May 26, 2020 (Via online at regulations.gov)

Docket Operations Facility U.S. Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Ave SE, W12-140 Washington, DC 20590

RE: Docket Number FRA-2020-0029, Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS), petition for Discontinuance or Modification of a Railroad Signal System

Comments of the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen

The Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS) is filing comments concerning the above referenced document that was printed in the April 8, 2020, Federal Register (pages 19794–19795). The BRS is the duly recognized collective bargaining representative for roughly 10,000 signal employees who are responsible for the inspection, installation, construction, repair, and maintenance of all signal systems on all Class I railroads and various other Carriers in the United States. Our membership has a vested interest in the aforementioned waiver request which affects the safety of our members, local residents, Railroad employees, equipment, and commodities.

In its application, NS seeks approval to discontinue and modify a signal system, NS requests permission to remove double track main line operations and convert into single signaled bi- directional track, NS rule 261, for approximately 32.6 miles on the Fort Wayne Line of the Division. NS seeks to retire one main track at milepost (MP) PC 84.8 to 96.7, MP PC 157.3 to 160.1, MP PC 161.9 to 169.4, and MP 178.0 to 188.3. It will also change the method of operation at MP limits of PC 160.1 to 161.9 and MP PC 175.1 to 178.0 to non-controlled track. The reason for the proposed changes is a line rationalization and system improvement.

As you are well aware, the most vital element to the safe and efficient operation of trains is a properly maintained signal system, and the established safety benefits that come with such are necessary for this type of railroad operation. The signal system that is currently in place is designed to protect the safety and integrity of railroad operations by providing broken rail and track defect protection, switch and derail alignment protection, route integrity protection, as well as protection against different types of train and on-track equipment collisions. Furthermore, the signal system is designed to mitigate dangers caused by human error or acts of vandalism. One needs to not look far to see the tragic circumstances that can be caused by the lack of a signal system, as was the case recently in Cayce, South Carolina. It is not disputed that the signal system was suspended, which led to a misaligned switch being undetected by an oncoming train. The consequence of this error was a tragic head-on collision and derailment that resulted in the loss of life, multiple injuries, and millions of dollars’ worth of damage. In its application, the Carrier wants to keep the track between MP PC 160.1 to 161.9 and MP PC 175.1 to 178.0, but make it a non-controlled track; looking at the prints NS provided, there are several spots that are safety hazards. At MP PC 160.1, the Carrier wants to install a switch from the main track to the non-controlled track before the Mohican River, leaving two switches between MP PC 160.1 and MP PC 161.9 on the non-controlled track. Finally, there is a switch at PC MP 161.9 connecting to the main track. NS is setting up another scenario that played out in Graniteville, South Carolina, where a switch can be left in the wrong position and trains can collide with each other. Alternatively, a train could come onto the main line after a train has taken the signal at MP PC 159.7 and another collision could occur. The location from PC MP 175.1 to 178.0, which the Carrier wants to make this a non-controlled track, essentially constitutes a 2.9-mile siding without signals. There is a switch approximately 0.5 miles from the 1783-2/1784-2 signals, which, as stated above, could have dire consequences. There are also two switches and an interlocker with the Ashland Railway on the non-controlled track, this is extremely unsafe for the employees and the adjoining railroad.

The primary reason put forth by the Carrier, for the proposed changes, is a line rationalization, reconfiguration, and system improvements. In NS’s application it states that the existing safety of operations would be maintained and further that removing signals, track circuits, and switch protection does not make any system less safe. BRS contends that doing this would diminish the proven, functional, safe, signal system that is already in operation. The aforementioned reasons given to modify the existing signal system from approximately 32.6 miles of main line track is extremely vague, and BRS can find no justifiable reason for this request to be granted. NS moves over 20 million gross tons of freight on this line, will that be reduced? Is NS planning upgrading this line, that is over 50 years old, with old PRR position light signals and the wayside equipment from the same time period? How many false clear incidents have occurred on this outdated system? On the highway-grade crossings that have active warning systems, is NS going to move the flashers or gate mechanisms to be in compliance with federal regulations? Has the state of , PUCO been notified of the specified changes? The application leaves several unanswered questions that concern the safety of the public and the employees of Norfolk Southern. There is no mention on how the railroad plans to mitigate the dangers of operating without a signal system on these segments of tracks that are going to be non-controlled, especially any mention on measures that NS will take to detect broken rails. The present system utilizes a fail-safe design and incorporates track circuits where the rails of the track form the foundation of the systems. These systems use wayside and control point signals to convey signal aspects and indications to train crews. They also detect broken rails, track defects, track obstructions, proper switch, and route alignment, as well as providing critical train location information. The absence of these important and fail-safe signal systems will create unsafe conditions and result in unnecessary risk for the local communities, employees, assets, and infrastructure.

BRS’s opposition is based upon concerns for employee and public safety, and we believe the current operable signal system is invaluable by providing information to dispatchers and other employees. The surrounding communities, towns, and environment would all be put at a significantly higher risk if these two segments were allowed to be de-signaled. These towns, communities, and people depend on the idea that railroads, especially those that traverse their neighborhoods, function as safely as possible. For the FRA to approve this petition would be an injustice to those in the surrounding areas. By removing the signal system we are taking a step backwards in safety. At a time when the NTSB, Congress, railroad employees, and the general public are calling for efforts to improve rail safety, such as positive train control (PTC), this Carrier proposes to take us back to an unsafe time of no signals.

Clearly, in this case it is in the best interest of the general public, local residents, railroad employees, and the environment to have the safety assurances which are provided by a fully functioning signal system. The signal system in question must be left in place. Railroad signal systems are valuable assets to transportation safety, they comprise a critical element of the safe and efficient operation of a railroad. The removal of these systems between CP Mans to Intermediate Signal 1783-1/1784-1, and between MP 160.1 to Intermediate Signal 1619-1/1620-1 to can only serve to have a negative impact on our nation’s overall transportation system. In view of the foregoing, the BRS respectfully urges the FRA to deny the above referenced waiver request in its entirety.

If you have any questions, please contact my office at 540.622.6525.

Respectfully Submitted,

Jerry C. Boles President