Information Laundering in Germany

Home , Information laundering, Potemkin village, RIA Novosti, Sputnik (radio station), Woozle effect, Zelimkhan Khangoshvili

978-9934-564-82-6

INFORMATION LAUNDERING IN GERMANY

Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence ISBN: 978-9934-564-82-6 Authors: Belén Carrasco Rodríguez Project manager: Merete Voetman Editor: Philip Birzulis Design: Kārlis Ulmanis

Riga, October 2020 NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalnciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe

This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here do not represent the views of NATO. TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 4 Methodology 6 Phases of Information Laundering 7 Main Findings 10 Key Actors Identified 11 INFORMATION LAUNDERING CASE STUDIES 14 Information Laundering Targeting Covid-19 15 Information Laundering Targeting Alexei Navalny 30 Information Laundering Targeting Nord Stream-2 34 CONCLUDING REMARKS 38 INTRODUCTION

Information laundering (IL) is a stratagem used by hostile actors within an information influence campaign. In this process, false or deceitful information is legitimised through a network of intermediaries that gradually apply a set of techniques to distort it and obscure the original source. In the context of this research, IL is leveraged by Kremlin-official or pro-Kremlin actors in a hostile information influence campaign (HIIC) to further their interests in Germany.

Information Laundering represents a in a particular country, since it uncovers how relatively new approach to information actors gradually distort, disseminate, and influence activities targeting a particular legitimise a piece of information through media environment. In the context of this the application of IL techniques. Actors report, IL research allows governments, conducting IL are generally supported by national institutions and civil society to cyber capabilities that enhance the spread reach a deeper understanding of the activity and amplification of a laundered piece, of domestic and transnational networks that e.g. through the creation of fake personas enable the spread of the Kremlin’s influence and burner accounts, and sophisticated

4 �� methods for manipulation of information, e.g. through the distribution of forged letters1. By exposing how these processes occur and who participates in them, EU institutions and national governments as well as civil society can build resilience against information influence activities, improving the understanding of the vulnerabilities of specific domestic media environments, and uncovering repeated patterns and connections between actors, media outlets, and influence techniques.

This research focuses on IL practices from Kremlin and pro-Kremlin actors targeting the German media ecosystem, analysing how domestic and foreign actors interact to enable the spread of pro-Kremlin influence in Germany, or to disseminate a particular image about Germany to foreign groups of audiences while laundering German news stories. This way, the Kremlin can strategically mislead audiences without incurring extensive political and military costs.

Our study on IL in Germany looked at two different types of Information laundering, with different target audiences and intended effects:

NEWS NEWS

...

IL-A IL-B

Domestic actors launder foreign or Foreign actors launder domestic German international news events, translating them news events to shape perspectives about into German, deliberately or accidentally, Germany for an international or foreign enabling the spread of the Kremlin’s audience (e.g. Case 2, 3 and 5). influence in the German media environment (e.g. Cases 1 and 4). Actors: Foreign Language: Foreign – mainly Russian and Actors: Domestic English Language: German Stories: Domestic German news events Stories: Foreign Target audience: international or foreign Target audience: German speaking population, inside or outside Germany

�� 5 Methodology

In terms of methodology and approach, our constructed by the NATO Strategic research utilised a case study analysis to Communications Centre of Excellence to explore Information Laundering processes analyse Information Laundering (explained targeting German news or conducted in the following pages). This report frames by German actors. This involved the the analysis through the theoretical selection of five disinformation cases construction of information laundering, from the EUvsDisinfo database divided developed from a metaphor of money by topic, i.e. COVID-19, EU sanctions laundering and the definition provided by against Russia, Nord Stream-2 and the the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency poisoning of Alexei Navalny followed (MSB) in 20182. The research in each by keywords-based research of articles case was conducted in three languages: directly related to the selected cases. In a) in the domestic language, i.e. German total, 97 articles were collected through b) in Russian, and c) in English. The manual advanced keyword-based research case studies were selected according to in search engines, supported by a mix of the following criteria: a) Kremlin-official open source investigation tools utilised media (foreign or domestic) was involved; to leverage data, e.g. InVID Multimodal, b) different techniques were applied, WayBack Machine, BuzzSumo. After simultaneously or in quick succession, in being collected, the news articles were order to gradually distort and disseminate organised chronologically by publication the original information;3 c) a network of date within each disinformation case, various types of actors participated in the applying the theoretical framework process4.

Placement Layering Integration Information from its original IL techniques ar The false or misleading source is distorted by applying applied by a network information resulted from the the first technique(s), of intermediaries to application of IL techniques is intentionally or accidentally, in further distort and accepted by legitimate media preparation for the layering disseminate the outlets and/or social media process. information. users, and enters into the public discourse.

Figure 1. Phases of Information Laundering

6 �� Phases of Information Laundering

IL comprises three phases – placement, layering, and integration – including everything from first use of an IL technique by an actor, to the progressive distortion and dissemination of this information, which eventually gets legitimised and becomes part of the public discourse. The definition of information laundering involves the use of a set of techniques by actors that progressively distort the information (laundering) and obscure the laundered piece from the original source. These techniques are the following:

傳 Automated translation: Articles are translated using machine translation services: these often contain A grammatical errors and/or incoherent sentences.

Deceitful translation: Articles are translated imprecisely, excluding pertinent information or B =A incorporating targeted messages in order to modify or spin the content, context, or meaning of the original text.

Disinformation: An article includes false or fabricated information meant to mislead or deceive a target audience.

Misappropriation: Factual data, contexts or connections are used strategically to mislead audiences; this may include incorporating unrelated information to frame a topic or event so as to align the message with aims of a HIIC; providing references that do not contain the alleged information; framing real information in a fabricated context; using headlines, pictures or other elements unrelated to the content to support the messages promoted by the HIIC.

NEWS Misleading headline: Biased or misleading ‘click-bait’ headlines are used to attract reader’s interest; these may be ambiguous and sensationalised, but not necessarily false.

Potemkin Villages: Articles are created by a network of deceptive, illegitimate ‘fact-producing platforms that endorse each other to create the appearance of truth and to build credibility to mislead target audiences. Potemkin villages attempt to hoodwink audiences into believing disinformation by leveraging the bandwagon fallacy; they directly contribute to source magnification.

Smurfing: Various accounts or websites controlled by the same actor (as opposed to a Potemkin village network of actors) to disseminate information that is difficult to attribute and thus difficult to debunk. Smurfing also contributes to source magnification.

Figure 2. Information Laundering techniques

�� 7 This study considers five indicators that can be used to identify connections between laundered news items and to trace the exact route of the laundering process, taking into account the time frame and the application of laundering techniques. The following indicators can be used to help verify that suspicious news items have undergone the laundering process:

Chronology: news articles have simultaneous or closely consecutive publication times

A A B B C C Structural similarity: news articles are either identical or contain similarly distributed information

Authorship: suspicious articles were written by the same author

Reference: an article published by one suspect media outlet cites or includes hyperlinks to another suspect source the previous one

Figure 3. Indicators of connection between laundered news items

Actors who are part of the network of influence are involved in all three phases of information laundering. This paper proposes the following categorisation of the various actors so that researchers can better identify the roles each actor plays.

This categorisation is based on the experience of subject matter experts as shown in Figure 4 on the next page.

To gain an insight into Information Laundering in Germany using German domestic news events, the following theoretical framework was applied to a sample of five disinformation cases from the EUvsDisinfo database.

Source magnification (SM) – the process of increasing the number of information sources to enhance the impact of a manipulated piece of information regardless of quality or veracity5 – is necessary for effective IL, as it supports the construction of legitimacy. However, since SM does not necessarily involve distortion, it is not considered an IL technique. Simple shares without altering content or translations may be SM but not IL.

8 �� Kremlin-oﬃcial media Kremlin state-funded media

Other media that participate in IL No proven relations with the Kremlin

ighly likely Domestic Foreign

Associated with the countr under Associated by name/domain, language or content research by name/domain, language or to an international or domestic readership that is content not related to the country under research

• Shares pro-Kremlin contnet on a regular basis • Pro-Kremlin content can be original (self-producet or reproduced for Kremlin-official or other Pro-Kremlin pro-Kremlin media through IL techniques

LikelyProbably media • Motivation for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives has been investigated by disinformation researchers who have identified some form of links to the Kremlin or Kremlin-official media sources

• Shares pro-Kremlin contnet on a regular basis • Pro-Kremlin content is never original. It is mainly reproduced from Kremlin-official media or Proxy pro-Kremlin media, directly contributing to source magnification (always) and IL (sometimes) • Motivation for spreading pro-Kremlin narratives has not been investigated and the reasons why it participates in IL processes are not know

• Shares pro-Kremlin contnet or opportunistically Unlikely Accidental • Content largely does not reflect pro-Kremlin narratives but may do so occasionally actor • Motivation for part-taking in spreding pro-Kremlin narratives is not known.

Estimative probalitity of links to the Kremlin or Kremlin-official media Figure 4. Actors involved in IL networks

IL- Country A SOURCE MAGNIFICATION Mistranslation Misinformation Ampliﬁcation

Kremlin official Media | Pro-Kremlin media Social media | Public debate Domestic proxies | Accidental actors | Social media Decision-making NETORKS TA [timeframe]

Original source Inﬂuence Domestic or placement layering integration international FACT - 0

Gradual application of Source magnification Disinformation | Misappropriation | Potemkin Villages Legitimacy TECHNIQUES Woozle effect | Smurfing | Misleading Headline

Fact - v1 Fact - v3 Fact - v4 ...

Distortion from the original fact

Figure 5. Model for understanding Information Laundering

�� 9 Main Findings

Research confirms that Information - A considerable amount of social Laundering is conducted in Germany by media users amplified content from Kremlin and/or pro-Kremlin actors: information laundering processes - Certain domestic outlets were seen from Kremlin-official and pro-Kremlin to enable the spread of pro-Kremlin sources. information influence in the German • These accounts largely share media environment, mainly among news from far-right or leftist German audiences German media, contributing to the - Research reveals that IL actors also polarisation of the debate in social target Germany by strategically networks exploiting domestic news exclusively - Proxies that amplify laundered news about Germany, or conspiracy stories inside and outside the country theories among domestic and international Russian and English- Predictably, the main language used was speaking audiences Russian, followed by German (31%). Two - Some German-language outlets reasons explain this: registered under a German domain a. Due to the nature of IL, most of the were seen to actively conduct SM processes are started by a Kremlin- from German-language Kremlin- official or pro-Kremlin source official media outlets and then translated into other languages to increase the reach of On average, 18 actors are involved in the the laundered content cases investigated: b. Kremlin-official or pro-Kremlin - Key relevance of pro-Kremlin (News- sources launder and translate non- Front, Topwar, SOTT) and Kremlin- Russian language news stories official media (RT, Sputnik) in German to influence Russian-speaking language audiences. - In the IL cases under investigation, pro-Kremlin and Kremlin-official media Themes: COVID-19 stories are intimately repeatedly amplified the voices of linked to conspiracy theories and anti- German political and public figures, Western narratives. Other themes of primarily from the far-right Alternative relevance: Nord Stream-2, Russophobia. für Deutschland (AfD) and leftist Die No purely domestic information laundering Linke. These were utilised to provide case has been identified. IL networks are credibility to the laundered content. generally transnational.

10 �� Key Actors Identified

The main actors participating in IL processes to enable the spread of the Kremlin’s influence in Germany are Kremlin-official media and Russian or German-language proxies.

Regarding domestic actors enabling the and Gazprom (from 2015), AfD’s spread of Kremlin IL in Germany, this Waldemar Herdt, and German-Russian research identified the following: Forum Chairman Matthias Platzeck.

International actors that publish in Der Tagesspiegel stories were used by several languages, mainly in English Kremlin-official and pro-Kremlin media and Russian, but also run German as a source for IL. This does not make language platforms. E.g.: SOTT, News- Der Tagesspiegel an active part of IL – Front, Shafaqna. Kremlin and pro-Kremlin outlets take the accurate reporting of news events German-language versions of Kremlin- by the German reputed outlet and official media, e.g. RT and Sputnik. distort it though IL techniques.

Main proxy platforms: the wordpress’ Keywords-based IL research identified blog ‘Co-op Anti-War Café Berlin’ and actors publishing pieces that, for Press24.net both share content from reasons of chronology and narratives Sputnik Germany and RT Deutsch, as pushed, could be somehow linked to well as from the platform Telepolis. laundering processes. However, IL techniques were not clearly identified German actors that are generally and more research needs to be mentioned or referenced in IL conducted to verify participation in processes to provide credibility to IL German IL, e.g. Junge Welt, journalist techniques: Historian Alexander Rahr, Florian Rötzer in the blog Telepolis. who was also Senior Advisor on Russia for Wintershall Holding (2012–2015)

�� 11 Table 1. Summary of the cases

Case Type of IL Summary Techniques (in order of appearance) Overview of IL networks Theme/s

.Information Laundering targeting COVID-19

1. COVID-19 is the result of Bill Mostly IL-A (Domestic The speech of Italian MP Sara Cunial about Bill Gates Woozle effect Total media involved: 12. COVID-19; conspiracy theories; deep

Gates’ depopulation policies and actors launder foreign orchestrating COVID-19 as a depopulation policy was NEWS Mainly proxies (64%). Mainly German state plans for world domination news events) strategically picked, translated and amplified by IL actors Misleading headline language (92%). Other language: to support popular conspiracy theories on social media English. Strong role of YouTube and platforms like Twitter or Facebook and blogs in Germany. Disinformation Telegram accounts to support IL.

Misappropriation

2. Germany demands a repeal of Mostly IL-B (Foreign During the COVID-19 crisis, a laundering process selected Total media involved: 46. EU sanctions against Russia; Ukraine; anti-Russian sanctions actors launder domestic statements from several political and public figures mainly 39% proxy, 33% pro-Kremlin media. COVID-19; Russophobia events) from Germany to legitimise the misleading news that Main language: Russian. Other Germany was asking the EU to lift sanctions against Russia. languages: German (15%) Woozle effect

Misappropriation

6 Potemkin village 3. US biolabs are putting CSTO Mostly IL-B (Foreign After RIA Novosti quoted Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Total media involved: 17. 71% Kremlin- Conspiracy theory; anti-US; COVID-19; countries and the Caucasus at NEWS actors launder domestic Sergey Lavrov speaking about US biolabs located in Russia’s Misleading headline official media (fundamentally Sputnik), Russophobia risk and encircling Russia events) neighbouring countries, different versions of Sputnik 29% proxies. Languages: Russian (65%), laundered the content mainly through misleading headlines Romanian (29%), German (6%) and source magnification in different languages.

.Information Laundering targeting Alexei Navalny

orchestrated directly in Berlin with a substance from the Novichok group, utilising for NEWS Other languages: Russian and English such purpose comments of alleged Novichok developers Misleading headline Leonid Rink and Vladimir Uglev. Both stated that Navalny’s Disinformation symptoms did not match those caused by Novichok.

.Information Laundering targeting Other Domestic Cases: Nord Stream-2

5. Berlin murder linked to Nord Mostly IL-B (Foreign Kremlin-official and pro-Kremlin media laundered a news NEWS Total media involved: 7. Nord Stream-2; Russophobia; Misleading headline Stream-2 actors launder domestic story on the murder of Georgian citizen and former Chechen Main language: Russian. Conspiracy theories; Skripal case events) fighter Zelimkhan Khangoshvili to give an impression image Disinformation Other languages: Georgian that this was a Russophobic strategy employed by Western countries to disrupt the progress of Nord Stream-2 Misappropriation No domestic media. IL mainly conducted by proxy actors

12 �� Table 1. Summary of the cases

Case Type of IL Summary Techniques (in order of appearance) Overview of IL networks Theme/s

.Information Laundering targeting COVID-19

1. COVID-19 is the result of Bill Mostly IL-A (Domestic The speech of Italian MP Sara Cunial about Bill Gates Woozle effect Total media involved: 12. COVID-19; conspiracy theories; deep

Misappropriation

.Information Laundering targeting Alexei Navalny

4. Navalny’s symptoms do not Mostly IL-A (Domestic Kremlin-official media amalgamates two unchained IL Woozle effect Total media involved: 10. Navalny; Russophobia; Nord Stream-2 coincide with Novichok and actors launder foreign processes to cast doubt among certain German audience 60% proxies. this news story is a theatre news events) groups about the idea that Navalny had been poisoned Misappropriation Main language: German (80%). orchestrated directly in Berlin with a substance from the Novichok group, utilising for NEWS Other languages: Russian and English such purpose comments of alleged Novichok developers Misleading headline Leonid Rink and Vladimir Uglev. Both stated that Navalny’s Disinformation symptoms did not match those caused by Novichok.

.Information Laundering targeting Other Domestic Cases: Nord Stream-2

�� 13 INFORMATION LAUNDERING CASE STUDIES

14 �� Information Laundering Targeting Covid-19

COVID-19-related IL targeting German audiences or German domestic news stories leverages conventional conspiratorial theories, i.e. anti-vaccine movements, world elite domination, to disseminate the idea that COVID-19 has been artificially created and spread by the West to international and domestic audiences.

speech was amplified by YouTube users INFORMATION LAUNDERING Information Laundering Case 1 in several languages: Italian, English and COVID-19 is the result of Bill Gates’ German. Analysis of these accounts shows depopulation policies and plans anti-vaccine and conspiracy theories like CASE STUDIES for world domination7 Pizzagate10, but no clear links to Kremlin- official or pro-Kremlin media. Pizzagate is Background. The COVID-19 pandemic is a debunked conspiracy theory started in subject to several conspiracy theories. In 2016 that claims that Hillary Clinton, Barack one of the most popular ones, Bill Gates Obama and other US political leaders appears as the orchestrator of the pandemic, (mainly from the Democratic Party) are allegedly for world domination purposes. running a child-trafficking ring out of the Sara Cunial, an independent member of the Washington pizza restaurant ‘Comet Ping Italian parliament expelled from the Five Pong’.11 Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) in April 2019 for accusing the party of being tied to The placement was conducted on 15 May, “agro-mafias”, addressed Italian President by English-language media outlet News Giuseppe Conte on 14 May 2020, suggesting Punch, formerly ‘Your News Wire’. This that Bill Gates was behind the pandemic. outlet has been identified by fact-checkers She proposed that the next time he received from CBS12, BuzzFeed News,13 FactCheck. a letter from Bill Gates, he should address org,14 and Snopes15 as one that commonly it to the International Court of Justice8. spreads conspiracy theories like Pizzagate. According to Reuters9, Cunial also publicly NewsPunch’s article already included compared vaccines to “genocide” in a now- the headline that German media outlets deleted post on social media. afterwards adopted during the laundering process: “Italian MP: Bill Gates Must Be Laundering. In the days following the Charged By International Criminal Court With parliamentary session, Sara Cunial’s ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ (“Italienische

�� 15 Abgeordnete fordert Verhaftung von Bill Gates No connection with the News-Front’s wegen “Verbrechen an der Menschlichkeit”). article was found. However, on the same The news piece also contained day, Connectiv.events shared a German quotes from Robert F. Kennedy Jr., version of NewsPunch’s article that was a public defender of the anti-vaccine authored by Qlobal-Change17. Research movement16 (placement by means of identifies Qlobal-Change as a loudspeaker of woozle effect and misappropriation). The QAnon conspiracy theories on Telegram18, coverage of Cunial’s speech specifically YouTube, Bitchute, Twitter, and Facebook19, focused on a quote addressed to the translating them into German and Italian, Speaker of the House and asked him to tell and via Telegram channels into Spanish President Giuseppe Conte that, next time he and Portuguese. QAnon is a conspiracy received a letter from Bill Gates, he should theory that claims that a group of Satan- send it directly to the International Criminal worshiping paedophiles is running a global Court for crimes against humanity. She also child sex-trafficking ring and plotting against questioned President Conte’s motives if he US President Donald Trump, who is allegedly was not willing to do it. In total, 12 outlets battling them20. Qlobal-Change amplified were involved in IL through laundering and translated the NewsPunch piece into techniques or amplifying laundered piece German and Italian and disseminated it on via SM. their social media.

On 17 May, German version of News-Front On 19 May, RT Deutsch shared and expanded selected and translated into German a part of News-Front’s article. This connection was NewsPunch’s article that covered Ms Cunial’s identified by the identical headline that both speech. It also maintained the woozle share. However, RT expanded on the content, effect. News-Front’s piece was amplified in adding some extra information about Boersenwolf.blogspot.com (SM). COVID-19 conspiracy theories surrounding Bill Gates (misappropriation). Later on, the On 18 May, German far-right online German-language version of pro-Kremlin media outlet Die Freie Welt wrote a media Sign of the Times (SOTT) conducted highly misinforming article about the misappropriation by selectively reproducing events, including a misleading headline parts of RT’s article. RT’s article was amplified with disinformation elements: ““Prison by Deutschland.Shafaqna.com. On the same camp conditions” in Italy: Bill Gates day, Watergate.tv continued amplifying allegedly strives for absolute control” NewsPunch’s version in German. (“»Gefangenenlager-Verhältnisse« in Italien: Bill Gates strebe nach absoluter Kontrolle”).

16 �� Figure 6. Information Laundering Case 1

Observations

While giving a speech, a single Italian This is a case where pro-Kremlin or politician called for former Microsoft CEO Kremlin-official media did not launder the Bill Gates to be arrested.This position was not content. The content was real and they just endorsed by the Italian government as a whole. strategically amplified it – RT shared it on This was a misappropriation conducted by the RT Deutsch page, on YouTube21 and also proxy and pro-Kremlin actors to give her quotes on RT Podcast22 in German. It was also more credibility. amplified by YouTube users who spread conspiracy theories. Research found similar The IL process was conducted mainly process happened in other languages. For in German and spread in very specific example, Romanian or Spanish – IL by Latin conspiracy theory networks.The IL American media outlets. techniques utilised and the types of actors involved suggest that German audiences Qlobal-Change’s Telegram post was were targets of the process. There was a actively disseminated in conspiracy high activity of conspiracy theory websites theory Telegram groups. both in German and English. IL was also shared by German conspiracy NewsPunch generally shares conspiracy theorists on their social media.23 theories like Pizzagate.

�� 17 Table 2. Information Laundering Case 1

Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

15 May

IL ( woozle effect, NewsPunch24 15:20 misappropriation) Foreign proxy (EN/USA)

17 May

News-Front25 16:36 IL ( woozle effect) Foreign pro-Kremlin media (DE/RUS)

Boersenwolf.blogspot.com26 Unk. SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

18 May

IL ( NEWS misleading Die Freie Welt27 12:30 headline, Domestic accidental actor (DE/GER) disinformation)

Connectiv.events (by Qlobal-Change28) Unk. SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

19 May

Watergate.tv29 06:45 SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

RT Deutsch30 08:03 IL ( misappropriation) Kremlin-official media (DE/RUS)

Signs of the Times (SOTT)31 17:49 IL ( misappropriation) Foreign pro-kremlin media (DE/RUS)

Deutschland.Shafaqna. com32 Unk. SM Foreign proxy (DE/Unk)

20 May

Qlobal-change.blogspot. IL ( disinformation) com33 13:52 Foreign proxy (DE/USA)

25 May

The Epoch Times34 14:09 SM Foreign proxy (DE/USA)

18 �� Translation from NewsPunch to News-Front

Example of Telegram group that shared Qlobal-Change

�� 19 Quote from Sara Cunial selected by News-Front in German and English

Original German text English translation

„Wir, die Menschen, werden die Feuer des “We, the people, will expand the fires of Widerstands so weit ausbauen, dass es resistance to such an extent that it is not nicht möglich ist, uns alle zu unterdrücken. possible to suppress us all. I ask you, Speaker Ich bitte Sie, Vorsitzender des Parlaments, of Parliament, to be our spokesman who will unser Sprecher zu sein, der Präsident advise President Conte: the next time you get Conte beraten wird: Wenn Sie das nächste a call from “philanthropist” Bill Gates, put it Mal einen Anruf vom „Philanthrop“ Bill directly on the International Criminal Tribunal Gates erhalten, leiten Sie ihn direkt an for Crimes against Humanity. den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof für Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit “If you don’t do this for us, tell us how to weiter. define you, the ‘friendly lawyer’ who takes orders from a criminal”. «Wenn Sie dies nicht für uns tun, sagen Sie uns, wie wir Sie definieren sollen, den» freundlichen Anwalt «, der Befehle von einem Kriminellen entgegennimmt»,

IL was also shared by German conspiracy theorists on their social media.

20 �� Information Laundering Case 2. Germany demands a repeal of anti-Russian sanctions35

Background. In March 2014, the European article including a misleading headline that Council agreed on the first diplomatic stated that Germany was urging the lifting measures (i.e. EU sanctions) in response to of sanctions against Russia (“В Германии the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. призвали снять санкции с России на фоне During the COVID-19 pandemic, several борьбы с коронавирусом”). The article German political and public figures asked summarised and referenced Izvestia’s piece, for sanctions to be lifted, among them sustaining the woozle effect. Lenta’s headline AfD’s Waldemar Herdt, Die Linke’s Aleksandr was almost exactly reproduced 2 minutes later Neu, German historian Alexandr Rahr, and (02:22 am and 02:24 am) again by Izvestia. chairman of the German-Russian Forum The timeframe and structural similarities and former Minister President of the federal between the three texts (Izvestia–Lenta– state of Brandenburg Matthias Platzeck36. Izvestia) suggest a Potemkin Village where the two media outlets were reinforcing each Laundering. Between 18 March and other as well as increasing the visibility of the 4 May, different Kremlin-official and pro- news. Hours later, Argumenti I Facti amplified Kremlin media actors disseminated the the laundered information, linking the first news that Germany called for the lifting article from Izvestia but using the headline of EU sanctions against Russia within the from the second article by the same outlet. EU. These outlets utilised quotes from The laundered information that resulted from different politicians and public figures to the Potemkin Village was directly amplified support and provide credibility for their via SM (copy-paste with no modification) by arguments. The placement was conducted M24, Wi-Fi.ru, Kremlin-official Sputnik Georgia, by pro-Kremlin medium Izvestia, combining Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Business-gazeta.ru. misappropriation and woozle effect with the Topwar translated the same article with an use of AfD’s Waldemar Herdt’s comments almost identical structure and headline into as a uniform position from Germany / the German, adding a concluding paragraph on Bundestag. Besides Mr Herdt, quotes from the sanctions against China and Iran. This Die Linke’s Aleksandr Neu and German was then amplified (SM) on the platform historian Alexandr Rahr supported the Weaponews.com. Following this, FedPress information laundering process. In total, included misappropriation, adding a last 46 media outlets participated in the process paragraph presenting Poland as another EU country that could support the lifting of On the same day as the placement, pro- the sanctions, “if conditions were met”. Kremlin medium Lenta.ru shared Izvestia’s

�� 21 While the Russian version of RT included Matthias Platzeck had urged Germany to lift misappropriation by mentioning a recent sanctions. Misappropriation was included visit from French President Emmanuel when adding a paragraph discussing Macron, Gazeta.ru applied a combination the identity of Eastern Ukrainians and of several techniques. It added other inhabitants of the Crimean Peninsula. comments to those made by Herdt This was translated into German and himself to Russian media in 2018 amplified by News-Front within hours and (misappropriation), reinforcing the idea that by Sputnik Deutschland two days later. the German politician is very supportive of Sputnik inserted disinformation implying Russia, and shifting the attention from the that due to sanctions, military tensions main issue. It also included comments by between Russia and the EU had increased, other German political figures supporting and misappropriation, claiming the EU the idea of withdrawing sanctions, and data cannot solve climate change and terrorism backing the economic gain that the lifting of without Russia. This again configured a sanctions would bring the country, without Potemkin Village where Kremlin-official and referencing or hyperlinking it to any source. pro-Kremlin media reinforce each other. The concept “new Cold War” was also When sharing the news from RIA, introduced (misappropriation). The Estonian News-Front changed the headline from version of pro-Kremlin outlet Baltnews “German politician urges lifting sanctions” Estonia included a misleading headline (RIA) to “Germany calls for anti-Russian that signalled that COVID-19 had opened sanctions to be lifted” (News-Front). Germany’s eyes regarding the sanctions. It also included claims that the index of On 5 May, Sputnik Deutschland amplified an investor confidence in the German economy interview with AfD politician Robbie Schlund saw the biggest drop since 1991, without on the sanctions, which was then picked up referencing any source (misappropriation). by Vzglyad on 7 May. Instead of commenting Sputnik Deutschland mixed this content on the topic of the interview, the 75th with comments by another AfD politician, Anniversary of the end of World War II, it only Anton Friesen, to RIA Novosti, and added covered the issue of sanctions, which was a misleading headline that stated that a small part of the whole article. This was sanctions would involve “Billions of losses”. posted under a very similar headline, “AfD’s Although the woozle effect citing Herdt Robbie Schlund calls for Germany to lift stopped largely after 19 March, the same sanctions”. The same misleading technique news item using a very similar headline was utilised in the headline, generalising remained until May. that it was the whole of Germany that requested the EU to lift the sanctions. On 4 May, Kremlin-official media RIA Novosti released an article stating that

22 �� Observations Another Potemkin Village identified was the one between RIA Novosti, News-Front and The main IL tactic was a combination by Sputnik. Kremlin-official and pro-Kremlin outlets of woozle effect and misappropriations, The closure of the EU’s external borders selecting quotes from public figures, i.e. was used strategically to disseminate politicians, journalists, etc. and mixing the idea that the EU was not going to them with wrong or inaccurate content to keep supporting third countries. enhance the credibility of their arguments. The EU, however, reinforced its willingness Quotes from German politicians, primarily, to continue supporting Ukraine during the but not limited to, AfD, were used to pandemic.38 In this process, EU sanctions disseminate the idea that Germany was overlap with COVID-19 narratives. asking the EU for the removal of sanctions and not doing it was against common sense. In German media: although there was no Mr Herdt and Mr Rahr were portayed as reference to Russian media, a keyword- defenders of Russia within Germany. based search demonstrates that similar news stories were disseminated in certain Misleading headlines together with German media during the same period. misappropriation were utilised to deceive This confirms that certain political groups audiences, making them believe that in Germany indeed proposed to lift the Germany had an official position and was sanctions. However, asking to lift sanctions thinking about lifting the sanctions. is not an official German government position, as pro-Kremlin and Kremlin-official This was a complex laundering process, media portrayed the situation. with the most active networks identified during the last weeks of March and first No German medium was found which weeks of May. AfD’s proposal was also directly enabled this Kremlin story to covered by the right-wing conservative penetrate the domestic media environment newspaper, Junge Freiheit.37 via IL techniques. However, the narrative was spotted, primarily in leftist media Kremlin official and pro-Kremlin outlets Junge Welt, which utilised misleading were seen to generously amplify AfD ideas headlines and misappropriations to amplify and voices. voices from within the fundamentalist German Communist Party (DKP), asking Potemkin Villages are a sign of coordinated for lifting of the sanctions during the same activity. Two of these IL structures were timeframe. However, a connection to this identified in this case.The initial Potemkin laundering process was not found. Village between Izvestia, Lenta, and Izvestia.

�� 23 Junge Welt’s coverage of the narrative (example)39 40 41

24 �� Table 3. Information Laundering Case 2

Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

18 March

IL ( woozle effect, Foreign pro-Kremlin media Izvestia42 00:01 misappropriation) (RU/RUS)

IL ( NEWS misleading Foreign pro-Kremlin media Lenta.r43 02:22 headline) (RU/RUS)

Baltijas Bals44 02:46 SM (Lenta) Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/LVA)

45 Foreign pro-Kremlin media Izvestia 02:24 IL ( Potemkin village) (RU/RUS)

Federal Press46 03:38 IL ( misappropriation) Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Foreign pro-Kremlin media Komsomolskaya Pravda47 04:11 SM (RU/RUS)

RIA Novosti48 04:16 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

Foreign pro-Kremlin media Regnum49 04:33 SM (RU/RUS)

Argumenti I Fakti50 05:08 SM Foreign accidental actor (RU/RUS)

RosBusinessConsulting51 05:35 SM Foreign accidental actor (RU/RUS)

RT Russian52 05:37 IL ( misappropriation) Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

SM (translation to Topwar 06:14 Foreign proxy (DE/RUS) German) Foreign pro-Kremlin media NSN53 06:19 SM (RU/RUS) Foreign pro-Kremlin media M2454 06:20 SM (RU/RUS)

Krpress.ru55 06:20 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Rossiyskaya Gazeta56 06:26 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

Foreign pro-Kremlin media TV Zvezda57 06:37 SM (RU/RUS)

Realnoevremya.ru58 06:48 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Wi-fi.ru59 07:14 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Sputnik Georgia60 08:01 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/GEO)

Business-gazeta.ru61 08:01 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

�� 25 Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

Weaponews.com62 08:05 SM (Topwar) Foreign proxy (DE/RUS)

Foreign pro-Kremlin media NTV63 08:16 SM (RU/RUS)

Avtoradio.ru64 08:25 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Mosday.ru65 09:00 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

1prime.ru66 09:09 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Kazan.Bezformata67 09:20 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Foreign pro-Kremlin media Gazeta68 09:26 IL ( misappropriation) (RU/RUS)

1sn.ru69 10:04 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Foreign pro-Kremlin media Life70 10:20 SM (RU/RUS)

Interaffairs.ru71 10:49 SM Foreign accidental actor (RU/RUS)

Versia72 10:57 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

Vesti FM73 11:10 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

IL ( NEWS misleading Baltnews Estonia74 11:35 headline, Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/EST) misappropriation)

Eer.ru75 12:17 SM Foreign accidental actor (RU/RUS)

izhevskinfo.ru76 Unk. SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

‘Federation of the Trade Unions of the Republic of Unk. SM Foreign proxy (RU/KAZ) Tatarsan’77

19 March

IL ( NEWS misleading Sputnik Deutschland78 08:32 Kremlin-official media (DE/RUS) headline)

Nao24.ru79 08:56 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

4 May

RIA Novosti80 13:47 IL ( misappropriation) Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

26 �� Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

B IL ( =A deceitful

81 translation, News-Front 18:47 NEWS Foreign pro-Kremlin media (DE/RUS) misleading headline, Potemkin Village) Deutsch-Russisches Forum82 Unk. SM Domestic proxy (RU/DEU)

5 May

IL ( disinformation, Sputnik Deutschland83 09:00 Kremlin-official media (DE/RUS) misappropriation)

6 May

84 Sputnik Deutschland 08:30 IL ( Potemkin Village) Kremlin-official media (DE/RUS)

7 May

IL ( NEWS misleading Vzglyad85 10:05 headline, Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/RUS) misappropriation)

Information Laundering Case 3. US military biological laboratories encircle Russia86 [29 May 2020]

Background. In recent years, the United Deutschland, and the dissemination of this States has built biological laboratories to piece in social media. foment research in Russia’s neighbouring countries such as Kazakhstan, Armenia, Laundering. The placement was carried Tajikistan, and Georgia. Pro-Kremlin out by Kremlin-official outlet RIA Novosti, and Kremlin-official outlets use those by means of misappropriation and woozle laboratories for their disinformation effect in selecting quotes from Russian activities, e.g. claiming that COVID-19 was Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov. intentionally developed in one of those labs. The process started again with a Potemkin In this case study, the reach of the content Village in which Sputnik in different versions to German audiences is limited to the reinforced and amplified RIA’s article. The translation of an international laundering article also discussed a conspiracy theory process by Kremlin-official media, Sputnik about how COVID-19 in Kazakhstan was

�� 27 associated with a biolaboratory built by Observations the US in 2016 (e.g. “интернете поползли слухи, что вирус может быть связан с IL where most of the actors involved биолабораторией, которую в 2016 году were Kremlin-official outlets. RIA Novosti на юго-востоке республики построили conducted the placement, but the process американцы”). In total, 17 outlets were happened principally in different versions involved in the process, where more actors of Sputnik (from Russia’s neighbouring conducted SM than IL. countries) in the course of one day. All were Sputnik versions in the region, i.e. in Russia’s On the layering phase, the first outlet to neighbouring countries, except Lithuania amplify these declarations was Sputnik and Germany. Abkhaz, followed by the Russian-language version of Sputnik Georgia. Interestingly, the Although research does not reveal any latter reproduced RIA’s piece but removed the tangible connection, previous information section that spoke precisely about Georgia. laundering research suggests it is likely Sputnik Lithuania conducted SM. Sputnik that RIA Novosti’s article from 29 May Belarus included a misleading headline: could have been inspired by an article ‘Biolaboratories under the auspices of the first written by Alexei Mukhin, the United States: peaceful developments or Director General of the Centre for Political dangerous experiments?’ (‘Биолаборатории Information of Moscow’s think tank The под эгидой США: мирные разработки Valdai Discussion Club and a regular или опасные опыты?’), causing a potential contributor to Russian outlets,87 pubished bias for the reader from the beginning and on 20 May 2020 in ‘Arguments of the week’ suggesting that the US could be conducting (Аргументах недели) 88. dangerous experiments in the region. Sputnik Deutschland shared the same article but with From official RU MFA sources, observed in a small change in the title: from asking why multiple languages. the US needs biolabs in Central Asia and the Caucasus to ‘Why does the USA need organic laboratories so close to Russia?’ (misappropriation). Sputnik Moldova’s article was amplified by proxies with a Romanian domain. Sputnik Armenia also included a misleading headline, reproducing the exact content but adding at the beginning of the title “Conspiracy you say!?”, aimed at refuting the idea that this is a conspiracy theory.

28 �� Table 4. Information Laundering Case 3

Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

29 May

89 RIA Novost 08:00 IL ( misappropriation, Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS) woozle effect)

90 Sputnik Abkhaz 12:42 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

91 Sputnik Georgia 13:19 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

92 Sputnik Lithuania 13:35 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

93 NEWS Sputnik Belarus 13:52 IL ( misleading Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS) headline)

94 Sputnik Uzbekistan 14:53 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

95 Saintbasil.ru 15:00 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

96 Dp73.spb.tu 17:00 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

97 Sputnik Deutschland 19:20 IL ( misappropriation) Kremlin-official media (DE/RUS)

98 Sputnik Ossetia 20:11 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

99 Sputnik Moldova 20:52 SM Kremlin-official media (RO/RUS)

100 Ziarelive.ro 20:54 SM (Sputnik MDA) Foreign proxy (RO/ROU)

101 NEWS Sputnik Armenia 20:55 IL ( misleading Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS) headline)

102 Portal-ro.com 21:00 SM (Sputnik MDA) Foreign proxy (RO/ROU)

103 Sputnik Azerbaijan 22:51 SM Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS)

104 SyFeed.com Unk. SM (Sputnik MDA) Foreign proxy (RO/ROU)

30 May

105 Sputnik Romania 11:07 SM Kremlin-official media (RO/RUS)

�� 29 Information Laundering Targeting Alexei Navalny

Kremlin-official and pro-Kremlin narratives related to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny compile three of the big conventional topics of information influence activities in the German media environment: Nord Stream-2106, EU sanctions and a Russophobic explanation of the Skripal case. IL processes targeting Navalny’s poisoning try to deny the Russian origin of the poisoning as well as blaming Western Russophobia. The activity of IL actors is expected to grow as the story develops.

Information Laundering Case 4A&4B. Navalny’s symptoms are not consistent with Novichok poisoning, and this is a political theatre orchestrated from Berlin [ongoing]

Background. On Wednesday 2 September, Russian news agency, Interfax. In total, German government spokesman Steffen 19 media were involved. Between 28–30 Seibert stated that toxicological tests on August RT Deutsch’s article was amplified samples taken from Alexei Navalny had by proxy platforms such as the blog Co- provided unequivocal evidence of a chemical op Anti-War Café Berlin and Press24.net, nerve agent from the Novichok group107 108. Ungeheuerliches, and Shafaqna. The Russian opposition leader was airlifted to Berlin’s Charité hospital on August 22 after After the placement by RT Deutsch on falling ill in Tomsk, a city in Siberia. 28 August, the domestic proxy platform Friedliche-Loesungen shared the exact Laundering. This process combined two content from the Kremlin-official outlet unchained IL sequences, starting with a but deleted the first paragraph. This German-language video published on RT automatically emphasised the content Deutsch on 28 August (placement by means of the second paragraph of RT’s piece of disinformation and misleading headline), (misappropriation): the alleged lack and incorporating later on a woozle effect of willingness of the Charité’s doctors with comments from Russian scientists to collaborate with Russian doctors, made to Kremlin-official RIA Novosti and with a component of Russophobia and

30 �� Two days later, on 4 September, the Information Laundering information was further laundered by the German version of RT, which included Targeting Alexei Navalny a misleading headline that stated the symptoms were “absolutely unusual” for Novichok (“Absolut unübliche Symptome”: Nowitschok-Entwickler bezweifeln Nervengift-Anschlag auf Nawalny”), continuing the woozle effect, and added several misappropriations, suggesting that Western authorities were unwilling to cooperate with Russian doctors as had happened with the cases of Litvinenko Image of Navalny utilised in Qpress.de and Skripal. At the end of the article, RT Deutsch republished the video shared on political interests aimed at jeopardising 28 August, combining both laundering Nord Stream-2. Later that day, domestic processes in a single piece. RT Deutsch’s marginal proxy Berliner TagesZeitung article was amplified through SM by continued the laundering process by copy- German-language platforms like Staseve.eu pasting the same RT headline, text and and Press24.net. The laundering process video but adding a single modification: an was continued by Qpress.de, in an article “evil” (“böses”) before “political theatre” that discussed whether Navalny is a victim in the title (“DER RUSSISCHE PATIENT” – of Nord Stream-2. Besides a misleading BÖSES POLITTHEATER IN DER BERLINER headline (“Ist Nawalny Opfer der Nord CHARITE´). By doing this, the author Stream-2 Pipeline?”), it incorporated accused German doctors of being immoral, disinformation and was accompanied by creating this alleged “political theatre”. This visual support that discredited Navalny’s process was also amplified by SM by click- image. bait site Der Nachrichtenspiegel (domestic marginal proxy).

The English version of RT combined both articles from RIA and Interfax, continuing the woozle effect, to publish a news piece directed at rejecting the possibility of Novichok. This was amplified by several English-language proxies like Shafqna, News Factory, and Ozovc.

�� 31 Observations of a strategy orchestrated to directly harm Russia. IL was also aimed at discrediting This IL was the result of two separate IL Navalny (e.g. see picture above). Some processes, 4 a and 4b (see tables 5 and 6) Kremlin-official media and pro-Kremlin that converged to disseminate the idea that sources label the Russian politician as a Navalny was not poisoned with Novichok / “blogger” cast doubt about it. RIA’s and Interfax’s pieces were laundered in other languages such as The level of distortion was high, from Russian and English. However, researching this symptoms not entirely matching Novichok’s exceeds the scope of this study. effects to Navalny being a victim of Nord Stream-2. IL was conducted mainly by foreign Russian-language and domestic German- German-language Press24.net, Friedliche- language actors over seven days. Loesungen, and Safaqna were seen again to act as proxies. The woozle effect was reinforced when quotes from Leonid Rink and Vladimir IL was widely amplified on social media. Uglev were repeated by IL actors to provide One of the Twitter users that amplified it legitimacy to the laundered content, but with was RT’s collaborator, Bryan McDonald4 a failure of maintaining the hyperlink to the sources of reference – i.e. Interfax and RIA. Keywords-based research on this laundering process shows that German This case illustrates how some IL journalist Florian Rötzer is taking a very actors simply launder the content by active role in casting doubt on Navalny’s reproducing the exact information from poisoning in the platform Telepolis On several the previous source and adding one subtle occasions, Nachdenkseiten has translated modification. In this case, the artificial content about Navalny’s case from the website incorporation of a word in the headline of former British Ambassador Craig Murray. (“evil political theatre”) reinforced the idea

32 �� Table 5. Information Laundering Case 4a

Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

28 August

IL ( misappropriation, NEWS RT Deutsch110 10:33 misleading Kremlin-official media (DE/RUS) headline)

Friedliche-Loesungen111 23:30 IL ( misappropriation) Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

Press24.net112 Unk. SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

Shafaqna113 Unk. SM Foreign proxy (DE/PAK)

29 August

Co-op News114 00:41 SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

Ungehuerliches115 Unk. SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

30 August

NEWS IL ( misleading Berliner TagesZeitung116 09:08 Domestic proxy (DE/GER) headline)

Der Nachrichtenspiegel Unk. SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

�� 33 Table 6. Information Laundering Case 4b

Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

2 September

IL ( woozle effect, RIA Novosti117 10:33 Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS) misappropriation)

Interfax118 16:52 IL ( woozle effect) Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/RUS)

IL ( woozle effect, RT119 19:52 Kremlin-official media (EN/RUS) misappropriation)

News Factory120 22:32 SM Foreign proxy (EN/RUS)

Ozovc121 Unk. SM Foreign proxy (EN/USA)

Syria.Shafqna122 Unk. SM Foreign proxy (EN/PAK)

4 September

NEWS IL ( misleading RT Deutsch123 06:30 headline, Kremlin-official media (DE/RUS) woozle effect, misappropriation)

NEWS IL ( misleading Qpress124 14:51 headline, Domestic proxy (DE/GER) disinformation)

Staseve125 Unk. SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

Press24.net126 Unk. SM Domestic proxy (DE/GER)

34 �� Information Laundering Case 5.Targeting Other Domestic Topics: Nord Stream-2

The murder of a Georgian in Berlin to support the connection between the is linked to Nord Stream-2 murder and Nord Stream-2. Although there [5 December 2019] was wide coverage of this issue in Russian- language media, this analysis focuses on Background. Georgian citizen and former the information laundering process started Chechen fighter Zelimkhan Khangoshvili by the distortion and selective use of was murdered on 23 August 2019 in the Alexander Rahr’s quotes to disseminate the centre of Berlin. Kremlin-official and pro- message that the Russophobic West was Kremlin media outlets in Russian and blaming this “new Skripal case” on Russia Georgian laundered the news in order to to influence Nord Stream-2. The laundering portray this case as a direct consequence was conducted mainly in Russian-language of the deteriorating relationship between media by seven outlets. Germany and Russia, related to the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline. After the murder of In the layering phase, also 4 December Mr Khangoshvili, Germany expelled two 2019, Vzglyad again reproduced the Russian diplomats as Germany’s federal previous article, applying the techniques of prosecutor stated that “there are sufficient a misleading headline, misappropriation, factual grounds to suggest that the killing and disinformation. The misleading [...] was carried out either on behalf of state headline directly linked Nord Stream-2 to agencies of the Russian Federation or those the murder and referred to the case as of the Autonomous Chechen Republic, as ‘the German Skripal’. Disinformation and part of the Russian Federation.”127 misappropriation were combined when the author claimed that the source of this This laundering case combines widespread information provided was respected German Nord Stream-2 related narratives news magazine Der Spiegel, including a with Russophobia, and Skripal case hyperlink. However, the source was actually conspiratorial theories. from the reputable German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel128. Only the latter outlet Laundering. The placement was conducted published on the story. Vzglyad’s author by pro-Kremlin media outlet Vzglyad on also declared that the piece proudly claimed 4 December 2019, including a woozle effect that now Germany had its own Skripal quoting German historian Alexander Rahr case (Авторитетное немецкое издание

�� 35 Screenshots from Sputnik Georgia

Der Spiegel в статье под заголовком misleading headline, increasing the «Российский государственный террор possibility of the report being picked by one бросает вызов Германии» и вовсе с of Germany’s most-read news magazines нескрываемой гордостью заявляет, что (disinformation), and selectively using «теперь у ФРГ официально есть дело experts’ quotes to connect two separate Скрипаля»), constituting misappropriation. events, i.e. the murder could have happened According to SimilarWeb, while Der Spiegel as a consequence of Nord Stream-2 has 112.35M monthly readers (data from (misappropriation). The newspaper also July 2020), Der Tagesspiegel has 26.23M. included other misappropriations at the end Both are reputable publications, but the of the piece, using comments from AfD’s former is a news magazine published once Waldemar Herdt to that the accusation a week and read across Germany, while the that the murder is linked to Russia was just latter is a daily newspaper mainly distributed but another case of Western Russophobia in and around Berlin. The similarities in (misappropriation). the newspapers’ names (primarily for non- German speaking audiences) was probably On the following day, Russian media outlet used strategically to appeal to a broader Topcor.ru amplified the content from audience, since Der Spiegel is a more better Vzglyad’s last article via SM, maintaining known publication than Der Tagesspiegel. the woozle effect. Although the platform directly amplified the content from Vzglyad, Ostensibly, Mr Rahr casually stated that again the link did not lead to the cited news this event happened precisely when Russia piece. The final paragraphs of Topcor.ru and Germany were improving relations included comments from Russian Minister and completing the construction of Nord of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov on the Stream-2. By selectively picking these events, defending Russia’s innocence and quotes from the German historian, the comparing this with the case of the MH17 newspaper Vzglyad created the perfect flight, i.e. the Russophobic West again piece: appealing to audiences with a blaming Russia without having proof to

36 �� back up their statements. On the same day, German news stories were used strategically the Georgian-language version of Sputnik to influence international and Russian- Georgia amplified the news on a video that speaking audiences. once again linked the whole situation to the construction of Nord Stream-2. The video The most relevant IL tactic was the was published on Sputnik’s website and combination of woozle effect and disseminated through its YouTube channels misappropriation, including German and social media. The Russian-language experts and Russian political figures in version of Sputnik Georgia amplified a order to legitimise misleading information: Russian translation the following day, with the idea that both the assassination and the a misleading headline that stated that blaming of Russia were linked to Western Germany and Russia were on the brink of a Russophobia and Nord Stream-2. This was scandal. reinforced by the strategic exploitation of the similarities in the names of Der Spiegel Observations and Der Tagesspiegel.

IL techniques were mainly conducted by Distortion of the facts was high, involving a proxy actors. The absence of German- mix of conventional disinformation pieces: the language media indicates that German- Skripal case, Nord Stream-2 and Russophobia. speaking audiences were not targeted. The media involved, the techniques applied, Vzglyad (placement) is owned by Putin and the source magnification suggest that supporter Konstantin Rykov,

�� 37 with connections to former Putin Key experts mentioned: Alexander Rahr aide Vladislav Surkov.129 130 Rykov is a (German historian), Waldemar Herdt propagandist who rganised the campaign (German politician, AfD). Allegedly, Mr Rahr ‘Glory to Russia!’ (Слава России!) and a also commented on the incident on the Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian pro-Kremlin outlet 360 TV133, which was Federation.131 132 amplified by the Russian language outlet Daily Storm134. The main language of the campaign was Russian. Georgian is secondary language.

Table 7. Information Laundering Case 5

Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin)

4 December

135 Vzglyad 12:56 IL ( woozle effect) Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/RUS)

IL ( NEWS misleading headline, Vzglyad136 14:14 Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/RUS) misappropriation and disinformation)

Top.st137 21:56 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

News.myseldon.com138 Unk. SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

5 December

Sputnik Georgia139 20:17 IL ( misappropriation) Kremlin-official media (GE/RUS)

Topcor.ru140 21:23 IL ( misappropriation) Foreign proxy (RU/RUS)

6 December

IL ( NEWS misleading Sputnik Georgia141 10:49 Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS) headline)

38 �� CONCLUDING REMARKS

This research confirmed that Information Laundering processes take place in Germany, with national and foreign actors enabling the spread of the Kremlin’s influence in the domestic media environment. Depending on their intended effects and the target audiences of each case, two types of IL have been identified in the country. As we can see in Cases 1 and 4, in IL-A, domestic actors launder foreign or international news events and translate them into German language, thereby deliberately or accidentally spreading the Kremlin’s influence in the German media environment. Meanwhile, Cases 2,3 and 5 illustrate IL-B, where foreign actors launder domestic German news events to shape perspectives about Germany for an international or foreign audience.

Media outlet Time Process Category (language of publication/ country of origin) In the context of IL, German actors Although they have a narrower audience, 4 December interact with foreign actors to configure German fringe outlets could potentially be transnational networks that launder regular used as a gateway into Germany’s (social) 135 Vzglyad 12:56 IL ( woozle effect) Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/RUS) domestic disinformation topics, for example, media environment. Finally, the activity of

NEWS conspiracy theories such as Pizzagate, Nord these domestic outlets was supported by IL ( misleading headline, Stream-2, and more recently, COVID-19, and pro-Kremlin (News-Front, Topwar, SOTT) and Vzglyad136 14:14 Foreign pro-Kremlin media (RU/RUS) misappropriation and Navalny’s poisoning. In total, 13 domestic Kremlin-official mediaRT, ( Sputnik) in the disinformation) outlets were identified as taking part in the German language, while foreign pro-Kremlin Top.st137 21:56 SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS) process. They were mostly proxies: and Kremlin-official media repeatedly amplified the voices of German political News.myseldon.com138 Unk. SM Foreign proxy (RU/RUS) In addition to the outlets mentioned in Table and public figures, mainly from the far-right 5 December 8, the IL investigation also identified actors Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and leftist publishing pieces that could somehow Die Linke. 139 Sputnik Georgia 20:17 IL ( misappropriation) Kremlin-official media (GE/RUS) be linked to laundering processes. More

Topcor.ru140 21:23 IL ( misappropriation) Foreign proxy (RU/RUS) research needs to be conducted to verify In summary, IL research aims to contribute participation in German IL by Junge Welt to the study of the Kremlin’s information 6 December journalist Florian Rötzer in the blog Telepolis. influence activities by mapping and

NEWS Rötzer has recently taken a very active role assessing the hostile information IL ( misleading Sputnik Georgia141 10:49 Kremlin-official media (RU/RUS) headline) in casting doubt on Navalny’s poisoning on environment of a particular country, Telepolis. On several occasions, fringe media taking a holistic approach to the life cycle Nachdenkseiten has translated content of information influence campaigns. By about Navalny’s case from the website of exposing how these processes occur and former British Ambassador Craig Murray. who participates in them, EU institutions

�� 39 and national governments, as well as vulnerabilities of specific domestic media civil society and journalists, can build environments, and uncovering repeated resilience against information influence patterns and connections between actors, activities, improving understanding of the media outlets, and influence techniques.

Table 8. Domestic actors directly participating in IL in Germany

Media outlet Category

Boersenwolf.blogspot.com Domestic proxy

Die Freie Welt Domestic accidental actor

Connectiv.events Domestic proxy (by Qlobal-Change)

Watergate.tv Domestic proxy

Deutsch-Russisches Forum Domestic proxy

Friedliche-Loesungen Domestic proxy

Press24.net Domestic proxy

Co-op News Domestic proxy

Ungehuerliches Domestic proxy

Berliner TagesZeitung Domestic

Der Nachrichtenspiegel Domestic proxy

Qpress Domestic proxy

Staseve Domestic proxy

40 �� Endnotes

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