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CQR U.S.-Iran Relations Published by CQ Press, an Imprint of SAGE Publications, Inc. www.cqresearcher.com U.S.-Iran Relations Will the nuclear deal ease tensions? nder an agreement last July with the United States and five other world powers, Iran promised to dismantle its military nuclear facilities and refrain U from building a nuclear weapon for at least a decade. In exchange, the United States and other countries lifted stiff economic sanctions placed on Iran because of its nuclear ac - tivities. The agreement has raised speculation that Iran might some - day join China, Vietnam and Cuba — non-democracies a nd former U.S. enemies — in cooperating on trade and diplomacy. Indeed, some believe the deal not only could spur trade between the United Good working relations between Secretary of State John Kerry, left, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif helped bring about the Iranian nuclear deal and States and Iran but also unite them in efforts to stabilize the Middle the quick release of 10 U.S. sailors held by Iran when their patrol boats entered Iranian waters. East. O thers say, however, that improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations is far from certain . I ran continues to antagonize the United States in national security- related incidents. As a result, the United States has imposed new sanctions on Iran unrelated to its nuclear activity. I Moreover, pro-engagement leaders in both countries face internal THIS REPORT N THE ISSUES ....................219 resistance against forming a closer relationship. S BACKGROUND ................225 I CHRONOLOGY ................227 D CURRENT SITUATION ........232 E CQ Researcher • March 4, 2016 • www.cqresearcher.com AT ISSUE ........................233 Volume 26, Number 10 • Pages 217-240 OUTLOOK ......................234 RECIPIENT OF SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS AWARD FOR BIBLIOGRAPHY ................238 EXCELLENCE N AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SILVER GAVEL AWARD THE NEXT STEP ..............239 U.S.-I RAN RELATIONS March 4, 2016 THE ISSUES SIDEBARS AND GRAPHICS Volume 26, Number 10 EXECUTIVE EDITOR: Thomas J. Billitteri • Should the United States 220 A Neighborhood of Turmoil [email protected] 219 seek closer ties with Iran? Iran sits in one of the world’s ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITORS: Kathy Koch , • Should better U.S.-Iranian most unsettled regions. [email protected], Chuck McCutcheon , relations depend on whether [email protected], Iran improves its human-rights Americans, Iranians Eye 221 Each Other Warily Scott Rohrer, [email protected] record? Most U.S. adults view Iran • Can Iranian nuclear activities SENIOR CONTRIBUTING EDITOR: unfavorably. Thomas J. Colin be accurately monitored? [email protected] Details of Iran’s Nuclear 224 CONTRIBUTING WRITERS: Brian Beary, ACKGROUND Deal Marcia Clemmitt, Sarah Glazer, Kenneth Jost, B The agreement with the Reed Karaim, Peter Katel , Barbara Mantel, U.S. and other nations limits Tom Price 225 Hot and Cold Relations Iran’s uranium enrichment for The United States severed 15 years. SENIOR PROJECT EDITOR: Olu B. Davis ties with Iran after the 1979 ASSISTANT EDITOR: Ethan McLeod hostage crisis. Chronology 227 Key events since 1951. INTERN: Molly McGinnis “Axis of Evil” 229 FACT CHECKERS: Eva P. Dasher, President George W. Bush Sanctions Continue to Michelle Harris, Nancie Majkowski, accused Iran of supporting 228 Limit U.S.-Iran Business Robin Palmer terrorism. Trade supporters hope more American products can be Nuclear Negotiations sold to Iran. 231 Iran finalized an international deal last July limiting its Iran President a ‘Loyalist nuclear development. 230 of the System’ Rouhani is watching the An Imprint of SAGE Publications, Inc. nuclear deal before VICE PRESIDENT AND EDITORIAL DIRECTOR, CURRENT SITUATION committing to better HIGHER EDUCATION GROUP: U.S. relations. Michele Sordi Iranian Elections 232 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ONLINE LIBRARY AND Moderates and reform-minded At Issue: REFERENCE PUBLISHING: politicians dealt a blow to 233 Should the United States seek Todd Baldwin hard-liners. closer ties with Iran? Copyright © 2016 CQ Press, an Imprint of SAGE Pub - 232 Avoiding Sanctions lications, Inc. SAGE reserves all copyright and other Companies are prohibited FOR FURTHER RESEARCH rights herein, unless pre vi ous ly spec i fied in writing. from doing business with No part of this publication may be reproduced Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. For More Information electronically or otherwise, without prior written 237 Organizations to contact. permission. Un au tho rized re pro duc tion or trans mis - 234 U.S. Politics sion of SAGE copy right ed material is a violation of Some lawmakers want new Bibliography federal law car ry ing civil fines of up to $100,000. sanctions against Iran tough - 238 Selected sources used. ened. CQ Press is a registered trademark of Congressional Quarterly Inc. The Next Step 239 Additional articles . CQ Researcher (ISSN 1056-2036) is printed on acid-free OUTLOOK paper. Pub lished weekly, except: (March wk. 4) (May 239 Citing CQ Researcher wk. 4) (July wks. 1, 2) (Aug. wks. 2, 3) (Nov. wk. 4) 234 Uncertain Relations Sample bibliography formats. and (Dec. wks. 3, 4). Published by SAGE Publications, Hostility could diminish once Inc., 2455 Teller Rd., Thousand Oaks, CA 91320. Annual the ailing Ayatollah Khamenei full -service subscriptions start at $1,131. For pricing, is replaced as supreme leader, call 1-800-818-7243. To purchase a CQ Researcher report experts say. in print or electronic format (PDF), visit www.cqpress. com or call 866-427-7737. Single reports start at $15. Bulk purchase discounts and electronic-rights licensing are also available. Periodicals postage paid at Thousand Oaks, California, and at additional mailing offices . POST - Cover: AFP/Getty Images/Kevin Lamarque MAST ER: Send ad dress chang es to CQ Re search er , 2600 Virginia Ave., N.W., Suite 600, Wash ing ton, DC 20037. 218 CQ Researcher U.S.-Iran Relations BY CHUCK MCCUTCHEON security-related incidents. What’s THE ISSUES more, the pro-engagement leaders of both nations face or years, a nuclear re - deep skepticism over the nu - actor complex near clear deal at home. F Arak, Iran, stirred global Obama has worked to im - fears that World War III could prove relations with Iran since be looming. The Iranian gov - the deal was clinched last July, ernment claimed the complex but he has less than a year had a peaceful purpose — left in office. Many lawmakers conducting research that could and presidential candidates — benefit hospitals and business - as well as Prime Minister Ben - es. 1 Western experts thought jamin Netanyahu of Israel, a differently, however. stalwart U.S. ally — remain Antiaircraft guns and missiles highly suspicious of Iran, protected the complex, and which the State Department Iran refused to allow outside says supports terrorists and inspectors inside. Finally, the critics say wants to eradicate world’s worries were con - Israel. Some in Congress as e firmed: Experts declared in r well as several candidates run - a n 2014 that the facility was on e ning for the White House want K the verge of being able to pro - a tougher penalties on Iran but t t duce weapons-grade uranium A must contend with Obama / s that could be used to make an e and his veto pen as they await g atomic bomb. 2 a the outcome of November’s m I y Now, after years of interna - t U.S. elections. On the other t e tional pressure, including the G hand, many U.S. allies are / imposition of onerous U.S. eco - P likely to be reluctant to jettison F nomic sanctions, Iran has A the deal because they see big stepped away from its nuclear Graffiti on a building in Tehran, Iran’s capital, says trade opportunities with Iran. “Down with the USA.” Despite Iran’s bellicose attitude program in a highly controversial toward the U.S. government, 53 percent of Iranians have (See sidebar, p. 228. ) deal with far-reaching global- positive feelings about Americans in general, though Tense talk over nuclear security implications. Under nearly 90 percent view the U.S. government negatively. weapons has dominated U.S.- pressure from the United States, Iranian relations for years, to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom The agreement has raised speculation the dismay of some who say it has over - and Germany, Iran said it removed the in political and foreign-policy circles shadowed other areas. Obama’s prede - core of the Arak reactor, pledged to let about whether Iran can someday join cessor, George W. Bush, in 2002 labeled inspectors visit the site and put other China, Vietnam and Cuba — formerly Iran part of an “axis of evil” (along with nuclear research on hold for up to 15 staunch U.S. enemies that now cooperate Iraq and North Korea) for its alleged years. In return, the other countries lifted on trade, diplomacy and other matters, pursuit of atomic weapons despite Iran’s many — though not all — economic even as their political systems remain insistence that its nuclear development sanctions against Iran in January, providing far from American-style democracy. was for peaceful purposes only. 4 some relief to its struggling economy. But any uptick in relations that could “We used to have a wide-ranging and The deal does not limit Iran’s de - bring a flood of U.S. products to Tehran, often well-informed debate about Iran,” velopment of civilian nuclear sites. unite the two countries in stabilizing Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of “We have a rare chance to pursue the Middle East or yield other large the foreign policy program at the Brook - a new path — a different, better future benefits is far from imminent — if it ings Institution, a centrist think tank in that delivers progress for both our peo - occurs at all. Many U.S. sanctions remain Washington, said at a forum last fall be - ples and the wider world,” President in place.
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