Eldad Shavit Rotem Nusem Rotem April 2018 | Valentina Cominetti Valentina No. 1 No. | Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky Yoel and Tira Ron Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka Kantor and Sharon Adi Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel and Udi Rob Geist Pinfold Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph Rosner and Shira Yotam Volume 21 Volume The Struggle over the Future of Iraq: of Iraq: the Future over Struggle The Milestones and Strategic Implications Milestones and Strategic Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel Bazak, Finkel and Gal Perl Yuval Gabi Siboni, Expeditionary Bases and Non-State Proxies Expeditionary Proxies Bases and Non-State Establishing a European Security Community:Establishing a European To What Extent Is the European Union United? Union United? Extent Is the European What To The Competition between Middle East Powers: Middle between East Powers: Competition The Looking to the Parliamentary Elections Parliamentary the Looking to and Beyond Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations Relations Australia-Israel Assessing Beer Sheva: Beyond European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy Case The Stability: in Egyptian Interest European Emerging Tensions between Eastern and Western Europe Europe Western and Eastern between Tensions Emerging The Development of Security-Military Thinking of Security-Military in the IDF Development The The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums Vacuums of Power Problem The after the Islamic State: Day The
Strategic Assessment Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018
Strategic ASSESSMENT
Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018
Abstracts | 3 The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF | 7 Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel
The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums | 21 Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel
The Struggle over the Future of Iraq: Looking to the Parliamentary Elections and Beyond | 33 Eldad Shavit
The Competition between Middle East Powers: Expeditionary Bases and Non-State Proxies | 45 Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky
European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy | 59 Valentina Cominetti
Establishing a European Security Community: Milestones and Strategic Implications | 69 Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph
To What Extent Is the European Union United? Emerging Tensions between Eastern and Western Europe | 81 Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka
Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations | 93 Rotem Nusem Strategic ASSESSMENT The purpose of Strategic Assessment is to stimulate and enrich the public debate on issues that are, or should be, on Israel’s national security agenda. Strategic Assessment is a quarterly publication comprising policy- oriented articles written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented here are those of the authors alone. The Institute for National Security Studies is a public benefit company.
Editor in Chief Amos Yadlin
Editor Mark A. Heller
Associate Editor Judith Rosen
Managing Editor Moshe Grundman
Editorial Board Shlomo Brom, Oded Eran, Moshe Grundman, Yoel Guzansky, Mark A. Heller, Ephraim Kam, Anat Kurz, Gallia Lindenstrauss, Judith Rosen, Amos Yadlin
Editorial Advisory Board Dan Ben-David, Azar Gat, Efraim Halevy, Tamar Hermann, Itamar Rabinovich, Shimon Shamir, Gabi Sheffer, Emmanual Sivan, Shimon Stein, Asher Susser, Eyal Zisser
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Strategic Assessment is published in English and Hebrew. The full text is available on the Institute’s website: www.inss.org.il
© All rights reserved. ISSN 0793-8942 Abstracts
The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel Although Israel has benefited from nearly absolute physical military superiority in recent decades, it appears, paradoxically, that its achievements against its enemies are diminishing. Theoreticians have explained this as “predestined,” deriving from the nature of new confrontations. This article will present an alternative approach, arguing that the phenomenon derives mainly from a weakening of military thinking in the IDF. It maintains that strengthening military thinking is critical for the development of an innovative doctrine, which the IDF and the State of Israel have needed in order to contend with the changing threats since the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. Keywords: IDF, doctrine, combat theory, technology, maneuver, fire
The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel The essay considers the territory in Syria that was liberated from the control of the Islamic State. Reclaimed territory in this war-torn state has been characterized by power vacuums that are often filled by pro- Assad groups, including Iranian proxy forces that severely repress local Sunnis. Subsequently, increased Iranian influence has fed resentment and legitimized Salafi jihadist forces in the eyes of many Syrian Sunnis. The essay advocates the counteracting of this trend by imbuing power vacuums with stability through local empowerment and non-sectarian governance, thereby mitigating ethnic and religious divisions. Examining case studies in Syria, the essay delineates policy implications for the United States and Israel in order to reverse the negative trends identified. Keywords: ISIS, Islamic State, Syria, Iran, power vacuums, territory, jihadists, Shiite militias
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 3 ABSTRACTS
4 The Struggle over the Future of Iraq: Looking to the Parliamentary Elections and Beyond Eldad Shavit The defeat of the Islamic State and the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections in May 2018 place Iraq at a crossroads for the first time in years. At the heart of this junction is an attempt to overcome a host of challenges in order to prevent yet another downward spiral into instability and a strengthening of radical Islam. The Shiite camp is expected to maintain its strength in the parliament, and the Shiite militias, most of which are affiliated with Iran, will attempt to translate their success in the struggle against the Islamic State into political capital in order to integrate into the Iraqi political sphere. In the year to come, Iraq will likely continue to | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic constitute an arena of struggle between the United States and Iran. Whereas the US administration centers its strategy primarily on Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, Iranian policy vis-à-vis Iraq is implemented broadly and on a number of levels in order to ensure broader influence. Though Israel has no direct influence over Iraq, it must nonetheless recognize that the future of Iraq will impact directly on its ability to limit the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in the region, and in Syria and Lebanon in particular. Keywords: Iraq, Iran, United States, regime stability
The Competition between Middle East Powers: Expeditionary Bases and Non-State Proxies Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky Competition between the Middle East regional powers is often conducted indirectly or in the territories of third countries. The need to intervene in third party and often distant theaters, and to project force on non- bordering regional competitors – which was not the focus of the regional powers’ traditional force buildup – has received more attention in recent years, and focuses, inter alia, on establishing military bases in territories of third countries and on expanding the use of non-state proxies. These trends give expression to deeper issues, including the challenge facing regional powers in acquiring operational access to their areas of interest. This joins their growing need for force projection far from their borders and protection of interests in the competition for regional influence, inter alia, against the backdrop of the serial collapse of Arab states that has left an extensive power vacuum in many territories. ABSTRACTS
5 Keywords: expeditionary bases, non-state proxies, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates
European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy Valentina Cominetti This paper analyzes the evolution of Italian-Egyptian relations after the murder of Giulio Regeni and the reasons behind the relatively quick resolution of the crisis. The Regeni case illustrates how most European countries see Egyptian stability as vital, to the extent that they are willing to pay for it in terms of leverage and credibility. However, while Europeans may turn a blind eye to Egyptian government repression, and this repression may well curb the flow of migrants to Europe, it could also become a greater driver of chaos in the longer term. Nevertheless, European leaders, largely 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic for populist electoral reasons, are unlikely to adopt a more farsighted strategy toward Egypt. Keywords: Egypt, Italy, Europe, migration, immigration
Establishing a European Security Community: Milestones and Strategic Implications Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph In December 2017, 25 defense ministers from European Union countries concluded an agreement on a program for permanent structured cooperation in the European security community (PESCO). This formative decision comes against the backdrop of a series of security developments that prompted European leaders to take steps to establish a pan-European security community based on cooperation on numerous security issues, such as: supervision of international waters, cooperation between intelligence services, and development of cyber capabilities. The article first presents the historical developments of the European security community and the challenges that led to the signing of the PESCO agreement. It then focuses on the objectives of the European army, its institutional and economic infrastructure, and the projects within its purview. The article also discusses the strategic implications of the agreement for the ties with NATO, Russia, and the UK, and the ties between EU members. It contends that although Israel has interests and expertise in many of PESCO’s areas, its political and security interests do not warrant participation in the agreement. ABSTRACTS
6 Keywords: PESCO, EU, Russia, NATO, Israel
To What Extent Is the European Union United? Emerging Tensions between Eastern and Western Europe Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka The desire to establish a united European collective is currently tested by weighty issues challenging the unity of the European Union and the ability of its leaders to shepherd it toward a secure future. A central issue, especially following the immigration crisis of 2015, is the destabilization of relations between East and West European nations. This essay examines how tensions between East European nations (the Visegrád Group) and the EU’s Western members are manifested, considers if the tensions in fact
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic undermine EU stability, and analyzes the implications for Israel. Keywords: Visegrád Group, European Union, Israel, immigration crisis, populist right wing movements
Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations Rotem Nusem While the documented history of the relationship between Israel and Australia suggests close ties dating back to the establishment of the State of Israel, in reality, these relations have far from reached their potential. Considering the extensive joint national interests and respective expertise in agriculture, innovation, defense, and cyber security, there is room for strengthened relations between the two. Yet due to lackluster diplomacy and volatile party politics, what could be a flourishing partnership remains as a sidelined old friend. This paper examines the evolution of the relationship between Australia and Israel and analyzes what the future of this relationship could hold. Keywords: Australia, Israel, middle power, diplomacy, national interest, security The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel
In the seven weeks between August 26 and October 17, 1953, Ben-Gurion spent his vacation holding the “seminar,”1 following which the State of Israel’s security concept was formulated, along with the key points in the IDF doctrine.2 Ben-Gurion, who had been at the helm of the defense establishment for the Israeli population since the 1930s, argued that he needed to distance himself from routine affairs in order to scrutinize and re-analyze defense strategies. Ben-Gurion understood that Israel would be fighting differently during the next war – against countries, and not against Israeli Arabs3 – and that the means, the manpower, and the mindset of the Haganah forces did not meet the needs of the future. This prompted him to concentrate on intellectual efforts, which led to the formulation of an approach that could better contend with the challenges of the future. This was only the starting point in the development and establishment of original and effective Israeli military thinking. This thinking was at the core of the building and operation of military and security strength under inferior conditions, and it enabled the establishment of the state and the nation, almost against all odds. The security doctrine that Ben-Gurion devised was based on the idea of achieving military victory in every confrontation. During a time when the Jewish population was 1.2 million and vying against countries whose populations totaled about 30 million, this was a daring approach, bordering on the impossible. As far as Ben-Gurion was concerned, it was the only
Dr. (Col. res.) Gabi Siboni is a senior research fellow and head of the Military and Strategic Affairs Program at INSS. Col. (res.) Yuval Bazak is the head of the IDF Concept Laboratory. Gal Perl Finkel is the coordinator of the Military and Strategic Affairs Program at INSS.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 7 Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
8 logical option, despite the opposition from camps in the military leadership, mainly from ex-Haganah commanders. Ben-Gurion understood that Israel’s advantages derive from a combination of human excellence, along with national spirit and the ability to exploit the topographic conditions that facilitate rapid mobility of concentrated groupings of forces, based on operations within internal lines, in order to create local superiority in every arena. On this basis, he said that: “If they attack us in the future, we do not want the war to be waged in our country, but rather, in the enemy’s country, so that we will not be on the defensive, but rather on the offensive. This war is waged not by border settlements, but rather by mobile forces equipped with rapid vehicles and strong firepower.”4 These conclusions led Ben-Gurion to opt for the
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic strategy of maneuver to push the war swiftly into enemy territory. These principles forged the Israeli doctrine for the next three decades and led to a series of impressive military victories. Although Israel has benefited from nearly absolute military superiority in recent decades, it appears, paradoxically, that its achievements against its enemies are diminishing. Thus, for example, despite the clear gaps in the power ratios between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 and between Israel and Hamas in 2014, the IDF took too much time to reach only partial achievements in the campaigns. Many theoreticians found refuge in the explanation that this is “predestined,” as a result of the characteristics of the new confrontations, an explanation that took hold in the Israeli security-military public opinion market. This article presents an alternative approach, focusing on the argument that this phenomenon derives mainly from the persistent weakening of security and military thinking. It maintains that the principal reason for the inability of the security establishment, and mainly the IDF, to provide a response to the challenges that the State of Israel is facing is not a shortage of resources, but rather derives mainly from a weakening of the structured systems inside the IDF that are tasked with developing and assimilating combat approaches. This article attempts to address several questions: why has Israeli military thinking weakened? What are the implications and repercussions for national security and the State of Israel’s military strength? How can security-military thinking be re-positioned in its rightful place at the heart of Israel’s national strength? And perhaps the most important question – how should this be accomplished so that the IDF will be adequately prepared for the challenges of the future? Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
9 Militaries in the Information Age: What Happened to Israeli Military Thinking? Military thinking is an all-purpose term for knowledge developed about war, preparing for war, and waging war. It relies on contemplation that strives to intellectualize the phenomenon of war and to extract universal principles and knowledge that were developed as a result of research and study of the phenomenon of war throughout history. On the other hand, military thinking is inextricably linked to time, place, and specific conditions, since war is a social phenomenon that changes its modes, its means, and the ideas that it serves as mankind evolves. It constitutes a reflection of societies and transforms itself in parallel to the transformation of human societies.
Therefore, military thinking must develop, must be revised, and must 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic keep abreast of changes in the basic data and in the relevant environment. For Israel, military thinking that is creative and vigorous is essential as a foundation for the development of unique security and military strategies and doctrines that address the security challenges. These strategies and doctrines will in turn constitute the theoretical foundation for the development of combat approaches and tactics for force buildup and deployment. However, military thinking is tested in the practical world during war. Its power is not in its ability to explain, but rather, its power is to lead to the correct action. “It is theory that leads to action.”5 Over the last forty years, with the accelerated evolution from the industrial age to the information age, knowledge has become the most critical resource for organizations and for countries. A country’s GDP, as well as its military strength and its ability to influence the international arena, depends today on its ability to acquire and develop knowledge, more than any other resource. Yet the more that Israel’s surrounding environment has realized that knowledge is at the heart of quality, is the core of the economy, and is the source of power, the more that Israel’s security establishment, and the IDF in particular, has moved in the opposite direction. The IDF, whose foundations of quality constituted a key component of its strength since its initial days, has become imbalanced over time, the more that its center of gravity has moved increasingly from the quality of its doctrine to the quality of its technology. This was nearly inevitable as a result of the way that the IDF developed. While technology evolved in the open fields of industry, academia, and scientific research, the foundations Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
10 of knowledge on which military and security discipline relied were steadily eroding. Why did this happen? Until the 1970s, the IDF enjoyed exceptional conditions – commanders with extensive operational experience acquired during the wars, a security concept and doctrine that were formulated during the 1950s and 1960s that constituted the basis for military thinking and knowledge, coupled with the “intellectual arm” of officers who were trained in foreign militaries; these officers wrote the combat doctrines and laid the foundation for the IDF’s Doctrine and Training Division. All of these supplemented basic military education, which began as a necessity and became, over the years, a principle in the IDF’s service model and the foundation for its culture and its professional development.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Maj. Gen. (res.) Haim Nadel, who researched the development of IDF military thinking between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, describes the “break” that occurred in Israeli military thinking after the Six Day War, which triggered a process of erosion and depreciation.6 The intoxication of victory and the nearly mythical faith in the power of the armored corps led to neglect of military thinking and to the commanders’ belief that they could manage future battles based on their personal experience. Oral law superseded written law, personal experience replaced in-depth analyses of the experiences of others, and the General Staff doctrines of the IDF’s Doctrine and Training Division were pushed aside to make room for single corps doctrines that were written by the commands and forces from a narrow, temporary, and incidental perspective. Thus, for example, “even though anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles had gradually emerged during air and ground confrontations with Egyptian forces during the War of Attrition, the IDF disregarded this development and suffered from thinking paralysis. Moreover, the IDF failed to learn lessons from other countries that faced similar circumstances,” and failed to develop a comprehensive conceptual and tactical response to them.7 It was actually after the Six Day War – a period marked by fundamental changes in the conditions underlying the security approach and when there was a dire need for an extensive, comprehensive, and methodical effort to develop military thinking and to hammer out new doctrines – when the major crisis began in Israeli military thinking, the basis of the entire security structure. The Yom Kippur War signaled a negative turning point, but it appears that the lessons of the surprise attack were attributed more Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
11 to intelligence than to aspects of military thinking, combat tactics, and operational plans. Beginning in the 1990s and in tandem with substantial technological advances, a gradual but ongoing process began that diminished the importance of military thinking and the institutions tasked with its development. Instead of doctrine being the engine driving the conduct of war, technology took its place. One of the examples of the loss of military thinking mechanisms was reflected in the Doctrine and Training Division, which had been engaged in developing military thinking and imparting it to commanders through combat doctrines, war games, and routine theoretical discussions. During the initial years of the IDF, the Doctrine and Training Division was headed
by officers from the IDF’s core Operations Directorate; officers influenced 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic how the army was designed and who were outstanding in combat.8 This role constituted a springboard for them to key military posts, and for good reason. The Doctrine and Training Division had constituted the General Staff’s “brain,” where thinking is developed and from where the doctrine to all IDF units emanates. It is possible, for example, to examine the role and standing of the Doctrine and Training Division during Rabin’s term as Chief of Staff, which began in 1964. As part of the process led by Rabin and the General Staff under him for the purpose of upgrading the IDF’s force buildup, weapons procurement, and training and adapting it for the next battle, the Doctrine and Training Division, headed by Maj. Gen. Zvi Zamir, took action to adapt the training of the various units to operational plans after intelligence was intercepted that indicated that the Egyptian and Syrian militaries had switched to defense formations based on the Soviet doctrine – a development that required the IDF to update and revise its operating doctrine. Even though these changes were sometimes met with opposition from some of the field commanders, the centrality of the General Staff in determining the training framework in general, and the Doctrine and Training Division’s control over training in particular, compelled the assimilation of the needed change. After the Six Day War, a long and protracted trend of erosion of the importance and centrality of the Doctrine and Training Division began, and correspondingly, Israeli military thinking steadily weakened. The breakdown of the IDF’s overall combat doctrine into separate doctrines for the various forces, and the severe deficiencies that were discovered in Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
12 the combined warfare during the Yom Kippur War led Minister of Defense Moshe Arens to order the IDF to establish a headquarters for the field forces, which was tasked with formulating the combat and organizational doctrine of the field forces.9 This was the first step in a process that resulted in the 1992 decision (when the General Staff was headed by Lt. Gen. Ehud Barak) to demote the Doctrine and Training Division from a division of the General Staff to a division subordinate to the Operations Directorate. This caused the division a steady and substantial loss of influence in designing and formulating the force buildup and the operational approach in the IDF. Initially, an officer at the rank of major general was appointed to head it, but as of 2000, requirements for the post were downgraded to brigadier
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic general. This constituted official acknowledgment that military thinking in the IDF was of lesser importance, and was a paradigm shift in what was deemed the core of quality, from military thinking to technology. For the first time since the establishment of the IDF’s General Staff Forum, a representative of military thinking was absent from the forum, and so it happened that on the brink of the global entry into the information age (sometime during the 1980s), Israeli security thinking lost its standing in high echelon strategizing. The supporting pillars that provided the foundation for the entire security structure eroded steadily, while technology gained steadily in standing and power. The gap that developed between the IDF’s security approach and combat doctrine and the current reality, which had changed rapidly after the Six Day War and even more so after the Yom Kippur War, remains to be closed; therefore, the doctrine must be updated and perhaps even dramatically revised.10 Even though there was a dire need to develop an updated doctrine, the security establishment failed to do so. Moreover, the Yom Kippur War signified not only the change in the battlefield, but also constituted a watershed reflecting the profound changes in Israeli society. The 1980s were years of profound geopolitical change in the regional arena and in the international arena; huge chunks of the basic data on which the security concept and doctrine were based had changed unrecognizably, yet nonetheless, the security establishment was unsuccessful in doing as Ben-Gurion had done. In the absence of the required transformation, the security ship was tossed and battered in the surging waves of reality: a deep budgetary crisis that threatened to topple the Israeli economy in the early 1980s; a crisis of Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
13 confidence in non-existential wars; the crisis of the inequitable burden on society, resulting from population segments being exempted from military draft; and the sour achievements in the battlefield during the Lebanon wars, in the security buffer zone, in the years of the first intifada, and in the operations in the Gaza Strip. Despite the widening gaps between the IDF and its enemies, and despite its immeasurably strong economic and technological superiority that were the stuff of the IDF during its first three decades, the outcomes were disappointing.
The Shift to Technological-Mathematical Wars: The Shattering of the Vision One of the key test cases of the phenomenon relates to the intensity of
fire versus maneuver in the IDF’s operational response to the threats that 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic developed. Once the information age began, a vision of a technological military began to emerge. The maneuver element was replaced with counter- fire based primarily on technological intelligence. For many, the Gulf War and subsequently the war in Kosovo signaled the beginning of a new era. An era of clean wars, of screens, and buttons was created – an era in which the art of war was replaced by the science of developing algorithms. Maj. Gen. Israel Tal, who observed this development, warned already two decades ago that “it is a mistake to think that because the means of warfare are becoming more precise and accurate, that war is also becoming ‘mathematical’ and precise.”11 The weakening of the doctrinal departments in the General Staff and the severance of the General Staff from the ground forces resulted in the top commands in the IDF neglecting the ground forces that, since that time, have been perceived more as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution, since deploying them is liable to continue over a protracted period and will, with nearly absolute certainty, involve casualties. Moreover, unlike the ground forces, whose deployment requires substantial logistics efforts, the air force is available for immediate delineated deployment (which may be halted at any time) and far from the public eye and does not necessarily commit the state to an actual war. On the face of it, the air force also enables Israel to utilize its technological and military superiority and to employ precision guided missiles, which reduces the risks to IDF forces and to civilian bystanders.12 It became evident that the temptation to wage clean and precise wars overshadowed the other considerations. Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
14 The more that the art of war deferred to precision firepower, the more the balance shifted in force building processes, and the ground force’s strike power lost its place and was replaced by intelligence-based firepower. The fact that since Operation Accountability the IDF has increasingly shifted the center of gravity to fire operations only strengthened the trend. The farther that the IDF marched along the path toward a technological military, the less that attention was given to exercises, equipment, emergency stores, and reserve duty; all of these became secondary. The technological approach was not questioned, even after the IDF suffered failures in the battlefield (the security strip, the Second Lebanon War, and the various operations in the Gaza Strip).13 There were many explanations for this, all of which led to the inevitable conclusion – that the IDF must continue strengthening
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic its technological advantage. On the other hand, another conclusion also became incontrovertible: that it is impossible to be victorious in these types of confrontations. The quality imbalance that was created between military thinking and technological thinking caused a shift in priority from the combat doctrine units to the units developing war materials, from operational solutions to technological research and development. In the emerging reality, even when efforts were exerted and combat strategies were developed by the Training and Doctrine Division and the Operations Directorate, they had almost no impact on the force buildup axis, which continued to be technology-centric. Combat doctrines not only were not the engine that puled technology along behind it, but rather, the opposite – “unfortunately, the investment in developing a doctrinal-professional-command response is negligible, compared to the investment in researching and developing the technological response.”14
What Must be Done? In his book on national security, Israel Tal states that “the principles of the security doctrine and the concept of the basic organization and structure of the IDF were defined in the 1950s; since then, Israeli military thinking has not been much more than a footnote to the military thinking that was forged back then. The fundamentals are the same fundamentals.”15 In his opinion, notwithstanding the dramatic changes that occurred in the security and military reality, Israel persisted in relying on insights and ideas that were devised to contend with completely different challenges and conditions. Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
15 Intellectual superiority over the enemy is one of the keys for improving operational effectiveness. This superiority is evident in two distinct areas – in creating the advantage in the learning competition between confrontations, and in the ability to adapt and draw tactical conclusions during a confrontation. On the one hand, the capability of the IDF and the security forces to learn quickly, to adopt modes of action while internalizing new means, were at the basis of the superiority that developed during the battles against the terrorist organizations during the second intifada. On the other hand, the security establishment failed in its preparedness to overcome the threat of the tunnels. Even though the IDF knew about this threat since 2003, the internal IDF investigation following Operation Protective Edge, led by Maj. Gen. Yossi Bachar, a paratroopers officer
who commanded the Gaza Division, said that “prior to the operation, the 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic attack tunnels were an unknown factor for most of the commanders of the maneuvering forces. They were aware of the threat, but they failed to recognize its intensity and magnitude.” As a result, the IDF did not train forces in subterranean combat, did not procure adequate engineering means to destroy tunnels and did not prepare a comprehensive tactical plan for eliminating this threat.16 Israel was also very late in responding to the threat of the enemy’s steadily advancing high trajectory fire capabilities, and was too late in comprehending the implications of the growing momentum in public awareness and legal campaigns. The IDF demonstrated impressive adaptive capabilities during clashes, but inferior capabilities in identifying challenges in advance and building effective responses to them, before a confrontation erupted.17 The rationale for the need to develop military thinking in the IDF is twofold: training and educating the entire command backbone; and building the organizational mechanisms for the development and assimilation of military thinking. The military profession, like any other profession, requires a foundation of specialization and knowledge development. Learning from experience is limited, because knowledge is rarely acquired on battlefields, which are the sole qualifying “laboratories” of the military profession. Therefore, the component of education, military studies, and research, which mainly impart the experience of others, are the main tools used to develop military expertise and know-how. There is no way to create military expertise in the currently existing structure, processes, and culture in the IDF. Without experts and expertise in the security and military knowledge worlds, knowledge and innovation cannot be expected Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
16 to develop, and without doctrinal innovation, improvement in operational effectiveness can hardly be expected. The IDF Strategy document published in 2015 placed renewed emphasis on ground maneuver. According to this new document, in a future confrontation, the IDF will operate “an immediate and synchronized combined strike” that includes rapid and aggressive maneuvers and massive precision firepower. Concurrently, processes were implemented to restore the General Staff’s responsibility as the ultimate commander deploying the ground forces. Besides the aspects of force deployment, the IDF strategy identifies the need to develop and establish military thinking and the requisite conditions for creating intellectual superiority, which will help the IDF, alongside its technological innovation, create innovative doctrines. To this end – which
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic still constitutes the basis for the security establishment’s military thinking – the IDF needs to take a number of substantial measures to transform the vision into a viable reality. First, there is a need to relink the elements of the “General Staff brain” while creating tight linkage between knowledge development and assimilation processes and force deployment systems. The Operations Directorate and the Doctrine and Training Division used to be the engine that drove this purpose of the General Staff, but they were divided and weakened over the years. It is essential to reconnect them and reinstate their standings and authorities. The IDF Operations Directorate was split between the Operations Directorate and the Planning Directorate. These two directorates need close coordination between them and, equally important, they must be delegated the authority and standing that will enable them to lead and guide the central processes vis-à-vis the forces and units. The appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff to head the staff in a full time position, as in the former example of the head of the Operations Directorate, is a recommended course of action that is capable of implementing this approach. Restoring military doctrine to its proper place, after it was ejected from the General Staff’s agenda over the last three decades, is the second necessary step. Today the commanding officer of the colleges is responsible for the training of senior officers, but does not engage at all in developing military thinking and doctrine. Tightening the link between the Doctrine and Training Division and the military colleges is critical in order to renew the connection between developing military thinking, drafting of doctrines, and assimilating them during officer training. For too many years, the Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
17 doctrines written by the IDF have been “left on the shelf,” while on the other hand, the knowledge that develops during the encounter between cadets and instructors during senior officer training courses is not incorporated in the doctrines. This reality must change. When it comes to force buildup, at a time when the IDF is developing strategies to guide the force buildup processes, the systems are disconnected, and at the same time, it is operating force buildup processes, including resource-intensive projects, in complete disregard of these strategies. The training system, the force buildup system, and the force deployment system need to be reconnected. The fact that the direct personal experience of most of the IDF’s officers was acquired in the tactical battlefields during limited confrontations has
made it difficult for the IDF to acquire expertise in the military profession. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic In-depth training courses, studies, and learning are mandatory for every person in the military. In order to accomplish this, it is proposed that the stages of officer training be revised, with a culture of research, study, and writing as routine practice between the training period and the service period. A professional command backbone specializing in the military profession, and not based solely on its own experience, is critical in order to reignite the momentum in military thinking. In addition, the IDF must create an echelon of doctrinal experts – citizens and officers in active duty, who “possess” the knowledge of this discipline, and who serve as aides and anchors for the development of military thinking. In the information age, the quality of an organization is measured by the quality of the experts working in it. In the absence of experts, the IDF is forced to receive help from temporary external advisors, a phenomenon that is injurious over time, since it undermines the development of ongoing knowledge acquisition by commanders within the IDF who are attuned to doctrinal knowledge and to the units in the field, to the state of their training, and to the nature of the threats. The development of a service track for military researchers in the various disciplines, which constitute the core of military knowledge, is needed for the purpose of creating military thinking capable of contending with the pace of the changes dictated by reality.
Conclusion In 2015, more than 40 years after the Yom Kippur War, the IDF issued the IDF Strategy document, whose purpose is to guide force buildup and force deployment. The IDF now has a document on comprehensive thinking that Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
18 constitutes the fundamental concept for contending with the challenges that it faces, but it is still too early to assess how this document will translate from orderly thinking into action, and how it will stand up against the challenges of time, organizational politics, daily pressures, and more. In the information age, extreme asymmetry has developed in the IDF between the pace and mode of development of scientific and technological knowledge and the impaired development of military thinking. Under this reality, there is a growing temptation to find solutions to military problems in the civilian knowledge market and to harness them for military applications, in a difficult and Sisyphean effort to develop solutions based on military thinking. In the IDF, which was built from the outset as an anti- professional military, this matter becomes acute.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic The core information of military organizations is organized according to its doctrine, from the highest echelons – the national security documents – to the techniques and procedures at the lowest echelon. These documents constitute the information infrastructure that was gleaned from the organization’s experience and from the experiences of others; they are used by the operations commanders when they develop tactical strategies and plans to resolve battlefield problems, and they constitute the foundation for building military strength and for developing capabilities to contend with the challenges of the future reality. Like any professional discipline, the doctrine needs to be based on the knowledge accumulated from past experience while taking a prospective outlook, and relevant knowledge needs to be developed about the challenges of the future. And like any professional discipline, it requires expertise from its professionals, acquired through many years of study, research, and analysis before they can build their own new knowledge bank. After three decades during which the IDF has invested enormous sums creating a technological advantage – while the feeling is that the gap from the enemy is only narrowing – the IDF must change direction and direct the spotlight on intellectual quality. This is what supported Israel when the IDF was first formed, under far more difficult conditions, and it is also used today as the foundation for the growth of the start-up nation that is propelling the Israeli economy forward in major leaps. Intellectual quality is the only element that has the power to build and operate effective national strength against the challenges of the future. Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel | The Development of Security-Military Thinking in the IDF
19 Notes 1 This was “the second seminar” that Ben-Gurion held to study Israel’s security problems. He held the first one in 1947. See Ofer Shelah, Dare to Win (Tel Aviv: Yediot Books, 2015), pp. 15-18. 2 This article makes use of the term “doctrine,” which means: the tactical approach or tactical theory of a military organization in general and, in the concrete context, of the IDF. 3 During the War of Independence, Israel initially fought against Palestinian gangs, such as during the battles fought by the Palmah (elite force of the Jewish underground army, the Haganah) on the Jerusalem front, including Operation Yevusi and Operation Danny; it was only during the second stage that Israel fought against Arab militaries, including the armies of Egypt and Jordan. After the war, the political threat intensified. 4 David Ben-Gurion, Singularity and Purpose, 3rd ed., ed. Gershon Rivlin (Tel
Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1980), p. 142. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 5 Yehoshofat Harkabi, War and Strategy (Ministry of Defense Publication, 1999), p. 360. 6 Haim Nadel, “The IDF’s Military Thinking between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War (1967-1973),” doctoral dissertation under the guidance of Prof. Yoav Gelber (Haifa University, 2002), p. 14. 7 Doron Almog, “Lessons from the Six Day War as a Crisis in the Development of the Combat Doctrine,” Maarachot 354 (November 1997): 7. 8 The commanders who headed the Doctrine and Training Division included Haim Laskov, Yitzhak Rabin, Zvi Zamir, Yeshayahu Gavish, Ariel Sharon, Yossi Peled, and Yitzhak Mordechai. 9 The State Comptroller, Annual Report 51.A, 2000, pp. 128-29. 10 In this regard, see Israel Tal, National Security: The Few Against the Many (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), p. 215, “The security doctrine lost equilibrium after the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. It became incompatible with the changes in the basic elements of the basic strategies after each of the two wars.” 11 Ibid., p. 226. 12 Gershon Hacohen, What is National about National Security? (Ben-Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense 2014), pp. 95-97. 13 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Spider Webs (Tel Aviv: Yediot Books, 2008), pp. 76-85. 14 Boaz Amidror, Cease Fire, IDF, IDF (Ben-Shemen: Modan and Ma’arachot Publishing, 2017), p. 185. 15 Tal, National Security: The Few Against the Many, p. 218. 16 Gal Perl Finkel, “Cognizance is More Important than Information,” INSS blog Shorty, October 25, 2016. 17 Yiftah S. Shapir and Gal Perl, “Subterranean Warfare: Old-New Challenge,” in The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, eds. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute of National Security Studies, 2014), pp. 51-57.
The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel
In September 2014, then-US President Barack Obama pledged to “degrade, and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State,1 a Salafi jihadist organization that had enjoyed a meteoric rise in power. Today, most of the territory controlled by the Islamic State has been recaptured. Ejected from Iraq, the organization now retains limited and severely reduced territorial enclaves within Syria only. In July 2017, President Donald Trump claimed the US-led coalition is “doing very well” against the Islamic State, with the organization “falling fast.”2 However, the role of American-backed forces should not be limited to defeating the Islamic State militarily. The United States would also do well to provide assistance to local Syrians, in order to form a stable governance infrastructure in liberated territory. This task is complicated further by the friction and competition between a plethora of interested actors: from Sunni and Shiite organizations, to states such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Indeed, whereas observers once debated how to defeat the Islamic State, commentators, policymakers, and local actors are now focused on “the day after.” Questions abound as to how to prevent the return of Salafi jihadist groups, while divergent actors scramble to secure order and power in the territory abandoned by the Islamic State and other rebel actors. This essay examines the balance of power that is emerging in Syrian territory where pro-regime and other forces are struggling to gain and exert control. Specifically, it studies the ramifications of a persistent trend: devolution of power to sub-state sectarian actors, in lieu of effective state projection of sovereignty. Following a brief overview of power vacuums in Syria, the essay delineates the new governance structures in territory Rob Geist Pinfold is a Neubauer research associate at INSS. Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel is the Managing Director of INSS.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
22 liberated from Islamic State control and examines the power relationships between rulers and ruled in those territories. It also identifies potential future trends of governance in Syria, contrasting the sectarianism practiced by pro-regime forces with a more pluralistic model of governance attempted by rebel forces in Raqqa, the liberated former capital of the Islamic State in Syria. More generally, the essay examines the negative ramifications of two ongoing trends within Syria: the lack of a stable, inclusive governance regime; and increasing Iranian influence within territory liberated from the Islamic State, through the use of Shiite militias. The combination of instability and anti-Sunni sectarianism practiced by pro-regime and pro-Iranian forces fuels Sunni grievances in the absence of any coherent, pan-sectarian national reconciliation and augurs the potential return of
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Salafi jihadist groups.
Syria after the Islamic State: An Overview At the height of its strength, the Islamic State controlled territory that spanned one third of Iraq and one quarter of Syria, and contained a population of some six million. In recent months, however, the organization has lost almost all of its territorial strongholds. In June 2017, the Iraqi city of Mosul, where in 2014 the Islamic State announced the establishment of its caliphate, was recaptured by pro-government forces. In late 2017, Raqqa, a Syrian city of 200,000 civilians, was captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a force consisting mainly of Kurdish fighters and Sunni rebels who are not members of jihadist groups. The SDF is also trained and supported by the US, which played a pivotal role in the founding of the force. The whole area north and east of the Euphrates River and up to the Syrian-Iraqi border is now controlled by the SDF, which routed Islamic State forces and hostile local militias. Nonetheless, forces loyal to the Syrian regime reoccupied the city of Deir ez-Zor, located near al-Omar, Syria’s largest oil reserve, and home to some 100,000 citizens. The redistribution of control and authority in the areas liberated from Islamic State control raises the question of what governance structures at a local level are filling the vacuum created by the ouster of the Salafi jihadist group. Territory reclaimed from the Islamic State rarely sees a return to pre- war norms: the Syrian government remains weak, lacking governance capabilities and legitimacy. The result is a decline in basic services and quality of life for local residents. In 2015, the United Nations estimated that 80 percent of Syrians live in poverty, with life expectancy having decreased Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
23 by twenty years since 2011.3 The ongoing civil war in Syria has resulted in the emergence of a macro trend, whereby individuals increasingly perceive their identity in local and sectarian terms, rather than in national identity. With the state failing to provide security and services, local militias have been formed, often based on ethnicity, clan, or religion, representing the privatization of the duties of the state and the re-emergence of traditional power structures. However, the increased power of local militias remains a poor substitute for the state. Rather than empower communities and individuals, the privatization of governance has largely resulted in the expansion of corruption and patronage networks in both rebel and pro- regime territory, leading to increased lawlessness and a prevailing sense of chaos and alienation.
Foreign Shiite militias – the most powerful of which is the Lebanese 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Hezbollah – have bolstered the depleted ranks of the Assad regime and now form a crucial part of the coalition supporting pro-regime forces in Syria. Funding and training many of these militias, Iran has also played a critical role supporting the Syrian regime. Iran seeks to increase its influence in the region by creating a land corridor controlled by Iranian proxies and allies spanning Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Though ardently opposed to the Islamic State, Iranian and pro-regime operations in Syrian territory reclaimed from the Salafi jihadist group may inadvertently encourage its return by fueling alienation from the state and feeding Sunni grievances. Reports are rife of ethnic cleansing and Sunni resentment of repressive Shiite domination.
Filling the Power Vacuum: Governance in “Liberated” Syria Despite the survival of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, the ongoing civil war has rendered contemporary Syria a de facto failed state of competing militias, tribes, and ethno-religious groups. The Syrian army no longer exists as a coherent and effective fighting force, and the Assad regime relies on Russian aid and Iranian-led Shiite militia fighters. Russia provides pro-regime forces with air support, air defense coverage, and logistical support; at least 1,200 Russian personnel are also on the ground in Syria.4 For its part, Iran deployed some 7,000 of its own fighters during the campaign to recapture the city of Aleppo from rebel forces. Though most of the Iranian personnel later left Syria, the number of Iranian-funded and equipped foreign fighters in Syria has increased to approximately 50,000 Shiites operating in several militias, including up to 8,000 members of the Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
24 Lebanese Hezbollah organization. Pro-regime Syrians increasingly prefer joining Iranian-affiliated militias, due to higher Iranian-subsidized wages and available training when compared to the remnants of the Syrian army.5 Thus, Iran-aligned militias in Syria are playing a pivotal role reclaiming territory and practicing local administration and governance, filling the vacuum left by the crippled state. Pro-Assad forces in Syria have been accused of investing relatively few resources in fighting the Islamic State. Instead, pro-regime and pro-Iranian groups often focus on defeating non-Islamic State rebels, especially those who received greater support from the Syrian population and are thereby perceived as a threat to the regime, such as the Free Syrian Army. Pro- regime forces have also practiced widespread ethnic cleansing in areas
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic of Iranian interest, such as around the border with Lebanon and in the vicinity of Damascus; in April 2018 alone, thousands of Sunni residents were displaced from the Damascus suburb of East Ghouta. This conforms to the broader Iranian goal of securing permanent access to Syria and Lebanon via a “land bridge,” while also bolstering the Assad regime. Ethnic cleansing in Syria is organized and premeditated, often manifested as population exchange. Shiites and Alawites are transferred from regions deemed less essential, replacing Sunnis who are expelled by pro-regime forces from territory perceived as strategically important. The Sunnis are then transferred to demographically homogenous enclaves, such as the Idlib region. Labib al-Nahas, a spokesman for the Sunni Islamist rebel group Ahrar-al-Sham, claims: “Full sectarian segregation is at the heart of the Iranian project in Syria. They are looking for geographical zones that they can fully dominate.”6 Ethnic cleansing is therefore strategic, conforming to the territorial objectives of pro-Assad forces. Frequently, pro-Assad forces have imposed “truces” on defeated or weakened rebel groups, which usually entail the forcible transfer of Sunnis, while their homes are confiscated and assigned to newly-arrived Shiites and Alawites.7 Along the Syria-Lebanon border, Hezbollah has worked systematically to diminish the local Sunni population by importing Shiites from Lebanon and Iraq, while re-settling Syrian Sunni refugees who fled to Lebanon – yet did not oppose the Assad regime – inside closely supervised “safe zones” within Syria.8 Sunni Syrian citizens were also transferred to cities deeper within Syria where fighting still continues, thereby endangering civilian lives.9 Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
25 No coherent program for national rehabilitation exists. Instead, forces loyal to the Assad regime frequently enact “comprehensive reconciliation,” a framework entailing the expulsion of anti-regime notables, while rebel paramilitaries are incorporated into pro-regime militias. Despite this combination of carrot and stick, comprehensive reconciliation relies on coercion, as the regime often reneges on pledges to exempt locals from conscription while failing to provide promised public services, exacerbating resentment.10 Prioritizing force over governance worsens the ongoing civil war. In lieu of an authentic mechanism for rehabilitation, former Islamic State fighters have switched allegiance to other jihadist groups instead of turning away from violence.11 Within “liberated” territory, pro-regime militias often indulge in corruption and racketeering. Rather than promote
a genuine program to restore local governance and autonomy, pro-regime 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic notables have simply taken over local militias. Thus, cities such as Aleppo lack a central authority; instead, individual militias monopolize specific public services, sharing the profits with the regime.12 Elsewhere, traditional local authorities, such as clans and families, provide services the state fails to deliver, engendering a re-emphasis on local identities. The praxis of the pro-Assad coalition therefore impacts negatively on reconciliation: governance in pro-regime territory is characterized by ethnic favoritism, corruption, and brutality. On a wider scale, inter-state rivalry, when played out locally in Syria, engenders instability. The continuing inability of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the US to agree on zones of influence and the failure to limit military activity against non-Islamic State forces has benefited the Salafi jihadist group. This is exemplified by the ongoing Turkish military offensive against Kurdish forces around the town of Afrin, in northern Syria. The fighting resulted in Kurdish forces withdrawing from combat against the Islamic State in order to defend their territory from Turkey.13 Though they agree on little, it is in the interests of all international actors with a stake in the Syrian conflict to prevent the re-emergence of the Islamic State or similar groups. Action is therefore required to establish clear boundaries of territorial influence within Syria, preventing further instability and conflict, which could be exploited by Salafi jihadist groups. Simultaneously, the continued weakness of the Assad regime means that local communities must take the lead in governing themselves, whether in rebel or regime-held territory. The challenge now facing all actors is to Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
26 ensure that these new governance structures are inclusive and serve their communities. This is far from a straightforward or simple objective.
Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa: Local Governance Compared While global media heralds the “end” of the Islamic State, many Sunnis perceive the presence of Shiite militias and pro-Assad forces to constitute the replacement of one brutal, illegitimate occupier with another. Al- Qaeda’s local Syrian affiliate, Ha’ay Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is growing stronger, its ranks buttressed by Sunni deserters from other rebel groups. 14 Discrimination against Sunnis is therefore counterproductive, feeding grievances and undermining the legitimacy of the central government,
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic potentially precipitating further ethno-religious conflict. Sectarian actions by pro-Iranian groups inadvertently promote the return of Salafi jihadist forces, regardless of Iranian opposition to the Islamic State. In the recent battle for Deir ez-Zor, pro-regime forces initially adopted a less sectarian model of governance, training and empowering local Sunni tribes who suffered at the hands of the Islamic State. Nevertheless, pro-Assad forces in Deir ez-Zor have been increasingly loth to employ their local power to promote stability, with reports suggesting a perpetuation of sectarian coercion. Indeed, the capture of the city followed a similar format to the re-conquest of Aleppo: Hezbollah commanders directed the offensive, while Afghan and Iraqi Shiites were front-line fighters.15 The International Crisis Group warned that the employment of foreign Shiite fighters in Deir ez-Zor boosts the Islamic State’s “Sunni credentials” and re-legitimizes the group in the eyes of Sunni locals.16 In addition, the pro- regime forces now in control of Deir ez-Zor have to contend with significant demographic changes in the city, as refugees from elsewhere in Syria have flocked there, displacing locals and returnees. Indeed, the province surrounding Deir ez-Zor now contains around 1.2 million overwhelmingly Sunni Syrian refugees.17 This trend exemplifies the need for comprehensive reconciliation, to prevent vulnerable individuals from being exploited by the Islamic State. Yet pro-regime forces have failed to enact a pluralistic model of local governance, instead perpetuating the grievances of locals and refugees alike. However, an alternative to this increasingly dangerous and unstable practice exists. The pro-Iranian, pro-Assad axis is not the only coalition re-taking territory from the Islamic State in Syria. Working with the US and Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
27 other Western powers, Syrian Kurdish groups and “moderate” Sunni rebels have joined with the Syria Democratic Forces. The SDF successfully captured significant swathes of territory in northeastern Syria from the Islamic State, particularly north of the Euphrates River. Concurrently, the SDF have used the capture of Raqqa as an opportunity to create a relatively pluralistic governance model, a rare paradigm in territory liberated from the Islamic State. Though the SDF is overwhelmingly Kurdish, Arab militias played a frontline combat role in the battle for the demographically Sunni city of Raqqa, in order to legitimize occupying forces to locals. The SDF formed the Raqqa Civil Council (RCC) to oversee reconstruction and deliver public services; local Sunni Arabs are heavily represented in both the RCC’s police force and in the council itself. The RCC recruited and mobilized hundreds
of police officers before the battle for Raqqa even began, ensuring that any 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic power vacuums or instability would be minimalized.18 Nevertheless, the four tribes that exert significant power in Raqqa remain suspicious if not hostile to the SDF, harboring fears that the organization remains a Kurdish-run front, a concern shared by some Western analysts.19 The Syrian regime also retains a degree of patronage in urban Raqqa, with many municipal workers remaining on the government payroll. Concurrently, the SDF model of supervised local empowerment, while initially perceived as successful in other towns retaken from the Islamic State, has recently been under stress in areas such as Manbij, with local actors complaining of insufficient resources for reconstruction, which in turn leads to corruption and instability.20 Finally, formerly exiled elites and remaining locals will have to co-exist with new arrivals; as in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa has witnessed a large influx of displaced Syrians from other areas of the country. Critically, US efforts to stabilize territory recaptured from the Islamic State are under immediate threat. President Trump recently announced his desire to withdraw US forces from Syria as soon as possible.21 Such a policy could jeopardize the partnership forged with the SDF to deliver pluralistic local governance. Russia – employing the perceived legitimacy of its presence, having been officially “invited” to Syria by the Assad regime (unlike the US) – is attempting to minimize US involvement. Similarly, despite being a NATO ally, Turkey has expressed substantial concerns about US support of Kurdish forces, even engaging in combat with SDF-affiliated forces in and around Afrin. However, as demonstrated by its emphasis on implementing the Raqqa model of governance, the US plays a pivotal role Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
28 in rehabilitating former Islamic State-held territory and citizens. Kurdish forces receiving support from the US proved their effectiveness against the jihadists, also stopping Iranian-aligned and pro-Assad forces from filling any power vacuum. The creation of islands of stability and the promotion of local empowerment, thereby minimizing corruption, sectarianism, and the potential return of the Islamic State, is a national interest for all the involved parties. Thus, the US Central Command – though faced with the question of how long it can and should maintain combat and support units within Syria – must cooperate with a broad spectrum of actors operating within Syrian territory.
The Need for Multilateral Coordination in Syria
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic At a joint press conference on November 11, 2017, President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin both expressed satisfaction with the decline of the Islamic State and the multilateral “deconfliction” efforts underway.22 However, the stabilization of territory recovered from Islamic State control and the establishment of effective national and/or local government remain urgent challenges. The fight against dangerous non- state actors in Syria is also far from over. Salafi jihadist organizations such as the Islamic State remain capable of re-filling local power vacuums. Concurrently, a revitalized, unreconstructed Assad regime, bolstered by pro-Iranian militas, poses grave implications for Shiite- Sunni relations. The perpetuation of sectarian violence and the lack of national reconciliation will prolong – rather than end – the Syrian civil war. If no action to redress these trends is taken, Salafi jihadist extremism is likely to remain vibrant, bolstered by the alienation of Sunnis. Despite their differences, the US and Russia have each expressed a preference for pluralistic, non-sectarian governance in Syria that promotes autonomy for local actors while maintaining law and order and providing essential services. Russia understands that it is not possible to form a strong central government in post-war Syria, and therefore accepts that local authorities should be empowered, with local power dynamics recognized. Both the US and Russia can therefore work together to tailor and implement the Raqqa model within Syria, laying the foundations for a decentralized system of government in the country, while delineating commonly agreed zones of influence. Though the provision of services such as education, welfare, and healthcare may seem less imperative, it is a national security interest to both Russia and the US that can help prevent the return of Salafi Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
29 jihadist groups. Arguably, Russia has played a more constructive role than Iran and has sought to establish a political settlement involving both rebels and pro-Assad forces, as demonstrated by the pivotol Russian role played in the Astana and Geneva talks. Russia and the US – despite backing the regime and rebel forces, respectively – could play countepart roles, advocating the Raqqa model to their respective constituencies and allies. Another challenge for the US is the question of how to reconcile its patronage of the SDF with its long term alliance with Turkey, particularly considering the Turkish campaign around Afrin. Even before the Afrin offensive, Turkey was working to fill the post-Islamic State vacuum by launching a successful program to train police in northern Syria, with over local 5600 graduates in 2017 alone.23 Despite their differences, the
US and Turkey could and should work together to prevent the emergence 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic of unstable power vacuums in northern Syria. Cooperating with local partners, the US, Russia, and Turkey should promote the resettlement of Sunni refugees in areas reclaimed from Islamic State control, provided they commit to cooperate with local government officials. This strategy could work to deprive jihadist groups of a principal recruiting ground and promote reconciliation in a There is no “one size fits post-war Syria. all” model of governance The Trump administration should reject that can be applied Russian and Syrian demands to disarm moderate throughout Syria, regardless rebel factions of the Free Syrian Army. Jordan has of local demographics and rightly expressed concerns that any such moves would create a power vacuum and encourage militia characteristics. Instead, members to join jihadist groups. Similarly, the US the values of inclusion, should continue its existing train-and-equip programs pluralism, and local to Kurdish forces, despite Turkish pressure. The empowerment should announcement that the US will help train and equip serve as guiding principles a “border security force” in the Kurdish region is for creating self-sufficient an important development that could prevent the infiltration of Islamic State operatives, while severing islands of stability, which are Iran’s land corridor to Syria via Iraq.24 Despite the critical in the fight against benefits of the Raqqa model, the difficulties faced the Islamic State. in Manbij demonstrate there is no “one size fits all” model of governance that can be applied throughout Syria, regardless of local demographics and characteristics. Instead, the values that underlie the Raqqa model – inclusion, pluralism, and local empowerment – should Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
30 serve as guiding principles for creating self-sufficient islands of stability, which are critical in the fight against the Islamic State.
Southern Syria in the Post-Islamic State Era: Implications for Israel During the initial stages of the civil war, the Syrian side of the Golan Heights was relatively stable, after rebel forces took control of most of the territory and forced actors loyal to the Assad regime to withdraw. In developments that were worrisome for Israel, the Syrian Golan Heights came to be dominated by extremist, Salafi jihadist rebel groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra – a local branch of al-Qaeda – and Shuhada al-Yarmuk, which declared loyalty to the Islamic State. Nevertheless, Israel provided humanitarian, economic, and medical aid to the population of Syrian Golan.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic This policy proved strategically effective, successfully dis-incentivizing rebel groups from attacking Israel while also helping to establish ties between Israel and local communities. Nevertheless, pro-regime forces have exploited the achievements of the US and its allies against the Islamic State, by using the instability to recapture significant swathes of Syrian territory from rebel forces. Thus, Israel must prepare for a centralized military effort by pro-Assad forces – including groups such as Hezbollah or Iranian-led Shiite militias – to retake the Golan Heights. If the various rebel forces are defeated in southern Syria, Iran will likely use the vacuum to increase its influence by proxy. This change in the balance of power augurs potential sectarian ramifications and negative consequences, particularly for local Syrians who “collaborated” with Israel. The local population is primarily Sunni, which suggests that relations with Shiite forces will probably be strained, leaving significant potential for local resistance, frustration, and instability. Concurrently, Salafi jihadist organizations will attempt to employ both the power vacuum and sectarian tinge of the pro-Assad forces to recruit local members. Faced with these threats, Israel should pre-emptively and proactively expand assistance to communities in the Syrian Golan while encouraging the formation of local, moderate militia forces. Israel could also cooperate with regional allies, such as Jordan, to assist and vet local militia groups, and carefully consider the possibility of providing weapons for self-defense. Simultaneously, Israel should use its good relations with both the US and Russia to perpetuate the calm in southern Syria and prevent the infiltration of Iranian forces, in accordance with an agreement between Moscow and Washington to establish zones of non-escalation. By collaborating with and Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
31 empowering various local actors, Israel should seek to limit the ability of Salafi jihadist groups to take advantage of any instability or resentment among the Syrian population of the Golan Heights. The Raqqa model is not a universally applicable framework of governance and instead represents a set of principles that must be operationalized on a case-by-case basis. Thus, Israel should be cautious in its involvement in the Syrian Golan. The aim of Israeli policy should be to create self-sufficient local communities, ruled and defended by local forces, which are resilient in the face of both Iranian and Salafi jihadist exploitation, rather than a coherent territorial entity controlled by Israel itself. Israel and Jordan, together with other regional actors with shared goals, should cooperate to create open, inclusive governance structures backed by real local empowerment, creating
islands of stability in an unstable and unpredictable space. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic
Notes 1 See “President Obama: ‘We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL,’” The White House, September 10, 2014, https://bit.ly/2ywepNW. 2 Jeff Daniels, “’ISIS is Falling Fast’: Trump Remarks before Entering Pentagon Meeting,” CNBC, July 20, 2017, https://cnb.cx/2HpsDEy. 3 Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2018 Country Report — Syria,” http://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/SYR/. 4 Christopher Kozak, “Iran’s Assad Regime,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ Iran%27s%20Assad%20Regime.pdf. 5 Lina Khatib, “The Growing Role of Pro-Regime Militias in Syria,” Chatham House, August 2017, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/the-growing- role-of-pro-regime-militias-in-syria. 6 Martin Chulov, “Iran Repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to Help Tighten the Regime’s Control,” The Guardian, January 14, 2017, https://bit.ly/2ju0tcX. 7 “Local Truces and Forced Demographic Change in Syria,” The Day After, January 31, 2017, http://tda-sy.org/en/publications/local_truces_in_syria. html. 8 Hanin Ghaddar, “Arsal: The Last Hurdle to Hezbollah’s Safe Zone,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 2836, July 21, 2017, https://bit.ly/2qDHTnA. 9 Lina Khatib, “Iran is Building a Base of Post-War Influence in Syria,” Chatham House, June 2017, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/iran- is-building-a-base-of-post-war-influence-in-syria. 10 Mazzen Ezzi, “How the Syrian Regime is Using the Mask of ‘Reconciliation’ to Destroy Opposition Institutions,” Chatham House, June 2017, https://bit.ly/2uoBFYx. Rob Geist Pinfold and Udi Dekel | The Day after the Islamic State: The Problem of Power Vacuums
32 11 Haid Haid, “Local Community Resistance to Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria: Lessons from Atarib,” Chatham House, June 2017, https://bit.ly/2H9Ep2n. 12 Mazen Ezzi, “The Regime and Local Militias Will Struggle to Disentangle their Relationship,” Chatham House, July 2017, https://bit.ly/2J2J1bd. 13 Tamara Qiblawi, “US-backed Kurds go from Battling ISIS to Fighting US Ally Turkey,” CNN, March 7, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/07/ middleeast/syria-kurds-leave-isis-fight-turkey-intl/index.html. 14 Genevieve Casagrande, “Al Qaeda Clearing the Path to Dominance in Southern Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November 22, 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-clearing-path- dominance-southern-syria. 15 Hanin Ghaddar, “Hezbollah’s Redeployment in Syria: Potential Confrontations,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 2820, June 13, 2017, https://bit.ly/2vlAcY4; Alexandra Gutowski, “The Syrian Regime Offensive Towards Deir Ezzor,” Long War Journal, August 18, 2017, https://bit.ly/2ESCk9m. 16 “Fighting ISIS: The Road to and Beyond Raqqa,” International Crisis Group, April 28, 2017, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b053-fighting-isis- the-road-to-and-beyond-raqqa.pdf. 17 Aron Lund, “Pivotal Point in Eastern Syria as Assad Breaks Key Islamic State Siege,” Irin News, September 4, 2017, https://bit.ly/2qDMBlz. 18 Haid Haid, “The Ramifications of the SDF Governance Plan for Raqqa Post- ISIS,” Atlantic Council, May 11, 2017, https://bit.ly/2qbXPOG. 19 Kyle W. Orton, “The Error of Arming the Syrian Kurds,” New York Times, June 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/opinion/syria-kurds- isis-raqqa.html. 20 Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “Who Will Rule Raqqa After the Islamic State?” Foreign Policy, September 13, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/13/ who-will-rule-raqqa-after-the-islamic-state/. 21 Karen DeYoung and Shane Harris, “Trump Instructs Military to Begin Planning for Withdrawals from Syria,” Washington Post, April 4, 2018, https://wapo.st/2JPCfad. 22 Andrew J. Tabler, “Beyond Deconfliction in Syria,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Alert, November 16, 2017, https://bit.ly/2ESEk1m. 23 “Turkey Trains over 5600 Policemen for Syria’s North,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 25, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-has-trained- over-5-600-syrian-policemen-so-far-121396. 24 Tom Perry and Orhan Coskun, “US-Led Coalition Helps to Build New Border Force, Angering Turkey,” Reuters, January 14, 2018, https://reut.rs/2ETyUmB. The Struggle over the Future of Iraq: Looking to the Parliamentary Elections and Beyond
Eldad Shavit
Background On December 9, 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi proclaimed victory over the Islamic State, following the liberation of parts of the country that since 2014 had been held by the organization, including Mosul, the country’s second largest city. Iraq, declared al-Abadi, has entered “the stage after the victory over the Islamic State.”1 Beyond the achievement represented by this victory over the Islamic State, and after many forecasts of the collapse and dissolution of the Iraqi state, al-Abadi can be credited with success, both inside and outside Iraq, in leading the efforts that have made it possible to maintain the country’s territorial integrity and strengthen Iraqi state frameworks, with an emphasis on the army and other security elements. Yet notwithstanding the territorial defeat of the Islamic State, many within and without Iraq continue to support the group ideologically, and Islamic terrorism remains a viable threat. Although due to the weakening of the Islamic State, 2017 witnessed a 50 percent drop in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks throughout Iraq in comparison to 2016,2 the number of civilians killed in attacks in January 2018 has already risen in comparison to the previous month, with many of these attacks in the capital city of Baghdad.3 Against this background, military operations conducted by security forces throughout Iraq to cleanse additional strongholds held by the Islamic State continue unabated. The Iraqi leadership can now focus on advancing efforts to turn the page and begin a new chapter, while directing attention and resources to
Col. (res.) Eldad Shavit is a research fellow at INSS.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 33 Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
34 overcome the numerous challenges before them. First and foremost, this includes strengthening internal integration in light of the significant gaps and conflicts that exist both within and among the different sectoral and ethnic elements (including the problem of the many displaced persons that have still not returned to their homes), repairing the extensive damage to the country’s civilian infrastructure,4 and reducing the influence of external forces. The general parliamentary elections that are scheduled for May 12, 2018 and the subsequent political processes will have a direct impact on Iraq’s chances of achieving state stability. Public opinion polls conducted in Iraq and interviews with decision makers there indicate cautious optimism alongside skepticism regarding the state’s current ability to overcome the 5
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic conditions that have previously resulted in deterioration. This article does not presume to predict the outcome of the elections (assuming they are in fact held on their scheduled date). Rather, it surveys the main elements currently influencing developments in Iraq and analyzing their possible implications.
After the Islamic State: The Attempt to Shape the Face of Iraq The political system in Iraq, which is characterized by internal division and considerable intricacies, is preparing for elections. In previous months, the forces with power have continued efforts to form a coalition that will advance their aspirations on the day after the elections. The ability of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish elements to ultimately overcome their traditional internal divisions and join forces in promoting a national agenda that takes into account the needs of all the sectors, as well as the nature of Iranian and US involvement in the process, will have a decisive impact on the chances of bringing about the desired change. Prime Minister al-Abadi failed in his attempt to lead the Shiite parties (who constitute more than 60 percent of the population6) to run together in the elections. The two rival Shiite leaders, Vice President and former Prime Minister Nuri al-Malaki and Prime Minister al-Abadi (who in practice belong to the Dawa party and ran together in the last elections) have announced that they will run on two separate lists (the State of Law Coalition and the Victory Coalition, respectively). Another list running in the elections will encompass the Iraqi Communist Party, which is supported by leading Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who initially threatened to boycott the elections if reforms were not made to the electoral system.7 Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
35 Al-Abadi has sought to cultivate the image of a list that cuts across ethnic and sectoral divisions. In practice, however, even if his list ultimately ends up including Sunni or Kurdish elements, this will only give the impression of sectoral partnership, and sectoral political division in Iraq will continue to exist after the 2018 elections as well. The Sunnis’ ability to expand their political influence remains extremely limited, inter alia due to their lack of leadership and the large number of Sunnis among the refugees who have not yet returned to their homes, and their attempt to postpone the elections was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Kurds, whose ability to maneuver has been significantly weakened due to Masoud Barzani’s failure to lead them to independence, are also entering the elections in the wake of military defeat and plagued by internal political divisions. Moreover,
Prime Minister al-Abadi, encouraged by the Iranians, appears to continue to 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic undermine all signs of Kurdish independence. Their weakened status and the difficulty of reaching agreements with the central government regarding economic issues are likely to make it difficult for them to maintain their political status and their piece of the regime’s economic pie.8 The consensus is that even after the upcoming elections,9 the Shiite parties will continue to maintain a parliamentary majority, and one of their leaders will succeed in forming a coalition and serve as prime minister. Prime Minister al-Abadi, who has As in the previous elections, succeeded in positioning himself as a determined and the split within the Shiite dependable leader promoting state interests,10 has a camp creates uncertainty, good chance of leading the Shiite bloc: in addition to which could result in new his success against the Islamic State, he was credited partnerships with the with determination in thwarting attempts by Barzani potential to completely turn to promote the independence of the Kurdish region, including the successful military operation to take the tables with regard to the back the city of Kirkuk from the Kurds.11 But it is still identity of the next prime too early to rule out al-Malaki’s chances of increasing minister. his power. In any event, as in the previous elections,12 the split within the Shiite camp creates uncertainty, which could result in new partnerships with the potential to completely turn the tables with regard to the identity of the next prime minister.
The Role of the Shiite Militias Whoever holds the title of Prime Minister will undoubtedly influence the future of the country. It is even more important, however, to analyze the Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
36 dynamics that currently characterize relations among the Shiite elements themselves, particularly regarding the significance of the decision of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) – the overarching framework of Shiite militias in Iraq, some of which are supported by Iran – to integrate into the Iraqi political arena. More than anything else, the question of the future of the Shiite militias in Iraq reflects the struggle over the orientation of Iraq, which can be expected to peak after the elections. The debate is among the Shiite elements themselves, shaped by the external intervention of Iran in its effort to exert influence on the one hand, and Western elements led by the United States and its Sunni allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, on the other hand. Since 2014, the Shiite militias have constituted a significant power element in
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Iraq, and were the most powerful force to fight alongside the Iraqi army against the Islamic State. It is widely agreed that without the involvement of the Shiite militias, Iraq would neither have achieved victory nor regained control over the territory it had lost. A number of studies of the past few years on the Shiite militias have emphasized that the strongest groups among them are the militias with close ties to Tehran. As a result of this allegiance, demonstrated through the defense of Iran’s interests, these militias enjoy large scale economic and military aid. Moreover, it has been shown repeatedly that the Quds Force and its commander Qassem Soleimani have been directly involved in influencing the actions of the militias.13 In addition, the Shiite militias that are loyal to Iran include a number of small groups that have served as Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria. Still, the bulk of the forces It is widely agreed that consist of Iraqi elements, some of which are already without the involvement active in the political sphere. Their political power of the Shiite militias, stems from the fact that they are Iraqis, whereas their military capacity is provided by Iran. Today, the Badr Iraq would neither have organization headed by Hadi al-Amiri already enjoys achieved victory nor parliamentary representation and has a minister regained control over the under its auspices serving as a member of al-Abadi’s territory it had lost. government. It was former Iraqi Prime Minister al- Malaki who, with Iranian encouragement, impelled these groups to integrate themselves into Iraqi politics and to join his party on the eve of the 2014 elections.14 The debate that has been underway in Iraq in recent months regarding the future of the militias has reflected disagreement between those who are Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
37 in favor of the militias’ complete disarmament and the resulting reduction in Iranian influence in Iraq, and those who have sought to take advantage of their popularity stemming from their decisive role in the victory over the Islamic State, in order to increase their power and influence in the Iraqi parliament. A prominent aspect of the public debate has to do with the future of the weapons currently held by the militias. In mid-December 2017 Prime Minister al-Abadi joined senior Shiite religious leader Ayatollah Sistani in a demand to collect all the weapons in the country, in light of the announcement of the end of the war against the Islamic State. Some of the militias were quick to announce their willingness to turn over their weapons to the government and cut ties with their original frameworks – apparently because Iraqi law prohibits elements within the military or other armed
elements from running in parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, it is not at 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic all clear whether the Iraqi authorities can guarantee that all those running in the elections did in fact turn over their weapons before their lists were authorized to run. The question of separation between the military and political elements will need to be clarified at some point. Still, the basic interest of most of the militias will be to retain military power, even if this requires an element of separation between their military arm and their political arm that would be elected to parliament and could take part in the future governing coalition. The militias’ intention to run in the elections required special consideration among the other major Shiite elements. Prominent in this context was Prime Minister al-Abadi’s unexpected declaration, made in late January, regarding the establishment of a political alliance, most likely brokered by Iran, with the pro-Iranian militias, including Hadi al-Amiri, leader of the Badr organization, who was previously recognized as an ally of al- Malaki and as a rival of al-Abadi. Although the agreement that was reached between al-Abadi and al-Amiri collapsed one day after it was announced,15 the motivations underlying the alliance appear to have remained intact. First and foremost, it appears that al-Abadi, who was appointed Prime Minister after al-Malaki failed to form a coalition and who lacked his own political basis, understood that in the political constellation developing in Iraq with the Iranian-affiliated militias’ entry into politics, the key to survival lay in allying himself with these forces, even if until now he had maintained the image of someone who was not interested in being identified as an ally of Iran. Prominent in this context was the assertion by an element within the coalition that the alliance had collapsed for technical reasons, Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
38 implying that the failure did not stem from ideological disagreement. The same element also made it clear that cooperation with al-Abadi would indeed be possible after the elections, as part of a future coalition that would establish the government in Baghdad.16 The prevailing assessment is that the militias will continue to hold significant political and security power after the elections, unrelated to the actual number of their elected representatives. In this context, al-Abadi recently issued an order specifying the Shiite militias’ full incorporation into the Iraqi army and stipulating that their economic rights be equal to those of Iraqi military personnel.17
The Iranian Role Iran’s meddling in Iraq by using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Guards under the leadership of Qassem Soleimani in order to establish an alliance between al-Abadi and the militias is indicative of Iran’s immense interest in intervening and, in practice, in influencing the election results. Its aim in doing so is to ensure that the coalition that is established after the elections serves its interests. Iran views unity within the Shiite camp as extremely important and will take action to make certain that the Shiites enjoy representation as broad as possible within the coalition, and that every Iraqi leader in the future view cooperation with Iran as a precondition for political survival. In this framework, Iran does not rely on one single political personality but rather takes action to provide itself with space for political maneuvering that will enable it to dictate an agenda that suits it. Iranian involvement in Iraq is nothing new, having existed for many years. Iran, which shares a 1,500-km long border with Iraq, regards Iraqi territory as its own backyard and a potential threat to its security. From its perspective, the ability to control developments within Iraq effectively is an important condition for expanding the influence of the principles of the revolution in the religious, ideological, and military realms of additional strategic regions, such as Syria and Lebanon. The Iranian effort to this end is based on a number of military and civilian realms, and in recent years, Iran has made great efforts to expand its economic, cultural, and religious influence in Iraq.18 The fundamental instability characteristic of Iraq, the Islamic State’s entry into the governing vacuum that resulted from the withdrawal of US forces, the great diversity of the sectors in Iraq, and the Shiite dominance in the country are all factors that have enabled Iran to solidify its hegemony in large parts of Iraq.19 Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
39 Even if the leading Shiite elements in Iraq include some who oppose or are trying to distance themselves from Iran, in recent years the Iranian leadership has succeeded in using the Republican Guards to take advantage of the extensive aid provided the militias, primarily in the military realm, to transform them into the best armed and most effective fighting force in Iraq. From Tehran’s perspective, this force serves as the primary arm of the Quds Force in Iraq. It has been estimated that the Shiite militias currently number between 110,000 and 122,000 fighters, with approximately 50,000 affiliated with groups that are under the Quds Force’s direct influence.20
The Involvement of the United States and its Arab Allies The United States welcomed Prime Minister al-Abadi’s announcement
on the defeat of the Islamic State, as vanquishing the group has been the 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic main challenge facing the United States since 2014 and a goal that President Trump emphasized repeatedly from the outset of his term in January 2017. A few months have passed since the conquest of Mosul and al-Abadi’s subsequent declaration, and questions still remain regarding US policy in Iraq on the day after the Islamic State. The formulation of strategy and its translation into practical measures holds importance not only with regard to the question of the future of the US forces stationed in Iraq, but also, and primarily, for the ability to learn from the mistakes made by the United States after the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011. The American administration is aware of the need to formulate practical and effective policy that will ensure it a position of influence that contributes to Iraq’s establishment as a democratic state, takes into consideration the needs of all its sectors, and works to effect an equal division of resources. This joins the need to prevent the return of radical Islamic forces and to contend with Iran’s accelerated efforts to seize control of the Iraqi sphere and create a situation in Iraq similar to that in Lebanon and Syria, where forces operating in the service of Iran (such as Hezbollah) leverage their military ability to accrue political strength. Indeed, the US Secretary of Defense recently acknowledged that the administration has information indicating that Iran is working to influence the outcome of the elections in Iraq. On the eve of the 2018 elections, the United States appears to be continuing to center its policy in Iraq on Prime Minister al-Abadi. President Trump’s meeting with him at the White House in March 2017 was followed by a declaration by both leaders regarding “the furthering of extensive political Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
40 and economic cooperation between the two countries.” Al-Abadi is perceived as a figure to work with who is capable of advancing measures that will result in unity among Iraq’s different ethno-religious groups. In practice, the Iraqi Prime Minister has indeed taken care to maintain good relations with the West, based in part on the understanding that his government is in need of massive resources in order to rehabilitate the country’s infrastructure and economy, most of which is expected to come from the United States and European countries. US administrations have also believed that al- Abadi both wants to and is capable of bringing about the establishment of closer relations with their Sunni allies on the one hand, and reducing its ties with Iran on the other hand. The United States’ reliance on al-Abadi – who in actuality is the only
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic card they currently hold – as a mover and shaker capable of achieving American aims is now being put to the test by the nature of his governing. At this point, the United States does not appear to have an alternative policy that would bring al-Abadi closer to the Sunnis and the Kurds, or to other Shiite elements who oppose Iranian involvement in Iraq. Moreover, United States opposition to the Kurds’ desire to declare independence, and its image as a country that has betrayed its allies in light of its silence regarding the military offensive initiated by al-Abadi to conquer the city of Kirkuk, has greatly weakened the Kurds. In practice, the ongoing discussion between the Iraqi Prime Minister and senior members of the US administration continues. In tandem, the United States has stated that it has started to withdraw its military forces that are currently deployed in Iraq as part of an agreement with the Iraqi government, and that it is taking action to coordinate additional investment in Iraq. However, as a product of the Trump administration’s aim of reducing American investments, the United States does not intend to allocate funds directly to the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure within the framework of the international efforts currently implemented by the coalition to establish stability in the country.21 At a conference held in Kuwait in February 2018, coalition members succeeded in raising only $30 billion of the $90 billion in aid that Iraq has said it needs in order to rebuild its infrastructure.22 At the same time, the United States continues its efforts to bring Iraq closer to its Sunni allies, with an emphasis on Saudi Arabia. Previous US administrations have tried, but the Arab countries have refused to establish closer relations with Iraq due to their perception of al-Malaki, and subsequently al-Abadi, as an Iranian lackey.23 In the past year, efforts by Saudi Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
41 Arabia, in conjunction with the United Arab Emirates, to establish closer relations with Prime Minister al-Abadi and with Muqtada al-Sadr, in light of his identification as an opponent of Iran, appear to have increased. In the course of 2017 Saudi Arabia took a number of such measures, culminating in Prime Minister al-Abadi’s visit to Riyadh, during which, in the presence of the US Secretary of State, the two countries set up a steering committee to oversee their mutual relations. The border shared by Saudi Arabia and Iraq was opened recently after having been closed for decades. And, for the first time since 1990, Saudi Arabia has opened a consulate in the city of Basra.24 The Saudis are also checking the possibility of expanding their investments in Iraq as part of efforts to increase their influence.25 At the same time, immediately following his visit to Saudi Arabia, al-Abadi was
quick to visit Tehran for meetings with the Iranian leadership. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic
Implications The defeat of the Islamic State and the impending parliamentary elections have, for the first time in many years, increased Iraq’s chances of implementing further processes that will solidify its stability and ensure its existence as a unified state. However, these prospects are contingent on the Iraqi leadership’s ability to contend with a long and complicated list of challenges. In the complex reality of power relations in Iraq and the risk of a return of Islamic State activists and/or other Islamic terrorist elements, there is an interest in both the United States and Iran to maintain the unity of the state. Moreover, both countries appear In the complex reality of to view Prime Minister al-Abadi as the right figure to lead Iraq in a manner that will serve their interests power relations in Iraq and after the elections as well. He himself continues the risk of a return of Islamic to take care to maintain good relations with both State activists and/or other the American administration and Iran, after many Islamic terrorist elements, years of successfully establishing a dialogue and there is an interest in both cooperation with the leaderships of both countries. the United States and Iran Although al-Abadi has an advantage leading up to the elections, his party’s ability to win a majority that to maintain the unity of will enable it to form a coalition is not guaranteed. the state. Presumably the Shiite militias will play a major role in determining the identity of Iraq’s next prime minister. Moreover, these militias, some of which are directly affiliated with Iran, will have significant influence on the character of Iraq and on the direction of its government. Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
42 The United States continues to base its interests primarily on the actions of Prime Minister al-Abadi, despite the fact that in the past year he appears to have moved closer to Iran. In addition, actions by the US administration over the past year suggest it does not have the attention or the motivation to resist the Iranian measures. The Iranians, for their part, are implementing their policy vis-à-vis Iraq broadly and in a number of dimensions in order to ensure their influence on all levels. From Tehran’s perspective, the need to ensure Iranian hegemony in Iraq serves the core of its security interests, including its interest in ensuring a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea. In practice, in the struggle for the control of Iraq, Iran has thus far enjoyed the upper hand. Even if all the sides wish to maintain and expand their influence, their success in doing so likely depends first and foremost on
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic willingness to invest energy and resources to translate their aims into actions on the ground. As such, whoever is willing to make such an investment stands to be the party with an influence. The Iraqi arena, and especially the business opportunities presented by the processes involved in building a military force and rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure, has also prompted additional countries (Russia, China, and European countries) to take an interest in expanding their investments in the country. The future of Iraq will likely have significance for Israeli interests, as its importance as a functioning independent country lies not only in the fact that in recent years it has provided fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic elements, but also in its capacity as a focal point of external influence. Therefore, attention must be paid to the regional implications of Iraq’s geographical location and the degree of influence exercised on it by external parties. Israel has no direct influence on Iraq. Nonetheless, it must take into account that the future of the country will have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to realize its goals of limiting the ability of Iran and Hezbollah to act in the region, in Syria and Lebanon in particular. In the struggle for the Israel’s efforts in this context must be focused on the control of Iraq, Iran has thus US administration, particularly on its willingness to far enjoyed the upper hand. remain active in Iraq, especially with regard to the building of, and influence on, its military force, in order to prevent Shiite militias with close ties to Iran from seizing control of these bodies. At the same time, as part of Israel’s shared interest vis-à-vis Iran with the Sunni states, and with Saudi Arabia in particular, the Sunni efforts at expanded influence in Iraq is a critical Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
43 aim from Israel’s perspective. Therefore, Israel would do well to conduct a dialogue with the Sunni states on the subject. Notes 1 Margaret Coker and Falih Hassan, “Iraq Prime Minister Declares Victory Over ISIS,” New York Times, December 9, 2017. 2 Aviad Mendelboim and Yoram Schweitzer, “Report on Suicide Attacks in 2017: Fewer Attacks, More Women Bombers,” INSS Insight No. 1008, January 7, 2018; United Nations Iraq, “UN Casualty Figures for Iraq for the Month of December 2017,” https://bit.ly/2pJd5AE. 3 United Nations Iraq, “UN Casualty Figures for Iraq for the Month of January 2018,” February 1, 2018, https://bit.ly/2GeS9bK. 4 As of the beginning of 2018, the World Bank assessed the damage to infrastructure caused by the war against the Islamic State at $45.7 billion.
See Michael R. Gordon and Isabel Coles, “Defeat of ISIS in Iraq Caused 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic $45.7 Billion in Damage to Infrastructure, Study Finds,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2018. 5 Renad Mansour, “Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State,” Chatham House, July 2017. 6 “The Middle East: Iraq,” in the World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html. 7 Hamdi Malik, “Pro-Iran PMU Factions Prepare for Electoral Battle in Iraq,” al-Monitor, January 2, 2018. 8 Zvi Barel, “Kurdish Spring or Winter,” Haaretz, December 24, 2017, https:// www.haaretz.co.il/news/zvibarel/.premium-1.4840477. 9 In contrast to other states in the region, elections in Iraq in recent years are considered relatively democratic, and their results are not known in advance. Parliament is made up of 328 members, who are elected for a four-year term. The head of the largest party is charged with forming a government that must be approved by the parliament. 10 Ronen Zeidel and Idan Barir, “We’ll Fight IS and Repulse Iran: The Least Valued Leader in the Middle East,” Walla, April 20, 2017. 11 Eldad Shavit and Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Baghdad Regains Control of Kirkuk: Strategic Implications,” INSS Insight No. 984, October 23, 2017. 12 The last parliamentary elections were held on April 30, 2014. The party of then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki earned 92 of the 328 seats. Given the achievements of the Islamic State in Iraq, opposition to al-Maliki grew, and four months later, under pressure from Iran, al-Abadi was appointed Prime Minister, and since then al-Maliki has served as Vice President. 13 Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2017. 14 Ibid. 15 “Iraqi Militias and PM Abadi to Contest General Election Separately,” The New Arab, January 15, 2018. Eldad Shavit | The Struggle over the Future of Iraq
44 16 Malik, “Pro-Iran PMU Factions Prepare for Electoral Battle in Iraq.” 17 Mohamed Mostafa, “Iraqi PM: Incorporation of Mobilization Forces Preserves Security Service,” Iraqi News, March 10, 2018. 18 Yoel Guzansky, “‘Made in Iran’: The Iranian Involvement in Iraq,” Strategic Assessment 13, no. 4 (2011): 85-100. 19 Tim Arango,”Iran Dominates in Iraq after U.S. ‘Handed the Country Over,’” New York Times, July 15, 2017. 20 Hanin Ghaddar, “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Impac t of Shia’s Militias on U.S. Foreign Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes 46, January 2018, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/ pubs/PolicyNote46-Ghaddar.pdf. 21 Jonathan Landay and Yara Bayoum, “U.S. Not Planning to Contribute Money at Iraq Reconstruction Conference – Officials,” Reuters, February 8, 2018.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 22 Margaret Coker, “Hoping for $100 Billion to Rebuild, Iraq Got Less Than a Third,” The York Times, February 14, 2018. 23 Yoel Guzansky, “Iraq and the Arabs following the American Withdrawal,” Strategic Assessment 15, no. 3 (2012): 39-48. 24 Mariam al-Jaber,”Saudi Consulate to Re-Open in Basra, Iraq,” al-Arabiya, February 12, 2018. 25 Martin Chulov, “Saudis in Talks over Alliance to Rebuild Iraq and ‘Return it to the Arab Fold,’” The Guardian, August 18, 2017. The Competition between Middle East Powers: Expeditionary Bases and Non-State Proxies
Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky
In recent years, the competition in the Middle East has waged primarily between the regional powers: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel, as well as, though to a lesser extent, Egypt (as it is preoccupied with its own domestic challenges). The United Arab Emirates, often acting in collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, is also noteworthy in this context. Most of the rivalries are concentrated in the triangle between Iran (and its non-state Shiite allies as well as the Alawite regime), Turkey (and to a certain extent, Qatar), and “all the other regional powers.” However, the competing regional powers for the most part do not border each other, and the competition between them is often waged indirectly and in territories of third countries. Even in the infrequent instances when the regional powers abut one another, for example Iran and Turkey (and the Gulf’s maritime border between Saudi Arabia and Iran), the border region itself is not, at least thus far, the focus of competition, and the competition is concentrated in territories of third countries. Furthermore, even when a regional power intervenes in the territory of an adjacent country, the intervention is not necessarily in the border regions, and is often deep within the bordering country (for example, the Iranian intervention in the Iraqi heartland or the Saudi support to the ethnic minorities deep inside Iran). As a historic generalization, one can contend that the regional powers built their armed forces in order to protect their borders. However, their need to intervene in third party and sometimes distant theaters and to project
Col. (res.) Ron Tira, a businessman, is the author of The Nature of War: Conflicting Paradigms and Israeli Military Effectiveness and a reservist in the IAF’s Campaign Planning Department. Dr. Yoel Guzansky is a senior research fellow at INSS.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 45 Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
46 force on non-bordering regional competitors, which has not been the focus of their traditional force buildup, has increased in recent years. This need has triggered three trends in force buildup: first – acquiring weapon systems that enable long range reach. Examples of this include Egypt’s acquisition of Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of additional transport helicopters, the Iranian focus on acquiring missiles for ranges of 1,000-2,000 km, and the rise of unlimited range cyber warfare. The second trend is establishing expeditionary military bases and installations in the territories of third countries. The third trend is expanding the use of non-state proxies. Focusing on the two latter trends, this article maintains that these trends reflect deeper issues – the challenges facing regional powers in acquiring 1
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic operational access to their areas of interest. This joins their growing need for force projection far from their borders and protection of their interests in the competition for regional influence, inter alia, against the backdrop of the serial collapse of Arab states that has left an extensive power vacuum in many territories.
Expeditionary Bases Recent years have seen a growth in the phenomenon of Middle East powers establishing expeditionary bases in the Middle East, in North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. This is a new development, as in the past, expeditionary bases were established nearly exclusively by global powers within the context of security alliances or colonial arrangements. Indeed, the establishment of expeditionary bases in third countries was a typical occurrence during the Cold War, in the context of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, and when the Cold War ended, the United States enjoyed a clear advantage in this field over every other actor. For the most part, the United States was allowed to establish expeditionary bases in exchange for security guarantees or within the framework of American arms sales. In some cases, this was done as part of the American global nuclear deterrence program. The Americans inherited bases from the British or built them as a way to establish a presence and “show the flag.” Today, expeditionary bases constitute a component of the American strategy for combating nuclear weapons proliferation, for combating global terror, for maintaining freedom of navigation, and for ensuring the regular supply of oil.2 Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
47 The Middle East regional powers are establishing new expeditionary bases in two contexts: the first – bases in countries where warfighting occurs, i.e., bases that enable a military force’s access to combat zones (for example, some of the Iranian bases in Syria), mainly in failed states that constitute a sort of “playground” for regional and international actors. The second context is bases in the territories of countries where no warfare occurs, but enable access to distant theaters and the ability to project force on other countries (such as the Turkish base in Qatar). The host countries’ motivations vary from strategic considerations (as is the case for Qatar) to economic considerations (as is the case with Sudan). The regional power leading the trend of shifting from fighting “on the borders” to a game being played along the full length and width of the
regional arena is Iran. According to various reports in the public media, Iran 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic has a number of bases in Syria (including near Aleppo, at the Damascus international airport, and in the T-4 airbase that was attacked by the Israeli Air Force), and is in the process of establishing a base for its Shiite militias and perhaps later, even a naval base.3 The more that progress is made in Syria’s stabilization process, the more Iran will presumably strive to establish additional bases and repurpose its bases in Syria from mainly supporting its forces participating in the Syrian civil war to projecting regional force, as well as enabling force application in a future war against Israel. Iran has also established weapons factories in Syria and in Lebanon.4 It appears that Iran is seeking to establish a land corridor that would create a territorial continuum mostly through friendly regions (mainly Shiite or unpopulated regions) from its border to the Syrian Golan Heights border and to the Syrian and Lebanese Mediterranean shores. In addition, Iran previously made use of a seaport in Port Sudan and had a base adjacent to the Assab port in Eritrea (which is now held by the United Arab Emirates), and it is striving to obtain a port in Yemen as well as in Syria. As for the other regional powers, Saudi Arabia is reportedly establishing a base in Djibouti (a base that formerly hosted United Arab Emirates forces), close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the United Arab Emirates has bases in Somaliland (a port and an airport that are leased for thirty years5) and in Assab in Eritrea. These African bases are being used to launch attacks against Yemen. The UAE also has bases in Yemen itself, including on the Yemeni island Perim, and launches air strikes on Libya from bases in Egypt and inside Libya itself, where it reportedly is establishing a new base. These bases are generally limited installations that include runways or docks, a Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
48 number of buildings, and logistics equipment (as opposed to, for example, the robust American bases in the Gulf). Turkey, without coordinating with the governments in Baghdad and in Damascus, has a number of bases in northern Iraq and in northern Syria, inter alia, to enable access to areas of operation against the Kurds. Turkey also has bases in Somalia and in Qatar, with the Qatar base constituting one of the causes for the dispute between Qatar and the Arab Gulf states. In December 2017, it was reported that Turkey had signed an agreement with Sudan, whereby Turkey will be able to maintain a military presence in Sudan and its territorial waters, including a base on the Sudanese Suakin Island. Turkey is also negotiating the establishment of an additional base in Djibouti. The establishment of the Turkish base in Sudan contributed to
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic the political crisis in Sudan’s relations with Egypt and Eritrea; consequently, there have been reports that Egypt is deploying forces in Eritrea and that Sudanese forces are deployed opposite them. Overall, a significant part of the expeditionary bases are located along the seaways of the Gulf and even more so of the Red Sea, and these seaways constitute a significant focus of force buildup for the militaries of the regional powers. More and more military hands are grasping the southern access ways to the Suez Canal, a fact that constitutes a strategic threat to Egypt and to the world economy.
Non-State Proxies Among non-state actors, some operate under a patron’s guidance (i.e., they have no independent political or strategic will of their own); some clients enjoy the support of a patron, while maintaining their own political will; and some collaborate with a patron in the context of ad hoc specific common interests. The patron might use a non-state actor in order to realize particular strategies (such as guerilla warfare or attrition warfare); in order to distance itself from the confrontation (deniability); in order to cut costs and mitigate the risks of the confrontation; in order to keep a rival preoccupied in a secondary theater; or simply due to operational access considerations: to enable effective military access to a theater to which conventional access is challenging. Iran began using non-state actors primarily due to considerations of cost management, risk mitigation, and deniability. For example, the manner in which Iran applied attrition warfare against the American forces in Iraq until they withdrew was designed to avoid a direct confrontation with the United Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
49 States and to provide Iran with deniability. Iran’s use of Shiite mercenary militias in Syria, which was accelerated in the context of mitigating heavy losses to the Iranians and limiting direct Iranian involvement in actual combat roles in Syria, served the purpose of reducing the price of fighting for Iran. However, to a great extent, the Iranian non-state proxies also served the purpose of providing it with access to various theaters. Hezbollah has enabled Iran operational access to Israel since the 1980s, and in recent years, the various non-state proxies constitute its main access agents to theaters such as Yemen. And indeed, the Iranian expertise in handling non-state proxies is so extensive that various countries, like Pakistan, are attempting to learn from Iran’s experience.6 Iran customarily created or adopted non-state actors from Shiite
communities residing in the relevant theaters. Iran enhanced Shiite forces 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic already operating in the relevant theaters by supplying them with training, intelligence, weapons, manufacturing means, funds, charity, and religious guidance. Prominent examples are Hezbollah (which besides being the most important military force in Lebanon, is also a religious, social, and political organization); Shiite militias in Iraq, such as el-Badr, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah; and the Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran also engages in strategic or tactical-contextual cooperation with non-Shiite groups, such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and certain Kurdish elements. The innovation in the web of Iran’s non-state proxies is the use of mercenary militias, mainly those recruited in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. These militias were formed in recent years by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and in particular the Quds Force, in order to assist the Assad regime in its war against its rivals; Iranian officers were assigned to them as instructors and commanders.7 Unlike Iran’s traditional non-state proxies that operated The Iranian expertise in in their respective home theaters, these militias handling non-state proxies are composed of foreigners who are not part of the is so extensive that various natural human fabric of the theater where they are countries are attempting to deployed. Accordingly, these mercenary militias learn from Iran’s experience. can be deployed to various theaters as needed. Nevertheless, at least at the present time, these militias are suffering from several weaknesses: first, their low fighting quality, certainly compared to Hezbollah; second, there is a question with regard to the extent of these militias’ commitment and loyalty, considering Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
50 that they are mercenaries for all intents and purposes; and third, the fact that they are foreigners, including with respect to their ethnic identity (and, in areas such as the Syrian Golan Heights, with respect to their religious identity as well) suggests they will find it challenging to operate “among the people” if and when they will be called upon to do so. The Arab Gulf states and Turkey lack the experience that Iran has acquired over the years in handling non-state proxies, and in any case, publicly available information about their use of non-state proxies is modest. It is known that in the past, for example, the Saudis had supported the Afghan mujahidin and later also rebel groups fighting against the Assad regime and its allies in Syria, and that Saudi Arabia might have supported various ethnic groups inside Iran over the years, such as the Azerbaijanis,
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic the Arabs, and the Baloch. Saudi Arabia’s money transfers to ultra-radical Salafi organizations in Balochistan have reportedly increased, and a Saudi research institute identifying with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman also called for support of the Baloch and for the “taking of immediate preventive measures” against Iran in this context.8 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states have considerable experience operating Western private security companies for domestic purposes – mainly policing, guarding of properties, and intelligence collection. They also operate private security companies and mercenaries, and recruit members of other nationalities for tasks requiring the use of sophisticated weaponry or in order to come into contact with the local population (recalling the case of Bahrain, where foreign forces, including Pakistanis and Jordanians, were tasked with quelling the domestic Shiite uprising in the principality in 2011).
The Challenge of Securing Regional Access One can argue that the issues of the expeditionary bases and non-state proxies derive from a deeper question, namely, the challenge facing the regional powers as to access to their areas of interest, or in gaining operational access to their peer competitors. One can also argue that the regional powers’ militaries were designed and built to protect their borders, sometimes jointly with partners (Turkey with NATO, Saudi Arabia with the United States), and not for operations in distant theaters. However, in recent years, the need to operate in distant theaters has become more acute, mainly due to the collapse of some of the Arab countries and due to attempts by the non-Arab regional powers, Iran and Turkey, to penetrate the Arab sphere. Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
51 The game between the regional powers has gradually become the primary game in the Middle East. Iran operates in or from Shiite regions, but its access to these regions is not necessarily assured. For example, Iran is faced with the challenge of securing access to Yemen, and this impedes its ability to provide significant assistance to the Houthis. This does not mean that Iran is incapable of providing assistance to the Houthis – it certainly does provide such assistance, which apparently increased after Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen. However, the nature of the supply routes and means is not the type that one would expect from a regional power. Iran is basically acquiescing to the maritime blockade imposed on Yemen by Saudi Arabia and its allies (in the sense that the Iranian navy is not trying to lift or even penetrate the blockade),
and is making do with dispatching advisers, providing financial assistance, 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic and smuggling war materials using a variety of low signature methods that inter alia limit the flow of the assistance. The smuggling methods are more typical of a limited or subversive player, rather than the conduct of a regional power. Iran is also contending with the challenge of securing access to Lebanon, which is evident by its struggle with Israel over the supply of advanced weapon systems to Hezbollah. As in the case of the Houthis, this does not mean that Iran is struggling to smuggle weapons or that its operatives cannot find their way to Lebanon, but rather, that the access is not unchallenged and is mainly dependent on the level of aggressiveness of third parties. Israel can hinder (and according to media reports, is hindering) Iran’s access to Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and its allies can and do hinder Iran’s access to Yemen. At the time of this writing, Iran’s access to Syria still depends to a great extent on Russian cooperation (and also on the extent to which the American administration persists in applying pressure on the Iranian supply routes along the Syrian-Iraqi border, as it did in May 2017). Iran’s access to the Yemeni theater likewise depends on Oman’s degree of cooperation or willful blindness, since some of the smuggling is routed through Oman’s territory. Indeed, the fact that Iran’s access to the heart of Syria is carried out mainly from the air (and subject to the associated constraints, such as dependence on the control of airports and the possibility of airplanes being intercepted), was the source of Iran’s motivation to carve out land routes to Syria and Lebanon. There are a number of possible land access routes from Iran, through Iraq and into Syria and then into Lebanon, but Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
52 each of them poses some challenge. Finding an access route that passes solely through Shiite regions is a complicated task, and in nearly every alternative route, there are sections that pass through territories of other ethnic groups or at least through unpopulated open desert. Iran’s access to areas deep inside Sunni regions of Iraq is also not a given, despite the fact that Iraq is a bordering state. Iran’s operational access to Israel is mostly achieved through its non- state proxies (Hezbollah), though it is in the process of consolidating itself in Syria and filling the void left there by the Islamic State. Iran’s direct operational access to Israel from its own territory is limited, and apparently comprises a few hundred missiles and cyber warfare only. Iran’s operational access to Saudi Arabia and to the Gulf states is limited;
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic a ground offensive is apparently not a viable option, and therefore the use of non-state proxies – for subversive activities in relevant theaters, such as Bahrain and the eastern district of Saudi Arabia, which is mostly populated by Shiites, and the Houthis in Yemen – appears to be a more practical alternative. Like in the Israeli case, so too in this case, Iran’s direct operational access is enabled through high trajectory fire and through cyber warfare, although in the Saudi case, the sea might also constitute a stage for limited direct confrontation. Indeed, Iran is also contending with the challenge of maritime operational access. Most of its capability in the Gulf’s waters is limited to its “nuisance value”; i.e., its ability to disrupt the freedom of navigation of others, but it does not appear that Iran is capable of establishing naval superiority and guaranteeing for itself freedom of navigation, if and when its rivals decide to challenge it. Iran is also striving to achieve a maritime presence in Bab el-Mandeb, in eastern Africa, and in the Red Sea, and its ships have shown their flag in the Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, a small number of outdated ships so far from home, and not benefiting from air superiority, constitute a convenient target far more than they pose any serious threat. Saudi Arabia and its allies in the United Arab Emirates have vital interests throughout the Middle East, from deep inside Iraq, through Syria and Lebanon, to eastern Africa and Libya. Bordering regions are easily accessible, for example, Yemen (without this guaranteeing any decisive military outcome), while the operational access to distant Libya is also relatively convenient (from Egypt, for example). However, it appears that Saudi Arabia and its allies are suffering from a shortage of “hard” means of influence in Syria, in Lebanon, and maybe even in Iraq, and Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
53 their main power of influence is “soft” – primarily, financing of sub-state actors – whose effectiveness, at least in these instances, is at best modest. Consequently, the Sunni Arab regional powers did not acquire a sufficiently strong “entry ticket” to the stabilization and shaping of Syria, and their impact to date on the processes in Iraq is also modest. Over the last three years, they even struggled to reach significant achievements in their own backyard – in Yemen. Although Iraq and Syria constitute Turkey’s historic backyard, Turkey is also challenged to gain operational access deep inside both of these countries. Turkish forces operate directly only in regions adjacent to the border, and the non-state proxies are limited to Turkish ethnic populations, mainly south of, but adjacent to, the Turkish-Syrian border. Turkey failed
to demonstrate robust operational access deep in Iraq and Syria (Mosul 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic is the exception, and even there, Turkey’s involvement was not robust), and failed to gain a sufficient “ticket” to the design of the political futures of Iraq and Syria. In essence, apart from demonstrating partial military “negative” or “preventive” capability with regard to a potential formation of a Kurdish political entity, Turkey has failed to achieve military end states, and as a result, to shape in positive terms the political end state in any of the theaters in which it is currently competing. The Turkish base in Qatar is not an asset that enables the effective operation of Turkish military power in the Gulf, but rather more than anything else serves as an attempt to shore up the rule of the incumbent emir, and by doing so, Turkey contributes to the crisis in Qatar’s relations with its neighbors in the Gulf.
The Implications for Israel Israel’s main challenge at this time is Iran: the Iranian nuclear project; Iranian force buildup in proximity to Israel (Iranian forces in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon and in Syria, including the establishment of high quality weapons factories in these theaters); Iranian transfers of weapons through various channels in the Middle East and east Africa; Iranian challenges to Israel’s allies; and a potential threat, far from Israeli territory, to gas fields, seaways, and airways. Some of the Iranian challenges to Israel are closer to home, i.e., in Lebanon and in Syria, at ranges in which Israel is accustomed to operate. The asymmetry in operational access between Israel and Iran is increasing. Iran is developing an extensive and prolonged strike capability against Israel (whose quality is steadily improving) through a non-state proxy Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
54 (Hezbollah) and perhaps through expeditionary bases (military presence in Syria that is directed against Israel). On the other hand, Israel is facing operational complexities in order to reach Iran, all the more so when the reference scenario is extensive and prolonged. The asymmetry in the bi-directional operational access between Iran and Israel forces Israel to contend with both directions: Iranian access to Israel, and Israeli access to Iran. Regarding Iranian access to Israel, insofar as at issue is buildup of statistical firepower to be operated by a non-state proxy, this is tantamount to shutting the stable door after the horses have bolted. But it appears that Iran is striving to enable its non-state proxy some sort of symmetry with Israel in the quality of firepower, a trend that Israel cannot allow. According to various reports, Israel has taken fairly successful action
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic to reduce transfers of high quality weapon to Hezbollah, but the erection of factories for the manufacture of high quality weapons in Lebanon and in Syria heightens this threat once again. It appears, therefore, that Israel must draw the red line9 at Hezbollah acquiring high impact weapons capabilities, particularly when they are manufactured within the theater (such as precision missiles, long range anti-ship missiles, and weapons of mass destruction), as these capabilities are liable to provide the non-state proxy with a paralyzing strike capability against Israel. As for the Iranian presence in Syria, it is within a tolerable range, insofar as at issue are foreign militias (who will have difficulties embedding themselves among the people) or light Iranian forces, whose main capabilities are limited to urban combat against insurgents in Syrian cities, and their level of threat to Israel is not high. Even the potential threat of the presence of Shiite militias in southern Syria is lower than the threat of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The Shiite militias constitute a foreign element that will find it difficult to conceal themselves among civilians, and the topography in southern Syria is more favorable for Israel than the topography of southern Lebanon. Similarly, the establishment of an Iranian military seaport or airport in Syria is not necessarily an intolerable situation for Israel. Israel faces two types of military challenges vis-à-vis Iran and Hezbollah: concealment among civilians (Hezbollah) or geographic access (Iran). Yet in a scenario in which Israel benefits from convenient operational access, then a high signature, relatively isolated Iranian expeditionary outpost suffers from an inherent disadvantage. An Iranian military port in Syria, for example, constitutes a target that will be both overt and convenient for Israel’s Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
55 operational access. Therefore, a “heavy” Iranian expeditionary base in Syria is liable to pose more of a burden on Iran than on Israel, and Israel might gain leverage over Iran without having to deal with an unanswerable threat. In this instance too, the red line is drawn at high quality weapons: any Iranian deployment of high quality systems on Syrian territory, such as advanced S-300 surface-to-air systems, precision surface-to-surface missiles, or high quality anti-ship missiles, is intolerable for Israel, which must therefore take all measures to prevent the situation. As for the other side of the asymmetry, Israeli operational access to Iran, Israel always possessed long range operational capabilities and, according to various reports, operated in the past from Tunis to Sudan and up to Iraq. But these operations were limited in their objectives, in their
order of battle, in the duration of the operation, and other dimensions. In 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic the current reality, Israel must possess both the capability of conducting extensive military operations against non-bordering Iran, and the capability of conducting certain military operations against Iran and its non-state proxies throughout the Middle East. These two needs require adjustments in Israeli force buildup, from strengthening Israel’s ability to achieve air superiority far from home, through strengthening its ability to bring a wide spectrum of support capabilities to distant theaters and maintaining them there continuously (capabilities including intelligence collection, electronic warfare, detection, air control, and refueling) and up In the current reality, Israel to strengthening its low signature and low friction operational capabilities. Such capabilities are must possess both the operated from Israel itself, but may be operated in capability of conducting coordination with several of Israel’s allies. extensive military The establishment of major permanent bases in operations against non- other countries’ territory is no trivial matter for Israel. bordering Iran, and the It is simpler to support a specific operation from capability of conducting the territory of a third country (such as support of Operation Entebbe from the territory of Kenya), and certain military operations Israel might be able to maintain some ongoing low against Iran and its non- signature activity in the territories of host countries. state proxies throughout In the past, Israel operated proxies (such as the the Middle East. South Lebanon Army) and cooperated with non- state clients (such as the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Christians). But it is doubtful whether the handling of non-state proxies is central to Israel’s competitive advantage, and its ability to realize its policies by joining forces Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
56 with clients has only been demonstrated in a limited number of cases. However, Israel can support various groups that in any case are already confronting Iran in the various theaters as well as groups operating against the regime inside Iran itself. Israel can also cooperate with various regional players that have better capabilities handling non-state proxies than does Israel itself, such as Saudi Arabia.
The War on Access Iran is challenged in gaining political access to non-Shiite communities, and suffers from difficulties gaining geographic access to some of the Shiite communities in the Middle East. The Iranian military and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were not built to deploy “heavy” conventional
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic military forces (army, navy, or air force) in major operations far from home. It might be that these access challenges constitute one of Iran’s key weaknesses. Iran’s other weaknesses are its aggressive overt courses of action since 2011, which have caused nearly all of the other powers in the Middle East to join forces against it; the scarcity of political state allies; its relative weakness in direct conventional military confrontations; the extent of resources that it can allocate to the various confrontations; and the large minority populations inside its territory. The Iranian military and the These Iranian weaknesses might enable the Revolutionary Guards were creation of a broad regional and international coalition that will launch a campaign against Iranian not built to deploy “heavy” operational access to theaters of confrontation in conventional military forces the Middle East. The obstacles that may be raised in major operations far to prevent Iranian access may include, depending from home. Iran’s other upon the context, conventional military efforts, covert weaknesses include its efforts, the use of non-state proxies and clients, and aggressive action since international diplomatic efforts. Much of the effort could to be concentrated on disrupting Iran’s access 2011, which have caused to the Sunni region in Iraq, at the Iraqi-Syrian border, nearly all of the other Iran’s access to the Syrian heartland, Iran’s access powers in the Middle East at the Syrian-Lebanese border, and Iran’s maritime to join forces against it. access to Yemen and the Red Sea. From the perspective of undercutting Iran’s access capabilities, there is an advantage in stabilizing Syria based on the idea of the divisions between different communities, which will make it difficult for Iran to hold a territorial continuum stretching from Tehran, through Ron Tira and Yoel Guzansky | The Competition between Middle East Powers
57 Baghdad and Damascus, and up to Beirut. Regions that will be controlled by non-Alawite Syrian forces, like the Sunnis, the Kurds, or the Druze are likely to cut up Iranian access routes in and via Syrian territories. An arrangement that divides up Syria may also drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, since such a division may be in line with Russian interests (but not in line with Iranian interests) and may reduce Russia’s operational dependence on Iran and on its Shiite non-state proxies. Israel’s influence on the diplomatic process concerning Syria’s future is not dramatic, but the said notion might be presented by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and even Turkey if and when discussions are held between them and Russia and the United States about the future of Syria.
Notes | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 1 “Operational access” is defined as the ability to project military force into an operational area. 2 Robert Harkavy, “Thinking about Basing,” US Naval War College, 2005. 3 Yoel Guzansky, “Iran’s Growing Naval Ambitions: Why it Wants Bases in Syria and Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, January 1, 2017. 4 Frank Milburn, “Iran´s Land Bridge to the Mediterranean: Possible Routes and Ensuing Challenges and Constraints,” Strategic Assessment 20, no. 3 (2017): 35-48, see pp. 35-36. 5 Alexander Cornwell, “UAE to Train Somaliland Forces under Military Base Deal: Somaliland President,” Reuters, March 15, 2018. 6 Ahmad Majidyar, “Pakistan’s Army Chief: ‘We’re Interested in Learning Experience of Basij from Iran,’” Middle East Institute, November 14, 2017. 7 Ephraim Kam, “Iran’s Shiite Foreign Legion,” Strategic Assessment 20, no. 3 (2017): 49-58, see pp. 49-50. 8 James Dorsey, “In Shadow Covert Wars, Iran Takes Center Stage,” BESA Perspective Papers, November 14, 2017. 9 Gideon Sa’ar and Ron Tira, “Political and Military Contours of the Next Conflict with Hezbollah,” Strategic Assessment 20, no. 2 (2017): 57-71.
European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
Valentina Cominetti
Relations between European countries and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states have always been overwhelmingly dominated by strategic and security priorities, including migration control, the fight against terrorism, and access to energy.1 The so-called Arab Spring has generated prolonged chaos in many of the local Arab states, with dramatic consequences for the northern side of the Mediterranean as well. Foremost among these is the refugee crisis, which is so significant in numbers and so difficult to handle that it undermines relations between the European Union member states as well as the very existence of the organization. Indeed, the fact that many countries are reinstating national borders and reconsidering the Schengen agreement has led some to hypothesize that the entire European project is in jeopardy, demonstrating that the migration crisis is not just a challenge to the organization’s stability of the EU but an existential threat to the EU. 2 In these circumstances, support of those Middle East and North African states that have somehow preserved their stability becomes a vital interest for EU member states, which have demonstrated their readiness not only to sacrifice parts of their democratization projects in the area but also to ignore issues of international credibility as they reveal how little leverage on local governments they actually have. A dramatic example of this phenomenon is the story of the relations between Italy and Egypt following the murder of Giulio Regeni, the Italian researcher who was allegedly kidnapped and tortured to death by the Egyptian secret services in early 2016. The fact that the ensuing diplomatic
Valentina Cominetti is an analyst and researcher at MM~Law, an American law firm specializing in civil cases for the compensation of victims of terrorism, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. She writes for Analisi Difesa, an Italian magazine on security and defense analysis.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 59 Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
60 standoff between the two countries was relatively brief shows how “the relations between Italy and Egypt go far beyond the traditional forms of cooperation.”3 Indeed, Rome’s economic and security ties with Egypt are essential, rather than merely important for the prosperity and stability of the country. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolution of relations between Italy and Egypt after the murder of Giulio Regeni and the interests behind the relatively quick resolution of the crisis. While this case had severe consequences for Italian and European public opinion, it alone cannot generate valid generalization about the state of broader European-MENA relations. Still, it does give a sense of how crucial the issue of migration is for European politicians and the price they are willing to pay in order to
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic contain that issue.
Background Giulio Regeni was a PhD student at Cambridge University’s Girton College, researching independent Egyptian independent trade unions. Regeni disappeared in Cairo on January 25, 2016, the fifth anniversary of the 2011 Tahrir Square protests. His mutilated and half-naked corpse was found in a ditch alongside the Cairo-Alexandria highway on February 3, 2016. The body showed signs of extreme torture, with contusions, abrasions, cuts, broken ribs, cigarette and more extensive burns, multiple stab wounds, a brain hemorrhage, and a broken cervical vertebra, which ultimately caused his death. Giulio Regeni’s murder has been attributed to his supposed ties with the Egyptian Independent Trade Union Movement, which was opposed to the central government of President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. The case triggered a heated debate throughout the world but particularly in Italy, because of the suspected involvement, partial or total, of the Egyptian secret services in his death. The suspicions were aggravated by the Egyptian authorities’ behavior during the investigation of the affair. At the very outset, the Egyptian authorities declared that Giulio Regeni died as a result of a car accident. By March 2016, however, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Regeni’s four kidnappers had been killed by the Egyptian police. According to the authorities, Regeni was killed by a gang of professional kidnappers wearing police uniforms. As evidence, they claimed that they found Regeni’s documents after the shooting in the house of one of the criminals.4 The Italian investigators never believed this version because of several gaps in it and because the Egyptian Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
61 authorities changed the story several times.5 Finally, phone records placing the leader of the gang more than 100 km from Cairo at the time of Regeni’s disappearance proved that the government’s scenario was not viable.6 Regeni’s murder was more likely related to the fact that independent labor unions are a particularly sensitive issue in Egypt under the Sisi government, which views them as having been a key galvanizing force in the 2011 revolution. Many democracy advocates in and outside Egypt, including Giulio Regeni and his Cambridge supervisor, Egyptian political scientist Dr. Maha Abdel Rahman, regarded this as a positive force, with the potential to strengthen civil society, democratic participation, and workers’ rights – elements that seem threatening to a military regime determined to repress autonomous sources of power.7
From a wider perspective, Regeni could be considered one of the victims 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic of the government repression intended to eliminate internal dissent in Egypt. Since the armed forces ousted President Morsi in July 2013, tens of thousands of people have been detained without trial or sentenced to prison terms or to death, often after trials of dubious legitimacy. By the government’s own admission, in 2016, 34,000 persons (and possibly thousands more) were behind bars.8 Indeed, the draconian new counter-terrorism law prompted the response by the authorities after the rise in violent attacks by armed groups against the police, army, judicial officials, foreign nationals, and ordinary citizens, which followed the Morsi’s government crackdown. Egypt has also seen the emergence of a new pattern of human rights violations against political activists and protesters, including students and children, hundreds of whom have been arbitrarily arrested, detained, and subjected to enforced disappearance by state agents. Those detained in this way did not have access to their lawyers or families and were held incommunicado and without judicial oversight. Local NGOs allege that an average of three to four people are abducted and arbitrarily subjected to enforced disappearance every day.9 This pattern of abuse has become evident since March 2015, when President el-Sisi appointed Major General Magdy Abd el-Ghaffar as Minister of Interior. Before assuming this post, Abd el-Ghaffar held senior positions in the State Security Investigations (SSI), the secret police force that became notorious for serious human rights violations under Mubarak, and in the National Security Agency (NSA), formed to replace the SSI when the authorities bowed to public pressure and in March 2011 announced its dismantlement. Since the appointment of the new minister, the NSA has emerged as the principal state agency engaged in suppressing opposition Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
62 to the government and committing torture and other “serious human rights violations with impunity.”10 According to Amnesty International, “Given this cycle of widespread abuse and government denial, the abduction and murder of Italian doctoral student Giulio Regeni in early 2016 raised suspicion that he may have been a victim of enforced disappearance who died under torture while detained by Egyptian state agents.”11
Diplomatic Stalemate and Resolution of Italian-Egyptian Crisis Italy’s major diplomatic action against Egypt was to recall its ambassador to Egypt, Maurizio Massari, on April 8, 2016. This decision was made immediately after a failed meeting between Italian and Egyptian investigators.12 In the weeks preceding the meeting, the Italian authorities had asked for
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic numerous materials from the investigation, but the Egyptian authorities presented only 30 pages of documents out of the more than 2000 requested. In particular, Italy had asked for phone records; Egypt’s assistant state prosecutor Mostafa Suleiman stated that providing them would violate the Egyptian constitution.13 The Italian investigators likewise demanded CCTV footage of the area where Regeni had disappeared, but Suleiman said that by then the footage had been automatically deleted. The Egyptian authorities did not even hand out their own autopsy report.14 As a consequence of the failed meeting, then-Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Paolo Gentiloni recalled Massari to Italy, officially for “consultation purposes,” but essentially as a diplomatic tactic to put pressure on Egyptian authorities with the international crisis that developed after Regeni’s murder. A similar measure was taken in February 2014 by then-Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini in the so-called “Marò case,” when India kept postponing the trial for the two navy riflemen, Salvatore Girone and Maurizio Latorre, accused of killing two Indian fishermen.15 In response, between August and September 2016, the Egyptian government agreed to hand over mobile phone records from both the area where Regeni had last been seen and the place where his body was found.16 Then, and more significantly, during a visit to Rome in early September, Egyptian prosecutors admitted for the first time that Regeni had been under police surveillance before his disappearance (though they insisted that the checks on him lasted only three days). This admission followed the publication of an interview with Mohammed Abdullah, leader of the independent street vendors’ union and the most important primary source for Regeni’s research, who revealed that he had personally denounced Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
63 Regeni to the authorities because he considered Regeni’s questions to be “not about street vendors.” The Egyptian government said that as a result of Abdullah’s tip, it placed Regeni under investigation, but decided after a few days that his research was of “no interest to national security.”17 In late January 2017, the Egyptian police agreed to make available for analysis by Italian and German experts the footage recorded in the Dokki Metro station in Giza, where Regeni had been seen for the last time.18 Then, on August 14, 2017, after the Egyptian public prosecutor’s office sent to its counterpart in Rome some material about interviews with the policemen who had first investigated Regeni’s murder, the Italian government announced its decision to send a new ambassador, Giampaolo Cantini, to Cairo. Officially, the government justified its decision by citing the improved cooperation
between the Egyptian and the Italian prosecutors’ offices. Yet according to 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic several media, the renewed ambassadorial-level ties were the result of the “realpolitik” efforts of the Minsters of the Interior (Marco Minniti), Defense (Roberta Pinotti), and Foreign Affairs (Angelino Alfano).19 After the return of the Italian Ambassador to Cairo in September 2017, Ibrahim Metwaly Hegazy, the founder of the Association of the Families of the Disappeared (an association that provides information to the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, a Cairo-based NGO-ECRF) and the Regenis’ family lawyer in Cairo, was arrested and charged with “managing an illegal group, spreading false news … [and] cooperating with foreign organizations.”20 On November 2, 2017, the Egyptian lead in the investigation into Regeni’s case seems to have been dropped in favor of a new one. Following the publication of an article by the newspaper La Repubblica, Italian magistrates issued a European Investigation Order requesting to interview Dr. Rahman, Regeni’s supervisor at the university, who insisted on focusing Regeni’s research on independent trade unions in Egypt, despite the fact that he had expressed concerns and fears about the direction his research was taking.21 This Investigation Order appears to be the final chapter of a diplomatic stalemate between the two countries, which was apparently never intended to last very long.
Italy and Egypt: Unavoidable Ties Italy and Egypt always enjoyed a close and cooperative relationship before the Regeni case cast a shadow over it. As stated by Claudio Pacifico, a former Italian ambassador to Egypt, the relations between Rome and Cairo “go far Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
64 beyond the traditional forms of cooperation”: Egypt is Italy’s main partner on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea and its role is essential to Italy both for business and security reasons. Moreover, after the outbreak of the refugee crisis, maintaining good relations with that country has become even more vital to Italy. Italian economic interests in Egypt range from trade through investment opportunities to access to energy. Egypt is Italy’s main trading partner in North Africa,22 and trade volume between the two countries rose by 30 percent to 1.3 billion euros in the first quarter of 2017.23 For Italy, Egypt is the sixth largest export market in the MENA region and the thirty-second in the entire world.24 Since 2014, the volume of Italian exports to Egypt has risen consistently, and given the estimated potential increase in exports 25
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic from Italy to Egypt, by 2020 is projected to amount to 474.1 million euros. In addition, Italian investments in the country are considerable. In 2016, Italy was the largest European source of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, and Egypt ranks third among African countries that received Italian investments; over the last seventeen years it has ranked fourth in this category.26 The Italian business presence in the country is large: 957 out of the 3500 Italian companies in the MENA region are located in Egypt.27 Among them, ENI, the main Italian energy company, is the biggest investor. In 2015, ENI’s investments in the Zohr gas project alone accounted for $6 billion out of a total of $7.4 billion Italian FDI in Egypt.28 Moreover, Italy is one of Europe’s most energy-vulnerable countries, which makes ENI, in the words of the former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, ‘‘a fundamental piece of Italian energy policy, foreign policy and intelligence policy.’’ ENI’s chief executive Claudio Descalzi knows the leaders of many countries better than do Italy’s ministers. Thus, as the pressure to solve Regeni’s murder mounted, Descalzi gave assurances that the Egyptian authorities were ‘‘putting in maximum effort’’ to find Regeni’s killers.29 Beside ENI, there are many other important Italian companies that have invested significant capital in the country, including Banca Intesa San Paolo (which in 2006 bought the Bank of Alessandria), Italcementi, Pirelli, Italgen, Danieli Techint, Gruppo Caltagirone, Alpitour, and Valtur. This presence is expected to increase because, according to forecasts, steady economic and population growth make Egypt a promising investment opportunity even for small and medium-size enterprises.30 No less significant is the fact that Italian-Egyptian security cooperation plays a crucial role in the relations between the two countries, in particular Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
65 with regard to immigration. Indeed, Egypt is considered the best Northern African partner for Italy in the fight against illegal immigration. This cooperation is framed by several agreements, including one providing for the speedy expulsion of illegal Egyptian immigrants from Italy.31 Since 2013, the number of migrants landing in Italy has grown significantly because of the upheavals in the MENA region, and these agreements became more vital for the Italian government. Indeed, even if only 7 percent of the migrants landing in Italy in 2016 actually left from Egypt, the country plays a wider role of migration containment because of its harsh laws against human traffickers.32 Moreover, most of the migrants apprehended in Egypt are detained in camps indefinitely; when not subjected to forced expulsion, their only option is to go back to their country at their own expense.33
Finally, and more crucially, Italy’s relationship with Egypt is essential 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic for the stabilization of Libya, which is Rome’s single most important foreign policy objective. Indeed, Libya has been the state from which most of the migrants landing in Italy departed in recent years, because it is the embarkation point for refugees, more than 180,000 in 2016, arriving by sea. In August 2017, the Italian Navy launched a mission to support the Libyan Coast Guard in fighting human trafficking. Since then, the number of migrants landing on the Italian coast from Libya has dropped significantly (by 30.13 percent, from 2016 to 2017).34 Yet Libya is still divided between two competing governments and Khalifa Haftar, the military commander of the eastern government, could impede effective cooperation. Indeed, when the agreement between the Italian government and the titular Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj was signed, Haftar accused the government in Tripoli of betraying the Libyan people, menacing the implementation of the agreement itself. In this context, Egypt has an important role to play because despite recognizing al-Sarraj as the legitimate Prime Minister of Libya, Cairo provides technical, logistical, and economic support to Khalifa Haftar in his efforts to confront the Islamists. The friendly relationship between Haftar and Egypt could help facilitate the effective operation of the Italian naval mission in Libya.35 Thus in the words of former NATO ambassador to Italy Stefano Stefanini before the diplomatic crisis was resolved, “We ideally need as much regional diplomacy in Libya as possible, and the Regeni case is a stumbling block.”36 Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
66 Conclusion The return of the Italian ambassador and the normalization of ties following the Regeni case underscore the prioritization of economic and security cooperation over support for human rights and the rule of law.37 Indeed, Italian policy toward the MENA countries has historically privileged economic and security ties over human rights. Despite the fact that for the first time the Italian government has been forced to answer public concerns about its dealings with the Egyptian government, it is unlikely that Italian policy in the region will change.38 Nor is Italy alone. Germany seems to follow the same path. For example, in 2011 a number of foreign NGOs, including Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (associated with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic party) were raided by the Egyptian police, and in 2013, an Egyptian court froze the assets of the organizations and found some NGO workers guilty of receiving “illegal financing from abroad.” Germany has paid a 250,000 euro bond for each worker in order to circumvent the ban on leaving the country imposed on them, and the relationship between the two countries has been affected by a crisis that still needs to be resolved. Nonetheless, Chancellor Merkel said very little about Egypt’s controversial NGO law during her 2017 meeting with President el-Sisi, and gave higher priority to the effort to cut a deal to curb the flow of migrants from Africa.39 The same is true for the European Union more generally. Indeed, the new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), revised in November 2015, acknowledged the importance of sustained efforts in support of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, but aimed to focus on the stabilization of the partner countries as the main political priority.40 Overall, the EU sees Egypt as a “first line of defense” against illegal migration and consequently makes little attempt to exercise leverage over the country. At the same time, the repression that helps preserve stability in Egypt could, over the long term, turn into a driver of chaos if abuses of power go unquestioned and people’s expectations go unmet.41 The consequences of such a scenario would not only affect migration flows toward Europe but the stability of the entire region. Still, migration is one of the most urgent concerns of European voters and it plays an undeniable role in the shaping of electoral campaigns throughout Europe.42 The fact that leaders’ ability to tackle immigration influences the outcome of elections in many EU countries makes a scenario in which European politicians choose to promote policies based on long term considerations over short term ones Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
67 unlikely. This seems to be the major reason why Italy, along with other EU member states, is likely to shape its relationship with Egypt according to short term security considerations rather than on long term issues. After all, to win the elections today, Egypt’s precarious stability is enough; possible long term consequences will probably be someone else’s problem.
Notes 1 Rosa Balfour, “EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring,” European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2012, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/ pub_2728_papersbalfour_for_euromesco16.pdf. 2 Camino Mortera-Martinez, “The Collapse of Schengen would have Only Two Winners: Terrorists and Populist Parties,” The Telegraph, May 5, 2016, https://bit.ly/2qfHneM.
3 “The Interview: Ambassador Pacifico, Frienship between Italy and 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Egypt is Even Stronger after a Year,” Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, July 29, 2010, https://bit.ly/2qgaazJ. 4 “The Egyptian Version on Regeni’s Death,” Il Post, March 26, 2016, http://www.ilpost.it/2016/03/26/morte-giulio-regeni/. 5 Ibid. 6 Alexander Stille, “Who Murdered Giulio Regeni?” The Guardian, October 4, 2016, https://bit.ly/2doVjk7. 7 Ibid. 8 Egypt: “Officially You Do Not Exist”: Disappears and Tortured in the Name of Counter-Terrorism, Amnesty International, 2016, https://bit.ly/2HDXDxx. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 10. 11 Ibid., p. 10. 12 “Italy has Recalled its Ambassador from Egypt,” Il Post, April 9, 2016, https://bit.ly/1S2uADT. 13 “Italian Ambassador Recalled from Cairo after Lack of Progress in Murder Probe,” The Guardian, April 10, 2016, https://bit.ly/2GKTabV. 14 “Italy has Recalled its Ambassador from Egypt.” 15 Ibid. 16 Stille, “Who murdered Giulio Regeni.” 17 Ibid. 18 “Regeni – Egypt Says Yes to Italian Experts Getting the Latest Images before the Disappearance,” La Repubblica, January 22, 2017, https://bit.ly/2jFN2a4. 19 Francesca Schianchi, “New Dossiers on the Death of Regeni. The Italian Ambassador Returns to Cairo,” La Stampa, August 15, 2017, https://bit. ly/2vDPuno. 20 Ruth Michaelson, “Egypt Charges Lawyer Investigating Italian Student’s Murder,” The Guardian, September 13, 2017, https://bit.ly/2EtGbJN. Valentina Cominetti | European Interest in Egyptian Stability: The Case of Italy
68 21 John Phillips, “Italy Seeks to Question Cambridge University Professor of Murdered Student,” The Telegraph, November 2, 2017, https://bit. ly/2HhFeqV. 22 Giacomo Gilglio, “Italy and Egypt: Economiv Reasons Come First,” Europae, February 18, 2016, https://bit.ly/2qgqwYX. 23 Ahmed Gomaa, “Italy, Egypt Renew Relations Despite Unresolved Murder,” al-Monitor, September 28, 2017. 24 “Country Card Egypt,” Sace Gruppo CDP, (2017), https://bit.ly/2FrcYj3. 25 Ibid. 26 “The Seventh Annual SRM Report on Economic Relations between Italy and the Mediterranean has been Presented,” SRM, 2017, https://bit.ly/2jhbWNQ. 27 Ibid. 28 Massimo Zaurrini, “Africa: Italy at the Top of the Investment Ranking,” Affari Internazionali, September 14, 2017.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 29 Declan Walsh, “Why was an Italian Student Tortured and Murdered in Egypt?” New York Times, August 15, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2wLV2wC. 30 Ibid. 31 “Embassy of Italy: Agreements with Cairo,” https://bit.ly/2JrX2QM. 32 “The Real Data on Migrants Landing in 2017,” Formiche, 2017, http://formiche.net/2017/04/30/sbarchi-migranti-2017/. 33 “Egypt, the Other Northern African Border of Europe,” ADIF, 2017, https:// bit.ly/2HhH8b3. 34 Sofia Cecinini, “Italy: Landings Decreased from 30.13%, but Fluxes from Tunisia and Algeria are on the Rise,” Sicurezza Nazionale, 2017, https://bit. ly/2GHQqjx. 35 Mattia Toaldo, “The Common Thread Connecting Regeni’s Death and the Migration Agreements,” l’Espresso, August 22, 2017, https://bit. ly/2GHHV8h. 36 Ruth Michaelson and Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “A Year On, Giulio Regeni Death Casts Shadow over Italy-Egypt Relations,” The Guardian, January 25, 2017, https://bit.ly/2jQbq9g. 37 Adel Abdel Ghafar, “A Stable Egypt for a Stable Region: Socio-Economic Challenges and Prospects,” European Parliament Directorate General for External Policies, 2018. 38 Matteo Colombo, “A Year after Regeni’s Death: How Italian Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean is Changing.” ISPI, January 27, 2017, https://bit. ly/2H6hfNz. 39 “Merkel Ignores Sisi’s Human Rights Record for Immigration-Curbing Deal,” The New Arab, March 3, 2017, https://bit.ly/2Ev9o6W/. 40 Ghafar, “A Stable Egypt for a Stable Region.” 41 Ibid. 42 Rossella Lombardi, “European Elections and Migration: What We’ve Learnt – and What to Expect,” Politheor, 2017, https://bit.ly/2qeAIS3. Establishing a European Security Community: Milestones and Strategic Implications
Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph
In December 2017, about 60 years after the signing of the Rome Convention, which constitutes the cornerstone of the European Union, defense ministers of 25 EU countries signed a “Permanent Structured Cooperation” agreement (PESCO).1 The purpose of the agreement is to enhance the security cooperation between the member countries and increase investment in defense capabilities that will be available for EU joint military operations. The difference between PESCO and previous cooperation frameworks on security issues is that the agreement is expected to comprise a basis for a “European security union” – an organization that would promote integration between military units and develop joint projects between European member states.2 The agreement was signed after decades of creating pan-European institutions, including a judicial system, parliament, currency, and foreign policy, accompanied by resolute opposition to military integration, which the EU countries perceived as an impediment to their sovereignty.3 The decision to establish PESCO was taken in view of a series of security challenges that prompted Europe’s leaders to reassess the idea of military integration: the political chaos in the Middle East and the ensuing immigration challenge; Russia’s aggressive activity, manifested in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the cognitive campaigns to cultivate rifts and polarize the European community; and the election of Donald Trump as US President, after he expressed doubts as to the US commitment to European security. These were joined by the decision of
Yotam Rosner is a former Neubauer research associate at INSS. Shira Bar-Joseph is an intern in the Europe Program at INSS.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 69 Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
70 the UK – the main opponent to the move – to leave the EU, which removed the last obstacle to the EU organizing a security entity.4 The article presents PESCO’s institutional and economic infrastructure and its strategic goals as a solution to the continent’s security challenges. The article also discusses the strategic implications of the joint organization for the EU’s ties with NATO and Russia. Finally, it focuses on the possible value of cooperation between Israel and PESCO.
The History of European Security Policy The desire to develop a European security community has existed for decades, but the idea met stiff political opposition that kept it off the EU agenda. Right after World War II, the Soviet threat and the apprehension
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic that Germany would rearm led to a proposal to establish a European Defence Committee (EDC) that would comprise West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg and be under a joint European military and political leadership. The EDC treaty was signed in 1952, but the initiative collapsed after the French parliament refused to ratify it.5 In the 1970s, when the EU became an economic power, there were growing expectations that the EU would renew the efforts to build a common framework regarding foreign and security issues. Thus in 1970 a document entitled European Political Cooperation (EPC) was presented in order to promote coordination in foreign policy between EU members, but the document did not result in many achievements.6 Later, following the Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986 as part of the integration and extension of the European Community, a permanent secretariat was established to present an agenda for European foreign policy, without engaging in security matters.7 The Yugoslavian civil war atrocities in the 1990s spurred Europe’s leaders to concede the need for institutionalizing European cooperation on security issues. The Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 made it clear that the security dimension is an integral part of the European integration process; consequently, the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) framework was established. The Helsinki summit in 1999 ratified the commitment to a common security policy and led to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) agreement. The security integration of the EU was extended following the September 11 terrorist attacks, when the European Defense Agency (EDA) was established, entrusted with developing crisis management Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
71 capabilities, promoting cooperation on armament issues, and improving security technology research. The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, presented new apparatuses for implementing EU security and defense policy, chiefly the Common Security and Defense Policy agreement (CDSP) of the EU, which superseded the ESDP agreement.8 In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon presented a framework called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), designed to foster cooperation between EU member states under the supervision and funding of the EU. Although the European Parliament urged the countries to implement the treaty’s articles, France was the only country to do so, following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. However, France decided to implement article 42(7) calling for mutual reciprocal aid only, and not to implement
article 222 calling for operational solidarity, so that the measure had chiefly 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic political, rather than practical, significance.9 Therefore, until 2015, a European military infrastructure remained in the realm of a theoretical idea.
The Security Challenges Facing the European Community From the vantage of the EU, one could describe the year 2016 as “the year of atrocities.” The security challenges that arose that year exposed the defects in the defense doctrine of the European countries and the need for establishing a supra-national security organization.10 From the intra-continental point of view, Europe had to cope with numerous challenges: the influx of refugees that engulfed the continent and the vain attempts to find an agreed formula for their relocation triggered disputes between EU members;11 terrorist attacks in Brussels, Nice, and Berlin exposed the unpreparedness of the internal security forces for the Islamic fundamentalist threat;12 and above all, the national referendum in the UK was decided in favor of quitting the EU.13 Over and beyond the loss of a major actor in the European defense disposition, Britain’s exit gave rise to the apprehension that other countries might follow suit.14 In parallel to the domestic challenges, the international arena was likewise unsettled. Due to the Arab Spring events that began in late 2010, Middle East states became hubs of instability, a source of mass emigration, and fertile ground for nurturing fundamentalist organizations.15 Russia under Putin’s leadership adopted a revisionist policy, aspiring to broaden its borders of influence. This policy was manifested in the military incursion into Georgia (2008), annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (2014), and the military campaign in Ukraine. Subsequently covert intervention by Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
72 Russia in election campaigns in European states also came to light; this intervention was aimed at widening the rifts between communities and strengthening the electoral power of extremist movements supportive of the Putin regime and averse to the EU.16 The most critical challenge for the EU was perhaps the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency in November 2016. During his campaign, Trump attacked the failure of several NATO states to comply with the NATO instructions to allocate 2 percent of the GDP for security needs, and questioned the US commitment to implement article 5 of the NATO convention (obligating all NATO member states to come to the aid of an attacked country).17 After entering office, he retained this posture.18 Such statements, coupled with his positive statements about Putin, caused
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic apprehension as to US unwillingness to come to the aid of European countries should they be subject to Russian aggression.19 The internal European challenges coupled with the changes in the international arena led Europe’s leaders to switch from the traditional defense doctrine, based on national armies and NATO, to the concept that these challenges necessitate structured cooperation in order to bolster EU defense capabilities as an integrated unit. Consequently, during 2016-2017, Germany and France promoted a joint proposal advocating pan-European defensive cooperation, with the support of the majority of EU member states and institutions.20 The only country opposing the proposal was the UK, apprehensive that the European army might undermine NATO. The UK’s decision to leave the EU, however, opened a historic window of opportunity to establish a “Common European Army.”21 Accordingly, on November 13, 2017, 23 countries signed a declaration of their intention to implement the PESCO plan, and on December 11 the decision was ratified by the European Council.22
The Infrastructure for the Common European Defense Program The drive to establish an integrative military body appears in article 42(6) in the Treaty of Lisbon, calling on EU countries to step up their mutual commitment regarding defense issues and invest efforts in establishing a permanent, structured operational force, known as PESCO.23 As a security union PESCO would only include countries willing to commit themselves to “demanding security missions” and increase their defense budgets steadily. Although the purpose of the article was to weed out certain states and streamline the decision making mechanism, almost Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
73 all EU countries accepted the conditions.24 The participant countries signed twenty commitments, which include increasing their defense budgets, investing in R&D, training human resources, and alleviating regulations in order to facilitate military mobility.25 EU institutions are also involved in the program: the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security and Vice President of the European Commission will be responsible for supervising the annual assessment of PESCO; the Military Committee of the EU will discuss the support for the operational aspects of the program;26 and the European Defense Fund will provide $6.4 billion in annual funding.27 The program will be conducted on two levels: the first, at the level of the European Council, responsible for overall policy and the decision making process, including overseeing the countries’ compliance with
their commitments; at the second level, the executive level, the participant 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic countries will manage the projects relevant to them according to general guidelines.28 The first stage of the program will continue until 2021, during which time the Multiannual Financial Framework will be established and the countries will start to fulfill their commitments. In the second stage, which will continue until 2025, the countries will have to meet their set objectives, after which the objectives will assessed and the next stages defined.29 Other countries may be invited to join the projects, though their acceptance will be conditional on their participation endowing significant added value; they would not be awarded powers of decision.30 In the first stage, the member states will focus on promoting 17 projects, including establishing a staff and logistics center, establishing a pan- European medical unit, and building a rapid response force to intervene rapidly in crises and natural disasters.31 The immigration crisis now plaguing Europe has made the Maritime Surveillance Project one of the leading projects in the program. This is an important step toward strengthening the control of common external borders.32 In response to terrorist threats, response teams will be established for emergency medical responses and a military force set up for rapid deployment. Regulations will also be adjusted in order to facilitate military traffic movement on European borders. Several projects will be established in the cyber realm, in response to Russian influence operations. Greece and Lithuania will operate teams for analysis and response to cyber events, and internet defense measures will be developed to enhance the immunity to attacks and reduce their frequency. The sides will cooperate and share their capabilities and intelligence with EU institutions and participant countries.33 Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
74 Strategic Implications of the Military Cooperation At first glance, the PESCO program appears to constitute an essential change in view of the strategic threats European countries have faced in recent years. The EU can utilize the program for improving the cooperation between its members, enhancing its technological prowess, and reinforcing its maritime borders to prevent uncontrolled immigration. On the other hand, however, establishing a pan-European defense framework portends considerable difficulties, including disputes between member states, coordination difficulties vis-à-vis NATO, and the tension with Russia. First, it is possible that the program will not foster cooperation between EU member states, but could give rise to disputes between its member states. For example, PESCO architects Germany and France might have different
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic objectives: Germany perceives PESCO as a means for European integration, and therefore, is interested in maximizing the number of member countries. France, on the other hand, is interested in a high acceptance criterion (two percent of the GDP invested in security, and 20 percent of the defense expenditure channeled to technological procurement and development), in order to streamline management of the framework. At present, neither of the two has had to compromise, since almost all the EU countries joined agreeing to the threshold conditions set by France. However, should any country not be able to comply with the required threshold level, tension might develop between the countries.34 Second, Over and beyond the despite the willingness of the countries signatory defensive implications of to PESCO to participate in conducting ambitious security projects, they could delay the program’s building a pan-European development due to sluggish bureaucracy, political army for the security of 35 opposition at home, and budgetary constraints. EU countries, the political Of no less importance are the relations with significance of this step is NATO. Even if the pan-European military project reinforcement of the ability starts to take shape, the reliance on the US military of the European community might necessitate retaining cooperation with NATO. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg gave his to counter the forces bent blessing to the European initiative and stressed the on its disintegration. need for coordination between PESCO and NATO. 36At the same time he cautioned of the possibility of redundancies and overlap, since 22 out of the 25 states participating in the program are also NATO member states.37 Despite NATO’s approval of the program, the possibility that Europe would establish a parallel military Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
75 force for itself raises several questions: how will cooperation between the two entities be conducted? Would there be redundancy in future projects, and in particular, will this program be economically viable? Most of the countries would probably not be able to afford the cost of investing in a new security entity, and it is feared that the security investment designated for PESCO projects might come at the expense of investing in NATO. Regarding the cognitive threat posed by Russia, the tension between the EU and Russia can be expected to grow. In October 2017, the European Commission declared that the EU countries have formulated a document indicating that cybernetic attacks on the part of hostile actors could constitute a casus belli, and in extreme circumstances, justify the use of conventional weapons.38 In view of the fact that most Russian offensive activity has been
conducted in the cyber realm, the change in doctrine could stimulate a 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic drop in Russian activity. Moreover, a significant number of the projects to be promoted in PESCO focus on cyber defense. However, the ability of the European military union to deter Russia from continuing to pursue its offensive activity is tenuous, since Russia is a nuclear power, and France, the only member state with nuclear weaponry, has yet to indicate its willingness to share its nuclear capabilities with PESCO. Finally, the question arises, how will the PESCO program relate to tertiary states interested in joining the program? The complexity and scale of the security challenges to Europe could necessitate including other countries, especially those with distinct military capabilities. Despite Brexit, Britain wishes to remain an important actor in the European arena and might join PESCO should the tension with Russia increase.
The Relations between Israel and the EU in the PESCO Era When the conditions under which other countries may join PESCO projects become clear, Israel will have to weigh the advisability of positioning itself as a potential candidate for joining the program, or of developing cooperative ties with the program. Israel shares many interests with the PESCO program. For example, one of its flagship projects is to establish a medical unit that would support military operations and crisis situations. Israel’s experience in providing emergency aid in crises could contribute considerably to this unit.39 The project for establishing a rapid response force to intervene in crises could be considerably bolstered if the know- how Israel has accumulated in the cyber security field were shared with PESCO, as would cooperation with the Israeli cyber system.40 These realms Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
76 are at the top of PESCO’s priorities; therefore, Israel could be perceived as a potential candidate. Joining the program could present Israel with an opportunity to bolster its standing in Europe, and this could be manifested both in defense ties and on the political level. Israel, however, must consider the political and strategic implications of cooperation or membership in PESCO with caution. From a strategic point of view, the emphases in the program on contending with maritime migration, terrorist threats in Europe, and Russian aggression do not coincide with Israel’s security threats; therefore, Israel would gain little security benefit from joining. Moreover, though PESCO has NATO’s support at present, the possibility of future tension that could stimulate deterioration in the system of trans-Atlantic relations cannot be discounted.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic In this situation, explicit identification of Israel with PESCO could trigger tension with United States. In addition, identifying Israel with PESCO could cast a shadow on its ties with Russia. Thus this step could have significant diplomatic ramifications, especially in view of Russia’s involvement in the long drawn out conflict in Syria. At the same time, based on data from recent Explicit identification of years, Europe has become a significant destination 41 Israel with PESCO could for Israeli security exports. Most of these exports trigger tension with United have provided a response to security needs such as immigration, counter terrorism, and cyber defense, States; at the same time, which are top priority issues for PESCO.42 Israel identifying Israel with could gain considerably if it succeeds in extending PESCO could cast a shadow these trade ties, without highlighting its identifying on its ties with Russia. with the program in a way that could impair its ties with its other allies.
Conclusion At present, the chances that a “common European Army” might be established are tenuous and its potential effectiveness is questionable, especially given that the main challenge facing the European Union is the growing tension with Russia, whose activity to influence elections in the West continues unabated. Other difficulties are anticipated in the integration processes between the various reservist units, in the countries’ ability to comply with the budgetary commitments, and in preserving the trans-Atlantic ties. Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
77 On the other side of the coin, the PESCO program could be a means both for increasing military cooperation, as well as for constituting a basis for a new army of the EU.43 Over and beyond the defensive implications of building a pan-European army for the security of EU countries, the political significance of this step is reinforcement of the ability of the European community to counter the forces bent on its disintegration.
Notes 1 Robin Emmott, “‘Bad News for our Enemies’: EU Launches Defense Pact,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, https://reut.rs/2AO3cKt. 2 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), on European External Action Service (EEAS), official website of the European Union, https://bit. ly/2hCt4jX.
3 Address given by Winston Churchill to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic August 11, 1950, CVCE, European Union, https://bit.ly/2qk53hR. 4 Anushka Asthana, Ben Quinn, and Rowena Mason, “UK Votes to Leave EU after Dramatic Night Divides Nation,” The Guardian, June 24, 2016, https:// bit.ly/2e8kFRu. 5 “The Failure of the European Defence Community (EDC),” see VCVE, European Union, https://goo.gl/StGBSP. 6 Ahmet Cemal Ertürk, “EU’s PESCO: A New Foreign Policy Instrument or the Same Old Story?” Global Political Trends Center Policy Brief No. 51, January 2018, http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/PB_51.pdf. 7 On European Political Cooperation (EPC) see CVCE, European Union, https://bit.ly/2qfGUK2. 8 Anand Menon, “European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya,” Survival 53, no. 3 (2011): 75-90. 9 European Council, “Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),” February 2016, https://bit. ly/1oq7eNH. 10 Tereza Novotná, “The EU as a Global Actor: United We Stand, Divided We Fall,” Journal of Common Market Studies 55, Annual Review (2017): 177-91. 11 Natascha Zaun, “States as Gatekeepers in EU Asylum Politics: Explaining the Non-adoption of a Refugee Quota System,” Journal of Common Market Studies 56 (2018): 44-62. 12 Reuters, “Timeline of Recent Terror Attacks In Western Europe,” Newsweek, August 4, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/timeline-recent-terror-attacks- western-europe-580977. 13 Asthana, Quinn, and Mason, “UK Votes to Leave EU after Dramatic Night Divides Nation.” 14 Marta Piorkowska, Vicky Goh, and Thomas C. Booth, “Post Brexit: Challenges and Opportunities for Radiology beyond the European Union,” Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
78 British Journal of Radiology 90 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ articles/PMC5605074/. 15 Shadi Hamid, William McCants, and Rashid Dar, Islamism after the Arab Spring: Between the Islamic State and the Nation-State, Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers 2015, January 2017, https://brook.gs/2p0mEMC. 16 Christopher S. Chivvis, “Understanding Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ and What Can be Done About It,” Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2017, RAND Corporation, 2017, pp. 2-4. 17 Justin McCurry, “Trump Says US May Not Automatically Defend Nato Allies under Attack,” The Guardian, July 21, 2016, https://bit.ly/2ainDSZ. 18 Robin Emmott and Steve Holland, “Trump Directly Scolds NATO Allies, Says they Owe ‘Massive’ Sums,” Reuters, July 25, 2017, https://reut. rs/2JxsVHx.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 19 Hrant Kostanyan and Mikkel Barslund, “Will Trump Matter for the EU’s Policy Priorities?” LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog, 2017. 20 Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU Unveils Military Pact Projects,” Politico, October 21, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-eu-to-unveil-military-pact- projects/. 21 Jonathan Marcus, “Brexit Vote Revives Dream of EU Army,” BBC News, September 9, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37317765. 22 Shannon Togawa Mercer, “No, Europe Isn’t Ambushing NATO,” Foreign Policy, January 3, 2018, http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/03/no-europe-isnt- ambushing-nato/. 23 The Lisbon Treaty – Article 42, https://bit.ly/20XJFvc. 24 Mercer, “No, Europe Isn’t Ambushing NATO.” 25 Council of Europe, “Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO),” pp. 3-5, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113- PESCO-notification.pdf. 26 Ibid., Annex II, point 18; Annex III, point 2.1. 27 Damien Sharkov, “Trump, Russia and Brexit Revive ‘Landmark’ Defense Project for Europe,” Newsweek, November 13, 2017, https://bit.ly/2uYFGb1. 28 EEAS, “Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO,” December 13, 2017. 29 See note 25. 30 Robin Emmott, “EU Countries Agree to Create a European Mega-army,” Business Insider, November 13, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/eu- countries-agree-mega-army-2017-11. 31 Barigazzi, “EU Unveils Military Pact Projects,” Politico, October 21, 2017. 32 Benedetta Fornaciari da Passano, “PESCO: Possible Implications in the Field of Migration,” Europeum, January 4, 2018, https://bit.ly/2GSvO3Y. 33 Council of Europe, “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) first collaborative PESCO projects – Overview,” https://bit.ly/2HsTLQN. Yotam Rosner and Shira Bar-Joseph | Establishing a European Security Community
79 34 Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, “Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?” German Marshall Fund of the United States, Policy Brief, Issue 033, October 6, 2017, pp 1-8. 35 Mercer, “No, Europe Isn’t Ambushing NATO.” 36 NATO, “Doorstep,” November 13, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/opinions_148840.htm. 37 Emmott, “‘Bad News for our Enemies’: EU Launches Defense Pact.” 38 James Crisp, “EU Governments to Warn Cyber Attacks Can be an Act of War,” The Telegraph, October 29, 2017, https://bit.ly/2HwZeGl. 39 “Israel Aid Delegation Departs from Mexico,” El Universal, September 27, 2017, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/english/israel-aid-delegation-departs- mexico; “In Wake of Deadly Earthquake, Israel Sends Aid Delegation to Nepal,” The Tower, April 26, 2015, https://bit.ly/2JzrMPM. 40 Israel National Cyber Directorate, “A Senior Delegation from Australia
Visited the Israeli National Cyber Security Authority,” November 1, 2017, 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/news/australia; Israel National Cyber Directorate, “Israel and India Signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Cyber Realm,” January 15, 2018, https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/news/ india. 41 Based on analysis of data from the UNROCA website over the last decade. According to data for 2017, Europe was the prime destination for security exports, the second being Latin America. 42 Elai Rettig and Yotam Rosner, “Europe’s Challenges Open the Market for Israel’s Arms Industry,” INSS Insight No. 965, August 21, 2017, http://www. inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/No.-965.pdf. 43 Kristi Raik and Pauli Järvenpää, “A New Era of EU-NATO Cooperation: How to Make the Best of a Marriage of Necessity,” Center for Transatlantic Relations, May 12, 2017.
To What Extent Is the European Union United? Emerging Tensions between Eastern and Western Europe
Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka
In November 2017, a warning issued by the Planning Division of the German military was leaked to the German media calling to prepare for a situation of “chaos with the possibility of a breakdown of the EU and the establishment of an eastern bloc.” The scenario, entitled “West versus East,” spoke of a possible breakdown of the European integration process, with the Eastern states leaving the EU and establishing a separate Eastern Union. The fact that heads of Eastern states announced they would not allow Muslim refugees to cross their borders and refused to change their position even after a round of legal threats by parties in the EU generated serious concern within the German army’s Planning Division.1 Indeed, and from a more general perspective, Europe has changed in recent years. In the last decade, the desire to establish a united European collective has been tested by weighty issues challenging the unity of the European Union (among them Iran, Brexit, Middle East turmoil, Trump’s election), and the ability of its leaders to shepherd it to a stable and secure future is being questioned. Another important issue trying the EU is the tension of recent years between East and West European nations. After a series of economic crises besetting the EU,2 the mass immigration crisis, the rise of populist right wing movements, and disagreements between East and West on how to respond to the Russian threat, it seems that the cautious optimism of Europe in the post-Communist era, which above all longed to unite East and West, has dissipated.3
Adi Kantor is a research fellow and coordinator of the Europe Program at INSS. Sharon Malka is an intern in the Europe Program at INSS.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 81 Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
82 The current rift in the EU is a complex issue expressed not only between Eastern and Western states. Euro-skeptical and anti-establishment stances can now be found throughout the European continent, including nations in the center and west. In Austria, for example, the October 2017 election resulted in a coalition uniting the People’s Party (ÖVP) headed by Sebastian Kurz with the Freedom Party (FPÖ) led by Heinz-Christian Strache, a party whose rallying cry is the struggle against “Islam’s seizure of Austria.”4 There are similar trends in Italy, Germany, Holland, France, and the United Kingdom.5 The split is exacerbated by separatist issues of factions in certain EU countries (such as Spain),6 and the challenge to present a united front against Russia (especially in the context of the EU’s involvement in the Balkans, the espionage affair, the suspicion that Russia tampered with the 7
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic US presidential election, and Russian gas supplies to Europe). This essay focuses on tensions between the East European nations (the Visegrád Group8) and the EU’s Western members, and considers how they are manifested and if in fact they undermine EU stability. The essay also examines the implications for Israel.
Background In 2004, 13 new states from Eastern Europe joined the EU. Of these, 11 were previously Communist. In hindsight, it seems that the idea to rehabilitate the economy of East European states by expanding the EU was partially successful. The EU viewed its expansion to the East as a tool that would eventually result in Western liberal democratic values becoming embedded in the nations that until recently had borne the yoke of the Soviet regime. At the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, EU leaders compiled a list of criteria as acceptance terms: stable democratic institutions of government and the rule of law, human rights, protection and dignity toward minorities, a uniform market economy, and more.9 However, this expansion did not result in full equality among the nations. The fact that the new members were former Soviet states where trust in the regime was low delayed their full integration into the EU.10 Many issues were left unresolved and the asymmetry in relations increased. Since then, particularly over the last decade, EU institutions have faced other challenges undermining their stability. The global economic crisis of 2008 did not leave Europe unscathed and the huge debts accumulated by the economically weaker nations led to the creation of massive aid packages and loans (Greece alone received aid worth €7.5 billion), which Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
83 in turn resulted in profound differences of opinion between the nations supporting debt relief and those opposing it.11 Another challenge was the military crisis on the Russian-Ukrainian border. In 2014, Ukraine approved a trade agreement with the EU at the expense of its ties with Russia. In response, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and began supporting the separatist struggle in eastern Ukraine that led to the deaths of more than 8,000 people.12 In addition to this crisis, in 2015, EU leaders were forced to confront the question of the dispersal of asylum seekers reaching Europe’s shores following an immigration crisis of a scope unprecedented since the end of World War II. This crisis further destabilized relations between East and West in the EU.
Domestic Issues 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic The growing strength of right wing populist political parties in response to the arrival of asylum seekers made waves all over Europe, but especially in Eastern states. In Hungary, the conservative party Fidesz headed by Viktor Orban came into power in 2010 and turned Hungary from a democracy that had reaped praise for being the leading democratic state in Eastern Europe to a democracy in freefall. The fact that Orban ran into virtually no strong opposition on the left domestically and no firm and active intervention from the EU allowed him, in short order, to pass new laws that clashed with both the Hungarian and the EU constitutions. Orban and his followers then embarked on a legislative blitz in which restrictions were imposed on civil society and moneys from the EU channeled to “loyal allies.”13 In addition to constitutional changes, Orban frequently attacked the media and the courts and placed friends and members of the business community in key positions of power and influence. Over eight years, about one thousand new laws were passed that have rocked the very foundations of Hungarian democracy.14 In 2015, Orban received a significant tailwind with the arrival of Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghan asylum seekers to Europe’s shores. As an extreme preventive measure, Orban decided to erect a wall along the Hungarian- Serbian border to prevent refugees from entering, resulting in a blow to Hungary-EU relations and making Hungary the hidden front line of the EU’s refugee crisis.15 That year, more than 50,000 asylum seekers who had gone through the Balkan land route entered Hungary. Orban called these asylum seekers “poison” and a “security threat,” and announced that “2018 will be a year of tough battles.”16 Ominous signs can be found Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
84 in new legislative initiatives he is currently advancing, which will make it possible to impose monetary fines on civic bodies helping the refugees.17 Prominent in Orban’s anti-immigrant campaign was American billionaire George Soros, a Jew of Hungarian extraction, whom Orban accused of financing organizations supporting asylum seekers in Hungary who, according to Orban, are destroying Hungary from within. According to Soros, Hungary “is encouraging an anti-Muslim atmosphere and using anti-Semitic language reminiscent of the 1930s.” 18 Trends similar to those in Hungary may also be found in Poland, which joined the EU in 2004 (and NATO in 1999). At first, Poland was thought to have a clear pro-European mindset, and many believed that Poland should join the expanding European collective, certainly for economic reasons. In
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic fact, the central motivation for joining was that after years of Communist rule, Poland strove to join the West, distance itself from Russia, and stride toward a democratic, Western future. However, in the early 2000s, as it was in the midst of the process of acceptance to the EU, the domestic political discourse took a sharp turn to the right. After the stark electoral defeat of the LID (Left and Democrats) Party, the pro-European rhetoric changed. Gradually, various Polish political parties started singing Euro-skeptical and nationalistic tunes, and distrust of the free market coupled with ultra- conservative Catholic positions grew.19 The Law and Justice Party, which took office in 2005, replaced the left-leaning LID Party and created a coalition with two parties of more extreme orientation dominating The asylum issue has only the Polish government to this day. Over the last magnified tensions and the two years, as the courts and the media have been sense of uncertainty over weakened, the Polish government has concentrated the EU’s overall stability. on implementing a religious nationalistic ideology. The church remains powerful in Poland, in sharp This uncertainty was sensed contrast to the widespread secularization of Western long before the arrival of Europe. The Polish clergy have a great deal of power, masses of asylum seekers, especially in their battle against members of the who merely exacerbated Communist Party and their efforts to curb the the already existing divide. influence of Western liberalism on Polish society. The lack of church-state separation is manifested, for example, in the government’s attempt to pass an anti-abortion law.20 Similar processes are also evident in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which emerged from the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and joined the EU in 2004. Miloš Zeman, the Czech Republic president, is known for his Euro- Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
85 skeptic, pro-Russian views. He supports ties with China and is adamantly opposed to the entrance of Muslim asylum seekers.21 Robert Fico, who until March 2018 was the Slovak prime minister, is also known for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and has said that “Islam has no place in Slovakia.”22
Relations among the States A key reason for the rising tensions between East and West was the tremendous wave of asylum seekers arriving at the continent from Muslim countries in the summer of 2015. While the leaders of the EU started dealing with immigration policy long before (the EU completed its Common European Asylum System designed to ensure that all member states would protect the rights of asylum seekers in the EU already in 2005), the refugee crisis
of recent years hit EU institutions hard, and they were unable to provide 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic a rapid response to the masses of asylum seekers who arrived within a very short period of time. The main disagreement among member states regarding refugees was the Dublin Regulation, which stipulated that every asylum seeker coming to the EU must submit his/her request for asylum in the first state where s/he sets foot (with most asylum seekers first arriving at gateway countries on the Mediterranean, such as Italy and Greece). The regulation’s fundamental aim was to prevent a situation in which asylum seekers would, from the gateway countries, head to countries with laxer immigration laws (mainly those in the European northwest, such as Germany, France, and the Scandinavian countries).23 However, the influx of more than one million asylum seekers to the gateway countries in the summer of 2015 exposed the flaw in the Dublin Regulation.24 As they entered, the intake centers came under massive pressure. They could not handle the volume and collapsed. It therefore became clear that in order to better manage the traffic of asylum seekers in the continent, it was necessary to reform the regulation. The amended Dublin agreement set new criteria defining the redistribution of refugees among member states aimed at a more equal balancing of the burden.25 The proposed re-division was led by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, who called it “a mandatory system of refugee quotas.”26 However, given the deep disagreements between the Eastern and Western EU member states, this program did not go into effect as planned. Hungary and Poland refused to take in any asylum seekers, while Slovakia and the Czech Republic took in about a dozen refugees each. The rhetoric of the Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
86 political leaders in Eastern Europe against the distribution program was mainly based on “security and national concerns,” given the increase in Islamist terrorist incidents in Europe in recent years.27 They further claimed that unsupervised entrance of “illegal immigrants”28 would necessarily change the nations’ cultural and religious nature, a scenario they sought to prevent at all costs.29 Eastern Europe’s unwillingness to help the countries that had already accepted many asylum seekers, such as Germany (which has taken in 1.1 million refugees), turned the European Parliament into a battleground.30 Consequently, in 2016, an agreement was reached with Turkey, whereby Turkey would take asylum seekers expelled from EU states in exchange for €6 billion and a fast-tracking of Turkey’s application to the EU.31 In tandem,
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic in 2017, after two years of stubborn resistance between the Visegrád Group and the northwest European nations, the European Court of Justice rejected the claim made by Slovakia and Hungary, supported by Poland, regarding the legality of the immigration agreements. The ECJ asserted that the EU has the right to obligate member states to accept the number of asylum seekers allotted according to the relative terms of distribution. Responses to the court decision were quick in coming. Hungary launched a frontal assault, calling the verdict “irresponsible” and “appalling,” and saying this was a rape of the values and principles of the EU. As such, the court decision endangers the security and future of all of Europe. 32 The Slovak prime minister also objected to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s open door policy.33 By contrast, Germany declared that it expects the Eastern states to fall in line with EU policy. German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said: “We can expect all European Right wing populist partners to...implement the agreements without movements that for years delay.”34 French President Emmanuel Macron also survived under the radar are expressed his disgust with the Eastern states’ position again taking center stage and stressed the importance of strengthening solidary within the EU and preventing rifts.35 and undermining the basis At the end of the process, Hungary was asked to of the EU and the project of accept 1,294 asylum seekers, and Slovakia 862.36 But integration. the harsh disagreement is still far from having a long term, stable resolution. The asylum issue has only magnified tensions and the sense of uncertainty over the EU’s stability in general. This uncertainty was sensed long before the arrival of masses of asylum seekers, who merely exacerbated the already existing divide. While Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
87 there has been a steep decline in the number of asylum seekers in the EU over the last two years and this has somewhat reduced tensions, they have not completely disappeared. The essential difference in the ideological line and sociopolitical approach between East and West will continue to challenge decision making processes in EU institutions and will make it difficult to articulate a systematic, uniform policy on essential questions affecting the EU’s future.
Implications for Israel The Visegrád Group is currently considered particularly friendly toward Israel, mostly because it does not condition relations with Israel on Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, a line more typical of the EU’s West European
nations. The warmer relations were in evidence already during Prime 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s official visit to Budapest in July 2017 when he met with all four Visegrád Group leaders.37 The visit bore historical significance: it was the first time an Israeli prime minister visited Hungary after the fall of the Berlin Wall.38 The purpose of the visit was twofold – economic and political-strategic – and the topics discussed showed Israel as taking a positive line towards the EU’s Eastern states while uttering pointed criticism against its Western nations. The four Visegrád states were eager to generate more security and technological cooperative ventures with Israel in the context of the European immigration crisis and bolster efforts in securing their borders, the war on terrorism, energy, military industries, cyberspace, and innovation.39 Relations between the Visegrád Group and Israel have implications for Israel’s relations with the EU. During his visit to Hungary, Netanyahu sharply criticized the EU’s foreign policy toward Israel, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Netanyahu stated: “The European Union is the only association of countries in the world that conditions the relations with Israel, which gives it technology, on political conditions. The only ones! Nobody does it.”40 Netanyahu sharply criticized the central/Western nations that instead of supporting Israel attack it and make their relations with it conditional on a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hence, the Israeli government views the Visegrád Group as an answer to the West’s critical stance on Israel. However, the warmer relations between Israel and the Visegrád Group are also problematic, especially with regard to Israel’s relations with the Jewish communities of Europe. During Netanyahu’s visit, the public atmosphere in Hungary was extremely hostile and heavily Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
88 tinged with anti-Semitism. At the time of the visit, Orban embarked on his no-holds-barred campaign against George Soros. Members of the Jewish community, feeling vulnerable and threatened, were hoping to get some protection from the Israeli government; that did not happen.41 The incident resulted in a severe crisis of trust between the Jewish community and Israel. Other than the events in Hungary, early 2018 saw tensions between Israel and Poland over the new Polish Holocaust law proposed by the ruling Law and Justice Party. According to the law, anyone who alleges participation or responsibility for Nazi crimes, crimes against humanity, or war crimes to a Pole or to Poland can be fined or even jailed for up to three years. This initiative aroused much anger in Israel, and diplomatic efforts were made to pressure Poland into annulling it or at least amending it. In
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic early March 2018, a Polish government delegation consisting of diplomats and historians visited Jerusalem in order to try to explain the law to Israel’s Foreign Ministry personnel.42
Conclusion Over the next few years, EU institutions will face a decisive test of stability, in particular, the nature of the relations between its Western and Eastern member states. The many challenges, domestic and external, threatening the integrity of the EU require its leaders to rethink the EU’s goals and the values on which it should be based. The recent influx of immigrants to Europe has proved that the desire to create a common European identity for the some 800 million people on the continent, with different national identities and narratives, is under reconsideration. Right wing populist movements that for years survived under the radar are again taking center stage and undermining the basis of the EU and the project of integration. EU leaders’ inattention to these processes is liable to result in deep fissures between two main worldviews: the one – liberal, Tensions within the EU can democratic, and global, promoting individual have a significant impact liberties, equality, separation of church and state, on the quality of Israel-EU and striving to erase borders between states and relations. deepen cultural and economic ties between them; and the other being largely its opposite, championing a return to nationalism, strengthening borders, and conservative, religious values. Reconciling these competing visions is the biggest challenge EU leaders have to face. Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
89 Tensions within the EU have significant impact on the quality of Israel- EU relations. Israel’s recent warmer relations with the Visegrád Group mean a tacit acceptance of a Euro-skeptic, populist, right wing line, which often reeks of anti-Semitism, a development that could be met with a chilly reception by West European nations and Jewish communities in the diaspora. In this context, one should remember that the EU is a major source for Israeli imports (approximately 41 percent) and the second largest export destination (after the United States) for Israeli goods (26 percent). Israel would be wise to maintain an open, even channel with EU institutions. Maintaining balanced relations with EU member states and with the Jewish communities of Europe is an Israeli strategic interest of the highest order. | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Notes 1 Nissan Tzur, “Preparing for a Gloomy Future,” Davar, October 13, 2017, http://www.davar1.co.il/94169. 2 In 2008, Europe too was affected by the global economic crisis, leaving the weaker EU nations (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) deeply in debt. In turn, this led to differences between East and West in how to tackle the problem. 3 Andrew A. Michta, “The Fading of the Idea of Central Europe,” American Interest, January 1, 2018, https://www.the-american-interest. com/2018/01/01/fading-idea-central-europe. 4 Nicola Slawson, “Austrian President Approves Far-Right Freedom Party Joining Coalition Government,” The Guardian, December 16, 2017, https:// bit.ly/2GZCQUK. 5 Jenny Hill, “German Election: Why So Many Voters in the East Chose AfD,” BBC, September 26, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world- europe-41398628; “Make No Mistake – Right-Wing Populism is Making a Resurgence in Europe, as the Italian Elections Show,” Independent, March 5, 2018, https://ind.pn/2Hzy0yB. 6 Oren Nahari, “The Separatists are Coming: Nationalism isn’t Dead, It has only Shattered into Fragments All Over Europe,” Walla, October 5, 2017, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3101851/. 7 Daniel Boffey and Jennifer Rankin, “At least 10 EU Nations to Expel Russian Diplomats in Spy Row,” The Guardian, March 23, 2018, https:// bit.ly/2pB6PLW; Dusan Stojanovic, “EU and Russia Battle for Influence in Balkan Region,” Independent, February 24, 2018, https://ind.pn/2qAGRsF. 8 In February 1991, a political alliance was established by four Central and Eastern European states: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The alliance’s objective was to promote cooperative ventures and common interests in the context of European integration on economic, Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
90 military, and energy issues. These four states share cultural and intellectual values and common religious traditions they wish to preserve through the alliance. See www.visegradgroup.eu/about. 9 Similarly, all had to commit to assume obligations of EU member nations. See Ana E. Juncos and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, “Enlargement,” in European Union Politics, 4th ed., eds. Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez- Solórzano Borragán (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), pp. 226-39. 10 Ibid. 11 James Kanter, “Eurozone Agrees to Debt Relief and Bailout Aid for Greece,” New York Times, May 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/ business/international/greece-debt-relief-imf-eurozone-bailout.html. 12 Haaretz, September 8, 2015, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/ europe/1.2727056. 13 Orban took over two thirds of parliament. Patrick Kingsley, “As West Fears
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What’s Possible,” February 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/europe/hungary-orban- democracy-far-right.html. 14 Ibid. 15 Patrick Kingsley, “Migrants on Hungary’s Border Fence: ‘This Wall, We Will Not Accept It,’” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ jun/22/migrants-hungary-border-fence-wall-serbia. 16 Ibid. 17 Kingsley, “As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What’s Possible.” 18 Israel Fisher, “Soros against Hungarian Government: ‘Dishonest and anti- Semitic,’” The Marker, November 20, 2017, https://www.themarker.com/ wallstreet/1.4610722. 19 Krzysztof Jasiewicz and Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, “Poland,” European Journal of Political Research 43 (2004): 1111. 20 Under public pressure, the attempt failed and the law was not passed. 21 Zeman has also suggested holding a referendum on the Czech Republic’s EU membership. See AP, “Czech President Miloš Zeman Wins Second Term,” Haaretz, January 27, 2018, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/ europe/1.5767739. 22 Vince Chadwick, “Robert Fico: Islam Has No Place in Slovakia,” Politico, May 27, 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/robert-fico-islam-no-place- news-slovakia-muslim-refugee/. 23 “Country Responsible for Asylum Application (Dublin),” Europa, February 25, 2018, https://bit.ly/2ASEOU3. 24 “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts,” BBC, March 4, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911. 25 Financial Times, “The EU: Heavy Fines on State Refusing to Accept Immigrants,” Globes, May 3, 2016, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article. aspx?did=1001121593. Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
91 26 According to Juncker’s proposal, Greece and Italy were to move about 160,000 asylum seekers to EU member nations up September 2017. The 28 states would then divide the asylum seekers in a balanced, equal way according to a division key based on the states’ GNP, population, unemployment rate, and past number of asylum seekers already there. Source: “The EU and the Migration Crisis,” European Commission, July 2017, http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration- crisis/en/; Naomi O’Leary, “The EU to Present Refugee Distribution Program,” NRG, May 11, 2015, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/694/019. html; “Refugee Crisis: Junker Unveils EU Quota Plan – As it Happened,” The Guardian, September 9, 2015, https://bit.ly/2H8KE6V. 27 Eszter Zalan, “Hungary to Challenge Refugee Quotas in EU Court,” EUobserver, November 18, 2015, https://euobserver.com/migration/131158; Rob Cameron, “Migrant Crisis: Why Central Europe Resists Refugee
Quota,” BBC, September 22, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world- 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic europe-34313478. 28 In the sociopolitical discourse, the leaders of the Visegrád states, including Orban, made a consistent point of calling the asylum seekers “illegal immigrants” in order to stress the threat they supposedly posed to national and state security, often also using the term “potential terrorists” around whom one must be on guard and whose entrance must therefore be prevented. 29 “How Is the Migrant Crisis Dividing EU Countries?” BBC, March 4, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886. 30 “1.1 Million Refugees Arrived in Germany in 2015,” January 6, 2016, Die Welt, https://bit.ly/2JOw99M. 31 To date, Turkey has taken in 3.5 million asylum seekers from Syria. The EU has made a partial transfer of funds of about €850 million. “The EU Paying Turkey €6 for Refugees,” Calcalist, March 19, 2016, https://www.calcalist. co.il/world/articles/0,7340,L-3683878,00.html. 32 Michele Sinner and Alastair Macdonald, “EU Refugee Court Ruling Triggers New East-West Funding,” Reuters, September 6, 2017, https://reut. rs/2eW8F4y. 33 “Europe Migrant Crisis: EU Court Rejects Quota Challenge,” September 6, 2017, BBC, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41172638. 34 Ibid. 35 Rebecca Flood, “Hungary Celebrates Victory over EU Migrant Quotas after Juncker Speech,” Sunday Express, September 15, 2017, https://bit.ly/2ESfbna. 36 Ibid. 37 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu’s Visit to Hungary Turns into Test of the Government’s Relations with Europe’s Right-Wing Nationalist Governments,” Haaretz, July 18, 2017, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/ politics/.premium-1.4261717. Adi Kantor and Sharon Malka | To What Extent Is the European Union United?
92 38 Michał Wojnarowicz and Łukasz Ogrodnik, “PISM Spotlight: V4+Israel Summit in Budapest,” Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 21, 2017, http://www.pism.pl/publications/spotlight/no-42-2017#. 39 Ibid. 40 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu Launches Blistering Attack on EU: ‘Their Behavior toward Israel is Crazy,” Haaretz, July 19, 2017, https://www. haaretz.com/israel-news/netanyahu-in-blistering-attack-on-eu-in-closed- session-1.5431215. 41 Netanyahu and the members of his office completely ignored the harsh anti-Semitic statements in Orban’s campaign and even joined in the attacks on Soros. Barak Ravid, “On Netanyahu’s Orders: Israel’s Foreign Minister Retracts Criticism of anti-Semitism in Hungary and Slams George Soros,” Haaretz, July 10, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-retracts- criticism-of-hungary-s-anti-soros-campaign-1.5492668.
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 42 Ofer Aderet and Noa Landau, “Dialogue between Israel and Poland Expected to Last Weeks; Warsaw: ‘We Will Not Amend Holocaust Law,’” Haaretz, March 3, 2018, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/ europe/1.5865632; Noa Spiegel and Ofer Aderet, “Israeli Ceremony in Poland Cancelled because of Mention of Murder of Jews by Poland in the Holocaust,” Haaretz, March 19, 2018, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/ education/1.5914131. Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
Rotem Nusem
Australia-Israel Relations: Why Change the Status Quo? Beyond the shared goal of a rules-based world order, a strengthened Australia- Israel relationship would advance the national interests of both countries. For Israel, enhanced ties would help counter negative trends in Israel’s international standing and consolidate an additional political and economic foothold in the Asia-Pacific region. For these reasons alone, an upgraded partnership with a longstanding supporter such as Australia should be a foreign policy priority for Israel. For Australia, strengthened ties would produce benefits in security and technology. For example, learning from technological advances made by the Israeli hi-tech industry and the Israeli Defense Forces multidisciplinary national “cyber-ecosystem” (which makes up Israel’s “cyber defensive envelope”), Australian government, industry, and small business could gain valuable skills in protecting critical infrastructure from the imminent threat of cyber attacks.1 Moreover, Israel’s start-up nation status has helped it promote a global network of ties that could benefit Australia. Australia’s Innovation Launch Pad in Tel Aviv, for example, is a first step in building frameworks for cooperation and tangible policy prospects in order to cultivate a thriving joint innovation culture. By the same token, Australia has already been able to benefit from Israeli expertise in arid zone agriculture, and joint research on climate-specific agricultural practices could reinforce their respective strong export industries in light of upcoming climate change-related turbulence.2 In addition, Australia is pushing to improve its
Rotem Nusem, a former intern at INSS, is the parliamentary office manager for the Australian House of Representative’s Second Deputy Speaker and an Advanced Masters student of national security policy at Australian National University.
Strategic Assessment | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 93 Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
94 status as an international leader in defense exports. One of the five pillars of Australia’s Defense Export Strategy is to foster greater innovation and productivity in the domestic defense industry, and collaborative technology initiatives could help promote this objective.3 Finally, Australian efforts to contain violent extremism by Islamist forces in the Asia-Pacific region could benefit from enhanced cooperation in counter-terrorism, including intelligence sharing with Israel.4
From Beer Sheva to Today The Battle of Beer Sheva on October 31, 1917 was one of Australia’s greatest World War I victories and the last significant cavalry charge of war history.5 The Australian Light Horse Brigade, composed of the 4th and 12th regiments,
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic launched an attack on the Turkish-held town of Beer Sheva, later to become the major city of southern Israel. The strategic significance of the town, along with its water supply, was critical to the entire Australian operation, and defeat in the battle would have risked enemy capture or life threatening dehydration. The Australians surprised the Turks by advancing through the desert, the one unprotected side of the occupied town. Charging at machine guns and incoming artillery, the brigade captured the water wells and the town as a whole, marking a stunning victory in the campaign that led to Turkish withdrawal from Palestine in the weeks to come.6 To this day, the Battle of Beer Sheva remains one of the most memorable milestones in the history of the Australian-Israeli relationship. Australia was one of the selected members of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, which endorsed the recommendation of the UN Special Committee on Palestine to partition the British Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state, and it was one of the first member-states to vote for General Assembly Resolution 181, which formally approved that recommendation.7 Since then, Australia has generally played a supportive role for Israel, though that support has more often taken the force of token diplomatic gestures rather than tangible action. Attitudes toward Israel have evolved slowly, with significant policy shifts occurring only with changes in government. During the 1982 Lebanon War, the Australian government seemed to adopt a “bandwagoning” approach by taking a neutral stance, urging both sides to avoid escalation and commending the UN and the United States for taking action to “prevent renewed hostilities.”8 Throughout the prolonged conflict in southern Lebanon, beginning in 1985, the government strongly condemned Israel’s Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
95 attacks from within Lebanon and did not endorse Israel’s presence in South Lebanon.9 At the same time, Australia has consistently supported Israel at the UN, illustrated by the Knesset’s 1987 expression of gratitude for Australia’s rejection of the General Assembly’s resolution to equate Zionism with racism. That year, Prime Minister Bob Hawke emphasized his “support [for] the principle of self-determination of the Palestinian people,” while adding that “like successive Australian governments, we see moral as well as political imperatives in our commitment to the security of Israel and its right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries.”10 Hawke also highlighted his government’s commitment to further coal exports to Israel, a sign of increased industrial and agricultural cooperation meant to 11 strengthen the bilateral economic ties. However, the warm rhetoric of the 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Hawke government was undermined later in 1987 when Trade Minister Ariel Sharon’s invitation to visit Australia was retracted due to negative reactions from Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) sympathizers in Australia.12 Terrorist attacks carried out in 1990 by Palestinian groups aligned with the PLO were described by government senators as a blow to the peace process that would only harden Israeli attitudes. Senator Robert Ray noted that following these attacks the government would reconsider its support for the PLO, after having approved the request by the Palestine Information Office in Canberra to change its name to the PLO Office.13 Over time, the issue of Jewish settlements has posed a growing challenge to Australia-Israel relations. Much like many other international actors, Australia believes that the settlements are destructive to the peace process, reflected in Prime Minister John Howard’s remarks during his 2000 visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories.14 Subsequently, criticism of Israeli policy with respect to settlements and – by extension – to the broader issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became particularly virulent in the ranks of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). In 2016, for example, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop called on Opposition Leader Bill Shorten to prevent a damaging motion by the New South Wales (NSW) Labor Friends of Palestine. The motion was intended to bar parliamentarians, officeholders, and rank-and-file members from accepting sponsored travel invitations to Israel while Benjamin Netanyahu’s government “continues settlements, refuses a Palestinian state (and) brutally mistreats Arab residents of the West Bank.”15 At the NSW State Labor Conference in 2017, former Foreign Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
96 Minister Bob Carr successfully passed a motion to unconditionally support a Palestinian state, a ground-breaking development in the traditional approach calling for the conflict to be resolved by negotiations and mutual agreement. Former party leaders Bob Hawke and Kevin Rudd also expressed their support for this motion. This movement could significantly sway the Labor party’s foreign policy position on the Palestine question in the next elections.16 These developments echoed the sentiments of former minister Barry Cohen of the Labor Party, who assessed that the party’s approach was “rampant with anti-Semitism.” This charge that has been denied by various Labor leaders but continues to shape the Australian Jewish community’s approach to the Party.17 Australia’s foreign policy approach toward Israel is of particular
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic significance due to the weight carried by the relatively small Jewish population. The Jewish community is one of the oldest diasporas in Australia, and has been described as “the most Zionist Diaspora Jewish community” in the world.18 Perhaps predictably, this Zionism translates into political affiliation and interaction with Australian political parties. Jewish parliamentarians makes up a total of 2.2 percent of total representatives in the Australian Commonwealth Parliament, although Australia’s Jewish community constitutes only about 0.45 percent of the total population.19 It is Australia’s open and democratic society that has played a large factor in encouraging Jewish intervention and participation in the political process. These activities are complemented by participation in the World Jewish Congress and the foundation of the Commonwealth Jewish Council, which is involved in advocacy of community concerns.20 In tandem, the Muslim population in Australia is growing rapidly and now accounts for 2.6 percent of the total population, though with only 1.3 percent representation in Parliament.21 Leading Arab businessmen in Australia have adopted an advocacy role for their community amid growing concerns about violent extremism in Australia.22 As Australia battles the threat of terrorism on its shores, Islamophobia is on the rise, with Muslims in Sydney experiencing discrimination at three times the rate of other Australian groups.23 The Lebanese community in Australia has experienced insensitivity to their concerns, and Minister of Home Affairs Peter Dutton has made discriminatory comments against the Lebanese and South Sudanese communities in Australia.24 Dr Anne Aly, the first female Australian-Muslim Member of Parliament and a counterterrorism expert, Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
97 has received death threats throughout her time in Parliament, suggesting the growth of hostility toward the growing Muslim community in Australia.25 The disparity between the Australian Jewish and Muslim communities in political representation and power is important when assessing the history of foreign policy approaches to the Middle East. Still, it raises the question of why, if Jewish representation in politics is high, are the relations between Australia and Israel stagnant, or at the very least, underperforming.
Netanyahu’s State Visit to Australia: Diplomatic Rhetoric or Genuine Mutual Commitment? The most recent developments in the relations between the Israeli and Australian governments came with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s
unprecedented visit to Australia in early 2017. The visit was accompanied 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic by announcements of collaboration between Israel and Australia, in the form of agreements that could mark a new era of strong bilateral economic and political ties. While visiting Australia, Netanyahu and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull signed a Bilateral Agreement on Technological Innovation and Research and Development, as a framework for science, engineering, and business groups to create jobs and industries of the future, as well as an agreement on air services to expand commercial and people-to-people links.26 Turnbull expressed hope, based on commitments to “share our national experiences and expertise in aviation security and the protection of crowded places,” as well as “initiatives that will advance our two countries[’] shared interests in national security, counterterrorism, cyber security, innovation, and trade and investment.”27 Indeed, meetings focused heavily on innovation and cyber security; Israel excels in these fields, and Australia has a growing interest in developing its own capabilities. Violent extremism was also a joint concern discussed in the meetings, and the two leaders stressed the importance of strengthened cooperation to combat terrorism.28 Not surprisingly, then, the central focus of the collaborations was on security, a concern that is increasingly relevant to all international actors and a field in which Israel has great expertise. Indeed, one of the most significant developments throughout the meeting was an affirmation of the importance of bilateral defense cooperation, which currently is lacking; neither sends officers to study at the other’s military staff colleges, and Australia’s defense attaché to Israel is based in Turkey. Both countries focused on incorporating Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
98 cyber capabilities into military operations, substantiating their commitment to a bilateral cyber dialogue. The visit, to be sure, did not go without scrutiny. During a joint press conference to mark the beginning of Netanyahu’s visit to Australia, Turnbull was questioned about his commitment to a two-state solution, after having expressed openness to a one-state solution following a meeting with President Trump earlier that year. In response, Turnbull reiterated Australia’s position on a two-state solution.29 In addition, in a meeting with Netanyahu, Opposition Leader Bill Shorten declared “‘clearly and unambiguously’ that where settlements and their expansion are a roadblock to peace, that’s damaging to the peace process.”30 Nevertheless, Netanyahu summarized his fruitful visit by stating that his agreements with Australia
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic reflect “our [Australia and Israel’s] commitment to defend our common values of freedom, of democracy, the rule of law, pluralism.”31 To mark the 100th year anniversary of the Battle of Beer Sheva in October 2017, a delegation of Australian government and opposition members visited Israel, including Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Amidst domestic political turbulence, Turnbull missed nearly half of his planned schedule in Israel, causing his coalition colleagues to argue before the diplomatic community that the delay was “not embarrassing.”32 Turnbull’s visit marked the first Australian Prime Minister’s visit to Israel since 2000,33 an interesting development but one that was underpinned by Australian military legacy rather than the desire to advance bilateral relations. During his brief visit, Turnbull reiterated that the relationship between Israel and Australia was strong on a governmental and personal level, with Netanyahu labeling Turnbull a “true friend of Israel.”34 The friendly remarks made during both visits represent a familiar recourse to diplomatic jargon rather than tangible and measurable action. Both Israeli and Australian officials refer repeatedly to the limited cooperation initiatives between them, such as Australia’s Innovation Landing Pad in Tel Aviv, mentioned in every media release and speech delivered by Turnbull during both visits, and the Battle of Beer Sheva, a historical moment that both parties cling to in an attempt to forge links. Thus the relationship between Israel and Australia, despite the momentous visit of Netanyahu to Australia, seems to have been no deeper than Israel’s ties with other soft power allies. This is an important fact in analyzing the lukewarm relationship, as it alludes to the lack of new and significant bilateral endeavors. Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
99 A Critical Analysis of Australia-Israel Relations This first visit by a sitting Israeli Prime Minister to Australia met with mixed reviews. Due to Australia’s heavy focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the visit was overlooked to some extent, with few analysts delving into the opportunities and challenges posed by a renewed bilateral focus. Significant Australian foreign affairs and strategy think tanks such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Lowy Institute did, however, feature critical analyses of the state of Australia-Israel relations. Analyses of the significance of the relationship included the argument that “there’s really no country in the Middle East whose interests are more closely aligned with Australia’s than Israel.”35 Others, however, viewed the visit as a display of token diplomacy, with little conviction behind it. Israel’s relative neglect of Australia did not go unmentioned. It was noted that 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Australia sits on the periphery of Israel’s worldview, an attitude attributed to the sense that Israel doesn’t know what it wants from the relationship.36 The relationship underachieves in many ways, with both states failing to recognize the extent to which they can contribute to the other’s national interests and relying more on rhetoric than on substance. Several points of mutual interest that could form the basis of a deeper relationship were highlighted in the analysis of the visit. It was suggested, for example, that Israel’s doctrine of self-reliance could be enhanced through exposure to Australia’s experience in military coalitions, while heightened intelligence sharing could bolster the approach to counterterrorism in the Asia-Pacific.37 At the same time, Australia’s current political climate and the volatility of party approaches to Israel could derail progress made over the past year. A future ALP government might adopt a firm stance on the unconditional recognition of Palestine, with the Liberal National Party’s (LNP) traditionally more fervent support of Israel also at risk of waning. To the extent that these risks can be attributed more to failed Israeli diplomacy than to successful Palestinian advocacy, they can be attenuated by more proactive public diplomacy in Australia.38 Shared interests should act as further motivation for Israel to focus heavily on reconciling its relationship with Australia, lest neglect end up costing Israel a key ally.
Looking Ahead Given the undeniable benefits that both Australia and Israel seek to gain from a strong bilateral relationship, there is a need to inject more content Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
100 into the relations. The future of that relationship depends on several critical factors. First, Australian political parties must take heed to act rationally in their foreign policy approaches to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This means making calculated, evidence-based statements, rather than rushing to respond to current events without assessing the implications of damaging rhetoric. For its part, Israel must make a concerted effort to elevate Australia’s status from one of several middle power allies and expand the scope of ties, rather than content itself with rhetorical support in the UN. As Australia’s focus shifts more and more toward the Asia-Pacific region, Israel can no longer keep Australia on its periphery and expect its support in return. Unless both parties invest more in tangible initiatives, the potential benefits of closer cooperation will slip away with the passage of time. | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Notes 1 Michael Raska, “Confronting Cybersecurity Challenges: Israel’s Evolving Cyber Defense Strategy,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, January 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ PR150108_-Israel_Evolving_Cyber_Strategy_WEB.pdf. 2 Brittany Patterson, “Australia’s Farmers Challenged by Climate Change,” Scientific American, March 19, 2015, https://www.scientificamerican.com/ article/australia-s-farmers-challenged-by-climate-change/. 3 Australian Government Department of Defense, Defense Export Strategy – Fact Sheet (Canberra: AGS Department of Defense Publishing, 2018), p. 2. 4 Anthony Bergin, “Benjamin Netanyahu’s Visit is a Chance for Australia to Forge Stronger Ties with Israel,” ASPI, February 21, 2017, https://www.aspi. org.au/opinion/benjamin-netanyahus-visit-chance-australia-forge-stronger- ties-israel. 5 Kelsey Munro, “Australia’s Forgotten Victory: What Happened at the Battle of Beersheba?” SBS News, November 2, 2017, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/ australia-s-forgotten-victory-what-happened-at-the-battle-of-beersheba. 6 Australian War Memorial Collections, “Attack on Beersheba,” Australian War Memorial, https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/E138/. 7 Marty Harris, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security Section, “Australia and the Middle East Conflict: A History of Key Government Statements (1947- 2007),” Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2012, p. 1. 8 Senator Dame Margaret Guilfoyle, “Australian Parliament Questions without Notice: Lebanon,” Hansard, March 9, 1982, https://bit.ly/2I2EZzj. 9 Senator Gareth Evans, “Australian Parliament Questions without Notice: Lebanon,” Hansard, June 7, 1994, https://bit.ly/2pF81xg. 10 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives Official Hansard (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, February 19, 1987), p. 361. Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
101 11 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives Official Hansard, Canberra: Parliament of Australia, February 19, 1987, p. 364. 12 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives Official Hansard, Canberra: Parliament of Australia, February 19, 1987, p. 367. 13 Senator Robert Ray, “Australian Parliament Questions without Notice: Israel: Palestine Liberation Organization Terrorist Organization,” Hansard, June 1, 1990, https://bit.ly/2I4fU6V. 14 “Jerusalem, Israel, 2 May 2000: transcript of Prime Minister ‘The Hon John Howard MP Press Conference at King David Hotel,’” Parliament of Australia website, May 2, 2000, https://bit.ly/2pJT8dH. 15 Christian Kerr and Tess Akerman, “Julie Bishop Calls for Bill Shorten to Stop ALP Ban on Israel Visits,” New South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies,
January 28, 2016, https://bit.ly/2uj84o6. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic 16 Stephen Dziedzic, “Palestine-Israel: Why does New South Wales ALP Care about this Dispute?” ABC News, July 31, 2017, https://ab.co/2GfryPM. 17 Barry Cohen, “The Anti-Semitic Labor Party,” The Age, October 25, 2004, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/10/24/1098556291677.html. 18 David Slucki, “Australia, Israel and the Politics of the Diaspora,” The Conversation, February 2, 2012, https://theconversation.com/australia-israel- and-the-politics-of-diaspora-4911. 19 Nick Evershed, Ri Liu, and Anna Livsey, “Are you Reflected in the New Parliament?” The Guardian, August 31, 2016, https://bit.ly/2ISqv5Y; David Graham, The Jewish Population of Australia: Key Finding from the 2011 Census (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2014), p. 7. 20 Jeremy Jones AM, “The Jewish Community of Australia and Its Challenges,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 15, 2006, http://jcpa.org/ article/the-jewish-community-of-australia-and-its-challenges/. 21 Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Religion in Australia: 2016 Census Data Summary,” ABS, June 28, 2017, https://bit.ly/2G3GUqF; Evershed, Liu, and Livsey, “Are you Reflected in the New Parliament.” 22 Tony Walker, “Arab-Australian Business Leaders Call for Balance,” Australian Financial Review, October 25, 2014, https://bit.ly/2pAlZkU. 23 Justine Kearney and Mohamed Taha, “Sydney Muslims Experience Discrimination at Three Times the Rate of Other Australians: Study,” ABC News, November 30, 2015, https://ab.co/2k4bfGu. 24 Katharine Murphy, “Peter Dutton’s Comments on Lebanese Migrants ‘Outrageous,’ Says Fraser Minister,” The Guardian, November 23, 2016, https://bit.ly/2I4QA0J; Paul Karp, “Peter Dutton Says Victorians Scared to Go Out Because of ‘African Gang Violence,’” The Guardian, January 3, 2018, https://bit.ly/2DFVVJi. Rotem Nusem | Beyond Beer Sheva: Assessing Australia-Israel Relations
102 25 Henry Belot, “Labor MP Anne Aly and Family Receive Death Threats after Peter Dutton Comments,” ABC News, November 23, 2016, http://www.abc. net.au/news/2016-11-23/anne-aly-and-family-receive-death-threats/8050496. 26 “Media Release: Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Visit to Australia,” Website of Prime Minister of Australia the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, February 20, 2017, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/prime-minister- netanyahu%E2%80%99s-visit-australia. 27 “Media Release: Visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories Media Release,” Website of Prime Minister of Australia the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, November 2, 2017, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/visit-israel-and- palestinian-territories. 28 Anthony Bergin, “Synergies at Stake in Better Ties with Israel,” ASPI, March 3, 2017, https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/synergies-stake-better-ties-israel. 29 “Transcript – Joint Press Conference with His Excellency Benjamin
| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Assessment Strategic Netanyahu Prime Minister of the State of Israel,” Website of Prime Minister of Australia the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, February 22, 2017, https://bit. ly/2G9jImN. 30 AP and TOI Staff, “Meeting PM, Australia Labor Head Pushes Palestinian State,” Times of Israel, February 24, 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/ meeting-pm-australia-labor-head-pushes-palestinian-state/. 31 “Transcript: Joint Press Statement with His Excellency Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of the State of Israel,” Website of Prime Minister of Australia the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, October 31, 2017, https://www.pm.gov.au/ media/joint-press-statement-his-excellency-benjamin-netanyahu-prime- minister-state-israel. 32 Sophie McNeill, “Dan Tehan Defends PM Malcolm Turnbull’s Israel Trip Delay Amid Citizenship Fallout,” ABC News, October 29, 2017, https:// ab.co/2E0uvhe. 33 Ibid. 34 Philip Williams and Sophie McNeill, “Malcolm Turnbull Lauds Strong Relationship with Israel after Meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu,” ABC News, October 31, 2017, https://ab.co/2E0HUFX. 35 Anthony Bergin, “Benjamin Netanyahu’s Visit is a Chance for Australia to Forge Stronger Ties with Israel,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 21, 2017, https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/benjamin-netanyahus- visit-chance-australia-forge-stronger-ties-israel. 36 William Stoltz, “Israel has Neglected Australia for too Long,” The Interpreter, February 21, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/israel-has- neglected-australia-too-long. 37 Bergin, “Benjamin Netanyahu’s Visit is a Chance for Australia to Forge Stronger Ties with Israel.” 38 Stoltz, “Israel has Neglected Australia for too Long.” Strategic Assessment welcomes submissions from researchers and experts in fields related to Israel’s national security and Middle East strategic issues.
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