Number 29 March 2005 Humanitarian Practice Network

HPNManaged by Humanitarian Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange In this issue Good Humanitarian Donorship Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI 2 Welcome to the club 4 Good Donorship: how serious are Donors and agencies alike have the donors? long sought means of improving ©Reuters/Yves www.alertnet.org Herman, courtesy 8 Too good to be true? US engagement in the GHD initiative the performance, accountability 10 The EU: Good Humanitarian Donorship and transparency of humanitarian and the world’s biggest humanitarian action. Whilst a proliferation of NGO donor and agency initiatives followed the 13 Promoting Good Humanitarian Donorship: a task for the OECD-DAC? Rwanda genocide of 1994, it was 16 Good Humanitarian Donorship and the not until 2003 that donor govern- CAP ments took the important step of 18 Good Humanitarian Donorship and agreeing a foundation for improved funding according to need performance in their own humani- 21 Good donorship in practice: the case of Burundi tarian policy and practice. 24 No magic answers: Good Humanitarian Donorship in the Democratic Republic At an international meeting in Stockholm Given the importance of good donorship of Congo Practice and policy notes in 2003, donors committed to a set of and the potential of GHD to address many 28 Civilian deaths: a murky issue in the war principles and good practice designed to of the challenges that confront the humani- in Iraq make responses to humanitarian crises tarian system, why has more not been said 30 The Darfur crisis: simple needs, complex more effective, equitable and principled. about the initiative by those involved in response In October 2004, a second international humanitarian action? Could NGOs and 33 Predatory governance in the DRC: civilian impact and humanitarian response meeting was held in Ottawa to reaffirm agencies use GHD more effectively as a 36 A crisis turning inwards: refugee and IDP and review progress on these commit- platform for their advocacy towards militarisation in Uganda ments. donors? What is the scope and potential of 39 Schooling in refugee camps this agenda to improve the humanitarian 41 Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian aid: a political The ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ response in countries like the DRC and takeover? 43 Is cultural proximity the answer to gaining (GHD) initiative, as it has become Burundi, where the principles and practices access in Muslim contexts? known, seeks to address many of are being piloted? And what level of 46 Dead or alive? Ten years of the Code of the weaknesses in the humanitarian commitment have GHD donors demon- Conduct for Disaster Relief system, including the need for strated, individually, within the European 48 The Kobe conference: a review better coordination, investment in Union or other fora, such as the OECD Endpiece prevention and preparedness and Development Assistance Committee? 49 Tsunamis, accountability and the humanitarian circus flexible, timely and predictable About HPN funding. This is an important The articles in the special feature of this The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas agenda. It is also a challenging issue of Humanitarian Exchange consider Development Institute is an independent forum one. In the context of significant these and other dilemmas at the opera- where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, unmet humanitarian needs in tional and policy level, from experiences of analysis and experience. The views and opinions ongoing crises in countries such the GHD pilots in Burundi and the DRC, to expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy as Chad, the Democratic Republic efforts to improve needs assessments and Group or the Overseas Development Institute. of Congo and Somalia, the strengthen the UN Consolidated Appeals massive donor response to Process, to donor policy in the EU and the Britain’s leading independent the Indian Ocean tsunami in US and efforts within fora such as the think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues December 2004 is a stark re- OECD-DAC to take the initiative forward. minder of the distance GHD still Overseas Development Institute has to travel before its commit- This issue also includes articles on a 111 Westminster Bridge Road London SE1 7JD ments to impartial and equi- range of other subjects of concern to United Kingdom table funding, according to policy-makers and practitioners in the Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 need and on the basis of humanitarian sector. We hope you find it needs assessments, are interesting and, as always, we welcome HPN e-mail: [email protected] HPN website: www.odihpn.org translated into practice. your feedback. 2 GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP Financing Quality ofMoney:DonorBehaviorinHumanitarian prepared fortheStockholm meeting,wasentitled humanitarian enterpriseleadus. conclusions ofourresearch onthecurrent stateofthe advocates. Yetbecoming GHD thatisprecisely where the As independentanalysts,we have hadreservations about The relevance ofGHD of Nations Oursubsequentbook, multiple moving parts. humanitarian endeavour islessthanthesumofits financing humanitarianwork’,andthatthewholeof tarianism isnotthemaindriver ofdonorbehaviorin existing humanitariansystem,concludingthat‘humani- issues forthefuture. has confirmedtheurgent needforitandsuggestssome initiative, examineshow theAsiantsunami of theGHD languishing process. restates theimportance This article and injectsomeurgency andenthusiasmintothe necessary tobringthediscussionbackfirstprinciples progress attheOttawasession15monthslater. We feltit initiative inJune2003andthereview of launch oftheGHD had beenadiscerniblelossofmomentumbetween the session oftheOttawameetingon22October2004. There These were ourobservations inastatementtothefinal Ian SmillieandLarryMinear, Humanitarianismand War Project, Tufts University W Action inaCalculating World 3 IanSmillieandLarryMinear, www.relief.net. 2 alongwithtwootherson related topics, isavailableThe report, at F America, Trocaire and World Vision Canada;andtheAgaKhan Canada,Oxfam Coordination ofHumanitarianAffairs;NGOsCARE Australia, Officeforthe Canada, Sweden andSwitzerland; theUN by thegovernments initiative, wassupported of preceded the GHD 1 Ourresearch onthepoliticaleconomyofhumanitarianaction,which oundation Canada. HUMANITARIAN more equitably. people inneed,more quickly, more effectively, and make majordifferences inyour abilitytoreach more forward andtogive itlife.Ithasthepotentialto the staminaandcourage topushtheinitiative Netherlands, Sweden andCanadawhichhave had credit toallofthedonorsinvolved, butespeciallythe twenty years infive pagesofresolutions, anditisa donors themselves. Itanswers thecriticismsof notleast,becauseitcamefrom the is important, initiatives inhumanitarianactionadecade.Andit –perhapsoneofthemostimportant important The GoodHumanitarianDonorInitiative isextremely elcome totheclub exchange . 2 , geared more tothegeneral publicthanto It identifiedstructural weaknesses inthe (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2004). The CharityofNations:Humanitarian GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 1 Our initialreport, The Charity The sense ofwhatisneeded. The thrustoftheircommitmentssquaredsupport. withour o that donorsthemselves were takingactiontoredress their ordination ofinternationalhumanitarianaction’. The fact r platformendorsed‘thecentral andunique tions. The GHD ence forimplementationby civilian over militaryinstitu- good practice includedimproved andaprefer- reporting tional andmore predictable. Atamore programmatic level, promotion ofinternationallaw. Funds shouldbelesscondi- needs assessments’,withinacontextofrespect forand toneedsandonthebasisof be allocated‘inproportion impartiality, neutrality andindependence.Funding should should beguidedby thecentral principlesofhumanity, r platformframed atStockholm,donorship. and The GHD the essentialprinciplesandgoodpractices ofhumanitarian The weaknesses we identifyare addressed by anumberof apparatus confirmed by thetsunamiwere theexistenceof Among theweaknesses intheexistinghumanitarian reforms. earlier years toimplement ‘GHD-esque’ confirmation ofthecostsassociated withthefailure in tional response tothetsunamihasprovided dramatic and preparedness strategies. Without doubt, theinterna- butalsostrengthenedsaving interventions, prevention Moreover, framework encompassesnotonlylife- theGHD only man-madecrisesbutalsonatural disasters. principlesembraces not the openingaffirmationofGHD we up inStockholm andOttawawere onvividdisplay. Nor disaster, theweaknesses inhumanitarianactionflagged Intheaftermathof its weighty imprimaturtoGHD. humanitarian apparatus, the26Decembertsunamilent ments toaddress theevidentweaknesses intheglobal Set againstthebackdrop ofdonorgovernment commit- The tsunamiexperience tarian apparatus. we policy-makers andpractitioners, vividlyillustrates the ole oftheUnitedNationsinproviding leadershipandco- eaffirmed atOttawa,stipulatedthathumanitarianaction wn behaviourseemedtoconstituteacompellingclaimfor re aknesses –andthestrengths –oftheexistinghumani-

moving parts less thanthesumofitsmultiple the humanitarianendeavour is they beyond thescopeofwhatdonorsenvisioned: 3 GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 3 6 mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu D principles by some governments and UNsome governments officials D principles by C’s focus has been on development policies and focus has been on development C’s the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Assistance the OECD-Development er time across a wider group. A non-binding GHD a wider group. er time across portedly played a positive role in the initial round of round in the initial portedly role a positive played 6 ‘Chair’s Overview: Continued Commitment to Good Humanitarian 6 ‘Chair’s 2004. 2 November Forward’, Way for the Donorship and a Roadmap These twin examples depict governments engaged in engaged depict governments twin examples These of the The dilution at fourthdecision-making remove. inspires hardly remove at each successive action element changes in dysfunctional in fundamental confidence under- however, governments, The timidity of policies. the importancescores elements solidifying the positive of in the GHD undertaking to their and holding donors of GHD in the number The increase pronouncements. to 22 at participants, 16 donors at Stockholm from to the references are Also encouraging Ottawa, is positive. GH donors’during the Geneva on the tsunami on 11 meeting donors to offer and the willingness of several January, of peer reviews in the next round their policies for scrutiny by A third area of concern involves the disappointing role of concern involves area A third As it often does, the NGO thus far. NGOs by played community has lamented that it was not consulted adequately in the GHDWhile hand-wringing has process. (‘the donors made me do become an NGO stock-in-trade it’ to criticism), the lamentations response is a frequent A look to the future The nascent GHD of of areas a number effort involves of nature to the voluntary continuing concern. One relates commitments to GHD some principles. At Stockholm, GHDquestioned whether membership in the club should that had made a perhaps be limited to governments commitment to implement GHDThe consensus principles. inclusive was that more however, among governments, behaviour a means to improve membership represents ov engage- goes, enables broader the reasoning process, is thus a need to monitor develop- There ment and buy-in. on governments and keep the pressure ments in this area and approaches to adopt national humanitarian policies consistent with the GHD framework. of the DAC about the role also been raised Questions have has The DAC donor behaviour. improved in encouraging re policies and which examined humanitarian peer reviews, Discussions are and Norway. in Australia practices pilot period for extend the which may well proceeding to for additional peer reviews allowing another two years, While the under way. the ones currently beyond proceed DA why it cannot reason is no inherent there programmes, attention to humanitarian issues. more direct now the situation bears monitoring and the discus- However, sions need to be widened to include non-traditional At a time when funding sources. donors and non-Western is of the humanitarian apparatus nature Western the donors’ an issue, the DAC increasingly club has its own Chairman of the the by offered The roadmap limitations. Ottawa sessions also identifies a number of other imple- movement. to help spur forward mentation vehicles British Medical 5 As if disasters can be expected to 4 , 31 December 2004, p. A15. , 31 December 2004, p. , 22 January 2004. membership in the GHDmembership club at bargain- seemed on offer basement prices D plan itself was rather more vague, committing vague, more D plan itself was rather esponse to humanitarian crises’. As is often the case in espect ‘the jurisdictions of scientific or political bodies, espect ‘the jurisdictions of scientific aising questions about the capacity of the UN about the capacity aising questions system to Journal 4 Andrew Revken, ‘How Scientists and Victims Watched Helplessly’, Watched Victims Scientists and ‘How Revken, 4 Andrew Times New York 5 Peter Walker, Ben Wisner, Jennifer Leaning and Larry Minear, ‘Smoke Minear, and Larry Jennifer Leaning Wisner, Ben Walker, 5 Peter The Illusionary Art of Disaster Funding’, and Mirrors: moving from broad affirmations to pesky particulars, broad from the moving GH the consenting donors, for example, only to ‘explore enhancing the flexibility of, or possibility of reducing, funding longer-term earmarking, and of introducing Membership in the club seemed on offer arrangements’. prices. at bargain-basement The tendency of governments to delay action in the area The tendency of governments the difficulties recalls disaster preparedness of natural meeting in getting at the Stockholm encountered action on GHD extended and an decisive Following itself. of the donors diffuse discussion, a unanimous vote and Good Practice the Principles ‘endorsed present outlined in this document [the Meeting Conclusions] as a common platform of understanding of good humani- to assist them in forming their tarian donorship, r The perils of inaction were also underscored. One of the also underscored. The perils of inaction were missed opportunities to light was the effort that came by network scientists to expand the existing early-warning to include the Indian Ocean. the Pacific from International Coordination in the UN’s Governments in 2003 the suggestion, voting had rebuffed Group to a sessional working group instead to ‘establish to establish an interses- a recommendation prepare that will study the establishment sional working group Pacific warning system for the southwest of a regional and Indian Ocean’. too many moving parts (e.g., multiple governments and parts moving too many governments multiple (e.g., centre, a weak agenda; its own each with NGOs) myriad r a provi- donors to create of some the strategy lead and action; the and orchestrate to mobilise sional coalition affected the both from forces, of military involvement and also in relief donor governments, and from countries in record track and the abysmal in political capacities; in converting pledges to other headline emergencies time- within realistic the ground activities on operational Asian crisis to the response The initial month’s frames. need for GHD,highlighted both the and the distance that the performance of in improving to travel yet donors have the humanitarian sector. the schedule of the sessions into which they organize the schedule of the sessions into which repre- government their work, or the fancy footwork of who attend such gatherings’. sentatives r 4 GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP serious donorgovernments are intheirengagement with fare askshow any better? sions. This article Will GHD humanitarianfundingdeci- sarily guidedgovernments’ Conventions or theRefugee Convention hasnotneces- formal adherence toinstrumentslike theGeneva ciples eitherindomesticlawortheirpolicies. Yet ments tocodifytheircommitmentshumanitarianprin- provides forgovern- anopportunity endorsement ofGHD Code ofConduct been borrowed from theRed Cross-Red Crescent INGO principles, manyofwhichhave Signing uptotheGHD humanitarian outcomesontheground. initiative, tolookathow theirown behaviouraffects right, through theGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD) parency andimproved performance. They have alsobeen been righttopress forgreater accountabilityandtrans- beneficiary hasreally improved. That said,donorshave still hastoworrywhetherthelotofhumanitarian one professionalism, performancesystemsandreporting, r organisations andthehumanitariansystem.For both,the trying tostrengthen theperformanceofhumanitarian spent the11years sincetheRwandagenocidein1994 Donor governments, have liketheirNGOcounterparts, the DisastersEmergency Committee intheUK. group ofmajorNGOsforheadlinecrises,comparable to tries suchasCanadaandtheUnitedStates acoordinating process. Onewouldbetoestablishincoun- of theGHD NGOs canalsotakesomenecessarystepsindependently In theinterest ofstrengthening theirown effectiveness, not, theyhave adoginthisfight. ‘ the timeofOttawaconference, concludedthatthey Infact,manyNGOsthemselves, meetingat behind GHD. up theirinvolvement andthrow theirconsiderable weight ments andtheUnitedNations.ItistimeforNGOstostep NGOs themselves foryears have beenpressing ongovern- principlesare onesthatthe obscure thereality thatGHD 8 See Ian Smillie, ‘The 8 SeeIanSmillie,‘The Way To Give Well’, Meeting,20October2004,p. 2. 7 Minutesfrom PAGER-GHD Richard Blewitt,IFRC Good donorship:howseriousare thedonors? F December 2004;andIanSmillieLarryMinear, ‘A BetterSystem for cannot afford to stay out of the GHD process’. cannot afford tostayoutoftheGHD ecord ismixed. Overall, despitetheincreasing level of unding Disaster Relief’, AlertNet, 24January2005. AlertNet, unding DisasterRelief’, HUMANITARIAN in thisfight like itornot,NGOshave adog exchange , is a brave and important step., isabrave Donors’ andimportant The GlobeandMail 7 Like itor , 30 8 Such 3. There is a lack of strong advocates of GHD within 3. There isalackofstrong advocates ofGHD 2. Overall, available resources donotmatchhumanitarian 1. Donorsare highlysusceptibletomediaandpolitical itself: the nature ofthe‘system’ Some are internaltodonorsthemselves, othersstemfrom meaning totheprinciplesandgoodpractice ofGHD. seem tomakeitdifficultfordonorsapplyandgive It ispossibletoidentifyasetofrecurring factorsthat Why isGHDsodifficult? lenges thattheyface. GH W Charity ofNations:HumanitarianActioninaCalculating Minear Humanitarianism and War Project of Tufts University. Ian Smillie y don’t breakadopted. Inshort, openthechampagnejust continuing tomonitorandevaluate theapproaches Independent analystswillhave theirown challengesin role.tarian personnelcanplayamore assertive humani- disciplined contributiontosucharegime. UN tarian enterprise,butshouldthemselves makeamore continue tobeadvocates ofatrulyneeds-basedhumani- but alsoheldtomeasurable results. NGOsshould ro nobody came? nottorally The issuesare tooimportant and party What ifdonorgovernments threw aGHD accountability. and competence,publicconcernaboutNGO sector, donorgovernment uneaseaboutNGOcapacity willingness toaddress thefree-for-all imageofthe funding issues.ItwouldalsobeanindicationofNGO dealing withindividualdonorsandgovernments on a vehicle wouldnotonlyprovide acommonfront for et, butatleastkeepitonice. orld und. Donorsneedtobeapplaudedfortheirinitiative, D, andexaminessomeoftheobstacleschal- government ministries,able towithstandcompeting funding andresponse. good intentionsandprinciples andtheactuallevels of orSomaliatoseethegulfthatexistsbetween the DRC needs across theworld.OneonlyhastolookatChad, inhumanitarianfunding. increasing distortions thetrend seemstobetowards ever-ments toGHD, planning indonordecision-making.Despitecommit- example ofalackrationality andneeds-based tions totheIndianOceantsunamiare butthelatest reac- donors’ ments toprinciplessuchasimpartiality; interest. The pressure toactcanoverride commit- (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2004). directs theProject. Their mostrecent workis is anOttawa-basedconsultanttothe Larry The GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 5

©Reuters/Radu Sigheti, courtesy www.alertnet.org mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu their own predispositions and political interests: the and political interests: predispositions their own start this may seem a strange and with the obvious,

ench in Côte d’Ivoire, the British in Sierra Leone, the Leone, the British in Sierra ench in Côte d’Ivoire, eams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, though in some instances eams (PRTs) esources – up to $200 million a year – was totally inade- – up to $200 million a year esources Americans in Liberia. In circumstances where a donor may where Americans in Liberia. In circumstances be particularly of previous engaged, for instance because to colonial links, decisions may be especially vulnerable policy or other concerns apartforeign the needs of from the population in question. perverse effects for Political engagement can have The mixing of mandates humanitarian aid programmers. humanitarian space and affect the security of can erode Reconstruction The Provincial humanitarian aid workers. T the blurred have may well successful on the ground, security and ‘hearts and military, distinction between To politics is a worker, Cross a Red statement coming from thing. Serious good thing, or at least it can be a good settings can help political engagement in humanitarian Donors exertedtackle the underlying causes of disasters. the Sudanese for peace between successful pressure January 2005. in the south in and rebels government was a distinct lack of political engage- there Conversely, of genocide in ment with Rwanda during the 100 days humanitarian 1994, despite evidence of a massive is another Taliban Afghanistan under the disaster. of the level instance of damaging neglect, where r of course, can change, Times, quate in terms of needs. amount a significantly larger and the country has received Clearly, fall. Taliban’s of assistance since 9/11 and the division first division and second (and third) are there affected contexts. Depending on the context, donors are by Fr The politics of donor action and its The politics of donor action and implications for Good Donorship actual levels of funding and response actual levels like Sudan’s highlight the gulf between good intentions and principles and good intentions and highlight the gulf between like Sudan’s Displaced Sudanese, Farchana refugee camp, Chad, July 2004. Emergencies Chad, July 2004. camp, refugee Displaced Sudanese, Farchana signing up to the GHD principles and importantis a brave step he short-termism in inherent eal programmatic change. eal programmatic change. This could be viewed as a good thing: the fact as This could be viewed change. is that the humanitarian system is not donor-driven also it is seen as an important However, characteristic. challenging it is to bring about testimony to how in humanitarian change and improvements positive or the humanitarian system. Donors organisations a consensus on the need to reached may have the humanitarian system, but the actual strengthen impact of donors’ been intentions on that system has limited. good receiver- good donorship requires Yet limited. communication between and effective Increased ship. all stakeholders in the GHD is likely to be process in this regard. central policy and political pressures. and political policy the people terms, In general in the humanitarian who work in aid ministries or sections of often are ministries foreign with small teams under stress, flows huge resource handling with and making decisions These limited information. clearly militate pressures work that against the kind of to turn would be required into rhetorical commitments r T donors’ humanitarian decision- needs- making makes rational, Time- based planning difficult. often artificially are frames short – even – typically a year in humanitarian crises that and look lasted for years, have It is more. like lasting for years accident that GHDnot by iden- of longer- tifies the introduction term funding arrangements, and flexibility of funding, as partalong with predictability agenda. of its good practice govern- is confused thinking within donor There of humanitarian the distinctiveness ments around and humanitarian work, as against organisations conflict reduc- activities like conflict mitigation and implications for the principle This has obvious tion. humanitarian of independence, which states that the political, action should be autonomous from a donor might economic, military or other objectives commitment to GHD’s It may also compromise have. in the delivery the primacy of civilian organisations of aid. 7. is in many cases donors and recipients between Trust 4. 5. 6. of systemic Holding the purse strings is no guarantee 6 GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP There islimitedpublicscrutinyoftheeffectiveness of • toincrease learning,thesystemfindsit Despite efforts • Mistakesmadeby humanitarianagencies,which can • There isstillnoopenaccountability to,androom for • that limittheutilityofGoodDonorshipinitative: system hassomefundamentalaccountabilityweaknesses tarian action;thisisagoodthing.However, thecurrent increasing levels oftransparency andevaluation ofhumani- The growing pubicscrutinyofdonorshasresulted in Donors andaccountability r imperative tosave lives. Mixingdonorandoperational other objectives, orbeperceived assuch,beyond the and rulesofengagement. They mustnotbelinkedto needtotakeplacewithinasetofguidelines interventions ment ofmilitaryassetscansave lives. However, such Indian Oceantsunami,operationality through thedeploy- such astheimmediateresponse totheaftermathof cations forhumanitarianaction.Insomecircumstances, increasing operationality alsohasobvious impli- Donors’ a challengetoindependent,neutral humanitarianaction. toaffectedpeople.Inthelongterm,thiscanpose support activitiesandhumanitarianrehabilitation minds’ . ECHOhas,inthepasteightyears, moved from beinga 1. v risk missingsomevery positive donorpractice andsome Like NGOs,alldonorsare different. Broad generalisations A oles mustremain anoptionoflastresort. ery gooddonors.Someexamplesofpractice include: ll donorsare different as other key documents, reports, guidelines, and linkstoothersites.Accessisfree. as otherkeydocuments,reports, provides anarchive NetworkPapers ofback issuesofHumanitarianExchange, andGoodPractice Reviews, aswell Y HUMANITARIAN ou canread current andpastissuesofHPNpublicationsonthewebsite atwww.odihpn.org. The website development. programming through theOECD-DAC are apositive donors towards peerreviewing theirhumanitarianaid humanitarian aidprogramming. Recent moves by GHD meaningful way. hard toaddress itsweaknesses inaneffective and populations, are rarely censured. sometimes have seriousconsequencesforaffected r itself asresponding mainlytoforgotten contexts. considerations tobeingadonorthathaspositioned donor heavilyinfluencedby politicalinterests and edress for, humanitarian claimants. guarantee ofsystemicchange holding thepursestringsisno exchange www.odihpn.org International Federation oftheRed Cross andRed Crescent. Richard Blewitt Donorsshouldcontinuetopress forreform across the 5. donorsshouldaimtofund ofGHD, Althoughnotpart 4. 3. Donorsshouldfind more dynamic waystoshare best 2. intotheirlegis- Donorsneedtoworkhard togetGHD 1. might include: steps just passedthefirstmileofmarathon. Further ra Solid progress hasbeenmadeinGoodDonorship. The thinking The finalfrontier: somebreakthrough 5. Although currently outside the GHD ‘club’, Althoughcurrently outsidetheGHD newactors 5. TheDutchgovernment hasbeenworkingtowina 4. with hasbeendeveloping long-termpartnerships DFID 3. remainsThe US strongly committedtosupporting 2. ce has started, butthere isalongwaytogo.ce hasstarted, We have humanitarian system. This maywell involve somerationalisation inthe higher levels ofaccountabilitytoaffectedpopulations. and well-coordinated humanitarianresponse and humanitarian system,pushingforprincipled,efficient sions. itarian indexshouldbeusedtoinformfundingdeci- 100% ofhumanitarianneedsby 2010.Aglobalhuman- tarian actorsshouldbereduced. settings. The dependenceoninternationalhumani- to local capacitiesinhumanitarian ness andsupport make muchgreater investment indisasterprepared- Donors shouldfollow through ontheircommitmentsto albeit thetrend iscurrently intheoppositedirection. less operationality wouldbeapositive development, practice; moving towards more gooddonorshipand and defensiblepositions. that theircommitmentsare turnedintopredictable lation andpolicy-makingagendas. They mustensure thinking tothehumanitarianenterprise. are emerging, whowillbringfresh anddifferent injointplanningexercises inthefield. of participation has donethisby linkingfundingdecisionstoevidence country-based commonhumanitarianactionplans.It commitment from internationalNGOstostrong strengthen theircore work. predictability andenablehumanitarianagenciesto encouragehumanitarian settings. These partnerships major internationalaidorganisations workingin neutrality andindependence. organisations liketheICRC inawaythatprotects their is Director ofMovement Cooperation, GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 7 mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in the meeting of needs affect not adversely crises does ongoing crises. to ensure humanitarian crises, strive to changing needs in in funding to United Nations and flexibility predictability and to other key humani- programmes agencies, funds and tarian organisations. imple- and financial planning by priority-setting strategic the possibility of reducing, explore menting organisations, earmarking, and of intro- of, or enhancing the flexibility funding arrangements. ducing longer-term Appeals and to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Movement Crescent and Red Cross to International Red supportappeals, and actively the formulation of Common primary instru- Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the planning, prioritisation and co-ordina- ment for strategic tion in complex emergencies. committed to and are to good practice fully adhere in efficiency and effectiveness accountability, promoting implementing humanitarian action. activities, the guidelines and principles on humanitarian Internal Displacement and the 1994 on Guiding Principles and Red Cross Code of Conduct for the International Red Organisations and Non-Governmental Movement Crescent (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. of safe of humanitarian action, including the facilitation humanitarian access. allocation including, as appropriate, tarian organisations, capacities for response. of funding, to strengthen implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas military where armed conflict. In situations affected by used to supportcapacity and assets are the implementa- that such use is in tion of humanitarian action, ensure conformity with international humanitarian law and of the leading role humanitarian principles, and recognises humanitarian organisations. Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. of humanitarian action. and efficient implementation tive to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance. in donor reportingparency on official humanitarian assis- of the development tance spending, and encourage formats for such reporting.standardised 12. response the necessity of dynamic and flexible Recognising 13.the importance and While stressing of transparent 14. and on the basis of burden-sharing, Contribute responsibly, enhancing implementation and standards (b) Promoting 15. that implementing humanitarian organisations Request 16. Committee Standing of Inter-Agency the use Promote 17. to offer support Maintain readiness to the implementation 18. Support humani- mechanisms for contingency planning by 19. in Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations 20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the and accountability (c) Learning 21. Support for the effec- learning and accountability initiatives of international responses evaluations regular 22. Encourage timeliness, and trans- of accuracy, a high degree 23. Ensure , meaning that Endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003 in Stockholm, Endorsed Objectives and definition of humanitarian action and definition Objectives neutrality rinciples and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship of Humanitarian Practice Good and rinciples , meaning the centrality of saving , meaning the centrality P , meaning the autonomy of humanitarian humanity , meaning the implementation of actions solely , meaning the implementation independence vide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportivevide humanitarian assistance in ways that are o elief to recovery and development activities. and development elief to recovery humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed any side must not favour humanitarian action such action is carried out; where conflict or other dispute and economic, military or other the political, from objectives to areas that any actor may hold with regard objectives humanitarian action is being implemented. where and those no longer taking part the provi- in hostilities, and health services sion of food, water and sanitation, shelter, and other items of assistance, undertaken benefit for the to normal return of affected people and to facilitate the and livelihoods. lives law and human rights. refugee humanitarian law, within their own the victims of humanitarian emergencies flexible and timely funding, on the to ensure strive borders, obligation of striving to meet human- basis of the collective itarian needs. on the basis of needs assessments. involve- possible extent, adequate to the greatest ensure, moni- ment of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, response. of humanitarian toring and evaluation mitigate and respond for, prepare communities to prevent, to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that better able to are and local communities governments with effectively and co-ordinate meet their responsibilities humanitarian partners. Pr striving to ensure and long-term development, of recovery of support, to the maintenance and return appropriate, where humanitarian from transitions and sustainable livelihoods r of leadership and co-ordination United Nations in providing of the international humanitarian action, the special role and the vital role Cross, International Committee of the Red and Red Cross of the United Nations, the International Red organisations and non-governmental Movement Crescent in implementing humanitarian action. human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; and alleviating suffering wherever human lives impartiality or without discrimination between on the basis of need, within affected populations; alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and human dignity during and maintain alleviate suffering disasters, crises and natural in the aftermath of man-made for the preparedness and strengthen as to prevent as well of such situations. occurrence the humanitarian should be guided by Humanitarian action principles of 3. of civilians the protection Humanitarian action includes principles General 4. the implementation of international and promote Respect 5. for of states the primary responsibility While reaffirming 6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and 7. to implementing humanitarian organisations Request the capacity of affected countries and local 8. Strengthen 9. of the 10. Support and unique role the central and promote in donor financing, management and Good practices accountability (a) Funding 11. action in new that funding of humanitarian to ensure Strive 2. 1. lives, to save are humanitarian action of The objectives Too good to be true? US engagement in the GHD initiative Abby Stoddard, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

For many observers, a particularly promising aspect of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative has been the supportive and active role played by the United States in its drafting and adoption. No small matter, considering that the US accounts for over a third of the total humanitarian funding provided by the OECD-DAC donors. The GHD has gained the endorsement and support of the senior leadership

of the two main humanitarian ©Tyler Navy J. Clements, US arms of the US government, the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). This engagement osten- USAID relief supplies being loaded aboard a US Navy helicopter in Aceh, sibly signals to their bureaus and Sumatra, January 2005 the rest of the government the seriousness with which the US has entered into this initiative. Moreover, for all the stated in policy documents the idea that foreign aid, administration’s emphasis on its prerogative to act unilat- including emergency aid, must be seen as integral to the erally, the US under GHD has committed to a multilateral nation’s broader political and security interests. process that aims to harmonise its policies and practice with those of its counterparts, potentially subject them to A year ago, the State Department and USAID issued the peer review and ground them more firmly in objective first ever ‘Joint Strategic Plan’, which laid out the goals of humanitarian principles, regardless of national interests. US foreign policy and assistance for 2004–2009. The stated purpose of the plan is to ensure that US foreign Reactions among humanitarian practitioners at the policy and development programmes will be ‘fully aligned prospect of the US fulfilling the commitments of the GHD to advance the National Security Strategy of the United range from the hopeful to the highly sceptical. How States’. Development aid has long been presented as in ‘good’, by the criteria defined at Stockholm, is the US truly service to US interests. However, the new strategic plan prepared to be as a humanitarian donor? Might this all undeniably ratchets up the relief aid-politics linkage, seem too good to be true? In fact, comparing US participa- particularly in the context of failed states, where, it notes, tion in the GHD process with recent developments in US most US humanitarian efforts take place, and from which aid policy reveals some stark contradictions. Unless arise the ‘most significant security threats’ to the US. resolved, these threaten to derail US engagement in the GHD process, or render it meaningless. The line between development aid based on national interests and emergency aid based only on need, never Contradiction 1: clearly drawn in official US policy, now seems much less GHD aims to reinforce the principles of visible. Even while the GHD initiative was being launched, neutrality and independence, but the US is complaints were intensifying about the US military co- linking humanitarianism with its political opting humanitarian roles in Afghanistan, and NGOs being agenda as never before pressured to display the USA logo. USAID, like some other An informal European Union (EU) conference on GHD in major donors, has also become more deeply involved in March 2003 reinforced the core principles that underpin programming, second-guessing needs assessments and the initiative: ‘assistance should be provided impartially, earmarking within projects. When interviewed, US offi- on the basis of, and in proportion to, humanitarian need cials did not allow that these inconsistencies represent alone. The independence and the neutrality of humani- serious impediments to implementing GHD. Some were tarian agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance should frankly dismissive of the possibility of disinterested donor be respected unconditionally’. Despite committing to giving. No bilateral donor is neutral, said one. On the

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN these ideals in the GHD process, the US has increasingly contrary, the funding differentials for emergencies across

HUMANITARIAN 8 exchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 9 New mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu eports $342 million in that Americans gave r donor mechanisms already adhere to this good practice, adhere donor mechanisms already

ar one of GHD neither USAID/DCHA nor PRM had incorpo- mains cautious. Concrete US action on GHDmains cautious. Concrete one in year ated GHD guidelines for into any formal policy or operational US perceptions and performance in the GHD US perceptions and performance in process to date US meeting, the delegation In the run-up to the Stockholm a to produce the language of the agreement helped to refine comfortabledocument they were with. Most officials that, for the most part, believed in the process the involved US consistent, systematic and policy- but need to become more GHD Unlike some other driven. participants, the end of by ye r meeting and attending the Stockholm officers. Beyond of support,expressions not been directly senior staff have of implementation activities, and to the in or seized involved it is seen of the initiative, aware staff are extent that general This lack of substan- exercise. as primarily a Geneva-based engagement in the US was discernible by high-level tive observers On one. at the Ottawa meeting at the end of year the US government and other areas, the peer reviews re was mostly limited to work on the launch of the GHD pilot in is using going forward priority The US government’s the DRC. accountability and trans- to push for greater the agreement especially among its UN agency grantees. parency, rivate aid can certainly be staggeringly generous. The aid can certainly rivate generous. be staggeringly ork Times eported receiving $10 million over the internet alone. eported $10 million over receiving and something to be actively encouraged. Smaller govern- encouraged. to be actively and something of principles bedrock are solutions and market ment has Bush administration politics, but the conservative gone further in stressing predecessors its Republican than as key to US and faith-based charity individual foreign assistance. P Y weeks for tsunami victims in the two contributions private US the Children hit in December 2004. Save after the waves r of private estimates using the most generous even However, the bottom of the 22 major towards giving, the US still ranks of income. of aid as a percentage donor nations in terms USAID under the Clinton administration beginning Moreover, A down. and trimmed weakened has been progressively closed and the agency has been have number of missions While the Bush govern- stripped of its autonomous status. its Millennium ment has pledged new aid money through HIV/AIDSChallenge Account and the African initiative, allocations. its planned received has yet neither programme has loudly criticised these shortfalls,A minority in Congress of funding. levels lower towards trend as the general as well money private emphasis on leveraging The government’s to the counter with public funds runs directly in funding across and even-handedness predictability in the GHD that is stressed emergencies As initiative. money noted, private agencies and donors alike have emer- public money to the higher-profile tends to follow funding for on private-sector reliance gencies. Greater inequity and not less, humanitarian aid will lead to more, in response. unpredictability how ‘good’, by the criteria by the ‘good’, how is the US at Stockholm, defined to be as a truly prepared donor? humanitarian D calls for more predictable and flexible predictable D calls for more ell before UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland’s UN Coordinator ell before Relief Emergency SAIDUS and Adelman in public documents and the tung by accusations of stinginess (accusations levelled accusations tung by ou take care of your own backyard’. own of your ou take care alues’, which does not distinguish between government not distinguish between alues’, which does egions render donor neutrality ‘a ridiculous concept ... ‘a donor neutrality egions render among the of humanitarian principles aise awareness esponded by enlisting Carol Adelman of the Hudson Adelman enlisting Carol esponded by other government assistance’other government Department (including State media, purporting of US the ‘true measure to show that their estimates Furthermore, they stress generosity’. charities and private churches, giving, through for private The message has side. on the low other channels, are aid is both a fact, of foreign been that the privatisation These higher figures have nonetheless been publicised by have These higher figures U Institute (a conservative think-tank) to reassess the ‘totality think-tank) to reassess Institute (a conservative with a emerged group Adelman’s assistance’. of US foreign aid in 2000, and $57.7 of $44.5 billion for US foreign figure billion in 2003. Using official US reporting to the OECD-DAC as a starting-point, billions in the Hudson Institute added ‘ contributions (based on private buildings and operations); to industrialised loose estimates and including flows – an estimated $18 nations); and – most controversially workers in the US to foreign sent by billion in remittances The Center for Global their families back home. has publicly disputed this new accounting. Development Although the Center and many other economists acknowl- an important are edge that remittances and neglected economics, they do phenomenon in global development that this can be counted as US aid. not agree comments after the Asian tsunami), the UScomments after the Asian tsunami), government r w funding based on needs, while the USfunding based on needs, while is of aid’ touting the ‘privatisation amount of official foreign Despite contributing the greatest last in billion in 2003), the US terms ($16.3 ranks aid in real of national income. terms of official aid as a percentage S Contradiction 2: Contradiction GH r y humanitarian principles in USThe discussion of donor albeit the term has now is still embryonic, structures to prefers The US traditionally the official lexicon. entered of ‘American aid as an expression speak of humanitarian v so, to some of aid. Even provision and non-governmental in USAID the principles component of GHD a ‘raises the withdrawal issues’. In particular, number of interesting Afghanistan in (MSF) from of Médecins Sans Frontières of insecurity due to compromised June 2004, on grounds caught the attention of some senior govern- neutrality, efforts new cross-donor ment officials, and spurred to r military and other partsgovernment. of the emergency. It must simply endeavour to deliver the aid in the message has been that the a neutral and impartial way. privatisation of foreign aid is The bifurcation and compartmentalisation of US humani- both a fact, and something to be tarian assistance has been cited as the reason for the US refusal to exercise decisive leadership in the global actively encouraged humanitarian system proportionate to its influence. Yet at the same time, it may be that the autonomy of the US humanitarian response vitally depends on this configura- tion, in order to preserve to the greatest extent possible a OFDA’s humanitarian action, notwithstanding sphere of apolitical humanitarianism within the US donor Any cognitive dissonance created by the contradictions machinery. The GHD progress review found that European between GHD principles and trends in US assistance humanitarian bodies see GHD as a useful tool to educate policy cannot be altogether new to US humanitarian offi- their governments on humanitarian principles, and to cials. DCHA/OFDA, the frontline entity of US humani- advocate for them. Their US counterparts are likely to feel tarian donorship, has over the years managed to carve ambivalence at the prospect, or are hoping to achieve the out an independent operational space that its personnel same thing in a much quieter, indirect way. perceive as neutral humanitarianism in practice, or its closest approximation. When an emergency occurs, Abby Stoddard is an Associate at the Center on OFDA decides whether to respond, based on needs, International Cooperation, New York University. without direction from the White House, the State Department or Congress. Although their resources wax and wane with Congressional decisions on supplemental References and further reading funding, an initial OFDA response has been seen to focus Carol Adelman, ‘A High Quality of Mercy’, New York government attention and create momentum for further Times, 4 January 2005. US policy responses. The ‘notwithstanding clause’ that applies to OFDA grants in many cases frees its imple- Carol Adelman, ‘The Privatization of Foreign Aid: menting partners from adhering to the US government’s Reassessing National Largesse’, Foreign Affairs, restrictive and cumbersome grant regulations and November–December 2003. procurement policies, such as the ‘Buy America’ regula- Adele Harmer, Lin Cotterrell and Abby Stoddard, From tions, which promote the purchase of US-made vehicles Stockholm to Ottawa: A Progress Review of the Good and pharmaceuticals in US-funded aid programmes. Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, HPG Research (The ‘notwithstanding’ clause of the Foreign Assistance Briefing 18, October 2004. Act of 1961, Section 491, states that no statutory or regu- latory requirements shall restrict USAID/OFDA’s ability Steve Radelet, ‘Think Again: US Generosity with Foreign to respond to the needs of disaster victims in a timely Aid’, Center for Global Development, January 2005. fashion.) USAID, ‘Taking the Full Measure of US International Assistance’, Foreign Aid in the National Interest, 2002, OFDA has tried to be faithful to its mission, and realistic in http://www.usaid.gov/fani/ch06/usassistance.htm. regard to US policy goals. It is possible that, by steering clear of political issues and focusing on operations, the USAID/DCHA/Office of Food for Peace (FFP), ‘Concept humanitarian wing of USAID has safeguarded its Paper for Its Strategic Plan for 2004–2008’, Final Draft, autonomy, and by extension the integrity of its humani- 10 September 2003. tarian action. OFDA staff, including those working on US government, ‘FY 2004–2009 Department of State and GHD, acknowledge the distance between principle and USAID Strategic Plan, Security – Democracy – Prosperity: practice, and adopt a pragmatic approach; the agency, Aligning Diplomacy and Development Assistance’, after all, can do little if its legislature decides it wants to http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004. contribute vast sums of money to a particular country or

The EU: Good Humanitarian Donorship and the world’s biggest humanitarian donor Barnaby Willitts-King, independent consultant

If the European Union (EU) were a country, it would be the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), together provide almost world’s biggest humanitarian donor. Despite claims to the half of the world’s official humanitarian assistance. Clearly, contrary, the EU is not (yet) a single superstate. None- any analysis of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) needs

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN theless, EU donors, including the European Commission to look at the individual and collective effort of the EU’s 25

HUMANITARIAN 10 exchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 11 mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu there are common EU common are values, there EUand the concert acting in can exert leverage significant donors could come together more on issues such as together more donors could come

ather than going back on pledges, it should also be emain in operationalising the principle of impartialityemain in operationalising in beginning to be made on the presumably esponse were Challenge 2: Funding according to need according Challenge 2: Funding a lack of donor coordina- revealed If the tsunami response major questions about donors’ tion, it also raised adher- impartiality humanitarian principle of ence to the core – and in proportion to, need. It is funding on the basis of, clearly importantaffected, solidarity with those to show to their to demonstrate and for donor governments in the first However, responding. publics that they are is impossible to days of a disaster such as this it the basis of need and in proportion to contribute ‘on Some the lack of information about needs. need’, given of need was clearly so that the level donors would argue and no contri- was necessary, that a huge response great but is some truth in this, There bution would be too much. leads to perversethe danger of early pledging is that it these to disburse within donor administrations pressures finan- by often driven which are pressures funds quickly, A good humanitarian budgeting considerations. cial-year donor might pledge, but be clear that its pledges are subject to detailed assessments of need on the ground. to the These assessments would be carried out according in the same criteria as in humanitarian crises elsewhere world, in terms of indicators such as mortality levels rates, of malnutrition, numbers in need of shelter and so on. R humanitarian pledges into longer- over possible to roll if the assessments and level responses term development many for this. For of other donor contributions argued tortuous this would be bureaucratically administrations and politically unpalatable. the challenges that demonstrates The tsunami response r decisions after the immediate world. Funding the real r estimates of death tolls, numbers affected, basis of rough and suchlike. In the detail, local capacity to respond though, comparing the need in Sri Lanka – with better or for that matter and capacity – with Aceh, infrastructure of Congo (DRC), depends on Republic the Democratic EU but this has a long way to go before the CAP, strengthening than rather as a tool of coordination, it fulfils its aim to act of like-minded donors Informal groupings just fundraising. on specific issues – for example joint can make progress fruit in the might bear donor collaboration – and evaluations the impact of interventions,design of tools to analyse rather However, outputs, as is common now. than looking solely at change EUto effect greater could work together, donors with ECHO support, in both common approaches to take all EU engagement by Deeper and advocacy. programming Committee (HAC) members in the Humanitarian Assistance be beneficial. and in ECHO decision-making would also hermore, EU donors are generally interested in EU interested hermore, generally are donors donors do not necessarily coordinate any better with any donors do not necessarily coordinate D are in danger of remaining just that, while exas- in danger of remaining D are ECHO in acting apolitically as a collective expression of expression ECHO in acting apolitically as a collective

rt ocess (CAP) – and direct collaborations, such as joint ocess (CAP) collaborations, – and direct quirements. But donor coordination – or lack of it – is But donor coordination quirements. alues, and the EU acting in concert can exert significant esponse, and the Ottawa meeting suggests that Challenge 1: Better donor coordination donors lies at among humanitarian Better coordination the heart of GHD. A good humanitarian donor will work the quality of response, with other donors to improve filled. that gaps in need are duplication and ensure avoid EU each other than with non-EU donors, and it is apparent to approaches that they individually take quite different on multilateral disbursing aid. Some donors focus national NGOs, and their own channels, others favour Never- capacity. significant operational others have benefits of a theless, the study highlighted the potential ‘joined-up’more EU played and the special role approach, by Interviews conducted during 2004 with for the study were states, including the new 25 member most of the EU’s is evidence of good that there These suggested entrants. in GHDpractice in the EU, can and should a lot more but This finding confirmed be done to make further progress. into GHD. be expected a year what could reasonably Fu action, and the quality of their humanitarian improving which good practice many examples of the study provided This article uses the study widely. could be adopted more as a starting particular point to focus on three challenges policy trans- needs assessment and – coordination, EU on how It also reflects and other donors parency. of both the these challenges, in the light should address response the recent outcomes of the Ottawa meeting and to the Indian Ocean tsunami. member states and ECHO. During its presidency of the EU of presidency During its and ECHO. states member in for a study proposed therefore 2004, Ireland half of the first to look in October 2004 at the Ottawa meeting publication EU GHD, doing in implementing at how donors were and to the EU across practice in good donor lessons and share beyond. evaluations. At the policy level, donors are coming donors are At the policy level, evaluations. GHDtogether through on reporting to coordinate re There are both ‘indirect’ are There – such forms of coordination as contributing via the UN Appeals Consolidated Pr in the tsunami still a major issue, seen most recently r donors’ quite limited. Many are ambitions in this area effort to make the extra donors seem reluctant to coor- inertiaThis may reflect within administrations, dinate. based on capacity or domestic or genuine constraints may be the only improvement politics – incremental is if little progress However, feasible way forward. of the aspirations coordination, made on improving GH other stakeholders and undermining their perating support for GHD. the EU’s humanitarian values. There are common EU are There humanitarian values. the EU’s v of on other donors. In addition, the advantage leverage within the EU approaches diverse is that ideas can be widely. more tested and successful lessons shared detailed assessments that were still emerging some good practice. The study was also not able to look in detail weeks after the wave struck. There are methodologies for at what donor practice looked like, as compared to policy: using these, but it is not clear how much these are really anecdotally, there is sometimes a gulf between the two. applied in donor decision-making. Donors need a clearer articulation of how policy and practice are guided by humanitarian principles, as well as Overall, needs assessment emerged in the study as an being clear about what exactly they mean by humanitarian area that EU donors are challenged by, but where they are action. Further discussion and research is called for on not necessarily making as much practical progress as what constitutes good practice in its detailed implementa- would be desirable. There is consensus that better needs tion, rather than just broad principles. assessment is required, and some donors see the Inter- Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Needs Assessment Beyond debating good practice and being transparent Framework and Matrix as a step in the right direction, but about policy, donors need to show examples of good few specific initiatives are in evidence. In particular, practice in performance monitoring and evaluation, both donors could do more to support the principle of impar- of themselves and of implementing agencies. The inclu- tiality by funding the development of needs assessment sion of humanitarian action in the OECD-DAC’s donor peer methodologies, and looking at ways to fund independent review process is important, as are steps by donors such needs assessments for specific crises. They could also do as the UK’s Department for International Development more to develop clear criteria for allocating resources (DFID) in setting specific targets in line with GHD, for according to need. In addition, while beneficiary involve- example in reducing earmarking (through the govern- ment is widely cited as a priority, few donors have ment-wide programme of Public Service Agreements). examined existing tools or developed new approaches to However, these are complex systems to put in place, are ensure that this occurs. limited in their scope, and may not suit all donors.

Challenge 3: Policy transparency NGOs also have an important part to play in improving Good practice ought to be defined by good policy, yet few donor behaviour. The study found that donors were donors have articulated precisely how they will provide surprised at how little NGOs were using the language of humanitarian assistance. The study found that donors are GHD in their lobbying and engagement on thematic and realising the importance of formalising humanitarian aid policy issues. This would be a natural extension of the approaches through policy statements: Spain and Ireland, firmer strategic relationships that donors are forming with for example, are developing new policy frameworks. some agencies, for example ECHO’s Framework Partnership Agreement with NGOs and its new thematic A transparent policy process goes hand in hand with other funding for the UN, or DFID’s institutional strategy papers forms of accountability. EU donors are advocating for with UN agencies and the Red Cross. humanitarian action and communicating their policies among stakeholders – parliament, other areas of govern- GHD is clearly a big agenda. Despite the many different ment, the public, NGOs and beneficiaries – both to build shapes and sizes of humanitarian donor in the EU, from support and as a means of providing accountability. Luxembourg’s one-person team to ECHO’s army of experts, Denmark’s Humanitarian Contact Group is an interesting many donors share the same areas of progress and of chal- example of an informal body for planning and coordi- lenge. A consistent message from almost all donors, large nating Danish assistance. It includes representatives of and small, is that they feel they have insufficient capacity to government departments and Danish NGOs. implement GHD in its entirety immediately, however much they aspire to do so, while still responding to the inevitable stream of humanitarian crises.

the first challenge in looking at The challenge for donors will be in prioritising which good practice is in defining it elements of GHD to take forward and developing detailed strategies, with appropriate resourcing, to do so. Donors which can prioritise the parts of GHD that are most impor- tant to them, and that are achievable within their capacity, The first challenge in looking at good practice is in defining will probably make more substantive progress. Despite, or it. The humanitarian field has a number of reference points perhaps because of, the breadth of the GHD agenda, the – not least the Stockholm GHD document. There are also study found that very few donor governments have devel- operational guides such as Sphere, specific guidance such oped their own frameworks for implementing GHD in as the IASC’s on HIV/AIDS in emergencies, and the guide- terms of how different aspects will be prioritised, and how lines on the use of military and civil defence assets to progress against these will be measured. This could be a support UN humanitarian activities in natural disasters/ first step in providing a guide for good practice. complex emergencies (the Oslo and MCDA guidelines). However, there is certainly no consensus on a range of Conclusion issues such as the relationship between relief and develop- The EU is a strange animal, a union of diverse countries ment, or between civil and military functions of government with sometimes arcane bureaucracy and complex proce- in humanitarian action. In some cases, there is a lot of dures. Although for many humanitarian donors their

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN practice without donors necessarily analysing whether it is European identity is not necessarily the most important

HUMANITARIAN 12 exchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 13 , mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu om Stockholm to Ottawa: A Progress to Ottawa: A om Stockholm Fr view of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative view of the Good Humanitarian D through some areas of its work, specifically donor some areas D through eferences and further and eferences reading C will need to establish new, informal relationships C will need to establish new, a cover Relief and Distress C statistics on Emergency R Policy (Humanitarian Lin Cotterrell Adele Harmer and on International (Center Stoddard and Abby Group) Cooperation), HPG Briefing Paper 18, October 2004, www.odi.org.uk/ 18, October 2004, HPG Briefing Paper hpg/papers/HPGbrief18.pdf. Crises, Assessment and Forgotten ECHO, Global Needs europa.eu.int/comm/echo/information/strategy/index _en.htm. DFID, ServicePublic 2005–2008, www2. Agreement dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files//psa/index.asp. Re eer Reviews and efforts to improve the collection of data and effortseer Reviews to improve eporting directives, but this has yet to be agreed by the by to be agreed eporting but this has yet directives, is available at www.reliefweb.int/ghd/EU_GHD_study_ at is available article in this expressed The views the are final_report.pdf. of those reflect not necessarily and do own, author’s Ireland. Cooperation Development GH P on humanitarian action. It is a can achieve. also limits to what the DAC are There by and it operates membership forum of 22 OECD states, members could This means that one or more consensus. the GHD block attempts to move delay or even agenda has in- nor its Secretariat Since neither the DAC forward. of humanitarian action, it will depth experience in the area expertise some of its and adjust relevant need to develop working methods if GHDThe addressed. is to be properly DA and international agencies, and it will with key multilateral The its statistical reporting directives. to improve have DA category of assistance than humanitarian action narrower is commonly understood to encompass. Data includes food aid’ ‘relief assistance’, items, ‘emergency broad three relief’. and distress emergency The data does and ‘other allocations, does not information on sectoral not provide emergencies complex disasters from distinguish natural with other data on humanitarian and is not comparable difficult to make it The existing reportingdirectives action. observations, monitor donor performance and validate among donors. and make comparisons trends measure system for data collection on humanitarian The present action is not sufficient for the needs of comprehensive DAC has startedWork on improving statistical analysis. r members. Good Humanitarian Donorship and Good Humanitarian is an independent consultant special- is an independent consultant , commissioned by Development Cooperation Development , commissioned by ooking beyond the EUooking beyond GHD to for as a whole, the priority esponse, namely how donors’esponse, namely how policies and procedures timely providing elate to meeting humanitarian needs, Henrik Hammargren, OECD Henrik Hammargren, Promoting Good Humanitarian Donorship: a task Good Humanitarian for the OECD-DAC? Promoting Barnaby Willitts-King L practical be to make demonstrable, all donors needs to in GHD.progress that the momentum built is a risk There wane as Ottawa could now and Stockholm up between donors need to costs of coordination: donors balk at the this opportunityseize that GHD show to just than is more rhetorical. barn- He can be contacted on policy. ising in humanitarian on which this articleThe study draws [email protected]. Willitts-King, is Barnaby one, better humanitarian donorship in the EU in the donorship better humanitarian one, mean could donors like-minded among of coordination level a greater a valuable also provides influence. It global and greater particularly good practice, sharing ideas and forum for member states. with the new the European Union: A Study of Good Practice and Recent of Good Practice Union: A Study the European Initiatives The final report, published on 15 September 2004, Ireland. The role and limitations of the DAC and limitations The role holds a unique position in monitoring Official The DAC and donor performance, Assistance (ODA) Development and fostering harmonisation and alignment among in the has not taken a leading role While the DAC donors. implementation of GHD, work and since policy-related to humanitarian action methodological issues in relation pursued within the UNare the DAC system and elsewhere, in promoting role to playing a constructive is well-suited Although GHD depends mainly on commitments at for common ground provides the initiative national level, donor performance. Since it effortscollective to improve it makes sense that its process, is a donor-initiated existing up through implementation should be followed As such, the systems for donor coordination. of the OECD Assistance Committee (DAC) Development in role to take on an active has in principle agreed GHD.promoting Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) the first addresses humanitarian effective set of challenges in providing r r International and flexible funding, and respecting The principles. Humanitarian Law and humanitarian of Good Humanitarian and Principles Objectives benchmarks and Donorship define commonly recognised a provide They therefore donor practice. identify preferred making humani- basis for harmonising donor practice, tarian donorship measurable. It should also be recognised that GHD does not primarily outside the framework of a recipient state). Whereas the focus on challenges related to the implementation or purpose of development cooperation is to eradicate delivery of humanitarian action: this is the domain, not of poverty, the objective of humanitarian assistance is, first donors, but of the UN, international organisations and and foremost, to save lives. While humanitarian action is NGOs. Implementation is regarded as a separate disci- included within ODA and has been referred to occasion- pline, and evaluation will remain the key tool in efforts to ally in Peer Reviews, the scope of this coverage has improve delivery in the humanitarian system.1 The DAC differed widely and there has been no systematic will explore the possibilities of so-called ‘Joint Country approach. Assessments’ to address implementation questions. However, for some issues related to the delivery of Nonetheless, there are obvious advantages in linking the humanitarian action, such as military and civilian coopera- monitoring of GHD with existing and well-established tion and the involvement of beneficiaries, donor policies procedures, rather than setting up a separate structure for have significant impact, and can be included in assess- humanitarian Peer Reviews. The role of the DAC and the ments of donor performance. Secretariat in conducting Peer Reviews is well recognised, and procedures are respected by members. Furthermore, Covering GHD in DAC Peer Reviews the DAC is able to address GHD perspectives on both an One condition for acquiring DAC membership is that individual donor level and a collective system level. The members agree to have their development programme objectives of DAC Peer Reviews have equal relevance for scrutinised by members on a regular basis (presently the promotion of GHD and for advancing development every four years). Two members are selected to review cooperation. A methodical inclusion of humanitarian another member, and the process is managed by the DAC action also contributes to a more complete overview of all Secretariat. The goals of the Peer Reviews are to: (1) dimensions of a DAC member’s ODA. It would also monitor the member’s development cooperation policies promote dialogue on the relationship between humani- and programmes, and analyse their effectiveness, inputs, tarian action and development cooperation, and link with outputs and results; (2) assist in improving individual and other issues of relevance to the DAC, such as conflict collective aid performance in both qualitative and quanti- prevention and peace-building, donor engagement in tative terms; (3) provide comparative reporting and failing states and transition situations. credible analysis for the wider public in OECD countries and the international community; and (4) foster coordina- tion among members. The comparative advantage of DAC the lack of policy-relevant DAC Peer Reviews rests on the policy level, and the strengths of the Peer Review procedure come from its collective data on humanitarian action is a learning methodology and systematic approach, which serious concern builds on commonly recognised principles.

Although GHD covers a complex set of issues, the 23 principles are structured and distinct, which allows the Improving data collection on humanitarian principles to be translated into sets of questions that can action – moving towards a common definition be used to monitor performance. For this purpose, the The lack of policy-relevant DAC data on humanitarian DAC Secretariat developed a GHD assessment framework action is a serious concern. Accurate data is a prerequi- to be used in the Peer Reviews. The advantage of using site to monitor that funding is allocated according to such an assessment framework is three-fold. First, it need, to follow up pledges and commitments and to ensures coverage of the 23 GHD principles. These princi- improve burden-sharing. The main value of DAC statis- ples should be read as a whole, while recognising that tics is as a comprehensive long-term record of aid flows, some can be immediately acted upon, while others may which could provide a useful ex-post check on the UN- take more time and investment. Second, it ensures that OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) and pledged humanitarian action is covered in an equal way in all Peer funding. But DAC statistical reporting directives on Reviews, avoiding an arbitrary approach. Third, it emergency and distress relief need to be improved. provides guidance for the DAC and the Peer Review team Creating a new category of humanitarian action within members. the current system could serve this purpose. For this to work effectively, donors would need to agree on a Analysis of members’ humanitarian action has not to date common definition to be used when reporting on actions been an area of priority for the DAC. Although part of a relating to humanitarian response. The need for such a common system, humanitarian action constitutes a definition is well recognised, and was identified early on distinct dimension of ODA separate from development in the process of improving humanitarian donorship.2 cooperation by virtue of its context (natural or human- The purpose of establishing a common donor definition made emergencies) and its systems of delivery (often would be to ensure accountability, transparency and comparability in reporting, which is in turn essential to 1 In order to improve the methodology of evaluations in complex efforts to harmonise donor policies. emergencies, the DAC carried out a comprehensive study. This resulted in Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in 2 Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003, Development Initiatives,

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN Complex Emergencies, published in 1999. 2003.

14 HUMANITARIANexchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 15 Addressing issues such Addressing mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu is Analyst – Humanitarian Action, Assessing procedures regarding decision- regarding procedures Assessing or example, regarding prevention and prepared- prevention or example, regarding Identifying strengths and weaknesses in policy and weaknesses strengths Identifying F unding levels and systems: unding levels as contributing to international burden-sharing of international burden-sharing as contributing to and timely action, providing funding humanitarian ‘earmarking’flexible funding, donor of funds, allo- and NGOs. cating funds to multilaterals and identifying emerging practice Identification of good issues: frameworks. Aligning donor policies with GHD policies donor Aligning frameworks. and of existing policies. the implementation monitoring coopera- with development of coherence Assessment non-aid policies. tion and other Management: principles, manage- to humanitarian relation making in coordination. situations, humanitarian ment of transition F and preserving disasters, creating ness for natural and civil and military cooperation, humanitarian space, support.transition Policy: D in the next five years. By 2010, all DAC donor policy By 2010, all DAC years. D in the next five army Swiss D is a multipurpose tool – a humanitarian C might have improved reporting providing structures improved C might have eakness. But it is the best – indeed the only – tool eview and Evaluation division, Development Cooperation division, Development eview and Evaluation esearchers refer to the principles and good practice in to the principles and good practice refer esearchers • • • to apply the GHD has agreed The DAC assessment At the Reviews. Peer in all forthcomingframework DAC the limitations of this approach same time, however, It and goals must be realistic. need to be recognised, could take the DAC on where might be useful to reflect GH GHDcould be harmonised around principles, and all DAC under a GHD Reviewed The members Peer framework. DA rela- The much-debated data on humanitarian action. humanitarian action and development tionship between been further may have GHD and cooperation explored, engagement with emerging in the DAC’s promoted donors. GH guidelines covering knife, with principles and practice donors how to issues related most of the controversial all multi-purpose finance humanitarian action. But like of be a source may well tools, its comprehensiveness w in this field. It donor performance is to address there should be put to use, and its performance monitored. GHD, can contribute to advancing The DAC but it will be just as important that implementing agencies and r with donors. their interactions Henrik Hammargren R is henrik.hammar- OECD. His email address directorate, in this articleThe opinions expressed are [email protected]. the official and do not necessarily reflect the author’s, of the OECD views of the OECD, or of the governments member countries. • The 3 national commitments to GHD essential advance are D contains a definition of the objectives of humani- of the objectives definition a D contains The objectives of humanitarian action are to save action are of humanitarian The objectives human and maintain alleviate suffering lives, of man-made and in the aftermath dignity during as to prevent disasters, as well natural crises and of for the occurrence preparedness and strengthen such situations. C codes which better correspond to UNC codes which better correspond or ECHO ays forward porting purposes. It does not provide an indication of porting It does not provide purposes. eporting to improved It would also contribute structures. 3 DAC Peer Reviews are available on www.oecd.org. available are Reviews Peer 3 DAC W In 2004 the GHD was applied in assessment framework and Norway). (of Australia Reviews Peer two DAC transparency and provide an importanttool for monitoring and provide transparency be better than statistics will never But DAC and evaluation. the data reported individual donors. Again, national by GHDcommitments to advance essential. are A common definition would allow donors to reportA common definition would allow humani- and then use the type of ODA, tarian action as a separate DA r when a situation becomes an emergency, nor is it clear nor is an emergency, when a situation becomes under the concept of ‘prevention’ what is to be included and ‘transition’ in the GHD – which figure ideas goals and The GHD work. in DAC to be adjusted definition will need statistical reporting. defi- Any of DAC to suit the purposes and action will be subjective nition of humanitarian the can embrace include limitations. No one definition implementing demands of all humanitarian actors, agencies, donors and the UN system, nor can it be action. A all aspects of humanitarian expected to cover of to build on a combination common definition will have inclusion of and the of practices an accepted compromise to be inclusive, the basic humanitarian principles. In order criteria: it should the following a definition should cover aid of objective define the situation and specify the beneficiaries to that situation; it should identify according guidance on delivery and activities; and it should provide principles. in line with international law and agreed However, this definition is not completely operational for operational this definition is not completely However, re GH action: tarian benefits of doing so, in terms of advancing GHD,benefits of doing so, in terms of advancing were identified in four areas: Good Humanitarian Donorship and the CAP Andrew Lawday, communications and policy consultant

Humanitarians should expect much from the Good Donorship principles and good practices’.2 GHD was also Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative and the invoked to remind donors of their commitments to Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). Both could signifi- meeting needs in crises like Burundi, the Central African cantly strengthen the world’s response to emergencies and Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where natural disasters, thereby reducing mortality and suffering. only 31%, 38% and 51% of funding requirements were Yet both are poorly understood in the wider humanitarian met.3 However, with GHD barely formalised or articulated community, and largely unknown beyond it. Leading donors by high-level officials, the Geneva Conventions and the and agencies share a duty and an interest in developing CAP-focused commitments made by donors at the annual communications to support these processes. Montreux meetings are still just as useful as advocacy tools.4 High hopes Many within the humanitarian community misunderstand and mistrust the CAP and GHD. Hopes for both are nonetheless high among those involved. Humanitarian the Humanitarian Appeal for agencies hope that GHD will create a government donor 2005 scarcely mentioned GHD funding system that works, so they can respond to crises more effectively. They long for reform to an arrangement that Ian Smillie and Larry Minear have called ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘hit-or-miss’ – akin to ‘trying to run a fire brigade in a GHD donors are also wary of standing too close to the big city on nothing but voluntary contributions’.1 Donor CAP. As the review of GHD notes,5 at field level the initia- governments, meanwhile, hope that the CAP will bring tive faces ‘the challenge of ensuring that it has a life United Nations, Red Cross and NGO agencies together to outside of the UN framework’, and highlights ‘the risks provide the best available humanitarian action in crises, involved in pinning its fate entirely on the success or consigning to history chaotic responses like those for the otherwise of the CAP/CHAP’. The recent pilot study of Iraqi Kurds in 1991, and for Rwandans in 1994. GHD in Burundi was misunderstood as a bid to bolster the CAP as a funding mechanism ‘with little reference to the Some humanitarians also expect GHD and the CAP to wider programming environment or, more broadly, to work together. After all, they have much in common: whether donors were being guided by humanitarian prin- both are complex institutional processes with dozens of ciples’. As the Burundi study noted, ‘no consensus exists powerful and independent-minded stakeholders; both that funding by the CAP is the best route to principled and are designed to improve accountability among them; effective humanitarian response, and many NGOs are in and both are already forging new consensus and any case reluctant to come under one consolidated dialogue. Yet neither wants to be too closely associated appeal’. with the other. Mistrust evidently lingers in the humanitarian community. The CAP, for example, has an interest in GHD to support Research in 2003, involving hundreds of interviews with its funding appeals. If the CAP reflects humanitarian donor and agency officials,6 found a ‘climate of mistrust’ needs, it offers a good opportunity for donors to fulfil and ‘lack of transparency’ in humanitarian financing. their GHD pledges. Through GHD, all the main donor Donors doubted the capacities and bona fides of UN governments have committed to providing needs-led humanitarian agencies and NGOs, and perceived UN funding, through Consolidated Appeals (article 14); agencies as exaggerating needs and funding require- stressed the need to ‘allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs’ (article 6); and emphasised the need 2 See Overview, Humanitarian Appeal 2005, to ‘contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2005/webpage.asp?Page=1176. sharing’ (article 14). GHD also offers a useful definition of 3 Financial Tracking Service (website): Major donors in 2004 to CAP humanitarian action (article 1). and globally, as of 10 August 2004, compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing agency Wariness and mistrust http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/index.aspx. The Humanitarian Appeal for 2005, however, made scant 4 Common Observations from Donors’ Retreat on the Consolidated Appeals Process and Coordination in Humanitarian Emergencies, 26 mention of GHD. The Appeal, which summarised the and 27 February 2004, Montreux, Switzerland, year’s Consolidated Appeals, said: ‘Agencies ... are http://www.reliefweb.int/cap/Policy/CAP_PolicyDoc.html. working with donors to apply Good Humanitarian 5 Adele Harmer, Lin Cotterrell and Abby Stoddard, From Stockholm to Ottawa: A Progress Review of the Good Humanitarian Donorship 1 The Quality Of Money: Donor Behavior In Humanitarian Financing, Initiative, October 2004, http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/Good_humani- An Independent Study, by Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, Tufts tarian_donorship.htm. University, April 2003, http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/index.html. GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN 6 The Quality Of Money.

HUMANITARIAN 16 exchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 17 Indeed, GHD lacks 11 There appears to There can be introverted at can be introverted 12 P mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March wn. developing proper commu- proper developing nications. humani- Donors, taxpayers, the GHD donors’ in meeting 2004 in October Ottawa the need to emphasised at communication ‘increase and with all stake- all levels holders’. any recognisable spokes- any recognisable that person, publications ‘con- outline the Stockholm clusions’ and Ottawa ‘road- of its or a website map’, o have been no mention of have in the Ottawa conference humanitarian global or even media. Consensus-building like GHDprocesses and the CA first, but their managers in a duty and interest have Nu ©Reuters/Jeremiah Kamau, courtesy www.alertnet.org equired of them. Those committed to GHD, of them. equired which itself 11 Chair’s Overview: Continued Commitment To Good Humanitarian To Overview: Continued Commitment 11 Chair’s 2nd International Forward; Way The For Donorship And A Roadmap Meeting On Good Humanitarian Donorship; Ottawa, Canada October 21–22, 2004. see 12 GHDWeb, published on Relief currently documents are http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd. tarian actors and beneficiaries need to know how GHD how to know tarian actors and beneficiaries need and the CAP undertaken affect them. Processes by information and publicly-funded institutions must provide advice about stakeholders’ entitle- rights, responsibilities, ments and opportunities, significant new announcing The UN of Office for the Coordination developments. the CAP, organises Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which understands its obligation to report on humanitarian collective explain the process, needs identified through about what is plans to meet them and advise donors r partly donors’ reflects account- willingness to improve of the value should recognise ability and transparency, objectives, GHD’s clearly explaining to stakeholders expected outcomes and progress. in communicating an interest also have Both processes policy goals. CAP to achieve effectively planners, for adequate contri- more certain, donors to provide require butions (sufficient, timely and equitable funding across agency and to seek greater and within emergencies) participation in an ‘inclusive’ GHD implementers, CAP. agencies to analyse needs better, meanwhile, require collect baseline data, set out priorities, report funding, and implement evaluation results assess impact, show the CAPfindings. By communicating well, and GHD will achieved. the likelihood that these goals are increase to approach OCHA took a strategic this, Acknowledging communicating its Humanitarian Appeal (CAP) for 2005. erall aid erall ov 9 At the same time as 7 and prioritisation, 8 ith the Canadian government as chair, ith the Canadian government W hope the CAP like Rwanda chaotic responses will help avoid 10 Rwandan refugees cross into Tanzania in May 1994. Donor governments in May 1994. Donor governments Tanzania into cross Rwandan refugees , 11 October 2003, http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/index.html. the Burundi pilot study points out that neither

P, esolved: policy confusion, politicised decisions, dissatisfac- policy confusion, politicised esolved: 8 Assessment Framework and Matrix, Inter-Agency Standing and Matrix, Inter-Agency 8 Assessment Framework Committee (IASC) CAP 2004, Group, Sub-Working http://www.reliefweb.int/cap/Policy/CAP_PolicyDoc.html. 9 [Internal note] Guidance for CAP Selection and Prioritisation, Project OCHA, 2004] 10 Burundi GHD – Subur Consulting Pilot external baseline evaluation S.L., May 2004 (Bijojote, Bugnion – Subur), http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/index.html. 7 Mark Dalton, Karin von Hippel, Randolph Kent and Ralf Maurer, and Ralf Kent Hippel, Randolph von 7 Mark Dalton, Karin Changes in Humanitarian Financing: Implications for the United Nations process has developed a clear ‘marketing strategy’ a clear ‘marketing has developed process for all stakeholders. The need for communication Mistrust will only deepen without good communication. about GHDWhile humanitarians lack knowledge and the CA ments, and lacking accountability. tion with UN needs agencies, NGO swarming, inadequate linkages flawed assessments, military ambivalence, and insufficient capacity- and development relief between building appear to persist, despite much discussion. Some with agencies’ frustrated are donors, in particular, inability defined needs. meet objectively their projects how to show Lack of trust is partly a sign of our more critical times. The Lack of trust is partlycritical times. a sign of our more humanitarian action of impact and professionalism quality, concern among humani- rightly become of increasing have ‘issues’tarians. And few of these humanitarian appear to be r dropped following the GHD following dropped commitments. Donors also like Afghanistan in 2002, emergencies continued to favour in 2004 and the Indian Ocean in 2003, Darfur Iraq tsunami, and ‘forget’ other crises in Africa. humanitarian agencies were working to improve coordina- improve working to humanitarian agencies were tion, need assessments The Appeal was based on an analysis of donor decision- ways to reach most humanitarian actors will probably be by making behaviour, when previously it had lacked a clearly- email, the web, direct mail and official channels. Mass defined purpose and objectives.13 By setting out to ‘help media can reach segments of public opinion. major donors to contribute adequately’14 to appeals, it sought to provide useful information to the key decision- New audiences? makers through appropriate communication activities. The Some donors and agencies talk enthusiastically about Appeal aimed to reinforce positive aspects of donor reaching new audiences. Those who want to take humani- behaviour, recognising that it would not change their tarian messages to the general public will be encouraged behaviour. Responding to a survey,15 donor decision-makers that many thousands of ordinary citizens worldwide said the Appeal communication activities had been ‘helpful’ responded to the tsunami appeals, and must wonder how and that the publication was ‘professional’. An Appeal letter to identify and develop that constituency. Available public sent from the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, also drew opinion studies on humanitarian aid suggest poor overall supportive responses from donor ministers. knowledge among donor citizens, who must be all the more confused by ‘humanitarian’ actions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Both GHD and CAP planners would be wise to develop Kosovo, by doubts about aid’s effectiveness, and by general strategic communication plans for the immediate and longer feelings of removal or powerlessness. Many, however, seem term. Using professional communications help, they should to respond generously when presented with a clear case of ensure that communications plans support GHD and CAP need, empathetic TV coverage and credible channels policy priorities and take account of target audiences, through which to respond. before developing strategies and messages accordingly, and allocating responsibilities and resources. Research into Once GHD and CAP have communication strategies in audience behaviour, attitudes and knowledge will provide a place for main audiences, they can reach out to new ones. basis for communication. Communications must also A joint campaign by donors and agencies could help them support planners’ international responsibilities, be objective achieve collective humanitarian policy goals. For example, and explanatory in tone, and cost-effective. a campaign could expect to increase global public under- standing and individual responsibility for impartial Communication must be understood as more than informa- humanitarian action, stimulate dialogue about humani- tion provision. Good communication means getting appro- tarian principles, and mobilise humanitarians behind the priate information to relevant people in an effective way; it common goal of meeting needs. Umbrella campaigns, depends on understanding what they do, think and feel. using creative marketing and TV advertising, can over Like traditional marketing, communication is a two-way time change behaviour, raise awareness, and bring stake- process that should build trust. Both GHD and the CAP holders together. A common banner concept might be should develop proper and professional communication ‘impartial action to meet needs’. However, until GHD and strategies to support their policy objectives, on the basis of the CAP communicate effectively with key stakeholders, information about audiences targeted. This will surely reaching out to new audiences should remain an aspira- mean providing transparent information about humani- tional goal. The priority must be to develop communica- tarian action and outlining how stakeholders can benefit, tions that support policy objectives and fulfil obligations without exaggeration, cheerleading or propaganda. Good to primary stakeholders.

13 Wendy Riches, Consolidated Appeal Process Launch Review, 2004. Andrew Lawday is a communications and policy consul- 14 Humanitarian Appeal Plan; Launch Strategy, Consolidated Appeals tant. He has worked for OCHA (CAP Launch Coordinator), Process, developed by Andrew Lawday for CAP Section, OCHA, August the World Bank, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2004. 15 Andrew Lawday and Delphine Pastorel, Review of Humanitarian the Norwegian and British Refugee Councils, Save the Appeal 2005: Review of Launch, Consolidated Appeals Process 2005, Children-UK and Taylor Nelson plc. His email address is December 2004. [email protected].

GHD and funding according to need Andre Griekspoor, WHO

The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative can be in proportion to need.1 This article looks at one aspect of seen as the donors’ equivalent of agency initiatives such as GHD: allocating humanitarian funding ‘in proportion to the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct, which aims to needs and on the basis of needs assessments’. improve the quality and accountability of humanitarian responses. In the GHD, donors have committed themselves 1 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. Endorsed to a set of principles and good practice for humanitarian in Stockholm, 17 June 2003. International Meeting on Good

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN action, including the provision of flexible and timely funding Humanitarian Donorship, Stockholm, 16–17 June 2003.

HUMANITARIAN 18 exchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 19 , According to Need? According mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu constructive in indicating how to plan the assess- in indicating how constructive 2 an improved version was expected to be ready by the by to be ready was expected version an improved

re P, 2 James Darcy and Charles-Antoine Hofmann, 2 James Darcy Needs Assessment and Decision-making in the Humanitarian Sector HPG Report 15, September 2003, http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport15.pdf. this well, funding and staff time need to be dedicated to be dedicated need to staff time and funding this well, and planned, be properly to It needs process. the to this a specific reference need to include agencies CAP in process donors understand so that programmes, the finding of This confirmed required. the resources assess- namely that on needs assessment, work HPG’s own a key activity in its as to be recognised ment has right. ment process better, and how the NAFM be tools can and how better, ment process the IASCfor the Through sWG user-friendly. made more CA challenges ahead More diffi- The experience of piloting the NAFM highlighted how a humani- of overview at an objective cult it is to arrive useful for overall tarian situation in a way that would be and devel- decision-making. Assessing needs, strategic to meet them, required oping estimates of the resources many judgments at every It involves is a complex problem. process. rational stage, and is not a straightforward, to make these judg- Depending on the principles one uses outcomes will result. ments, different findings Interpreting to often compared The findings of an assessment are benchmarks such as the situation prior to the crisis, or these benchmarks and the time. In practice, over trends of needs differ depending on subsequent interpretation in differently the context. Needs may be understood very for a for example. Others argue Burundi and Kosovo, of needs and an interpretation rights-based approach, minimal desired based on a comparison with a universal standards. like the Sphere level, It seems Mortality one example of this problem. are rates to the situation prior to the crisis, rates logical to compare But this is meaningless in in the region. or the average some- is also There lasted for 20 years. crises that have a humanitarian thing fundamentally unethical, from In general, the results in terms of describing needs fell in the results In general, short the NAFM got document Perhaps of expectations. the tool meant mostly that Rejecting too much attention. been misinterpreted It may have nothing else was done. tool, while the essence was that as being an assessment to bring the avail- the process structure it would merely able information together. in Burundi and the DRCNonetheless, our experiences we being made to are 2005, and preparations end of February extend support the or six countries in preparing to five CHAP firmly estab- is more for 2006. Once the process labour-intensive, lished, it is expected that it will be less moni- will help to improve and assessment overviews processes. toring and review not made available. parent way; and parent and risks. discuss needs, severity tion; re equired to gain trust and confidence, for people to equired Substantial progress was made only in sectors where Substantial progress (despite the fact additional staff had been deployed visited that they also found the matrix unhelpful). Staff partners in capitals and in the field, to ask all relevant was Time for their analysis and to discuss findings. r contributing to, and to understand what they were for of the exercise convince people of the added value A organisation. including their own sector, the entire and it needed to be covered, of sources wide variety took time to put things together in a systematic way and to synthesise findings. One of the conclusions of a OCHA was that to do by quick lessons-learned exercise The NAFM was piloted in support of the assessment 2005 CHAPs for Burundi and the for the process This was a logical of Congo (DRC). Republic Democratic also the pilot were that these countries choice given countries for the GHD. In Burundi, the NAFM was consid- as rejected it was generally useful; in DRC, however, ered Most criticism being too complex and not user-friendly. focused on technical aspects like what the measuring units should be (populations, or specific vulnerable of aggrega- or on levels areas?), or geographic groups of the the potential value While demonstrating tion. the also showed the piloting exercise process, supportive, special funds but Donors were constraints. we Supporting in the Burundi and DRC assessment process • to a platform for colleagues in the field to provide is most vulner- This, combined with an analysis of who available, and what capacities are they are able, where If programming. will assist in setting priorities and in joint confi- increase and its findings will the process done well, donors and for both dence in the priority-setting process allo- resource evidence-based agencies, and enable more matrix (NAFM) and cation. A needs assessment framework of the humani- the description was designed to structure that the GHDtarian situation. It soon became clear initia- if it was of needs overview needed such an objective tive according on its commitment to funding to make progress to need. • trans- the information in a systematic and to organise • informa- to bring together existing needs assessment The starting-points the assessment for strengthening in the CAPprocess were: In 2003, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee sub-Working Committee Standing the Inter-Agency In 2003, (IASC Process Consolidated Appeals for the Group sWG) (CAP) the needs assessment started work on improving a stronger a view to establishing with the CAP, aspects of Plan Humanitarian Action for the Common foundation (CHAP). Needs assessment in the CAP assessment Needs perspective, in talking about mortality rates reaching Estimating how much funding is required emergency thresholds when they are more than double The choice of interventions and the approach to imple- the baseline rate. Average mortality rates in Sub-Saharan mentation has consequences for costs. Here again, there Africa are already more than double what they are in other is no quick-fix formula. Some benchmarks exist, like costs parts of the world; to declare an emergency in Sub- per capita for medicines, or per metric ton for a specific Saharan Africa, they have to double again! If different food item. While there are some agreed levels for over- absolute emergency rates are applied between contexts, heads, little is known about what would constitute an resulting in inequitable aid responses, what does this say acceptable cost for coordination or quality assurance. about the universal value of human life?3 There could be more transparency in the unit costs of common programmes, which could be adapted to the We also need to make predictions for the future, and particular circumstances, for instance if goods need to be anticipate future needs. Defining needs and comparing delivered to isolated areas by air. severity within and between humanitarian crises is thus a complex process. Assessment findings do, however, Donors’ funding decisions make it possible to establish priorities within a sector. If All the factors described above would need to be weighed a health assessment tells us that the majority of excess against each other. To make rational funding decisions, deaths are due to malaria, malaria control programmes cost-effectiveness analyses would need to be made. Work will logically be among the top priorities. Moreover, has been done on this for health interventions,4 but it has even priorities within a particular sector, such as not yet been applied in complex emergencies as there are malaria control, may require work across sectors – in too many variables affecting both costs and effects. this case health, water and sanitation and shelter. At Moreover, cost considerations should never be the only the end, the point is not whether water is more or less criterion of choice. There are also continued problems in important than food or health, but how to achieve the securing approval for programmes to reduce vulnerability, optimal balance of sectoral inputs to achieve the such as disaster preparedness and prevention work. priority goals. No practical models exist to make these decisions for us. cost considerations can never be Developing programme approaches There are usually different approaches to addressing the only criterion of choice needs. Where there is food insecurity one can give food aid, and also seeds or tools. Reconstructing a road may improve access to markets, and may have a longer- Even if such rational methods existed, donors’ funding lasting effect on malnutrition than a selective feeding decisions are also influenced by other factors: their confi- programme. Choices are determined by such things as dence in the ability of an agency to deliver; the size of the context, the degree of urgency, the balance between their budgets from the previous year; how budgets have short- and long-term effects and the obligation to been divided between sectors in the past; and official strengthen local capacities. The mandates of imple- menting agencies are also important. 4 World Health Organisation, Choosing Interventions That Are Cost Effective, http://www3.who.int/whosis/menu.cfm?path=evidence, 3 Personal communication, Nick Stockton. cea&language=english, accessed 8 February 2005.

Table 1: Baseline reference mortality data by region

Region CMR CMR U5MR U5MR (deaths/10,000/day) emergency threshold (deaths/10,000 U5s/day) emergency threshold

Sub-Saharan Africa 0.44 0.9 1.14 2.3 Middle East and North Africa 0.16 0.3 0.36 0.7 South Asia 0.25 0.5 0.59 1.2 East Asia and Pacific 0.19 0.4 0.24 0.5 Latin America and Caribbean 0.16 0.3 0.19 0.4 Central and Eastern Europe/ 0.30 0.6 0.20 0.4 CIS and Baltic States Industrialised countries 0.25 0.5 0.04 0.1 Developing countries 0.25 0.5 0.53 1.1 Least developed countries 0.38 0.8 1.03 2.1 World 0.25 0.5 0.48 1.0

Source: Sphere project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 2004 edition, p. 261. GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN

HUMANITARIAN 20 exchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 21 mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March 7 Nu works in the Department Health for At the World Conference on Disaster Reduction Conference World At the 6 el Forum on the MDGs’,el Forum Abuja, Nigeria, 2–3 December 2004, ith the GHD also of donors is now the role initiative, v ontières in 1990, and has included field postings in in 1990, and has included field ontières 6 ‘Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Fragile States. High States. Goals in Fragile the Millennium Development 6 ‘Achieving Le http://www.hlfhealthmdgs.org/December2004Mtg.asp. 7 Jan Egeland, UN for Humanitarian Affairs, General Undersecretary Japan, Kobe, on Disaster Reduction, Conference World Speech at the 18–22 January 2005, http://www.unisdr.org/wcdr/. Monterrey target, which says that donors should donors says that which target, Monterrey of GDP 0.7% allocate poorest aid to the development to and be found to coordinate New ways must countries. in fragile funds development humanitarian and invest adequate at risk can receive that communities states, so support. in Kobe, Japan, in January 2005 it was proposed that it was proposed in January 2005 Japan, in Kobe, in invested to disasters be 10% of funds for responding preparedness. strengthening Conclusions W the effective- improving around included in discussions of humanitarian interventions.ness and accountability is the only mecha- Appeals Process The Consolidated so that the whole can programming, nism for common sum of the parts. than the become more the It also has are the limited funds available that potential to ensure allo- are needed most: that funds they are used where of needs to an evidence-based analysis cated according but both from on either, yet and priorities. It is not there have and the donor side, commitments the interagency work is More these processes. been made to strengthen the in and rationality transparency called for to increase programming of assessing needs, and complex process The fact that the various and allocating resources. together on finding ways to work stakeholders are these is promising. Griekspoor Andre His Geneva. Health Organisation, World Action in Crises, in humanitarian aid startedcareer with Médecins Sans Fr is His email address Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Liberia. [email protected]. the emergency threshold. Poverty was shown to be was shown Poverty threshold. the emergency with 85% of the population living on less generalised, (the international line of than $1 per person per week an is $1 per person per day). In such poverty extreme the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)environment, – which was piloted in Burundi in 2004 – is initiative if its application does not unlikely to be effective to essen- approach a fundamentally different involve part for a large of the tial and lifesaving healthcare Burundian population. ) GNA ssessment ( A eeds N ), Methodological Note’, ECHO, ), Methodological Note’, FCA The GHDcould be used group 5 lobal humanitarian G ssessment ( A risis C The survey revealed crude mortalityThe survey revealed rates 1 , www.msf.be, 2004. , www.msf.be, Access to Health Care in Burundi: Three Epidemiological Three in Burundi: Access to Health Care orgotten orgotten Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) revealed that (MSF) revealed Médecins Sans Frontières have such overall objective estimates will it start objective such overall have F get to that next step, we also need more objectivity in also need more we get to that next step,

unding based on needs: remaining based on needs: unding ecovery. equested. OCHA’s Financial Tracking System has very System Tracking Financial equested. OCHA’s anking system for humanitarian crises based on multiple anking system for humanitarian crises Global Humanitarian exist; ECHO’s ankings already Surveys 1 MSF, 1 MSF, Good donorship in practice: the case of Burundi MSF Brussels and Armand Sprecher, Vazquez Mit Philips, Inma 5 ‘ECHO Strategy 2005: 5 ‘ECHO Strategy 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/pdf_files/strategic_method- ologies/methodology_2005.pdf and Adequate funding is needed if we are to make progress, are Adequate funding is needed if we the to achieve encouraged and donor countries are making sense to compare funds received to funds funds received making sense to compare r in determining whether funding needs are limited value being met. how costs are estimated in response to needs. Only when estimated in response costs are how we To to bring the different ranking methods together, as a first methods together, ranking to bring the different to against which reference an agreed step towards allocation decisions. resource develop almost a million people in Burundi – a fifth of the rural as a direct healthcare from excluded population – were policy of cost- consequence of the government’s r At the end of 2003, a countrywide population survey by If we really want to make progress towards needs-based towards progress want to make really If we will need to be all of the above and funding, programming of the pilots in Burundi and DRC, In the case considered. the starting not point for donors was that funding would the intention was to year; previous the over be increased effectively. could be used more funds available see how than planning rather This constitutes resource-based In addition, the pilots in the two needs-based planning. budget allocations discussions on countries did not allow still far from are We crisis-affected countries. between DRC all and Burundi, let alone being able to compare would need a do this, we To humanitarian contexts. r Such Index. indicators, like the Human Development r Needs Assessment (GNA), DRC and for example, ranks Burundi first and second. F for GHD challenges foreign aid policy. Available budgets are finite and almost finite budgets are Available aid policy. foreign priori- of round is a second The result inadequate. always or quality is reduced, and/or which coverage tisation, in important to be cut. activities have and mortality rates for children under five well above well and mortality under five for children rates Access to healthcare in Burundi estimates is required to provide a basic package of care.2 Burundi’s cost-recovery system requires patients to pay for Donors are reluctant to finance recurrent costs, particularly medicines and medical services before receiving care. salaries. The new CAP approved for Burundi within the Some 17% of people did not seek care even when they felt framework of the GHD requests $21 million to finance themselves to be very sick. People tended to wait too long health projects. With a population of around seven million, before seeking help, or did not seek help at all, mainly due this corresponds to about $3 per capita. Even when these to lack of money. The average price for a simple consulta- extra funds are added to the current national health tion corresponded to five to 12 days of income, and was budget, the level of financing is still well short of what is out of reach for many; the fact that mortality rates for needed to provide a decent basic package of essential care. malaria were twice as high among people who depended Project funds will be spent on infrastructure and equip- on health centres applying cost recovery, compared to ment, essential drugs and other material, but staff remu- those applying a low flat fee, seems to confirm delays in neration is not mentioned in the CAP. The average salary of appropriate care. Eighty-two percent of patients consulting a nurse in Burundi is equal to $23 a month. health centres take on debt or sell a possession (harvest, land, livestock) in order to pay for care. As for secondary The perverse effect this can have is illustrated by an care, reports from hospitals indicated prices for lifesaving example from Karuzi province. As part of a WHO treatment that were completely out of reach of most programme to reduce maternal mortality, an ambulance people (a lifesaving Caesarean section, for example, costs was purchased and posted in Karuzi province. The ambu- $150). Patients have even been held in the health structure lance was intended to transport women to the referral until the family was able to pay the bill. In theory, a waiver hospital in cases where there were labour complications, system should protect those unable to pay, but in practice or a lifesaving Caesarean section or transfusion was less than 1% of patients obtained care free of charge. No required. The running costs and maintenance of the link could be detected between partial waiving of the fee ambulance had to be covered by the health authorities. and vulnerability criteria, such as returnee or displaced The authorities’ first reaction was to propose raising the status. Price reductions mainly benefit the holders of the level of user fees in the health centres to meet these health insurance card for state employees. costs. This might indeed fit with cost-recovery logic, but it does not accord with the principle of assured access to essential and lifesaving care. Donors prefer to leave the GHD is unlikely to be effective if burden of running costs to local coping mechanisms, even when this means excluding a substantial number of it does not involve a fundamentally people from the intervention they are funding. different approach to essential Regarding access criteria, the GHD Needs Assessment and lifesaving healthcare for a Framework used for the preparation of the CAP and the large part of the Burundian CHAP in Burundi does not explicitly address financial obstacles to access, though it does mention other access population problems, such as social and cultural hindrances. That financial access was mentioned in the needs assessment report was due to chance rather than intent. If funding were guided by the assessment matrix, the problem of Donor policies in Burundi financial access to healthcare would have to go begging Since the MSF survey was carried out, there has been elsewhere. But even though the final version of the 2005 little improvement in access to care, nor has donor policy CAP does acknowledge that cost recovery is causing changed with regard to user fees. There has been no serious access constraints, no concrete measures are updated population-based assessment after the MSF proposed in the CHAP to correct the situation. Project survey, and it is not possible to state if mortality has now descriptions talk of access to basic services for returnees, dropped below emergency levels. Donors provide tech- vulnerable groups and the poor, but there is no indication nical assistance for the further implementation of cost of how this will be realised through existing health recovery, without any specific efforts to monitor financial services. MSF’s population survey showed that the waiver accessibility and affordability. WHO and other UN system does not protect vulnerable groups, even when agencies do not challenge the cost-recovery system, and formally within the eligibility criteria. Without much closer NGOs, despite their large input in terms of in-kind and control, waivers for returnees or other vulnerable groups cash resources, have not succeeded in persuading the (such as female-headed households or the poor) will Ministry of Health to lower fees or offer free care, even in remain theoretical only. NGO-supported health structures. Similarly, no explicit reference has been found to the need Burundi’s annual health budget is equivalent to $5 per to suspend user fees in cases of epidemic outbreak, capita, well below the average $34 per capita that WHO renewed fighting or other crisis situations requiring effec- tive and urgent coverage of people’s needs. During a 2 Macro-economics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic cholera outbreak in a refugee camp in June 2004, the Development: Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and health authorities resisted the lifting of user fees in the Health, chaired by Jeffrey Sachs (Geneva: WHO, 2001). GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN adjacent health centre. At the end of 2004, WFP pointed

HUMANITARIAN 22 exchange GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 23 7 . ejection r formal Humanitarian Humanitarian Exchange As the current ‘resource As the current 6 also a cause for concern. In for concern. a cause also participation’ ‘community practice, to people refer does not necessarily taking part but rather in decisions, In the contributions. to financial of cases, this translates majority any protec- Without fees. into user without any tion for the poor and (this level the central subsidy from local solidarity means government), suffi- to raise mechanisms will fail fail to assure cient money and will and poorer between cross-subsidy richer communities. worrying that the It is extremely CHAP to ‘facilitate the is supposed rehabilita- to longer term transition mobili- resource and tion strategies sation mechanisms attached to them’. mobilisation mechanism’ for health patients fees they charging involves seems highly in- this cannot afford,

©Valerie Michaux be able to fill the User fees will never , Working Group of the Commission for Macro- Group Working , Mobilising Resources for Health Care: The Case for Health Care: Mobilising Resources 8 , 26, March 2004. , 26, March ather to financial contributions in practice, ‘community ‘community in practice, participation’ not to people refers, taking part in decisions, but r change ecommendations xternal Baseline Assessment, submitted by DFID,xternal Baseline Assessment, submitted by 3. 2003, p. ecognised that user fees are excluding a significant excluding ecognised that user fees are 6 Burundi Good Humanitarian Donorship Pilot: Terms of Reference, Terms 6 Burundi Good Humanitarian Donorship Pilot: E Sector: An in the Health Poletti, ‘Cost-Recovery Timothy 7 See Emergencies’, Policy in Complex Inappropriate Ex 8 D. Arhin-Tenkorang, Revisited for User Fees 2000. November economics and Health, Geneva, of user fees in any health intervention in humanitarian health interventions less rendering crises. User fees are and equity; coverage because they reduce effective is virtually groups vulnerable impossible targeting patients fees. that charge health structures through has The case against user fees in complex emergencies issues of been made in previous existing health financing gap in poor countries. From that mortality know other post-conflict contexts we can R a It is our view that donors should include increasingly contexts, it is now But outside emergency r of impoverishment proportion a source of patients, are anti-poor. and are appropriate, and at variance with the objectives of the GHD the objectives with variance and at appropriate, the high in and equity of aid rank Effectiveness initiative. ambitious GHD principles. core agenda, and should remain However, , 2003. 5 , September . eference is made to MSF’s is made to eference R 4 Survey in 3 Provinces in Burundi Survey in 3 Provinces The health centre in Bwiza, in the cost-recovery zone in Bwiza, in the cost-recovery The health centre et no action was taken to abolish or reduce et no action was taken to abolish or Y , facilitated by WHO and UNICEF, Burundi, May 2004; Burundi, WHO and UNICEF, , facilitated by 3 Communication du programme alimentaire mondial: situation alimentaire Communication du programme Summary Report Health and Nutrition Needs of the Interagency cost recovery or cost sharing have not shown to be effec- not shown have or cost sharing cost recovery 4 Assessment 2004. Fund, the Children 5 Save 3 WFP, 3 WFP, 2004 à Kirundo, décembre alimentaire for 2005 Humanitarian Health and Nutrition Strategy The regular use of terms like ‘community participation’ use of terms like ‘community The regular in the CAP (or in the GHD for Burundi principles, which of beneficiaries’) is involvement speak of the ‘adequate tive in countries in crisis’. The clarity of this statement in countries in crisis’. tive in the with the ambiguous indicator retained contrasts a cost at services provided ‘curative logical framework: revenues with the beneficiary community’s commensurate to a minimum or if necessary suspended), all (reduced services for free’. preventive the following paragraph states that ‘while somebody has paragraph the following health the debate over to pay for health provision, and in complex emer- financing for the most vulnerable The same document also states that gencies is ongoing’. ‘ During the GHD consulted at pilot in Burundi, NGOs were its popula- from data MSF provided stages, and different made to the reference But the only explicit tion survey. WHO and UNICEFdata is in the humanitarian health and 2005. for nutrition strategy The need for an unambiguous donor position The need for an unambiguous to the difficulties people were experiencing in accessing experiencing to the difficulties people were basic health services amid food shortages in Kirundu province. survey and to a survey carried out by Save the Children, survey and to a survey Save carried out by a more recommend and it is explained that both studies funding to the public increasing equitable system by affordable. making healthcare health sector, user fees, even temporarily. user fees, even remain well above emergency thresholds many months The targeting and financial protection of vulnerable after the end of the conflict.9 The same factors of vulnera- people should be monitored closely, and adequate bility remain: overall, people are still destitute, and their measures of financial exclusion to essential care should living conditions precarious. be part of evaluation criteria. In order to measure exclu- sion correctly, population surveys should be carried out Informally, most health actors in poor countries acknowl- since this is the only method that will provide information edge that cost recovery is not a solution, even in countries on the people excluded. The WHO and UNICEF common where there is no prevailing humanitarian crisis. Where user strategy for 2005 show some openness to monitoring as fees have been abolished at national level, attendance rates they foresee ‘mini-population health surveys’, which have increased, particularly among the poor.10 Recent could include financial access criteria. recommendations to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) state that user fees should disappear at the Under the current cost-recovery scheme in Burundi, one in latest by the end of 2006.11 If a moratorium on fees is desir- five people will not receive health services because of lack able in development contexts, the case to abolish them in of money; three in five will put themselves at risk of humanitarian interventions seems self-evident. further impoverishment in order to obtain money for health fees and drugs. At the beginning of 2004, MSF We also recommend that donors overcome their reluc- calculated that about €10 million would be enough to tance to finance recurrent costs. The main reason cited for replace revenues from patient fees, based on an average not doing this is that it creates difficulties once the attendance rate of around 0.6 consultations per capita per humanitarian crisis is over. But this should not take prece- year. At least part of the funds planned for the health dence over the humanitarian responsibility to respond sector in Burundi should go towards relieving the burden adequately, effectively and urgently to the assessed patients face in paying for essential care. needs of people, as in Burundi today. Mit Philips has worked for MSF since 1985, mainly in Africa. 9 M. Van Herp et al., ‘Mortality, Violence and Lack of Access to Health She is currently part of the Access to Health Care unit, in the DRC’, Disasters, vol. 27, no. 2, 2003. providing support for policy analysis and advocacy around 10 G. Burnham et al., ‘Discontinuation of Cost Sharing in Uganda’, access to essential care. Her email address is Mit.Philips Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, 2004, 82, pp. 187-95; @msf.be. Armand Sprecher was medical coordinator for Wilkinson et al., ‘Effect of Removing User Fees on Attendance for MSF-Belgium in Burundi from November 2003 until June Curative and Preventive Primary Health Care Services in Rural South Africa’, Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, 2001, 79, p. 665. 2004. He is currently working as a public health specialist at 11 UNDP, Millennium Project: 10 Key Recommendations, www.unmp. MSF headquarters in Brussels. He can be reached at forumone.com. Priority 5 is ending user fees for primary schools and [email protected]. Inma Vazquez joined MSF in essential health services no later than the end of 2006. 2004 as a liaison point for institutional donors.

No magic answers: Good Humanitarian Donorship in the Democratic Republic of Congo Wendy Cue, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA

There are no magic answers, no miraculous action to save lives and alleviate the suffering of the DRC’s methods to overcome the problems we face, just most vulnerable people. This opportunity has not, the familiar ones: honest search for understanding however, been grasped, and there has been little ... and the kind of commitment that will persist discernible impact on the ground. Why? despite the temptations of disillusionment, despite many failures and only limited successes, inspired Since it was conceived in 2003, the DRC pilot has been by the hope of a brighter future. hampered by the lack of a clear vision statement and Noam Chomsky communications strategy. Different stakeholders have different perceptions of what a GHD pilot is – and what the The objective of piloting the Good Humanitarian outcomes should be. How to reach these outcomes is also Donorship (GHD) principles and good practice in the not clear. There is a lack of common understanding as to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is to test them in a the process and methodology to be used to implement the complex emergency. Given that GHD encompasses issues pilot. Lead donors have focused on technical improve- to do with international humanitarian law, needs-based ments, such as needs assessment, thereby avoiding some funding, strategic planning and the promotion of stan- of the difficult larger questions, such as whether the dards in humanitarian practice, the pilot would seem to funding available is in proportion to need. The lack of a

GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP GOOD HUMANITARIAN represent an opportunity for more coherent and effective common needs assessment format is cited as an impedi-

HUMANITARIAN 24 exchange OCHA commissioned a base- line survey on the status of donor funding and behaviour in 2004.1 Impact would then be measured by collecting the same data at the end of 2005. The survey team found a lack of information about the GHD pilot among humanitarian actors in the DRC, and difficulty in gathering measurable data against the indicators selected by donors because the indica- tors were not specific enough, and not linked to concrete goals or objectives. The survey report identifies constraints, and rec-

©OCHA DRC/Scott ommends priority actions for improvement. Some of these constraints and recommenda- tions are discussed below.

Displaced people in Bunia, Eastern DRC, 2003 Challenges and constraints First, lack of clarity about the ment to decision-making, but on the other hand the purpose of GHD in the DRC, and the lack of information humanitarian priorities in DRC are generally well known. about it in the field, led partners to wonder what was While improvements in effectiveness, efficiency and expected of them, what collective actions were needed accountability can still be made, the time and energy it and how the outcomes would be measured. GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP takes to gather comprehensive up-to-date information in a constantly changing situation should be measured Second, GHD is a voluntary initiative. As such, it resem- against whether enough information for decision-making bles humanitarian agencies’ use of IASC policy as ‘soft already exists. Are we debating the size of the bandage law’, which OCHA attempts to disseminate in the field. As while the patient is losing blood? Are we missing the OCHA knows only too well, coordination works best when primary goal – increasing humanitarian financing and there is either the authority or the incentive to coordinate. action in the DRC? GHD donors in the DRC are grappling with the same issue – the lead donors, the US and Belgium, must find a Origins and development common incentive around which to motivate other donors The origins of the GHD pilot in the DRC lie in efforts to to dedicate both financial and human resources to GHD. strengthen the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), as At present, this incentive is missing. first called for by the 2003 Montreux donor retreat on coordination. DRC was selected as a pilot country because it met GHD implementation group criteria: it had a CAP, a strong UN presence and a large donor presence, as OCHA knows only too well, and it is a ‘forgotten’ crisis. As the period of application is coordination works best when 2005, 2004 was about helping to shape the pilot, with meetings of the pilot sub-group in Geneva in December there is either the authority or 2003, and in Kinshasa in July 2004. Representatives of the the incentive to coordinate lead donors, the US and Belgium, visited the DRC in December 2003.

Fourteen impact indicators were developed to measure Third, there is a need for an agreed framework or method- changes in donor behaviour in the DRC as a result of the ology to develop, articulate, respond to and monitor a pilot, covering issues such as the flexibility, timeliness common humanitarian strategy around which GHD partic- and appropriateness of funding, the promotion of good ipants can coordinate. At the GHD meeting in Kinshasa in practice, advocacy for safe humanitarian access and July 2004, the pilot sub-group encouraged participants to measures to strengthen local capacities. The country visit attend the forthcoming OCHA-led common humanitarian provided recommendations on how to implement the strategy workshop, the results of which formed the basis pilots in the field. These included assessing needs in terms of vulnerability, ensuring a comprehensive common 1 The survey is Charles Kinkela, Lene Poulsen and Julie Thompson, strategy and communicating clear directions from head- ‘Baseline Survey Good Humanitarian Donorship Pilot DRC’, commis- quarters to local donor counterparts. sioned by OCHA/ESU, 2004.

25 26 GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP ment by OCHA, UN agencies, members oftheSteering ment by OCHA,UN tomakeadifference requiresthe opportunity commit- pilot contributestothisend. While donorsleadthepilot, there isaneedtodemonstrate how adheringtothe GHD incentive enough tofostermore active engagement,but targets. Savinglives andalleviatingsufferingshouldbe re and agenciesneedtodedicatefinancialhuman GH Third, incentives toadhere tothepilotwouldhelphold indicators tobetterreflect impact. questioned. Limitingthenumberofvariables wouldallow covering were the completeterritoryofDRC already being phases ofthepilot,practicality andviabilityof limiting thepilot’s geographic scope.Duringtheinitial impactindicators,or selecting asmallnumberofkeyGHD smaller area ofaction. This canbedoneeitherby Second, thescopeofpilotshouldbefocusedona motivated andon-track.updates mayhelptokeeppartners country briefingsandthedisseminationofprogress stronger commitmenttoactionandclarityofpurpose. In- willhelptofostera intheDRC objective topartners First, selectinganagreed objective andcommunicatingthis R similar levels toprevious years. in2005willbemaintainedat whether fundingfortheDRC Ocean tsunamiofDecember2004.Itremains tobeseen affect ongoingoneswasputtothetestby theIndian ensuring thatfundingofnewcriseswillnotadversely r access tendstoreflect thestateofpeaceprocess, and challenges.For example,increased humanitarian wider internationalcontext,poseadditionalconstraints The complexityandvolatility crisis,andthe oftheDRC produced adraft report. onlythehealthsector(with (NAFM), consultants) WHO endorsed NeedsAssessmentFramework andMatrix needs assessment. wastopilottheIASC- While theDRC need. In2004,littleprogress wasmadeinusingcommon funding decisionsmustbebasedonasolidassessmentof pilotisthat andoftheDRC fundamental principleofGHD theelaboration ofacommonstrategy.needs tosupport A challengeisdeveloping ashared analysisof A fourth priority needs. sible, toanswer thequestionofwhetherwe are meeting gathered togetherinoneplace,itisdifficult,ifnotimpos- W v tarian projects are notincludedintheappeal,limitingits vulnerability indicators,isstillmissing.Manyhumani- to communicatepriorities,keyinformation,suchas documentattempts the strategy reflected inthe2005CAP Moreover,because itwasseenastooUN-focused. while been considered acredible enoughframework forGHD hasnot as aninter-agency strategic planningtool,theCAP However, forDRC. despiteitsuniquerole of the2005CAP ather thanchangesindonorbehaviour. The principleof alue asanoverview ofneeds,activitiesandimpact. ecommendations for2005 ithout aframework toenableinformationbe sources atthefieldlevel tofollow thepilotandreach HUMANITARIAN D participants totheagreed objective. Bothdonors D participants exchange CA r outside oftheCAP, wouldbetoshare informationon tive, forthoseagencieswhoappealorreceive funding programme cycle. Analterna- be donethrough theCAP ofprogrammetoring andreporting implementationwould contributions againsttheserequirements, andthemoni- tarian requirements in-country. wouldmonitor The FTS humanitarian needsand,ideally, includesallhumani- asareference documentthatrepresents total use theCAP against estimatedneeds.Onewaytodothiswouldbe willfacilitatethemonitoringoffinancialresponse(FTS) toOCHA’sBetter reporting Financial Tracking System to guidetheallocationofadditionalresources. doing what,aswell asamapofimplementation,willhelp implementing agencies.Amore accurate picture ofwhois of Financial incentives mayencourage theparticipation board, analysisandownership willbestrengthened. health care, schools,isasyet hard tomeasure. Congolese displacedby war, withoutadequateshelter, actually means,interms of improving thelives of ground, anditsoutcomesare hard toidentify. What it r However,humanitarian needsintheDRC. GHD’s potential encouraging coherent donorbehaviourinresponse to principlesrepresent adonorcodeof conduct, The GHD would bemade. the basisofhumanitarianneed,muchmore ofanimpact community responded trulyon tothecrisisinDRC can bemademore effective. Butiftheinternational assessments andinformationflows, andprogrammes according toneed?Improvements canstillbemade in tofund Is notthefundamentalgoalofGHD an impactthantechnicalimprovements toprogramming. cant increase infundingwouldarguably makemore of actors ontheground withresponse capacity. Asignifi- inadequate, andthatthere are toofewoperational agree thatthere are enormousneeds,thatresources are All thoseinvolved inhumanitarianresponse intheDRC andbaseline data. ment missionreports asacentralOCHA shouldalsoserve repository forassess- inthedevelopment oftheassessmentmatrix. participate toshare assessmentinformation and instructing partners by thiseffort assessment matrix.Donorscansupport information, andcompilethisinformationintoaneeds to bringcoherent analysistodifferent needsassessment Finally, OCHA,initscoordination role, needstoworkharder needs are beingmetthrough adifferent channel. CA y mid- The 2005CAP agreed rightattheoutsetofGHD. as (CHAP)/CAP the useofCommonHumanitarianActionPlan F ontheground. partners andother Committee forHumanitarianResponse (SCHR) equirements, contributionsandimplementation,sothat emains poorly understood among partners onthe emains poorlyunderstood amongpartners ourth, thepilotgroup needstosendaclearmessageon ourth, ear review will be an opportunity tostrengthen the2005 ear review willbeanopportunity Pr P.

If donors send a clear message to get partners on If donorssendaclearmessagetogetpartners equirements canbeadjusteddownwards where the strategic planningprocess. This was HPN ORM membershipF

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HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK Network Papers

Network Papers provide longer treatments of particular areas of humanitarian concern. We publish four a year.

1 MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secçoes), Mozambique: A Data Collecting System Focused on Food Security and Population Movements by T. Dusauchoit (1994) 2 Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: The Programme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM) by D. Mukupo (1994) 3 An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia by M. Duffield (1994) 4 Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours - The Political Economy of Relief and Rehabilitation in the Somali Region 5, Eastern Ethiopia by K. Van Brabant (1994) 5 Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold War Era: Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs by K. Rupesinghe (1994) 6 The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: initial successes and failures in food assistance by S. Jaspars (1994) 7 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief ed. J. Borton (1994) 8 Targeting the Poor in Northern Iraq: The Role of Formal and Informal Research Methods in Relief Operations by P. Ward and M. Rimmer (1995) 9 Development in Conflict: the Experience of ACORD in Uganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola by ACORD (1995) 10 Room for Improvement: the Management and Support of Relief Workers by R. Macnair (1995) 11 Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, Southern Ethiopia by P. Jenden (1995) 12 Dilemmas of ‘Post’-Conflict Transition: Lessons from the Health Sector by J. Macrae (1995) 13 Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide and Directory to the Internet for Agencies involved in Relief and Rehabilitation by L. Aris, P. Gee and M. Perkins (1996) 14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996) 15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the Assessment and Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam (1996) 16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Study III ed. J. Borton (1996) 17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan, A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996) 18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict and Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996) 19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what relief workers need to know by J. Darcy (1997) 20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel ed. S. Davidson (1997) 21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience by I. Levine (1997) 22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by P. A tkinson (1997) 23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka by K. Van Brabant (1997) 24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by C. Palmer (1998) 25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief ‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998) 26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for understanding rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998) 27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998) 28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett (1999) 29 Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda by K. Neefjes (1999) 30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999) 31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being by R. Garfield (1999) 32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000) 33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know by P. Le Billon (2000)

HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK 34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for Accountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000) 35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. H olzmann (2001) 36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods Approach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001) 37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002) 38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations for Practice by A. Smith (2002) 39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002) 40 Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999-2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in Kenya by Yacob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa (2002) 41 Politically Informed Humanitarian Programming: Using a Political Economy Approach by Sarah Collinson (2002) 42 The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict by Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003) 43 Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster by Sultan Barakat and Rebecca Roberts (2003) 44 Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia by Simon Narbeth and Calum McLean (2003) 45 Reproductive health for conflict-affected people: policies, research and Programmes by Therese McGinn, Sara Casey, Susan Purdin and Mendy Marsh (2004) 46 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives by Randolph Kent (2004) 47 Missing the point: an analysis of food security interventions in the Great Lakes by Simon Levine and Claire Chastre (2004) 48 Community-based therapeutic care: a new paradigm for selective feeding in nutritional crises by Steve Collins (2004) 49 Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost benefit analysis by Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton (2004) 50 Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia by Degan Ali, Fanta Toure, Tilleke Kiewied (2005) Good Practice Reviews

Good Practice Reviews are major, peer-reviewed contributions to humanitarian practice. They are produced periodically.

1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994) 2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Shoham (1994) 3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996) 4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996) 5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives by J. Telford (1997) 6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998) 7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998) 8 Operational Security Management in Violent Environments by K. Van Brabant (2000) 9 Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and Preparedness in Development and Emergency Programming by John Twigg (2004)

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HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP 27 , study commis- mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu , April 2002. author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views reflect does not and opinion personal author’s of OCHA. , Independent Consultancy Report presented by WHO the for Report, Independent Consultancy by presented March 2005 Network Paper 50 Network Paper , 18 April 2002, www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/ocha-cap- Joint Assessment of Health Status and Health System among Crisis Affected among and Health System Health Status Joint Assessment of Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience Recent from Lessons Humanitarian Coordination: Degan Ali, Fanta Toure, Tilleke Kiewied Tilleke Toure, Degan Ali, Fanta Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia lessons from area: in a contested Cash relief eport IASC of the Appeals Process of the Consolidated Review R An External Review of the CAP of An External Review is Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA. Her OCHA. Officer, Affairs is Humanitarian ter, ter, r r a copy of this Network Paper, contact [email protected]. The paper is available for download at the HPN for download The paper is available contact [email protected]. r a copy of this Network Paper, sponses may be feasible, there are concerns that women may be excluded, and that the cash may be spent in and that the cash may be spent concerns that women may be excluded, are sponses may be feasible, there ebsite: www.odihpn.org/documents/networkpaper050.pdf. eferences and further and eferences reading endy Cue endy Commodities, rather than cash, remain the predominant form of emergency relief: relief agencies typically relief relief: form of emergency the predominant than cash, remain Commodities, rather people the cash with which to buy these give shelter materials; they rarely distribute food aid, seeds, tools and and cost-effective that they can be more argue Supportersthings themselves. in emergencies of cash responses benefit the economies into choice and dignity and greater the recipients timely than commodity distribution, give particularly often not practical, are in complex that cash responses injected. Sceptics argue which they are cash where deemed unacceptable. Even security risks and the risk of corruption are where emergencies, re local markets, and inflation and depress sudden access of cash may increase or anti-social ways. A unwelcome of instability. in areas conflict may encourage namely cash response, describing one example of an emergency This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by programme, The (ECRP) in the Sool Plateau in Somalia in 2003–2004. Program Cash Relief the Emergency $691,500 to 13,830 drought- distributed a total of Aid (NPA), People’s and Norwegian Horn Relief implemented by mounted in Somalia. ever cash response affected households, making it the largest world, governments in the developed In emergencies option in Somalia. is a valid that cash relief The paper argues as the most flexible and efficient way of helping affected so is recognised because doing cash grants provide Why is right, why should people in Africa or Asia be ineligible for similar help? are people. If the preconditions that the answer can recognise If we to food and other limiting resources? aid so commonly restricted emergency as a viable barrier to the acceptance of cash relief eliminated the core have lies in fear and paternalism, then we intervention in Somalia and other parts world. of the developing Fo w ECOSOC-18apr.pdf. Wiles, and Peter Nicola Reindorp Humanitarian Affairs, June 2001, www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/evalua- of the Office for the Coordination sioned by tions/ochacoordination.pdf. David Bassiouni, R 2001, Global Policy Forum, Assistance’, Development of Official a Renewal Towards Jens Martens, ODA: ‘Rethinking www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/oda/2001/04rethinking.pdf. Scheeb and Markus Michael, Von Johan Populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Republic Democratic Populations in the Matrix Pilot in DRC,Needs Assessment www.reliefweb.int/ghd/index.html. June 2004, Toby Po W email address is [email protected]. This articleThis the represents is [email protected]. address email 28 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES Cordesman; theother, intheonlinemagazine official, Anthony DefenseDepartment long-time US r internet whichhelpedtodefuse thepoliticallyvolatile By 30October, twodiscussionshadappeared onthe not aired hisinitialdoubts. free/2005/01/2005012701n.htm) thathewishedhad time hehasstated(seehttp://chronicle.com/ andthatsince said thathehadnotseenthereport, the high. What saying thatthe100,000-deathestimateseemedtoo lethality ofvarious coalitionweapons usedinIraq, as ontherelativeanalyst andauthorofarespected report ofHumanRights Marc Garlasco Watch, aweapons r Post The studywaspublishedby the Public perceptionsofthestudy 100,000 deathshadoccurred. suggestedthatsome other 32neighbourhoodssurveyed when thedeathtollwascalculated.Results from the death rate inFalluja wassohighthatitsetaside consequence oftheinvasion andoccupation. The cluster hoods, lessthanonepercent ofresidents haddiedasa deaths intheprovince asawhole.Inmostneighbour- ofresidents haddied,implyingperhaps200,000 quarter hood, inthecityofFalluja inAnbarProvince, almosta The numberofdeathswaslessclear. Inoneneighbour- forces were violentdeaths. responsible formostreported the majorcauseofdeath,andthatairstrikesby coalition U The studyfoundthatviolencewasup58-foldafterthe re until thedateofinterview. Eighty-onepercent of up home on1January2002,anddeathsordepartures people wholived inthehome,compositionofthat askedabouttheageandgenderof Interviewers minimum, inorder tolimittheriskinterviewers. sample wasnotstratified orenlarged above thestandard location. Securityconstraints were extreme, andthe 30householdsineach hoods inIraq, interviewing r number ofciviliandeathsduringthewarinIraq. The Mustansaryia University inBaghdadtoestimatethe by Al In September2004,astudywasundertaken by New York Times story. paperspickeditupasawire-service major US The United States, where coverage wasvery limited.Most deal ofattentionintheworld’s press, thoughnotinthe online on29October2004. The results received agreat L Civilian deaths:amurkyissueinthewarIraq esearchers visited33randomly-selected neighbour- esults ofthesurvey. Onewasanonlinecritiqueby a ascontroversial.eport Inparticular, the es Roberts, JohnsHopkinsBloomberges Roberts, SchoolofPublic Health S-led invasion inMarch 2003,thatviolencehadbecome HUMANITARIAN ported deathswere confirmedby deathcertificates. ported

the reporter Fredthe reporter Kaplan. Both were complimentary on page12.Bothstoriesattemptedtopaintthe exchange Post covered itonpage8,the did not report is that Garlasco also isthatGarlasco did notreport Lancet RCIEADPLC NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND , andwasput Post W Slate ashington quoted , was mating only8,000deathswas flawed. she hadheard ontalkradio thatthe neighbour hadnotheard theactual electiondayon2November,8,000. ByUS mynext-door passed theword thatthetruenumber mightonlybe ishing speed. Talk show radio hostsandministersall This spinofthestoryspread through with aston- theUS at thetimeofpublication. little chancethatthedeathtollhadbeenbelow 100,000 outlier clusterofFalluja isincluded,there appearstobe number wasbelow 44,000. When the extremely high number wasbelow 8,000,andonlya10%chancethatthe implied thatthere wasa2.5%chancethatthetrue that result willbefound. distribution The reported either direction onemoves, themore unlikelyitisthat estimate ofthestudy. from thatnumberin The further 8,000 and194,000.Infact,themostlikelynumberis the trueresult wassomewhere –anywhere –between dence interval forthe32neighbourhoodsindicatedthat id/2108887/). Bothauthorsimpliedthatthe95%confi- (http://slate.msn.com/ an estimate.It’s board’ adart Lancet interpretation ofthedataby theauthorsand ignored the58-foldincrease inviolenceandignored the the results. They ignored theAnbarProvince data, this kindofwork,andbothfocusedonimprecision in about theresearchers, bothdiscussedthedifficultyof violent deaths.Kaplan saidofthe quoted estimateatthetime,whichwasabout15,000 information sincetherange includedthemostwidely- Both writersconcludedthatthisresult addedlittlenew 8,000 and194,000. r different samplinglocations,itisexpectedthat95ofthe times withtheexactsamemethodbutchoosing 194,000. This meansthat,ifthestudywasrepeated 100 died, witha95%confidenceinterval from 8,000to that98,000peoplehad bourhoods, thestudyreported from thesafest32neighbourhoods.Intheseneigh- epeats wouldestimatethedeathtolltobebetween for most reported violentdeaths for mostreported coalition forceswere responsible death; andthatairstrikesby become themajorcauseof was up58-fold;thatviolencehad the studyfoundthatviolence ’s

r eviewers. Instead,theyfocusedontheresults Lancet Lancet Lancet study: ‘This isn’tstudy: ‘This estimate, but study esti- What does this mean? The question arises, when the public interpretation of The Lancet study raises two issues for humanitarian science is either done deceptively or incompetently: workers who document hardships in politically volatile what is the role of the investigators in responding to the settings: misunderstanding? In this case, the investigators were hampered by several factors. The timing of the study’s 1) How do we articulate the complexity of imprecise publication, five days before the US election, was unfor- results in language that will be understood or reported tunate. Investigators planned to conduct the study in by the press? April 2004, but videotaped beheadings convinced them 2) Are we responsible for the digestion of our information to delay until June. In June, security was worse. The lead by the public once it is released? investigator had five months of teaching obligations beginning in the last week of October. Thus, the final Most of us have been exposed to the idea of a normal preparations were conducted in August and the survey distribution, but few of us really understand the related began in early September, ending in Falluja on 20 nuances. In particular, the probability that a specific September. The data were entered and an initial number is the ‘true measure’ declines the further from analysis completed on 24 September. The manuscript the mid-point of the distribution one moves. In the 32 was submitted to the Lancet on 1 October. The timing neighbourhoods of our study excluding the Anbar may have made some members of the press wary, espe- Province cluster, there was only a 7.5% chance that the cially given a scandal in the weeks before, when docu- true number of related deaths was between 8,000 and ments alleging that President Bush had shirked his 44,000, but about a 42% chance that the true number National Guard duties during the Vietnam War appeared was between 44,000 and 98,000. Scientists use 95% to have been faked. Had the Lancet article appeared a confidence intervals as a default criterion to avoid week or two earlier, it may have received more attention allowing the subjective judgement of the individual in the US. researchers to influence their conclusions. The use of this default is somewhat arbitrary. When dealing with It was also a mistake for the lead investigator, faced with the press, providing an 80% confidence interval would repeated questioning by an Associated Press reporter, to probably be a more effective way of communicating admit that he had been opposed to the invasion of Iraq. imprecision than the 95% confidence interval because This was not a very controversial position, given that most the small and unlikely outcomes covered by the tails of people on the planet had been opposed to the invasion. the distribution would not be included. In the case of the The reporter included this in her piece, not mentioning 32 neighbourhoods discussed above, we could state that other investigators had been in favour of the that there is an 80% chance that the true number of invasion, and not mentioning the first response to this

deaths was between 44,000 and 152,000, instead of a question, which was that this was primarily a study of the NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND 95% chance that the true number was between 8,000 occupation, which all of the investigators wanted to go and 194,000. The former implies that researchers were well and peacefully. Cordesman cited this AP-reported 80% sure that the commonly-quoted estimate at the ‘bias’ as another reason for disregarding the study time was at least three times too low. The latter, findings. This blunder highlights how poorly equipped according to Cordesman and Kaplan, implied that the most relief workers and scientists are at managing researchers were not sure if the results differed from the messages. existing 15,000-death estimate. Time favours truth A separate issue concerns judgment. The Falluja data was Time will reveal a more precise estimate of the death toll set aside because it statistically did not belong with the from the war in Iraq. According to a July 2004 New 32 other neighbourhoods when describing the range. England Journal of Medicine article, 12% of returning army Many lay-people felt that this meant the data was ground forces and 24% of returning marine ground forces discarded. Anyone watching the news during the summer report that they were responsible for the death of an Iraqi of 2004 would have reason to believe that a death rate in non-combatant. The NGO Coordinating Committee of Iraq Falluja 25 times higher then the average elsewhere was (NCCI) has been recording twice as many Iraqi deaths as very plausible. In keeping with sampling theory, the the most widely cited website, Iraqbodycount.net. It is not Falluja cluster implied that about 200,000 deaths had important that the Lancet study’s 100,000 figure will occurred in Anbar Province, although the precision of this almost certainly be shown to be an underestimate. It is estimate was essentially unquantifiable. Thus, when important that the recording of tens of thousands of Iraqi looking at the dramatic increase in violence and the deaths at the hands of the country’s occupiers did not evidence of far more deaths in Anbar Province, the investi- produce a meaningful response, either to limit civilian gators were confident that the death toll was far more deaths in Iraq or to bolster the human rights community likely to be over 100,000 than under 100,000. In the so that it might convince the world that pre-emptive war Lancet article, the abstract concludes that ‘Making should be viewed as incompatible with civil society. conservative assumptions, we think that about 100,000 excess deaths, or more have happened since the 2003 Les Roberts is a Research Associate at the Center for invasion of Iraq’. The ‘or more’ part was discussed exten- International Emergency, Disaster, and Refugee Studies, sively in the European press, but almost never mentioned Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, in the limited US coverage. Baltimore, MD.

Number 29 • March 2005 29 The Darfur crisis: simple needs, complex response Max Glaser

The crisis in Darfur has left some 80,000 people dead, tional) were operating. However, of the 55 agencies in displaced over 1.6 million (nearly 30% of Darfur’s estimated Darfur at the end of 2004, just ten accounted for 90% of six million people), and created 300,000 refugees.1 What expatriate staff.5 The other 45 organisations employed on makes this crisis particularly shocking is the structural char- average fewer than two expatriates each. Some UN acter of the violence: villages have been torched, and civil- agencies, including ones crucial to protection like UNHCR ians have been deliberately targeted by (aerial) bombing, and UNICEF, employed only limited numbers of interna- summary executions, massacres and systematic rape as tionals (21 and 26 for UNHCR and UNICEF respectively in part of a strategy of fear instigated by the Sudanese military November 2004).6 Arguably, rather than there being too and the so-called Janjaweed, armed and supported by the few agencies in Darfur there are in fact too many (small) government of Sudan.2 The crisis in Darfur has therefore ones. Competition over scarce resources, including demanded both a humanitarian and a political response. human resources, has fragmented the overall response, The political response has consisted of increased pressure and professional capacity is thin on the ground in many on the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed, agencies. Heads of agencies confirm that many positions ensure security and allow aid agencies into Darfur to provide remain vacant for extended periods, and that staff humanitarian aid. Humanitarian needs include food, shelter, turnover is high. water, health, sanitation and nutrition. But more than that, the structural violence against civilians means that there is an urgent need for protection, as systematic abuse, rape protection by presence may and displacement continue unabated. reduce the vulnerability of At least in the eyes of displaced Sudanese, the protection civilians, but it also carries risks gap has a simple and straightforward solution: the presence of khawajas (foreigners), the only people they trust. Indeed, in many locations where humanitarian presence has been established, targeted abuse, attacks and rape have dimin- This dearth of international staff has obvious implications ished dramatically. Local authorities became more cautious for protection by presence, which relies for its force and more sensitive to protection issues. Protection by precisely on the foreignness of the presence. Protection presence therefore may be an effective mechanism to reduce efforts are also hampered by the tendency of many the vulnerability of civilians. Yet it also carries inherent risks, agencies to limit their presence to the three state capitals, and requires some fundamental preconditions.3 El Fasher in North Darfur, Nyala in South Darfur and El Geneina in West Darfur; only a minority of agencies have The humanitarian presence in Darfur ventured out to remote areas. UN agencies – with the As international pressure on the Sudanese government exception of WFP, which has opened several field stations led to improved access conditions during 2004, the – also confine themselves to the state capitals, as do the humanitarian presence in Darfur increased significantly. International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the By December 2004, approximately 55 international African Union Cease Fire Commission (AU-CFC). Insecurity humanitarian organisations deploying an estimated 8,400 is one reason for this, as well as issues of administration aid workers, nearly 900 of them internationals, were and logistics.7 But again, a lack of human (and financial) active in Darfur.4 Compare this with the position in April resources is also to blame. 2004, when just 11 agencies and 202 staff (36 interna- Given Darfur’s size, effective protection by presence is badly under-resourced. In remote areas that are visited only inter- 1 See UN-OCHA Humanitarian Profile, December 2004, http://unsu- danig.org/emergencies/darfur/profile/data/2004/December/DHP_na mittently, where there is no permanent international human- rrative_DEC_21Dec.pdf. The precise number of violence-related deaths itarian presence, protection remains a severe problem. is unknown and heavily debated. See Eric Reeves, ‘Current Data for Conversely, where an international presence is established Total Mortality from Violence, Malnutrition and Disease’, Sudan protection can significantly improve. In eastern West Darfur, Tribune, 12 December 2004, www.sudantribune.com/article. for example, increased international presence after August php3?id_article=6984. The Humanitarian Profile estimates the total 2004 saw a dramatic and acute drop in rape cases, some- war-affected population at 2.19 million. 2 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support’, 20 July 2004, http://hrw.org/english/ 5 The ten were Action Contre la Faim, CARE, Concern, Goal, the ICRC, docs/2004/07/19/darfur9096.htm. Médecins Sans Frontières (all sections counted as one), Save the 3 Protection by presence is the UN’s official strategy, accepted in Children-UK and US, Oxfam and World Vision. Humanitarian Profile, 1 October 2004. See Protection of Civilians – A Strategy for Darfur, December 2004, p. 10. October 2004. 6 Humanitarian Profile, November 2004. 4 This includes the Red Cross and Red Crescent and UN agencies. 7 It should be stated that operations in remote areas require addi- The Humanitarian Profile for December 2004 puts the number of tional resources such as above-standard all-weather 4x4 vehicles and

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES registered international NGOs at 67. extensive communication systems.

HUMANITARIAN 30 exchange needs. However, as soon as the staff left the security authori- ties arrested the members of the committee.

IDP committees are an attempt to mobilise a community in defence of its (human) rights. IDPs are certainly entitled to basic human rights, such as the right to association and assembly. But the current situ- ation in Darfur does not yet allow for the promotion of rights. In fact, as the example shows, doing so risks harming the very people meant to be protected. These conditions

©Max Glaser imply a need for professional and experienced leadership, to enable informed decisions to be taken on appropriate A woman takes shelter at the edge of an IDP camp in Darfur approaches to the integration of protection in humanitarian action. The same approach will times by as much as ten-fold, according to organisations on not work in all locations – protection is context-sensitive. the ground. This shows that presence can in itself make a Although the IASC definition appears to include fulfilling real difference, even if it cannot address the underlying human rights obligations as an objective, the primary causes of abuse. objective of ‘protection by presence’ in Darfur is to reduce the vulnerability of civilians and prevent abuse. In other areas, mainly on the front lines between Sudanese government and rebel forces, humanitarian presence has brought stability and tranquillity as long as it has coincided the humanitarian response in NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND with the disengagement of the warring parties. In Jebel Marra, for instance, the deployment of aid agencies was Darfur is increasingly perceived connected to guarantees from rebel forces to stay away as biased from IDP locations and access roads, to avoid potential counter-attacks from government troops (ironically, but unintentionally, also serving the interests of government A related concern is that the humanitarian response is forces). However, as soon as fighting resumed insecurity increasingly perceived as biased. Arab nomad leaders prohibited humanitarian access once more. Incidents of have stated that they see Western organisations, UN and insecurity included the Sudanese military shooting into NGOs alike, as being anti-Arab, and claim that they have towns (literally over the heads of aid workers), and the not received any assistance. It is true that, currently, most arrest, abuse and apparently targeted killing of interna- if not all assistance goes to Fur IDPs.9 Given that these tional aid staff. populations are in greatest need, this seems to be in accordance with the principle of impartiality. While the Rights, politics and protection principle must be upheld, it is also important that humani- The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines tarian strategies take into account the opinions or protection as ‘all activities aimed at ensuring full respect concerns of ‘the other side’, or at least listen to them, if for the rights of the individual in accordance with ... only to avoid the appearance of favouritism. The fate of human rights law, international humanitarian law and Arab nomads is a case in point. Some may have been, or refugee law’.8 In this definition, fulfilling human rights perhaps are, involved in atrocities and violence against obligations would seem to be included as an objective of civilians. Many, and probably most, nomads may have had protection. But in Darfur the conflation of ‘rights-based little or nothing to do with abuses, but suffer equally from action’, ‘humanitarian protection’ and ‘human rights’ is a the consequences of a collapsed agricultural sector, recurrent problem. The organisation of IDP committees is failing markets and food shortages. The principal differ- one example of the dangers inherent in this conflation. In ence between them and the displaced population is, of one instance, in West Darfur, international NGO staff course, that the Fur have been exposed to systematic promoted IDP committees to represent IDP concerns and violence, rape and displacement. But Arab representa-

8 See also Sylvie Caverzasio (ed.), Strengthening Protection in War 9 ‘Fur’ is used as a collective term for the Darfur population, not as an (Geneva: IFRC, 2001). ethnic or tribal appellation.

Number 29 • March 2005 31 tives also cite cases of violence and abuse which they or CFC, must be effectively deployed. To ensure and preserve their families have been exposed to. The fundamental the neutrality of humanitarian actors on the ground, a clear point is that Arab nomads constitute part of the conflict division of labour is essential between organisations environment, and so their concerns must at least be providing aid (and protecting by presence), and organisa- properly understood to ensure an even-handed, impartial tions preventing abuse and/or placing pressure on the and non-biased humanitarian response. government over rights violations. But again, it is of paramount importance that all these actors – aid organisa- The way that the word Janjaweed is used illustrates these tions, UN agencies, the IOM and the AU-CFC – are present as Arab concerns. For many of Darfur’s people, Janjaweed has close as possible to the locations where violations and become synonymous with ‘bandit’ or even more generally abuses are committed. ‘bad person’. Any Arab camel rider or Arab-looking indi- vidual is referred to as Janjaweed, as are all perpetrators of Conclusion violence and crime. Given the scale of the violence and In December 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated abuse in Darfur, this is to a degree understandable, that the UN’s approach in Darfur was not working.10 Annan however inaccurate. But the distorted use of the label has was undoubtedly indicating that international pressure on also taken root among aid workers. Subsequently, the term the government of Sudan was not yielding the results has lost its distinctive meaning of ‘armed horseman’ or expected in terms of the disarmament of the Janjaweed and ‘Arab militia’. For example, on one occasion an aid worker the effective protection of civilians. Annan called on the UN referred to Arab nomad children as Janjaweed, meaning Security Council to speed up the deployment of African that they were not entitled to aid. Equally, many attacks and Union (AU) troops, adding that ‘it should be investigated robberies are instinctively attributed to ‘Janjaweed’. Not all what other measures can be taken to hold individuals who aid workers hold this view. But labelling like this amounts are responsible [for war crimes] in order to move forward’. to taking sides in the conflict. Appropriate contextual The dispatch of more AU troops to Darfur is appropriate and knowledge is therefore essential, especially in the context essential. The protection afforded by humanitarian presence of protection by presence. It is important to understand can only be effective if it is accompanied by credible force. that there is more than one loser, more than one victim. The objective of protection by presence is not the prosecu- On various occasions, Sudanese government officials have tion of individuals guilty of, or responsible for, abuse and referred to the international humanitarian presence as an alleged crimes. The main purpose is to prevent the abuse of ‘intervention’. International humanitarian agencies are civilians. To this end, it would perhaps be more effective to viewed as ‘agents’ of an anti-Arab, anti-Sudanese interna- have fewer organisations with a larger response capability tional agenda. In the officials’ view, the khawajas are the and capacity, rather than a multitude of small (and weakly- cause of all Darfur’s current problems, and stand in the way resourced) agencies, fragmenting the response. But human- of (their) solutions. In an ironic way this is true, in that it is itarian actors are not the sole providers of protection. A precisely for this reason that displaced people insist on the successful approach requires a collaborative and parallel presence of khawajas – to prevent abuse and intervene response by various actors, and simultaneous action at when it occurs. Caught between the displaced and the gov- various levels. However, such a response can only be effec- ernment, international organisations, given their protective tive if it is supported by actual presence on the ground. capacity, thus risk becoming actively involved in the conflict. Max Glaser was UN-OCHA Senior Humanitarian Affairs However, protection should not be mistaken for conflict Officer in Darfur between July and December 2004. resolution or the restoration of civil rights. The most Previously, he worked for ten years for MSF-Holland. pressing priority in Darfur is to prevent the ongoing violence Between 2002 and 2003 he was a Visiting Research Fellow and abuse against civilians. The fact that the perpetrators of at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy these violations include Sudanese government proxies (the School of Government, Harvard University. He is the Janjaweed), as well as members of the police forces and author of Negotiated Access – Humanitarian Engagement military, certainly complicates the response to these viola- with Armed Non State Actors (see http://www.ksg. tions, but it does not compromise the potential of ‘protec- harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/NegotiatedAccess.pdf). This article tion by presence’ as such. To achieve a successful reflects the author’s opinion only. ‘protection by presence’ strategy, however, UN agencies such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 10 Warren Hoge, ‘Sudan: Annan Urges More Effort On Darfur Conflict’, and UNHCR, along with bodies such as the IOM and the AU- New York Times, 23 December 2004.

References and further reading

Sylvie Caverzasio (ed.), Strengthening Protection in War (Geneva: ICRC Central Tracing and Protection Division, 2001). The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). Simon Chesterman (ed.), Civilians on War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES

HUMANITARIAN 32 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 33 , , à la ). combines the , Network Paper , Network mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March ely receive their monthly ely receive our gun is your salary’our gun is your r debrouillez-vous’ ‘ our salary’. Physical assault, Nu y and rape armed robbery, common, particu- are murder ‘Y What distinguishes predatory in the DRC from governance the crime and brutality of other corrupt states? State corruption is typically associ- ated with illegal financial manoeuvring, such as embez- zlement, which bends or the the law to favour breaks few or the one. Corruption congolaise impulses of a felo- acquisitive nious state with the incapacity the public to pay or control Civil servants, of order. forces soldiers and police officials ra salary of $10. Unable to meet the economic needs of their soldiers, military commanders gun is inform them ‘Your

©Reuters/Anjuguna Njuguna, courtesy www.alertnet.org larly in the eastern provinces, where tens of thousands of where larly in the eastern provinces, and ‘benefits’ their salaries unpaid soldiers extract from – the exploitation, armed extortioncivilians. Predation and – has become the civilians physical abuse of ordinary Congolese often joke of a default mode of governance. imploring the popu- constitutional amendment, Article XV, lation to ‘fend for yourselves’ ( High mortality effects of the direct and morbidity are consequence for the gravest Yet governance. predatory is groups and vulnerable humanitarian operations Although this is a particular physical inaccessibility. conflict is where in the eastern provinces, problem countrywide. Roads, ongoing, access difficulties are unmaintained and dilapidated, bridges and waterways are and air transport and unsustainable. is expensive otecting Human Rights: The Challenge to Humanitarian Organizations The Challenge to Humanitarian otecting Human Rights: Pr Armed men on the streets of Bunia, DRC, May 2003 Armed men on the streets otection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm Deliberate from Civilians for Protecting Strategies Level Field Practice: otection in When Needs are Rights: An Overview of UN Efforts To Integrate Human Rights in Humanitarian Action Rights in Humanitarian Human Integrate Rights: An Overview of UN are When Needs EffortsTo Pr en Kenny, en Kenny, r eferences and further and eferences (continued) reading main inactive in the face of predatory governance and governance in the face of predatory main inactive R Diane Paul, 30, Humanitarian Practice Network, July 1999. Network, July Practice 30, Humanitarian Ka Occasional Paper 38 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, 2000). Studies, Institute for International Watson Thomas J. RI: 38 (Providence, Paper Occasional Minear, and Larry Diane Paul Mark Frohardt, 1999). for International Studies, Institute Watson J. Thomas RI: (Providence, 35 Occasional Paper emained of the national humanitarian responsehumanitarian consultant independent B. Rackley, Edward Predatory governance impact and in the DRC: civilian Corrupt and brutal governance – ‘predatory governance’ – ‘predatory Corrupt and brutal governance humanitarian crisis: civil- – has exacerbated the DRC’s or mortar gunfire ians perish not from from shells, but sexual violence infectious diseases and food insecurity, corruption human rights violations. Impunity, and gross rife, despite the violence are and civilian-directed 15,000 UN of over peacekeepers, a transi- presence anticipating national elections in tional government effortsJune 2005 and well-funded to disarm, demo- ex-combatants into civilian life. In bilise and reintegrate humanitarian agencies cannot such an environment, re consequences for human health and its disastrous safety. health, judicial, education and transport systems after decades of misrule three Mobutu under President Physical violence, Sese Seko. are and deprivation coercion common experiences for the million people, 53 country’s 31 million of whom OCHA classifies as ‘vulnerable’. Since 1996, conflict in the of Republic Democratic Congo (DRC) has claimed 2.5 million and 3.5 between making million civilian lives, the Congolese war the dead- liest in the world. According to the UN Office for the Human- of Coordination itarian Affairs (OCHA), a further3.25 million refugees and internally displaced of assis- in need people are violence has tance. Regular decimated the population and finished off what r 34 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES ported whenfamiliesare forced tofleefighting. ported easily hiddenfrom militarythieves andare easilytrans- guinea pigsaslivestock donationsbecausetheyare more thatrural farmersnowof Goma,hasreported request rural communities. World Relief, anagencyoperating out stock (chickens,ducks,goats)have disappeared from ov attackers, pickingover theremains anddelivering left- L farmers, steallivestock andpillagelocalplantations. groups, includinggovernment soldiers,terrorise rural W primarily from unruly, unsalariedmilitarypersonnel.Inthe In thevolatile easternprovinces, foodinsecuritystems Kinshasans, isnow devoid ofcommercial traffic. Congo River Basin,oncethebreadbasket for10million to compensateforthehighcostsofcorruptionupriver. The throughout theinterior, are forced toraise prices inKinshasa taxation by unsalariedcivilservants stationedatports food scarcity are theresults. River traders, subjecttoillegal accrues tothestate.Acrippledrural economyandurban permission’, etc.).Only8%of fees are authorised;even less (‘loadingrights’,‘dockingtrumped-up orfictionalservices and feesimposedby unauthorisedcivilservants for operating costsare accountedforby illegaltaxes traders’ produce travels by water. Results showed that92%of traders in Western Congo,where 80%ofcommercial R tion isarecent organisation studyby theUS Innovative consequences forhumandevelopment are rare. Oneexcep- concrete analysesofinstitutionalisedcorruptionandits While qualitative overviews ofCongolesekleptocracy exist, Corruption, economicparalysis andfoodinsecurity quences ofpredatory governance inthefollowing areas. Humanitarian agenciesare responding totheconse- Confronting theimpactsofpredation Congo focus on responsive support mechanisms,as Congo focusonresponsive support tarian agenciesconcernedwith sexualviolenceineastern Besides monitoring,documenting andadvocacy, humani- sixofthempeacekeepers. staffinDRC, seven UN inquiry upheldallegationsofsexualexploitationagainst has addedanotherlayer tothecrisis.InJanuary2005,aUN UN r imprisonmentfor Congolese armedforces to36months’ inEquateurProvincecourt sentencedasoldierfrom the trators are not heldaccountable,inoneexception amilitary groups oftwotofive men. While thevast majorityofperpe- 2004. oftheseviolationswereThree-quarters committedby 620 rapes by meninuniformbetween July2003andApril South Kivu,MédecinsSansFrontières (MSF)hasreported intheeastern provinces.particularly Inthetown ofBaraka, ‘ The impunityenabledby predatory governance creates a Sexual violenceandreproductive health http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4156819.stm. Congo SexAbuseClaimsUpheld’, 1 ‘DR ors niomn’forperpetrators ofsexualviolence, no-risk environment’ aping afive-year-old girl. The highlypublicisedscandalover ocal authoritiesfollow inthewakeofarmed esources Management (IRM) ofillegaltaxationriver esources Management(IRM) alikale area of North Kivu,forexample,mobilearmed alikale area ofNorth ers totheirfamilies.Asaresult, allformsofsmalllive- HUMANITARIAN

peacekeepers andchildprostitution inBunia in2004 exchange BBC News , 8January2005, 1 tial componentsofchildprotection intheDRC. family tracing, accompanimentandphysicalsecurityessen- orphans, children separated by displacement). This makes accused ofsorcery ( be itforced oraccidental(e.g.thebanishmentofchildren rights’. The abuseofchildren isalsoenabledby separation, tion where the‘familyisnow aprimaryviolatorofchildren’s severe destitutioncausedby thewarhave created asitua- According toUNICEF, themilitarisationofsocietyand children andchildsoldiersatthecommunitylevel. mechanismsforvulnerabledown oftraditional support Lack ofprotection forminorsalsostemsfrom thebreak- under-report thenumbersofminorsintheirranks. with militias,butcannotconfirmthisasmilitialeaders UN 2,000 have beenreintegrated intocivilianlife.InIturi, intotheircommunitiesoforigin.Approximately sertion families are traced andchildren begintheprocess ofrein- armed groups. Afterathree-week stayinthecentres, toreceive andprocess children recovered from centres’ Kivu,there are threeIn North ‘orientation andtransit seeing littleimpactontheproblem. advocacy astheirprimaryprotection tools,butadmitto groups usemonitoring,documentation,sensitisationand protecting andassistingchildren associatedwitharmed conflict since1996.Humanitarianagenciesinvolved in Child soldiershave beenapersistentfeature ofCongolese Children associatedwitharmedgroups guered judiciarysystem, specifically intheEast.For are underwaytocombatimpunityandrevitalise the belea- groups andrelevant efforts nationalofficials. Important tointernationaldonors,humanrights ments andreport system, theycandocument abuses,monitordevelop- humanitarians cannotphysically reanimate anentire legal of impunityishighlylucrative andcountrywide. While L whereoption intheDRC, judicialcorruption ispervasive. andtribunals. This isnotawidespreadcourts orreliable provide forthelegal settlement ofdisputes,suchas tioning state,civilianshave recourse toinstitutionsthat isessential.Inafunc- Confronting the‘judiciaryvoid’ Impunity, accountabilityandthejudicialsystem where internationalhumanitarianagenciesoperate. are non-existentexcept inthefewlargeservices centres means thatmostcasesgountreated. Psychosocial exceeds supply, andthescarcity ofmedicalservices far (4) legalassistance,ifdesired. Demandforservices r psychosocial care; (3)helpingwithcommunityorfamily testing);(2) exams andtreatment (includingHIV basic formsofdirect assistanceare available: (1)medical preventive are deemedtohave littleimpact.Four efforts einsertion (asrape are survivors blamed/rejected); and einsertion egal judgmentsare boughtandsold,the‘business’ ICEF citesaworkingfigure of6,000childrenICEF associated bought andsold in theDRC,legaljudgmentsare ‘ enfants sorciers’ ), childsoldiers, PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 35 Christian Science . His email address of the Congolese military, mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu Multitudes is a consultant to international agencies modus operandi and French journal and French Security Council, Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-

SAID, ‘Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in War of Weapon as a Rape SAID,Terrorism: ‘Sexual eferences and furthereferences reading erhaul, new equipment, training and civilian oversight. and training erhaul, new equipment, RM’s research on links between corruption and corruption on links between research RM’s ithout this, the national army will remain an unaccount- army will remain ithout this, the national General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in on the United Nations Organisation General of the Congo, S/2004/251, 25 Republic the Democratic 2004. March R I can be found at www.irmgt.com/ economic paralysis pdf/Etude%202004.pdf. See also: U www.peace- of Congo’, Republic Eastern Democratic women.org/resources/DRC/USAIDDCHADRC.pdf. of No Peace No Joy, ‘I Have Médecins Sans Frontières, and Socio-Economic Mind: Medical, Psychosocial, in Eastern DRC, April Violence Consequences of Sexual 2004’, www.msf.org/source/countries/africa/drc/2004/ drcreport-nojoy.pdf. UN arious militia groups and self-defence forces across the across and self-defence forces arious militia groups eform. The national military and police require a complete police require The national military and eform. leaders of child soldiers preparing to enter a reorientation to preparing soldiers of child leaders process. to the opposition deep-seated a site indicate supportInternational demo- of disarming, for the process of thousands of ex- the tens reintegrating bilising and at around soldiers, stands many of them child combatants, former Belgium, Congo’s South Africa and $200 million. of under- a memorandum signed have colonial occupier, and modernisation reinforcement standing for the training, is still- but the initiative of law and order, forces of Congo’s DDR of a successful in the event Even born for lack of funds. no substitute for wider security sector this is programme, r ov W gang of armed child-men. Particularlyable, undisciplined dire. will remain for civilians, the consequences Conclusion violence and insecurity, Congolese civilians face extreme Third-party efforts groups. at the hands of armed to largely to be having a negligible impact. civilians seem protect normalised predation Impunity and unaccountability have as the principal v done little to halt this east. International peacekeepers have for humanitarian is a role there Nonetheless, practice. international donors agencies to play in communicating to particularly its governance, the scope and scale of predatory and civilian protec- consequences for human health grave ideally suited to argue agencies are tion. As eyewitnesses, response the important emergency effective link between and safety of civilian populations. security and the improved Rackley Edward primarily in conflict and post-conflict contexts, operating in the in Africa. His writing has appeared Monitor is: [email protected]. er 50,000 people are thought er 50,000 people are ov in ethnic violence in died to have Ituri since 1999 officials in Ituri advocate regularly for troop restraint for troop regularly officials in Ituri advocate

escue Committee (IRC) conducted and MSF have The ICC began an investigation into alleged war crimes in into alleged The ICC began an investigation 50,000 people are over Ituri in September 2004, where violence since died in ethnically motivated thought to have components 1999. Humanitarian agencies with protection contributed evidence and documentation to the UN’s have civil affairs division, and this material was taken into decision to begin work in the DRC. account in the ICC’s and accountability for civilian killings, mass rapes, live- mass rapes, and accountability for civilian killings, conceding that While destruction. stock theft and crop aid offi- predation, this has minimal impact on military and investi- cials in Ituri maintain that documenting the civilian gating abuses nonetheless serves to record costs of the war – an important oral task in a largely demon- documenting violations and Similarly, society. the lack of civilian safety the links between strating and increased displacement, for example) (forced mortality important and morbidity are for strategies The International bearing witness to civilian devastation. R mortalitynumerous the studies across and morbidity and forcefully more them to advocate country allowing health programmes. the impact of their rural to evaluate Disarmament, demobilisation and security sector reform priority in Eastern Congo, Ending impunity is an urgent that solution must recognise but a comprehensive economic by motivated violence against civilians is largely an is first and foremost control and that troop necessity, economic question. International donors and the diplo- in the best position to demand matic community are The Congolese troops. over control government greater disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration current began in September 2004 in Ituri. It is (DDR) process so far unim- are Militia groups results. mixed producing militia by executions with DDR,recent and pressed UN The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Cross Committee of the Red The International military commanders to improve works with regional curb civilian abuses, but concedes its and control troop Military discipline is unlikely to be impact is minimal. soldiers authorities fail to provide maintained when the Goma delegate in As one ICRC with salaries or benefits. in this soldier every punished if you complains: ‘Even they would still have cutting off their right hand, by town themselves’. to find a way to feed example, the European Commission and the French and the Commission European the example, Française Cooperation agency development government’s in a joint effort engaged the local criminal are to restore begun this initiative, from in Bunia. Results justice system for the a strategy to frame 2004, will help in January justice system. of the national planned reconstruction A crisis turning inwards: refugee and IDP militarisation in Uganda Robert Muggah, Small Arms Survey, Geneva

Uganda’s displacement crisis has been called the ‘forgotten human- itarian emergency’. One particu- larly devastating feature of this crisis is the lack of physical protection of refugees and inter- nally displaced people (IDPs). Surveillance data reveals that injury rates in settlements and camps are disproportionately high. A considerable number of refugees and IDPs are injured as a result of intentional violence, and a significant proportion of these can be attributed to gunshot wounds. Sexual violence is also common, and is regularly perpetrated at gunpoint. Dis- ©Robert Muggah ©Robert placed people are the target of direct military attacks, coercion, intimidation, forced conscription into formal and militia forces, informal taxation, abduction and Military escorts en route to Bobbi IDP Camp, Gulu, Uganda, August 2004 arbitrary arrest.

This article explores the issue of the militarisation of refugee people within camps, the storage and diffusion of weapons, settlements and IDP camps in Uganda. It argues that, while military training and recruitment, infiltration and the technical and humanitarian interventions are no substitute presence of armed elements, political activism and criminal for the political solutions the problem ultimately requires, violence within camps. In Uganda’s case, camps and settle- specific measures aimed at demilitarising communities and ments are exposed to escalating levels of armed violence displaced populations could improve their protection. by Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) combatants, Karamoja pastoralists and criminals. The motivation for attacks Displacement in Uganda appears to be a combination of forced recruitment, the Uganda has hosted refugees from over a dozen countries pursuit of assets including food and non-perishable goods, since the 1950s, from Europeans fleeing after the Second and politically-motivated violence. Arms caches, usually of World War to former combatants from neighbouring coun- assault rifles, grenades and ammunition, are occasionally tries. Hundreds of thousands of Ugandans have also been uncovered outside of refugee settlements, though most are violently internally displaced since the late 1960s as a result believed to be on the other side of the border in Sudan or of internal conflicts in the West Nile and Gulu/Kitgum the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). districts. The country’s 210,000 refugees and 1.6 million-plus IDPs are geographically and ethnically differentiated. The Virtually all IDP camps are fortified with barracks, and have majority of Sudanese, Congolese and Rwandan refugees are a military presence with increasingly heavy deployments of concentrated in relatively small ‘settlements’ throughout the army forces and militia groups. The current policy of the north-west, west and south-west. Many of these populations Ugandan army is to increase overall militarisation in order share ethnic affiliations with communities in neighbouring to pursue LRA combatants and to ‘protect’ refugee settle- states. Between five and twenty per cent of the overall popu- ments and IDP camps. Although the majority of IDPs are not lation of Uganda’s western districts are refugees. IDPs are ‘militarised’, a considerable number of young men have concentrated in large ‘camps’ predominantly in the north- been recruited into self-defence units. These are trained by west, north-east and central districts of the country; they are the army, with some members redeployed to other parts of primarily from the Acholi ethnic group. Between 60% and the country or even abroad. In the central and north- 90% of the total aggregate population of north-eastern eastern districts, Acholi leaders and displaced people are Uganda are considered to be internally displaced. increasingly reluctant to volunteer for ‘militia’ service or civil defence activities without guarantees against rede- The militarisation of refugees and IDPs in ployment to other districts. The widespread presence of Uganda militias, with relatively ambiguous controls, potentially ‘Militarisation’ in the context of refugees and IDPs is often constitutes a long-term threat to the protection of refugees, described as a combination of military or armed attacks on IDPs and civilians more generally. PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES

HUMANITARIAN 36 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 37 ad mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu frequently expressed by refugees and IDPs refugees by about the expressed frequently

and confused. Although internal processes of disarma- internal processes and confused. Although re actical, appropriate and transparent procedures for the procedures transparent and actical, appropriate gandan army. The current policy of demobilising and of demobilising policy The current gandan army. he Ugandan army must also articulate for he Ugandan a clear strategy einforce the army and police presence in settlements, the army and police presence einforce the UNHCR favours esettle ex-combatants. Moreover, efugees. In the case of IDPs, 11 and 21 Guiding Principles efugees and IDPs in ‘un-gazetted’ (unofficial) camps, and policing’ than ‘military’ rather approaches The solutions. identification, internment and demobilisation of ‘armed demobilisation internment and identification, elements’ the together with to be developed in camps need U the LRA combatants in former redeploying subsequently north precedent. dangerous is an extremely T appears the process At present, dismantling the militia. hoc under- (DDR) were and reintegration ment, demobilisation has submitted government Ugandan taken in 2002, and the package’ for a ‘security a proposal to UNHCR to in order r and integrated do not appear to be any coherent, there or to disarm, demobilise, return medium-term strategies r ‘ of militia, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration a priority and should be is forces and rebel paramilitary for security sector reform. included in a long-term strategy police the army and the national government, The Ugandan to the approach and proactive a responsive must develop settlements and IDP of refugee protection camps. Concerns we behaviour of the army and lax and in some cases predatory law in refugee safeguards clear normative are There militia. of protection concerning the and via EXCOM 94 resolutions r mutilation, torture against rape, and protection guarantee as the protec- as well treatment, inhuman and degrading tion of property or indiscriminate against pillage and direct and humanitarian These should be enforced, attacks. is being agencies should monitor whether protection Particularensured. attention should be paid to ‘self-settled’ r Disaster Management work with the District-level OCHA’s Committees should be maintained. army needed governing are Clear rules and regulations and settle- to protection functions and mandates in relation appears to be there ment/camp management. At present, and mandate of the army and its the role confusion over auxiliaries (e.g. local defence units and militia) with respect established around Although perimeters are to protection. often inade- settlements and camps at nightfall, these are This is and IDPsquate to defend refugees attack. from especially the case with ‘non-recognised’ or ‘spontaneously settled’ and IDPs refugees camps, many of in un-gazetted protec- the for food away from to search forced whom are access to international due to limited tion of army forces and IDPs refugees appear to have assistance. Moreover, of their own the shape and character little influence over despite clear norms that call for their informed protection, consent and participation. Consultations with IDP represen- of appropriate could facilitate the elaboration tatives security benchmarks and mechanisms for strengthening and protection. together with UNHCR, with together UN the Department for Peace- government. Ugandan and the (DPKO) Operations keeping Pr highlights a Agenda for Protection concern over refugee militarisation refugee concern over has increased ecutive Committee (EXCOM) 94 explicitly called for ecutive riety of small arms-related concerns, and UNHCR’s riety of small arms-related ery effort international actors to should be made by ocedures for screening settlements and camps of ‘armed settlements and for screening ocedures ogrammes have also been established to demobilise and have ogrammes equired – with the possible involvement of a peace- – with the possible involvement equired eintegrate child soldiers via the army’s Child Protection child soldiers via the army’s eintegrate Pr as interning combatants, need to be elements’, as well UNHCRstrengthened. procedures screening has elaborated for settlements, and OCHA could also establish protocols, Non-violent efforts and other to deal with LRA combatants The govern- armed elements should also be encouraged. been have an amnesty in 2000, and there ment declared and an programmes via radio initiatives other pro-peace (ARLPI). Initiative Peace Leaders Acholi Religious Pr Unit, UNICEF and local NGOs like the Gulu Support the in respondents The surge (GUSCO). Organisation Children the LRA indicates that non-violent and defectors from results. to demilitarisation can yield positive approaches Ev support programmes. these locally-developed While technical and humanitarian interventions are no While technical and humanitarian interventions are are measures substitute for political solutions, specific the ‘protection’ that could improve available of refugees Increased Uganda. and internally displaced people in of borders attention to the monitoring and reinforcement armed of potential could assist with the screening the DRC and Sudan, from into Uganda elements crossing attacks on of the frequency which could in turn reduce needs to be thus control settlements and camps. Border will be approaches Regional assigned a high priority. r joint opera- in the DRC, as increased as well keeping force the army along the authorities and tions with Kenyan in the role a pivotal has played Uganda Sudanese border. 2000 Nairobi of the establishment and enforcement Great of small arms in the on the proliferation Declaration of Lakes and the Horn of Africa, indicating that a degree exists here. political will currently r Concern over refugee militarisation – particularly militarisation refugee in over Concern According – has increased. situations refugee protracted involve crises of all refugee 15% over to one estimate, UNHCR refugees. militarised the impor- has recognised the spread – and controlling security tance of enhancing mandate. protection its basic achieve of small arms – to ‘Goal 4’ of UNHCR’s Moving forward: humanitarian and political humanitarian forward: Moving aspects emergen- refugee to disarm combatants during measures ‘for that measures recommended cies. In 2002 the agency armed elements and the identifica- the disarmament of of combatants should be and internment tion, separation at the point of entry preferably taken as early as possible, for new arrivals’. centres or at the first reception/transit Ex va Minimum benchmarks and standards of protection and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activi- care for refugees and IDPs must be adopted by all ties for army and LRA combatants. The police force also stakeholders. In particular, donors and international needs strengthening, particularly in relation to commu- agencies should apply pressure to ensure that minimum nity policing in rural areas, improved communications standards are devised for IDP camps and the ‘sponta- infrastructure and coordination across districts, tighter neously settled’. Such standards may be achievable, at regulatory controls for illegal weapons, and better least with regard to IDPs, who are entitled to basic storage, maintenance and destruction procedures for human rights under the Ugandan constitution. The small arms. establishment and deployment of ‘protection monitors’ to ensure that protection and the management of settle- Finally, international agencies must establish clear policies ments and camps are of a minimum standard could be on the use of armed escorts. A sizeable proportion of relief considered. agencies hold that military escorts are necessary for access to refugee settlements and IDP camps. This is particularly Preventing forced ‘encampment’ and exploring concrete the case for food convoys in high-risk areas. However, this options for the ‘decongestion’ of refugee settlements sends out contradictory signals to the populations agencies and IDP camps in situations of safety and security is a purport to assist. Greater emphasis on negotiated access priority. The movement towards permanent settlement and alternative approaches to service delivery should cannot wait for the final neutralisation and disbanding of perhaps be considered. the LRA. UNHCR is preparing the messaging, logistics and financing for voluntary repatriations from refugee Robert Muggah is project manager of the Small Arms settlements from 2005. Although the contexts are Survey at the Graduate Institute of International Studies different, there do not appear to be similar strategies for in Geneva, Switzerland. He is also a professional fellow of IDP camps. While many IDPs would no doubt prefer to the US-based Social Science Research Council and a stay in camps until they are sure that security in their doctoral candidate in Development and Forced Migration home areas has improved, a small minority wish to Studies at the University of Oxford. return. This article is drawn from a longer report entitled Security sector reform (SSR) must be front and centre in Protection Failures: Outward and Inward Militarisation of any strategy to demilitarise refugee settlements and Refugee Settlements and IDP Camps in Uganda. It is part IDP camps. This should include strengthening the of a four-country study of refugee militarisation in Africa accountability of militia groups to the army and civilian undertaken in 2004, also including Guinea, Tanzania and jurisdiction, improved training and accommodation and Rwanda. The work was commissioned by the Small Arms transparent procurement and budgeting procedures for Survey and the Bonn International Center for Conversion, the army and its auxiliaries, as well as appropriate in partnership with UNHCR and OCHA.

References and further reading

Rosa da Costa, Maintaining the Civilian and Human-itarian Character of Asylum, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (Geneva: UNHCR/DIP, 2004). Jeff Crisp, ‘A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya’, New Issues in Refugee Research, no. 16, 1999. T. Kaiser, Participating in Development? Refugee Protection, Politics and Developmental Approaches to Refugee Management in Uganda, presentation to ASA-UK, London, 2004. Zachary Lomo, Angela Naggaga and Lucy Hovil, The Phenomenon of Forced Migration in Uganda: An Overview of Policy and Practice in an Historical Context, Refugee Law Project Working Paper 1, 2001. J. Merkx, ‘Refugee Identities and Relief in an Africa Borderland: A Study of Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan’, Refugee Survey Quarterly: Displacement in Africa – Refuge, Relief and Return, 21(1 and 2), 2002. Leben Nelson Moro, Refugee Camps in Northern Uganda: Sanctuaries or Battlegrounds, American University of Cairo, 2002. Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, ‘Refugees as Resources in War’, in Stedman and Tanner (eds), Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). Willet Weeks, Pushing the Envelope: Moving Beyond ‘Protected Villages’ in Northern Uganda (New York: OCHA, 2002). PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES

HUMANITARIAN 38 exchange Schooling in refugee camps Kim LeBlanc and Tony Waters, California State University, Chico

Refugee relief is typically thought about in the acute Faced with these difficult questions, humanitarian relief stages of a crisis, when water, sanitation, housing, agencies often reduce schooling for refugees to a security and disease threaten lives. Because assistance in logistic problem. The result is that education packages such circumstances focuses on keeping people alive, for refugee camps, like food reserves, are ‘borrowed’ relief is often described as an apolitical humanitarian from a stockpile in the host country or elsewhere, and project. But refugees by their very nature are the products little attention is paid to broader questions to do with of a struggle over power and authority – that is, a product the kind of future children will have. In refugee camps, of politics. Nowhere is this more evident in relief the core function of schools – the creation of citizens – programmes than in the provision of schools. Basic is often ignored. It is perhaps not surprising that, as a schooling has emerged as a humanitarian ‘right’, just like result, refugee camps often have confusing mixes of water, sanitation, food, security and shelter. Yet education curriculum, which leads to inconsistencies in educa- programmes for refugee children have longer-term polit- tional policies. Such inconsistencies stem from the ical significance, as well as immediate humanitarian political compromises that both internal and external consequences. Education pushes humanitarian action actors must make in refugee situations. Some examples beyond a medicalised endeavour to ‘save lives’ to a are: project that also shapes futures. • In Indochinese refugee camps in Thailand in the Unimagined past, unimaginable future 1980s and 1990s, instruction was in a general Thai Political theorist Benedict Anderson famously called the curriculum, even though the government’s policy was modern nation an ‘imagined community’. By this he that no refugees would stay in Thailand. Chinese, meant that, while the members of even the smallest English and French curricula were also offered at nation will never know, meet or hear about their fellow- different times and places. Despite explicit policies members, ‘yet in the minds of each lives the image of their for repatriation, few refugees in fact ever went home, communion’. This communion takes place in large part and hundreds of thousands resettled abroad, or because vast numbers of people are exposed to common stayed in Thailand illegally. schooling. In modern societies, education’s core function • Mozambican camps in Malawi in the 1980s offered a RCIEADPLC NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND is the creation of citizens able to imagine themselves as Malawian curriculum in English to facilitate integra- having both a past, and a plausible future as part of a tion. However, in the 1990s repatriation came to be wider national community. seen as more important, and the Malawian curriculum was replaced with a Portuguese Mozambican one. • Camps for Burundians in Tanzania in the 1970s and basic schooling has emerged as 1980s focused on a Tanzanian Swahili curriculum, and many Burundians remain in Tanzania today. However, a humanitarian ‘right’, just like refugees from Burundi in the late 1990s were educated water, sanitation, food, security by the international community in a mix of French and Kirundi, under an official ‘repatriation only’ policy. and shelter Meanwhile, refugees established their own schools, with teaching in Swahili and English. • In camps for Afghan refugees in the 1980s, the interna- Refugees do not have a common past or a future; there tional donor community funded conservative Islamist is only a ‘present’ as a refugee in a camp full of people political parties to establish schools which promoted with the same problem of homelessness. One conse- political ideologies, including an insistence that quence of this is that, in refugee camps around the females be excluded from schooling. In the meantime, world, education programmes are often confronted with the UN and Western NGOs developed their own questions largely resolved in peaceful settings. What programmes promoting gender equity. language should be used? Who is qualified to teach? • Perhaps most notoriously, schools in Palestinian What is a respectful relationship between teacher and refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank and student? Are rote learning or group-centred activities Gaza promote a distinctly Palestinian identity. best? These are big questions, often going to the root of Palestinian children have been taught that they are seemingly intractable political problems. Whose history, both dispossessed, and foreigners in the Arab lands to language, music or literature is taught in primary school which they fled. As a consequence, today’s Palestinian – Israeli or Palestinian; Catholic or Protestant; Hindu, curriculum, which teaches that Jewish people unjustly Sikh or Muslim; mujahedin or Royalist; Hutu or Tutsi – seized Palestinian land, is a focus for the on-going has much to do with expressions of power. Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Number 29 • March 2005 39 part of what became known as the ‘Cross-border Humanitarian Program’. By the time educa- tional support was wound down in 1994, over $50 million had been spent by the US and UNICEF. The goal of the programme was to give political legitimacy to the mujahedin com- manders fighting the Soviet-led Afghan armed forces. The text- books were also intended to promote powerful political mes- sages. These are two quotes from a textbook prepared for the programme:

1. The Mujahedin laid 260 anti- tank mines for Russian tanks. Out of that 180 mines exploded. Now find out how ©Susan Nicolai many mines are remaining.

2. 15 Mujahedin attacked 100 Communists from one side. A classroom for displaced children in Burundi 17 Mujahedin attacked from the other side. Out of 100 Communists, 14 were arrest- The role of schools in refugee populations ed and 72 were killed. Find out: a) how many In administering schools, humanitarian organisations Mujahedin were involved in the attack and b) how make decisions which have consequences for how many infidels fled. power is distributed. Teachers are identified and promoted, a language of instruction is chosen and This attempt to deliver political statements through the specific norms of deference and respect are enforced. medium of numeracy is an important example of how The question that educators in refugee camps should and why national identity becomes embedded in a ask is: what will such policies mean for a refugee popu- curriculum, even a seemingly benign subject like basic lation in one, five, ten or 20 years? This is a question mathematics. By funding these militarised anti-commu- that technicians focused on food rations, curative nist textbooks, Western donors made a statement that medical care or water systems can ignore, and still do a opposition to communism was more important than good job by keeping daily mortality rates under control. humanitarian principles. When Thailand insisted that The questions that educators must ask, by contrast, are Indochinese refugees must be repatriated, rather than inherently political. Educational administrators in settle in Thailand, while at the same time insisting on a refugee camps ignore such political questions at their Thai curriculum, the decision made short-term political peril. This is because, in their decision-making in seem- sense, even though the long-term consequences meant ingly technical areas to do with curriculum, pedagogy that many refugees in fact did not repatriate. Today in and school administration, they plant the seeds of a Chad, choices are being made by donors and the future. This future may see repatriation, resettlement, Chadian government about the future identity of the end of an old identity, or the beginning of a new one. refugees fleeing Darfur. Decisions are being taken But the identity cultivated may also be the basis for about who will be schooled, and what the curriculum continued armed struggle. will be about. In northern Uganda, where children are housed in separate villages away from their parents to protect them from kidnapping, new relations are being humanitarian relief agencies established. A new ‘us’ is being created, and a new future imagined. often reduce schooling for refugees to a logistic problem Kim LeBlanc is a graduate of California State University, Chico’s MA programme in Social Science. Tony Waters is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociology, California State University, Chico, and author of Education choices may also reveal something about Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan (Boulder, CO: the priorities of donors. In Afghan refugee camps in the Westview, 2001). Emails: [email protected] and

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES late 1980s, for example, the US provided textbooks as [email protected].

HUMANITARIAN 40 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 41 Comparative mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March (London: Cassel, 1998). (London: Nu . When it carries out overseas relief work, relief When it carries out overseas . hajj (compulsory Islamic charity) donations, collected by it is unusual to find any instance of Saudi aid that is not in some way connected to senior members of the al Saud family erseas work. This collaboration is frequently conducted is frequently This collaboration erseas work. had been established in Saudi Arabia, with Prince Salman Prince with had been established in Saudi Arabia, of and a full brother of Riyadh Province – the governor been the first This seems to have – as its head. King Fahd work. humanitarian with overseas involvement close royal to the extent Since then, this association has continued unusual to find any instance of Saudi aid that it is now senior members of that is not in some way connected to the al Saud family. Saudi charities, the Saudi Red most prominent The three (SRC), the IIROCrescent closely are and al Haramain, In some ways, the SRC appears family. linked to the royal of the Ministry of Health: it is to function as a branch main runs the kingdom’s the government, financed by of for the welfare ambulance network and is responsible pilgrims on credited frequently are including King Fahd senior royals with funding or calling for such assistance. financial independence, but greater Other charities have much Although family. associated with the royal still remain of the funding for the IIRO comes from and al Haramain zakat both the IIRO branches, their regional al Haramain and family in carrying out with the royal often collaborated have ov Committees, which focus on Afghanistan, Relief through The General and the Palestinians. Chechnya, Kosovo the Supervisor Naif, of each of these committees is Prince Education as a Humanitarian Response as a Humanitarian Education , 225(25), 2001, pp. 16–19. , 225(25), 2001, pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Press, Columbia University York: (New (London: Verso, 1991). Verso, (London: The New Republic Imagined Communities Imagined , 49(2), forthcoming, 2005. Ban Vinai: The Ban Vinai: Refugee Camp (London: Elsevier, 1997), pp. 47-62. pp. 1997), Elsevier, (London: ancisco O. Ramirez, ‘The Nation-State, Citizenship, and Global Change: Institutionalism and Globalization’, in and Globalization’, Institutionalism and Global Change: Citizenship, ‘The Nation-State, Ramirez, ancisco O. eferences and furthereferences reading ynellyn Long, ynellyn Long, ony Waters and Kim LeBlanc, ‘Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling without a Nation-State’, a Nation-State’, Schooling without and Education: Mass Public ‘Refugees and Kim LeBlanc, Waters ony eo Barasi Education Review T L (eds), Adeo-Richmond and Ruth Gonzalo Retamol Fr Twenty- and Nations for the Schools, Students Preparing of Education and Development: International Handbook First Century School’, ‘Prep Elizabeth Rubin, R Benedict Anderson, et to be published; some of the Ministry’s announce- et to be published; some of the Ministry’s efugees in northern Pakistan. Within a year of the Soviet a year Within efugees in northern Pakistan. L Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian aid: a political takeover? Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian This is not the first time the ruling al Saud dynasty has The Soviet humanitarian work. in overseas been involved many Islamic of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted invasion particularly work in the region, NGOs to begin relief with r Donation Committee for Afghanistan a General invasion, The attacks of 11 September and the ensuing ‘war on The attacks of 11 September and the terror’ media and policy- Western the prompted have activities of osten- makers to examine the international accusations sibly humanitarian Saudi charities. Following that these charities supported the Saudi groups, terrorist Ministry of Information announced in July 2003 that it had Seven sending any funds abroad. banned them from of a National the establishment it declared months later, Precise Abroad. Work and Charity Commission for Relief Commission will function have the National details of how y all aspects of private ments suggest that it may take over Saudi while others indicate that private aid operations, the scope of Whatever charities will continue to function. activities, it is clear that it will the National Commission’s in overseas involvement government facilitate greater the scale and scope of the work of Saudi Given charity. Organisation charities like the International Islamic Relief (IIRO), important any such change will have conse- in the Islamic world. quences for humanitarian relief Saudi Arabia has one of the largest humanitarian aid humanitarian has one of the largest Saudi Arabia through This assistance is delivered budgets in the world. While the mechanisms. of public and private a range with relationship has always had a close government to pursue been free generally Saudi charities, most have developments recent aid priorities. However, their own This articlemay limit their independence. discusses the humanitarian of Saudi possible implications for the future in the work of the involvement aid of closer government charities. country’s 42 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES Commissioner forRefugees inRiyadh,towhichitalso W systems. Itannuallydonates several milliondollarstothe traced through theUN’scan bepartially monitoring contributions,which humanitarian aidinmultilateral UN priorities. that theroyal familyandSaudicharitieshave differingaid by Fr Indian Oceantsunami. aid toSudanandhasprovided relief aidfollowing the funds: itrecently dispensed$10.7mofbasichumanitarian decree againsttheinternationaltransfer ofcharitable ov aid seemstohave largely beenlimitedtoMuslims.Its Africa,where itshumanitarian the MiddleEastandNorth worked outsidethekingdom,ithasbeenmostactive in international humanitarianprojects. When theSRChas tohave contributedaroundit isalsoreported $1.6bnto of around 3,000. While itspriorityisdomestichealthcare, The SRChasanannualbudgetofaround $8mandastaff Afghan refugees inPakistan. among others,andwasheavilyinvolved inworkingwith has delivered foodtoSomalia, IndonesiaandBurma r ithasnot ities onMuslimcountries,althoughliketheIIRO Haramain alsoappearstohave generally focuseditsactiv- charity claimedtobeworkinginsome95countries.Al nities, suchasCameroon andSriLanka.In2001,the provide aidinplaceswithrelatively smallMuslimcommu- Muslim-dominated countries,althoughitcontinuedto aid provision. More recently, ithasworkedprincipallyin inits wasseekingtobeimpartial the mid-1990s,IIRO active throughout AfricaandAsiauntil2003.Atleast andalHaramain were evidence indicatesthatbothIIRO theiractivities.However,formally reporting anecdotal trace accurately sincetheydonothave atradition of The fullscopeoftheworkSaudicharitiesisdifficultto The scopeanddistributionofSaudiaid capable ofactingaccording totheirown priorities. work inJuly2003,thelargest Saudicharitiesremained activities itisclearthat,untiltheclosure ofoverseas charity from thescopeoftheir influence.Nevertheless, of important from thealSaudswhenacloseassociationwouldbesign Saudi charitywouldwanttodemonstrate itsindependence of amembertheroyal family. There isnoreason whya scale ofinternationalhumanitarianaidrelies onthesupport bution ofwealth andprivileges.AnySaudienterpriseonthe ro of theSaudieconomy. Sinceoilrevenues flow directly tothe This level ofcooperation isnotsurprisinggiven the structure distributed by thesecharities. often credited withproviding thehumanitariansupplies when aRelief Committeeisnotinvolved, theKinghimselfis Interior Ministerandanotherfullbrother ofKingFahd. Even the figures given here are illustrative only. 1 Whilst somefinancingdataisavailable it isnotcomprehensive, so estricted itself to working in Arab states. It reports thatit estricted itselftoworkinginArab states.Itreports om thedestinationsofofficialhumanitarianaidgiven orld Food High Programme, andhostsanofficeoftheUN yal family, itsseniormemberscontrol thenationaldistri- erseas activitieshave notbeenstoppedby theroyal

HUMANITARIAN the Saudigovernment itisclear andrecorded by the UN, exchange 1 Saudi Arabia gives substantialquantitiesof guidance on expense ofthoseinSub-Saharan Africa.Afterall,the Muslims intheMiddleEastandCentral Asiaatthe should besodeterminedtoprovide aidtocrisesinvolving need. Yet thisalonedoesnotexplainwhythealSauds r of thereligious establishment,andsoisconstantly eighteenth century. The rulingfamilyrelies onthesupport Islam. This hasbeencentral toalSaudrulesincethemid- and charitylies Wahhabism, thenationalinterpretation of At thebaseofstrong linksbetween theSaudistate Iraq andin2004Darfur. P the aidpriorityforeachyear. In2001,thiswastheOccupied single countryorterritoryhasgenerally beenassignedas AfricaorCentral andSouthAsia.A the MiddleEast,North more than75%ofthetotal,and97%went tocountriesin to countrieswhere theMuslimpopulationsaccountedfor sent toatotalof44different countries.Ofthose,92%went has given $504min149recorded humanitariandonations, Humanitarian Affairs.Inthelastfouryears, thekingdom r humanitarian donations,however, are bilateral provisions provides substantialdonationseachyear. The largest Saudi by P government’s prioritisingofaidtopopularcauses– public criticismwaslargely Islamist.Itisplausiblethatthe within thekingdom,andby themid-1990sanyremaining they have faced. The liberals cametobemarginalised r two groups, liberals andIslamists,thealSauds’ generally beenpossibletodividethesediscontentsinto discontent withtheexistingpoliticalstructure. Ithas The 1990–91Gulfwar, however, prompted anewwave of and waslargely dealtwithby thestatesecurityapparatus. since 1979.Duringthe1980s,thispressure waslimited pressure forsocialandpoliticalreform inthekingdom state directs itshumanitarianaidisthebuild-up of The otherfactorwhichmayinfluencewhere theSaudi motivation; internalsecuritywasalsoafactor. P have encouraged thealSaudstoprovide aidtothe possible thatconcernsaboutaninfluxofrefugees may OCHA cannotbeexplainedinthesameway. While itis of Kuwait in1990.However, thebilateral aidrecorded by the Iran–Iraq warduringthe1980sandIraqi invasion numbers ofrefugees inneighbouringcountries,notably correspond withregional criseswhichcreated large forexample, peaks inSaudidonationstotheUNHCR, Some stateaidreflects externalsecurityconcerns:the political factorsshouldinfluencethedistributionofaid. of whichthealSaudsdonated around $6m. similar telethonforIraq inApril 2003raised around $12m, the Palestinians; hepersonally donatednearly$1m.A 2002 Prince Naiforganised atelethontoraise moneyfor detailed thestate’s spendingonforeign aid,whileinApril government-sponsored reply tooneIslamistcriticism The publicitysurrounding somedonationsisstriking.A eported to the UN Office for theCoordination of totheUN eported esponses have reflected thebroad nature ofthecriticisms eminded ofitsreligious dutytoprovide aidforthosein alestinian Territory. In2002itwasAfghanistan,in2003 alestinians, AfghansandIraqis –demonstrates adesire alestinians, AfghansandIraqis, thiswasnottheonly

the alSaudstoassociatethemselves withthesecauses. zakat does notindicatethatgeographical or PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 43 , The , the religious zakat . As the third pillar of . As the third mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March . These are non-obligatory These are . , HPG Report 14 (London: zakat Nu sadaqa , vol. 58, no. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 58, no. , vol. in Joanna Macrae and Adele Harmer (eds) in Joanna Macrae is crucial to all Muslims. There are eight are There is crucial to all Muslims. humanitarian worker, wherever they are wherever humanitarian worker, , was recently a volunteer research assistant research a volunteer was recently any zakat ashington DC. DI, 2003). eferences and furthereferences reading eview of Trends and Issues Trends eview of téphane Lacroix, ‘Between Islamists and Liberals: Islamists ‘Between téphane Lacroix, R and – Saudi Ministry of Culture http://www.saudinf.com Information Resource in – Saudi Embassy http://www.saudiembassy.net W and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan, Jonathan Benthall World Politics of Aid in the Muslim Charitable Crescent: 2003). Tauris, I. B. (London: Islam after 11 Jonathan Benthall, ‘Humanitarianism and September’ O S in Reformists’, New “Islamo-Liberal” Saudi Arabia’s Middle East Journal 345–365. Humanitarian Action and the Global War on Terror: A Terror: on War Humanitarian Action and the Global R eo Barasi with the Humanitarian Policy Group. He is currently Group. Humanitarian Policy with the will aid and foreign thesis on Saudi Arabia’s writing a 2005. His email in University Oxford from graduate is [email protected]. address occur, Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian aid will undergo aid will humanitarian Saudi Arabia’s occur, changes. profound L some Muslim contexts. The question considered in this The question considered some Muslim contexts. article is enough common ground is whether there humanitarian principles and Islam to Western between enable from, to work in Muslim environments. to work in Muslim environments. from, duty to give up a fixed proportion of one’s wealth (about wealth proportion up a fixed of one’s duty to give 2.5% of savings annually) for specified causes. Another form of giving is called and above over alms given Islam, permitted classes of beneficiaries, including the poor, of the road’prisoners of war and ‘sons (travellers, to help the The desire displaced people and refugees). and Western of both is thus at the core most vulnerable Western At first sight, then, a Islamic charitable traditions. humanitarian worker should not find any difficulty in oper- ating in a Muslim setting. Humanitarianism and Islam importanceIslam places paramount on charity and alms- giving. Of particular importance is cultural proximity the answer to gaining access the cultural proximity

ther regional political instability may also encourage political instability may also ther regional r ossible futures for Saudi aid for Saudi futures ossible K, which argue that Muslims are best at conveying that Muslims are K, which argue ention. The solutions considered have been either to have The solutions considered ention. esponsibility for it remains unknown. The priorities and The priorities unknown. remains esponsibility for it Nouria Brikci, independent Is contexts? in Muslim While many factors will dictate whether Western NGOs Western While many factors will dictate whether workers, this article proximate on culturally should rely of the cultural validity on the religious concentrates the is a sense that, through There argument. proximity as an insur- Islam is being framed pursuit of the GWOT, NGOs’Western mountable obstacle to to work in ability In the context of the US ‘global war on terror’In the context of the US ‘global the (GWOT), has become an increasingly proximity issue of cultural question for humanitarians. In countries such as pressing large NGOs employing Western Afghanistan and Iraq, been assessing whether numbers of expatriate staff have ‘face’Western their acts as a barrier to humanitarian inter- v send Muslim expatriates to Muslim contexts, or to form partnershipsmore with Muslim NGOs (sometimes local, certainlysometimes international). Agencies have been Muslim NGOs in the by in both approaches encouraged U accept- more generally certainthey are and that values, aid workers. Western able to Muslim populations than the government to prioritise security spending ahead of the government with rising unemploy- aid. Equally, foreign providing under 15 years are population (40% ment and a young a likely to capture of age), domestic social spending is partgrowing these developments of the budget. Should In addition to this uncertainty priorities about the future factors a number of other are there of Saudi charities, within the next that may limit Saudi humanitarian aid end of the 1990s decade. A jump in oil prices at the averted that would an economic crisis in Saudi Arabia aid budget. Should oil a cut in the foreign forced have it of the late 1980s and 1990s, to the level prices return would decline. is likely that Saudi humanitarian aid Fu If the National Commission does provide the al Sauds the provide does Commission National If the independent previously over control with complete the rulers’ follow they may come to charities, aid priori- of humanitarian a redistribution This would lead to ties. Saudi prioritised by countries previously the aid from aid the national by to those prioritised charities South-East Asia Africa and Sub-Saharan programmes. as indeed they have affected, would be adversely of Saudi charities. However, closure the been by already and obscure, commission remain the functions of the r support considerably princes vary bases of the senior charities vary demands on private and their likely accordingly. P Values Most Western NGOs claim to rely, in their operations, on the values of impartiality, independence and neutrality. By contrast, there is a clear perception that the religious basis of Muslim NGOs does not allow similar space for such values.

Could this perceived difference be www.alertnet.org©Reuters/Gleb courtesy Garanich, the basis for a justification for relying on Muslims in Muslim contexts? If indeed humanitari- anism in Muslim minds precludes such values, then Muslims would find the Western framework diffi- cult to accept. But is this true?

The impartiality debate centres on whether charitable funds should be available only to Muslims, or whether they can be allocated indis- Iraqi women wait for humanitarian aid, criminately to all. In other words, Baghdad, April 2003 can Muslim aid be impartial? Some argue that funds should be given based solely on need: poor people should be helped course that this independence is genuine. In some parts whatever their religion. Others contend that, while zakat of the Muslim world, the Gulf for instance, most NGOs are can only be disbursed to Muslims, sadaqa can be given to far from independent from their government. But this anyone in need. does not imply that independence is impossible.

In principle, Islam allows for impartial giving, and all Finally, can Muslim charitable giving be neutral? The Muslim NGOs in the UK claim impartiality. While in practice Islamic concept of a united ummah or community of it might be difficult for Muslim NGOs to convince their believers precludes any neutral stance: in the event of donors to abide by an impartial interpretation of zakat, this conflict between a Muslim and a non-Muslim population, is an operational difficulty, rather than a fundamental reli- Muslim should stand alongside Muslim. The reality, of gious impossibility. If there is no intrinsic reason why course, is much more complex. Muslims should be unable to support impartiality, then there should be no religious reason not to accept non- The war on terror has deepened the perception that Muslim NGOs or NGO workers in a Muslim context. Muslims are being attacked by the West. Humanitarian workers associated with Western NGOs therefore are Is Muslim charitable aid independent? Can Muslims and seen as part of this struggle, and lose their neutrality as Muslim NGOs give zakat or sadaqa independently from a consequence. This is a very serious problem, but it is a political affiliations? Answering this question entails political problem, not a religious one. Nor has the looking into the division between the political, the religious concept of the ummah won universal acceptance within and the civil in Islam. It is commonly believed that, because the Muslim world as no one group can lay claim to theo- the Prophet Mohammed was not only a spiritual leader but logical hegemony. There is therefore no basis upon also the supreme ruler of Medina, there is no distinction which to claim that solidarity between Muslims would between these different spheres. Indeed, some Muslim necessarily come before solidarity with humanity as a states, such as Mauritania, Saudi Arabia and Iran, partly whole. There seem to be no grounds to argue that base their legitimacy on their role as protectors of the faith. Muslims should not recognise or accept others as However, processes of modernisation throughout the neutral actors. Muslim world have brought a higher degree of separation between state and religion in countries like Algeria, Turkey The legal basis of Western humanitarianism and Tunisia, as well as increased secularisation. This Western humanitarianism relies on a framework of inter- suggests that, while the origins of Islam as a religion were national law, particularly international humanitarian law, intertwined with politics and state formation, this has not refugee law and human rights law, in order to operate. Is always remained the case. Muslim charitable giving will not this legal framework compatible with Islamic law? therefore necessarily be linked to the state or to the clerical establishment. International law and Islamic law share a common history, and have influenced each other since at least the middle This would imply that, in principle, non-Muslim humani- of the nineteenth century. US academic Sohail Hashmi tarian workers should be able to present their organisa- notes that ‘some Muslim writers even argue that the

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES tion as independent from state imperatives, provided of antecedents for the western just war tradition’s concerns

HUMANITARIAN 44 exchange with proportionality and discrimination in war, which in killed since March 2003. The majority were Afghans. In Iraq, turn contributed to the rise of humanitarian law, lie in many of the aid workers kidnapped are Iraqis. Political gain, Islamic conceptions of Jihad’. not religion, is the driving factor. Being alike, by supposedly sharing similar values, does not necessarily keep one safe. Within the legal tradition of Islam, many parallels can be drawn with international humanitarian law. The status of ‘Cultural proximity’ is not the answer to the problems of non-combatant, for example, is fully recognised, and access and insecurity that Western NGOs currently face in combatants have to obey a set of mandatory rules in war, countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. What is needed including injunctions prohibiting the destruction of civilian instead is investment in training to infuse in humanitarian objects and the appropriation of civilian property. Life is workers an interest in learning about frameworks other sacred within Islam, and the enormity of taking innocent life than their own. This would go some way towards ensuring is expressed in many verses of the Koran. Refugees, or ‘sons that anyone could work anywhere. It would not, however, of the road’, are given a preferential status within the Islamic overcome the other barriers that might render the work of tradition. This stems from the Prophet’s flight from Mecca to Western humanitarians difficult in some Muslim coun- Medina and the protection offered to him there. Islamic law tries, such as a colonial past or current politics. affirms the practice of providing refuge to persecuted people and that asylum should be provided without discrim- The inability of NGOs to negotiate access with armed non- inating between free persons and those who are enslaved, state actors is not new; Maoist guerrillas have refused rich and poor, men and women, or Muslims and non- access to humanitarian workers in Nepal for many years. Muslims. The medieval theologian Ibn al Arab suggests that Today, however, the focus seems to be on those armed states are obliged to offer asylum ‘where there is injustice, non-state actors who are fighting a supposedly Muslim intolerance, physical persecution, disease and financial fight. Muslim aid workers are not necessarily able to insecurity’. There is, in other words, clear compatibility negotiate with these fighters any better than their non- between the legal framework upon which Western humani- Muslim counterparts. tarianism is based, and Muslim legal tradition. Nouria Brikci is a research officer at MSF (UK), concen- Why has this common ground not kept aid trating particularly on Muslim perspectives of humanitari- workers safe? anism. The views expressed here are her own. Islam and the principles and laws underpinning Western humanitarianism share numerous common features. There References and further reading should therefore be enough common ground between the two traditions to enable any humanitarian worker, whatever J. Benthall and J. Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent: The Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (New their origin, to operate in a Muslim context. NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND York: IB Tauris, 2003). However, the view of Islam presented here is not neces- James Cockayne, ‘Islam and International Humanitarian sarily shared by all Muslims, and particularly by those Law: From a Clash to a Conversation between extremist groups for whom the ummah is a reality, and for Civilizations’, International Review of the Red Cross, whom concepts of neutrality or independence ring hollow. vol. 84, no. 847, September 2002, pp. 597–625. For such groups, these ideas are in profound opposition to their understanding of their religion. This stems from the Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, Le Jihad Humanitaire (Paris: fact that, within Islam itself, there are many different Flammarion, 2002). schools and interpretations. To believe that Muslims consti- Sohail Hashmi, ‘Saving and Taking Life in War: Three tute one homogenous family, and hence to believe that Modern Muslim Views’, in Jonathan E. Brockopp (ed.), sending Muslims to Muslim contexts or relying solely on Islamic Ethics Of Life – Abortion, War and Euthanasia Muslim NGOs (whether local or international) will ensure (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, the safety of aid workers, is profoundly simplistic. In 2003). Afghanistan, for example, over 30 aid workers have been

Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost benefit analysis Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton Network Paper 49, November 2004

This Network Paper is intended to inform the growing discussion on risk reduction in a number of ways. First, it aims to provide evidence-based research to confirm that investment in mitigation and preparedness (DMP) initiatives is money well spent from an economic point of view. Second, it intends to show how cost benefit analysis can be used as an analytical tool to choose between different types of DMP intervention. Third, it aims to provide evidence of the potential for using DMP as a significant element in both humanitarian relief and development programming. Such evidence can also be used to advocate for increasing the resources allocated to specific DMP interventions.

For a copy of this Network Paper, contact [email protected]. The paper is available for download at the HPN website: www.odihpn.org/documents/networkpaper049.pdf.

Number 29 • March 2005 45 46 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES Code of Conduct is considered important include: Code ofConductisconsidered important was strongly appreciated. Reasons given astowhythe Code ofConductinthefield,peopleholditdear, andit Despite thefactthatlittleexplicitreference ismadetothe ofthem’. the principlesare part trations oftheprinciples,theydon’t quotetheprinciples, with people’s experience.Manycolleaguesare livingillus- said:‘inmanycases,theCode coincides One interviewee v Hague foraconference todiscusstheCodeofConduct’s policy-makers from across theworldgathered in The In September2004,130humanitarianpractitioners and evaluations. DEC hasusedtheCodeinasimilarwayseveral other sentatives ofsignatoryorganisations. andtheresults of115repre- ofasurvey sions, interviews practice. isbasedontheconference discus- This article r conference, DisasterStudies Wageningen conducted lenging toolthantheyhadexpected’. code evaluators founditamore effective andchal- As oneoftheevaluators, Tony Vaux, notes:‘inusingthe out by theUK’s DisastersEmergency Committee(DEC). evaluation response carried oftheGujarat earthquake for example,itwasusedasthetermsofreference inan interest intheCodeofConducthasincreased; in2001, ciples forhumanitarianorganisations. Inrecent years, great asetofshared potentialvalue prin- inarticulating Code ofConduct,withits300-plussignatories,isstill least asaresult oftheAfghanistanandIraq crises,the today’s intensediscussionsofhumanitarianism,not Crescent Movement andNGOsinDisasterRelief. Given of ConductfortheInternationalRed Cross andRed The year 2004markedthetenthanniversary oftheCode ples were other hand,there wasasensethattheCodeanditsprinci- actual reference ismadetotheCodeinfield.On other fieldpurposes,thegeneral opinionisthatlittle Otherwise, forprogramming, negotiatingaccessand Code isalsoincreasingly usedforpurposesofevaluation. tion courses,forexample.AstheDECexampleshows, the training processes, ininduc- ofagencies’ mainly aspart of theCodeinhumanitarianpractice. Instead,itisused Our research revealed thatthere islittleexplicitusemade The value oftheCode Dorothea Hilhorst, Wageningen University Dead oralive?Ten yearsoftheCodeConductforDisaster Relief edgecenter/nieuwsitem.asp?nieuws=50. Netherlands andotherDutchNGOs. Seehttp://www.pso.nl/knowl- Cordaid, WorldNetherlands, incooperation withIFRC, Vision organised by theNetherlandsRed Cross, PSOandNovib/Oxfam P 2 The conference, entitled‘Ten Years oftheCode ofConduct: 1 Tony Vaux, esearch onopinionsoftheCode,andhow itwasusedin alue, anditspossiblefuture. rinciples inPractice’, tookplaceon23September2004.Itwas HUMANITARIAN exchange implicitly The DECandtheRed Cross Code–apolicyproposal incorporated intohumanitarianwork. 2 In preparation forthe 1 Since then,the . tingent. it makesthefundamentalhumanitarianprinciplescon- Some takethepositionthatCodeisweak in that people inthemedia. andtherepresentation ofdisaster-affectedparticipation tion ofvulnerability, collaboration withlocalpartners, pecting localculture, accountability, thelong-termreduc- development-oriented perspectives. They concernres- on how aidshouldbegiven, andare inspired by more R and independence,albeitinaweaker form thantheoriginal humanitarian principlesofhumanity, impartiality, neutrality concernthefundamental tarian aid. The firstfourarticles The Codeaccommodatesdifferent approaches tohumani- for theiractions,andpurposesofaccountability. But italsomakeslessusefulforNGOsseekingguidance The cautiouslanguagemakestheCodecomprehensive. canimposecontradictory demands. the different articles such as‘we shallendeavour to’, instead of‘we will’,and The Codeisnotregulatory. Itusescautiouslanguage, r behaviour. The Code does not,however, provide clear tudes isoutsidethescopeofacceptablehumanitarian example, todistributeBiblesorpromote racist atti- warlords,broad for agreement thatusingaidtosupport humanitarian aid.Itsetsparameters forthataid. There is The CodeofConductdoesnotprovide ablueprint for Ten years on,andwith304signatories,theCodehas • Itisrelatively conciseandsimple;there isnoneedfor • Itisareference fordiscussionsbetween humanitarian • Itprovides acommonreference pointfordiscussions • Itdefineshumanitariansasagainstgovernments and • Itconstitutesabodyofcommonlyshared principles. • contingent wording andthe broad nature oftheCodeisin On thebasisofourresearch, Iwouldargue insteadthatthe mental principlesover theothersixarticles. humanitarian aidis,andshouldprioritisethefunda- present text. The Codeshoulddefinemore clearlywhat neutrality,ciples, inparticularly whichisill-definedinthe future theCodeshouldstrengthen thefundamentalprin- for example, 3 This positionismosteloquentlypropagated by NickStockton; see, unpublished paper, 2003. egulations astohow humanitarianaidshouldbedone. ed Cross principles. The othersixprinciplesgive directions donor communities. gained broad recognition withinhumanitarianand elaborate training. staff andmarketers. and development divisions,andbetween programme between NGOsandwithstakeholders. the military. 3 According tothisposition,beusefulinthe Humanitarian Values: UnderSiegefrom Geopolitics , fact a strength. In 1999, Stephen Jackson and Peter Walker an active role in follow-up activities. Other organisations cautioned against entrenching the division between could develop projects to promote the Code. humanitarian and development-oriented approaches to aid, and argued for looking at humanitarian aid in a more This is, however, not enough. To become valuable for the contextual way, which acknowledged that some situations future, a mechanism should be put in place to manage the will allow for development-oriented assistance, whereas Code of Conduct. This should have three aims. In the first in others assistance should be limited to relief.4 Working place, it should act as a regulator of the signatories. in the midst of an ethnic conflict requires a different Presently, the International Federation of the Red Cross approach to working in the relative calm of a refugee and Red Crescent (IFRC) is ‘caretaker’ of the Code, but the camp, or in a post-conflict situation. Some situations IFRC has no mandate to remove signatories, and there are require strict neutrality; others do not. Some situations no minimal requirements for signatories. This is problem- allow for a developmental approach; other emergencies atic because there is a status attached to the Code. The require a strict concentration on life-saving activities. In EC’s Humanitarian Aid Office ECHO, for example, makes extremely tense situations, local organisations may not be being a signatory to the Code one of its conditions for reliable; in others, it might be highly unethical and ineffi- funding. cient not to rely on local groups. In these circumstances, there can be no blueprints for humanitarian aid, and Second, the mechanism should be a platform where humanitarian policy needs to be attuned to the context. issues pertaining to the Code in practice can be The Code of Conduct provides an instrument to help discussed. Such a discussion should include questions humanitarian decision-making in a differentiated and about complaint mechanisms and (self-) monitoring contextual way. procedures. The Code presently contains no sections about monitoring or complaint procedures. This is The future of the Code consistent with its intention, expressed in the preamble, The revived interest in the Code of Conduct, its high value to be a ‘voluntary code, enforced by the will of organisa- in the eyes of signatories and its potential utility in tions accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in humanitarian decision-making suggest that it is worth the Code’. Our research showed broad agreement that keeping the Code alive. To fulfil its potential, the Code the articles should be binding, and that beneficiaries should become more institutionalised. There are many should be able to use the Code to complain about poor ways by which signatories could incorporate the Code into aid provision. There is also agreement that self-reporting their internal and external affairs. Based on our research, should be a requirement. There thus appears to be a here are some examples: constituency in support of discussing possibilities for complaints and monitoring, or self-monitoring. This • Announce on the agency’s website that the agency accords with a trend among the many local codes – in RCIEADPLC NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND had signed up to the Code, and insert the text of the Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan, for example – to intro- Code on the website. duce mechanisms for complaints and monitoring. • Incorporate the Code into the organisation’s reports. Introducing complaint procedures would additionally • Produce internal guidelines or a policy paper making result in an ongoing dialogue around what is acceptable clear how the principles of the Code relate to the humanitarian behaviour. organisation’s principles or other standards adopted by the organisation. Thirdly, the mechanism should consider amendments to • Make compliance of, or respect for, the Code part of the wording of the Code. To retain its relevance, three contracts, and ensure that staff sign up to this when problems deserve priority: they join the organisation. • Make the Code part of training curricula. • Articles 3 and 4 on neutrality and independence • Make the Code a standard part of the terms of refer- should be strengthened and clarified. ence for evaluations. • Article 5 on respect for local culture should be elabo- • Refer to the Code in general policies. rated. • Provide a complaint mechanism for people served by • The wording of the entire Code must be adjusted to the organisation. remove its bias towards international NGOs, and make • Ensure self-assessment or peer reviews of the organi- it equally relevant for local NGOs. sation’s accordance with the Code. These amendments can be made without changing the There is significant scope for initiatives within and spirit of the articles or the scope of the Code of Conduct. between signatories to promote the Code. The DEC has used the Code in its evaluations. The International Council Dorothea Hilhorst is senior lecturer in Disaster Studies of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and the Steering Committee of Wageningen University. She can be contacted at: for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) have initiated a [email protected]. A paper prepared for the Hague project to write a commentary to the Code, and the group conference, A Living Document: The Code of Conduct of of Dutch NGOs that organised the Hague conference plays the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, by Dorothea Hilhorst, can be down- 4 Stephen Jackson and Peter Walker, ‘Depolarising the Broadened and loaded at www.pso.nl/asp/documentsite.asp?document Back-to-Basics Relief Models’, Disasters, 23(2), 1999, pp. 93–114. =363.

Number 29 • March 2005 47 48 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES community gathered atKobe: The declaration setsouttheapproach ofthe Declaration.pdf). negotiated (www.unisdr.org/wcdr/official-doc/Draft-Hyogo- that theHyogo Declaration (namedafterKobe’s prefecture) was committee. This was thereal politicalbattlefield.Itwashere Finally, oftheRussian doll,there wasthedrafting attheheart presentations anddiscussions. and high-level roundtable discussions,whichfeatured formal Government delegationsspent mostoftheirtimeattheplenary universities. village groups, municipalauthoritiesandresearchers from local control, a process that,liketherebuilding ofKobe, involves local implementation process forflood,avalanche andmudslide canton Valais presented areview ofitsplanningand africa/index.html). Attheotherendofspectrum,Swiss development inKenya andSomalia(seehttp://iri.columbia.edu/ University onusingclimatechangedatatohelpplanagricultural interesting, withafascinatingstudypresented by Columbia the sessionsonclimatechangeanddisasterswere themost throughout theweek onjustaboutevery possiblesubject.For me, Next were thethematicclusters:five parallel setsofworkshops I y system fortheIndianOcean,tobeoperational withinone agenciespledgingtocreate atsunamiwarning states andUN preparedness’, toquotefrom the front page. The conference saw ‘ geological andweather-related ina warningsystemsoftheUN was alsolaunched. This sitebringstogetherinoneplaceallofthe early-warningsystemwebsite (www.hewsweb.org)The newUN (www.reliefweb.net). w exhibitions ofthegreat Kobe Inthemiddleof earthquake. search and rescue equipment.More soberingwere thephoto beach-warning signsinSinhalesetosurvival rations andhi-tech manufacturer showing theirwares, from freshly run-uptsunami there wastheexhibitionhall,withjustaboutevery gadget themetothem. Then though, hadadistinctlyurban/earthquake cultural heritagefrom the effectsofdisasters.Mostsessions, to thevoice ofvictims,bio-diversity anddisastersprotecting there were thepublicNGOmeetings,great sessionsonlistening processes. Ontheoutside layers ofotherseeminglyimportant like thebaby atthemiddleofaRussian doll,behindlayers and conferences isalwaysinthedrafting committee,hiddenaway, on DisasterReduction. The real businessoftheseinternational Some 4,000peoplecametoKobe toattendthe World Conference been well learnedinKobe. disaster hastobedriven ofthedisaster–has by thesurvivors create animpressive rebirth. The lesson–thatrecovery after came togethertenyears agoandhave workedtogethersinceto local government, thecorporate sectorandnationalgovernment of Kobe ishow ithastransformed itself. Science,civilsociety, trauma andthelossofhomeslivelihoods. Butthereal impact still have cracks, andnoteveryone hasyet recovered from the history. Today, allhasbeenrebuilt. Afewoftheolderbuildings city suffered inmodern oneofthemostdevastating earthquakes R K global multi-hazard watch site to support humanitarian global multi-hazard watchsitetosupport EWP.pdf). ear (seewww.unisdr.org/wcdr/media/pressrelease/PR200505- obe, Japan,wasthevenue forthe World Conference onDisaster eduction between 18and22January2005. Ten years ago,the eek, ReliefWeb launcheditsnewwebsite intheexhibition HUMANITARIAN We v society, includingNon-governmental organizations and national organizations andfinancial institutions,civil stakeholders, includinggovernments, regional andinter- ofinvolving all cation, amongothers,andtheimportance r eduction, sustainabledevelopment and poverty eradi- olunteers, theprivate sectorandthescientific community.

r ecognize theintrinsicrelationship between disaster exchange P eter Walker, Feinstein InternationalFamine Center The Kobe conference: areview 2) 1) There were three keybattles: (www.unisdr.org/wcdr/official-doc/programme-outcome.pdf). ment wasbrought, foughtover andfinallyagreed upon It istothiscommitteethatthedraft programme outcomedocu- r failure, andtheirreduction asamatterofgoodgovernance, risk now on, willbeseenessentiallyasanexpression ofdevelopment Disasters,atthisconference andhopefullyfrom This isimportant. 3) W seriously, ofdevelopment andnotasanafterthought. aspart moment andpushedfordisasterreduction tobe taken v but credit shouldbegiven tocivilsocietygroups fortheir The finaloutcomedocumentwasahard-fought compromise, tangible targets andnomeasurable goalsondisasterreduction. the conference proceed withnochangedcommitment, following theIndianOceantsunami,itwouldbeimmoral tolet on dayfouroftheconference, captured theconcernofmanythat, The civilsocietyinitiative, thoughtupondaytwoandpresented • Callsforfinancialcommitments. • Delineatesrealistic targets andtimeframes. • Integrates disaster riskreduction intodevelopment policy. • that the WCDR Framework ofAction: r the declaration, callingfor‘people-centered disasterrisk Some 45groups cametogethertopublishtheirown version of andSouthern,wouldhave likedmore. NGOs, bothNorthern edu. Center, Tufts University. Hisemail address ispeter.walker@tufts. P translates intoaction. planning. We have come alongwayintherhetoric.Let ushope it r mitigation through integrated approaches, notjusttechnology; Disasters asdevelopment failures, notgeo-metrological hazards; the outcomedocumentofthisconference isagreat stepforward. International DecadeforNatural DisasterReduction in1990,then changes addup. Ifwe lookbacktothebeginningof change onaday-to-daybasis,butover theyears the small and negotiationfeellikeageologicalprocess. Oneseessolittle eduction andlivelihood focus. ebuilding through theleadershipofcivil society, notcentral eduction anddisasterpreparedness’. The statementurged ociferous lobbying, andtothosegovernments thatseized the eter Walker ill itall w country delegations. The outcomedocumentisfullofthose from many but intheendfightwaslost,despitesupport delegations tosetmeaningfultargets fordisasterreduction, NGOs TearFund andActionAid led thebattletopersuade W victory. acknowledgement ofclimatechangestayed in.Asmall by not climatechange).Intheend,afterheavylobbying led (global changeandweather patternchangewere fine,but delegation wasadamantlyopposedtotheuseofphrase W v integration ofriskreduction associatedwithexistingclimate programmes fordisasterriskreduction’, and‘Promote the ‘Publish andperiodicallyupdateasummaryofnational baseline assessmentsofthestatusdisasterriskreduction’, to setthemup. States have pledgedto‘publish national specific targets, itdoesincludeacommitmenttomechanism The third battlewaswon.Althoughthetextcontainsno risk reduction. Outlines anaccountableprocess formainstreaming disaster ariability andfuture climatechange’. easel-words ‘should’, ‘endeavour’, ‘support’, ‘cooperate’. ould specifictargets besetfordisasterreduction? The UK ould climatechangebementionedornot? The US

the Swedish, BritishandSwiss delegations, make anydifference? Attimes,internationaldiplomacy is Director oftheFeinstein InternationalFamine ENDPIECE

Tsunamis, accountability and the humanitarian circus David Rieff, writer and policy analyst

The debate over humanitarian res- ponsibility and accountability dates back at least to the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, and the 1996 Danish government-sponsored

Joint Evaluation of the International ©Reuters/Yves www.alertnet.org Herman, courtesy Response to the Genocide in Rwanda. Since then, the production of new statements of humanitarian principles, standards and codes of conduct has been a growth industry within the growth industry that the relief world became in the 1990s. The Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, the Humanitarian Acc- ountability Project International and the Plate-forme Qualité are just three Boxes of humanitarian aid at a camp near Galle, Sri Lanka, January 2005 among a plethora of examples. Alongside these guidelines and codes, there are institutions that, to the extent that the NGO world and the UN like the Active Learning Network for Accountability and specialised agencies were experiencing difficulties, this Performance (ALNAP), whose raison d’être has been to was because they were being instrumentalised by states, foster the diffusion and acceptance of what has been the most egregious offender being the United States, and presented as a new, more responsive, more beneficiary- the most obvious examples of co-option being the respecting approach to relief work. More recently, 21 govern- attempt to turn relief NGOs into subcontractors of the war ments have tried to develop improved guidelines for effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. The general assumption so-called Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). among humanitarian agencies was that they had changed for the better, even if the world, unfortunately, had not. Confronted with all this hard work, thought and scruple, it There would be no more humanitarian circuses à la Goma; might be reasonable to assume that the most egregious no rush to be present, no matter what the actual needs of errors of the recent humanitarian past – what Nicholas the beneficiaries or the competencies of the agencies, à la Stockton once called ‘the deterioration of humanitarian Kosovo; and no more misleading advertising campaigns space, with a proliferation of agencies and a high degree implying – as MSF had done in the 1980s with its claim of amateurism’ – would have become a thing of the past. that ‘we have two billion people in our waiting room’ – a After all, by the end of the 1990s the need to reject the old direct correlation between how much money an NGO image of the aid worker as a Western freebooter, bringing received and how much (presumably limitless) good it in expertise and monopolising authority in zones of need could do; no more disaster pornography of ‘before and and conflict, was an article of faith among mainline after’ photos; in short, no more humanitarian presump- Western aid agencies (though it has continued to mark tion. Nor, said the Code of Conduct, would agencies allow the conduct of many SRSGs – Special Representatives of themselves to be used as instruments of foreign policy by the UN Secretary-General – whose style has become their donor governments (a commitment that was compre- markedly more ‘colonial’, while NGO conduct has become hensively abandoned in Afghanistan and Iraq).

more egalitarian). Much internal debate and many reform ENDPIECE initiatives within mainstream NGOs such as Oxfam, CARE Accountability and the Indian Ocean tsunami and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were meant to insti- response tutionalise this new approach. The response of NGOs to the tsunami in late December 2004 suggests to this author that this is one more case of Few serious relief workers would ever claim that institu- let the buyer beware; or, as they say in my home town of tionalising accountability, whether to donors or beneficia- New York City, if you believe that I have a bridge I’d like to ries, was simple. On the contrary, much good work was sell you. From Action Against Hunger (UK) to World done trying to think through why it was so difficult. But it Emergency Relief (UK and US), from well-known actors was generally agreed that progress had been made, and such as Baptist World Aid, Cafod, MSF, Oxfam and Save

Number 29 • March 2005 49 the Children to less familiar names like Operation USA crises like the tsunami, where the Western public and and Clear Path International, the list of relief agencies on Western donor governments are attentive and engaged. the ground in the countries and areas affected by the tsunami is a who’s who of the mainstream relief world. On its website, Oxfam has a lot of sensible things to say Practically every relief NGO capable of deploying about the need for debt relief for tsunami-affected coun- personnel and getting supplies over long distances is tries, and the need to pursue long-term development not there, not to mention UN specialised agencies, Western only in the affected areas but throughout the poor world. government institutions (such as USAID, the US military But in advertisements in the US in January, headed ‘Help the and the French ministries of Cooperation and Health), let Tsunami Victims’, Oxfam America claimed that ‘immediate alone local government authorities and local NGOs. food, shelter, and clean water are needed for victims of the Asian earthquake. Oxfam America, one of the world’s largest Given the staggering amounts of grant money available humanitarian agencies, is working tirelessly to provide aid from Western governments and regional states, and the to the survivors and prevent the death toll from rising need- unprecedented level of private interest, it is not surprising lessly. In Sri Lanka, one of the areas hardest hit by the that so many NGOs are able to fund programmes in the tsunamis, Oxfam is already assembling 25,000 food kits and tsunami zones. But how much of this programming is shelter for 10,000 families. The survivors need your help’. actually, really needed? How much is duplication? Some of And of course they do, just not in the way that this advert the material supplied – and there has been the usual influx claims. Oxfam is not alone in using this kind of language, of relief kits, blankets, tents, food, water purification but this is, I would argue, a misdescription of the situation. supplies, shelter construction and medical and public In particular, it was always extremely unlikely that the death health expertise – has without doubt been useful. But the toll among survivors would rise very much – in a tsunami public health emergency predicted by the World Health one generally either dies or survives. Organisation and UNICEF did not take place. Even leaving aside such ill-advised claims as the one made by the French Obviously, to say this is not to claim that there was not a Health Minister that dead bodies would cause epidemics great deal of human need in Banda Aceh and the rest of (an assertion icily described by Rony Brauman as pre- northern Sumatra, in Sri Lanka, or in Thailand. Nor is it to Pasteurian), OCHA’s repeated insistence that a post- minimise the task of reconstruction and redevelopment tsunami humanitarian disaster was possible, one that that will be necessary if these regions are to recover (obvi- could take as many lives as the tsunami itself, proved ously for the families and friends of those who have unfounded. NGOs with expertise in building refugee camps perished, recovery will be a matter of generations; being deployed throughout the affected zones, but there was made whole materially, even assuming that this is virtually no need for NGO-built refugee camps because possible, will only be one, subordinate part of the story). survivors were taken in by family and friends. Nor was food But it is to insist, as MSF-France’s president, Jean-Hervé security a major issue in most (though not all) stricken Bradol, has put it, that ‘the reconstruction of a region, [or] areas. In fact, there were very few food shortages, hardly of a country is what we call public aid for development. surprising in a region of such natural abundance, and the It’s the domain of states, of the World Bank, and the G-8. local health authorities actually coped very well, all things [So] if one asks individual donors [in Western countries], considered. In short, the massive deployments of foreign people who already finance this aid through their taxes, to relief workers were to a very considerable extent an do it through their donations as well, one must be very exercise in superfluity. As MSF-Belgium’s assessment precise, very clear about what and how the money one is report, written one month after the tsunami, puts it, in asking them for is going to be used’. affected areas of Aceh the agency found ‘a population in generally good health. No wave of epidemics has been Plus ca change? detected ... even though the risk remains real’. MSF-France was the first mainline relief NGO to break from the apparent NGO consensus that there is virtually Yet donations to MSF-Belgium equalled the group’s entire no limit on the role relief groups can play, and conse- budget for its operations in Angola, Afghanistan, Liberia, quently no logical reason not to keep on soliciting for and Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accepting contributions for programmes in the tsunami combined. This pattern of giving has been repeated across zone. Since then other groups, including Oxfam, have the relief world. But to my knowledge no NGO has said to followed suit. But when it made the announcement, in DFID or USAID or ECHO, ‘sorry, we don’t really have a role to early January, MSF’s decision was greeted with consterna- play in the relief effort, and, actually, the money you’ve tion by other mainline groups, who either denounced it earmarked for Aceh would actually be much better spent in (ACF), or demanded that it be explained very carefully, lest Darfur or Angola’. On the contrary, what the tsunami has the public misunderstand (Médecins du Monde). I would demonstrated is that, for all the conferences, internal argue that this in itself demonstrates how little change reviews, pledges of accountability and transparency, codes there has been in the practice of humanitarian of conduct and the like, the humanitarian circus is alive and fundraising, and in how mainline NGOs construe their well and performing in Aceh. Goma rules – or more to the role. If one assumes that relief NGOs do not, ipso facto, point Kosovo rules, since after all the cholera epidemic in need to be involved in every crisis and are limited in what Goma was real – still apply. For all the talk of coordination they can accomplish, the controversy that followed MSF’s and accountability, the need to maintain market share announcement that it was no longer soliciting funds for

ENDPIECE continues to trump sound humanitarian practice – at least in relief efforts in the tsunami zone seems not just

HUMANITARIAN 50 exchange ENDPIECE 51 (New York: A Bed for the At the Point of a Gun: (New York: Simon & Simon York: (New mber 29 • March 2005 mber 29 • March Nu , 14 February 2005, www.timesonline. , 14 February is a New York-based writer and policy analyst. writer and York-based is a New The Times a ‘remarkably, singularly effective, swift and muscular’ singularly effective, a ‘remarkably, interna- en Bigger Rehabilitation Task’, UN News Service, 26 January 2005, Task’, en Bigger Rehabilitation ean and Ben Hoyle, ‘Charities Struggle To Spend Cash for To ‘Charities Struggle ean and Ben Hoyle, sunami’, 1 At a press conference on 26 January 2005, Egeland claimed that conference 1 At a press ‘tens of thousands’ odds’ tremendous ‘against had been saved of lives by Effort, Relief UN Faces Tsunami into See ‘One Month tional response. Ev http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13140. Eleven years after Goma, this remains the fall-back the this remains Goma, after years Eleven UN and the NGOs for many position as a both system take the worst, predict and in its aftermath: crisis infolds, of a as indicative problems minor public health even in a and continue apocalypse to come, possible not quite sure ‘we’re that in effect says mode fundraising with good people but we’re money, do with the what we’ll is This think of something’. we’ll good intentions and in the short the term Yes, wise. nor neither responsible such a In the long term, however, public is engaged. of accountability in any serious – the antithesis strategy of any code of conduct worthysense, and the antithesis of cynicism. breed the name – can only David Rieff action includes His work on humanitarian in Crisis Night: Humanitarianism 2003) and, most recently, Schuster, and Armed Intervention Dreams Democratic forthcoming, 2005). See also Alexandra Simon & Schuster, Fr T co.uk/article/0,,18690-1483564,00.html. John Twigg

by 1 Disaster risk reduction: Disaster risk reduction: Good Practice Review 9, March 2004 Review Good Practice mitigation and preparedness in aid programming mitigation and preparedness ecognise the main issues that must be understood and addressed when carrying out risk reduction or disaster when carrying out risk reduction ecognise the main issues that must be understood and addressed mitigation and preparedness initiatives; and initiatives; mitigation and preparedness cycle. the project throughout these issues in practice, to address terms – how understand – at least in broad appreciate the significance of hazards (primarily natural hazards) and the risks associated with them; and the risks associated with hazards) (primarily natural the significance of hazards appreciate of such efforts; the value planning and implementation, and the need for risk management in project appreciate r a copy of this Good Practice Review, contact [email protected]. The Review is also available for download at for download is also available The Review contact [email protected]. Review, r a copy of this Good Practice • that can approaches of counter-risk and the variety the scale and extent of the problem, It is easy to be intimidated by goal to be attained It is a long-term overnight. against disasters will not be reached be taken. But lasting protection time, over can be built up incrementally to hazards resilience Community of improvement. a continuous process through is sound. as long as the basic approach Fo www.odihpn.org. the HPN website: The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 has shown yet again the loss of life and immense damage natural disasters again the loss of life and immense damage natural yet The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 has shown Ethical, in aid programming. of mitigation and preparedness in favour to arguments can cause. It has also added weight and aid suffering. Many researchers human life and prevent oblige us to act to protect humanitarian considerations to sustainable development. major threat disasters as a identified natural institutions have planners and managers to: aims to help project Review This Good Practice • • •r xfam in its post-tsunami assessment), let alone more xfam in its post-tsunami assessment), elief organisation was assertingorganisation elief contributed it had that MSF’s decision was not meant to preclude international to preclude decision was not meant MSF’s On the contrary, areas. affected aid reaching development of of the depth and breadth position was that a crisis MSF’s was such that it was the tsunamis by the one engendered NGOs. relief of emergency the remit fundamentally beyond call for humanitarian humility – some- It was, in effect, a course of the much in evidence over thing that has not been of accountability A serious reading the tsunami response. not just the familiar donors would involve towards of perfor- higher standards coordination, demands for more (a key point made by mance for the agencies involved O it would demand that NGOs say benefit concerts. Rather, and regional Western as opposed to little they, clearly how can actually do in the aftermath of the governments, demand candour tsunami. Accountability to donors would money can be spent much the limits lie to how about where an What it would not do is predict usefully and responsibly. this does not occur, apocalyptic outcome and then, when for avertingtake credit Egeland of OCHA has done it, as Jan official to do so). (and he is not the only major relief misplaced, but incomprehensible. A medical emergency medical A incomprehensible. but misplaced, r expertise, and both in resources what it could, that no and was there it received, money much more matter how signifi- least, nothing of any it could do – at nothing else MSF has to the survivors. Interestingly, cant value its supporterscontacted ‘de-restrict’ inviting them to their spent elsewhere; them to be to allow tsunami donations donations. agency is offering to refund the alternatively, Humanitarian Practice Network

The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) is an independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience.

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