CERAH working paper
The Funding of Humanitarian Action by Non-Western Donors
The Sustainability of Gulf States’ Contribution
Celine Billat
CERAH Working Paper 30
2014 - 2015
a Joint Centre of
Dissertation Master of Advanced Studies in Humanitarian Action
Academic Year 2014-2015
The funding of humanitarian action by non-Western donors: the sustainability of Gulf States’ contribution
Submitted by Céline BILLAT
Examining Board:
Supervisor: Professor Gilles Carbonnier Expert: Mr Charles-Antoine Hofmann CERAH: Mrs Edith Favoreu (PhD)
September 2015
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KEY WORDS
Gulf donors, Non-Western donors, Emerging donors, Non-DAC donors, Humanitarian financing.
ABSTRACT
Non-Western donors are increasingly funding humanitarian action and among them Gulf States are dominating the aid flows. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar are the four Gulf donors most significantly contributing. Indeed, those four donors have raised their contributions from 1% of the total humanitarian funding in 2000 to reach 7% in 2014 (Source: https://fts.unocha.org/). The main issue is therefore to address the following question: is increasing Gulf States’ contribution to humanitarian action a sustainable trend? Or is it only due to ad hoc and temporary reasons and might thus wane once these specific factors disappear? This paper argues that Gulf States high-level humanitarian funding is indeed likely to continue on a middle/long term perspective. This finding is based on the three main following arguments. Gulf States’ donorship is anchored in their religion and culture, combined with great political interests in funding humanitarian action essentially linked with their strategic foreign policy considerations (Part I). These factors lead Gulf States to implement a sustainable strategy articulated around two parallel dynamics: the integration into the traditional humanitarian system (understood as the Western system coordinated by the UN) through increased penetration of its institutions and increased funding and partnerships with Western actors (Part II) at the same time as the building of their own national and regional institutional and operational systems (Part III).
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ACRONYMS
ADFD Abu Dhabi Fund for Development BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South-Africa CERF Central Emergency Response Fund ERF Emergency Response Fund FTS Financial Tracking Service GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income IDP Internally Displaced Persons ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies KFAED Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development KSC King Salman Centre for relief and humanitarian works MICAD Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (UAE) NGO Non-Governmental Organization OCFA Office for Coordination of Foreign Aid (UAE) OECD-DAC Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee OIC - ICHAD Organization of Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Affairs Department RCRCM Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement SFD Saudi Fund for Development UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East WFP World Food Programme
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TABLE OF CONTENT
INTRODUCTION ...... 6
I. Gulf States sustainable funding factors ...... 8
A. Religion and culture ...... 8
1. Islamic finance ...... 9
2. A wider concept of humanitarian needs ...... 10
3. Recipients: impartiality at stake? ...... 11
B. Political strategic interests ...... 12
1. Domestic factors ...... 12
2. Regional factors ...... 13
a) Stability and security ...... 13
b) Relations with Israel ...... 15
c) Competition among Gulf States ...... 15
3. International factors ...... 15
a) South-South cooperation ...... 16
b) International branding strategy ...... 17
II. Gulf States integration into the traditional international humanitarian system ...... 19
A. With Western donors and coordination bodies ...... 19
1. Coordination and cooperation ...... 19
2. Transparency ...... 22
B. With Western actors: funding and partnerships ...... 24
1. Increased operational partnerships ...... 24
2. Increased multilateral funding? ...... 25
III. Gulf States building their own humanitarian system ...... 27
A. At regional level ...... 27
1. Regional institutions ...... 27
2. Regional operational cooperation ...... 28
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B. At national level ...... 29
1. The impact of 9/11 ...... 29
a) Variety of funding channels ...... 29
b) The counter-terrorism measures ...... 30
2. Decision-making process ...... 32
3. Institutionalization in progress ...... 33
CONCLUSION ...... 34
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INTRODUCTION
At Governmental and institutional level, humanitarian aid has been usually mostly funded by countries members of the Development Assistance Committee from the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC), currently comprised of the European Union and 28 Governments, most of them being Western donors. These DAC donors accounted for 94% of reported international humanitarian assistance provided from governments over the last decade and 90% (US$16.8 billion) in 2014 (“Global Humanitarian Assistance Report” 2015). Nevertheless, amongst Government donors, non-Western donors are taking an increasing part. They are mainly composed of two categories of countries. The ones called the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa) and Gulf donors understood as the six countries member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) founded in 1981 in order to strengthen cooperation in the region. So far Gulf States are dominating the humanitarian aid flows reported by non-DAC donors. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has been the top non-DAC donor every year in between 2000-2010 excluding 2004 & 2009 when the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were the largest (Smith 2011, 8). During this decade, the UAE were the third non-DAC donor, Kuwait the fourth and Qatar the eighth (Harmer and Martin 2010, 17). Thus Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar are the four members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that are amongst the top ten non-DAC donors significantly funding humanitarian action (Harmer and Martin 2010, 17). Oman and Bahrein are also members of the GCC but they have not yet emerged on the humanitarian scene as great donors and therefore they will not be studied in this paper. Although the total contributions of Saudi Arabia are the most important regarding this period of time, it is interesting to consider these countries as a group, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, sharing geographical, political, economic, cultural and religious aspects that create common features to their donorship. Namely their common anti liberal and authoritarian monarchical regimes (Gause III 2015, 40), their Arab and Sunni religious identity and their economic wealth based on their natural resources (petrol and gas). Gulf States are not per se new donors; they have been active donors since the discovery of oil and state foundation in the 1960s and 1970s after their independence from the British Empire. A report from the World Bank (Tabor et al. 2010) shows that between 1973 and 2008, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have given in foreign aid 1.5% of their Gross
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National Income (GNI) thus far exceeding the 0.7% target of OECD-DAC countries set by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1970. The academic literature about Gulf States donorship which also generally1 tackles these countries as a group - although more information is provided about Saudi Arabia and the UAE than about Kuwait and Qatar (one reason might be their greatest level of funding that has raised more interest for them) – is not approaching humanitarian aid distinctively but in the context of their broader foreign aid, probably because the distinction they make between development and humanitarian action is blurred in terms of concepts and institutions. Only very few reports from humanitarian researchers have so far been published specifically about humanitarian aid, hence it is noteworthy that there is a gap in addressing the stricto sensu Gulf States humanitarian donorship. The first estimate of the financial humanitarian contributions from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since their contemporary donorship emerged during the 1967 Arab- Israeli war to support neighbouring countries hosting Palestinian refugees (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 13) was made by a Saudi researcher Al-Yahia who considers that they have given $120 billion since the early 1970s (IRIN 2012b). But except this estimation no disaggregated data exist about Gulf States humanitarian aid before 2000 and the onset of the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) database managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) which is based on voluntary inputs from the donor or the recipient to report a contribution and therefore which might not be completely exhaustive. Examining FTS data shows that the contributions of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar rose steadily from 1% in 2000 to reach 7% of the global humanitarian funding in 2014 (Annex 1.1). From 2000 to 2014, these four main Gulf donor countries have contributed in total $6.6 billion. Saudi Arabia is the largest donor with 55% of this amount followed by the UAE (24%), Kuwait (14%) and Qatar (7%) (Annex 2.1). Except in 2001 and in 2008 that were 2 years of remarkable contributions from Saudi Arabia, the aggregated contributions flow of Gulf States donors have been increasing slowly and regularly since the 2000s until 2012. Then the humanitarian funding of Gulf States raised greatly from 2012 to reach 7% (Annex 1.1) of the total humanitarian funding in 2014 which was a peak in the Gulf States recorded humanitarian funding representing 8,4% of all Governments funding (Source FTS).
1 At the exception of one report on Saudi Arabia: (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011) 7
Research Question, Structure and Findings
The main issue is therefore to address the following question: is increasing Gulf States’ contribution to humanitarian action a sustainable trend? Or is it only due to ad hoc and temporary reasons and might thus wane once these specific factors disappear? This thesis is based on a literature review of Gulf States’ donorship and on a study of primary data extracted from FTS over a fifteen years period from 2000 to 2014 (see annexes). On that basis, I argue that Gulf States’ surge in aid is likely to be a sustainable trend. This finding is based on three main arguments that will be developed in the three parts of this dissertation. The Gulf States high-level humanitarian funding is indeed likely to continue on a middle/long term perspective. This is not just because Gulf States have the financial capacity to do so thanks to their natural resources wealth. It is also and mainly because humanitarianism is anchored in their religion and culture, combined with great political interests in funding humanitarian action essentially linked with their strategic foreign policy considerations (Part I). These factors lead Gulf States to implement a sustainable strategy articulated around two parallel dynamics: the integration into the traditional humanitarian system (understood as the Western system coordinated by the UN) through increased penetration of its institutions and increased funding and partnerships with Western actors (Part II) at the same time as the building of their own national and regional institutional and operational systems (Part III).
I. Gulf States sustainable funding factors The Gulf States humanitarian contribution is likely to be a sustainable trend because they have the financial potential and motives through their religion and culture combined with political interests to funding humanitarian action, mainly linked to their foreign policy strategy. A. Religion and culture Acts of humanitarianism are an essential element of religious practice for the Muslim enshrined in Quranic verses and prophetic texts: the hadiths which are the words of the Prophet reported by its companions that provide the principal sources of Islamic legislation. Charitable giving is either of an obligatory character by which all Muslims rich and poor are bound or of an inciting nature. For Muslims, humanitarian giving or action is a way of erasing sins, validating faith, pleasing God, to be accountable in the hereafter, receiving help from heaven and meriting paradise and protecting oneself against misfortune (Krafess 2005, 327).
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1. Islamic finance There is a one thousand and four hundred (1400) years old tradition of wealth redistribution in the form of zakat (obligatory charity), sadaqa (voluntary charity) and waqf (public endowment) that continues to the present day (Kroessin 2008, 36). Zakat is the third pillar of Islam as important as the profession of faith, praying, fasting during Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca. It is a spiritual duty of the Muslim as a means of redistributing wealth in order to restore social equality and promote a more just society (Stirk 2015, 7). According to Quran, Sura 9, Verse 60, there are eight categories of zakat beneficiaries which allows zakat to fund both emergency and long term assistance (Krafess 2005, 335). It is mandatory and every year, mainly during Ramadan, 2,5% of one’s wealth are given or taxed by the Islamic government based on solidarity with the poor and needy. Although a majority of Islamic scholars agree that zakat should not be redistributed to non- Muslims, this issue is in debate among the various Islamic fora (Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 12). Gulf States are Islamic States and the obligation to assist fellow Muslims and those in needs also applies at the official level (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 21) and religious scholars decreed that if zakat does not fulfill the needs of the poor, the Muslim Government has the prerogative to mobilize available resources (Krafess 2005, 328). In Gulf countries, state agencies collect zakat as part of the public taxation system (Kroessin 2008, 36) but only a small percentage of what they could. In Qatar, the Qatar Zakat Fund has collected $45.8M in 2012 which represents 0,02% of its GDP (2013), in Saudi Arabia, the Department of Zakat and Income tax has raised 4.6B$ in 2013 which represents 0,62% of its GDP and the UAE through the UAE Zakat Fund have raised $35M which represents 0.01% of its GDP (Stirk 2015, 3). According to Stirk, the total volume collected each year through formal zakat mechanisms alone is, at the very least, in the tens of billions of dollars. Data for Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which make up 17% of the world’s estimated Muslim population, indicates that in these countries alone at least US$5.7 billion is currently collected annually through formal Zakat-collection institutions and between 23% and 57% is used for humanitarian response. But a lot more could be collected towards humanitarian action if the channelling to the humanitarian response community was formalised and ideological barriers such as the use of zakat for non-Muslims were overcome (Stirk 2015, 3). According to a religious edict, Zakat should be owned by the poor, and thus given in the form of direct assistance and not loans or micro-credit. Feeding the poor and helping orphans are
9 encouraged repeatedly in the Quran and have thus become preferred forms of zakat (IRIN 2012a). Another type of religious giving that raises much more money than zakat is Sadaqa which means “alms” and is practiced in the form of a volunteer donation. It is encouraged especially via telethons which are TV shows, very popular in the Gulf States, fundraising for a specific cause, usually for sudden unforeseen crisis (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 25; Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 12). When the famine stroke in the Horn of Africa in July 2011 Gulf countries were able to raise funds with remarkable speed and ease. In the span of three hours, a TV telethon in Qatar raised nearly 25 million riyals ($6.8M) while telethons in the UAE reportedly raised an additional $50M (IRIN 2011). Building mosques has been a popular form of sadaqa, largely due to the Prophet Muhammad’s saying that the one who helps build a mosque will have a castle built for him in heaven. Islam also established a system allowing sins to be erased by performing humanitarian acts which is called Kaffara “erasing of sins”. “Alms extinguish sins exactly as water extinguishes fire” (Hadith n° 2951). For instance when a person is unable to fast during Ramadan he should feed or fund the feeding of sixty needy people. Thus, the ritual of the Ramadan fast can be replaced by charitable giving (Krafess 2005, 329). Waqf (continuous alms) is the fourth source of religious income. It consists of making an endowment of property or rendering it inalienable for the benefit of a religious foundation or the common good. The structure concerned will assume the responsibility of managing the endowment and distributing the income or usufruct amongst the needy. This property or wealth (money, property, shares, etc.,) should yield a continuous and lasting profit. All actions providing a long term profit are considered continuous alms. Bequest is an example of waqf. The projects financed by waqf have been very diverse but the most current ones are the construction of schools and hospitals (Krafess 2005, 338). Finally, because riba (interests generated by money) is forbidden by Islamic finance rules, the interests are often redistributed to charities (Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 14). The same tenet also applies to loans that have no payable interests in the Muslim religion (Krafess 2005, 335). 2. A wider concept of humanitarian needs The concept of humanitarian need does not only comprise the basic needs such as food, water, shelter or health but is widened to include things which fall under the scope of what a Muslim should perform in order to fulfill his (or her) religious obligations and sustain his spiritual
10 life (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 19). Support to African Muslims to attend the pilgrimage in Mecca or to celebrate Eid, the building of mosques and Islamic centres, the printing and distribution of Quran are all labelled ‘humanitarian’. The same organization can at the same time implement different types of activities: humanitarian assistance, charitable activities (special attention to poor and orphans according to the Qur’an recommendations - Muhamad also being an orphan), support to seasonal activities (Ramadan, Eid, meet distribution for sacrifice), Da’wa (Spreading the Faith): construction of mosques and koranic schools and support to predicators2. The question of the content of the aid and of the separation between humanitarian action and religious activities is still in debate among various fora (Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 25). 3. Recipients: impartiality at stake? Middle-East benefits from 56% of Gulf contributions worldwide, Asia is the second region receiving 15% and then Africa 12% (Annex 2.3). The main recipient countries have been the Occupied Palestinian Territories which have been yearly recipients with 20% of the total Gulf funding followed by Syria and Iraq with respectively 11%. Finally, only 15 countries have received 90% of the total contributions. Out of these top recipients Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia and Afghanistan are the only ones not to be in the Middle-East but all of them are Muslim countries (Annex 2.4). According to Robyns and de Geoffroy (Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 23) the religious principle of “Umma community” which represents the Muslim community explains the vast majority of funds going to Arab and Islamic solidarity in the Middle-East and the Arab peninsula. Nevertheless, data also demonstrate that Muslim countries have been the most affected by crisis, including the Bam earthquake in Iran in 2003, the Southeast Asian tsunami of 2004, the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, the attack on Gaza in late 2008, the flooding in Pakistan in 2010 and nowadays the crisis in Syria. Only in 2013, an estimated 75% of people living in the top ten recipient countries of humanitarian assistance were Muslim (Stirk 2015, 3). Yet, still according to the same authors, a distinction should be made between private charities more oriented towards religious actions and Governmental actions which are taking distance from religion and are closer to the traditional humanitarian principles and more specifically the impartiality in the provision of assistance based on the criteria of needs regardless of the identity (religion, ethnicity, etc.) of the recipient. Saudi Arabia for instance
2 It could be interesting in a further research to elaborate a definition of what means humanitarian action from a Gulf States’ perspective. 11 stresses that the Kingdom sees humanitarian assistance as a moral obligation based on humanitarian principles and argues that their aid is given on the basis of needs regardless of the identity of the recipients (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 9). But on the other hand, religious symbol is a determining factor for Saudi Arabia contribution and to comply with the Saudi Arabia public opinion the Kingdom does not make any significant contribution to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) neither to national Red Cross societies (unless through the Saudi Red Crescent) (Binder, Meier, and Steets 2010,19). The ICRC is anyhow receiving only 0.8% of Gulf States funding while the IFRC is receiving even less: 0.2% (Annex 2.5). Therefore we could conclude with Momani and Ennis that there is a difference in the discourse of rulers and in the statistics that are showing that aid is mainly going to Arab and Muslim countries (Momani and Ennis 2012, 614).
In addition to the great potential of funds offered by Islamic finance, Gulf States also benefit from high-level income provided by their natural resources wealth. Nevertheless, scholars have shown that if the level of funding is linked with the oil price, however it is not always following the same trend (Momani and Ennis 2012, 606). The same conclusion is made by Young who states that the politics of Gulf States aid if enabled by resource wealth is anyhow above all else strategic and political goals can override economic prudence (Young 2015, 44). Indeed despite the context of the dramatic fall in oil prices from late 2014 that could affect the ability of these States to contribute to humanitarian action (Young 2015, 44) Gulf States humanitarian aid is skyrocketing.
B. Political strategic interests The Arab Gulf States have historically used foreign aid and humanitarian aid as a quiet tool of their respective foreign policies (Young 2015, 43) and they still have high political interests in funding humanitarian action. 1. Domestic factors In domestic politics, Gulf States use humanitarian assistance to appease expatriate worker populations from disaster-prone countries who often face miserable working conditions (Binder and Meier 2011, 1139). 85% of UAE and 30% of Saudi Arabia populations are migrant workers coming from low income countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia (Binder, Meier, and Steets 2010, 29; Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 27). Indeed, South Asia is the second world region after Middle-East to benefit from Gulf States assistance with 12%, the other regions of Asia: Southeast, Southwest and East only receiving
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1% each of Gulf contributions (Annex 2.3). The first recipient country from South-Asia is Pakistan with 8% the second one is Bangladesh with 3% and the third one is Indonesia with only 1% (Annex 2.4). Moreover, Pakistan is the UAE’ second recipient country (Annex 6.3) and Saudi Arabia third recipient country (Annex 5.3). Indeed, Saudi Arabia was the first donor to the Pakistan floods ($200M) in 2010 (Smith 2011, 17). The important contributions of Gulf States to tsunami affected countries in 2005 have also contributed to this politics of aid towards origin countries of migrant workers. In total Gulf States contributed $114M (UAE: $58M, Qatar: $25M, Saudi Arabia: $21M, Kuwait: $10M) (Source: FTS). 2. Regional factors a) Stability and security The regional strategy of Gulf States is twofold: keeping the stability of their monarchical regimes and being in security despite the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran about becoming leader of the Islamic world. Regarding the Sunni-Shiite antagonism, the rationale of Saudi Arabia is to suppress the rise of its hegemonic competitor, the Shiite Iran, perceived as a threat, by supporting Sunni movements in Iraq, supporting Karzai Government in Afghanistan and supporting the Sunni governing coalition in Lebanon (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 25; Momani and Ennis 2012, 622). Saudi Islamist turn took place during the reign of King Faisal (1964-1975) when its priorities shifted towards pan-Islamic engagement following the creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969. The dispersal of Saudi-sponsored Islam became an important vehicle for reinforcing and projecting the Kingdom’s legitimacy in Islamic communities across the world and the al-Saud’s much desired recognition as guardian of Islam’s holiest places (Ulrichsen 2012, 109). Nevertheless, it is interesting to mention that despite this rivalry, Iran is a recurrent recipient of Gulf States’ humanitarian aid. Qatar has contributed bilaterally $25M to the Government of Iran during the earthquake in 2012, while the UAE have contributed $944,000 bilaterally and through the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRCM). Saudi Arabia has also given humanitarian aid in-kind for each emergency in Iran: for the floods of 2001, the earthquakes of 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006 and finally to support Iraqi and Afghan refugees through World Food Programme (WFP) for a total of $9.7M (Source: FTS).
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Stability of the monarchy regimes. Since their independence in the 1960s and the 1970s, the Gulf monarchies have adopted a conservative political stance in order to safeguard their regime that distinguished them from the majority of post-colonial States in the developing world that were pro-communist. This contrast resulted in an anti-communist pronouncement and furthermore Saudi encouraged the formation of conservative Islamic organizations to counter left-wing or secular oppositional alternatives (Ulrichsen 2012, 106). During the cold war, aid was provided especially from Saudi Arabia to anti-communist countries for example by supporting Afghanistan after Soviet invasion in 1979 (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 22). Since the end of the cold war, the main strategy is to promote national security through regional stability, establishing their leadership on their neighbourhood (Binder and Meier 2011, 1145). Hence, since the 1990s the Gulf States have assumed a leading role in the region and have been supporting predominantly Sunni monarchies but also Non State Actors such as the Islamist movements and their newly established political parties. For instance during the 2012 electoral campaign in Egypt, Qatar was supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi actors for their charity organizations, websites, and TV channels while Saudi Arabia was supporting the Salafi Nour party (Isaac 2014, 421). While Qatar since the end of 2014 is taking some distance with the Muslim brotherhood which relationship was not appreciated by the other GCC members, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait remain the chief funders of the other side: the military regime of General al-Sisi (Gause III 2015, 30). The Gulf States believe that the security of their regimes depends on maintaining a common monarchical front in times of crisis and they are brought together by a profound fear of regional transformation (Gause III 2015, 35). According to Isaac, funding of Gulf States after the Arab spring shows that it is more driven by the aim of stabilization than by the economic or social needs of the countries in transition. The assistance offered by Gulf States to Tunisia after the Arab spring in 2011 was small ($504M loans and $229M grant, plus 530 tons of aid in-kind from Saudi Arabia) in comparison with the aid provided to Jordan and Morocco at the same period: $5billion in development projects to each country. The discrepancies in amount of aid provided to strengthen the two monarchical regimes show that Gulf aid is primarily addressed in order to stabilize similar political systems (Isaac 2014, 424). The example of Bahrain during the uprising in February 2011 is striking regarding what is qualified by Ulrichsen as “Saudi Arabia attempts to deploy its financial largesse to minimize the destabilizing impact of regional transition” (Ulrichsen 2012, 104). The uprising was
14 perceived as Shiite-led and believed to be supported by Iran which had issued territorial claims over the small island of Bahrain in the past and Gulf countries feared that the uprising would export to the entire Gulf region. Therefore in March 2011, in addition to Saudi Arabia and the UAE tanks forces, GCC granted $10B to Bahrain in order to improve the social well- being of its 1M people over 10 years which represents a very high per capita ratio. b) Relations with Israel The Occupied Palestinian territories are the first recipients with 20% of the total Gulf States humanitarian funding (Annex 2.4). On one hand, according to Cotterrell and Harmer, this regularity shows that regardless foreign policy factors solidarity is also a driver for humanitarian funding. Indeed since the start of the 2nd Intifada in 2001, aid has been significant in volume and duration from all Gulf States donors (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 23). On the other hand Barakat & Zyck qualify Gulf States’ support to the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a form of “financial jihad” to deflect criticism from the Arab world and to compensate for their inability or unwillingness to support military action in defence of the Palestinian people due to their relationship with pro-Israel Western countries notably Saudi Arabia close relationship with the United States (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 31). c) Competition among Gulf States One country’s achievement in the humanitarian sphere impels others to follow suit on similar or greater scale where feasible (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 46). Competition among Gulf States to earn recognition at regional level seems to also be playing its part in the high level funding of the Gulf States. For instance during telethons and public campaigns fundraising, sheiks and members of the royal families in Qatar and Emirates compete to show off their generosity by giving important contributions. It is after such a call for donations that the NGO Dubai Cares was created in 2007 after $926M were collected (Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 11). Another recent example occurred on July 1st 2015 when a business man, the Saudi’s Prince Alwaleed, pledged his entire $32 billion fortune to charity (The National 2015a) and was followed a week later by another business man from the UAE, Abdullah Al Ghurair who announced giving a third of his wealth – more than $1 billion to his newly created foundation to support education3 (The National 2015b). 3. International factors “Foreign aid is clearly a priority of Gulf Arab State foreign policy. Aid creates alliances and seeks to uphold friendly regimes” (Young 2015, 51).
3 This trend reminds the initiative launched by US billionaire Warren Buffet who declared in 2006 that he would give 85% of his fortune to charities after his death and was followed by Bill Gates and other US billionaires. 15
a) South-South cooperation Already in the 1970th, Gulf States’ foreign aid was serving the dual purpose of rebalancing the balance of payments and the deficit concern: $142 billion surpluses for the Gulf States versus $80 billion deficit for developing countries (Momani and Ennis 2012, 608). “Despite the rapid increase in their oil wealth through the 1970s, Gulf citizen and leaders remained keenly aware of their countries’ former underdeveloped position in the global economic system. This awareness seem to have continued in the recent history.” (Momani and Ennis 2012, 612) The feeling of Gulf States to have the responsibility to redistribute a portion of their new-found oil wealth to poorer Arab communities was manifested through the development of state-owned funds and multilateral funds which are gathered through the Coordination Group of Arab National and Regional Development Institutions since 1975. It currently consists of nine institutions, three of which are national funds including the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KAFAED), the eldest, created in 1961, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADF) opened since 1971 in the UAE and the Saudi Arabia Fund for Development (SDF) created in 1974, and five regional organizations consisting of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) 1974 based in Kuwait assuming the role of the Coordination Secretariat who also facilitate the co-funding of projects, the largest one being the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) 1975 based in Saudi Arabia, the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) 1975 based in Austria, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) 1974 based in Khartoum, the Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development Organizations (AGFUND) 1980 based in Saudi Arabia as well as the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) 1976 based in Abu Dhabi. They work mainly as bilateral financing structures offering concessional loans and technical assistance and drove flows far exceeding the ones from DAC countries. Although members of the Non-Aligned Movement since their independence, it is only from the 1990s with the globalization that deepened and broadened the links between Gulf States and the international system as well as the oil considerations that Gulf States were casted as leading global players and that their international posture shifted (Ulrichsen 2012, 110). Saudi’s intent to redress the imbalance in international financial architecture and to reshape the architecture of international governance is manifested by its presence within the G20 and on the board of the International Monetary Fund supporting a proposal to increase emerging economies’ representation that would more accurately reflect their weight in the global economy. “Saudi Arabia involvement in the G20 Leaders process has also meant that it has
16 become the de facto representative of the Gulf donors at this global forum.”(Momani and Ennis 2012, 615) Moreover Saudi is “visibly representing the emerging realignments of non-Western emerging powers” in its participation to the creation of the BRICS forum in Russia in 2009 and its participation in the summit of Non-Aligned Movement (2009). Kuwaiti officials used the occasion of this latter event to announce donations to funds supporting projects in emerging economies and combating poverty in Africa (Ulrichsen 2012, 111–120). Through the greater role that Gulf States intend to play amongst non-DAC countries, a pattern emerges in which they project broader global influence. b) International branding strategy As stated by Donini “humanitarian action is part of global governance, if not of global government” (Donini 2007, 49). It is therefore used by Gulf States as a tool for their foreign policy especially their international branding strategy. Since the 2000s, Gulf States sought to increase their influence and recognition at global level through the funding of humanitarian emergencies worldwide and through taking the lead and hosting various humanitarian events and initiatives in the Gulf with an international scope. Hence, most of the meetings about Middle-East humanitarian and development issues are now taking place in the Gulf. Thus Kuwait is hosting most of the international meetings such as the Arab-DAC dialogue meetings and the Syrian pledges conferences which are taking place in Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia took the lead with Yemen in 2010, both with the Friends of Yemen Forum and by organizing the high-level Riyadh meeting of regional and international donors in February 2010. Qatar’s high profile involvement in conflict mediation, boosted by its early success between competing factions in Lebanon in 2008, kept hosting diplomatic mediations such as between the Sudanese Government and Justice and Equality Movement in 2009 and in 2010 between the Yemeni Government and the Houthis opposition armed group. The most pro-active are probably the UAE who have launched several initiatives. First since 2003 they are organizing the annual Dubai International Humanitarian Aid and Development Conference and Exhibition (DIHAD), following an “aid in trade” initiative as a conference and forum for humanitarian suppliers, procurers and agencies. The International Humanitarian City of Dubai has been set up as a hub based on its ideal logistical location due to its political stability and geographical proximity to regions that are frequently affected by natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies (Momani and Ennis 2012, 620). A tax free zone has been set up called “Dubai aid city”, for humanitarian agencies to deal with procurement, supply, stockpiling and logistics (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 17).
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Besides these initiatives, the consciousness of the use of humanitarian visibility through important contributions in order to raise their international profile could be the main reason of the sustainability of their high-level funding as a part of their ‘rebranding initiative’ (Momani and Ennis 2012, 606). Indeed the Gulf States seem to have in their strategy to improve their international image and raise the profile of their aid in the international sphere. One aspect is to make the aid more visible but carefully controlled (Momani and Ennis 2012, 620). Gulf donors usually make few but large commitments which are even more visible that they are requesting the recipients for publicly acknowledging their contributions through press releases and other public statements4 (Binder, Meier, and Steets 2010, 8). Indeed, the peaks in Gulf donors’ contributions (Annex 1.1) are often due to great one-off contributions. Thus, in 2001, Saudi was the second largest humanitarian donor mainly (98%) due to a contribution to the Occupied Palestinian Territories of $645M. Then in 2008, Saudi Arabia made another very important donation to the World Food Programme (WFP) of $339M and in 2014 another major donations to the UN operations in Iraq of $500M. However there used to be an exception to this pattern from the UAE who used to have lots of recipients countries and organizations. In total, the UAE have funded 81 country emergencies over the last fifteen (15) years even if only a small number of countries out of this great number are benefiting the majority of funds (Annex 6.3). But recently a shift has occurred and it appears that the UAE have decreased significantly their number of beneficiaries. From 39 emergencies in 2010 UAE have decreased their number of recipient countries to 11 in 2013 and 10 in 2014 (Source: FTS). Moreover, Gulf States and especially Saudi Arabia have understood that they could gain international recognition by supporting more than just Muslim countries. Humanitarian contributions could be used as a soft power to improve bilateral relations and build diplomatic networks outside their traditional zone of influence (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 30; Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 25). For example China who is not a usual recipient of Gulf Sates’ aid but a strategic partner has benefited from their assistance during the earthquake in 2008 for a total amount of $80M mainly through bilateral aid. Another reason for using humanitarian contributions as a branding tool is to counter the international criticism and accusations to fund terrorism that were a consequence of the 9/11 attacks where Saudi citizens were involved. Hence the Saudi Arabia Government
4 This is also the way most of Western donors proceed and first of all the European Commission. 18
increased its contribution willing to give the image of a “humanitarian kingdom” (Binder and Meier 2011, 1141). The Syrian crisis is another example where several reports have alleged that Gulf States have been covertly funding some groups inside Syria and Iraq, most prominently the self- proclaimed Islamic State (Plotkin Boghardt 2014) or at least by backing rival groups in the opposition against the regime of Bashar al Assad, encouraged divisions that have bolstered the so-called Islamic State (Gause III 2015, 30). The increasing Gulf support for Syria and Iraq could also be to refute these allegations of supporting - either tacitly or explicitly - the extremist Sunni groups. Indeed, in 2014, Saudi Arabia has committed $500M to the United Nations operations in Iraq. In the recent case of Yemen, Saudi Arabia who on one hand, since March 2015, is engaged in a military campaign against the Shiite Houthi armed group, on the other hand has pledged the entire UN appeal. Yet Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition who is accused of grave violations of International Humanitarian Laws and more particularly targeting civilians, conducting indiscriminate attacks and using disproportionate means of warfare (Human Rights Watch 2015). Nevertheless, we could argue that Saudi is also in this case using humanitarian funding in order to enhance its image. This case is too recent for scholars to have the time to write about it, so as of now only NGOs and journalists are raising the issue. Saudi Arabia has pledged $274M through UN agencies and primarily WFP but many NGOs are so far unwilling to accept Saudi Arabia’s funding for humanitarian response on the basis that its bombing campaign and blockade are behind much of the suffering (Jakes 2015).
II. Gulf States integration into the traditional international humanitarian system “Rather than trying to change the structure of the global […] system, they are instead attempting to maximize their own influence within it” (Ulrichsen 2012, 111–120). A. With Western donors and coordination bodies Along with their will to take part in global governance, Gulf States are increasingly coordinating and cooperating with Western donors and actors however the main challenge is the misperceptions from both sides (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 40). 1. Coordination and cooperation The statement made by Cotterrell and Hamer in 2005 that “the increase in visibility and humanitarian funding had not yet been translated into an inclusion of these new donors in the “formal international club and fora” is not so valid anymore since an increased cooperation is visible.
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Usually there used to be no cooperation between Gulf States and Western donors and no participation to Western cooperation fora or Donor Groups. The main reason hampering cooperation is the perception by Gulf countries of the international system as double standard regarding religion: Muslim charities being suspected to fund terrorism when they intervene in Islamic countries while other faith-based Western NGOs are free to operate anywhere (Al- Yahya and Fustier 2011, 22). Secondly because of a lack of knowledge of how the system works and mistrust towards the UN system perceived as having a low efficiency and high administrative and coordination costs, while the Islamic finance’s ruling stipulates that administrative costs should not exceed 18%. Finally, UN institutions, norms and rules are perceived as being Western, with not enough Arab representatives and therefore the West responsibility to fund (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 22; Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 28). This lack of trust also concerns the use of the funding by Western actors that could have a different conception of some values and therefore use funds in a way that would not please Gulf donors. The gender issues and a topic like women empowerment as understood by the UN are considered by Gulf actors to be against their religious and moral values. “Organizations from this part of the world would fear partnering with the UN if women’s empowerment is understood to mean “removing the hijab [covering a woman’s hair], destroying the family institution and throwing religion out the window.” (IRIN 2011) Nevertheless, in July 2009 a shift has been initiated in the development sphere during a conference held in Kuwait City involving representatives of the OECD-DAC and all major Gulf States aid institutions who engaged in an action plan for stronger partnership (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 39). They have since then met in 2011, 2014 and 2015 under an initiative called the Arab-DAC dialogue on development in order to improve collaboration. Then at a conference in Kuwait City in September 2012, organized by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the International Islamic Charitable Organization (IICO) of Kuwait to promote partnerships, aid agencies from the region spoke with unprecedented honesty and frankness about decades of mistrust between the mainstream humanitarian system and aid agencies from the Arab and Muslim worlds. There was recognition of a need to better communicate and coordinate international aid. A new bilingual web portal, launched by OCHA at the conference: “Arab Humanitarian Portal”5 aims to help fill the gap by bringing news of UN activities to Gulf donors in Arabic, and the actions of
5 (http://www.arabhum.net/indexen.php) 20
Gulf donors to a UN audience in English, including profiles of all major aid agencies in the region and updates on funding. Participants at the Kuwait conference in 2012 suggested among other ideas: exchange programmes in which Gulf aid workers can be seconded to the UN; a meeting specifically focused on addressing the lack of trust; the introduction of institutional incentives for collaboration and cooperation; and a legal framework mandating accountability processes in these institutions (IRIN 2012b). Following this momentum, new meetings were held. Among them, in January 2014 a senior staff meeting was held in Jordan gathering international and Arab humanitarian NGOs and multilateral organisations to discuss challenges and opportunities for improved humanitarian action in the Arab region. Then in April 2014 a round table on Syria at the Brookings Doha Center took place to foster an in-depth dialogue and enhance collaboration efforts. The UAE are so far amongst Gulf donors the most involved in donor coordination groups, being member of OCHA donor support Group since 2006 and member of UNHCR Donor support group since 2009. As a latest step, the UAE have become on 1st July 2014 the first Participant in the OECD-DAC and, as such, can take part in all non-confidential meetings of the Committee, including its High-Level and Senior-Level Meetings, and the meetings of the OECD-DAC subsidiary bodies. However, the UAE will not take part in formal decision- making processes and cannot serve as Chair or Vice-Chair of the DAC or its sub-committees. Finally, if Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) none of the four Gulf States studied have so far signed the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) (2003). Those two agreements seek to improve aid effectiveness through commitment of donors to donorship principles. But while the first one - setting five principles regarding development funding - was agreed among a broad consensus of 100 countries, the latter was initiated by 16 Western countries establishing a/their definition of humanitarian action, principles and good practices in donor financing, management and accountability. The less inclusive and more Westernized GHD process probably explains why Gulf State donors have not committed to abide to it as of yet. Thus we can argue with Momani and Ennis that the rising influence and power of Gulf States donors may them think that it is no longer in their best interest to adhere to normative conventions but it is in their interest to introduce new norms into the global governance landscape (Momani and Ennis 2012, 622). An interesting example of the implementation of Gulf State assistance based on their own standards is the case of the UAE Red Crescent camps in Yemen and Jordan. Unfortunately,
21 although it would be a very interesting topic of research, there is no academic research on this issue and it is so far only mentioned by journalists. Indeed, instead of funding UNHCR that have the UN mandate to coordinate and manage camps, the UAE Red Crescent have preferred to set up their owns, labelled by the humanitarian community as ‘five stars camp’ because of the high-level standard services provided far from the internationally agreed ones. In November 2009 they opened “Mazraq camp II” in order to host internally displaced persons (IDPs) in north Yemen. The camp provided residents with 24-hour access to electricity and water, caravans instead of tents, three meals a day, daily ration of meat and tea, and a resident-to-medical staff ratio of less than 400:1, a psychological support team and a children’s health clinic. But in 2011 the camp was handed over to local partners who could not afford the $15M yearly running cost to keep the same level of service. Hence the camp does not longer officially exist, there is no more electricity and much of the site’s infrastructures have been looted. IDPs have been left with caravans they cannot maintain and medical equipment they cannot use. There are no more doctors and the mortality rate is higher than in the other IDP camps nearby (Mazraq I and Mazraq III), that continue to operate. It is now classed as a “settlement” rather than a “camp”, still housing more than 500 families on an unmanaged site. In May 2013 the UAE Red Crescent opened a same type of camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan called ‘Mrajeeb al-Fhood’. As of June 2015, 6000 persons were living in the camp6. The amount for the running of the camp is unknown but the same question about the facility’s long-term sustainability appears. However the main difference with the experience in Yemen is that in Jordan, several UN agencies and international NGOs are collaborating within the project. This should give a better chance for the project to continue when the UAE - who declared about Yemen engaging only in emergencies – will decide to hand-out the project. 2. Transparency One of the main criticisms of Gulf States from Western actors is that they are deemed to be opaque regarding the reporting of their funding (Shushan and Marcoux 2011, 72). A study of Shushan and Marcoux in 2011 on Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait provides us with two conclusions: data reported by the national funds are often reported inconsistently while the funds provided by Governments are often unreported. This difference is due to the fact that national funds are more institutionalized than the Governmental institutions which
6 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement.php?id=224&country=107®ion=73
22 lack knowledge and capacities to keep track although their funding level is more important (Isaac 2014, 421). Regarding funds provided by National Funds, ADFD is the least consistent and did not report from 1988 to 1997 and has gaps again from 2005 to 2007. SFD is missing data for 1981, 2000-01 and after 2005. KFAED is the most reliable and from 1962 only lack one year in 1970. Finally Gulf donors do not report debt forgiveness such as DAC donors. According to the same study, Saudi Arabia conducts a major share of its activity through the Ministry of Finance and off the books rather than through the SFD. The same feature appears for Kuwait while the UAE seem to be the most accurate in reporting the Government’s transfer of grants (Shushan and Marcoux 2011, 1972). Private donations (often sourced from members of the respective ruling families of Gulf monarchies) go unreported (Young 2015, 49). The main reasons given by this study on the opacity of Arab donors is: the lack of democratic channels through which to demand accountability, the very purpose to hide a donation that could appear unpopular to its population or to the international community but in the interest of the regime survival, a lack of exposure to the transparency standards, the distinction between public and private wealth is blurred and finally the culture of modesty which prevents from publicizing generosity. Nevertheless, in the last few years Gulf States have made efforts to streamline reporting of official aid. The UAE made its first foreign aid report in 2013. Kuwait is reporting through the KFAED reports although individual donations continue to be a source of concern. Qatar has also begun to report its foreign aid and to attempt to track private charity funds within the sheikhdom. The establishment of Qatar Charitable Society in 1992 was meant to streamline private donations going outside the country but there has been so far only one foreign aid report released by the Government in 2012 (Young 2015, 49). Finally, at international level, these countries have also become more consistent in their reporting to FTS (Harmer and Martin 2010, 18). It seems that they have understood that conformity to international norms of accountability and transparency is a way to improve their image (Momani and Ennis 2012, 622) and also their visibility. The increased sums reported in 2014 reflect efforts to improve this. For example, as well as reporting increased sums in 2014, Saudi Arabia also retrospectively reported $426M that it had disbursed over the 2010–2013 period (“Global Humanitarian Assistance Report” 2015, 35).
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B. With Western actors: funding and partnerships 1. Increased operational partnerships On the same path of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which set up its regional office in 1991 in Kuwait focusing on establishing a more substantive dialogue with donor Government and local actors, many Western organizations (UN agencies and INGOs) have established regional offices in the Gulf in order to develop closer ties with Governments and local NGOs mainly with the aim of fundraising. Indeed, the first aspect usually considered by Western actors for seeking cooperation with Gulf countries is the opportunity of new funds to add to the traditional ones in order to respond better to the increasing unmet needs especially while there is a growing number of natural and urban disasters and a low capacity of Western actors to increase their contributions (Binder and Meier 2011, 1135). But partly driven by previous unsuccessful attempts and by the crisis in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been an increased recognition by both parties of the need for greater dialogue and cooperation and a shift from focusing specifically on fundraising occurred (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 14). Indeed, only a few Western NGOs have managed to access funds such as the Danish Refugee Council ($5M) Islamic Relief ($1.8M) Save the Children ($1.7M), International Rescue Committee ($1M) Care International ($500,000) (Annex 2.5). Moreover, so far only Qatar and the UAE seem to be funding Western NGOs while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have not done so yet (Annexes 5.4, 6.4, 7.4, 8.4). The ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) both considered as Western organizations have also only received a very little funding $55M for the ICRC (1% of total Gulf States funding) and $13M for the IFRC (Annex 2.5). The ICRC is perceived by its Islamic and Third World critics as a deeply conservative body and is believed to be following the Swiss foreign policy dominated by the United States (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 55). Nevertheless, the UAE and Qatar have both strong and close relationships with Western actors in the form of operational and technical partnerships where Western staff is provided in support to Gulf structures which lack expertise and capacities and therefore are seeking new partnerships with Western NGOs (Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 29). For instance, while the UAE Red Crescent could not access beneficiaries in Palestine, it created partnerships with OXFAM and CARE. Dubai Cares (UAE NGO) has funded Western actors such as Save the Children, Oxfam, CARE, and MSF. ROTA Qatar not only funded but also signed a multiyear partnership with Mercy Corps for technical and human resources support in order to develop their institutional strategy. Qatar Charity signed a collaboration
24 protocol with the Norwegian Refugee Council regarding interventions, evaluations, trainings and fundraising. Qatari and Kuwaiti agencies are members of the Humanitarian Forum that was created in 2004, including Red Crescent and Red Cross Movement, NGOs, and donors, to help foster partnerships and facilitate closer cooperation between actors in the West and in the Muslim World and to tackle misconceptions (Kroessin 2008, 36). Finally, increasing cooperation with Gulf donors could be the opportunity to dewesternize humanitarianism and to manage to build a more legitimate and universal system (Binder and Meier 2011). 2. Increased multilateral funding? The trend in development literature stating that between 1999 & 2009, Gulf States have provided nearly half of their assistance bilaterally (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 32) which is confirmed by Robyns and de Geoffroy (2009) stressing that between 2000-2008, Saudi Arabia has given half of its aid bilaterally is slightly different as far as humanitarian funding is concerned. In between 2000-2014, humanitarian funds provided directly to affected governments amount to 26% of Gulf donors’ aid while the multilateral channel (UN agencies and pooled funds) is the most important with 39% (Annex 2.5). But Gulf States have very divergent policies on this matter. Saudi is the country funding the most directly through the affected Governments (33%) and this is linked with a dear principle of Saudi Arabia for the respect of the sovereignty of the affected state stressing that relationships should be based on an equal footing and that needs should be defined by the demanding State (Binder and Meier 2011, 1138). This is illustrated by the previously mentioned Yemen case (2015) where the Saudi Government although funding the operation through the UN has requested that the Yemeni Government in exile be consulted before distribution of the assistance even in areas under the control of the Houthis opposition forces. NGO argued that to give information to one side in an active civil war could put both NGOs and the people they support at risk. NGOs are also concerned that areas under the control of the Houthis would be neglected (Jakes 2015). On the other hand, Kuwait and Qatar do not seem to praise much the bilateral channel. Indeed only 3% of Kuwaiti funds are going directly towards affected Governments. And it could become a channel even less popular looking at the example of Qatar which in 2014 alike in 2013 did not transfer any humanitarian fund bilaterally. Nevertheless it is important to note that contributions to UN have been very irregular (Annex 3.1). Apart from UNRWA which received Gulf funds every year since 2000, the first
25 significant year of contributions from Gulf States to UN agencies was made in 2005 ($85M) to various agencies mainly towards the tsunami, Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Then in 2008 Saudi Arabia made a large contribution to WFP for an amount of $339M representing 60% of Saudi’s funding this year. While WFP is the main UN recipient agency with 14% of their total contributions, UNHCR is the second with 7% and UNRWA the third with 5% (Annex 2.5). Finally, the increase in multilateral funding since 2012 is directly linked with the Syrian crisis. Out of a total amount of $1.8B contributions to the Syrian emergency 41% was disbursed through UN. Kuwait is the Gulf State top donor to the Syrian crisis with $633M over the three years followed by Saudi Arabia ($568M), the UAE ($375M) and Qatar ($226M) (Annex 4.1). The Syrian emergency in three years (2012, 2013 and 2014) is indeed representing 27% of Gulf State reported humanitarian disbursements since 2000 (without including the contributions to Syria neighbouring countries such as Jordan or Lebanon which are as well receiving an important share of Gulf States contributions). A trend which is likely to increase since there is no perspective of an end to this conflict in the short term. The main reason for choosing multilateral aid is probably that regarding Gulf States opposition to the regime of Syria’s current President Bashar-al-Assad, the bilateral channel is not an available option for them. Moreover, channelling funds through the UN undermines the idea that Gulf funds are going directly towards terrorist groups, although one does not exclude the other. Finally, as already noticed in 2005 by Cotterrell and Harmer and that could still be valid is the Gulf States’ intention through multilateral funding to enhance their international visibility and profile, as well as the capacity to exert influence in international fora and decision making processes (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 14). Besides, we could wonder if the multilateral system is not mainly used as a way to outsource their foreign aid since contributions are always earmarked at least at country level. This probably explains the low interest of Gulf States for other multilateral mechanisms such as the UN humanitarian pooled funds and especially the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which is not earmarked at country level. Contributing to pooled fund mechanisms is less visible and less publicized by the UN than contributions made directly to agencies which usually advertise the important contributions that they receive. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which gathers non earmarked donor contributions in order to distribute them either to underfunded crisis or at the onset of sudden emergencies has only received $16,7M from Gulf States in between 2000-2014 (0.25% of total Gulf contributions). Nevertheless, Qatar and Kuwait are both members of the CERF advisory group. The Emergency Response Funds (ERF) - a pooled funding mechanism established for the rapid
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release of funds at the onset of an emergency - has received only three but substantial contributions amounting to $82M. The first one ($50M) was made in 2010 by Saudi Arabia to the Haiti ERF then becoming its 1st donor. The lack of in-depth country knowledge as well as the lack of presence in the field probably explains the choice of this modality (Smith 2011). Finally the Syrian ERF channelled $12M from Kuwait in 2013 and $20M from Qatar in 2014 (Source FTS). The important increase in Gulf States funding since 2012 is thus linked with the multilateral contributions made towards the Syrian crisis. Since this high-level of multilateral funding is quite recent (last three years) it is therefore too early to be able to know if it will continue. Yet this trend has already been confirmed by two other very important contributions from Saudi Arabia: $500M to the UN operations in Iraq in 2014 followed by the funding of the whole UN appeal for Yemen in 2015 ($274M). Finally, together with integrating the international Western traditional system, Gulf States are developing institutions and mechanisms in order to build and strengthen their own regional and national humanitarian systems.
III. Gulf States building their own humanitarian system By building a humanitarian system on which to ground their action, Gulf States are showing their commitment towards humanitarian action and their will to take an increasing and durable part in it. A. At regional level The main regional institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council are all starting to take part in humanitarian affairs mainly through setting up humanitarian coordination mechanisms while at operational level several regional initiatives have been launched in order to strengthen cooperation and affirm their identity. 1. Regional institutions The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (1969) based in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) is the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations which has membership of 57 States spread over four continents. In 2008 the OIC established a Humanitarian Affairs Department (ICHAD) which engages in policy making and dialogue facilitation among NGOs in OIC member States. In 2011 it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with OCHA.
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The intervention of the OIC-ICHAD during the Somalia famine response in 2011 and 2012 has played a major role. Due to insecurity, the UN and international NGOs had limited their presence in many parts of the country since 2009. In 2011 the OIC-ICHAD set up a coordination office in the capital Mogadishu and created an alliance of 27 organizations that operated across the country, including areas in the south controlled by al-Shabab. It conducted agency meetings and set up a mini-cluster system. Playing down the idea that OIC has ambitions to become a Muslim version of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an Humanitarian Policy Group report recognized ICHAD’s significant contributions in Somalia, but noted “limited reporting and accountability” (IRIN 2015). The League of Arab States (AL) (1945) which aims to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries is also starting to take part in humanitarian affairs. In 2004 for the first time, it gave the recommendation to its members to support Darfur. The IFRC and the Arab League have signed a Memorandum of Understanding and are attending each other’s meetings (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 23). In 2014 at a summit in Kuwait, it took the resolution to establish an Arab mechanism for coordination of Humanitarian assistance within the Secretariat (“Global Humanitarian Assistance Report” 2015, 35). Regarding the Gulf Cooperation Council, at a Kuwait conference in 2012, some participants called for a regional body that would track and coordinate all Gulf aid. But past efforts at coordination have been hampered, by a desire of each country or institution to promote itself. According to Al-Yahya, a Saudi humanitarian expert “Each country has its own institutions and there is competition between them […] they do things bilaterally so that they can raise their own flag.” (IRIN 2012b) 2. Regional operational cooperation The conference of Arab Red Crescent and Red Cross Societies has its secretariat in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) and is independent of the Federation (IFRC) (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 53). It aims to strengthen the representation of Arab National Societies through promoting common positions on key issues such as support to the Palestinian people and gathers all Red Cross and Red Crescent societies from the region on an annual basis (IRIN 2012b). At their level, the GCC countries have created a committee to coordinate the work of the Red Crescents member countries and develop specific competencies (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 13).
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The GCC secretariat is also planning to open in 2015 an emergency management centre in Kuwait to coordinate between national disaster management centres in the Gulf; support national responses to challenges like epidemics, oil spills, and climate change and water scarcity; and build preparedness across the region (IRIN 2012b). Finally, Qatar’s Foreign Minister is behind a new global initiative to strengthen civil and military coordination in response to natural disasters. The so-called “HopeFor” initiative aims to create centres of excellence around the world that would collect and exchange best practices and lessons learned, link into early warning systems, manage a database of contacts and promote regional and sub-regional agreements. B. At national level Gulf States are building and developing their own specific humanitarian institutions in order to rationalize their policy and remain in control of their aid. 1. The impact of 9/11 The variety of funding channels, the mix between public and private funds made it difficult for Gulf Governments to control aid flows. But after 9/11 and the accusations of funding terrorism, Gulf States have set up counter-terrorism measures that increased the control of Governments on the channelling of funds especially the private ones. a) Variety of funding channels Gulf funds are coming from private and public bodies and funding is also going through private and public channels. Regarding public funds, after multilateral funding through UN agencies (39%) and bilateral funding (26%) for which state-owned funds are especially used (Binder and Meier 2011, 1142), the Governments are funding their National Red Crescents (12%) domestic organization for their humanitarian activities abroad especially in Gulf region (Annex 2.5). They were established in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1960s and in the UAE in the 1980s. The link of these institutions with the national identity is very strong and therefore reinforces the visibility of the donor. Red Crescents societies are by far the most important humanitarian delivery institutions for Gulf humanitarian assistance. The one receiving the more funds is the UAE Red Crescent Society which has received 32% of UAE funds since 2000 and is its first recipient before affected Governments and the UN agencies (Annex 6.4). Qatar and Kuwait are also channelling an important share of their aid through their national Red Crescent societies, respectively 19% (Annex 8.4) and 9% (Annex 7.4) while Saudi is only channelling a small portion through its national institution: 3%, from far preferring the multilateral channels: 42% and the bilateral aid: 33% (Annex 5.4).
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It is in 2004 that Government funds started to be channelled through NGOs notably in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This policy shift was primarily driven by the increasing proximity of crisis in the region and pressure to respond with all forms of financing and to respond to a more global trend of increasing the grant assistance to the poorest countries (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 8). Furthermore, NGOs such as Dubai Cares, Qatar Charity, Reach Out to Asia (ROTA) are at the same time implementing activities abroad and also funding donors for NGOs (including Western ones), UN & Red Crescents. There is a great number of Gulf NGOs with various levels of organization and coordination. In Dubai the 5 biggest NGOs including Human Appeal and the Sharjah Charity Establishment are brought together under an oversight committee at federal level but it does not include the two main Abu-Dhabi charities neither the Red Crescent. In Kuwait there is a joint relief committee under the International Islamic Charitable Organization with oversight of the Kuwaiti NGOs including the Red Crescent (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 13). In Saudi Arabia out of the 962 charities that raise funds and deliver aid, 18 operate internationally (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 29). Foundations are also an important channel of funds. They have been established in the 1990s under the auspices of leading members of the royal families and have a strong presence outside the countries. They channel funds both from Government and private bodies (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 13). However, in between 2000 and 2014, foundations and NGOs (international and nationals) have received only 2% of the total Gulf recorded humanitarian funding (Annex 2.5). Finally, private funds rose through telethons and public campaigns can be either channelled through Red Crescent societies, bilaterally or through international agency (UNRWA) or to another Red Crescent Society in affected country (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 13). b) The counter-terrorism measures The traditional view of zakat in which the giver is expected to provide assistance in good faith that the recipient will utilize it appropriately used to be the norm and as mentioned by Lakhdar Brahimi about Gulf interventions in Afghanistan, there was a ‘little follow-up”. However, after 9/11 many Gulf organizations have been accused to fund terrorism which had an impact on institutionalization and channelling of funds requesting more transparency and more caution in the controlling of their image (Momani and Ennis 2012, 606). In Saudi Arabia, since July 2003, all national NGOs have been banned from sending funds abroad. Since the 2012 rules issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), NGOs are also prevented from public fundraising, electronic donations and collecting cash
30 donations at mosques and other public places which was a traditional source of fundraising with an exception for the Red Crescent Association. Thus, some NGOs fear the increasing reach of the Government into civil society under the pretext of counter-terrorism (Mackintosh and Duplat 2013, 60). These measures have reduced the private contributions and some Saudi charities operating abroad have been closed down such as Al-Haramain that was operating in 50 countries for being accused by the Saudi Government and the United States of funding terrorism (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 19). Subsequently, relief aid has been gathered by the Saudi Red Crescent and new NGOs have been created, more professionalized and referring to the universality of Humanitarian principles. These Saudi NGOs operating abroad have been imposed strict reporting rules especially as funding channels, notably requesting thorough needs assessment by both donor and recipient (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011, 22). The reluctance to respond to these conditionalities prohibited a contribution during the Pakistan floods in 2011 of $100M to the UN who could not meet these requirements. Yet, while the requirement level for the UN is quite high, there is none for bilateral funding (Binder and Meier 2011, 1143-4). In Qatar, local, national and international partners must be endorsed by the Ministry of Social affairs and receive relevant permits and accreditation prior to funding. But neither clear criteria for assessment is provided nor a clear regulation, which has led some NGOs to freeze their partnerships with some overseas partners until they could clarify the requirements of the counter-terrorism donor framework. As a consequence, Qatari humanitarian aid has been channelled through international NGOs and Red Crescent Society in order to manage the risk of not complying with the counter-terrorism framework (Mackintosh and Duplat 2013, 59). The remarkable funding of $10M for Gaza through Hamas in 2009 is a counter example of this shift. Hence, Gulf donors especially NGOs have now become highly demanding donors. They request detailed and regular reports, sending technical staff on the ground to undertake monitoring on the implementation (Robyns and de Geoffroy 2009, 31). Nevertheless, these measures if they have succeeded in controlling the channelling of private funds have not necessarily translated into increased accountability from the Government’s own aid programmes mainly because of a lack of independence of the regulatory authorities and because of a lack of enforcement mechanisms (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 19). Indeed the Governmental aid is closely linked with decisions taken by the royal families at the head of the States.
31
2. Decision-making process The decision-making process regarding Governmental funding in the Gulf monarchies is very linked with the royal families. Foreign policy making is not very bureaucratised in these States. None of the leaders (with the partial exception of Kuwait) has to face an elected parliament with real powers, or a free press. Strong lobbies on foreign policy issues do not exist and public opinion is a minimal constraint. All these factors combine to give the individual monarchs enormous latitude in foreign policy (Gause III 2015, 32). Thus it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between private and public funding given that the members of royal families play a pivotal role in both Governmental decision and in charitable organizations and are contributing both privately as well as in their official capacity (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 18). On the other hand the reactive nature of funding decisions untied of policy and thus bureaucracy, often based on alerts from ambassadors (Binder and Meier 2011, 1143) allows a peculiar swiftness in disbursements. The latest example in December 2014 is the contribution of US$52 million from Saudi Arabia to WFP operations in Lebanon to assist about 1.7 million Syrian refugees who had faced suspension of their food assistance.7 The capacity to disburse funds swiftly is an asset especially when the International community at the end of a fiscal year has spent all its budgeted aid. Nevertheless, if Gulf States can be swift in pledging this has to be nuanced by a very important ratio of pledges that do not turn into concrete disbursements. According to Sushan and Marcoux, from 1980 to 1989, due to the declining oil prices, Saudi Arabia’s disbursements were only 55% of its commitments (Shushan and Marcoux 2011, 1978). Until 2010, the post July War in Lebanon appears to be one of the only occasions when Gulf States have fulfilled their pledges. But in Afghanistan post 9/11 and in Iraq post Saddam as well as after the Gaza post 2008-20009 the disbursements never reached the pledges (Barakat and Zyck 2010, 29). According to a new World Bank report (World Bank 2015) Gulf States and Turkey have spectacularly failed to fulfill their pledges to Gaza, contributing to a two-thirds shortfall in promised assistance. Qatar has delivered just 10 percent of the $1 billion it promised, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Kuwait between them have handed over just over $50M of the $900M they pledged. In total regarding humanitarian funding, from 2000-2014 there is a total amount of 1.3B$ uncommitted pledges from the 4 Gulf States donors: 55% from Saudi Arabia (450M$), 24%
7 https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-welcomes-substantial-and-timely-assistance-refugees-kingdom- saudi-arabia 32 from the UAE ($292M), 14% from Kuwait ($533M), 7% from Qatar ($27M) (Annex 2.1). This high amount of uncommitted pledges raises the question of the reliability and of the predictability of Gulf States funding. However, if the decision-making process remains mostly driven by the royal families, nevertheless, at Governmental level the institutionalization is in progress. 3. Institutionalization in progress Until very recently, there used to be no specific or centralized structure for humanitarian activities and the humanitarian aid used to be managed by the same structure - the State- owned Funds - that were dealing with the development funds or by various Ministries (Cotterrell and Harmer 2005, 18). Apart from Kuwait which has not yet followed the path of the other States and still manages its foreign aid through its national fund (KFAED), the other Gulf States have since the 2000s created Governmental agencies to manage aid but until recently with no distinction between development and humanitarian aid. This is still the case of Qatar whose Department of International Development from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is at the same time responsible for humanitarian assistance since 2009. Nevertheless, recently in 2014 and 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both created institutions specifically dedicated to humanitarian aid which reinforces the sustainability of their commitment through an increased ownership of their aid. In the UAE the Office for Coordination of Foreign Aid (OCFA), operational since 2009, tracks all foreign governmental and private aid. Since March 2013, the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (MICAD) is responsible to coordinate the UAE foreign aid and also plays the role of umbrella for UAE-based organizations. Its vision is: “an enhanced regional and international profile of the UAE in international development and cooperation”8. Nevertheless, due to the federal dynamic between emirates Abu Dhabi and Dubai control their own policies and programs. On 12 May 2014, the UAE Cabinet established the Committee for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, chaired and supported by the MICAD, in order to coordinate, document and unify the UAE's relief efforts. Its mandate is “to ensure optimum coordination, common goals, and unity of purpose among all the UAE parties concerned with the provision of humanitarian relief assistance, consistent with international standards and best practices”9.
8 https://micad.gov.ae/En/HumanitarianResponse 9 https://micad.gov.ae/En/HumanitarianResponse 33
As a first step in 2004, Saudi Arabia created the National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad as a measure to have an oversight on all charitable activities and use of funds following 9/11 accountability measures. But it had never become operational and funding decision making remained driven by the Royal family. It is only recently in May 2015 that the King Salman Center (KSC) for Relief and humanitarian works was launched. Much about the centre’s operations remain uncertain. As of yet, the full chain of command is unknown, but it plans on establishing numerous departments including monitoring and evaluation and research arms. Government contributions will now likely be channelled through the KSC, which could decrease its contributions to the UN. Moreover, several universities in the Gulf, including King Saud University in Saudi Arabia, are planning to introduce tracks in non-profit management as part of master’s degrees, to better prepare the region’s next generation of aid workers (IRIN 2012b).
CONCLUSION We could argue with Christina Bennett from the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) that “there isn’t enough history working with these emerging donors to know whether they can be counted on year after year in the same way that traditional donors have been” (IRIN 2014). And indeed, the timespan over which to gauge their new levels of contributions is not long enough in order to provide evidence of sustainability regarding Gulf States commitments. The latter are still volatile and the current high-level of funding dates back a few years and is obviously directly linked to the crisis in the region. Hence in order to analyse the sustainability of Gulf States’ contributions it is not sufficient to take into consideration only the contributions but it is necessary to look at them in light of the Gulf States’ funding factors and strategy. Indeed, this paper has shown that the contribution of Gulf donors to humanitarian action is likely to be sustained since it is enshrined in their religion and culture which not only provide them with great incomes such as zakat, sadaqa and waqf but also is part of their daily religious practice. Additionally, given their important reserves, income from natural resources are arguably another sustainable funding factor in the middle and long term. Moreover, Gulf States have found in humanitarian funding a tool to serve their political interest from a domestic point of view in order to appease the numerous expatriate worker population native from disaster-prone countries. From a regional perspective, humanitarian funding is a way for Saudi Arabia to spread contributions to the Sunni friendly regimes in its competition with the Shiite Iran as leader of the Muslim world. Besides, it also serves the
34 purpose to finance social programmes in monarchies such as Jordan or Morocco which have faced uprising during the Arab Spring that could have had destabilizing repercussions on the Gulf monarchy regimes. From an international perspective, Gulf States are also using humanitarian contributions in order to raise their profile in the international sphere. Their first ambition being to appear as leaders and representatives of the Global South through their participation in the G20 and in the Non-aligned Movement, trying to reshape the traditional international architecture. Finally, beyond the Global South, Gulf States are willing to increase their influence and recognition before the entire international community. To do so they have set up a branding strategy based on few but large humanitarian contributions and on taking the lead of various initiatives launched in the Gulf to gather the international community, playing as convening power. We have shown that, doing this, Gulf States intend primarily to build diplomatic networks outside their traditional zone of influence such as with China, secondly to counter the international criticism and accusations to fund terrorism such as in Syria or thirdly to counter-balance the adverse effect on their image of being engaged in wars that are affecting civilian populations such as in Yemen. Out of these motives, Gulf States are engaging in processes that show their willingness to commit to humanitarian action on the long term. Firstly is the integration into the traditional Western system. On one hand, notably since 2009, they are increasing their coordination and cooperation with Western donors and coordination bodies, through: meetings to foster dialogue, participation in UN donor groups and OECD- DAC, and improving their reporting in order to increase their visibility and counter their image of opaqueness. On the other hand, they are setting up operational and technical partnerships with Western NGOs and are increasing their funding through the UN system. Secondly, Gulf States demonstrate their sustainable commitment to humanitarian action by building their own systems at regional and national levels. The main regional organizations such as the OIC, the Arab League and the GCC are now taking part in humanitarian action either at institutional level or at operational level through mechanisms reinforcing cooperation. Finally, there have been some recent evolutions with the creation of specific national humanitarian agencies in the UAE and Saudi Arabia which testify the increased rationalization of Gulf States ‘aid. In conclusion, these various elements are in favour of the hypothesis of the sustainability of Gulf States’ contribution to the funding of humanitarian action.
35
Therefore, knowing that Gulf States are likely to remain committed in humanitarian action, it becomes relevant to open further researches in the field of the impact of Gulf States’ contribution. Yet the humanitarian operations for the Syrian crisis are bringing together an unprecedented number of Gulf actors on the ground with the traditional Western actors. If the need to better communicate and collaborate is already acknowledged by all the stakeholders, it would be interesting to study the shape that it will take on the ground. Which changes will it bring to the traditional humanitarian system? Will this cooperation, additional funds and resources go towards more aid effectiveness?
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LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex 1.1: Gulf States ranking 2000-2014 Annex 2: Gulf States 2000-2014 2.1: summary 2.2: contributions by year 2.3: contributions by region 2.4: contributions by recipient country 2.5: contributions by recipient organization Annex 3.1: Gulf States contributions to UN agencies and Emergency Response Fund 2000- 2014 Annex 4.1: Gulf States contributions to the Syrian crisis (2012-2014) Annex 5: Saudi Arabia 2000-2014 5.1: Summary 5.2: by region 5.3: by country 5.4: by organization Annex 6: UAE 2000-2014 6.1: summary 6.2: by region 6.3: by country 6.4: by organization Annex 7: Kuwait 2000-2014 7.1: summary 7.2: by region 7.3: by country 7.4: by organization Annex 8: Qatar 2000-2014 8.1: summary 8.2: by region 8.3: by country 8.4: by organization
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Celine BILLAT Annex 1.1 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 Gulf States ranking 2000-2014
Ran Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 k 2013 2014 % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % Saudi Arabia 13 543 516 20 658 463 519 2 34 590 961 19 67 035 365 14 36 857 810 22 112 949 976 14 131 125 327 13 213 082 068 11 569 975 595 5 115 333 760 17 261 561 151 14 163 485 848 16 309 700 572 10 236 783 956 13 736 843 992 8 UAE 463381 5000 0 2534421 96 833 989 13 104 343 617 15 43 788 340 20 45 149 681 21 109 591 351 19 352 600 679 9 113 789 853 18 193 336 361 14 42 249 200 90 136 466 19 361 800 552 13 Kuwait 0 366 013 3 246 445 27 746 308 19 11 000 000 13 300 000 24199958 11000000 95 575 000 21 40269355 10 586 865 13 615 000 13 521 859 326 807 835 10 330 908 448 14 Qatar 559450 1000000 0 15302000 45698573 4500000 200000 2647598 12948641 2 039 963 12 430 245 104 942 844 17 102 503 114 18 153 674 498 18 TOTAL Gulf States 14 566 347 1% 659 834 532 17% 37 837 406 1% 112 618 094 1% 144 691 799 3% 276 292 166 2% 203 613 625 3% 269 431 749 3% 777 789 544 7% 521 152 435 4% 387 977 832 2% 382 867 454 3% 470 414 475 4% 756 231 371 5% 1 583 227 490 7% GRAND TOTAL 1 774 395 132 3 810 981 467 5 114 675 116 7 535 755 974 4 733 034 042 13 134 646 375 7 665 154 855 7 905 391 709 11 872 153 075 12 412 014 956 16 140 704 680 13 510 164 101 12 986 219 908 14 470 687 115 23 023 976 265
Gulf States humanitarian contributions 2000 - 2014 1 800 000 000
1 600 000 000
1 400 000 000
1 200 000 000
1 000 000 000
800 000 000
600 000 000
400 000 000
200 000 000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Saudi UAE Kuwait Qatar
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (Last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 2.1 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 Total Gulf States 2000 - 2014 summary
USD pledged USD Donor % but not committed/contributed committed Total: 6 598 546 319 100% 1 303 570 802 Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of) 3 661 333 416 55% 449 854 444 United Arab Emirates 1 556 622 891 24% 292 524 294 Kuwait 922 143 086 14% 533 600 000 Qatar 458 446 926 7% 27 592 064
4 000 000 000 3 500 000 000 3 000 000 000 2 500 000 000 2 000 000 000 1 500 000 000 1 000 000 000 500 000 000 0 Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of) United Arab Emirates Kuwait Qatar
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 2.2 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 Total Gulf States 2000 - 2014 by year
Emergency USD USD pledged year committed/contributed Total: 6 598 546 319 1 303 570 802 2000 14 566 347 0 2001 659 834 532 0 2002 37 837 406 0 2003 112 618 094 0 2004 144 691 799 0 2005 276 292 166 474 498 333 2006 203 613 625 313 965 000 2007 269 431 749 450 000 2008 777 789 544 150 000 000 2009 521 152 435 47 802 491 2010 387 977 832 147 306 111 2011 382 867 454 0 2012 470 414 475 2 000 000 2013 756 231 371 63 768 252 2014 1 583 227 490 103 780 615
USD committed/contributed 1 800 000 000 1 600 000 000 1 400 000 000 1 200 000 000 1 000 000 000 800 000 000 600 000 000 400 000 000 200 000 000 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
USD committed/contributed
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 2.3 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 Total Gulf States 2000 - 2014 by region
USD Emergency Region Name % committed/contributed Total: 6 598 546 319 100% Middle East 3 678 898 057 55,75% South Asia 816 440 670 12,37% Unspecified 747 768 232 11,33% East Africa and Horn of Africa 486 103 653 7,37% Worldwide 190 790 747 2,89% West Africa 154 653 209 2,34% North Africa 105 743 685 1,60% Southeast Asia 92 499 788 1,40% Southwest Asia (Central Asia) 91 634 704 1,39% East Asia 88 774 688 1,35% Caribbean 66 010 354 1,00% Great Lakes Region and Central Africa 38 269 148 0,58% Southern Africa 30 724 362 0,47% South Eastern Europe (Balkans) 6 364 062 0,10% South America 1 681 338 0,03% Central America 1 020 105 0,02% Caucasus 816 792 0,01% Eastern Europe 334 725 0,01% Pacific 13 000 0,00% Western Europe 5 000 0,00%
Middle East 1,39%1,35%1,00%0,58%0,47%0,10%0,03%0,02%0,01%0,01%0,00%0,00% 1,60%1,40% 2,34% 2,89% South Asia
7,37% Unspecified
East Africa and Horn of Africa 11,33% 55,75% Worldwide
West Africa
12,37% North Africa
Southeast Asia
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Total Gulf States Annex 2.4 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 2000 - 2014 by country USD Destination Country % committed/contributed Total: 6 598 546 319 Palestinian territory, occupied 1 293 705 973 20% Syrian Arab Republic 754 759 698 11% Iraq 696 979 589 11% Region 611 169 089 9% Pakistan 502 566 202 8% Lebanon 426 009 682 6% Jordan 301 445 893 5% Sudan 276 174 353 4% Yemen 211 142 488 3% Bangladesh 179 327 238 3% Somalia 176 590 647 3% none 167 372 774 3% Turkey 115 265 198 2% Ethiopia 113 487 662 2% Afghanistan 84 286 270 1% China 79 618 080 1% Haiti 65 590 354 1% Indonesia 49 564 300 1% Philippines 41 298 937 1% Iran, Islamic Republic of 39 355 668 1% Mauritania 36 969 618 1% Egypt 32 618 666 0% Sri Lanka 31 153 962 0% Niger 29 265 801 0% Tajikistan 24 779 580 0% Myanmar 23 190 286 0% Liberia 18 915 457 0% Kenya 18 737 306 0% Mozambique 13 191 916 0% Guinea 13 184 970 0% Tunisia 10 314 401 0% Malaysia 10 001 987 0% Malawi 9 822 050 0% Senegal 9 412 924 0% Djibouti 9 217 322 0% Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 9 091 228 0% Mali 8 352 142 0% Chad 7 400 241 0% Burkina Faso 7 199 507 0% Nepal 6 890 956 0% Sierra Leone 6 643 499 0% Cameroon 6 365 944 0% Morocco 5 088 533 0% Tanzania, United Republic of 4 695 882 0% Albania 4 239 941 0% Ghana 4 038 857 0% Cote d'Ivoire 3 977 706 0% Algeria 3 932 782 0% Eritrea 3 908 062 0% Burundi 3 698 819 0% Comoros 3 080 447 0% Cambodia 3 069 011 0%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Total Gulf States Annex 2.4 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 2000 - 2014 by country
USD Destination Country % committed/contributed Rwanda 2 847 385 0% Viet Nam 2 513 465 0% Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 354 694 0% Maldives 2 347 919 0% Zambia 2 029 651 0% Togo 1 967 401 0% India 1 884 333 0% Thailand 1 562 614 0% Libya 1 518 564 0% Congo, Democratic Republic of the 1 015 945 0% Central African Republic 997 849 0% Venezuela 951 745 0% Timor-Leste 892 589 0% Oman 680 754 0% Montenegro 679 124 0% Mauritius 660 533 0% Azerbaijan 647 036 0% Madagascar 635 253 0% South Africa 577 548 0% Macedonia, The former Yugoslav Republic of 505 124 0% Namibia 414 028 0% Benin 368 307 0% Russian Federation 320 000 0% Bolivia 298 063 0% Colombia 297 728 0% Guinea-Bissau 277 524 0% Kyrgyzstan 192 989 0% Ecuador 128 788 0% Kazakhstan 124 275 0% Armenia 100 000 0% Dominica 100 000 0% Lesotho 92 917 0% Georgia 69 756 0% Nigeria 65 228 0% Japan 60 380 0% Uganda 51 337 0% El Salvador 20 105 0% Swaziland 20 000 0% Gambia 19 260 0% Congo, Republic of 18 613 0% Moldova, Republic of 12 725 0% Zimbabwe 10 019 0% Solomon Islands 10 000 0% Cuba 10 000 0% Dominican Republic 10 000 0% Chile 5 014 0% Mongolia 5 000 0% Italy 5 000 0% Singapore 4 839 0% Papua New Guinea 3 000 0% Ukraine 2 000 0%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Total Gulf States Annex 2.5 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 2000 - 2014 by organization USD Recipient Organization % commited committed/contributed Total: 6 598 546 319 World Food Programme 955 350 804 14% United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 464 338 462 7% United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 324 099 518 5% United Nations Children's Fund 267 578 369 4% World Health Organization 136 628 266 2% Emergency Response Fund (OCHA) 82 000 000 1% World Bank 80 000 000 1% International Organization for Migration 62 375 425 1% UN Agencies, NGOs and/or Red Cross (details not yet provided) 39 873 701 1% United Nations Development Programme 27 028 449 0% United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) 24 531 780 0% Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 21 704 296 0% Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 21 436 935 0% United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 17 167 796 0% United Nations Population Fund 16 963 300 0% Central Emergency Response Fund 16 729 600 0% United Nations Office for Project Services 15 700 650 0% United Nations Mine Action Service 2 099 975 0% UN Agencies (details not yet provided) 1 000 000 0% United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 966 000 0% United Nations Department of Safety and Security 571 128 0% United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS 500 000 0% Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 74 982 0% United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery 30 025 0% United Nations Operation Programme Support 10 013 0% Sub-total multilateral funding 2 578 759 474 39% Bilateral (affected government) including Oman 1 725 558 367 26% Various Recipients (details not yet provided) 1 016 336 066 15% Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates 500 226 748 8% Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society 101 364 684 2% Qatar Red Crescent Society 87 066 597 1% Kuwait Red Crescent Society 80 660 307 1,22% International Committee of the Red Cross 55 041 792 0,83% Palestine Red Crescent Society 53 333 333 0,81% International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 13 850 844 0,21% Pakistan Red Crescent Society 1 266 530 0,02% Indonesian Red Crescent Society 1 015 000 0,02% Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran 707 485 0,01% Red Cross Society of China 547 598 0,01% Tunisian Red Crescent 358 578 0,01% Red Cross Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina 341 628 0,01% Sri Lanka Red Cross Society 300 000 0,00% Lebanese Red Cross 271 739 0,00% Moroccan Red Crescent 226 496 0,00% Yemen Red Crescent Society 204 087 0,00% British Red Cross 200 000 0,00% Indian Red Cross Society 200 000 0,00% Thai Red Cross Society 200 000 0,00% Iraqi Red Crescent Society 194 161 0,00% Sudanese Red Crescent 139 006 0,00% Syrian Arab Red Crescent 121 361 0,00% Somali Red Crescent Society 100 000 0,00% Mauritanian Red Crescent 68 800 0,00% Libya Red Crescent 60 644 0,00% Comoros Red Crescent, The 50 136 0,00% Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan 50 136 0,00% Jordan National Red Crescent Society 50 000 0,00% Red Crescent Society of Kyrgyzstan 35 000 0,00% Bangladesh Red Crescent Society 27 225 0,00% Afghan Red Crescent 20 526 0,00% Kazakh Red Crescent Society 20 000 0,00% Red Cross Society of the Republic of Moldova 12 725 0,00% Red Crescent Society of Azerbaijan 9 750 0,00% Burkinabe Red Cross Society 5 000 0,00%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Total Gulf States Annex 2.5 MAS Dissertation - CERAH 2015 2000 - 2014 by organization
USD Recipient Organization % commited committed/contributed Japanese Red Cross Society 4 983 0,00% Singapore Red Cross Society 4 839 0,00% Djibouti Red Crescent Society 2 722 0,00% Ukrainian Red Cross Society 2 000 0,00% Sub-total RCRCM 898 362 460 14% Islamic Development Bank 250 000 000 4% International Humanitarian City 4 547 666 0% Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations 2 206 555 0% Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of) 750 712 0% Sub-total various Gulf recipients 257 504 933 4% Khalifa Bin Zyed Al Nehayan Foundation 30 000 000 0,45% ZAYED Foundation 18 357 000 0,28% International Development and Relief Foundation 16 622 009 0,25% Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 6 005 616 0,09% NOOR Dubai 5 819 709 0,09% Physicians Across Continents 5 589 140 0,08% Sudan Medical Care 5 494 505 0,08% Danish Refugee Council 5 023 408 0,08% International Islamic Charitable Organization 5 000 000 0,08% Direct Aid 3 250 000 0,05% Arab Medical Equipment and Services Organization 2 529 763 0,04% Eid Charity 2 352 345 0,04% Islamic Relief Worldwide 1 800 254 0,03% Save the Children 1 750 000 0,03% Qatar Charity 1 737 264 0,03% Action for Youth & Environmental Development 1 200 000 0,02% Raf-Thani Foundation 1 157 967 0,02% Somalia Relive Centre 1 100 531 0,02% International Rescue Committee 1 040 000 0,02% Hospital Hermanos Ameijeiras 1 000 000 0,02% SANAD Charity Foundation 710 486 0,01% Life for Relief and Development 613 080 0,01% CARE International 500 477 0,01% Joint Saudi Committee for Kosovo Relief/Skopje 443 875 0,01% PMU-Interlife 388 279 0,01% Indonesian Humanitarian Committee 340 321 0,01% Mohamed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Humanitarian and Charity Establishment 324 705 0,00% Islamic Commission of Care 305 472 0,00% Women's Education Partnership 250 000 0,00% NGOs (details not yet provided) 241 055 0,00% La chaine de l'espoir 200 117 0,00% Pakistan Association in Dubai 130 192 0,00% Al Zubair Charity Organisation 129 246 0,00% Integrated Regional Information Network 108 419 0,00% Assisting Marsh Arabs and Refugees 100 000 0,00% Charitable Development Association 81 677 0,00% Al-Sabeel Foundation for Social Development 80 588 0,00% Islamic Charity Association 50 982 0,00% Al Maktoum Foundation 49 960 0,00% Gaza Zakat Committee 36 000 0,00% Pema Medical Charity 23 611 0,00% Jordanian Charity Association 20 964 0,00% Philani Maswati Organization 20 000 0,00% Sharjah Charity House 13 613 0,00% Norwegian Refugee Council 8 490 0,00% Center for Humanitarian Services 7 010 0,00% Charitable Society for Social Welfare 6 806 0,00% San Remo Institute for Humanitarian Law 5 000 0,00% Islamic Institute of Autism 2 717 0,00% Alnour Wal Amal Association 1 361 0,00% Islamic Medical Association 1 005 0,00% Sub-total NGOs & Foundations 122 025 019 2%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 3.1 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015
Gulf States multilateral funding 2000-2014 (UN agencies and pooled funds)
Emergency USD USD year committed/contributed pledged Total: 2 458 548 193 168 084 400 2000 1 800 000 0 2001 2 050 000 0 2002 10 968 317 0 2003 28 472 308 0 2004 8 508 323 0 2005 94 209 448 0 2006 30 924 938 9 965 000 2007 23 688 488 0 2008 361 674 116 0 2009 185 793 319 5 010 019 2010 130 094 903 147 306 111 2011 197 789 805 0 2012 54 014 672 2 000 000 2013 324 224 355 0 2014 1 004 335 201 3 803 270
1 200 000 000
1 000 000 000
800 000 000
600 000 000
400 000 000
200 000 000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: https://fts.unocha.org (last accessed on August 20th 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 4.1 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 Gulf States contributions to the Syrian crisis 2012-2013-2014
Total funding Total funding % of Syria Country 2012 2013 2014 of Syria crisis 2000-2014 funding Kuwait 8 163 142 325 057 835 300 551 040 633 772 017 922 143 086 69% Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of) 275 770 102 213 810 000 78 516 655 568 096 757 3 661 333 416 16% United Arab Emirates 14 364 202 85 740 666 275 494 110 375 598 978 1 556 622 891 24% Qatar 50 846 902 74 918 326 100 592 503 226 357 731 458 446 926 49% Total général 349 144 348 699 526 827 755 154 308 1 803 825 483 6 598 546 319 27%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org (last accessed on 8 August 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 5.1 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 Saudi Arabia 2000 - 2014 Summary
Emergency USD USD pledged year committed/contributed Total: 3 661 333 416 449 854 444 2000 13 543 516 0 2001 658 463 519 0 2002 34 590 961 0 2003 67 035 365 0 2004 36 857 810 0 2005 112 949 976 256 398 333 2006 131 125 327 9 950 000 2007 213 082 068 200 000 2008 569 975 595 0 2009 115 333 760 0 2010 261 561 151 146 306 111 2011 163 485 848 0 2012 309 700 572 2 000 000 2013 236 783 956 0 2014 736 843 992 35 000 000
800 000 000
700 000 000
600 000 000
500 000 000
400 000 000
300 000 000
200 000 000
100 000 000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 5.2 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 Saudi Arabia 2000 - 2014 by region
USD Emergency Region Name % committed/contributed Total: 3 661 333 416 100,00% Middle East 2 049 655 988 55,98% South Asia 487 489 927 13,31% East Africa and Horn of Africa 393 419 512 10,75% Unspecified 233 857 376 6,39% West Africa 138 647 384 3,79% East Asia 85 241 450 2,33% Southwest Asia (Central Asia) 64 473 282 1,76% Caribbean 57 796 099 1,58% Southeast Asia 56 481 593 1,54% Great Lakes Region and Central Africa 30 110 217 0,82% Southern Africa 28 227 019 0,77% North Africa 18 078 216 0,49% Worldwide 14 271 894 0,39% South America 1 626 324 0,04% South Eastern Europe (Balkans) 1 429 849 0,04% Caucasus 527 286 0,01%
Middle East
South Asia
East Africa and Horn of Africa Unspecified
West Africa
East Asia
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 5.3 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 Saudi Arabia 2000 - 2014 by country USD Destination Country % committed/contributed Total: 3 661 333 416 100,00% Palestinian territory, occupied 920 541 296 25,14% Iraq 544 374 157 14,87% Pakistan 278 033 753 7,59% Syrian Arab Republic 254 545 419 6,95% Region 204 834 628 5,59% Bangladesh 168 956 072 4,61% Lebanon 144 734 348 3,95% Sudan 133 360 500 3,64% Somalia 122 517 486 3,35% Yemen 118 030 559 3,22% Ethiopia 109 752 369 3,00% Jordan 77 308 322 2,11% China 76 199 510 2,08% Haiti 57 696 099 1,58% Afghanistan 40 120 097 1,10% Turkey 39 993 833 1,09% Mauritania 34 829 766 0,95% Indonesia 30 138 727 0,82% Niger 28 382 801 0,78% Tajikistan 24 662 030 0,67% Liberia 17 772 143 0,49% Kenya 17 364 487 0,47% Philippines 17 119 162 0,47% Sri Lanka 14 228 018 0,39% Myanmar 12 953 360 0,35% Mozambique 12 632 466 0,35% Egypt 12 327 936 0,34% Guinea 10 120 886 0,28% Malawi 9 822 050 0,27% Iran, Islamic Republic of 9 705 899 0,27% Senegal 9 048 844 0,25% Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 9 041 940 0,25% Djibouti 8 207 543 0,22% Mali 8 014 648 0,22% Burkina Faso 7 163 197 0,20% Nepal 6 890 956 0,19% Chad 6 178 770 0,17% Sierra Leone 5 614 293 0,15% none 4 871 894 0,13% Ghana 4 031 532 0,11% Cote d'Ivoire 3 977 706 0,11% Eritrea 3 858 333 0,11% Algeria 3 822 782 0,10% Burundi 3 698 819 0,10% Tanzania, United Republic of 3 091 305 0,08% Cambodia 3 017 536 0,08% Rwanda 2 847 385 0,08% Viet Nam 2 493 438 0,07% Zambia 2 029 651 0,06% Togo 1 967 401 0,05% Maldives 1 881 335 0,05% Morocco 1 806 210 0,05% Comoros 1 703 499 0,05% Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 624 646 0,04% Cameroon 1 315 944 0,04% India 1 093 413 0,03% Congo, Democratic Republic of the 1 015 945 0,03% Thailand 983 200 0,03% Venezuela 951 745 0,03% Timor-Leste 892 589 0,02% Mauritius 660 533 0,02% Azerbaijan 527 286 0,01% Macedonia, The former Yugoslav Republic of 505 124 0,01% Madagascar 474 967 0,01% Central African Republic 421 157 0,01% Namibia 414 028 0,01% South Africa 396 908 0,01% Bolivia 298 063 0,01% Guinea-Bissau 277 524 0,01% Colombia 247 728 0,01% Benin 216 635 0,01% Albania 214 900 0,01% Ecuador 128 788 0,00% Libya 121 288 0,00% Dominica 100 000 0,00% Lesotho 92 917 0,00% Uganda 40 892 0,00%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT Annex 5.4 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 Saudi Arabia 2000 - 2014 by organization
USD Recipient Organization % committed/contributed Total: 3 661 333 416 100% World Food Programme 793 387 478 21,67% United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 198 681 497 5,43% United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 150 807 203 4,12% United Nations Children's Fund 114 751 662 3,13% World Health Organization 81 086 889 2,21% Emergency Response Fund (OCHA) 50 000 000 1,37% International Organization for Migration 49 264 400 1,35% Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 21 011 935 0,57% United Nations Office for Project Services 15 700 650 0,43% United Nations Development Programme 15 560 800 0,43% United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) 15 450 850 0,42% United Nations Population Fund 11 413 300 0,31% Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 4 200 581 0,11% United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2 167 796 0,06% Action for Youth & Environmental Development 1 200 000 0,03% Central Emergency Response Fund 1 100 000 0,03% United Nations Mine Action Service 1 100 000 0,03% United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 966 000 0,03% Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 25 000 0,00% UN Agencies (details not yet provided) 0 0,00% World Bank 0 0,00% United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS 0 0,00% Sub-Total 1 527 876 041 41,73% Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society 101 277 065 2,77% Palestine Red Crescent Society 53 333 333 1,46% International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2 000 000 0,05% Indonesian Red Crescent Society 1 015 000 0,03% Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran 707 485 0,02% Sri Lanka Red Cross Society 300 000 0,01% Red Cross Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina 265 950 0,01% International Committee of the Red Cross 209 880 0,01% Indian Red Cross Society 200 000 0,01% British Red Cross 200 000 0,01% Thai Red Cross Society 200 000 0,01% Yemen Red Crescent Society 200 000 0,01% Somali Red Crescent Society 100 000 0,00% Libya Red Crescent 60 644 0,00% Sub-Total 160 069 357 4,37% Bilateral (affected government) 1 206 487 485 32,95% Various Recipients (details not yet provided) 491 823 110 13,43% UN Agencies, NGOs and/or Red Cross (details not yet provided) 1 000 000 0,03% International Development and Relief Foundation 16 622 009 0,45% Physicians Across Continents 5 589 140 0,15% PMU-Interlife 388 279 0,01% NGOs (details not yet provided) 160 000 0,00% Assisting Marsh Arabs and Refugees 100 000 0,00% Danish Refugee Council 23 408 0,00% Sub-Total 22 882 836 0,62% Islamic Development Bank 250 000 000 6,83% Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of) 750 712 0,02% Joint Saudi Committee for Kosovo Relief/Skopje 443 875 0,01% Sub-Total 251 194 587 6,86%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT UAE 2000-2014 Annex 6.1 MAS dissertation CERAH 2015 Summary
USD Emergency year USD pledged committed/contributed
Total: 1 556 622 891 292 524 294 2000 463 381 0 2001 5 000 0 2002 0 0 2003 2 534 421 0 2004 96 833 989 0 2005 104 343 617 100 100 000 2006 43 788 340 15 000 2007 45 149 681 0 2008 109 591 351 50 000 000 2009 352 600 679 42 802 491 2010 113 789 853 0 2011 193 336 361 0 2012 42 249 200 0 2013 90 136 466 63 768 252 2014 361 800 552 35 838 551
400 000 000
350 000 000
300 000 000
250 000 000
200 000 000
150 000 000
100 000 000
50 000 000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT UAE 2000-2014 Annex 6.2 MAS dissertation CERAH 2015 by region
USD Emergency Region Name committed/cont % ributed Total: 1 556 622 891 100,00% Middle East 861 732 755 55,36% South Asia 248 937 654 15,99% Worldwide 146 661 257 9,42% Unspecified 89 892 756 5,77% North Africa 84 561 319 5,43% East Africa and Horn of Africa 51 303 688 3,30% Southeast Asia 28 013 813 1,80% Southwest Asia (Central Asia) 23 714 977 1,52% West Africa 7 950 843 0,51% Caribbean 6 664 255 0,43% Great Lakes Region and Central Africa 3 108 931 0,20% Southern Africa 1 542 484 0,10% East Asia 1 036 352 0,07% South Eastern Europe (Balkans) 934 213 0,06% Eastern Europe 334 725 0,02% Caucasus 139 750 0,01% South America 55 014 0,00% Central America 20 105 0,00% Pacific 13 000 0,00% Western Europe 5 000 0,00%
Middle East
South Asia
Worldwide
Unspecified
North Africa
East Africa and Horn of Africa Southeast Asia
Southwest Asia (Central Asia) West Africa
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT UAE 2000-2014 Annex 6.3 MAS dissertation CERAH 2015 by country
USD Destination Country % committed/contributed Total: 1 556 622 891 100,00% Syrian Arab Republic 334 480 848 21,49% Pakistan 189 519 360 12,18% Palestinian territory, occupied 188 998 095 12,14% none 132 643 284 8,52% Sudan 116 906 703 7,51% Region 93 074 771 5,98% Lebanon 85 850 353 5,52% Jordan 83 931 884 5,39% Yemen 77 681 253 4,99% Iraq 69 220 750 4,45% Somalia 33 872 501 2,18% Afghanistan 24 333 890 1,56% Philippines 22 457 670 1,44% Indonesia 18 480 671 1,19% Sri Lanka 16 686 071 1,07% Malaysia 10 001 987 0,64% Tunisia 9 772 002 0,63% Haiti 6 644 255 0,43% Egypt 4 745 270 0,30% Myanmar 3 736 926 0,24% Ethiopia 3 675 293 0,24% Morocco 3 282 323 0,21% Guinea 3 064 084 0,20% Turkey 3 011 405 0,19% Tanzania, United Republic of 1 604 577 0,10% Kenya 1 372 819 0,09% Libya 1 297 276 0,08% Chad 1 221 471 0,08% Comoros 1 181 539 0,08% Liberia 1 143 314 0,07% Sierra Leone 1 029 206 0,07% Djibouti 1 009 779 0,06% China 970 972 0,06% Iran, Islamic Republic of 944 164 0,06% Mauritania 889 852 0,06% Niger 878 000 0,06% India 790 920 0,05% Bosnia and Herzegovina 730 048 0,05% Oman 680 754 0,04% Montenegro 679 124 0,04% Central African Republic 576 692 0,04% Bangladesh 371 166 0,02% Senegal 364 080 0,02% Mali 337 494 0,02% Russian Federation 320 000 0,02% Thailand 285 683 0,02% Maldives 213 597 0,01% Kyrgyzstan 192 989 0,01% South Africa 180 640 0,01% Madagascar 160 286 0,01% Benin 151 672 0,01% Kazakhstan 124 275 0,01% Azerbaijan 119 750 0,01%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT UAE 2000-2014 Annex 6.3 MAS dissertation CERAH 2015 by country
USD Destination Country % committed/contributed Tajikistan 117 550 0,01% Algeria 110 000 0,01% Japan 60 380 0,00% Cambodia 51 475 0,00% Colombia 50 000 0,00% Eritrea 49 729 0,00% Burkina Faso 36 310 0,00% Albania 25 041 0,00% El Salvador 20 105 0,00% Viet Nam 20 027 0,00% Georgia 20 000 0,00% Swaziland 20 000 0,00% Gambia 19 260 0,00% Congo, Republic of 18 613 0,00% Nigeria 15 246 0,00% Moldova, Republic of 12 725 0,00% Uganda 10 445 0,00% Zimbabwe 10 019 0,00% Cuba 10 000 0,00% Dominican Republic 10 000 0,00% Solomon Islands 10 000 0,00% Ghana 7 325 0,00% Chile 5 014 0,00% Italy 5 000 0,00% Mongolia 5 000 0,00% Singapore 4 839 0,00% Papua New Guinea 3 000 0,00% Ukraine 2 000 0,00% Seychelles 0 0,00%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT UAE 2000-2014 Annex 6.4 MAS dissertation CERAH 2015 by organization
USD Recipient Organization % committed/contributed Total: 1 556 622 891 100% Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates 500 226 748 32% International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 4 350 844 0% International Committee of the Red Cross 1 763 916 0% Pakistan Red Crescent Society 1 266 530 0% Lebanese Red Cross 271 739 0% Moroccan Red Crescent 226 496 0% Iraqi Red Crescent Society 194 161 0% Sudanese Red Crescent 139 006 0% Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society 87 619 0% Red Cross Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina 75 678 0% Mauritanian Red Crescent 68 800 0% Comoros Red Crescent, The 50 136 0% Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan 50 136 0% Jordan National Red Crescent Society 50 000 0% Red Crescent Society of Kyrgyzstan 35 000 0% Bangladesh Red Crescent Society 27 225 0% Syrian Arab Red Crescent 21 361 0% Afghan Red Crescent 20 526 0% Kazakh Red Crescent Society 20 000 0% Red Cross Society of the Republic of Moldova 12 725 0% Red Crescent Society of Azerbaijan 9 750 0% Burkinabe Red Cross Society 5 000 0% Japanese Red Cross Society 4 983 0% Singapore Red Cross Society 4 839 0% Yemen Red Crescent Society 4 087 0% Djibouti Red Crescent Society 2 722 0% Ukrainian Red Cross Society 2 000 0% Sub-total 508 992 027 33% Bilateral (affected government) 418 367 026 27% Oman 680 754 0% World Food Programme 69 662 215 4% United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 64 669 248 4% United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 53 468 063 3% United Nations Children's Fund 53 151 707 3% UN Agencies, NGOs and/or Red Cross (details not yet provided) 36 873 701 2% United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) 9 080 930 1% Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 6 798 715 0% Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 6 005 616 0% United Nations Development Programme 5 867 649 0% United Nations Mine Action Service 999 975 0% United Nations Department of Safety and Security 571 128 0% Central Emergency Response Fund 370 000 0% World Health Organization 91 377 0% United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery 30 025 0% United Nations Operation Programme Support 10 013 0% International Organization for Migration 9 986 0% Sub-total 307 660 348 20% Various Recipients (details not yet provided) 249 026 925 16% Khalifa Bin Zyed Al Nehayan Foundation 30 000 000 2% ZAYED Foundation 18 357 000 1% NOOR Dubai 5 819 709 0% International Humanitarian City 4 547 666 0% Arab Medical Equipment and Services Organization 2 529 763 0% Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations 2 206 555 0% Islamic Relief Worldwide 1 800 254 0% Save the Children 1 750 000 0% International Rescue Committee 1 040 000 0% SANAD Charity Foundation 710 486 0% Life for Relief and Development 613 080 0% CARE International 500 477 0% Indonesian Humanitarian Committee 340 321 0%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT UAE 2000-2014 Annex 6.4 MAS dissertation CERAH 2015 by organization
USD Recipient Organization % committed/contributed Mohamed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Humanitarian and Charity Establishment 324 705 0% Islamic Commission of Care 305 472 0% La chaine de l'espoir 200 117 0% Pakistan Association in Dubai 130 192 0% Al Zubair Charity Organisation 129 246 0% Integrated Regional Information Network 108 419 0% Charitable Development Association 81 677 0% NGOs (details not yet provided) 81 055 0% Al-Sabeel Foundation for Social Development 80 588 0% Islamic Charity Association 50 982 0% Al Maktoum Foundation 49 960 0% Gaza Zakat Committee 36 000 0% Pema Medical Charity 23 611 0% Jordanian Charity Association 20 964 0% Philani Maswati Organization 20 000 0% Sharjah Charity House 13 613 0% Center for Humanitarian Services 7 010 0% Charitable Society for Social Welfare 6 806 0% San Remo Institute for Humanitarian Law 5 000 0% Islamic Institute of Autism 2 717 0% Alnour Wal Amal Association 1 361 0% Islamic Medical Association 1 005 0% Sub-total 71 895 811 5%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT KUWAIT 2000 - 2014 Annex 7.1 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 Summary
USD Emergency year USD pledged committed/contributed Total: 922 143 086 533 600 000 2000 0 0 2001 366 013 0 2002 3 246 445 0 2003 27 746 308 0 2004 11 000 000 0 2005 13 300 000 118 000 000 2006 24 199 958 304 000 000 2007 11 000 000 250 000 2008 95 575 000 100 000 000 2009 40 269 355 0 2010 10 586 865 1 000 000 2011 13 615 000 0 2012 13 521 859 0 2013 326 807 835 0 2014 330 908 448 10 350 000
350 000 000
300 000 000
250 000 000
200 000 000
150 000 000
100 000 000
50 000 000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT KUWAIT 2000 - 2014 Annex 7.2 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 by region
USD Emergency Region Name % committed/contributed Total: 922 143 086 100,00% Middle East 500 593 288 54,29% Unspecified 326 307 835 35,39% South Asia 32 250 000 3,50% East Africa and Horn of Africa 24 337 728 2,64% Worldwide 14 753 955 1,60% West Africa 7 005 000 0,76% Southeast Asia 6 504 382 0,71% South Eastern Europe (Balkans) 4 000 000 0,43% Southwest Asia (Central Asia) 3 446 445 0,37% Caribbean 1 550 000 0,17% North Africa 1 000 000 0,11% Southern Africa 195 409 0,02% Caucasus 149 756 0,02% East Asia 49 288 0,01% Central America 0 0,00%
Middle East Unspecified South Asia East Africa and Horn of Africa Worldwide West Africa Southeast Asia South Eastern Europe (Balkans) Southwest Asia (Central Asia) Caribbean North Africa Southern Africa Caucasus East Asia Central America
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT KUWAIT 2000 - 2014 Annex 7.3 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 by country
USD Destination Country % committed/contributed Total: 922 143 086 100% Region 179 731 678 19,49% Lebanon 144 782 194 15,70% Syrian Arab Republic 144 694 288 15,69% Jordan 130 882 324 14,19% Palestinian territory, occupied 129 309 392 14,02% Iraq 65 186 792 7,07% Turkey 30 645 588 3,32% Egypt 15 545 460 1,69% none 14 753 955 1,60% Somalia 12 971 715 1,41% Pakistan 12 250 000 1,33% Sudan 11 366 013 1,23% Bangladesh 10 000 000 1,08% Myanmar 5 000 000 0,54% Albania 4 000 000 0,43% Afghanistan 3 446 445 0,37% Iran, Islamic Republic of 3 000 000 0,33% Philippines 1 259 065 0,14% Mauritania 1 250 000 0,14% Haiti 1 250 000 0,14% Indonesia 245 317 0,03% Comoros 195 409 0,02% Yemen 173 407 0,02% Armenia 100 000 0,01% Georgia 49 756 0,01% Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 49 288 0,01% Niger 5 000 0,00% Mozambique 0 0,00% Libya 0 0,00% Guatemala 0 0,00%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT KUWAIT 2000 - 2014 Annex 7.4 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 by organization
Recipient Organization USD committed/contributed % Total: 922 143 086 100% United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 222 630 018 24% United Nations Children's Fund 93 175 000 10% World Food Programme 81 255 000 9% World Bank 80 000 000 9% United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 69 749 958 8% World Health Organization 54 250 000 6% International Organization for Migration 13 101 039 1% Emergency Response Fund (OCHA) 12 000 000 1% United Nations Development Programme 5 600 000 1% United Nations Population Fund 5 550 000 1% Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 4 800 000 1% Central Emergency Response Fund 3 009 600 0% UN Agencies (details not yet provided) 1 000 000 0% United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS 500 000 0% Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 425 000 0% UN Agencies, NGOs and/or Red Cross (details not yet provided) 0 0% Sub-total 647 045 615 70% Kuwait Red Crescent Society 80 660 307 9% International Committee of the Red Cross 53 019 355 6% International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 7 500 000 1% Sub-total 141 179 662 15% Various Recipients (details not yet provided) 97 221 300 11% Bilateral (affected government) 28 196 509 3% International Islamic Charitable Organization 5 000 000 1% Direct Aid 3 250 000 0% Women's Education Partnership 250 000 0% Sub-total 8 500 000 1%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT QATAR 2000 - 2014 Annex 8.1 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 Summary
Emergency USD USD pledged year committed/contributed Total: 458 446 926 27 592 064 2000 559 450 0 2001 1 000 000 0 2002 0 0 2003 15 302 000 0 2004 * 2005 45 698 573 0 2006 4 500 000 0 2007 200 000 0 2008 2 647 598 0 2009 12 948 641 5 000 000 2010 2 039 963 0 2011 12 430 245 0 2012 104 942 844 0 2013 102 503 114 0 2014 153 674 498 22 592 064
* Data lacking in the database
180 000 000
160 000 000
140 000 000
120 000 000
100 000 000
80 000 000
60 000 000
40 000 000
20 000 000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT QATAR 2000 - 2014 Annex 8.2 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 by region
USD Emergency Region Name % committed/contributed Total: 458 446 926 100,00% Middle East 266 916 026 58,22% Unspecified 97 710 265 21,31% South Asia 47 763 089 10,42% East Africa and Horn of Africa 17 042 725 3,72% Worldwide 15 103 641 3,29% Great Lakes Region and Central Africa 5 050 000 1,10% East Asia 2 447 598 0,53% North Africa 2 104 150 0,46% Southeast Asia 1 500 000 0,33% West Africa 1 049 982 0,23% Central America 1 000 000 0,22% Southern Africa 759 450 0,17% Southwest Asia (Central Asia) 0 Caribbean 0
Middle East
Unspecified
South Asia
East Africa and Horn of Africa
Worldwide
Great Lakes Region and Central Africa East Asia
North Africa
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT QATAR 2000 - 2014 Annex 8.3 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 by country
USD Destination Country % committed/contributed Total: 458 446 926 100% Region 133 528 012 29,13% Palestinian territory, occupied 54 857 190 11,97% Lebanon 50 642 787 11,05% Turkey 41 614 372 9,08% Iran, Islamic Republic of 25 705 605 5,61% Pakistan 22 763 089 4,97% Syrian Arab Republic 21 039 143 4,59% Iraq 18 197 890 3,97% Afghanistan 16 385 838 3,57% Yemen 15 257 269 3,33% none 15 103 641 3,29% Sudan 14 541 137 3,17% Jordan 9 323 363 2,03% Somalia 7 228 945 1,58% Cameroon 5 050 000 1,10% China 2 447 598 0,53% Myanmar 1 500 000 0,33% Indonesia 699 585 0,15% Mozambique 559 450 0,12% Tunisia 542 399 0,12% Philippines 463 040 0,10% Thailand 293 731 0,06% Maldives 252 987 0,06% Sri Lanka 239 873 0,05% Libya 100 000 0,02% Ethiopia 60 000 0,01% Nigeria 49 982 0,01%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015) Celine BILLAT QATAR 2000 - 2014 Annex 8.4 MAS Dissertation CERAH 2015 by organization
USD Recipient Organization % committed/contributed Total: 458 446 926 100% Various Recipients (details not yet provided) 178 264 731 39% United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 26 231 993 6% Emergency Response Fund (OCHA) 20 000 000 4% United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 15 000 000 3% Central Emergency Response Fund 12 250 000 3% World Food Programme 11 046 111 2% United Nations Children's Fund 6 500 000 1% Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 5 905 000 1% United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 2 200 000 0% East UN Agencies, NGOs and/or Red Cross (details not yet provided) 2 000 000 0% World Health Organization 1 200 000 0% Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 49 982 0% United Nations Population Fund 0 Sub-total 102 383 086 22% Qatar Red Crescent Society 87 066 597 19% International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 0 0% Red Cross Society of China 547 598 0% Tunisian Red Crescent 358 578 0% Syrian Arab Red Crescent 100 000 0% International Committee of the Red Cross 48 641 0% Sub-total 88 121 414 19% Bilateral (affected government) 71 826 593 16% Sudan Medical Care 5 494 505 1% Danish Refugee Council 5 000 000 1% Eid Charity 2 352 345 1% Qatar Charity 1 737 264 0% Raf-Thani Foundation 1 157 967 0% Somalia Relive Centre 1 100 531 0% Hospital Hermanos Ameijeiras 1 000 000 0% Norwegian Refugee Council 8 490 0% Sub-total 17 851 102 4%
Source: https://fts.unocha.org/ (last accessed on July 2nd 2015)