'Mericancommitteeonafrica

'merican Committee On Africa j 198 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 100381(212) 962·1210 I Cable AMCOMMAF December 1981. Dear Friends: As you may have read in recent newspaper reports, the struggle for self-determination in Western Sahara is inten sifying. At this crucial time, the Reagan administration is increasing its involvement with Morocco which illegally occupies Western Sahara. A recent US military mission to Morocco revealed plans for closer military ties between the two nations including major weapons sales. On December 3, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger met in Fez with King Hassan. The meeting came only a few days after a visit by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Plans have been announced for Secretary of State Alexander Haig to visit Morocco in Decem~er. The enclosed report by ACOA Literature Director Richard Knight gives background information on the struggle in West ern Sahara and explains what is at s'take. It dramatizes the seriousness of the Reagan administration's military policy in the region. Congress has the power to review and to overturn the sale of weapons to Morocco. In particular, Representative Harold Wolpe and Senator Nancy Kassebaum who chair the congressional subco~nittees on Africa could be key in this process. Please write and urge them to oppose the sale of weapons to Morocco, and write to your own representative and senat0rs as well. Senator Na"nc'/ Kas3e'ha.l.1"1 Hon. Harold Wolpe Chairman Africa P~N Affairs The Sena'te Subcommittee New Jersey & C Sts. SE on Africa Washington DC 20515 S~na·te Office Buildi,1g Washington DC 20002 \ enn' fer~vis , cutive . rector , (;\. American Cornmi~tee On Africa ~\~ 198 Bro;tdway, ~ew Ymk. ~.Y. 10038/(212) '162-1210 I Cable AMCOMMAI The Reagan Administration and the Struggle for Self-Determination in Western Sahara The struggle for self-determination and independence continues in Western Sahara under the leadership of Polisario. King Hassan of Morocco, unable to defeat Polisario and facing increased political problems at home, has turned to the United States for help, which the Reagan administration seems more than willing to provide. Background Western Sahara was colonized by Spain in the late nine teenth century, but widespread resistance prevented full con trol from being established until 1934. Opposition to Spanish rule continued in the 1950's and 60's, and on May 10, 1973, Polisario( Popula;r Front for the Liberation of-Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro) was formed to int~nsify the fight for independence. Ten days later armed struggle began. By 1975, Spain was ready to end its formal colonial rule, but both Morocco and Mauritania were now laying claim to West ern Saharao As a result of these claims, the United Nations sent a mission to the area. It reported that the people of Western Sahara were "categorically for independence and against the territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania" and that Polisario was the dominant political force. Late in 1975 the Internaticnal Court of Justice (World Court) found that Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara were without legal jus tification and that the people of Western Sahara were entitled to salf-determination including independence. Although the UN mistion urged the holding of a referendum to determine the will of the people of Western Sahara, Spain gave into pressure from Morocco, withdrew, and divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania. Polisario rejected the Spanish agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, declaring it illegal because it denied the people of Western Sahara the right to self-determination. On February 27,1976, one day after the Spanish withdrawal, Polisario de clared the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and continued Western Sahara•••#2 armed resistance. Over the next three years Po1isario grew in strength making the war more costly to its adversaries. In August 1979, Mauritania sued for peace and withdrew from Western Sahara. Morocco prQmpt1y extended its claims to in clude the area formerly claimed by Mauritania, and the war continued. Morocco is determined to hold on to Western Sahara for both political and economic reasons. The war draws attention away from political and economic problems at home and builds the nationalist and patriotic image of the monarchy. There are also large phosphate reserves located in the Western Sahara at Bu" Craa, just 58 miles from the coast. A by-product that can be extracted from the phosphate is a form of Uranium, U-238 which can be used to make fuel for nuclear reactors. l Exploitable oil and iron deposits are also thought to exist in the area. US Policy US policy toward the region h~s long been centered around close military ties with Morocco, but the Carter administra tion maintained a position of neutrality on the issue of West ern Sahara. Recent Reagan administration moves appear to signal a sig nificant shift in policy. In early November a 23 man military delegation visited Morocco and the battle zones in Western Sahara. The joint Pentagon-state Department delegation was led by Francis J.(Bing) West, Jr., assistant secretary of defence for international security affairs. The visit raised speculation that the United States may become directly involved in Morocco's military efforts in the S"ahara. The press reported that West suggested to Col. Maj 0 Mohammed Kabba, Moroccan airforce head, that more mobile com mando style tactics be.' adopted and that the US would provide the necessary training. "We can train General D1imi's forces" West was quoted as saying, referring to the Moroccan armed forces chief. In addition, West said during the visit that sophisticated' radar detection and jamming equipment could be made available for the F-5 airplanes which had been supplied to Morocco by the USo Washington has delivered twenty F-Sos to Morocco this year and several have already been shot down by Po1isario. The equip- western Sahara .0.*3 1 ment would protect the planes from radar guided missiles such as Sam 6's. The West mission marks a significant new public us commit ment to Morocco and its territorial claims. In the past, de spite evidence to the contrary, the State Department had claim ed that us supplied weapons were unrelated to the war in West ern Sahara and basically not useful to Morocco in the conflict. This new commitment also seems to run counter to the policy laid out in a statement by us representative, George Christopher to the United Nations on October 30th. liThe United states has not taken a positic'm regarding the final status of Western Sahara, IIsaidChristoph~.IIWehave, however,been convinved that a military solution to the conflict was neither possible nor desirable. We have hoped for an early, peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflict and have contributed where possible' to its achievement. Such a solution should be based on the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the territory. II The Reagan administration's policy of escalating support for Morocco is consistent with its overall foreign policy. lilt is the prevailing view of this administration that America's allies and close associates should expect understanding and reliable support, II said Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secre taryof State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in tes timony before Congress in March. Morocco is a conservative Arab state and a long-time ally. In the past there have been US military bases in Morocco and the US navy regularly uses Moroccan ports. The US sees King Hassan as an ally in need and fears that if Morocco loses in the Sahara the King may lose his throne. Draper added that Morocco neededlladditional support and consider ation" and the US would not withhold arms for what he termed IIreasonable and legitimate ll purposeso Another factor in the us government's attitude toward Poli sario stems from its cold war policies toward the Soviet Union. Many Soviet-aligned countries have supported Polisario diplo matically and several, including Cuba, have recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Polisario obtains arms from both Algeria and Libya, and the administration's view of Libya's Colo Muammar Qaddafi as a pro-Soviet terrorist leader must in evitably affect its attitude. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig has shown a particular sympathy for Morocco. In one of his official acts, he approved the sale of l08·M-60 tanks to Morocco. The move came just two days after the US hostages in Iran had been released, largely Western Sahara.oo o#4 through the good offices of Algeria. The move was widely seen as a snub to Algeria, and as if to confirm the fact, in early February an American embassy spokesman in Morocco announced the delivery of the first two of six OV-10 counter-insurgency aircraft. To implement his policy, President Reagan has chosen Joseph Vernon Reed to be the new US ambassador to Morocco. A personal friend of King Hassan, Reed "is known to be particularly eager to increase US support for the king's military struggle in the Sahara, II according to the Washington Post. He formerly worked at Chase Manhattan Bank as chief of staff for David Rockefeller another friend of Hassan. In presenting his credentials to Hassan he said, liThe leadership of the Reagan administration has stated that your country's concerns are my country's con cerns. II President Reagan!s policy differs from President Carter's more in degree than in approach. Carter was restrained by mem bers of his own party in Congress who were opposed to arms sales or at least to the use of US-supplied arms in the Sahara.

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