their property and then help inform action and policy both in BiH and sold it to others, mostly to those of the new in urban displacement contexts elsewhere. majority group in the respective localities.
Seeking cool ground The alternative to this ‘home return’ approach is a ‘looking for cool ground’ approach where people’s decision to remain elsewhere is connected to feelings of safety and the opportunities they find in their new locations.1 For many displaced Bosnians, the return to their pre-war homes would imply living as a minority amidst another ethnic group, and that could instil feelings of insecurity or fear of conflict. Furthermore, with the collapse of the socialist industrial economy, this return would imply a choice between unemployment and living off the land, which the younger generations are not so inclined to do. Places that represent ‘cool ground’, on the other hand, would provide security, in the mstfcn/Shutterstock.com sense both of being shielded from possible Sarajevo animosity, resentment or conflict and of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords stipulated having better prospects for employment. the right of IDPs to return specifically to While for some this cool ground was a their “homes of origin”, rather than the foreign country, others found it in big more common UNHCR “return to country cities like Sarajevo, where the economy of origin” framework. This specificity was was better than elsewhere in BiH. Living grounded in the desire of international actors among people with whom one shares a to reverse the ‘ethnic cleansing’ which they language and often a religious and overall did not stop during the war. In addition, it cultural code was preferable for some to Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 43 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
living elsewhere and having to negotiate networks needs to be complemented by different languages and cultures. community development. The divisions Most displaced people in Sarajevo whom between groups can be moderated by I interviewed told me that they feel at home concentrating on common challenges and in the city.2 For some, feeling at home was a opportunities, by working on a common matter of spending enough time in a place vision to benefit all. One area where this can and getting accustomed to it. For others, happen is urban planning and development. feeling at home meant being surrounded by Interviews reveal that for most residents, supportive and engaging social networks. displaced or not, the problems of urban For some, Sarajevo became home as it is a living are similar – relating to employment, relatively large city and thus a place both traffic, urban amenities – and working of anonymity and of discovery. For others, together to address these issues could help however, the size of the city caused loneliness to cement the feeling of community. and hampered a sense of community. Humanitarian actors need to pay more One obstacle to feeling at home in Sarajevo attention to urban issues and the needs of is a perception of animosity and arrogance urban IDPs. One possible avenue of action shown by the pre-war local population. would be for humanitarian actors to advocate As the majority of the displaced were of to local authorities the need to involve local the same ethnicity and religion as the new residents of all backgrounds – including demographic and political majority in the city IDPs – in small community projects (working (i.e. Bosniaks), one might expect that their with local community NGOs) and in wider integration would be smooth, facilitated by participatory planning and development the authorities and embraced by the local schemes. It is important, however, not to population. What actually happened defies single out IDPs in poor communities and this assumption. Locals invoke the notion of thereby risk creating animosities between a Sarajevo spirit, Sarajevski duh, to express the the host community and IDPs; any projects refined urban culture of Sarajevo, and depict should rather address the overall structural the newcomers as rural, primitive, traditional, problems of the area and the concerns religiously radical – all traits assembled of all residents.4 Such an approach will under the umbrella of ‘uncultured people’, foster people’s sense of belonging and nekulturni, who are unable to adjust to the city. facilitate a more inclusive urban vision. A number of the urban IDPs whom I interviewed discussed the perceived Gruia Badescu [email protected] differences between the rural (‘uneducated’) PhD candidate, Centre for Urban Conflicts and urban (‘educated’) newcomers: Research, University of Cambridge. www.urbanconflicts.arct.cam.ac.uk “Taxi drivers talk about all those people who came 1. See Allen T (Ed) (1996) In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight & here: …[the newcomers] are uneducated, they don’t Homecoming in Northeast Africa. James Currey; see also work by know how to behave, they throw rubbish from the Stef Jansen on Bosnian IDPs. windows and not in the bins, and all these stupid 2. In 2013-14, I interviewed urban IDPs in Sarajevo from a variety things. I am sure there are some like that but that of backgrounds, urban and rural, who either came directly to Sarajevo as IDPs or who were refugees abroad first. Many thanks does not make a pattern. I am educated, I do not to CESI for facilitating this research and especially to CESI throw rubbish out of my window….” (Vedad, 44) director Dr Selma Porobic for her support. My research on IDPs did not include East Sarajevo (in Republika Srpska); for a study “There is a lot of animosity. People believe that of Sarajevo Serb IDPs in East Sarajevo see Armakolas I ‘Sarajevo No More? Identity and the Experience of Place among Bosnian being born in some place is more noble. But then Serb Sarajevans in Republika Srpska’, in Bougarel X, Helms E you ask – […] you think that just by being born and Duijzings G (Eds) (2007) The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, here, you are better?” (Nihad, 47) Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society. Ashgate. 3. Housing availability was, unusually for IDPs, not a problem in Sarajevo at the end of the war as most of the Sarajevo Serbs The persistence of divisions within had fled the city, vacating properties. More, low-cost informal Sarajevo’s urban population indicates that construction took place on the hills surrounding the city. providing housing,3 employment and support 4. Known as area-based integrated urban development. 44 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 The compound effects of conflict and disaster displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina Wesli H Turner
Some IDPs living in protracted displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as many Roma IDPs, were especially vulnerable to the effects of the May 2014 flooding and landslides.
Over a few days in May 2014, Bosnia settlements and illegally built houses and and Herzegovina (BiH) experienced the a more favourable legislative framework heaviest rainfall reported in 120 years. but has yet to be fully implemented3 and The deluge led to the flooding of the rivers there is still no state-level regulation on the Bosna, Drina, Una, Sava and Vrbas and legalisation of informally built housing units. their tributaries, damaging 43,000 homes Resolution of property disputes for the land and triggering landslides that destroyed a on which such houses are built remains the further 1,952 homes in 81 municipalities.1 responsibility of the two ‘entities’ and Brčko The floods affected more than 1.5 million District at the municipal/cantonal level. people (nearly 39% of the population) At the same time, newly displaced Roma and displaced around 90,000 people. continue to face discrimination in accessing Many of those displaced by the floods assistance. In interviews conducted with 373 were IDP returnees, formerly displaced displaced Roma families in 20 municipalities, persons who had integrated locally, and 45% said their homes had been destroyed by IDPs still living in protracted displacement flooding or landslides in 2014.4 Those who following the conflict, and already vulnerable had built on public land without permission groups such as victims of wartime sexual or building permits are not eligible for violence and landmine victims. Once again reconstruction assistance due to the legal they were forced to flee their homes, having requirement to provide proof of ownership to find refuge with family or friends or in of a destroyed property. It is not clear what temporary accommodation facilities. housing assistance, if any, there will be for informal settlers and other non-owners. IDPs in hazard-prone areas The prioritisation of return – by the state and Prioritise according to need, not cause of the international community – between 1999 displacement and 2005 exacerbated the vulnerability of BiH received aid from bilateral donors, some IDPs, especially Roma IDPs. Those who international organisations and the European did not want to return and did not benefit Union (EU) to respond to the flooding- from financial assistance often settled in at- induced displacement in 2014. As part of this, risk areas near riverbanks prone to flooding facilities to house those who were unable or on hillsides that were susceptible to to remain in their homes were identified. landslides, simply building on vacant land. Here, in the context of another programme Without ownership or other rights to their (CEBII5) funded by the Council of Europe property, many such IDPs are under constant Development Bank to close all collective threat of eviction by authorities. In addition, centres, it became important to distinguish the use of cheap construction materials and between shelter for IDPs displaced by the unskilled craftsmen has meant that it is the conflict and those displaced by the floods most vulnerable IDPs and returnees from the and landslides. The new shelters became conflict 20 years ago who are again prone to known as ‘temporary accommodation displacement, this time by natural hazards.2 facilities’ (TAFs) so as not to confuse The National Action Plan on Roma them with the ‘collective centres’ which Housing calls for the legalising of informal continue to house IDPs from the conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 45 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 EC/ECHO/EEAS/EU Delegation BiH
Photo taken by a Slovenian helicopter crew as they provide assistance to people affected by floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014. Where a country experiences multiple then again by the floods and landslides. waves of displacement, the most vulnerable The biggest question surfaced around should be prioritised. After the initial surge reconstruction assistance for housing that of post-flood assistance, many organisations was built informally as there is still no became worried that displacement caused legislation or legal regime in place to provide by the floods would undo progress made reconstruction assistance to those who have in returns and local integration of IDPs built informally – primarily Roma IDPs. from the conflict, delay work to improve Some progress has been made in that living conditions of IDPs in collective municipalities are now able to allocate centres, and damage donor commitments public land free of charge to persons who to facilitate ‘conflict returns’ (if donors lost their homes in the landslides. Roma decided to assist those displaced in the who meet the eligibility requirements can more recent disaster rather than those request such assistance, like everyone else, who were displaced 20 years ago). but are still required to provide some proof This last concern was not unfounded. In of ownership, which many do not have. The the immediate aftermath of the floods, the distribution of free land by the municipality Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees does not adequately address their housing and the EU approved a diversion of funds needs or the specific challenges – such allocated to end displacement caused by as documentation – faced by the Roma the conflict towards those displaced by community. Innovative approaches to the floods and landslides. There was an circumvent all of these challenges are needed. emphasis on vulnerable populations that Wesli H Turner [email protected] included ‘Roma and displaced communities’ Associate Regional Analyst, Internal but the requirement to show proof of Displacement Monitoring Centre. ownership remained (in order to be eligible www.internal-displacement.org for reconstruction assistance) and there was uncertainty as to whether previous assistance 1. Bosnia and Herzogovina Recovery Needs Assessment, Floods 14-19 May, European Union, 19 May 2014 provided to conflict IDPs would affect http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/floods/rna- their eligibility for flood-related assistance. executive-summary.pdf There was no official guidance for donors 2. In addition, many Roma IDPs do not have official IDP status as or government authorities on this matter. they did not have the identity documents required to register. Eventually, the Ministry of Displaced 3. Government of Bosnia and Herzogovina (2013) Action Plan for Roma in the areas of employment, housing and healthcare, p28 Persons of the Federation of BiH – one of http://tinyurl.com/BiH-Action-plan-Roma-2013 (Bosnian only) the two entities governing BiH – shifted 4. IOM (June 2014) Impact of the Floods and Landslides in Bosnia and funding intended for conflict IDPs and Herzegovina on the Affected Roma Population: First Assessment Results, used it to prioritise people who had been IOM (June 2014). 5. See article by Mayne A ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after doubly displaced, once by conflict and Dayton’, pp8-11. 46 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Prijedor: re-imagining the future Damir Mitrić and Sudbin Musić
Public memorialisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina today is an act of remembering not just those who died in the conflict but also the multi-ethnic reality of earlier times. Articulation of this, however, is being obstructed in cities like Prijedor.
The political elites of post-Dayton Bosnia Srpska (RS), with the immediate post-war and Herzegovina (BiH) have carefully political leadership dominated by those patrolled their respective histories of ‘what who had ‘ethnically cleansed’ the town of happened’ during the war, with school its non-Serb population.1 Annex 7 of the curricula, public broadcasting, public Dayton Peace Agreement established the events and memorial sites on all sides right of all refugees and displaced persons mostly narrating an un-nuanced story to return freely to their homes of origin, and of victim and perpetrator. Imposing an was generally successfully implemented in embargo on memories of pre-war BiH has Prijedor, in contrast to other parts of BiH; become an important component of this. between 1998 and 2003 some 10,000 Bosniaks In the north-western town of Prijedor, decided to return to the place of their birth. a systematically executed policy of However, only 20% of the original Bosniak ethnic cleansing resulted in the killing of population has permanently returned. Until 3,173 residents at the hands of local Serb 2007, reclaiming and rebuilding destroyed authorities, with a third executed in the private property had been the primary driver three infamous concentration camps of of return. Thereafter returns stagnated, Omarska, Karaterm and Trnopolje. and many of the returnees decided to move The signing of the Dayton Peace across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line into Agreement in November 1995 left Prijedor the Bosniak-Croat Federation or to join their within the jurisdiction of the Republika relatives in exile across the globe. Their beautifully renovated houses stand empty in Prijedor for most of the year. With an ageing population and an economy that offers no opportunities for young people – who are increasingly abandoning the town – Prijedor faces the prospect of being emptied once again.
Politics of memorialisation Equally worrying is the politically sanctioned culture of denial of the war crimes committed against the non-Serb Sudbin Musić population. Local Tomašica mass grave, in Prijedor municipality. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 47 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
authorities regularly use their political war Yugoslav Prijedor, they also embody power to interfere with or prohibit public memories of pre-conflict times. They were memorialisation. Most prominently, in May places where neighbours worked side by side 2012 Mayor Marko Pavić instructed the to secure the prosperity of the municipality, a police to stop planned commemorations prosperity shared by all. Thus memorialising marking the twentieth anniversary of what happened in 1992 is also an act of the killing of 266 women and children in remembrance of the earlier multi-ethnic Prijedor and prohibited a further planned reality – and it is that re-imagining of the past gathering on 10th December that year. that local authorities are determined to deny. Meanwhile, survivors of the notorious The impossibility of reconciling unity Omarska concentration camp are still and ethnic cleansing lies at the heart of waiting for an official site of remembrance. the issue that today’s BiH is facing. How In 2004 the local government sold could my neighbours have mutated into my the industrial complex of Omarska to the killers? The question may be impossible to world’s biggest steel producer, ArcelorMittal answer but its articulation in public spaces Steel, which has then denied access to the is a necessary foundation for a future that former concentration camp premises for encompasses all the country’s peoples. commemoration purposes on a number of occasions. Most controversial was the Damir Mitrić [email protected] company’s refusal to allow survivors access Post-doctoral researcher, La Trobe University, to the Omarska complex in 2012 to mark Melbourne. www.latrobe.edu.au the twentieth anniversary of its creation as Sudbin Musić [email protected] a concentration camp in 1992. Only after Co-founder, Bridges for the Future Association. intense public pressure did the management www.mojprijedor.com finally allow the proceedings to go ahead. 1. Ito A (2001) ‘Return to Prijedor: Politics and UNHCR’, Forced The premises of the Omarska complex Migration Review issue 10 stand for more than just the killing fields www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/textOnlyContent/FMR/10/11.htm of a bloody war. As the backbone of pre-
ArcelorMittal Orbit In a rather bizarre twist, in May 2012 – one month before the opening of the London Olympic Games – survivors of the Omarska camp accused ArcelorMittal Steel of using iron ore deposits from the Prijedor mine in the building of the 115-metre-high sculpture ArcelorMittal Orbit for the Olympic Park in London. Claiming that the iron ore had been dug up from the Omarska premises containing bodies of still-missing Bosniaks scattered in unmarked mass graves (a claim the company denied), survivors appropriated the sculpture as their Omarska memorial-in-exile. For Bosniak survivors, the Orbit expresses the grief they are unable to share publicly in their home town, and casts a longer shadow back to a time when they could never have imagined the loss to come. Its proximity to the London Olympic flame and even its shape trigger memories of the Sarajevo Olympics in 1984 – when today’s ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ were neighbours in a country which proudly looked outwards to the world to showpiece its multi-ethnic society. The Orbit also represents the economic devastation of Prijedor experienced by today’s unemployed returnees; the iron ore which once was the safety net for a prosperous town is now controlled by a multinational company. 48 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Mass evacuations: learning from the past Caelin Briggs
Twenty years after the evacuations from the Bosnian ‘safe areas’, humanitarians continue to struggle with dilemmas around humanitarian evacuations.
Between 1993 and 1995, humanitarian and interrogation. The longer these men actors made multiple unsuccessful attempts remained in captivity, the more painful and to evacuate civilians from the Srebrenica obvious the parallels to the Balkans became. enclave. On July 11th 1995, Serb forces broke Evacuations of civilians from besieged through the southern perimeter of the areas can be a critical protection measure town, triggering a mass movement of 25,000 in the face of imminent violence. In some people desperate to escape before the enclave cases, an evacuation may be the only option fell. Srebrenica had been declared a “safe available to save lives. But often, if not area” by the United Nations (UN) but as always, evacuations are also defined by grave the Serb forces pushed through the streets, dilemmas. There may be no good outcome neither the peacekeepers nor humanitarians available, leaving humanitarians to try to could protect the civilian population. determine the least damaging way forward Evacuations and ‘population exchanges’ in the midst of only bad choices. With this were a regular feature of the war in Bosnia in mind it is important for humanitarians and Herzegovina, and were often facilitated to reflect on lessons from the Balkans and by international organisations whose concerns other evacuations in the succeeding two about complicity in ethnic cleansing were decades in order to develop strategies to outweighed by the need to find any means to minimise harm. These lessons include: protect people from greater harm. Many of the facilitated movements from the safe areas Don’t wait until it is too late to deal with in July 1995 were as much forcible transfers the tough issues: If potential dilemmas and as they were evacuations, and shared similar, complications are not discussed until an chilling characteristics: men were separated evacuation is imminent, staff on the ground from their families and detained, convoys will be left to make fast decisions on their own. were stopped and searched, and trucks At an institutional level, organisations should containing men were diverted and thousands discuss common dilemmas and develop of these men were never seen again. guidance for their staff.
Parallels: the Balkans and Syria Do a careful mapping of potential dilemmas: Twenty years later, humanitarians continue Mapping potential dilemmas is critical in to struggle with many of the same challenges helping to manage complications that may in evacuations and siege environments. In arise during an evacuation but, perhaps more February 2014, the UN was asked to facilitate importantly, it can also help humanitarians an evacuation from Homs, Syria, the terms decide whether to proceed with an evacuation of which had been decided by the parties to in the first place. In some circumstances, the conflict largely without the involvement the risks associated with an evacuation may of the humanitarian community. Among outweigh the likely benefits. The determinant the conditions imposed was a requirement is not the dilemma itself but the level of risk that humanitarians would not evacuate any it carries with it, and how this ranks against men between the ages of 15 and 55. While the immediate imperative to relocate the humanitarians were eventually able to population. negotiate around that particular condition, they were not able to prevent hundreds of Employ a systematic approach to risk men from being detained for questioning analysis: Once a contextualised list of Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 49 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
possible dilemmas has been developed, It is helpful to recall this in order to lend humanitarian actors should chart the severity perspective on the role of humanitarians in of each dilemma, how the risk compares to such a context. There is a tendency to see a the urgency of the evacuation, and whether humanitarian evacuation as a success and there are possibilities to mitigate the risks. solution to a crisis, when in fact it is neither. This assessment will help the decision on At their best, evacuations can provide short- whether to proceed with the evacuation and, term, life-saving protection and buy time for if so, it will support humanitarians to develop leaders to find a solution, but an evacuation in contingency plans for the best-case, worst-case and of itself can neither prevent nor respond and most likely scenarios. to a breakdown of protection in the long term. Humanitarians have an imperative to Sharing lessons: For high-risk interventions take every possible measure to promote like evacuations, there is still some reluctance the safety and well-being of conflict- to speak forthrightly about what went well affected communities, including through and what did not. Given that many of the same evacuations where necessary. But, ultimately, dilemmas and challenges arise time and again, the responsibility for finding a permanent it is imperative that we share lessons learned. resolution to the crisis continues to rest with political leaders and the state. Conclusion If civilians are being evacuated, it means Caelin Briggs [email protected] political leaders have failed to reach an Humanitarian Policy and Protection Advisor, agreement, states have failed to protect their Norwegian Refugee Council. www.nrc.no citizens, and parties to the conflict have failed to uphold their obligations under The Norwegian Refugee Council has recently international humanitarian law. Evacuations produced a guide called Considerations for are likewise not a solution – they are a Planning Mass Evacuations of Civilians in temporary, life-saving measure to be pursued Conflict Settings. Please contact NRC Geneva for only when other options have been exhausted. more information [email protected]
Bosnia revisited: a retrospective on the legacy of the conflict Brad K Blitz
It is instructive to review the legacy of both the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the post-war settlement and experience in order to appreciate how this European conflict set the stage for major institutional developments in the field of humanitarian protection, and how, after 20 years, the lessons which emerged from this experience are being ignored.
While more than 1.2 million Bosnians still the United States, Canada and the United have not returned after fleeing the conflict, Kingdom granted refugee status, though in the vast majority successfully received smaller numbers. As a result, Bosnia and refugee status in countries of asylum. Herzegovina (BiH) established a large and Germany and Austria took in hundreds of important diaspora which its government thousands of refugees, most of whom were has turned to in the hope it may assist with given temporary protection for four to five the economic revival of the country. years and later either returned to Bosnia In addition to providing international or moved on to third countries such as protection, the international community Australia. Other countries such as Sweden, invested heavily in a programme of political 50 Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
reconstruction. It created a Human Rights two ‘entities’ (the conjoined Croat-Muslim Chamber, an International Criminal Tribunal Federation of BiH and a Bosnian Serb mini- for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, later, state, Republika Srpska) resemble a cross special war crimes courts operating within between Belgium and Switzerland. This the region. It also established the Office for constitutional order, which preserved the the High Representative and saw institutions ethnic division created by the war, was later pass from UN to European control to be condemned by the European Court during a phase of marked supranational of Human Rights in its ruling on Sejdić and development and European integration. Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina for denying While Europe impressed its design on Roma, Jews and others from the possibility the former Yugoslavia – for example by of assuming the highest political office. pressing for greater regional cooperation Independent post-war BiH looked and by drafting multi-staged roadmaps that considerably different from the multi-ethnic would, if followed correctly, open the door and largely secular republic of the former to European Union accession – BiH emerged Yugoslavia. The war had robbed it of its from the war less as an independent state and young, deprived it of a manufacturing base more visibly an international protectorate. and left many without any hope for a better The most glaring example of Western future, while the war criminals who had political interference was the imposition incited and participated in the war were of a new constitutional order by means of protected in neighbouring Serbia and, to a the Dayton Peace Agreement, which saw lesser extent, Croatia. It was only the prospect the re-configured state of BiH, with its of European accession for Croatia and later proliferation of cantons and its division into Serbia that gradually saw these two countries UNHCR/R LeMoyne
View of Sarajevo from its ruined Parliament building, 1996. Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years on from the Dayton Peace Agreement 51 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
distance themselves from the ethnic Serb BiH’s collective centres remain inhabited and ethnic Croat populations in BiH. While by people displaced by the conflict, some Croatia joined the European Union in 2013, twenty years later, is a shameful indictment and Serbia is a candidate country awaiting of a policy effectively of encampment. accession negotiations, BiH is a generation Second, those who held out hopes of away from Europe. A key fault line remains justice, both through the International the effective partition of the country. Court of Justice and the special tribunals, One surprising development is the including the ICTY, have been sorely economic progress of the Republika Srpska, disappointed. BiH’s neighbours refused to which experienced extreme poverty just hand over the most significant perpetrators ten years ago and now enjoys relative of violence and incitors of hate. The lure prosperity, thanks to the country’s mineral of justice is a powerful and important wealth. One important consequence of motivating force for refugees and victims this has been the further empowerment of conflict but it must not be oversold. of those in power who place ethnic Third, the prospect of return is ‘purity’ above other considerations, who considerably more complicated to achieve have done little to recapture the human than was sold to BiH, its nationals and its capital lost during and after the war years protectors. The return project has failed to but insist rather on full secession. revive BiH, and new models of migration need to be examined, including the potential Learning from history for greater circular migration and for Twenty years on, the return project is ready delayed return migration, perhaps at the for review. While a commitment to return point when people are at retirement age. was formally written into the Dayton Peace The most positive conclusion from the Agreement under Annex 7, the untold Bosnian experience remains the management story of BiH’s post-war independence is the of the humanitarian effort during the war large numbers of nationals who returned and the reception given to more than two but then left again to go back to their host million people who desperately needed countries or to re-emigrate to Australia, the protection. From the vantage point of host US and Canada. The suggestion that return states, this demonstrates that temporary would be a ‘durable solution’ is at odds with and large-scale humanitarian protection the experience of post-war Bosnia. There is possible. The history of humanitarian are, nonetheless, some important lessons protection in BiH is especially relevant to one can take from the country’s recent the contemporary horrors of the conflict history, both during and since the war. in Syria that has destroyed much of the First, the experience of those who, in country and caused the displacement of the early stages of the war, either took more than eight million people. While the refuge in private accommodation as European Union Member States remain internally displaced persons or who fled in disagreement over the relocation of abroad contrasts markedly with those some 60,000 Syrian refugees, the Bosnian who sought protection from international experience demonstrates that people can be agencies, including the United Nations effectively protected, resettled and integrated High Commissioner for Refugees. And in Europe. Cooperation is possible. That must all of these had experiences which were be one of the key messages from this tragedy. sharply differentiated from those of people who stayed where they were, often Brad K Blitz [email protected] under siege conditions. Overwhelmingly, Professor of International Politics, Middlesex those who sought refuge in temporary University. www.mdx.ac.uk accommodation rather than in camps See Blitz B K (Ed) (2006) War and Change in the were integrated much faster, whether in Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation, receiving states or within BiH. The fact that Cambridge University Press. 52 General articles FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 Inconsistency in asylum appeal adjudication Nick Gill, Rebecca Rotter, Andrew Burridge, Melanie Griffiths and Jennifer Allsopp
New research findings indicate that factors such as the gender of the judge and of the appellant, and where the appellant lives, are influencing asylum appeal adjudication.
There is a widespread, and growing, and their legal representative (if they have expectation that no matter where a person one), a Home Office representative, and an seeks asylum, comparable procedures interpreter (where required by the appellant). and consistent standards of fairness The hearing has a standard structure, will be applied in assessing their claim beginning with an introduction from the under the Refugee Convention. While judge, moving on to examination of the positive steps have certainly been taken to appellant and sometimes of witnesses by promote consistency at a broad structural the legal representative and the Home Office level, the extent to which it is achieved representative, and culminating in summary in practice is still largely unclear. submissions of legal arguments by both sides. Initial findings from a three-year Under UK government policy, asylum study by researchers at the University of seekers are entitled to accommodation and Exeter1 examining asylum determination subsistence if they agree to be relocated procedures in the UK has found that there are away from London and the South East considerable differences between the hearing of England, the most densely populated centres where asylum applicants’ appeals are part of the country. When they lodge an heard, and significant inconsistencies in the appeal, their hearing is allocated to their practice of judges who decide such appeals. nearest hearing centre. In other words, asylum seekers generally have limited Asylum appeals choice about where they live, and even less Asylum appeals in the UK are heard at one choice about where their appeal is heard. of 13 hearing centres scattered across the country. Our researchers visited nine of Differences between hearing centres the centres, and carried out a quantitative We encountered striking differences between survey of 240 hearings at three of these: the hearing centres themselves in terms of Taylor House, a large and chaotic centre in accessibility, local resources, atmosphere the heart of London; Sheldon Court, a busy, and facilities. Some, such as Taylor House medium-sized centre in the UK’s second and Sheldon Court, are well connected by largest city, Birmingham; and Columbus public transport but others are much more House, a fairly quiet centre on the outskirts difficult to reach, which can pose barriers of Newport in south Wales. We spent to witnesses, friends and family attending months sitting at the back of court rooms, the hearing to support the appellant. Some recording the moods, manners and dialogues appellants told us that they had to get up of the actors present and whether certain at dawn and scrape together the money for procedures were adhered to in order to expensive peak-time train tickets in order explore whether the asylum appeals process to reach some of the hearing centres for the differs between and within hearing centres. scheduled start time of 10am, with fatigue In the UK, claims for asylum are then compounding their pre-existing anxiety. considered in the first instance by Home Most appellants require a consultation Office officials. Around 75% are refused, and with their legal representatives immediately applicants generally have a right of appeal before their hearing; indeed, in most cases, against this decision. Each appeal is heard the day of the hearing is the first time the by an immigration judge, and generally appellant and their lawyer will meet. Some involves the asylum-seeking appellant hearing centres are so busy, however, that General articles 53 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
demand for consultation rooms outstrips Differences in adherence to procedures supply, and appellants and their legal During the hearings themselves, we examined representatives have to conduct the pre- 14 key procedures which, according to best hearing consultation while sitting, standing practice guidelines,3 judges should ordinarily or even squatting in noisy public waiting carry out to ensure fairness. Such procedures areas. At Harmondsworth, a hearing centre relate to transparency, communication and attached to a detention centre, there is only accommodating needs, and led us to ask one consultation room – a suite with a prison- questions such as: Does the judge introduce style glass barrier between the appellant themselves and state their independence from and the visitor. Users report that the two the Home Office, so that the appellant is aware parties must shout to hear each other – of the role of the Tribunal and the separation difficult for appellants with health problems of judiciary and State? Does the judge check or when discussing sensitive matters. the correct pronunciation of names and Another key difference between the inform the appellant that they can request hearing centres is the frequency with a break, in order to accommodate the needs which appellants are able to obtain legal of vulnerable appellants in particular and representation. Over the past decade as a sign of respect? Does the judge explain the UK government has successively cut the purpose of the hearing and how it will legal aid funding for immigration cases, proceed, so that the appellant understands resulting in ‘legal deserts’: areas where what to expect and what is expected of them? there are no legal aid immigration and Where an interpreter is present, does the asylum solicitors, or only a few suitably judge instruct the appellant in how to use qualified and accredited lawyers.2 Our the interpreter, and check understanding research suggests that Columbus House between the two, to ensure successful in Newport is located in a ‘legal desert’: communication? And does the judge explain 25% of the appellants we observed there to the appellant that they must say if they were unrepresented, compared with do not understand anything, so that the 13% at Sheldon Court in Birmingham appellant knows that they can voice problems and 6% at Taylor House in London. in the hearing and so that misunderstandings Judges are advised to take an ‘enabling’ are less likely to go unnoticed? role with unrepresented appellants but in Many of these procedures are particularly most of the cases we observed this did not important in the context of asylum, as achieve the aim of giving the appellant a appellants are often vulnerable, unfamiliar fair chance. Although the judge often told with the UK legal system, and wary of the appellant that they would have the authority due to experiences of persecution chance to give submissions, they did not and injustice in their countries of origin. explain what this meant, or suggest how The procedures also have a social value, submissions might be structured. As a result, in ensuring that the appellant is treated appellants tended not to engage with the with equality and respect, and is able Home Office’s arguments against them but to participate, and a utilitarian value in simply pleaded for the judge’s sympathy – a increasing the likelihood that the evidence, natural, but legally ineffective, tactic. on which the appellant’s risk on return A final key difference between the hearing to the country of origin is assessed, will centres is the gender ratio of presiding be properly adduced and reliable. judges. The percentage of hearings we observed headed by a female judge was 49% Troubling findings at Sheldon Court, 41% at Taylor House and Our analysis produced a number of troubling 19% at Columbus House. This is particularly findings. The 14 procedures were carried out important in light of the correlation between just over half (55%) of the time. In the case of the gender of the judge and the conduct some procedures, most of the judges behaved of the hearing, as we show below. the same way. For example, in almost all 54 General articles FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
cases (98%), judges checked understanding in hearings, as has occurred with much between the appellant and the interpreter, success for Home Office initial decision and in a great number of cases (88%) they making. Simply observing and publicising neglected to inform the appellant that they judges’ behaviour, as we have done, would could request a break. However, there was also help. The geographical disparities more often significant disparity in following we have highlighted could be addressed the procedures, with judges stating their through greater communication between the independence in around a third of cases (35%), hearing centres, such as via regular forums explaining that the appellant should say if which bring together dispersed judges. they do not understand anything around half Although broader inequalities, such the time (53%), and explaining the purpose as legal aid cuts and their impacts, need of the hearing (61%) and how it will proceed to be tackled at a societal level, procedural (66%) in about two-thirds of cases. It is when consistency might be improved by the some judges follow the procedures and others provision of clearer guidelines for judicial do not that procedural inconsistency emerges. conduct in hearings, such as a checklist that An even more worrying finding is that summarises the key things that immigration the likelihood of these key procedures being judges should do. Furthermore, enhanced followed is correlated with extraneous training could be delivered to judges, factors, such as the gender of the judge and including by appellants themselves, using appellant. Female judges were more likely novel methods such as peer observation than male judges to explain the purpose and judge/appellant role-play to provide of the hearing and how it will proceed, to experiential insights into best practice and introduce themselves, to check that names the consequences of not following it. are correctly pronounced and to make the appellant aware that they should say if Nick Gill [email protected] they do not understand anything. Judges Associate Professor in Human Geography, also more often explained the purpose University of Exeter. of the hearing, introduced parties, and Rebecca Rotter [email protected] thoroughly checked understanding between Research, Impact and Knowledge Exchange the interpreter and the appellant when the Coordinator, University of Edinburgh. appellant was male rather than female. These findings have important Andrew Burridge [email protected] implications. Inconsistencies in procedure Associate Research Fellow, University of Exeter. undermine faith in the fairness of legal processes, and a reduced perception of Melanie [email protected] fairness could result in further appeals, ESRC Future Research Leaders Fellow, University as appellants seek to challenge what feels of Bristol. like an unjust decision. The findings also raise questions about whether systems Jennifer Allsopp [email protected] of legal determination which rely on PhD Candidate, University of Oxford. multiple, geographically dispersed centres can be regarded as fair. Lack of http://geography.exeter.ac.uk/asylumappeals/ adherence to procedures in particular 1. The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research could lead to erroneous decision making, Council, grant number ES/J023426/1. with the grave consequence that asylum 2. Singh A and Webber F (2010) ‘Excluding Migrants from Justice: the Legal Aid Cuts’, IRR Briefing Paper No ,7 Institute of Race seekers may face forcible return, to Relations. http://tinyurl.com/IRR-BP7-Singh-Webber face persecution or serious harm. 3. Such guidance is ad hoc. See, for example: the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal Guidance Notes www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/immigration-and-asylum- Addressing the issues tribunal-rules-and-legislation-2/ We advocate increased independent, external Judicial College (2013) Equal Treatment Bench Book and Guidance monitoring and assessment of practice www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/equal-treatment-bench-book/. General articles 55 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 Sheltering displaced persons from sexual and gender-based violence Julie Freccero
Providing a variety of safe shelter types, each with its own unique strengths and limitations, within a single area could help meet the diverse and changing needs of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.
Men, women and children risk sexual and mainstream population but were open to gender-based violence (SGBV) in situations serving displaced persons. In the course of conflict and emergency and during the of the study, researchers developed a process of flight. Even once they are settled, typology of safe shelter models serving in displacement camps or urban areas, their refugees and other displaced persons: individual insecurity often increases, due to Traditional safe houses: survivors factors such as, for example, the breakdown live together in a common structure, of family and community ties, shifting with staff overseeing operation of the gender roles, and limited access to resources, accommodation. police protection and adequate housing.
The health and psychosocial needs of Independent living arrangements: refugees and internally displaced persons staff arrange for survivors to be housed (IDPs) fleeing SGBV can also be urgent and in separate accommodations (e.g. complex, resulting from the individual or independent flats or hotel rooms) that were collective harms they have suffered. Yet not built specially for safe shelter purposes. guidance on the provision of safe shelter to Community hosting arrangements: those fleeing SGBV is surprisingly limited. survivors temporarily live in the homes of The Inter-Agency Standing Committee selected community members. (IASC) Guidelines for Gender-Based Violence Protected areas: survivors live in their own Interventions in Humanitarian Settings homes in a protected, enclosed subsection offer the most detailed guidance.1 However, of a refugee or IDP camp. their brief discussion of safe shelter focuses Alternative purpose entities: survivors only on camp settings, and lacks concrete stay in a setting designed to provide examples of possible models and of ways to services unrelated to safe shelter (e.g. a extend protection to marginalised groups. police station, hospital clinic or church). To address this gap, in late 2011 the Sexual Violence Program of the Human There were also hybrids that combine Rights Center at the University of California, elements of the above models.2 Berkeley, undertook the ‘Safe Haven’ study of safe shelters serving refugees, IDPs and Traditional safe houses other forced migrants in four countries: The safe house was by far the most Colombia, Haiti, Kenya and Thailand. common. In general, traditional safe The individual safe shelter programmes houses are beneficial to residents with included in the study serve either adult greater security needs, offering measures survivors of SGBV or adults and children such as guards, gates, confidential combined. They are run by government, locations and rules governing residents’ international NGOs or local civil society movement and visitors. However, this organisations and vary widely in physical comes at the expense of community form, size and capacity. Some were engagement, mobility and independence. designed specifically to serve refugees or Extreme examples are the shelters for IDPs, while others primarily served the high-risk IDPs in Colombia fleeing conflict- 56 General articles FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
• Police Station
• Traditional safe houses: • Independent living arrangements: Guard • Entry Miguel Visser hellingproof.com Miguel Visser hellingproof.com Miguel Visser hellingproof.com
• Community host systems: • Protected areas Garden
• Brush fence perimeter • Hybrid models: • Alternative purpose entities Kakuma "Protection Area"
Shelter Types Key: symbols representing each shelter type as defined in the Safe Haven study. related violence. Residents of these shelters identify as LGBT. Informants in Thailand reported feeling locked in or imprisoned noted that, given the gender norm that due to the rigid security protocols, police “men can protect themselves” and the patrols and armed escorts accompanying stigma attached to men using safe shelters, survivors to outside services. Exceptions an independent living arrangement model are the traditional safe houses run by may be more accessible to and culturally grassroots women’s and migrants’ rights appropriate for men and teenage boys. organisations in Thailand, which are often The main limitation of independent attached to a community centre offering living arrangements was the lack of any resources, information and social activities. real security provision at housing sites. This variation of traditional safe house Scattered housing can also be isolating seems to strike an effective balance between and unable to provide the social support security and resident empowerment. that many find essential to recovery. Traditional safe houses also bring strangers to live in close proximity, which Community host arrangements can result in conflicts related to cleanliness, The community host system, in which shared resources, unequal power dynamics survivors stay in the homes of volunteers, or pre-existing animosity towards members is an emerging protection strategy. These of other cultural and ethnic groups. programmes offer survivors the comfort of a home setting and the ability to stay within Independent living arrangements their own communities, which can help them These arrangements are useful in allowing to maintain supportive relationships with more freedom and independence than other friends and family and ease the reintegration models. They also seem to provide more process. It also fosters a network of survivor confidential or comfortable options for advocates within the community. members of some marginalised groups who In Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, two have specific needs or do not feel comfortable community host systems run by international being housed with the general population. NGOs temporarily place survivors in the In Kenya, one programme houses LGBT3 homes of community leaders and volunteers. refugees with protection concerns in low- In a camp setting, this model allows for profile private apartments around Nairobi, a community-based option that neither where they can live inconspicuously in the cuts people off from their normal support general community. However, they were networks nor raises their expectations safe only as long as they did not outwardly of long-term stays or resettlement. General articles 57 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
Community host systems are less resource- intensive and they also provide an option for those
who may not want to take Kim Thuy Seelinger the extreme step of leaving the community, even temporarily. However, such systems may not be suitable for survivors with high security risks, particularly in a closed camp setting where it is not possible to move to another area secretly. Host families in Colombia expressed concerns about their Safe Haven shelter in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, 2011. own safety when housing people in volatile situations with minimal term, emergency basis, such as beds in security, and some noted that it had a negative health clinics in Kenya and Thailand, and impact on their own family dynamics. In housing at boarding schools in refugee Kenya, survivors and volunteer hosts were camps in Kenya and Thailand. In Kenya, occasionally attacked, and in other instances a community-run detention centre for potential hosts simply refused to accept offenders – known as The Sudanese Cell – survivors because they feared for their own doubles up as a safe space for survivors. safety. These programmes also depend on a The primary limitation of alternative community’s awareness of women’s rights purpose entities is that they are simply and approval of survivors seeking protection. not oriented to address the complex needs of survivors. In certain cases, they could Protected areas provide temporary security but could not Protected areas are closed-off sections of a address medical or psychosocial needs. In refugee camp with enhanced security, where other cases, the reverse was true. Findings at-risk individuals can live with their families suggest that these models should be used in their own homes among other families in only as a short-term, last resort for sheltering need of protection. In Kakuma refugee camp survivors in emergency situations. in Kenya, for example, the protected area is enclosed by a wire-mesh fence covered in A diversity of options thorny branches that shield residents from This typology of safe shelter models can be view. Two security guards work at the gate useful in building an evidence base for more and a nearby police station enhances security. effective shelter protection and it can serve However, this model posed challenges as a framework for analysing trends and similar to those associated with traditional understanding the strengths and limitations safe houses, including a focus on of different programme types. The study security at the expense of connection to identified a number of critical factors for the community and tensions resulting the success of safe shelter programmes, from strangers of diverse backgrounds regardless of type. These include: living together in a congested space. how the community perceives the shelter Alternative purpose entities the provision of adequate security and Alternative purpose entities can provide psychosocial support for both residents important protection options on a short- and staff 58 General articles FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
a survivor-centred approach in which urgently needed to confirm which models survivors are involved in all levels of work well in different circumstances. decision making Julie Freccero [email protected] the development of transition strategies Associate Director of the Sexual Violence for residents to be able to move on as early Program at the Human Rights Center, University as possible. of California, Berkeley, School of Law. www.law. a shelter’s level of coordination with other berkeley.edu/centers/human-rights-center/ shelters and other service providers in the area. This article is based on findings of the Safe Haven study of the Human Rights Center. Julie Having a diversity of safe shelter options Freccero was lead researcher and author for the available is ideal to accommodate the range of Thailand case study and co-author of the four- security needs as well as individuals’ desire country comparative report. The Safe Haven for independence and community connection. report series is available at Understanding the diversity of possible http://tinyurl.com/SafeHaven-BerkeleyLaw programme models – and making this range 1. http://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_ available within a single camp or community files/tfgender_GBVGuidelines2005.pdf – can enable survivors to transfer to more These Guidelines are currently in the process of revision. appropriate safe shelters as their needs and 2. In the full reports of the Safe Haven series a sixth category of preferences evolve. More in-depth, rigorous ‘hybrid models’ is also discussed. evaluation of safe shelter programmes is 3. Lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender. Changing how we measure success in resettlement Justin S Lee, Suzie S Weng and Sarah Ivory Refugees should be treated not as poor, traumatised foreigners but as strong and capable people who can be resources in their countries of resettlement.
While it is evident why resettlement success not by their individual economic countries are interested in the self-reliance self-sufficiency but by their ability to ‘give of refugees, these are not necessarily back’ to their communities and to maintain the same benchmarks of success against a connectedness to their culture of origin. which refugees measure themselves. By Though this finding does not necessarily investing in understanding more about reflect the sentiments of all refugees, it how refugees define their own success, we does offer insight into important gaps can improve our capacity to evaluate and between how receiving countries measure adapt programmes intended to support success (through employment statistics) refugees in their transition into permanent versus how those receiving services in resettlement. Furthermore, by reframing these countries measure success. our definition of what makes an outcome successful, we have the opportunity to build Supporting resilience on the strengths of the refugees themselves, Resilience is often cited as the main and to improve our capacity to demonstrate determining characteristic for successful not just a reduction in the perceived burden integration into a new community and, in on receiving communities but also the that context, is often seen as a characteristic value that resettled refugees can add. required of the individual alone. However, Nearly all of the 15 permanently if resilience is “…the capacity of individuals resettled refugees interviewed on the to access resources that enhance their well- subject of how individuals define their being and the capacity of their physical and own success reported that they measure social ecologies to make those resources General articles 59 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
available in meaningful ways…”,1 it also caseworker recognised the young man’s requires a resettlement country to share capacity for leadership and his passion for the responsibility for the level of success helping others in the programme; with that a refugee community achieves by her help, the young man started a support ensuring that opportunities and resources group for newly resettled unaccompanied exist which support long-term success. minors. This blossomed into a valuable For example, the United States (US), venue where young refugees could support the world’s largest resettlement country, one another, share practical knowledge, evaluates programmes almost entirely develop personal relationships and begin based on a single outcome – rapid early to heal their sense of community and employment. This can be effective in belonging. In this instance, the resettlement demonstrating financial self-sufficiency agency was able to support an environment and elimination of public dependency; in which the refugee’s strengths could be however, this alone does not guarantee that shared with his community in a meaningful the foundation is set for resilience and long- way. Had the case worker focused only on term success. Imagine asking not just “what that individual’s deficits and trauma, this is the minimum qualification for success?” outcome would not have been possible. but instead, “how do refugees define their own success, and what impact does this Giving back have on our community?” Asking these When host countries measure the success questions might, for example, highlight of resettlement only in terms of economic instances in which stepping stones provided self-sufficiency, a great resource is being by receiving communities to achieve short- overlooked – the drive and dedication of term success serve as stumbling blocks for resettled refugees to give back to their longer-term positive results. For example, communities, countries and cultures of finding employment within the first three origin. Some of the resettled refugees to four months in a new place might volunteered with a resettlement agency, achieve immediate self-sufficiency but some sent money home to relatives still in upon further investigation we might find refugee camps, and some started service that it limits refugees’ access to language and non-profit organisations that have an training – training that might have far more impact on thousands of displaced people added benefit in the long term for potential globally. So important was the commitment upward mobility in the job market. to ‘giving back’ that they described it as a major motivating factor for gaining an Strengths-based perspective education and achieving a high-paying job. Resettlement countries that are able It is clear that newcomers who achieve to recognise the inherent assets and their potential as measured against capabilities that refugees have developed their own definitions of success have through their own personal experience positive contributions to make in their and who use this information to design resettlement communities and further programmes that bolster rather than afield. Effectively leveraging this potential, restrict these talents will benefit most. however, requires receiving countries to Although, at the level of bureaucratic create environments in which resilience is systems, infusing policy with a person- nourished and strengths are recognised. centred strengths perspective is a daunting One thing that receiving countries can do prospect, it is much less so at the practitioner to support this is to expand the benchmarks level. At this level it is already happening by which we measure success in the first but is not well supported or accounted for place. New measurements that take into in the outcomes. One example is that of account a broader spectrum of successful a young refugee who had come to the US integration would provide opportunities to as an unaccompanied refugee minor. His demonstrate the positive impact of refugee 60 General articles FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
resettlement to the communities that receive Justin S Lee [email protected] them. This could in turn increase support Assistant Professor of Social Work, University and resources aimed at improving those of North Carolina at Greensboro www.uncg.edu outcomes and thus supporting programmes that improve the environments into which Suzie S Weng [email protected] we receive refugees. Ultimately, this Assistant Professor of Social Work, University would create a positive feedback loop that of North Florida www.unf.edu/ would make resettlement programmes stronger and more sustainable over time. Sarah Ivory [email protected]
1. Ungar M (2008) ‘Resilience Across Cultures’, British Journal Regional Director for US Programs, Church of Social Work, Volume 38. http://bjsw.oxfordjournals.org/ World Service www.cwsglobal.org/ content/38/2/218.full
Young Afghans facing return Kim Robinson and Lucy Williams A project in the UK aiming to prepare young men for return to Afghanistan through an assisted voluntary return programme was unsuccessful. A different, longer-term approach might have been more appropriate and more effective.
Unaccompanied children claiming asylum Office meant that potential trainees were in the United Kingdom (UK) live in the supposed to apply for AVR before they precarious position of having to learn to would be eligible for the training course. adapt to their host country while knowing AVR is one of a range of voluntary that they may eventually be returned to the return schemes promoted by the UK country they have fled from. Local Authority government. AVR offers cash and support Social Services departments are charged to ease the integration of migrants back with their care under the Children Act 1989 into their countries of origin; such schemes but receive no funding once the children are common but are controversial in that turn 18. At this stage, the young people’s their ‘voluntary’ nature can be disputed asylum claims are reviewed and in many in cases when migrants would prefer cases they are deemed not to qualify for to stay but are obliged to return. continued asylum. This article examines the Existing evidence from our research case of six young people who, on reaching and other studies of young Afghans 18, were no longer eligible for care from presents a clear picture that young ‘Care Social Services and were identified as Appeal Leavers’ do not want to return.1 Many Rights Exhausted Care Leavers (ARECL) cannot imagine a future in Afghanistan and thus subject to removal from the UK. and the continuing state of unrest in the The Positive Futures Project was country makes return an uncertain and developed in recognition of the needs and frightening prospect. In addition, many vulnerabilities of young people facing the young people have lost contact with family prospect of enforced return to Afghanistan. members and friends. Legal challenges to The basic aim of the project was to encourage forced return are sometimes successful these young Afghans to volunteer for and, as of April 2015, the legality of charter Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) by giving flights taking Afghans back to Afghanistan them some extra training and skills that is under challenge in the UK courts. would be useful once back in Afghanistan. However, the source of the Project’s funding “They said we must sign and go back…” (the government’s Return and Reintegration The Project did not succeed in persuading Fund) and its connection to the Home any of this group of young people to apply General articles 61 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
for AVR. What was offered to them – they are still in care as minors. This could training and the highest level of financial be jointly funded, through both the care and reintegration support available – did not the training budgets, enabling support staff outweigh their fears and concerns. A to work more closely with young people to session with the Choices team, the NGO overcome barriers such as finding suitable responsible for explaining AVR in the UK, school places and access to continuing was only scheduled at the end of the first education. week – when it became clear that the young A cultural approach: Encouraging a sense people had not fully understood that they of belonging – either in Afghanistan or must commit to return to Afghanistan in the UK – and bi-culturalism would help order to receive the training. They all left them to think positively about returning to the programme, angry and disappointed at Afghanistan. This could include literacy and how things had turned out. We were told: age-appropriate fluency in their language of “We were thinking we can go to college, we can origin and building connections and social do anything, we can learn – but then they said we networks in Afghanistan. Family-tracing must sign and go back. I know that, I’ve been in services could also be used more proactively detention … they can give some money and you to develop the few links these young people can go back to Afghanistan to live there. What am I may have. going to do with that money if I haven’t got family? Furthermore, the funding for Care If I go somewhere and people see I’ve got money, Leavers who are classified as Appeal they will steal it from me. They might kill me as Rights Exhausted (and therefore eligible to well. It’s not right.” be deported) remains contentious. Local Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children Authorities are financially responsible for need improved care, support and educational providing care while the Home Office’s role opportunities to help them prepare better for is that of an enforcement agent. The resulting adulthood and to reduce the possibility of tension over financial liability needs to be detention, destitution and deportation. More resolved if more holistic approaches to the broadly, the study highlighted a complex care and support of these young people are area of immigration policy which, we argue, to be feasible. Equipping a young person could be improved if local authorities’ with cultural skills appropriate to a future obligations as ‘corporate parent’ focused in the UK as well as in their country of more on the needs and futures of the young origin has the potential to support them in person than on wider political issues. building positive futures as contributing citizens wherever their lives take them. Recommendations Our recommendations challenge the Kim Robinson [email protected] culture of increasingly punitive migration Lecturer in Social Work, School of Health and controls and argue that public spending Social Development, Deakin University. on these children could prevent longer- www.deakin.edu.au term problems for their well-being, political engagement and settlement. Lucy Williams [email protected] Independent Researcher and Senior Visiting AVR and incentivising return: There needs Research Fellow, University of Kent. to be discussion early on in the establishment www.kent.ac.uk/sspssr/ of care for young people in relation to preparation for potential return, particularly in 1. See for example Gladwell C (2013) ‘No longer a child: from the UK to Afghanistan’, Forced Migration Review issue 44 terms of accessing education for future careers www.fmreview.org/detention/gladwell; Schuster L and Majidi N and business opportunities. (2014) ‘Deportation Stigma and Re-migration’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol 41 (4). Comprehensive training: With a longer-term http://tinyurl.com/JEMS-2014-Schuster-Majidi view, training could be incorporated while 62 General articles FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015 A fragmented landscape of protection Roger Zetter
Changing concepts of protection and a growing diversity in the practice of protection, and in the range of humanitarian and other actors doing protection work, have led to a fragmentation of effective protection for forced migrants.
Over the last decade, in response to Human Rights advocates and refines the the changing dynamics and increasing norms of protection which should be complexity and unpredictability of forced provided at borders and entry points.2 and irregular migration, there has been Whereas this normative development of a significant remaking of the concept of protection has been rather limited, practice protection, a diversification of the practice has developed and diversified both rapidly of protection and an expansion in the range and extensively. While the International of humanitarian and other actors doing Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continues protection work. In principle, at least, these to lead the development of Protection developments have the potential to reduce the Standards, a wide range of non-governmental, risks to which forced migrants are exposed intergovernmental and UN humanitarian and their vulnerability to those risks, and organisations have developed strategies for to allow people to flee conflict, violence emergency humanitarian evacuation and and human rights abuses in security. basic civilian protection in war zones. Self- However, this has led to a fragmented protection is widely advocated by a number landscape of protection which is conceptually of NGOs. The Global Protection Cluster problematic, and which has divergent standards, procedures and governance. The result has been increasing vulnerability of forced migrants and a protection regime that lacks coherence and fairness. UNHCR/A D’Amato Remaking protection – changing norms and practice Some progress has been made in developing norms of protection. At the 2005 United Nations (UN) World Summit, the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was adopted,1 a far-reaching attempt to protect people exposed to the extreme human rights abuses that lead to forced displacement; however, the international community has stopped short of giving it any teeth and R2P lies fallow. With norms endeavouring to keep pace with the changing dynamics of forced displacement, especially for those who do not fall within the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, we have seen adaptations such as subsidiary forms of protection – ‘humanitarian protection’, ‘complementary protection’ and ‘temporary protection’. And a recent report from the Office of the High Commissioner for Syrian refugees are rescued in the Mediterranean Sea by crew of the Italian ship, Grecale. March 2014. General articles 63 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
has played an important role in setting and Given this expanding portfolio of disseminating protection standards and protection standards and practice, it may policies and in capacity building. For urban seem that progress has been made but areas, protection tools and instruments this is primarily for refugees, not the are being refined. Within Europe the 2013 wider categories of migrants who are Common European Asylum System (CEAS), forcibly displaced but who do not meet although heavily criticised, is a wide-ranging the normative definition of a refugee. instrument seeking to ensure consistent Thus there are significant conceptual protection standards and performance in all and operational questions which suggest European member states. that protection space and the quality The normative protection gap for third- of protection (discussed below) have country nationals indirectly caught up diminished, and that international norms in conflict countries – so-called stranded and standards have been sacrificed to migrants such as the 800,000 migrant operational and political imperatives, creating workers and migrants in transit in Libya in a fragmented landscape of protection. 2010 – has been pragmatically filled by joint International Organization for Migration-UN From protection norms to protection High Commissioner for Refugees action. The management European Commission has adopted Regional Alongside the ‘soft-law’ normative initiatives Development and Protection Programmes, mentioned above, there is now a much a potentially valuable instrument adding sharper focus on the policies and operational to the quality and reliability of protection instruments for protection. This reflects for forced migrants in regions of origin. and reinforces a profound transformation in the underlying rationale and practice of protection. This is the transformation from norms-based principles to the ‘management’ of protection, linked to a reconfiguration of institutional structures and responsibilities. One example is within the European Union (EU), where the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM – the EU’s principal strategic policy) and the CEAS reveal the way the management of protection has displaced the search for normative conditions of protection that might address the new dynamics of international migration. In other words, protection has been appropriated by international agencies and humanitarian actors as an institutionalised and operational task. The consequent loss of the normative supremacy of protection is potentially one of the most critical outcomes of the way in which the protection challenges posed by the contemporary dynamics of forced migration have been addressed.
Conceptual diversity and uncertainty There is increasing debate, but little consensus, as to whether protection should continue to be ‘status-based’ or whether ‘needs-based’ or ‘rights-based’ protection 64 General articles FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
might better address the diverse range becoming increasingly embedded. From of vulnerabilities and risks which forced a single starting point of international migrants face. Status-based determination legal and normative standards set out in – contingent on international legal and international law, a twin-track protection normative frameworks such as the 1951 model has now emerged. Within regions Convention which designates certain that generate most of the world’s forced categories of forced migrant and as laid out migrants, improved standards and expanded in the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal protection capacity are promoted by external, Displacement – has dominated both the usually Global North, actors. These same protection discourse and operational post-industrial countries are simultaneously considerations. But the disaggregation giving diminished access to fair asylum of protection challenges into constituent procedures and showing a progressively statuses does not accurately address reduced commitment to refugee resettlement. contemporary protection needs. Nowhere is this dichotomy more evident By contrast, some humanitarian actors, than in the regime of the EU. The EU has for example the ICRC, contend that there is enabled extra-territorial processing of a demand for protection from a wide range migrants and asylum seekers through its of threats – such as direct physical violence, Mobility Partnerships and Readmission coercion and exploitation and deliberate Agreements with neighbouring and transit deprivation – irrespective of the category or countries, a process known as ‘rebordering’. normative status of the individual. Indeed, Meanwhile, closer to Europe itself, a with violent conflict and forced migration battery of instruments and interventions, taking on new manifestations, these agencies mainly in southern Member States and the argue that protection should be predicated Mediterranean, has been created to enhance on a needs-based approach which responds security of the common external border – to these vulnerabilities, and not on a specific Frontex, EUROSUR, EASO3 and The Task legal status. Another line of argument, Force for the Mediterranean. Constructed to promoted by some humanitarian NGOs and manage the security of Europe and to meet the International Federation of Red Cross the challenge of mixed migration flows, and Red Crescent Societies, proposes a this process has relentlessly diminished the rights-based approach for recognising and quality of protection for forced migrants. determining the protection entitlements of This twin-track approach to protection is forced migrants. In other words, the right further evidence of the fragmented landscape. to protection, like many other rights, is an entitlement that belongs to all human beings Fragmented practice and institutional and most certainly to forcibly displaced delivery people. It is not contingent on a particular The proliferating protection practices noted legal (or social or political) status. above lack a coherent, systematic framework Irrespective of the basis for protection, or over-arching normative architecture all three approaches point to the need for a of support. Instead, an extensive array framework that is as inclusive as possible but of policies, instruments and operational this aspiration, as yet, remains fragmented. responses has been created which are largely reactive and often pragmatically Structural ambiguity of protection tailored to specific protection contexts and There is a distinct and growing dichotomy protection gaps. between the concepts and practice of Even where coherence and convergence is protection in regions of mass forced the aim, as with the CEAS, there is still vast displacement in the Global South, compared policy and operational divergence, as a recent to the Global North where regimes that Eurostat report noted.4 There is divergence simply do not allow in refugees, asylum in procedures (reception, admission, seekers and other forced migrants are status determination, nationality and age General articles 65 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
verification tests, appeals and removals) and Nowhere are the issues of rebordering divergence in standards and practices (for and the protection for forced migrants example, access to legal advice, detention, so highly politicised in public discourse deportation and temporary protection). as in Europe in relation to international This lack of coherent practice is migration, mixed migration, mobility between paralleled by the lack of a comprehensive European countries, and asylum seekers institutional response to protection. Many and refugees. National elections, elections to of the initiatives have been developed by the European Parliament in 2014, and rising international agencies, governments, the xenophobia all provide ample evidence of EU or humanitarian NGOs on an individual this. Only Australia rivals the EU in the basis to meet their specific institutional fragmentation of protection brought about goals, programming strategies or political by contemporary political discourse. priorities. What is significant here is that whilst the international duty to protect rests Conclusion with a very small number of agencies such as Instead of enhanced protection, this UNHCR and the ICRC, many humanitarian fragmented landscape has resulted in a organisations, notably NGOs, now include protection regime that lacks coherence protection in their response to forced and fairness and in a growing protection migration almost as if they have a mandate crisis, especially at Europe’s borders. to do so. Many humanitarian organisations As a consequence, forced migrants are now have specialised protection staff and increasingly vulnerable and their dignity well-developed policies and strategies and rights are less and less respected. on protection. It could be argued that How to develop and adapt protection this plurality of protection better tailors norms and practices that respond to protection activity to particular situations profoundly different patterns and dynamics and needs, and to the capacity of the actor. of population displacement in the However the impact of this proliferation contemporary world, compared with the of protection has been to reinforce the situation when the normative principles and disaggregated response to contemporary international frameworks were originally protection challenges and thus the established, is the challenge that remains. fragmentation of the normative basis of protection. Roger Zetter [email protected] Emeritus Professor, Refugee Studies Centre, The politicisation of protection University of Oxford. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk Finally, the most disturbing evidence of the fragmentation of protection is the This article draws on the analysis of a recent highly politicised milieu within which study for the Swiss Federal Commission on protection is now located, far removed Migration.5
from the normative precepts on which it 1. www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf was originally based. Protection has, in 2. OHCHR (2014) OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines effect, been co-opted and instrumentalised on Human Rights at International Borders. to serve national interests and a political www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/A-69-CRP-1_en.pdf discourse which reinforces the securitisation 3. Frontex: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of of migration and asylum (predominantly the European Union; EUROSUR: European External Border in post-industrial countries) at the Surveillance System; EASO: European Asylum Support Office. expense of the rights and protection of 4. Eurostat (2014) Asylum Statistics. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/ migrants. The fact that protection now lies Asylum_statistics at the cross-over of human rights, legal 5. Zetter R (2014) Protecting Forced Migrants – A State of the Art and normative precepts, and politics is Report of Concepts, Challenges and Ways Forward potentially the most disturbing evidence for www.ekm.admin.ch/ekm/fr/home/aktuell/news/2014/2014-12-18. html the fragmented landscape of protection. 66 News from the Refugee Studies Centre FMR 50 www.fmreview.org/dayton20 September 2015
Annual Harrell-Bond Lecture Departure of Dr Kirsten McConnachie Oxford: 4th November 2015, 5pm After three years at the RSC as the Joyce Pearce Junior Research Fellow, Dr Kirsten McConnachie has “We do not want to become refugees” – taken up a position in the University of Warwick’s Human mobility in the age of climate change School of Law. Professor Walter Kälin (Envoy of the Chairmanship During her time at the RSC, Dr McConnachie of the Nansen Initiative, and Professor of worked primarily on a comparative study of security Constitutional and International Law, University and self-governance strategies among refugees of Bern) will give the 2015 Annual Harrell-Bond from Myanmar in Southeast Asia. In 2015 she lecture. Disaster displacement is one of the was jointly awarded the 2015 Socio-Legal Studies big humanitarian challenges of our times and Association Early Career Book Prize for her book is likely to increase significantly in the context Governing Refugees: Justice, Order and Legal of climate change. Building on the work of the Pluralism (Routlege, 2014), which examines themes Nansen Initiative on disaster-induced cross-border of community governance, order maintenance and displacement, the lecture will explore different tools legal pluralism in the context of refugee camps available to address displacement and other forms on the Thailand-Burma border. More recently, Dr of disaster-related human mobility. McConnachie has been writing about Southeast Location: Oxford University Museum of Natural Asia’s migrant boat crisis, highlighting the need for History, Oxford OX1 3PW. ASEAN and global involvement in resolving Rohingya Email [email protected] to reserve statelessness and the discrimination against them. a place. For more details, visit www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/ See (May 2015) https://theconversation.com/ events/2015-annual-harrell-bond-lecture. south-east-asias-migrant-boat-crisis-is-a-global- responsibility-41698. New appointments at the RSC Dr Will Jones has been appointed Departmental Lecturer in Politics and Forced Migration for one Professor Dawn Chatty elected Fellow of the year (as sabbatical cover for Professor Matthew British Academy Gibney). He will continue to work with Alexander We are delighted to Betts on the political life of refugees in Africa, announce that Dawn including their forthcoming book The Animators: Chatty, Professor of How Diasporas Mobilise to Contest Authoritarianism Anthropology and (Cambridge University Press). Forced Migration and former Director of Georgia Cole has been appointed as the new Joyce the Refugee Studies Pearce Junior Research Fellow (in association with Centre, has been Lady Margaret Hall). Her appointment is for three elected a Fellow of years. She will be continuing her research on the the British Academy. politics of refugee cessation in relation to Rwandan Professor Chatty is and Eritrean refugees, as well as beginning a new among 42 highly project on the ‘value of refugee status’. distinguished UK academics from Dr Leïla Vignal will be joining the RSC for two years 18 universities elected as Fellows in 2015 in on a Marie Curie Fellowship. As a geographer, she recognition of their outstanding research. will be working on a number of projects relating to mapping the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, Professor Chatty is a social anthropologist whose both in the region and in Europe. ethnographic interests lie in the Middle East, particularly with nomadic pastoral tribes and Recent publications refugee young people. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications Refugee Innovation: Humanitarian innovation that starts with communities FMR Podcasts Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Nina Weaver (July 2015) All the articles in this issue are available as podcasts on the FMR ‘A critical approach to the production of academic website and also on iTunesU. Click on knowledge on refugee integration in the global the icon to view FMR podcasts, or visit North’, RSC Working Paper Series, 109 http://tinyurl.com/iTunesU-FMR. Christina Kovacs (June 2015) News from the Refugee Studies Centre 67 FMR 50 September 2015 www.fmreview.org/dayton20
‘Destination: Europe’ place it in its broader context. For more details, see The December issue of FMR will focus on www.fmreview.org/destination-europe. ‘Destination: Europe’. The plight of migrants and refugees on the Mediterranean Sea has made ‘While Europe squabbles, people die’ frequent headline news, triggering impassioned Professor Alexander Betts, Director of the RSC, has debate among Europe’s citizens as well as its been interviewed recently on a number of occasions politicians. Meanwhile, growing numbers are about the current Mediterranean/Europe refugee travelling to Europe by overland routes through and migrant ‘crisis’. Listen, for example, to an the Balkans, triggering different challenges and interview with the BBC World Service: protection concerns. This issue will discuss the www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/2018while-europe- complexities of the European asylum debate and squabbles-people-die2019-alexander-betts. UNHCR/A Rodríguez
Thank you to all FMR's donors in 2014-2015 FMR International Advisors FMR is wholly dependent on external funding to Advisors serve in an individual capacity and do cover all of the project’s costs, including staffing. not necessarily represent their institutions. We are deeply appreciative to all of the following Lina Abirafeh Rachel Hastie donors for their support and collaboration. Lebanese American Oxfam GB University CAFOD • Catholic Relief Services-USCCB • Danish Lucy Kiama Refugee Council • European Union • Henry Luce Guido Ambroso Refugee Consortium Foundation • ISIM, Georgetown University • Islamic UNHCR of Kenya Relief Worldwide • Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Alexander Betts Khalid Koser Affairs • John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation Refugee Studies Centre Global Community • Mohammed Abu-Risha • Norwegian Ministry of Engagement and Foreign Affairs • Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Nina M Birkeland Resilience Fund Norwegian Refugee Council Displacement Monitoring Centre • Oak Foundation Erin Mooney • Open Society Justice Initiative • Oxfam • Regional Dawn Chatty UN Protection Capacity/ Development and Protection Programme • Swiss Refugee Studies Centre ProCap Agency for Development and Cooperation/Swiss Jeff Crisp Steven Muncy Cooperation Office - Afghanistan • Swiss Federal Independent consultant Community and Family Department of Foreign Affairs • UN-Habitat • UNHCR Mark Cutts Services International • UNOCHA• US Conference of Catholic Bishops • OCHA Kathrine Starup Women’s Refugee Commission • World Relief Eva Espinar Danish Refugee Council We would also like to thank all those who have University of Alicante Richard Williams supported the production and dissemination of FMR Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh Independent consultant by making individual donations through our online University College London giving site at www.fmreview.org/online-giving Still worth reading... Articles on post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina previously published in FMR
April 1998, FMR 1 Discontent with assistance to the Bosnian www.fmreview.org/internal-displacement return process Guy Hovey Bosnia and Herzegovina: problems and progress in the return process How sustainable are minority returns? What do the displaced themselves think of the return process and Carl Hallergård the programmes designed to facilitate return? While the return of people displaced by the 1992- 95 war is an explicit objective of the international September 2004, FMR 21 community, only 15% have so far returned to their places of origin. www.fmreview.org/return-reintegration Restitution of land and property rights Managing the return of refugees to Bosnia Anne Davies and Herzegovina Without property restitution, perceptions of injustice Richard Jacquot are perpetuated and underlying conflicts remain In the early stage of the war, European nations unresolved. reluctantly agreed to provide refuge to those displaced by the war but warned that the refugees would have Post-conflict property restitution in Croatia and to return as soon as the war ended. Return, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina: legal rationale would be difficult for several reasons. and practical implementation Rhodri Williams April 2000, FMR 7 A human-rights based approach to post-conflict www.fmreview.org/land-and-property-issues property restitution is likely to produce results that are At the heart of the return process: solving property more consistent, fair, effective and sustainable than issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina those based purely on the ‘right to return’. Catherine Phuong September 2004, FMR Supplement The Dayton Peace Agreement explicitly put property issues at the heart of the return process and the www.fmreview.org/house overall peace framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Housing reconstruction in Bosnia: field realities Ana Povrzenic The rehabilitation of homes and return of Housing reconstruction is not just a question of minorities building houses. It is about return and restoring the to Republika Srpska right to return to all those who lose this right during Guy Hovey conflict. The return of IDPs from minority communities generates many lessons and raises policy questions. September 2009, FMR 33 www.fmreview.org/protracted October 2001, FMR 11 www.fmreview.org/return-to-peace Unfinished business: UNHCR and IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina Problems or partners? Working with women to Erin Mooney and Naveed Hussain rebuild the Balkans Fourteen years after the war’s end, renewed national Rachel Wareham and Diana Quick and international efforts are needed to complete the Why have post-war reconstruction initiatives treated work of securing durable solutions for IDPs. women as passive recipients of aid rather than as active partners? Local integration for refugees in Serbia Miloš Teržan and Dejan Kladarin Bosnia and Herzegovina – no future without By paying particular attention to the promotion of reconciliation livelihoods and self-reliance, UNHCR hopes to be able Walpurga Englbrecht to phase out the long-standing assistance programme. The three phases of reconciliation are not yet completed in Bosnia: reconciliation is impossible until When ‘temporary’ lasts too long the truth is known. Erin Mooney Though intended as temporary places of shelter, collective centres often become a place where IDPs or refugees stay for years, even decades.
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