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Les Assassinats Et Tentatives De Meurtres Visant Les Opposants Tchétchènes Dans Les Pays Européens Depuis 2009 FEDERATION DE

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Les Assassinats Et Tentatives De Meurtres Visant Les Opposants Tchétchènes Dans Les Pays Européens Depuis 2009 FEDERATION DE FEDERATION DE RUSSIE 30 mai 2020 Les assassinats et tentatives de meurtres visant les opposants Tchétchènes dans les pays européens depuis 2009 Avertissement Ce document a été élaboré par la Division de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra en vue de fournir des informations utiles à l’examen des demandes de protection internationale. Il ne prétend pas faire le traitement exhaustif de la problématique, ni apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d’une demande de protection internationale particulière. Il ne doit pas être considéré comme une position officielle de l’Ofpra ou des autorités françaises. Ce document, rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices communes à l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) [cf. https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/lignes_directrices_europeennes.pdf ], se veut impartial et se fonde principalement sur des renseignements puisés dans des sources qui sont à la disposition du public. Toutes les sources utilisées sont référencées. Elles ont été sélectionnées avec un souci constant de recouper les informations. Le fait qu’un événement, une personne ou une organisation déterminée ne soit pas mentionné(e) dans la présente production ne préjuge pas de son inexistence. La reproduction ou diffusion du document n’est pas autorisée, à l’exception d’un usage personnel, sauf accord de l’Ofpra en vertu de l’article L. 335-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle. Fédération de Russie : Les assassinats et tentatives de meurtres visant les opposants Tchétchènes dans les pays européens depuis 2009 Table des matières Introduction ....................................................................................................... 4 1. Les premiers assassinats d’opposants tchétchènes hors Russie entre 2009 à 2017 ................................................................................................................... 5 1.1. L’assassinat d’Oumar ISRAILOV à Vienne (Autriche) en 2009 .......................... 5 1.2. Autres assassinats hors Union européenne ................................................... 6 2. L’assassinat de Zelimkhan KHANGOCHVILI à Berlin (Allemagne) le 23 août 2019 ................................................................................................................... 6 2.1. Le profil de Zelimkhan KHANGOCHVILI ........................................................ 6 2.2. Le profil du meurtrier présumé ................................................................... 7 2.3. Crise diplomatique entre Berlin et Moscou en décembre 2019 ......................... 9 3. L’assassinat du blogueur Imran ALIEV à Lille (France) le 29 janvier 2020 . 10 3.1. Le profil d’Imran ALIEV ........................................................................... 10 3.2. Le profil du suspect ................................................................................ 13 3.3. Des mises en causes politiques de l’assassinat évoquées mais non immédiatement formellement établies ....................................................................................... 15 4. Les menaces contre Minkail MALYSHEV / Minkail MALIZAEV (Allemagne, Belgique et France) .......................................................................................... 16 4.1. Parcours d’exil de Minkail MALYSHEV/MALIZAEV ......................................... 16 4.2. Liens avec l’assassinat d’Imran ALIEV et cible potentielle du tueur ................ 17 5. L’attentat contre Toumso ABDOURAKHMANOV (Suède) de février 2020 .... 18 5.1. Le plus populaire des blogueurs tchétchènes .............................................. 18 5.2. Parcours d’exil de Toumso ABDOURAKHMANOV depuis 2015 ........................ 18 5.3. Un blogueur toujours menacé à l’étranger .................................................. 20 5.4. La tentative d’assassinat à son domicile du 26 février 2020 .......................... 21 5.4.1. L’agression du 26 février 2020 ........................................................... 21 5.4.2. Les réactions à l’agression ................................................................. 21 5.4.3. Procédures d’enquêtes de police ......................................................... 22 Bibliographie .................................................................................................... 24 2 DIDR – OFPRA 30/05/2020 Fédération de Russie : Les assassinats et tentatives de meurtres visant les opposants Tchétchènes dans les pays européens depuis 2009 Résumé : Cette note relative aux assassinats et tentatives de meurtres visant les opposants tchétchènes dans les pays européens depuis 2009 abordent les menaces publiques proférées à leur encontre, d’une manière générale, par le chef de la Tchétchénie Ramzan KADYROV et ses acolytes, et le rôle joué par les autorités fédérales russes, à travers le Service fédéral de Sécurité (FSB). La note aborde l’assassinat d’Oumar ISRAILOV en Autriche en 2009, l’assassinat de Zelimkhan KHANGOCHVILI en Allemagne en août 2019, l’assassinat du blogueur Imran ALIEV alias Mansour STARYÏ en France en janvier 2020, les menaces répétées contre le blogueur Minkail MALYSHEV alias Minkail MALIZAEV en Allemagne, en Belgique et en France, et la tentative de meurtre contre le blogueur Toumso ABDOURAKHMANOV en Suède en février 2020. Abstract : This note on the assassinations and attempted murders targeting Chechen opponents in European countries since 2009 addresses the public threats made against them, in general, by the head of Chechnya Ramzan KADYROV and his acolytes, and the role played by the Russian federal authorities, through the Federal Security Service (FSB). The note addresses the assassination of Umar ISRAILOV in Austria in 2009, the assassination of Zelimkhan KHANGOSHVILI in Germany in August 2019, the assassination of blogger Imran ALYEV alias Mansur STARYÏ in France in January 2020, repeated threats against blogger Minkail MALYSHEV alias Minkail MALIZAEV in Germany, Belgium and France, and the attempted murder against blogger Tumso ABDURAKHMANOV in Sweden in February 2020. Nota : La traduction des sources en langues étrangères est assurée par la DIDR. 3 DIDR – OFPRA 30/05/2020 Fédération de Russie : Les assassinats et tentatives de meurtres visant les opposants Tchétchènes dans les pays européens depuis 2009 Introduction En 2016, le chef de la Tchétchénie Ramzan KADYROV profère à l’adresse de ses compatriotes vivant à l’étranger la menace suivante : « Un jour, peut-être dans 5 ou 10 ans quand vous serez un peu plus malins et quand vos parents vous diront que vous devez rentrer à la maison, dans votre patrie, ou quand vous serez expulsés de l’Europe et que vous n’aurez nulle part où aller, alors vous aurez à répondre auprès de moi pour chacune de vos paroles ! »1. Il déclare également le même jour : « Je connais tous les sites, je connais chacun des comptes de ceux qui habitent en Europe, que ce soit sur Instagram, Facebook ou les autres medias sociaux. J’ai noté chacun de vos propos, nous avons des infos sur chacun de vous et nous savons qui vous êtes. Nous vivons aujourd’hui à l’époque de la technologie et nous savons d’où vous écrivez et vous êtes à notre merci »2. Il apparaît ainsi explicitement que Ramzan KADYROV et ses services utilisent les réseaux sociaux et les messageries sur smartphones, tels qu’Instagram ou WhatsApp, afin de retrouver les personnes ayant quitté le territoire tchétchène, et notamment les opposants qui continuent à s’exprimer publiquement contre le pouvoir tchétchène3. De telles pratiques sont en outre attestées par le témoignage d’un exilé dont le compte WhatsApp a été piraté et qui reçoit par ce canal des menaces du président du Parlement tchétchène Magomed DAOUDOV4. Le 4 novembre 2019, dans un discours prononcé en tchétchène devant une réunion élargie du gouvernement tchétchène, et diffusé en soirée aux actualités de la chaîne de télévision « Grozny » et sur le site Internet de la chaîne de télévision d’Etat de Tchétchénie (TchGuTRK, selon l’acronyme russe), Ramzan KADYROV dénonce « les provocateurs créant un climat d'information négatif autour de la république » et appelle à un châtiment sévère contre ceux qui le critiquent sur Internet5. Il poursuit : « Quiconque propage des troubles, des commérages - s’ils ne sont pas tués, emprisonnés, arrêtés, rien n’en sortira »6. Le porte-parole du président russe Dmitri PESKOV refuse de commenter cette déclaration publique de menace de Ramzan KADYROV7. Ce dernier revient sur ces déclarations le 14 novembre 2019 en affirmant que « ses mots ne doivent pas être pris littéralement »8 et que « des provocateurs ont mal interprété ses déclarations », tout en les justifiant, puisque, selon lui « les menaces de battre et de tuer correspondent à l'Adat »9, le code de l’honneur coutumier tchétchène. L’organisation non gouvernementale (ONG) russe de défense des droits de l’Homme « Mémorial » interpelle les autorités fédérales quant aux menaces publiques prononcées par Ramzan KADYROV, dont la Direction pour la Tchétchénie du Comité d’enquêtes de la Fédération de Russie. « Mémorial » reçoit le 26 février 2020 une réponse formelle de ladite Direction pour la Tchétchénie du Comité d’enquêtes de la Russie refusant d’examiner les propos tenus par Ramzan KADYROV et de donner suite à la requête et informant que celle-ci est transférée au Comité d’enquêtes de la Républiques de Tchétchénie10. Le 27 mai 2020, Ramzan KADYROV qu’il est prêt à pardonner les partisans de l’indépendance de la Tchétchénie (Itchkérie)
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