Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in Support of Operation Overlord
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A SPECIAL FORCE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEDBURGH PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION OVERLORD A thesis:presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the.requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE .. .WYMAN W. IRWIN, MAJ, USA B.A., ~ethodistCollege, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 1975 .,. ./ , . , ... , . <. 7, : ,;; .: . , I. ! ' I,.< . .;. ., '4.. '... : . .... .. , . ! 7,. --. ... ..< 1 .a,..:.. .: : .. ,.. .... -:. - .- , ..:, . :, . Fort Leavenworth, Kansas ..,,. ..., ,. 1991 . Li L...L ..<:.“,. ..~.::...., .,- -.. ,. : Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A SPECIAL FORCE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEDBURGH PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION OVERLORD A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE by WYMAN W. IRWIN, MAJ, USA B.A., Methodist College, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 1975 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991 Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited. MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate: MAJ Wyman W. Irwin, USA Title of thesis: A Special Force: Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in Support of Operation Overlord Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chairman Samuel/J.) Lgwi4, Ph.D. el Gordon F. Atcheson, M.A. I / ., Member C''Accepted this 7th day of June 1991 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Philip J: Brookes, Ph.D. Prog rams The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii ABSTRACT A SPECIAL FORCE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEDBURGH PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION OVERLORD by Major Wyman W. Irwin, USA, 211 pages. This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission. The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort. These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today's UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank those who have contributed to this study. My thesis committee provided exceptional support and guidance throughout the project. Dr. S. J. Lewis of the Combat Studies Institute showed remarkable patience as committee chairman. He also helped with locating source documents and in making a truly rough draft more readable. Colonel Gordon Atcheson and Mr. John Hunt were a constant source of encouragement. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to those former "Jeds" who provided so much in the way of time and source documents. Their interest and support were evident through the months of correspondence and interviews. Among the American Jedburghs, I wish to express my gratitude to the following: Everett Allen, Colonel (USA, Ret.) Aaron Bank, Jacob Berlin, John Bradner, Philip Chadbourn, the Honorable William E. Colby, Lucien Conein, Paul Cyr, Ray Foster, Dick Franklin, Horace Fuller, Bernard Knox, Lucien Lajeunesse, Bob Lucas, Henry McIntosh, Bob Montgomery, Cecil Mynatt, John Olmsted, Major General (USA, Ret.) John K. Singlaub, Don Spears, Ray Trumps, Allan and Amanda Todd, Bill Thompson, and George Verhaeghe. Charles Carman, another American "Jed", also assisted in providing source documents from the Jedburgh Archives at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. British Jedburghs contributing to the study were Stanley Cannicott, John Montague and Cyril Sell. I am grateful to the following French "Jeds" for their invaluable correspondence: General (Ret.) Paul Aussaresses, General (Ret.) Guy le Borgne, Prince Michel de Bourbon de Parme, Colonel (Ret.) Robert Cantais, Joseph Carbuccia, Robert Clause, Rene Esteve, Francois Franceschi, Joe de Francesco, Maurice Geminel, Adrien Grafeville, Colonel (Ret.) Paul Grall, Claude l'Herbette, Xavier Humblet, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Pierre Jolliet, Marc Lautier, Camille LeLong, Georges Marchal, Jacques Martin, Edgar Mautaint, Roland de Mecquenem, Rene Meyer, Jacques Morineau, Etienne Nasica, Maurice Pirat, Philippe Ragueneau, Jacques Robert, Baron Albert de Schonen, Rene de la Tousche, Robert Toussaint, Francois Verger, and Marcel Vermot. Finally, thanks go to my wife Angie and my sons, Thomas and William, for the many sacrifices and the unwavering support. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ................ ii ABSTRACT ...................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ................. v CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .............. i CHAPTER 2 : ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT .......... 18 CHAPTER 3 : BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE ...... 39 CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT ......... 34 CHAPTER 5: FROM CONCEPT TO PLAN ........... 73 CHAPTER 6: XECRUITING THE FORCE .......... 90 CHAPTER 7 : TRAINING THE FORCE ............ 115 CEAPTER a: CONCLUSIONS .............. 150 APPENDIX A: JEDBURGH TASKS AND TRAIAIAG PRIORITIES . 156 APPENDIX B: STAFF OF THE JEDBURGH TRAINING SCHOOL . 159 APPENDIX C: LONDON JEDBURGH STAFF ......... 163 APPENDIX D: THE TEAMS ................ 165 APPENDIX E: GLOSSARY ............... 177 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................... 191 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............. 205 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Any nation that uses it [partisan warfare] intel- ligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those, who disdain its use. Carl von Clausewitz. On War This study will explain the history of the creation of the Jedburgh project, to include the selection and training of personnel to execute the plan. In the way of a brief introductory definition, the Jedburghs were small special operations teams which were parachuted throughout occupied France and Holland from June through November 1944. Working well behind German lines, the Jedburghs' primary mission was to coordinate activities of the various French and Dutch resistancF,elements to ensure that these activ- ities supported the Allied ground operations. As such, the Jedburghs were the doctrinal forerunners of our present day Army Special Forces.1 1The Jedburghs, as well as OSS Detachment 101 in WWII Burma, can be considered the forerunners in terms of the Army Special Forces mission of unconventional, or partisan, warfare. Other special operations units in the Second World War, such as Merrill's Marauders and the combined American-Canadian First Special Service Force, were forerunners in terms of the SF direct action mission. For more on the history and lineage of U.S. Army Special Forces, 1 This paper will cover the period up to the deployment of the first Jedburgh teams on the night of 5 June 1944. This allows discussion of training, as well as refinement of the Jedburgh plan and its relation to Allied planning for the invasion of the continent, which continued up to D-day. I do not intend to evaluate the operational effectivenesscof the Jedburgh concept or the accomplishments or shortcomings of any of the teams. That is an area for further study. The value of any special operation, particularly within the context of total war, is often a source of debate. Operations such as these are difficult to conduct and even harder to evaluate in terms of their success. For those wishing to pursue the study of the contributions made by the Jedburghs, I would offer the following. Many of those who dispute the contributions made by groups such as the Jedburghs shouid caution against overestimating the expected results of.such operations. It is true that the organized resistance,.aided by the Jedburghs and others, did not 'win' the war for the Allies in Europe. Nor did the signal corps, the engineers, or even the armor or the see Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, 1986), written by a former Jedburgh team member; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, DC, 1982); Charles M. Simpson 111, Inside the Green Berets (Novato, 1983); and Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975 (Novato, 1985). 2 infantry. But each contributed, in its own way, to that victory. That the activities of these special forces and the resistance groups helped to shorten the Allied campaigns in France is almost certain. To fully understand the origin of the Jedburgh concept, it is first necessary