Search and Rescue

House of Commons Transport Committee

Search and Rescue

Eighth Report of Session 2004–05

Volume I Report, together with formal minutes

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 23 March 2005

HC 322-I Published on 2 April 2005 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £10.00

The Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies.

Current membership Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody MP (Labour, Crewe) (Chairman) Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) Mr Brian H. Donohoe MP (Labour, Cunninghame South) Clive Efford MP (Labour, Eltham) Mrs Louise Ellman MP (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) Ian Lucas MP (Labour, Wrexham) Miss Anne McIntosh MP (Conservative, Vale of York) Mr Paul Marsden MP (Liberal Democrat, Shrewsbury and Atcham) Mr John Randall MP (Conservative, Uxbridge) Mr George Stevenson MP (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South) Mr Graham Stringer MP (Labour, Manchester Blackley)

Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/transcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Eve Samson (Clerk), David Bates (Second Clerk), Clare Maltby (Committee Specialist), Philippa Carling (Inquiry Manager), Miss Frances Allingham (Committee Assistant), Miss Michelle Edney (Secretary), Henry Ayi-Hyde (Senior Office Clerk) and James O’Sullivan (Sandwich Student).

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]

Contents

Report Page

Summary 3

1 Introduction 5

2 Organisation of SAR services 6 The international context 6 The UK Search and Rescue Organisation 6 Demand for SAR services 8 Beach lifeguards 10

3 The voluntary ethos 11 Volunteers 12 A volunteer shortage? 12 Availability of volunteers 15 Charities 18 VAT 20

4 HM Coastguard 24 Conflicting evidence 24 National Coastwatch Institution 27

Conclusions and recommendations 29

Annex: Visit notes 32

Formal minutes 34

Witnesses 35

List of written evidence 36

Reports from the Transport Committee since 2002 37

Summary

The UK’s Search and Rescue arrangements are generally effective, and better than those which existed previously. The current arrangements are a patchwork which involves at least six Government Departments, one Government Agency, the devolved administrations, the statutory emergency services and numerous voluntary organisations. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, but the number of organisations involved means extra effort is needed to ensure they all work together. Demand for Search and Rescue seems likely to increase as more people engage in boating and high–risk leisure pursuits on land and at sea. More systematic ways need to be found of forecasting demand, so that we can be sure the UK’s Search and Rescue resources are adequate.

The UK’s Search and Rescue effort relies heavily on volunteers and voluntary organisations. Unless further support is given to volunteering, we fear more employed staff will be required in the future, at greater cost to the taxpayer. The Government needs to support volunteering and voluntary organisations now to save money in the future. This includes reducing some of the administrative and financial burdens on voluntary organisations, volunteers and their primary employers.

We are also concerned at the apparently poor relationship between the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Public and Commercial Services union, which represents Coastguard watch staff. Conflicting information from the MCA and PCS has prevented us from assessing fully the performance of HM Coastguard. Put simply, this is not good enough, and we suggest in Chapter 4 that the MCA and PCS should co–operate to provide us with better information when the Government produces its response to this Report..

1 Introduction

1. We pay tribute all those who work in Search and Rescue. They often take much greater risks than most of the rest of us, and they do so to save lives and help people in distress. We admire their dedication and commitment. This Committee is charged by Parliament with examining the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies, and this report is part of that task.

2. The Department for Transport (DfT) is responsible for civil maritime and aeronautical Search and Rescue policy. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) provides the co-ordination service for maritime Search and Rescue. The Committee’s report into the work of the MCA highlighted the increase in incidents, accidents and deaths around the coast,1 and the Government’s response emphasised the role of the Auxiliary Coastguard Service.2 The Committee therefore decided to examine the UK’s Search and Rescue arrangements in more detail in order to gain a broad view of their effectiveness, resources and capabilities.

3. On 3 February 2005, Members and staff of the Committee visited the MCA’s Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Dover. On 9 February and 2 March, the Committee took oral evidence from the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA), Mountain Rescue— England and Wales, the Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR), the UK Lowland Institute, the National Coastwatch Institution (NCI), the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI), the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS), NUMAST (the National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers), the MCA Chief Executive and the Chief Coastguard, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State at the Home Office, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Department for Transport, Fiona Mactaggart MP, Phil Hope MP and David Jamieson MP respectively. We also received written evidence from a number of organisations and individuals. We are grateful to everyone who helped us with our inquiry, and to our Specialist Adviser, Professor James McConville.

1 Transport Committee, The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Fourteenth Report of Session 2003–04, HC 500 [2003–04] 2 The Government’s Response to the Transport Committee’s Report on the Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Cm 6343

2 Organisation of SAR services

The international context 4. Search and Rescue (SAR) is generally understood to mean the location and recovery of people who are in distress, in potential distress or missing, and their delivery to a place of safety. The United Kingdom is a signatory to various international conventions, notably the Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1974), the Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR 1979) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (“the Chicago Convention” 1974). These oblige the UK to provide certain Search and Rescue services in the UK Search and Rescue Region for civil maritime and civil aeronautical traffic, and require some of these to be organised in certain ways.3

5. Although the international obligations impose a common framework for each State Party’s Search and Rescue organisation, for example by requiring Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCCs), there are many models worldwide for the organisation of the services which are an essential part of the SAR effort. For example, many lifeboat and lifesaving services are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like our own RNLI, but some also provide other services, and others are government bodies, like the Canadian Coast Guard.4 Some choices about the provision of the UK’s civil maritime and aeronautical SAR services therefore remain matters for the UK, but our international obligations require that the services themselves must be provided and placed within a defined organisational framework. Inland Search and Rescue—such as mountain rescue and lowland search—is not governed by international obligations in the same way. We nevertheless consider inland SAR to be an essential service.

The UK Search and Rescue Organisation 6. The UK Search and Rescue Organisation is “an amalgam of civil, military, maritime, aeronautical and land–based assets involving separate Government Departments, the emergency services and other organisations. These include a number of charities and voluntary organisations which play a significant role in providing a national SAR capability.”5 Although, as previously noted, the Department for Transport has responsibility for civil aeronautical and maritime SAR policy, the police service is responsible for the co-ordination of land–based and inland waters SAR. By inter– departmental agreement, the Ministry of Defence, which provides SAR facilities for military purposes, also exercises the Department for Transport’s responsibility for civil aeronautical SAR.

7. The UK SAR Organisation exists primarily through its committee structure. The current structures were established in 2000 and replaced the previous “UK Search and Rescue Committee”, which many of our witnesses agreed had been unwieldy, and which did not

3 see map of UK Search and Rescue Region attached to SAR 13 4 See Evans, C. (2003) Rescue at Sea: An International History of Lifesaving, Coastal Rescue Craft and Organisations, London, Conway Maritime Press 5 SAR 13, paragraph 2

bring together air, land and sea interests in the same way.6 Mr Michael Vlasto, Operations Director of the RNLI and a member of the current UK SAR Operators Group, described the current arrangement as “not perfect but it is a lot better than it was.”7

8. The UK SAR Strategic Committee is the inter-agency policy forum which brings together organisations with aeronautical, maritime and land-based SAR responsibilities. It advises Ministers on the structure, scope and framework of the organisation of SAR for the UK SAR region.8 The Department for Transport representative chairs the Strategic Committee, and the Department also provides its secretariat. The Ministry of Defence provides the vice chair. The other members of the Strategic Committee are the Home Office, the Maritime & Coastguard Agency, the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO), the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPO(S)), the Chief Fire Officers’ Association (CFOA), the Ambulance Service Association (ASA) and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI).

9. Mr David Jamieson MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Transport, told us that the Strategic Committee met only once last year.9 This is at odds with the requirements of the UK SAR Framework, which was only published in 2002 and states that it should meet at least twice per year.10 Mr Andrew Freemantle MBE, Chief Executive of the RNLI, told us that he did not think the Strategic Committee met often enough,11 and Captain Stephen Bligh, Chief Executive of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), suggested that “possibly it [the committee] has not been as active as it should have been”.12 We do not advocate meetings of the Strategic Committee for the sake of having them, but last year the committee did not even meet the undemanding terms of the SAR Organisation’s “constitution”. There also seems to be an appetite from the both the MCA and the RNLI—the only non-governmental member of the committee—to meet more often.

10. As Chairman of the UK SAR Strategic Committee, the Department for Transport should review the frequency of meetings of that committee. We agree that there is no point to unnecessary meetings, but the RNLI and MCA suggest the committee could meet more often. We hope that the issues raised in this report will provide some suitable subject matter for discussion at those meetings.

11. The UK SAR Operators Group brings together the national organisations whose members and employees provide search and rescue services. It is part of the same overall structure as the Strategic Committee, but we were told it meets every two to three months.13 It advises and makes recommendations to the Strategic Committee. The Operators Group is chaired by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. The Ministry of

6 eg Q 175 7 Q 178 8 SAR 13, paragraph 1 9 Q 356

10 Queen’s Printer and Controller, Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 2002, paragraph 7.2.2 11 Q 166 12 Q 294 13 Q 357

Defence (RAF) provides the vice-chair. Other Members of the Group are the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO), the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPO(S)), the Chief Fire Officers’ Association (CFOA), the Ambulance Service Association (ASA), the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI), the Royal Life Saving Society, Mountain Rescue—England and Wales, the Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland, the British Cave Rescue Council and the Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR).

12. In 2001, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) became the Government Department responsible for the fire and rescue service, which had previously been the responsibility of the Home Office. We were initially surprised that ODPM was not represented on the Strategic Committee or the Operators Group. However, Mr Jamieson told us that:

“I think it is an omission that the ODPM is not represented on the Strategic Group, and that is something I think we are going to put right.”14

13. We are grateful for the Minister’s indication that the ODPM will be represented on the UK SAR Strategic Committee in the future, and suggest that it should also be represented on the Operators Group.

Demand for SAR services 14. We were keen to establish whether demand for SAR services is likely to rise, fall or remain constant in the future. Estimates are essential to determine whether SAR capacity will be sufficient in years to come, especially if that capacity might vary unless action is taken. The MCA has traditionally assessed demand for maritime SAR by examining the number of reports to the Coastguard.15 The official statistics in Table 1 show that the number of reports to the Coastguard increased by an average of 3.58% each year between 1998 and 2004, and by 23% overall over the same period.

Table 1: HM Coastguard incident reports since 1996 Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Total 11,553 12,220 12,016 12,514 13,395 13,849 14,240 Reports

Source: SAR 12B 15. The assessment method used previously by the MCA suggests that the trend for maritime SAR demand is certainly one of increase. The RNLI told us that demand was increasing for its services, year on year,16 that there had been a growth in recreational boating, and that the increase in the number of people participating in hazardous water sports led to an increase in the number of people requiring assistance.17 Mr Freemantle reported growth in the “Birmingham navy” of occasional sea–farers:

14 Q 388 15 SAR 12B 16 Q 199 17 Q 200

“As people have more money they buy boats and they drive them to the coast at the weekend and perhaps do not know how to drive them on the sea as well as they should, and of course quite a number of our rescues are caused because of that and that is a trend.”18

16. The Government admitted that anecdotal evidence suggested a rise in demand, but noted there was not a great deal of data. The MCA has commissioned research which should help calculate demand around the coast:

“Although there is much anecdotal evidence that the number of people involved in leisure pursuits around the UK coast (including high–risk activities) is increasing (for example, the tourist boards provide some material which is a helpful indication of trends in this area), there are no reliable, comprehensive official statistics available. In 2004 the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) commissioned a research project to establish accident ‘rates’ by comparing the number of accidents against the numbers of people participating in leisure activities in a variety of areas around the coast. This work will be completed in April 2005 and will provide a more robust measure of risk and monitoring trends within this non-regulated sector.”19

17. The MCA’s research only covers the coast. On land, Dr Anthony S G Jones MBE, Vice Chairman of Mountain Rescue—England and Wales, told us that the number of people going out onto the hills and fells had increased, so the absolute number of people involved in incidents had increased.20 He also suggested that new sports such as parapenting21 and mountain biking on hard ground had increased the risk.22 Mr Alan Riddet of the Chief Fire Officers Association suggested not only that more people were engaging in high–risk leisure activities, but that “there is great expectation from the public that when things go wrong, somebody will be there to deal with it.”23 He also acknowledged that data had to be gathered to prove the rising trend and that “we cannot just deal with that anecdotally”.24 Although Mr Robert Bradley of the UK Lowland Search Institute was understandably wary of the costs to voluntary organisations of collecting and managing statistics,25 Mountain Rescue—England and Wales were able to tell us that the number of call–outs has increased by over 125 per year since 1999.26 We believe the type of research which the MCA has commissioned for maritime SAR should be commissioned for inland SAR in order to help forecast demand.

18. The Government and the SAR Strategic Committee need to be able to forecast future demand for SAR services in order to assess the ability of SAR services to meet it. The MCA has commissioned useful research about accident levels around the coast, but

18 Q 224 19 SAR 12B 20 Q 86 21 Parapenting is a sport in which the participant jumps from a high place wearing a modified type of parachute which is then used as a hang-glider.

22 Q 86 23 Q 31 24 Q 33 25 SAR 01 26 SAR 11

more work is required inland. Data collection does not need to be particularly onerous, but the Strategic Committee must determine whether research should be commissioned or further information be collected by inland operators to better forecast demand for inland SAR.

Beach lifeguards 19. While the RNLI is most famous for its lifeboats, it also now provides beach lifeguards on 57 beaches under service level agreements with local authorities.27 Local authorities make a contribution to the RNLI where the Institution provides this service, but it costs the RNLI £3m per year to run a service which employs 300 lifeguards.28 Mr Freemantle told us that some local authorities were reluctant to continue to make a contribution to the RNLI when the time came to renew their service level agreements:

“[T]hey try to back away and leave us holding the can, which is something that we are not very happy with and is stopping us doing it elsewhere.”29

20. Mr Freemantle suggested that, even if the RNLI provided the lifesaving service, the local authority should retain overall responsibility for lifesaving on a beach because they made money out of car parking and other franchises there.30 We have sympathy with his view, but we also understand that local authorities may not want to bind themselves to service level agreements which supply a service they are not legally obliged to provide. Mr Phil Hope MP, Parliamentary Under–Secretary of State at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), agreed to look into the matter further, but explained that while local authorities might take into account the need for lifesaving services, there was no statutory requirement for local authorities to supply lifeguards.31 The Government subsequently outlined to the Committee the arrangements for reporting local authorities which act outside their powers when managing contracts, which is not really the issue.32

21. We are grateful for Mr Hope’s indication that the ODPM will consider further the problems caused when local authorities leave the RNLI in the lurch after it has been providing beach life guarding services. It would be useful for an ODPM Minister to meet representatives of local authorities and the RNLI to get to the bottom of the issue. Longer service level agreements between coastal local authorities and the RNLI might provide greater stability for the RNLI.

27 SAR 09

28 Q 213 29 Q 218 30 Q 217 31 Qq 392-3 32 SAR 12B

3 The voluntary ethos

22. A number of charities and voluntary organisations provide Search and Rescue services. The most well-known is probably the RNLI, which was founded in 1824 and incorporated by Royal Charter in 1860. The question of whether lifeboat operations should be the responsibility of the state rather than a voluntary organisation resurfaces periodically. In 1897, a Select Committee on the Royal National Lifeboat Institution was ordered by Parliament following allegations about the financial probity and adequacy of the RNLI. That Select Committee, chaired by Mr Charles Darling MP (Conservative, Deptford), concluded that there was

“no ground for recommending that the Lifeboat Service should be taken over by the State, so long as it is maintained as efficiently and successfully as at present by public benevolence. There would be no saving of expense by the transference of the service to Government; and, so long as the crews which man the boats are volunteer crews, your Committee believe that they would work more successfully under the discreet administration of a well–selected local committee than under the more rigid discipline of a Government Department. Your Committee consider that there are many advantages in committing the control of this service as now, to a voluntary association of honourable men—who have in many cases devoted years of their lives, without pay or remuneration of any sort, to the cause of life saving—relying for funds on the beneficience of the people of these Kingdoms, and, for crews to man the boats, on the unfailing courage and devotion of the maritime population.”33

23. The importance which the 1897 Report attached to maintaining an efficient and successful service is still relevant today. It was clear from the evidence we received that the RNLI goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate its efficiency, and raise adequate funds. We address these matters in detail later in this chapter, however we have received no evidence which suggests we should call into question the underlying structure of the lifeboat service in the UK.

24. Inland SAR services are also often provided by dedicated volunteers. Although there are 4 RAF mountain rescue teams throughout the UK34 and 3 police mountain rescue teams in Scotland,35 there are also around 2,800 volunteers organised into over 70 voluntary mountain rescue teams in England, Wales and Scotland.36 Mountain Rescue— England and Wales (formerly the Mountain Rescue Council for England and Wales) note that this means civilian mountain rescue teams now provide the primary response to air crashes.37 Civilian mountain rescue teams also perform other functions: they undertake searches for missing people, rescue injured people in rural areas and provide assistance to the community in very bad weather.38 Outside upland areas, these tasks may be undertaken

33 Report of the Select Committee on the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, HC 317 [1897], p. ix 34 SAR 11

35 Queen’s Printer and Controller, Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 2002 36 SAR 03, SAR 11 37 SAR 11 38 SAR 11

by the 450 volunteers in the 12 lowland search and rescue teams which have expanded rapidly over the last 5 years and work together in the Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR). These teams work alongside local police forces and in close co–operation with volunteers from Lowland Search Dogs UK.39

25. We suspect that the extent to which statutory services involved in Search and Rescue rely on volunteers is less well–known. The Fire and Rescue Service is heavily dependent on volunteers to the Retained Fire Service. In 2004, the ODPM: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the Regions Committee found that the Retained Fire Service provided around 60% of fire cover throughout the UK.40 In some areas of the country, the percentage of cover provided by the retained service is naturally higher than the average. Mr Riddet explained that in his service—Lincolnshire—over 90% of the service was provided by retained fire fighters.41 Our colleagues on the ODPM Committee concluded last year that the Retained Fire Service was “under valued”.42

26. HM Coastguard, which is part of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, employs watch staff at 6 Maritime Rescue Co–ordination Centres (MRCCs) and 13 Maritime Rescue Subcentres (MRSCs) around the coast. They co–ordinate the response to maritime emergencies and are employees, not volunteers. The MCA is also responsible for the Auxiliary Coastguard Service, which comprises 3,307 volunteers organised into over 400 Coastguard Rescue Teams (CRTs) and Initial Response Teams (IRTs).43 These teams are based at strategic locations around the coast and can be called out by coastguards on duty in MRCCs and MRSCs to investigate, survey and report on incidents. All CRTs can conduct searches and many are able to perform cliff and/or mud rescues.44

Volunteers 27. Thousands of volunteers donate their time and skills to organisations which provide Search and Rescue services. The willingness of people to volunteer is crucial to the continued success of both statutory and voluntary search and rescue organisations, and the absolute number of volunteers is certainly important. Even so, other factors also affect the service which volunteers provide. For example, a lack of goodwill from employers to release SAR volunteers without notice can affect the SAR service, as can increased volunteer turnover, demographic changes which result in fewer day-time volunteers, and volunteers’ increased fears about being held to account in the courts for their actions.

A volunteer shortage? 28. We wanted to establish whether there was sufficient recruitment now, and would be in the future, to support the ongoing reliance on volunteers to provide such a high proportion

39 SAR 15 40 ODPM: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the Regions Committee, The Fire Service, Third Report of Session 2003–04, HC 43–I [2003–04], paragraph 121

41 Q 22 42 HC 43–I [2003–04], paragraph 128 43 SAR 12A 44 Queen’s Printer and Controller, Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 2002, paragraphs 1.7.1–2

of SAR services. The organisations which gave evidence to the Committee painted different pictures of current volunteer availability and likely future trends. In 2004, the ODPM: Housing, Planning Local Government and the Regions Committee found that the Retained Fire Service was 20% under complement,45 and the February 2005 report of the Retained Review Team on behalf of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister confirmed this.46 Mr Riddet suggested that if the decline in volunteers continued, the UK might have to consider fully statutory services to meet its obligations.47 This was not of immediate concern, nor was it inevitable:

“There is an opportunity to deal with this, if we start to act relatively soon, so I am not talking a year or so, I am talking years still. My fear, if anything, is that if we do not pay attention to it in maybe a decade we may wake up one morning and realise it has all suddenly gone horribly wrong. That would be a shame because there is enough indication about at the moment that it needs attention now to prevent it getting to that point.”48

29. The MCA told us that, at the end of February 2005, 145 Coastguard Rescue Teams out of a total of around 400 did not have their full complement of Auxiliary Coastguards, and that the complement shortage was 241. At the same time, 47 teams had more than their full complement, with an excess of 61 team members. This implies an overall shortfall of 180 Auxiliary Coastguards, or just over 5%. We find this vacancy ratio of 5% hard to reconcile with Mr Jamieson’s view that, “At the moment, we do not have a shortage. We always have some vacancies but we do not have a shortage,”49 since the Government’s own statistics show that the average job vacancy ratio in the UK in the three months ending January 2005 was only 2.5%,50 although we certainly acknowledge that the shortfall in the Auxiliary Coastguard Service (ACS) is nowhere near that identified for the fire and rescue service retained duty system.

30. The MCA assured us that the fact teams worked together allowed some teams to run below complement.51 While the MCA pointed to its success in recruiting 13 members of the new Lake District CRT after receiving 60 applications,52 the joint memorandum by the Department for Transport and the MCA suggested that “changing circumstances and society’s expectations … have led to recruitment difficulties in some areas.”53 Indeed, the MCA’s ongoing internal review of the ACS, which is due to report in mid-2005, includes an examination of “the impact and implications of existing and potential legislation, regulations and trends of the UK voluntary sector with particular regard to the ACS.”54

45 HC 43–I [2003–04], paragraph 130 46 Retained Review Team, The Fire and Rescue Service Retained Duty System: A Review of the Recruitment and Retention Challenges, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005 47 Q 35 48 Q 36 49 Q 364

50 Source: Office of National Statistics Vacancy Survey, on-line edition via www.statistics.gov.uk 51 SAR 12A 52 SAR 12A 53 SAR 12 54 SAR 12A

31. The RNLI told us that “volunteers are the bedrock of the RNLI and have been since it was formed.”55 There are over 7,000 volunteers involved in operational roles at lifeboat stations, of whom over 4,500 are crew.56 In addition, approximately 30,000 volunteers are involved in fundraising for the RNLI, often as members of the Institution’s fundraising branches or guilds.57 Mr Andrew Freemantle, Chief Executive of the RNLI, explained that in most cases it was not difficult to recruit volunteer crew, although full–time crew are sometimes employed in sparsely populated areas such as the west coast of Shetland.58 The RNLI also employs mechanics or boat–minders at its all–weather lifeboat stations.59

32. Dr Jones told us that some mountain rescue teams had no difficulty recruiting members, whilst others found it very difficult.60 Overall, Mountain Rescue—England and Wales, which requires its volunteers to be skilled mountaineers, thought that the difficulty of obtaining and sustaining volunteers was “one of the challenges that will not only face Mountain Rescue but other emergency services that rely on the goodwill of volunteerism.”61 Mr Adrian Edwards, Acting Chairman of the Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR), noted that lowland search was currently expanding and was able to recruit from a greater range of people than Mountain Rescue, but he anticipated recruitment difficulties in the future, perhaps in 15 to 20 years.62

33. 2005 has been designated the “Year of the Volunteer”.63 Fiona Mactaggart MP, Parliamentary Under–Secretary of State at the Home Office, told us that the Government was investing £80m in the “voluntary sector infrastructure” and that “one of the jobs is recruiting and persuading people who have not volunteered traditionally to find ways of volunteering”.64 SAR organisations, we were told, had not generally used “the volunteering infrastructure” for recruitment because, “they have had traditions in their communities where word of mouth type recruitment, and so on, has been very appropriate and traditionally has kept up sufficient volunteering”.65 We remain unsure exactly what “the volunteering infrastructure” is, and how SAR organisations’ engagement with it will assure them an increased number of volunteers.

34. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister demonstrated the seriousness with which it takes the recruitment and retention challenges facing the retained duty system of the fire and rescue service by establishing the Retained Review Team, which has just produced a comprehensive report. The MCA is currently conducting an internal review of the Auxiliary Coastguard Service which should address recruitment and retention. The UK SAR Organisation should draw on the ODPM and MCA reviews,

55 Q 183 56 SAR 09, Q 180 57 SAR 09 58 Q 180 59 Q 190 60 Q 64

61 SAR 11 62 Q 95 63 see www.yearofthevolunteer.org 64 Q 373 65 Q 373

supplementing them as necessary, to identify the recruitment and retention challenges facing all the statutory and voluntary sector Search and Rescue bodies which rely on volunteers. This review must make concrete proposals to ensure that SAR capacity is not diminished as a result of recruitment and retention difficulties.

Availability of volunteers 35. Volunteers working for SAR bodies are often on–call and have to drop everything in order to set out to help people in distress or danger. Retained fire–fighters are released by their main employer; mountain rescue teams and some Auxiliary Coastguards may also leave their work; others may volunteer in their spare time. The unpredictability of SAR volunteering differentiates it from many other types of volunteering, which generally involved fixed, or at least regular, commitments. Although this variability can be managed to some extent by volunteers being on–call for specified periods, the availability of those who do volunteer is affected by demographics and employer attitudes.

36. Commuting is now common-place, and the distance which people are prepared to commute appears to be increasing: official statistics show that the distance of the average commuter trip increased from 6.1 miles in 1985/86 to 8.5 miles in 2003.66 Mr Steve Quinn, Liaison Officer for Scotland for the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) and also Watch Manager at MRCC Aberdeen, suggested that it was not always possible to get Coastguard Rescue Teams (CRTs) in the right place at the right time because the members of that team would not always be close to their base during working hours: “the team is based in a small village but most people in that small village will commute to the nearest town to work.”67 The reduced number of volunteers who are available near their base during working hours places additional pressure on SAR service providers who rely on volunteers. Mr Quinn suggested that in his experience MRCCs increased the number of CRTs they called out in order to muster sufficient personnel,68 although the MCA insisted that multiple teams were called out because they trained together to provide a local service.69 Ms Penelope Brockman, Treasurer of Mountain Rescue—England and Wales, told us that the need to ensure that enough volunteers responded led to the paging of multiple mountain rescue teams.70

37. The problem identified by Mr Quinn and Ms Brockman is one of local availability of volunteers, particularly during working hours. It would be a denial of the realities of modern life to refuse willing and capable volunteers simply because they commute a reasonable distance, providing their distance from the base or incidents during working hours does not jeopardise the effectiveness of the SAR response. The immediate question is, therefore, how to ensure that volunteers can be summoned and then travel quickly to their assembly points or the scene of an incident. Ms Brockman told us that use of pagers had helped mountain rescue teams,71 but Mr Quinn reported some ongoing problems with

66 Department for Transport, Transport Statistics Bulletin SB(04)31 National Travel Survey: 2003 Final Results, October 2004

67 Q 259 68 Q 258 69 Q 319 70 Q 62 71 Q 62

pager coverage for CRTs72 that Mr John Astbury, the Chief Coastguard and Director of Operations at the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, described as “glitches” during a change of service provider.73 The Government made clear in its response to the Committee’s Report on the MCA that members of CRTs do not have “traffic priority status” and need to balance speed with safety when responding to incidents.74

38. The answer is not to allow all mountain rescue and Coastguard volunteers to use blue lights and sirens on their private vehicles in order to reach assembly points or incidents. Concerns about road safety, insurance and the cost of driver training are all arguments against this solution. Mr Jamieson told us that the Department for Transport was “very reluctant … to extend it [the use of blue lights] any more than absolutely necessary.”75 Nevertheless, we wonder whether arrangements could be devised—perhaps involving police vehicles—in areas where volunteer team members find it hard to assemble quickly. The issue should be explored more fully by those most closely involved. The SAR Operators Group should examine whether further co–operation between voluntary and statutory SAR organisations, such as the police, could help assemble voluntary teams more quickly in areas where this is a problem.

39. A further problem was identified by Dr Jones, who told us that it was more difficult nowadays for mountain rescue volunteers to arrange time off work for call–outs.76 Both employers and employees are often disadvantaged in the short–term when volunteers respond to call–outs: employers lose some of their workforce, and employees may lose some of their pay. Dr Jones explained that many mountain rescue team volunteers would lose wages for mid–week operations.77 The problems are compounded for self–employed volunteers, whose business efficiency and income both suffer when they are called out. The position of self–employed volunteers is particularly important; Mr Vlasto estimated that around two–thirds of the RNLI’s crew volunteers are self–employed.78 Although they might get compensation for loss of earnings when attending some training courses,79 RNLI volunteers are normally only paid a tax–free allowance for each call–out of £9 for the first hour and around £2 for every subsequent hour.80 Auxiliary Coastguards are paid the national minimum wage, currently £4.85 per hour for those aged 22 and over, and receive a minimum of three hours’ pay per call–out.81

40. The Retained Review Team’s report into the Fire and Rescue Service’s Retained Duty System summarised the issue in a way which is also relevant to the Auxiliary Coastguard Service and other SAR services:

72 Qq 259–261 73 Q 320 74 The Government’s Response to the Transport Committee’s Report on the Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Cm 6343, p. 3 75 Q 413 76 Q 63

77 Q 64 78 Q 189 79 Q 223 80 Q 189 81 SAR 12B

Viewed from the employer’s perspective, their lack of enthusiasm in response to requests to release employees, though disquieting, is nonetheless understandable. They face harsh economic realities: the loss of just one employee during the working day, or periodically at particular times of the year, may have a significant effect on output or jeopardise fulfilment of contracts. The self–employed have to deal with similar problems in running their business. Faced with the demands of operating a local business it should not be surprising if community spirit and social responsibility are deemed lesser considerations. An employer is entitled to ask of the fire and rescue service ‘What’s in it for me?’”82

41. Fortunately, there is a potential incentive for the employer’s bottom line: as Ms Mactaggart mentioned, the Government does provide tax incentives as part of the Corporate Challenge scheme to employers who allow their employees to volunteer.83 Under this scheme, an employer can deduct for profit calculations any cost incurred in connection with the employment of someone who works on secondment to a charity— including the relevant proportion of salary—even if that person only works for the charity for a few hours.84 We doubt, however, whether the administration of such a scheme is likely to be worthwhile in respect of an employee who is called out relatively rarely for a few hours at a time.

42. The Minister also suggested that softer measures might increase the willingness of employers to release volunteers, such as a recognition of this when assessing a company’s corporate social responsibility.85 It is also important that employers understand the benefits of having a trained fire-fighter, coastguard or rescuer on their pay–roll. Such measures do indeed have their place, but we believe that hard measures which affect companies’ profits and tax liabilities are likely to have greater impact, especially for smaller businesses in rural areas. We also believe that, when rewarding employers, a distinction could be drawn between volunteers in the broadest sense and those who volunteer to work as members of essential statutory or quasi–statutory emergency services, such as the fire and rescue service, mountain rescue, Auxiliary Coastguard and other SAR bodies.

43. We agree with the Retained Review Team that further work is needed on financial and tax incentives for employers who release their employees for emergency call–outs. A better way also needs to be found to compensate self–employed volunteers. The Government must propose new incentives which reward employers whose employees take time off work to provide SAR services, whether in the voluntary or statutory sectors. Different treatment for these particular volunteers is justified because of the combination of their pivotal role in the UK’s emergency and SAR services and the unpredictability of call–outs. As a starting point, we suggest that for all such volunteers, the tax incentive offered to employers under Corporate Challenge should be extended to allow employers to deduct for tax purposes a much higher proportion of the costs

82 Retained Review Team, The Fire and Rescue Service Retained Duty System: A Review of the Recruitment and Retention Challenges, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005, paragraph 4.12 83 Q 268 84 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_ccr/spend_ccr_voluntary/spend_ccr_corpchall.cfm and HM Treasury/Home Office, A guide to tax incentives for corporate giving, at www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/charities 85 Q 368

related to their employment, not just the proportion which relates to the period for which they are called–out.

Charities 44. Some of the UK’s major Search and Rescue service providers, such as the RNLI, Mountain Rescue—England and Wales and lowland search units, are entirely or largely funded by voluntary donations from the public. The Government saves because they are not funded by taxation. As the Chief Fire Officers’ Association pointed out, these organisations “provide a high value/low cost service to the nation.”86 The saving is, however, difficult to quantify for two reasons: first, because it is not clear that all the activities of voluntary bodies could or would be taken on by statutory bodies if that became necessary; and, second, because the costs of providing services in the statutory sector are not the same as the cost to the voluntary sector.

45. The RNLI cost £110.4m to run in 2003, of which £89.1m (80.7%) was spent on providing the rescue service, £17.4m (15.8%) on fundraising and £3.9m (3.5%) on support services.87 Nevertheless, even the running costs of voluntary organisations do not equate neatly with money saved to the public purse; although salaried employees would cost substantially more than volunteers (the RNLI pointed out that £326,000 per year is spent on salary-related costs for the River Thames Lifeboat Station at Chiswick which is staffed by full–time crew, compared to about £6,000 per year in allowances for a standard volunteer lifeboat station),88 a provider in the statutory sector would not have to spend money to raise money.

Finances 46. The RNLI relies heavily on legacies as a source of income; as can be seen from Table 2, they accounted for 68% of the Institution’s fundraised income in 2003.

Table 2: RNLI Sources of Fundraised Income 2003 Source of income Proportion of total income (%)

Legacies 68

Regions 14

Members and donors 13

General 2

Personal donations/trusts 1

Sales 1

Corporate 1

Source: RNLI (SAR 09)

86 SAR 01 87 SAR 09 88 SAR 09

47. The Annual Review and Report and Accounts for 2003 show that the costs of running the RNLI were £8m more than its income in 2003, and that the amount received from legacies fell by £5m that year.89 We do not believe there is cause for undue concern, since the RNLI is managing the inherent risks and maintains free reserves to cover between one and 3 years’ operations. These are designed to “withstand any short-term attack, whether operational, in the investment markets or in key sources of income, such as legacies”.90 They stood at £113m at the end of 2003, representing 14 months of operations.91 Nevertheless, Mr Freemantle told us that “the generation which has been so generous to us is, by definition, dying off.”92 The RNLI is therefore already considering other means of raising funds, such as charging for training for overseas rescue services at its Lifeboat College in Poole.93

48. Other voluntary SAR organisations are not in the same fortunate position as the RNLI. Mountain Rescue—England and Wales described their funding as “working on a hand to mouth principle” and recognised that this made long–term strategic planning difficult.94 Many mountain rescue team members spend their own money to ensure they can respond to call–outs. This includes buying their own equipment and pagers, and paying their own fuel costs. The financial position of mountain rescue teams has to be considered against a background of increased demand for mountain rescue services: Mountain Rescue— England and Wales told us that since 1999 the number of call–outs has increased by over 125 per year, and stood at 1,078 in 2002.95

49. We were told that the Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland received general grant funding of £400,000 in 2003 and £500,000 in 2004 from the Scottish Parliament, in addition to further investment in major assets for mountain rescue in Scotland, such as new integrated radio equipment and a communication and control vehicle.96 There is no comparable central funding for Mountain Rescue—England and Wales, although there is limited funding for equipment from two NHS trusts in England and from the National Assembly for Wales. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Mountain Rescue and Search Teams is investigating funding for mountain rescue.

50. Ms Mactaggart told us that mountain rescue teams in North Wales in Cumbria and North Wales received funding from the police service to assist with their costs, mainly of insurance.97 North Wales Police contributed £12,500, and this was met from within the policy authority’s normal resources.98 The Minister believed it was fair that council taxpayers in that area should pay a contribution towards mountain rescue which was not paid elsewhere:

89 RNLI, Annual Review and Report and Accounts 2003, www.rnli.org.uk 90 RNLI, Annual Review and Report and Accounts 2003, p.23, Annual Report of the Trustees 91 RNLI, Annual Review and Report and Accounts 2003, p.24, Treasurer’s statement 92 Q 186 93 Qq 186–7 94 SAR 11 95 SAR 11 96 SAR 11 97 Q 399 98 Qq 403–405

“[W]hat is right … is that, in a police authority area, that police authority can decide what the needs of that area are, and police authorities in different places have different sets of needs, not all of which are obvious policing of the community.”99

51. We believe the Minister’s claim of fairness is dubious. It is not fair to council taxpayers that some police authorities contribute to their local mountain rescue team, or indeed lowland search and rescue team, while others do not. Nor does a patchwork of funding assist with the provision of a consistent service. We see mountain rescue as a rescue, rather than a policing, need, although we acknowledge there are police mountain rescue teams in Scotland. While Dr Jones was concerned that conditions might be attached to government funding which could impinge on effective operations,100 he suggested that “government funding would be a very good demonstration of the government’s support to maintain the volunteer search and rescue which is so cost effective.”101 Dr Jones also suggested that the SAR Operators Group could ensure that funding to voluntary search and rescue organisations was properly audited and scrutinised.102 Although Mountain Rescue— England and Wales cannot expect to receive government funding with no accountability strings attached, we prefer Dr Jones’ solution to the Minister’s defence of the status quo. The Government should make funding available to mountain rescue and lowland search teams via the SAR Operators Group, rather than allowing individual police authorities and forces to choose whether to support these services. This will help to ensure consistent availability of inland SAR services throughout the UK.

52. An examination of the finances of the RNLI and Mountain Rescue—England and Wales suggests that “the voluntary sector can be subject to … significant fluctuations in income and support.”103 We do not believe, however, that good risk management cannot overcome these fluctuations. We welcome the foresight which the RNLI is showing by planning ahead to manage changes to its income. Its ability to plan in this way is probably a function of its size, history and capacity. Not all the SAR voluntary organisations are as large as the RNLI, yet shortfalls in their financing would have a direct impact on SAR services. The SAR Strategic Committee and Operators Group should encourage voluntary sector SAR operators to build financial reserves which assure their future operations. Such support could include the sharing of good practice, courses and professional advice for treasurers, and seed funding for those reserves.

VAT 53. We also heard concerns from the RNLI, Mountain Rescue—England and Wales and ALSAR about their liability for VAT on equipment. Ms Margaret Bennett, Secretary of ALSAR told us that she and lowland search staff would

“feel a bit more appreciated if we were given some of the VAT benefits which are available to other types of charities and are not available to us. Even in regard to

99 Q 407 100 Q 73 101 Q 70 102 Q 70 103 SAR 10

search and rescue I know that sea rescue charities have a far greater range of products which they buy which are VAT exempt, or zero rated.”104

54. The RNLI incurred additional costs of £3.9m in 2003 through the payment of irrecoverable VAT.105 Mr Freemantle told us that this was the price of two all–weather lifeboats.106

55. The Government is not willing to allow all voluntary organisations to recover the VAT they pay, nor is it willing to differentiate between voluntary organisations in order to reimburse some of them. The Government told us that:

“For more than two decades, charities have been pressing successive governments to change the rules to reduce or reimburse them for their irrecoverable VAT bills, and no Government has considered the issue more seriously than this one. Twice, in the 1999 Treasury Review of Charity Taxation, and in the 2002 Cross Cutting Review of The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector in Service Delivery, we have conducted major reviews to see if we could find an efficient, affordable, principled solution to the problem of irrecoverable VAT.

“Through these reviews, we came to two conclusions: first, that it would not be an affordable or efficient use of public resources to reimburse all 250,000 charitable bodies in the UK for the VAT they incur, regardless of the activities they are involved in or their financial health, and which would cost between £500 million and £1 billion per year; and second, that there was no fair and principled basis on which we could decide that some charities would be reimbursed their VAT and some would not. (…)

“It is a fundamental principle of VAT that tax incurred on purchases can only be recovered by VAT registered bodies if it relates to taxable business activities. This means that charities providing services for no charge, or providing services which are exempt from VAT, cannot recover the VAT they incur on purchases related to these services.”107

56. The Government needs to use this statement with care: it could be seen as incitement to the SAR voluntary organisations to charge the Government for their services. The Government also told us that each year it provided voluntary organisations with over £200m in relief from VAT (which we understand to mean that VAT on the goods and services provided by certain voluntary organisations was charged at a level lower than the standard rate), and that “[t]his forms part of the total Government funding for the voluntary and community sector, which stands at £3.3billion per year.”108 The suggestion that income foregone by the Exchequer constitutes “funding for the voluntary and community sector” involves an unusual definition of “funding”, but, as we set out below, we are more concerned that while the Government’s position on VAT is unshakeable, the

104 Q 55 105 SAR 09 106 Q 226 107 SAR 12B 108 SAR 12B

alternative routes it suggests voluntary organisations should use to maximise their income are of limited use to the RNLI, which pays £3.9m VAT each year.

57. Ms Mactaggart told us that, in discussions with the Treasury,

“the conclusion has been that the most effective way to increase the income of a voluntary organisation, like the RNLI, which depends on donations, is through very substantial tax breaks on charitable giving and effective encouragement of tax-efficient giving, which can increase the value of donations by 33 per cent. We are focusing on the income to be dealt with by tax breaks rather than on the expenditure.”109

58. Tax–efficient giving, such as Gift Aid, can undoubtedly increase the benefit charities derive from donations from UK taxpayers. Nevertheless, it is misleading for the Government to simply shift the focus from irrecoverable VAT to tax-efficient giving for two reasons: first, because the combined effect of greater use of tax–efficient charitable giving and VAT refunds would be greater than the effect of tax–efficient charitable giving alone; and second, because legacies left to charities are already tax–efficient (because they are exempt from inheritance tax). As recorded above, 68% of the RNLI’s fundraising income came from legacies in 2003.

59. Encouraging tax–efficient donations is insufficient on its own to help SAR voluntary organisations make the most of the money they receive; the RNLI receives most of its income from legacies, which are already tax–efficient. The Government must reconsider whether voluntary SAR organisations should be relieved of the burden of their VAT payments in some way. We suggest that they should; the service they provide could not be foregone because of the UK’s international obligations; it would have to be financed by the state if it was not funded by donations. It is not surprising that SAR voluntary organisations feel under–valued by Government: they provide essential services cheaply, but a significant proportion of their fundraising effort services the Exchequer. If there is a legal problem which prevents the recovery of VAT, the voluntary organisations could receive an annual grant to off-set their VAT payments over the previous year; the precise method is less important than the effect.

Barriers to better service 60. Mountain Rescue—England and Wales told us that different police forces have different attitudes to mountain rescue teams’ use of the blue lights and sirens fitted to their vehicles, which may be designated as either “ambulances” or “vehicles used for an ambulance purpose”.110 This leads to absurd situations in which the police and ambulance service travel to emergencies using blue lights and sirens, but then have to wait for the mountain rescue team to arrive. It also led to a reprimand of the mountain rescue team during the floods at Boscastle:

“All the emergency services were briefed on the critical situation in the village at the time they were called and all travelled to Boscastle using lights and sirens. The team

109 Q 416 110 SAR 11

leader of the mountain rescue team who responded with 2 fully crewed vehicles was reprimanded by the police for the use of blue lights and sirens.”111

61. Mountain Rescue—England and Wales took up this issue with the Department for Transport in March 2003, but there has apparently been no resolution. Mr Jamieson indicated to the Committee that he would be happy to examine the issue further, and that his understanding was that mountain rescue could use blue lights.112 Their use is indeed permitted by RAF mountain rescue vehicles, but not explicitly by voluntary teams.113 Official mountain rescue and lowland search vehicles operated by trained drivers should be able to use blue lights and sirens to reach incidents in the same way as RAF mountain rescue teams. The Government should lay amending Regulations to correct this anomaly.

62. The RNLI was concerned that a very small number of its volunteers sought redress in their disputes with the Institution through Employment Tribunals.114 Although we do not doubt that the RNLI treats its volunteers well, we understand that grievances can occasionally arise and, when the internal procedure is exhausted, the Employment Tribunal is the only body to which people can turn. Mr Freemantle told us there were five such cases, and he did not see why the Employment Tribunal was the appropriate body to examine their situation because

“these people are not employed, in our view, and not in their view either. (…) [I]f you volunteer for something in the first place and you do not like it for some reason, you can unvolunteer yourself just as easily as you volunteered in the first place.”115

63. It is odd that RNLI volunteers, even if they are paid a small allowance, have access to an Employment Tribunal. However, we do not accept Mr Freemantle’s suggestion that an alternative forum needs to be established to deal solely with volunteers’ grievances;116 this seems unduly bureaucratic. The jurisdiction of Employment Tribunals results from a number of Acts and we cannot speculate why the RNLI volunteers have been able to take cases. The Government and the SAR Operators Group should examine whether the prospect of volunteers taking cases against voluntary SAR organisations in Employment Tribunals is a significant drain on resources. If it is, the Government should consider what legislative changes might be required. Larger voluntary organisations such as the RNLI might also consider the use of external arbitrators as part of their grievance procedures.

111 SAR 11

112 Qq 413–4 113 Road Vehicle Lighting Regulations (S.I. 1989 No. 1796) 114 Qq 192–198 115 Q 192 116 Q 192

4 HM Coastguard

64. The Committee examined the work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) during the last Session and reported in June last year.117 Many of the concerns we noted at that time related to HM Coastguard, whose watch staff co–ordinate maritime SAR operations at MRCCs and MRSCs. Most of these were raised with us again as part of this inquiry, most notably by the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS).118 We also received some written material in confidence from serving coastguards and auxiliary coastguards, which served as extremely useful background but which we have not drawn on directly in this Report.

65. HM Coastguard remains an organisation undergoing a period of fundamental change: its staff used to be recruited from those leaving maritime service in the navy or merchant navy; nowadays, as Mr Quinn put it and the MCA confirmed,119 “there is no longer this pool of recruits to come in with the background experience.”120 HM Coastguard is also now part of the MCA, rather than being a stand–alone organisation. We need to be confident that change is being managed by the MCA in a way which assures the public a competent and cost–effective service. To do so, we need a clear picture of what is really happening in operations rooms around the coast. While we were fortunate enough to pay a brief visit to the Dover MRCC, we need to base our report on a wider evidence base. Unfortunately, the evidence we received is not sufficiently clear.

Conflicting evidence 66. The evidence we were given by MCA management often conflicted directly with that of PCS, as recorded in Table 3.

117 Transport Committee, The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Fourteenth Report of Session 2003–04, HC 500 [2003–04] 118 SAR 08, SAR 08A 119 Q 301 120 Q 245

Table 3: Conflict between evidence from PCS and MCA Subject PCS view MCA management view

Staffing levels at MRCCs and “There has been no coastguard To the best of the Chief MRSCs station, to our knowledge, that Executive’s knowledge, it is not has been properly staffed commonplace to have throughout the whole year.”121 unqualified or inexperienced This statement was staff managing a watch.125 subsequently qualified by PCS in further written evidence: “no The Chief Coastguard said: “I Coastguard Rescue Centres and think the PCS probably sub centres were fully staffed overstated that somewhat (…) with qualified substantive That is not the evidence we are grades during the past year on getting from our local one or more occasions”.122 managers.”126

There were vacancies for 21 Vacancies are less than 2% Watch Officers, 1 Watch across the organisation. There Assistant and 1 Watch Manager were only vacancies for 3 in the Eastern and Scotland & Watch Managers, 11 Watch Northern Ireland Regions in Officers, 1 Sector Manager and January.123 1 District Operations Manager on 2 March when PCS and the MCA gave oral evidence.127

PCS provided examples of The PCS was offered the occasions when they considered opportunity to draft a paper on that operations rooms were staffing complements for inadequately staffed because watch–keeping. Papers have watch staff were either absent, been commissioned by MCA standing in for someone of a management from Regional higher grade, or still under Operations Managers, on which training.124 PCS were to be consulted.128

Skills of watch staff Staff recruited without “Co–ordination Centre staff seagoing experience are not above Coastguard Watch gaining this experience before Assistants (Operations) must qualifying, as agreed following hold an externally assessed a previous recruitment qualification that demonstrates review.129 and confirms technical competence. CWA(O) staff Watch staff on probation and undergo training lasting a year under training should be and although this is currently

121 Q 236 122 SAR 08A 123 SAR 08 124 SAR 08A 125 Q 302 126 Q 302 127 Q 300

128 Q 328 129 SAR 08 130 SAR 08 131 Qq 240–1 132 Q 250

supernumerary to the internally accredited, the MCA complement until they are are seeking external qualified.130 accreditation in the future.”133

The training centre has only The training centre has recently one Watch Officer course completed a Watch Officer programmed for 2005, which training course, providing 13 would only provide 12 or 15 trained staff. Another is just trained staff.131 starting.134

Promotion from Coastguard “Watch Managers wanting to Watch Assistant to Watch become SAR Mission Controllers Manager can happen within 3– are now required to undergo 4 years, which is too quick; it an intensive training course.”135 should take 6 years.132

Linking of pairs of MRCCs and The removal of equipment “Louise Ellman: Do you MRSCs so that one can take from Forth MRCC is a precursor intend to close any more over the operations of another to the closure of co–ordination Rescue Co–ordination Centres? if necessary (“pairing”). centres.136 “Captain Bligh: No. This is an Planned closures of old chestnut.”139 co-ordination centres “Louise Ellman: Does that mean you are ruling out more closures? “Captain Bligh: Yes.”140

MCA management is “forging Pairing ensures that some ahead with station pairing stations can assist their flank regardless of the inherent risks station in a major incident. It associated with this releases resources for strategy.”137 prevention work.141

PCS has not been consulted on The changes at Aberdeen and the removal of equipment and Forth are a trial about which transfer of control from Forth PCS was consulted.142 MRSC to Aberdeen MRCC.138

Reliability of the VISION “Operator confidence in the “The new computerised incident management IT system system is low because of long– incident and command system standing faults and other has now been fully installed in technical problems such as all Coastguard Rescue systems lock ups, loss of data Co-ordination Centres. Initial and messaging facilities.”143 system difficulties have been rectified, the roll out was

133 SAR 12 134 Q 300 135 SAR 12 136 Q 257 137 SAR 08 138 SAR 08

139 Q 343 140 Q 345 141 Qq 344-5 142 Q 344 143 SAR 08

completed in November 2004 and the system is now operating well.”144 67. We find these contrary accounts frustrating, because they do not allow us to gain a clear understanding of what is really happening in the MCA. Mr Dave Clempson, the MCA Group President for PCS told us that “it seems to happen that we get treated as a union in a not very friendly way at times. The fact is that if they want to go ahead they do it and they close stations down and tell us afterwards.”145 The Chief Coastguard does meet the unions, and had already met them twice in 2005 when we took evidence at the beginning of March.146 We conclude that relations between the MCA and PCS as organisations are poor, although we do not know whether this is a true reflection of industrial relations at the MCA more generally.

68. The obvious incompatibility of the evidence from the Public and Commercial Services union and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has undermined our confidence in both organisations. As part of the Government response to this report, we would like to receive detailed position statements on each of the following issues: (a) staffing levels in Coastguard operations rooms; (b) skills of watch staff; (c) “pairing” of co-ordination centres and any planned closures; and (d) the reliability of the VISION IT system. We would like these position statements to be agreed jointly by the MCA and PCS wherever possible, and urge both parties to seek consensus. If agreement proves impossible, we invite PCS to submit its own observations to supplement the Government response. These should be supported by clear, hard evidence.

National Coastwatch Institution 69. The National Coastwatch Institution (NCI) is a voluntary organisation which was established in 1984. It aims to restore a visual watch of the UK coast, and over 1,000 trained volunteers—who are often retired—keep a daylight watch from 27 stations.147 The stations are mainly in the south–west, although the NCI is planning further northward expansion.148 Watch keepers maintain logs of the on– and off–shore activities they observe and report incidents to the Coastguard if necessary. Mr Jon Gifford, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the NCI, told us that watch keepers also worked with HM Customs & Excise (the NCI is an “Anti–Drugs Alliance Partner”), the Ministry of Defence, the RNLI, police, local authorities, and wildlife and pollution agencies.149

70. Mr Mark Danson–Hatcher, Deputy Chairman of the NCI’s Declared Facility Inspection Panel, emphasised that the NCI provided a visual watch: “That is something no other agency really does to the same extent.” This is indeed the case. When we asked the Chief Coastguard whether staffed watch stations were needed, he told us that:

144 SAR 12

145 Q 284 146 Qq 327, 329 147 SAR 14 148 Q 125 149 Q 109

“I do not believe there is a need at all. We ceased it in 1978, for good reason. We discovered that nearly 99 per cent of the calls we got, either through 999 calls or wherever, came from members of the public”.150

71. The NCI pointed out that there was “much protest” when the Coastguard ceased its visual watch on the coast, and suggested that a visual watch is needed because “the coastline cannot be properly surveyed from MCA call centres”.151 Although the NCI has a memorandum of understanding with HM Coastguard, and reported its relations with MCA operations staff as “very good, excellent”,152 Mr Gifford suggested that, at the administrative level, he and his colleagues felt they were “tolerated, rather than wanted.”153 The Chief Executive of the MCA disagreed, and reported that he had received only the day before a letter from the NCI which thanked the MCA for its assistance.154

72. The MCA believes that the NCI should be treated as a fixed watch of members of the public who know how to provide a look–out service and can report events properly to the Coastguard.155 Mr Gifford was clear that the NCI is not a rival organisation to the Coastguard.156 The two bodies do disagree about the use by the NCI of former Coastguard stations as look-out posts: the MCA has refused the NCI access to certain former stations which now house radio equipment both on grounds of insufficient space and security.157 The Minister confirmed that the reasons for denying access were “solid”.158

73. The National Coastwatch Institution provides a helpful service, even if the MCA does not view it as essential. The NCI and the Agency should patch up any differences in their relationship and continue to work together to ensure safety around the coast. We understand the MCA has good reason for refusing the NCI access to some of its former coastguard stations, but believe it should review quickly the decisions which have been made to establish whether further access can be permitted. The NCI should not need to plead with the Department or the MCA Chief Executive in order to secure access; these matters should be resolved with less pain.

150 Q 332 151 SAR 14B 152 Q 112 153 Q 113

154 Q 336 155 Q 335 156 Q 158 157 Qq 336–7 158 Q 426

Conclusions and recommendations

Organisation of SAR services 2. As Chairman of the UK SAR Strategic Committee, the Department for Transport should review the frequency of meetings of that committee. We agree that there is no point to unnecessary meetings, but the RNLI and MCA suggest the committee could meet more often. We hope that the issues raised in this report will provide some suitable subject matter for discussion at those meetings. (Paragraph 10)

3. We are grateful for the Minister’s indication that the ODPM will be represented on the UK SAR Strategic Committee in the future, and suggest that it should also be represented on the Operators Group. (Paragraph 13)

4. The Government and the SAR Strategic Committee need to be able to forecast future demand for SAR services in order to assess the ability of SAR services to meet it. The MCA has commissioned useful research about accident levels around the coast, but more work is required inland. Data collection does not need to be particularly onerous, but the Strategic Committee must determine whether research should be commissioned or further information be collected by inland operators to better forecast demand for inland SAR. (Paragraph 18)

5. We are grateful for Mr Hope’s indication that the ODPM will consider further the problems caused when local authorities leave the RNLI in the lurch after it has been providing beach life guarding services. It would be useful for an ODPM Minister to meet representatives of local authorities and the RNLI to get to the bottom of the issue. Longer service level agreements between coastal local authorities and the RNLI might provide greater stability for the RNLI. (Paragraph 21)

The voluntary ethos 6. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister demonstrated the seriousness with which it takes the recruitment and retention challenges facing the retained duty system of the fire and rescue service by establishing the Retained Review Team, which has just produced a comprehensive report. The MCA is currently conducting an internal review of the Auxiliary Coastguard Service which should address recruitment and retention. The UK SAR Organisation should draw on the ODPM and MCA reviews, supplementing them as necessary, to identify the recruitment and retention challenges facing all the statutory and voluntary sector Search and Rescue bodies which rely on volunteers. This review must make concrete proposals to ensure that SAR capacity is not diminished as a result of recruitment and retention difficulties. (Paragraph 34)

7. The SAR Operators Group should examine whether further co–operation between voluntary and statutory SAR organisations, such as the police, could help assemble voluntary teams more quickly in areas where this is a problem. (Paragraph 38)

8. We agree with the Retained Review Team that further work is needed on financial and tax incentives for employers who release their employees for emergency call– outs. A better way also needs to be found to compensate self–employed volunteers. The Government must propose new incentives which reward employers whose employees take time off work to provide SAR services, whether in the voluntary or statutory sectors. Different treatment for these particular volunteers is justified because of the combination of their pivotal role in the UK’s emergency and SAR services and the unpredictability of call–outs. As a starting point, we suggest that for all such volunteers, the tax incentive offered to employers under Corporate Challenge should be extended to allow employers to deduct for tax purposes a much higher proportion of the costs related to their employment, not just the proportion which relates to the period for which they are called–out. (Paragraph 43)

9. The Government should make funding available to mountain rescue and lowland search teams via the SAR Operators Group, rather than allowing individual police authorities and forces to choose whether to support these services. This will help to ensure consistent availability of inland SAR services throughout the UK. (Paragraph 51)

10. We welcome the foresight which the RNLI is showing by planning ahead to manage changes to its income. Its ability to plan in this way is probably a function of its size, history and capacity. Not all the SAR voluntary organisations are as large as the RNLI, yet shortfalls in their financing would have a direct impact on SAR services. The SAR Strategic Committee and Operators Group should encourage voluntary sector SAR operators to build financial reserves which assure their future operations. Such support could include the sharing of good practice, courses and professional advice for treasurers, and seed funding for those reserves. (Paragraph 52)

11. Encouraging tax–efficient donations is insufficient on its own to help SAR voluntary organisations make the most of the money they receive; the RNLI receives most of its income from legacies, which are already tax–efficient. The Government must reconsider whether voluntary SAR organisations should be relieved of the burden of their VAT payments in some way. We suggest that they should; the service they provide could not be foregone because of the UK’s international obligations; it would have to be financed by the state if it was not funded by donations. It is not surprising that SAR voluntary organisations feel under–valued by Government: they provide essential services cheaply, but a significant proportion of their fundraising effort services the Exchequer. If there is a legal problem which prevents the recovery of VAT, the voluntary organisations could receive an annual grant to off-set their VAT payments over the previous year; the precise method is less important than the effect. (Paragraph 59)

12. Official mountain rescue and lowland search vehicles operated by trained drivers should be able to use blue lights and sirens to reach incidents in the same way as RAF

mountain rescue teams. The Government should lay amending Regulations to correct this anomaly. (Paragraph 61)

13. The Government and the SAR Operators Group should examine whether the prospect of volunteers taking cases against voluntary SAR organisations in Employment Tribunals is a significant drain on resources. If it is, the Government should consider what legislative changes might be required. Larger voluntary organisations such as the RNLI might also consider the use of external arbitrators as part of their grievance procedures. (Paragraph 63)

HM Coastguard 14. The obvious incompatibility of the evidence from the Public and Commercial Services union and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has undermined our confidence in both organisations. As part of the Government response to this report, we would like to receive detailed position statements on each of the following issues: (a) staffing levels in Coastguard operations rooms; (b) skills of watch staff; (c) “pairing” of co-ordination centres and any planned closures; and (d) the reliability of the VISION IT system. We would like these position statements to be agreed jointly by the MCA and PCS wherever possible, and urge both parties to seek consensus. If agreement proves impossible, we invite PCS to submit its own observations to supplement the Government response. These should be supported by clear, hard evidence. (Paragraph 68)

15. The National Coastwatch Institution provides a helpful service, even if the MCA does not view it as essential. The NCI and the Agency should patch up any differences in their relationship and continue to work together to ensure safety around the coast. We understand the MCA has good reason for refusing the NCI access to some of its former coastguard stations, but believe it should review quickly the decisions which have been made to establish whether further access can be permitted. The NCI should not need to plead with the Department or the MCA Chief Executive in order to secure access; these matters should be resolved with less pain. (Paragraph 73)

Annex: Visit notes

Dover Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) 1. Those attending from the Committee were: Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody MP (Chairman), Mr Brian H. Donohoe MP, Clive Efford MP, David Bates (Clerk), Frances Allingham (Committee Assistant), and James O’Sullivan (Sandwich Student). The Committee arrived in Dover in the morning of 3 February and returned to London in the afternoon.

2. The Committee was met at Dover Priory station by Mr Richard Martin, Coastal Resources Manager from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and Ms Tess van de Vliet, Deputy Station Officer for the Langdon Coastguard Rescue Team (CRT), and taken to Dover Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre situated on the cliffs over Dover harbour. On arrival the Committee was welcomed to the Centre by Captain Stephen Bligh, MCA Chief Executive, and Mr John Astbury, MCA Director of Operations and Chief Coastguard.

3. A presentation by Mr James Findlay, Head of Information Communications Technology introduced the Committee to the Integrated Coastguard Communications System (ICCS), which has an interface with the VISION incident management system and the BOSS system. The ICCS project started in 1999 and was completed in 2003. The VISION upgrade commenced in 2002 and was completed at all sites in November 2004.

4. ICCS has a user–friendly (touch–screen) interface for communications handling. It allows the management of telephone calls and VHF radio transmissions, and incorporates a comprehensive telephone directory. All calls and transmissions are electronically recorded. This system is in use in other emergency services’ control rooms.

5. VISION is a full geographical incident management system which uses a graphic presentation system. It enables search and rescue incidents to be logged instantly. VISION has brought the MCA the ability to pair rescue co–ordination centres. If a centre is out of action or unable to respond for any reason, its paired centre can manage the incident. The Committee was told that, through pairing, resources and workloads can be shared. Each of the two centres can view what the other is doing.

6. The BOSS (Browser Operational System Status) interface provides real-time links to other Coastguard co-ordination centres’ systems. It provides real–time remote monitoring of incidents at all Coastguard stations to all Coastguard operational staff, MCA HQ operational staff and other authorised users. Statistics and reports can be generated by the system.

7. Dover MRCC is unique among rescue co-ordination centres because it has responsibility for monitoring the Dover Strait Traffic Separation Scheme. This two lane scheme operates to avoid collisions in the Dover Strait. Each lane is limited to one direction of traffic flow. The Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) was introduced in 1972. CNIS forms a large part of Dover MRCC’s workload. All vessels over 300 gross tonnes transiting the Dover Strait are required to ‘report in’ with either Dover MRCC or Gris Nez in France, depending on their direction of travel. Information reported must include details of any hazardous cargo on board.

8. The Dover system includes an ability to receive AIS (Automatic Identification System) transmissions from suitably equipped vessels. This technology is mandatory under SOLAS for all ships over 300gtn and transmits information about the ship, including its name, destination, cargo, speed and location. AIS signals can be received by 32 compatible radio masts around the UK. AIS links in to the CNIS radar picture to give the operators at Dover MRCC a complete picture of the Dover Strait and the ships transiting it. The MCA makes AIS information available to other government agencies.

9. The Committee was given a tour of the co-ordination centre by Area Operations Manager, Murray Milligan. In the Operations room there was explanation of incident handling and the Committee met managers Gordon Wise, Mike Painter, Trevor Dowle and District Operations Manager Spike Hughes.

10. In the afternoon, a presentation was made to the Committee about Lifeskills Kent, a planned education centre which will inform young people about the everyday dangers of life, including activity and safety on the coast.

11. The Committee met members of Langdon Coastguard Rescue Team and saw their vehicles and equipment. John Marshall, an auxiliary coastguard volunteer, and Tess van de Vliet discussed with the Committee the role of CRTs and volunteer auxiliaries. Langdon CRT has a great deal of experience of cliff rescue and the Committee discussed illustrated accounts of call-outs with the team.

12. Some Members were shown the Coastguard helicopter based at Portland and taken on a short flight over Dover harbour. The Committee returned to the operations room to observe a search and rescue demonstration involving the helicopter and RNLI’s Dover Lifeboat.

Formal minutes

The following Declarations of Interest were made:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody, Member, Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen

Mr Brian H. Donohoe, Clive Efford and Mrs Louise Ellman, Members of the Transport and General Workers’ Union

Ian Lucas, Member of Amicus and member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Mountain Rescue and Search Teams

Mr Graham Stringer, Member of Amicus

Wednesday 23 March 2005

Members present: Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody , in the Chair

Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Ian Lucas Mr Brian H. Donohoe Miss Anne McIntosh Clive Efford Mr Graham Stringer Mrs Louise Ellman

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report (Search and Rescue), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 73 read and agreed to.

Annex agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Eighth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select committee (reports)) be applied to the Report.

[Adjourned to a day and time to be fixed by the Chairman.

Witnesses

Wednesday 9 February 2005

Mr Alan Riddet, Director of Community Safety, Lincolnshire County Council, Chief Fire Officers' Association

Dr Anthony S G Jones MBE, Vice Chairman and Ms Penelope Brockman, Treasurer, Mountain Rescue - England and Wales, Mr Adrian Edwards, Acting Chairman and Ms Margaret Bennett, Secretary, Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR) and Mr Robert Bradley, UK Lowland Search Institute

Mr Jon Gifford, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and Mr Mark Danson-Hatcher, Deputy Chairman of the Technical Assessment Panel, National Coastwatch Institution

Wednesday 2 March 2005

Mr Andrew Freemantle MBE, Chief Executive, and Mr Michael Vlasto, Operations Director, Royal National Lifeboat Institution

Mr Nick Radiven, National Officer, Mr Dave Clempson, Maritime and Coastguard Agency Group President, and Mr Steve Quinn, PCS Liaison Officer for Scotland and MCA Watch Manager (MRCC Aberdeen), Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS); and Mr Allan Graveson, Senior National Secretary, and Mr Andrew Linington, Head of Communications, NUMAST

Captain Stephen Bligh, Chief Executive, and Mr John Astbury, Operations Director and Chief Coastguard, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)

Mr David Jamieson MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport; Phil Hope MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; and Fiona Mactaggart MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office

List of written evidence

SAR 01 UK Lowland Search Institute SAR 02 Chief Fire Officers Association SAR 03 Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland SAR 07 Kevin Hutchens, Labour Party Spokesperson for Moray SAR 08 Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) SAR 08A Supplementary memorandum by PCS SAR 09 Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) SAR 10 NUMAST SAR 11 Mountain Rescue – England and Wales SAR 11A Supplementary memorandum by Mountain Rescue – England and Wales SAR 12 Department for Transport and Maritime and Coastguard Agency SAR 12A Supplementary memorandum by Maritime and Coastguard Agency SAR 12B Supplementary memorandum by the Department for Transport SAR 13 Secretariat of the UK Search and Rescue Strategic Committee SAR 14 National Coastwatch Institution SAR 14A Supplementary memorandum by the National Coastwatch Institution SAR 15 Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR) SAR 16 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister

Reports from the Transport Committee since 2002

Session 2004–05 First Report Work of the Committee in 2004 HC 251 Second Report Tonnage Tax HC 299 Third Report Disabled People’s Access to Transport: A year’s HC 93 worth of improvements? First Special Report Government Response to the Seventeenth HC 377 Report of the Committee: Cars of the Future Fourth Report The Departmental Annual Report 2004 HC 409 Second Special Government Response to the Eighteenth Report HC 410 Report of the Committee: Galileo Fifth Report Rural Railways HC 169–I Sixth Report The Performance of the London Underground HC 94 Seventh Report Road Pricing: The Next Steps HC 169-I

Session 2003–04 First Report Traffic Management Bill HC 144 Second Report The Departmental Annual Report HC 249 Third Report The Regulation of Licensed Taxis and Private HC 215-I Hire Vehicle Services in the UK Fourth Report Transport Committee Annual Report 2002-03 HC 317 Fifth Report The Office of Fair Trading’s Response to the HC 418 Third Report of the Committee: The Regulation of Licensed Taxis and Private Hire Vehicle Services in the UK Sixth Report Disabled People’s Access to Transport HC 439 Seventh Report The Future of the Railway HC 145-I Eighth Report School Transport HC 318-I Ninth Report Navigational Hazards and the Energy Bill HC 555 Tenth Report The Work of the Vehicle and Operator Services HC 250 Agency and The Vehicle Certification Agency Eleventh Report National Rail Enquiry Service HC 580 Twelfth Report British Transport Police HC 488 Thirteenth Report The Rail Regulator’s Last Consultations HC 805 Fourteenth Report The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard HC 500 Agency First Special Report Government Response to the Eleventh Report of HC 1132 the Committee: National Rail Enquiry Service Second Special Government Response to the Ninth Report of HC 1133 Report the Committee: Navigational Hazards and the Energy Bill Third Special Report Government Response to the Twelfth Report of HC 1134 the Committee: British Transport Police Fifteenth Report Financial Protection for Air Travellers HC 806-I Sixteenth Report Traffic Law and its Enforcement HC 105-I Seventeenth Report Cars of the Future HC 319-I Fourth Special Government, Health and Safety Commission and HC 1209 Report Executive, and Office of the Rail Regulator Responses to the Seventh Report from the Committee, on the Future of the Railway Eighteenth Report Galileo HC 1210

Session 2002–03 First Report Urban Charging Schemes HC 390-I Second Report Transport Committee: Annual Report 2002 HC 410 Third Report Jam Tomorrow?: The Multi Modal Study HC 38-I Investment Plans Fourth Report Railways in the North of England HC 782-I Fifth Report Local Roads and Pathways HC 407-I Sixth Report Aviation HC 454-I Seventh Report Overcrowding on Public Transport HC 201-I Eighth Report The Work of the Highways Agency HC 453 Ninth Report Ports HC 783-I First Special Report Government and Office of Fair Trading HC 97 Responses to the Seventeenth Report of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, The Bus Industry Second Special Government Response to the Committee's HC 1212 Report Fourth Report, Railways in the North of England

Session 2001-02 First Special Report The Attendance of a Minister from HM Treasury HC 771 before the Transport, Local Government and The Regions Committee Second Special Government Response to the to the Fifth Report HC 1285 Report of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, Session 2001-02, European Transport White Paper Third Special Report Government Response to the Eighteenth Report HC 1305 of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee, Session 2001-02, National Air Traffic Services Finances

ISBN 0-215-02371-4

Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery OYce Ltd. 9 780215 023711 4/2005 304246 19585