House of Commons Transport Committee The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the Maritime Incident Response Group Sixth Report of Session 2010–12 Volume I Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/transcom Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14 June 2011 HC 948 Incorporating HC 752-i Published on 23 June 2011 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £22.00 The Transport Committee The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its Associate Public Bodies. Current membership Mrs Louise Ellman (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair) Steve Baker (Conservative, Wycombe) Jim Dobbin (Labour/Co-operative, Heywood and Middleton) Mr Tom Harris (Labour, Glasgow South) Julie Hilling (Labour, Bolton West) Kwasi Kwarteng (Conservative, Spelthorne) Mr John Leech (Liberal Democrat, Manchester Withington) Paul Maynard (Conservative, Blackpool North and Cleveleys) Gavin Shuker (Labour/Co-operative, Luton South) Iain Stewart (Conservative, Milton Keynes South) Julian Sturdy (Conservative, York Outer) The following were also members of the committee during the Parliament. Angie Bray (Conservative, Ealing Central and Acton) Lilian Greenwood (Labour, Nottingham South) Kelvin Hopkins (Labour, Luton North) Angela Smith (Labour, Penistone and Stocksbridge) Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/transcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Mark Egan (Clerk), Marek Kubala (Second Clerk), David Davies (Committee Specialist), Tony Catinella (Senior Committee Assistant), Edward Faulkner (Committee Assistant), Stewart McIlvenna (Committee Support Assistant) and Hannah Pearce (Media Officer). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is [email protected] 1 Contents Report Page Summary 3 1 Introduction 5 Our inquiry 5 Coastguards giving evidence 6 2 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency: funding 8 3 Consultation on the future of HM Coastguard 9 The consultation process 13 Savings 14 Local knowledge in coastguard stations 15 Volunteers 16 Daylight hours 18 Communications technology 19 Resilience 21 Conclusion 21 4 Emergency towing vessels 23 Deployment 23 Commercial tugs 26 Alternative funding sources 27 5 Maritime Incident Response Group 29 Deployment 30 Ships crews 31 A rationalised MIRG 31 Conclusion 33 Conclusions and recommendations 34 Formal Minutes 39 Witnesses 40 List of printed written evidence 41 List of additional written evidence 42 List of unprinted evidence 44 List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 46 3 Summary Her Majesty’s Coastguard provides an essential emergency service around the shores of the United Kingdom. The workload of the Coastguard has increased significantly over the past decade, as our coastlines have become busier and our seas more congested. Both the number of incidents to which the Coastguard has responded, and the number of deaths involved in such incidents, increased by more than 70% between 2000 and 2009. In December 2010 the Department for Transport launched a consultation into proposals, from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), to modernise the Coastguard. The MCA proposes a significant reorganisation of the structure of the Coastguard, reducing the 18 Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres currently based around the UK coast down to three centres open on a 24-hour basis, and five other centres operating only during ‘daylight hours’. Ten existing regional MRCCs would close. This came in the wake of two other Government announcements with implications for maritime safety. As part of the Spending Review in October 2010, the Government announced it would not renew the existing contract for the UK’s four emergency towing vessels (ETVs). A review of the Maritime Incident Response Group (MIRG), a national fire-fighting-at-sea capability, part-funded by the MCA, was also announced. This Report examines these three separate, yet inter-related, proposals. Taken together, we consider the proposed changes to the co-ordination of the Coastguard and the potential loss of the ETVs and the MIRG to represent a significant restructuring of the country’s marine search and rescue and accident and pollution prevention capabilities. It is therefore regrettable the Department for Transport announced all three sets of proposals with no prior consultation whatsoever and did not consider their combined impact. We cannot support the MCA’s proposals on the future of the Coastguard in their current form. The evidence we have received raises serious concerns that safety will be jeopardised if these proposals proceed. Our main concern about safety is the loss of local knowledge, or ‘situational awareness’, amongst coastguard officers that will inevitably occur under the proposals. Rationalising the number of MRCCs so drastically, in our view, will reduce the quality and rate of exchange of information, particularly at key points when information must be passed swiftly in order to save lives. We are not convinced by the MCA’s assertions that technology can, at present, adequately compensate for the loss of this knowledge. We are also concerned that the proposals risk placing too great a burden of responsibility on volunteer coastguards and pay insufficient attention towards the safety of leisure craft, small fishing vessels and the like (as opposed to the commercial shipping industry), and we have doubts about the statistics used by the MCA to justify its proposals to close several stations at night-time. We are not convinced that the concept of daylight-hour stations should be proceeded with in any future re-organisation of the Coastguard. The strength of opposition against the modernisation proposals we have encountered is such that, if, as the Minister has said, this is a genuine consultation, the proposals cannot be given approval in their current form. The Government should withdraw its proposals and consult on revised plans that address the key issues we have identified: the implications of the potential loss of local knowledge for both safety and volunteering, and the application 4 of upgraded technology. The Government should also demonstrate that the alternative proposals put forward by coastguards have been properly considered when revising its plans for the future of the Coastguard. We strongly condemn the decision to withdraw funding for Emergency Towing Vessels. The decision, which was made against the findings of an independent risk assessment, is unwise and short-sighted. It is, quite literally, inviting disaster. Our evidence strongly suggests that there is no suitable commercial alternative available to the ETVs. We urge the Government to reverse the decision to terminate the provision of ETVs through the MCA. We recognise, however, that there is a strong case for finding other sources of income to help cover the costs of ETVs. We note that the Government is brokering discussions with the ETV working group in pursuit of a solution to this problem. It would be unacceptable for the UK shoreline to lie unprotected if no agreement has been reached by 30 September. In such a scenario, the Government should make exceptional provision by extending the ETV contract over the winter, giving the ETV working group a further six months in which to resolve the issue. We oppose ceasing central funding to the MIRG, which we believe has played an important role in tackling fires at sea in the few years since its inception. Our evidence suggests that while ships’ crews have some training their skills do not match the expertise of the MIRG. It is equally clear that without MCA funding, the MIRG will cease to operate. Local fire services cannot and should not be expected to support a national strategy. We recommend that the Government adopt a rationalised MIRG model which is better calibrated to the risk and more cost-effective than the present arrangement. 5 1 Introduction 1. Her Majesty’s Coastguard provides an essential emergency service around the shores of the United Kingdom. Although not as high-profile as other emergency services, its interventions—to assist those in danger in our waters and on our cliffs and our beaches— can be just as critical. The workload of the Coastguard has been increasing. Our coastlines are far busier than ever, enjoyed by 200 million people a year, and our seas are becoming more congested.1 There are clear signs that weather conditions are also becoming persistently more extreme, with significant weather events becoming more frequent and severe. The Coastguard responded to almost 22,000 incidents in 2009, a 76% increase since 2000. More than 400 people died during such incidents in 2009, a 71% increase over the same period.2 2. The structure and organisation of the Coastguard has recently been subject to considerable public and parliamentary scrutiny. In December 2010 the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)—the government agency responsible for maritime emergency response—published proposals to modernise the Coastguard which have proved to be controversial. This came in the wake of two other Government announcements with implications for maritime safety. As part of the Spending Review in October 2010, the Government announced it would not renew the existing contract for the UK’s four emergency towing vessels (ETVs).