THE BEAUMONT RACE RIOT, 1943

by

JAMES ALBERT BURRAN, III, B.A.

A THESIS IN HISTORY

Submitfced fco fcheGraduafc e Faculfcy of Texas Tech Universifcy in Partial Fulfillmenfc of fche Requiremenfcs for fche Degree of MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Chairm,^ c/f fche Gommifcfcee

/ )f' 7^

Acc^pfced /^

Deatn/ of fche (^raduafcel/^hool August, 1973 6U>±>

• I^H.^ •"* ^"^

:?7

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1 am deeply indebfced fco Professor Alwyn Barr for his direcfcion of fchis fchesis and fco fche ofcher member of my commifcfcee. Professor Harry Jebsen, for his helpful criti­ cism.

11 CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - ii ILLUSTRATION 12 I. INTRODUCTION: RACE RIOTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 II. WAR AITD SOCIAL REDIRECTION 20 III. ANTECEDENTS TO VIOLENCE 59 IV. "IT WAS LIKE HELL": THE RIOT 64 V. "IT EQUALS THE MEUSE-ARGONNE SECTOR": THE AFTERMATH 100 VI. CONCLUSIONS 129 BIBLIOGRAPHY 144

111 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: RACE RIOTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Unifced Sfcafces has been described as having a his­ tory, bufc nofc a fcradifcion of violence. Ifc has a hisfcory of violence because such acfcion has been frequenfc in fche growfch and developmenfc of America; almosfc commonplace afc fcimes. Bufc fche nafcion does nofc have a fcradifcion of domesfcic violence because fche violence has never had an ideological or geographic cenfcer, and mosfc Americans have preferred fco dismiss domesfcic violence, ifc seems, as an unhealfchy ex­ cess. The facfc remains, however, fchafc violence has been a parfc of American hisfcory. Ifcs frequency and persisfcence in our society, even in confcemporary fcimes, are impressive.

Wifch regard fco American domesfcic violence fcwo basic generalizafcions can be made. Firsfc, American violence has been remarkably free of insurrecfcionary fcendencies. Mosfc violence in fche Unifced Sfcafces has been direcfced by one group of cifcizens againsfc anofcher, whefcher based on economic, efchnic, or social lines. The efchnic and economic diversifcy in fchis nafcion, as well as fche diffusion of governmenfcal power, has broughfc aboufc a minimum of cifcizen againsfc sfcafce violence and a frequency of cifcizen versus cifcizen conflicfc.

Richard Hofsfcadfcer and Michael Wallace, eds., American Violence, A Documenfcary Hisfcory (New York, 1971), 337: The other generalization one can make about American violence is that it has had a predominantly conservative underpinning, or the tendency to retain the social status quo through the clear separation of whites and minorities. Violence has been unleashed on abolifcionisfcs, Cafcholics, radicals, labor organizers and workers, and efchnic minor­ ities, among ofchers. Ifc has been used fco profcecfc fche sfcereofcyped "American" or whifce Anglo-Saxon Profcesfcanfc genre. Much of fche violence in America has been perpe- fcrafced by fchose who have been mosfc sensifcive aboufc pro- fcecfcing fchis sfcereofcype, fche middle and especially lower class whifces. The lower class has represenfced fche closesfc socio-economic parallel fco many minorifcy groups, so fchafc fche members of fchis class, fco remain respecfcable in fche eyes of WASP sociefcy, were forced fco make clear fche disfcincfcion befcween fchemselves and minorifcies. So while lower classes have nofc precipifcafced all of American domesfcic violence, fchey have inifciafced much of ifc and have added fco fche main- fcenance of efchnic separafcion. 2 Slave insurrecfcions and fcheir suppression provide early and relafced forms of racial fcurbulence. In fchese cases oppressive condifcions produced violence by slaves which was almosfc wifchoufc excepfcion defeafced by overwhelming and offcen rufchless counfcerforce. Major insurrecfcions included fche

^Ibid. New York slave revolfc of 1712, the Gabriel Prosser incident of 1800, the Louisiana slave insurrection of 1811 (after _ which slaves' heads were placed on exhibit along the Mississippi River), and the Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner uprisings of 1822 and 1831.^

Lynching became a second major form of racial vio­ lence, especially after Reconsfcrucfcion. Vigilanfce commifcfcees conducfced mosfc lynchings which, like revolfcs and insurrecfcions, usually were planned in advance fco some degree and were nofc spontaneous activity. The historian Richard Hofstadter has noted that lynching was in fact so unparalleled elsewhere that it could be considered an American peculiarity. Confcrary fco popular belief, lynching fcook place across fche nafcion insfcead of solely in fche Soufch, and in some insfcances whifces were vicfcimized as well as blacks. There is an inherenfc difference befcween insurrecfcion­ ary acfcivifcies and lynching, and fche fchird general form of racial fcurbulence, riofcing. In fche firsfc fcwo fcypesorgan - izafcion and planned acfcivifcy foimed infcegral parfcs of fche fcofcal scheme. Bufc in race riofcs violence erupfced spon- fcaneously, fche riofcers were of varied socio-economic

5 •^Hofsfcadfcer and Wallace, American Violence, 187-201; Clemenfc Eafcon, A Hisfcory of fche Old Soufch, C2nd ed., New York, 1966), 23T. ZL Hofsfcadfcer and Wallace, American Violence, 20-21. classes, and fche vicfcims were chosen in a random and unpafc- fcerned fashion. So while general causes for violence were similar in all fcypes of racial fcurbulence, fche means fco effecfc fchis fcurbulence and fche physical characfcerisfcics were highly varied. In a broad sense race riofcs may be defined as "gener­ alized responses in which fchere is cafcegorical assaulfc on persons and properfcy by virfcue of fcheir racial membership." This is somewhafc oversimplified bufc does convey a general concepfc from which one may sfcudy fche many variefcies of race riofcs.^ By way of furfcher definifcion race riofcs in general have developed from similar circumsfcances, regard­ less of fche fcime of occurrence or physical and emofcional sefcfcings of fche disorders. Riofcs are mosfc likely fco occur when social insfci- fcufcions funcfcion inadequafcely, or when grievances are nofc resolved, or cannofc be resolved under exisfcing insfcifcufcional arrangemenfcs. The failure of funcfcionaries fco perform fche roles expecfced by one or bofch of fche racial groups, cross-pressures, or fche absence of an insfcifcufcion capable of handling a communifcy problem involving infcerracial relafcions will creafce fche condifcions under which riofcs are mosfc likely.^ Periods of social duress and insfcabilifcy have provided the atmosphere for much of fche nafcion's efchnic riofcing.

-^Sfcanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipifcanfcs and Underlying Condifcions of Race Riofcs," in Racial Violence in fche Unifced Sfcafces, ed. by Allen D. Grimshaw CGhicago, I969J, 36S-69. ^Ibid. The mosfc concenfcrafced periods of racial oufcbreaks include fche years surrounding World War I, fche World War II era, and fche 1960's, ofcherwise known as fche civil righfcs revolu­ tion. Wifchoufc excepfcion fchese fcimes of social redirecfcion and change fosfcered mass insecurifcy on fche one hand and new opporfcunifcies and hopes on fche ofcher. The lack of domesfcic manpower during fche fcwo world wars, for insfcance, vacafced a number of herefcofore predominanfcly whifce posifcions infco which blacks were fchrusfc. Conversely, in fche 1960's a lack of opporfcunifcies in economic and social befcfcermenfc in fche face of rising expecfcafcions aroused frusfcrafcions and sub- sequenfc reacfcions againsfc fche whifce majorifcy, while fco whifces fche desfcrucfcive and vociferous black populafcion represented a fchreafc fco fcradifcional social norms.

The resulfc of fchese periods has been domesfcic racial violence in one form or anofcher, usually by riofcing. The black populafcion saw sociefcy changing fcoo slowly while fche socially conservafcive whifce majorifcy saw sociefcy changing fcoo rapidly. A seemingly hopeless dilemma was creafced, and was offcen solved by violence, which fco many was fche only possible form of recfcificafcion. Furfcher generalizafcions may be exfcended fco include fche developmenfc and physical characfcerisfcics of fcypical race riofcs. The precipifcafcing facfcors usually were confcinua- fcions of some exisfcing pafcfcern which occurred when fche afcmosphere was mosfc flammable, bufc fchey could have been evenfcs so complefcely new and unexpecfced fchafc fchey sfcirred immediate anger. Following fche precipifcafcing incidenfc have been a series of common sfcages in fche progression of race riofcs. These include crowd formafcion,' rumoring and exaggerafcion, fche emergence of leadership, and fche spread of fche riofc acfcion. Affcer fche violence reached ifcs peak governing in- sfcifcufcions fcook refcaliafcory acfcion, which usually involved fche deploymenfc of sfcafce or nafcional fcroops. The riofcs fchen ended in one of fcwo ways; fchey were eifcher broughfc under confcrol by force or exhausfced fchemselves.^

These generalizafcions and broad sfcafcemenfcs may be consfcrued fco include fche various fcypes of riofcs fchafc fche Unifced Sfcafces has experienced. These include anfci- abolifcionisfc riofcs, which basically resemble race riofcs, polifcical riofcs, food riofcs, and indusfcrial riofcs, among ofchers. However, fchese generalizafcions can besfc be infcer- prefced as mosfc consonanfc wifch race riofcs, which have been fche mosfc frequenfc as well as fche mosfc desfcrucfcive fcype of riofcing in America. Whafc may be considered race riofcing began in fchis counfcry as early as fche 1830's. Some of fche mosfc imporfcanfc early racial confronfcafcions fcook fche form of anfci-abolifcion

^Nafchan S. Caplan and Jeffery M. Paige, "A Sfcudy of Ghefcfco Riofcers," Scienfcific American, 219 (Augusfc, 1968), 15-21; Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, Race Riofc (New York, 1968;, xiv-xxiv. riofcs which were usually perpefcrafced in Norfchern urban areas. These riofcs focused on fche leading abolifcionisfc groups and were espoused largely by members of fche American Colonizafcion Sociefcy or persons of similar convicjfcions. In his book Genfclemen of Properfcy and Sfcanding; (New York, 1970), Leonard L. Richards has sfcudied fchese riofcs as a form of racial discord. The anfci-abolifcion riofcs were direcfced nofc so much againsfc abolifcion in many cases bufc were insfcead clear cases of whifces fighfcing black advance­ ment through men like William Lloyd Garrison. The riofcs of New York City in 1834 and in Utica in 1835 offer testimony fco fchis sfcafcemenfc as bofch were led by colonizafcionisfcs. In Alfcon, Illinois, fche riofcers who killed Elijah Lovejoy in 1837 also idenfcified fchemselves as African colonizafcion­ isfcs. Thus, in many cases dispufces occurred befcween abolifcionisfcs and Negrophobes rafcher fchan befcween dif­ ferences of principle fcoward fche befcfcermenfc of fche black man. 8 Wifchoufc including fche anfci-abolifcion riofcs of early fco mid-cenfcury, fche firsfc urban race riofcs occurred afc ap- proximafcely fche same fcime. In 1831 a race riofc erupfced in Providence, Rhode Island, precipifcafced by alleged miscege- nafcion in fche cifcy's black disfcricfc. Ten years lafcer an

o Leonard L. Richards, Genfclemen of Properfcy and Sfcanding, Anfci-Abolifcion Mobs in Jacksonian /unerica (New lork, 1970), 30. 8 even larger race riofc broke oufc in Cincinnafci because of black migrafcion fco fchafc cifcy and economic encroachmenfc upon lower class whifces.

- The nexfc large riofc fco occur was fche. anfci-draffc riofc of 1863 in New York. Despifce ifcs name, fchis incidenfc was acfcually a race riofc in which fcensions befcween lower class whifces, mainly of Irish exfcracfcion, and black migranfcs fco fche cifcy finally caused efchnic fcurbulence. In nearly a week of riofcing nofc less fchan fchree hundred persons died. Ofcher race riofcs of fche Civil War and Reconsfcrucfcion period occurred in several urban areas of fche Soufch as well as fche Norfch.^ Although lynching, vigilanfcism, and individual murders abounded fchroughoufc fche Gilded Age and fche firsfc decades of fche fcwenfciefch cenfcury, no major race riofc fcook place from fche fcime of Reconsfcrucfcion unfcil 1898, when fche Wilmingfcon, Norfch Carolina, riofc occurred. While fchis incidenfc had ifcs anfcecedenfcs as far back as 1894, fche major cause was fficfcion befcween Bourbon Democrafcs and a fusion of Populisfcs and Republicans which was sympafchefcic fcoward blacks. Affcer considerable harassmenfc, fche Demo­ crats ousted fcheir opponenfcs, including black office­ holders, in an elecfcion on November 8, 1898. On

-^Hofsfcadfcer and Wallace, American Violence, 218-29; Some of fchese include Newark, Jersey Cifcy, Troy, Bosfcon, Toledo, Evansville, New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis, Laurens, Soufch Carolina, and Meridian, Mississippi. 9 November 10 fche whifce cifcizenry of Wilmingfcon complefced the coup by riofcing againsfc fche cifcy's blacks, and killed perhaps as many as one hundred of fchem. Affcer fche Wilmingfcon affray, large scale racial vio­ lence disappeared unfcil 1906, when fche Afclanfca race riofc erupfced. This riofc was represenfcafcive of fche Progressive Era, because in spifce of lifcfcle or no reform fco help blacks, fchey in facfc began fco advance on educafcional and economic levels, fchus causing whifce resenfcmenfc. This con- difcion made riofcs likely, and fche Afclanfca riofc was only one of several during fche Progressive Period. Precipifcafced by highly publicized alleged rapes of whifce women by black men, fche Afclanfca riofc caused fcwenfcy-six deafchs and hundreds of serious injuries, as well as considerable properfcy damage. The period of World War I broughfc a rash of racial incidenfcs fco fche nafcion's urban areas. The year fche Unifced Sfcafces enfcered fche war, 1917? saw fche mosfc concen­ fcrafced racial discord. The "Black Exodus," in which aboufc half a million blacks moved from fche soufchern sharecropper lands fco fche indusfcries of fche norfchern urban areas, pro­ vided fche major facfcor behind fchese riofcs. Whifce

•^^Ibid. , 230. Charles Crowe, "Racial Massacre in Afclanfca, Sepfcem- ber 22, 1906," Journal of Negro Hisfcory, LIV (April, 1969), 150-68. 10 resentment over black economic competition in time of war caused great fcension and on several occasions sfcimulafced race riofcs. The Easfc Sfc. Louis, Illinois, riofc of July 1-2, 1917, was one of fchese incidenfcs. Precipifcafced by a case of misfcaken idenfcifcy, fche riofc fcook fche lives of nine whifces and fchirfcy-nine blacks. One of fche main causes for fchis and ofcher riofcs in general, such as fche Chicago riofc of 1919 and fche Defcroifc incidenfc in 1943, was fche phenomenal growfch of fche black populafcion in urban areas. The black communifcy in Easfc Sfc. Louis, for in­ sfcance, grew from 6,000 in 1910 fco 13,000 in 1917- Over­ crowded condifcions, high expecfcafcions, higher economic sfcatus, and whifce resenfcmenfc all confcribufced fco fche racial •a- 12 animosifcy. Anofcher racial incidenfc afc Housfcon on Augusfc 23, 1917, involved fcurbulence befcween whifce Housfconians and black soldiers sfcafcioned afc a nearby milifcary camp. Following fche beafcing of fcwo black soldiers a black confcingenfc from Camp Logan swarmed infco fche cifcy, benfc on revenge. Thir- fceen persons, only one a Negro, died as a resulfc of fche incidenfc. This fcype of acfcion, alfchough highly unusual in fche firsfc half of fche fcwenfciefch cenfcury, sfcemmed from relafcively common condifcions including discriminafcion on fche parfc of fche Housfcon press, local policemen, whifce •^^Elliofcfc M. Rudwick, Race Riofc afc Easfc Sfc. Louis, July 2, 1917 (Carbondale, 1964;, 2r/-ib. 11 officers in command of black fcroops, and fche cifcy fcrans- y7\ porfcafcion sysfcem. ^ The period of fche Red Scare witnessed a similar series of racial incidents. The end of World War I left the American public in a sfcafce of war and a relucfcance fco mentally converfc from fchafc warlike sfcafce. Suspicions of the Soviet Union, namely fche possible ramificafcions of fche Bolshevik Revolufcion of 1917, placed an even greafcer afcmosphere of apprehension in fche minds of many. The series of sfcrikes across fche land in quick succession, fche bombs senfc fco various public officials, and fche subsequenfc invesfcigafcions and raids, mosfc nofcably by Afcfcorney General A. Mifcchell Palmer and his subordinafce J. Edgar Hoover, helped creafce a sense of mass hysfceria across fche nafcion and fche belief fchafc Bolshevism would afcfcempfc fco supplanfc 14 democracy in fche Unifced Sfcafces. A direcfc offshoofc of fche Red Scare was a rash of race riofcs in Charlesfcon, Longview, Washingfcon, Chicago, Knoxville, and Omaha in 1919. Of all fche race riofcs of fche Red Scare fchafc in Chicago proved fche largesfc. The drowning of a young black youfch because he was swimming in a beach area reserved for whifces precipifcafced fche incidenfc which

•'-^Edgar A. Schuler, "The Housfcon Race Riofc, 1917," Journal of Nep:ro Hisfcory, XXIX (Ocfcober, 1944), 300-58. •^^Roberfc K. Murray, Red Scare, A Sfcudy in Nafcional Hysfceriari919-1920 (New York, 19^5), 5-17. 12 erupfced infco a major struggle befcween aggressive whites and in many cases equally as aggressive blacks. Negroes, incensed by the long line of discriminatory practices againsfc fchem, and whifces, indignanfc fcoward blacks because of fcheir recenfc advancemenfc, joined in one of fche nafcion's bloodiesfc riofcs. Beginning on July 27, fche riofc ended a week lafcer wifch fchirfcy-eighfc persons dead and hundreds injured. Whafc is surprising is nofc fchafc fche riofc fcook place bufc fchafc ifc was nofc larger, and fchafc fchere were nofc ofcher riofcs year affcer year.^

While nofc as large as fche Chicago riofc, fche Longview, Texas, riofc of July 10, 1919, was an example of fche hysfceria and paranoia of fche Red Scare. Ifc was precipi­ tated by alleged miscegenation and did not have a broad range of causal factors such as the Chicago riot. But as the second riofc in Texas in fcwo years fche incidenfc illus- fcrafced fche afcmosphere of Red Scare condifcions fcogefcher wifch blafcanfc racial infcolerance. Two prominenfc blacks in Longview who were fche local agenfcs for fche Chicago Defender were accused of wrifcing a sfcory for fchafc newspaper which said a prominenfc v/hifce woman in Longview had been in love wifch a black man. The whifce cifcizenry, feeling fchafc fche

^Arfchur I. Waskow, From Race Riofc fco Sifc-In, 1919 and fche 1960's (Garden Cifcy, 1967;, 12; William li. Tufcfcle, Jr., fece Ri()fc. Chicago in fche Red Summer of 1919 (New York, 1970; , 24^; Anofcher valuable v/ork dealing wifch fche Chicago riofc is The Chicago Commission on Race Relafcions, The Negro in Chicago (Chicago, 1922). 13 arfcicle was slanderous bofch fco fche woman and Longview in general, went on a rampage in search of fche fcwo men. Bofch escaped, bufc nofc before fche mob killed one Negro, badly injured several ofchers, and leffc many homeless.''"^ The 1919 riofcs, fchen, can be seen fchrough fchese exam­ ples as an exfcension of fche "Red Summer" of fche same year. Infcolerance, paranoia, and in many cases a form of social conservafcism or fche desire fco refcain a segregafced sociefcy, fchrew many cifcizens fchroughoufc fche nafcion infco a frenzy which lasfced over a year. While fche race riofcs were by no means fche only forms of violence afc fche fcime, fchey re­ ceived fche mosfc publicifcy and, as a group, formed a frame of reference which parfcially characfcerized fche period.

Affcer a hiafcus from 1921 fco 1935, large scale racial fcurbulence developed in Harlem. This fcime, however, an enfcirely new fcype of race riofc appeared. On March 19, 1935, affcer an alfcercafcion befcween a black youfch who had sfcolen a knife from a deparfcmenfc sfcore and his capfcors, violence erupfced. " Many blacks believed fche youfch had been beafcen or killed when in facfc he had been released un­ harmed. Insfcead of whifce aggression againsfc black defense, however, fche violence followed a pafcfcern of black aggression againsfc whifce-owned properfcy in Harlem. Riofcers loofced and

•^^William M. Tufcfcle, Jr., "Violence in a 'Heafchen' Land: The Longview Race Riofc of 1919," Phylon, XXXIII (Winfcer, 1972), 524-55. 14 destroyed sfcores and businesses known fco be eifcher managed or owned by whifce people. This new pafcfcern of riofcing occurred again in Harlem in 1945 bufc nofc a fchird fcime unfcil fche riofcs of fche 1960's.-^'^

The change, in 1955, 1945, and finally in fche 1960's

from whifce perpefcrafced violence fco black aggression re­

sulted from fcwo general facfcors. Firsfc, race relafcions had undergone a marked shiffc. Whifces became more sensifcive fco

fche plighfc and demands of blacks, while blacks raised fcheir

expecfcafcions bufc in many cases did nofc see fchem fulfilled.

Second, blacks confcinued fco migrafce in large numbers from

fche farm fco fche cifcy during fche years affcer fche Firsfc

World War. Blacks flooded many urban indusfcrial areas and

became an imporfcanfc power, alfchough fcheir economic sfcafcus

remained low. Violence ensued as sensifcive blacks and re- 1 P> senfcful whifces collided. Thus a change fromfche fcradifcional fco fche modern form

of race riofcing resulfced, nofc because cerfcain members of

sociefcy wanfced ifc fco, bufc in general because of evolving

condifcions, especially in view of fche marked rise of fche

•'-^Hamilfcon Basso, "The Riofc in Harlem," The New Re­ public, April 5, 1955, PP- 209-10; Augusfc Meier and Elliofcfc Rudwick, "Black Violence in fche Twenfciefch Cenfcury: A Sfcudy in Rhefcoric and Refcaliafcion," in Violence in America, Hisfcorical and Comparafcive Perspecfcives, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted ilo'berfc Gurr (J^Jew York, 1969), 405.

•^^eier and Rudwick, "Black Violence in fche Twenfciefch Cenfcury," 405-06. 15 black man and his effecfc on whifce sociefcy. Alfchough nofc becoming a nofciceable change unfcil fche 1960's, fche fcwo fcimes fche new riofc pafcfcern did occur, in Harlem in 1955 and 1945, fchey have symbolized fchese changes as parfc of a broad demographic and social shiffc from fche rigid sociefcy of fche Vicfcorian Age fco fche more elasfcic sociefcy of the twentieth century. The rigid society was still present, however, during World War II.

The period from 1941 to 1946 marked another time of rapid change in fche sfcafcus of fche black, much fco fche cha­ grin of many who, imbued wifch an obsession for refcaining fche social sfcafcus quo, were nofc willing fco see any real change effecfced. Jim Crow sfcinabled badly during fche war years, a developmenfc which blacks wafcched wifch subdued glee while many whifces gnashed fcheir fceefch. The crifcical con­ difcions presenfc in warfcime America produced new avenues for black advancemenfc along wifch fresh expecfcafcions, while much of whifce America overreacfced because of ifcs resenfc­ menfc. In fche main because of fchese condifcions racial violence became frequenfc, even rampanfc afc one fcime. As in fche period surrounding World War I, a rash of race riofcs occurred wifchin a concenfcrafced period, fchis fcime in fche summer of 1945 afc Mobile on May 25, Los Angeles on June 5-7, Beaumonfc on June 15-16, Defcroifc on June 20-21, and Harlem on Augusfc 1-2. Of all fchese oufcbreaks fche Defcroifc riofc proved by far fche largesfc wifch a deafch fcoll 16 of thirfcy-four and considerable properfcy desfcrucfcion. Only fche Harlem upheaval represenfced fche "new sfcyle" or black aggressive riofc againsfc whifce properfcy. The ofchers, fchough nofc exacfcly alike, followed fche older pafcfcern of whifce precipifcafced violence againsfc blacks who, while assuming fche role of defenders, refcaliafced againsfc fcheir assailanfcs when possible. The Mobile, Beaumonfc, and Defcroifc riofcs provided examples of fchis pafcfcern of racial discord. In fche Los Angeles "zoofc-suifc" riofc, however, whifce servicemen focused fcheir afcfcenfcion more on Mexican- Americans fchan blacks. Thus a more narrow form of riofcing wifch regard fco bofch fche parfcicipanfcs and fche vicfcims was wifcnessed, bufc fche resulfcs were all fcoo similar fco fchose of ofcher incidenfcs. Deafch, desfcrucfcion, and confusion in general, along wifch ill-direcfced energy on fche parfc of fche riofcers, slowed war producfcion so fchafc fche fruifcs of in­ fcolerance endangered nafcional securifcy. For fchis reason many believed fchafc Axis agenfcs had insfcigafced fche riofcs fco creafce domesfcic fcurmoil and hinder producfcion. Bufc fchis was nofc so. The insfcigafcor of riofcs invariably included racial infcolerance of economic advancemenfc, rising expec­ fcafcions on fche parfc of minorifcies, and in general fche problems of a warfcime sociefcy. The Defcroifc riofc has been sfcudied in Race Riofc (New York, 1968) by Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, who provide a synfchesis of causafcion and riofcing in a 17 general sense as well as fche acfcual evenfcs and analysis of fche riofc in Defcroifc. ^ The Harlem riofc has nofc been sfcudied in any definifcive work, bufc arfcicles do exisfc from which informafcion may be gleaned. Piecemeal informafcion also exisfcs on fche Los Angeles "zoofc-suifc" riofc. Unforfcunafcely, no sfcudies have appeared on eifcher fche Mobile or Beaumonfc riofcs. Nofcwifchsfcanding, bofch riofcs are highly significanfc. The Fair Employmenfc Pracfcices Commifcfcee (FEPC) did invesfcigafce fche Mobile riofc since ifc direcfcly concerned discriminafcion in employmenfc, bufc even unpublished compilafcions are nofc available on fche Beaumonfc riofc. The Beaumonfc riofc of June 15-16, 1945, is of regional and nafcional imporfcance in fche hisfcory of American vio­ lence. The gap leffc by fche lack of wrifcing and research on fche riofc is obvious, especially when one considers fche summer of 1945 on fche one hand as a wafcershed in black hisfcory in fchafc fche war marked a redefinifcion of fche black's sfcafcus in America, and on fche ofcher hand as fche predecessor fco fche profcesfc which led fco fche civil righfcs movemenfc of a score years lafcer. Beaumonfc served as one of fche visible signs of fchis redirecfcion. There is very lifcfcle informafcion on fche Beaumonfc riofc

'^Anofcher valuable work dealing wifch fche Defcroifc riofc is by Roberfc Shogan and Tom Craig, enfcifcled Defcroifc Race Riofc (Philadelphia, 1964). 18 confcained in general works aboufc race riofcs. In most of fchese sfcudies fche riofc is seen as eifcher one of fche 1945 riofcs or as fche immediafce predecessor fco fche much larger Defcroifc riofc, and fchus barely merifcs afcfcenfcion. Equally disfcressing is fche lack of afcfcenfcion placed on fche Beaumonfc riofc by volumes concerned wifch fche fcwenfciefch cenfcury Soufch. The imporfcance of racial conflicfc affcer Reconsfcrucfcion on sociefcy has been large. Yefc lifcfcle or no menfcion has been made of fche Beaumonfc incidenfc in many well regarded gen­ eral works. In A Hisfcory of fche Soufch (New York, 1955), Francis Bufcler Simkins described fche riofc briefly bufc in- accurafcely. John Samuel Ezell, in The Soufch Since 1865 (New York, 1965), menfcioned fche riofc in passing. And neifcher The Soufch Since Appomafcfcox (New York, 1967) by Thomas D. Clark and Alberfc D. Kirwan, nor The Emergence of fche New Soufch, 1915-1945 (Bafcon Rouge, 1967) by George Brown Tindall menfcioned fche riofc afc all.

Because of fche painful lack of research and wrifcing on fche Beaumonfc race riofc, ifc is necessary fco examine fche incidenfc bofch fco defcermine ifcs characfcer as a riofc and fco discover ifcs role in fche general fcrend of American vio­ lence. Ifc is also necessary fco examine fche riofc regarding fche hisfcory of race relafcions in fche Soufch as well as in Texas since ifc is of regional imporfcance bofch as one of only fchree Texas race riofcs and as one of fche few soufchern race riofcs in fche fcwenfciefch cenfcury. Even fchough fche 19 Beaumonfc riofc was one of fche smaller of fche 1945 racial incidenfcs ifcs impacfc was considerable in a regional sense because ifc helped mark a wafcershed in Texas and in fche Soufch regarding race relafcions. The gap creafced by fche lack of afcfcenfcion on fche riofc and ifcs surroundings is only one of many fchafc musfc be filled before fche hisfcory of race relafcions in fche Unifced Sfcafces can be complefcely under- sfcood. CHAPTER II

• WAR AND SOCIAL REDIRECTION

Warfcime inevifcably brings some changes fco fche fabric of a nafcion. The economic demands of war creafce new op­ porfcunifcies, new advanfcages are fcaken, and fche people who make fchese changes cause a redirecfcion in some areas of fche economic, social, and polifcical sfcrucfcure of fche nafcion. In fche Unifced Sfcafces fchis has occurred mosfc visibly during fche Civil War, World War I, and World War II. Wifchin fchis confcexfc one may say fchafc fchose warfcime forces which have remolded some of fche basic fabric of sociefcy have been fche mosfc general as well as fche mosfc imporfcanfc alfcerafcions, nofc fche leasfc of which has been a redirecfcion in fche role of black Americans.

The search for a wafcershed in recenfc black hisfcory ends wifch an examinafcion of fche social changes wroughfc by fche Second World War. Thafc conflicfc marks a fcurning poinfc in American race relafcions, because black faifch in whifce America died wifch fche social fcrauma of fche war years. A cerfcain hope, which had been carefully nurfcured since fche New Deal years, expired because of fche failure of a peace­ ful coexisfcence befcween blacks and whifces in World War II.

•^Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgofcfcen Years' of fche Negro Revolufcion," Journal of American Hisfcory, LV (June, 1968), 90.

20 21

The years of fche war opened a new era of frusfcrafcion and hope for black people in fche Unifced Sfcafces. Affcer fche fcraumafcic experiences of World War I, especially fche race riofcs of fche period, blacks fchen faced fche frusfcrafcions of fche depression years. Blacks, who had been disproporfcion-

afcely represenfced on fche unemploymenfc rolls of fche 1950's, welcomed fche defense buildup which began in 1940. Bufc in

facfc discriminafcion ran rampanfc in fche defense indusfcries

throughout the war. Many signs on hiring gates changed

from "No Help Wanted" to "Help Wanted, White." The lower

class, unskilled black was once again turned aside. Affcer

being fche firsfc-fired during fche depression, he now found himself lasfc-hired.

The new, specialized, highly skilled indusfcries for

defense were especially cool fcoward fche black. Aircraffc

planfcs informed fchose who soughfc jobsfchafc "fche Negro will be considered only as janifcors and in ofcher similar ca­ pacities." When able fco gefc jobs blacks mefc exclusion by many unions and found fchemselves in fche dirfciesfc and

lowesfc-paying posifcions. Discriminafcion fchus successfully 2 exfcended infco fche war efforfc.

Nofc only in fche defense indusfcries, bufc in all phases

of American life blacks faced blafcanfc discriminafcion. The

Dalfiume, "The 'Forgofcfcen Years'," 91; Harvard Sifckoff, "Racial Milifcancy and Infcerracial Violence in fche Second World War," Journal of American Hisfcory, LVIII (December, 1971), 6^5": 22 army segregafced black soldiers and fche navy accepfced blacks only for fche messmen's branch. The blood of whifces and blacks was separated, even though chemically the same. In milifcary training camps segregafcion and discriminafcion re­ mained widespread. Transporfcafcion facilifcies many fcimes refused service fco black soldiers if fchey failed fco sifc in fche Jim Crow secfcions.

Bufc blacks proved unwilling fco accepfc confcinued discriminafcion. The sudden changes broughfc by fche war

engendered new hopes. The defense buildup provided jobs

for many blacks, especially when fche manpower shorfcage began fco be felfc affcer Pearl Harbor, even fchough fchey re­

ceived coolfcreafcmenfc and were relegafced fco fche lower

class jobs in defense planfcs and elsewhere.

New organizafcions formed as a visible and vocal means

of furfchering black advancemenfc afc a fcime of opporfcunifcy.

Membership in fche Nafcional Associafcion for fche Advancemenfc

of Colored People (NAACP) mulfciplied nearlyfcen fcimes

during fche war years. The Congress of Racial Equalifcy

(CORE) organized in 1942 and began non-violenfc forms of

acfcion, such as demonsfcrafcions, fco end segregafcion. Black

colleges and young black liberals began fco employ sifc-ins

and ofcher experimenfcafcion for direcfc confronfcafcion. The

March on Washingfcon Movemenfc (MOWM) provided an all-black

approach fco profcesfc in 1941. Businesses, frafcernal or­ ganizafcions, professional sociefcies, and fche black press 23 collaborated in fche bafcfcle againsfc domesfcic oppression.

Mosfc blacks during fche war called for dual vicfcory: vic- fcory againsfc fche Axis and vicfcory againsfc discriminafcion and infcolerance afc home.'^

As fche black populafcion became more vociferous in ifcs

dissafcisfacfcion wifch prevailing condifcions and pursued

gradual economic advancemenfc during fche war years because

of fresh opporfcunifcies, much of fche whifce populafcion

looked on wifch unconcealed chagrin. Indignanfc afc fche

fchoughfc of having blacks working side by side wifch fchem,

whifce workers venfced fcheir anger verbally and physically

on black skilled workmen. Lower class whifce workers, who

were mosfc liable fco come infco confcacfc wifch blacks, showed

fche greafcesfc agifcafcion. The shorfcage of manpower forced

employers fco look infco herefcofore unfcouchable reservoirs,

and from fchis condifcion emerged black workers in jobs which

unfcil fchen had been denied fchem. Paranoia gripped fche

whifce defense worker afcfche fchoughfc o f being on fche same

economic plane wifch fche black man. His reacfcion became an

overreacfcion as fche whifce man lashed oufc in defiance of new

condifcions. Beafcings, mufcilafcion, exporfcafcion from fche

area, and even murder were nofc unusual in war cenfcers where

blacks found fche greafcesfc opporfcunifcy and fchus came infco

confcacfc wifch indignanfc whifces. Sociefcy was changing fcoo

^Sifckoff, "Racial Milifcancy," 662-63. 24 rapidly for mosfc whifce people, while on fche ofcher hand sociefcy was changing fcoo slowly for expecfcanfc blacks. The uneasy peace befcween blacks and whifces underwenfc* furfcher sfcrain when, as a resulfc of fche issuance of Execufcive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941, Presidenfc Franklin D. Roosevelfc esfcablished fche Commifcfcee on Fair Employmenfc Pracfcice (FEPC). This acfcion resulfced from fche March on Washingfcon Movemenfc. A. Philip Randolph, presidenfc of fche Brofcherhood of Sleeping Car Porfcers, organized fche MOWM in early 1941 as a mass profcesfc againsfc discriminafcion in defense indusfcries. To avoid embarrassmenfc and undue harsh publicifcy, Roosevelfc bargained wifch MOWM officials and issued order 8802 in exchange for fche cancellafcion of fche march. The black press overesfcimafced fche value of fche order creafcing fche FEPC by enfcifcling ifc "fche greafcesfc docu- menfc since fche Emancipafcion Proclamafcion," bufc blacks were 4 nonefcheless jusfcifiably jubilanfc. The order declared ifc fco be fche , . . dufcy of employers and of labor or­ ganizafcions fco provide for fche full and equifcable parfcicipafcion of all workers in defense indus­ fcries, wifchoufc discriminafcion because of race, creed, color, or nafcional origin.5 Roosevelfc reorganized fche FEPC in May 1945 as an

^Charles Zaid, comp., Preliminary Invenfcory of fche Records of fche Commifcfcee on Fair itopioymenfc Pracfcice ^Wash- ingfcon, 1962;, 1. ^Ibid. 25 independent agency within fche Office for Emergency Manage­ ment, and gave it greater and better-defined powers for invesfcigafcing discriminafcion in defense planfcs. In spifce of ifcs principles and fcheorefcical power, however, fche FEPC proved fcoo limifced fco be of greafc service. Ifc pursued a sfcricfc infcerprefcafcion of fche execufcive order fco avoid un­ due racial anfcagonism, while a serious lack of funding forced ifc fco overlook many cases of discriminafcion in fche defense indusfcries.

Alfchough fche FEPC was nofc as effecfcive as many had hoped, ifcs mere exisfcence caused many whifce people con­ siderable anguish. Ifc served on fche one hand as a beacon of inspirafcion for black economic equalifcy, bufc on fche ofcher as a confcinual irrifcanfc fco whifce defense workers, so fchafc racial milifcancy and resenfcmenfc came fco be a focal poinfc for infcerracial affairs: The more Negroes demanded fcheir righfcs, fche more whifce resisfcance sfciffened, which led blacks fco become even more impafcienfc wifch second- class cifcizenship and defcermined fco asserfc fchemselves. The increasing compefcifcion befcween fche races and fche many pefcfcy irrifcafcions of war—fche rafcioning, shorfcages, overcrowding, and high prices—engendered frusfcrafcion, supersensi- fcivifcy, and belligerency. The fafcigue of long work weeks wifch lifcfcle opporfcunifcy for recrea- fcion, fche anxious scanning of casualfcy lisfcs, fche apprehension over a new job and a sfcrange

U.S., General Services Adminisfcrafcion, Federal Records of World War II, Vol. I, Civilian A.gencies (.Wash­ ingfcon, 1950;, 627; Louis Ruchames, Hace, jobs, "and Polifcics, The Sfcory of FEPC (New York, 1955;, 140. 26 cifcy, and fche desire of non-combafcanfcs fco prove fcheir masculinifcy all fed fche boiling racial cauldron.7

The Soufch was no excepfcion fco eifcher indusfcrial build­ up and warfcime problems or infcerracial discord. Because of ifcs fcemperafce climafce , fche Soufch was dofcfced wifch mili­ tary fcraining camps. Bufc as fche nafcion called upon all ifcs resources, heavy indusfcry slid soufchward from fche fcradi- fcionally indusfcrial Norfch, and many large defense planfcs resulfced. By fche end of fche war fche Soufch confcained booming war producfcion cenfcers concerned wifch food and clofching, pefcroleum, shipbuilding, and aircraffc. Much of fchis indusfcrial expansion proved fcemporary, bufc fche war boom produced permanenfc assefcs in fche Soufch. In all, fche indusfcrial capacifcy of fche region during fche war increased by aboufc forfcy per cenfc. From 1959 to 1947 the number of manufacturing establishments in the South nearly doubled, rising from 1,549,000 in 1959 to 2,855,000 in late 1945, and remained at 2,025,000 in 1947. After the reconversion of the nation, therefore, the South retained about fifty o per cent of the wartime addition to its factory force. Shipbuilding and petroleum became the largest areas of wartime production in the South. In addition to the "^Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 670. o George Brown Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1915-1945, Vol. X: A Hisfcory of fche South, ed. by Wendell Holmes Sfcephenson and E. herfcon Coulfcer (Bafcon Rouge, 1967), 696-701. 21 exisfcing yards in 1940 fche Marifcime Commission sponsored fche enlargemenfc or consfcrucfcion of shipyards afc Norfolk, Virginia, Tampa, Florida, Mobile and Pascalouga, Alabama, and Beaumonfc and Orange, Texas. Because of fche need for large quanfcifcies of pefcroleum producfcs for domesfcic and armed forces use, as well as for fche producfcion of syn- fchefcic rubber, oil also formed a vifcal confcribufcion fco fche war efforfc. Pipelines speeded fche movemenfc of oil fco ifcs numerous desfcinafcions. From Texas oil flowed fchrough fche "Big Inch" pipeline from Longview fco Norris Cifcy, Illinois, and fchrough fche "Lifcfcle Big Inch" from Beaumonfc fco Linden, 9 New Jersey. "^ The war producfcion of Texas represenfced no small parfc of fche fcofcal confcribufcion of fche Soufch, since her manu- facfcures were many and varied. Pefcroleum producfcion and shipbuilding proved fche sfcafce's largesfc and mosfc vifcal con- fcribufcions. These accomplishmenfcs were nofc effecfced, however, wifchoufc racial discord. On fche polifcical fronfc, only nine per cenfc, or 50,000, of fche blacks in Texas had regisfcered fco vofce in 1940. This sifcuafcion exisfced be­ cause of fche infamous whifce primary and fche poll fcax, alfchough fche lafcfcer, being only Si.75, was nofc very effec­ fcive as a barrier fco blacks in Texas. The whifce primary confcinued in fche Soufch as a mefchod of making meaningless

^Ibid. 28 the black franchise since the Democratic primary in most

of fche region proved tantamount to election. But every year there was a "primary case" in which someone attempted

to challenge fche primary sysfcem. The whifce primary had been upheld by fche Supreme Courfc in fche Grovey v. Townsend

case of 1955, bufcfchafc same fcribunal in April 1944 finally

reversed ifcs decision in Smifch v. Allwrighfc, a case fchafc

also began in fche Lone Sfcar Sfcafce. Throughoufc mosfc of fche

war, however, polifcical discriminafcion as embodied in fche

whifce primary and poll fcax prevailed.

In ofcher areas, blacks in Texas faced discriminafcion

roofced in cusfcom. This offcen meanfcfchafc violafcion s of

segregafcionfcradifcions, a s defined by fche whifce majorifcy,

resulfced in violenfc refcribufcion. Texas had no monopoly on

infcerracial violence, bufc wifch economic and polifcical ad-

vancemenfcs for blacks during fche warfcime period, violence

became more widespread as whifces venfced resenfcmenfc of black

advancemenfc exfcralegally. Black Texans recognized fche paradoxical nafcure of fcheir sifcuafcion.

The warfcime experiences of fche black people in Texas produced social aspirafcions which reflecfced fche influence of milifcary service, racial vio­ lence, discriminafcion wifchin fche legal sysfcem, and fche discriminafcion in public educafcion. The irony in fighfcing a world war againsfc aggression by an enemy preaching a masfcer race ideology, while afc

Neil Gary Sapper, "A Survey of fche Hisfcory of fche Black People of Texas, 1950-1954" (unpublished Ph.D. dis- serfcafcion, Texas Tech Universifcy, 1972), 7^-76, 90-91. 29 fche same fcime defending racial segregafcion and whifce supremacy, was obvious fco black Texans.11 As a reflecfcion of an infcolerant sociefcy, each mili­ fcary fcraining camp in Texas was segregafced, and fche black soldiers inhabifced fcheir "lifcfcle Harlems" which were separafce and usually unequal. Afc Camp Wallace, near Galvesfcon, fche 6,000 black fcroops had no esfcablished recre- afcional facilifcies, while fcheir whifce counfcerparfcs were surrounded by a service club, an air-condifcioned fcheafcer, a church, a library, and a guesfc house. Similar condifcions held fcrue in such Texas camps as fche Pampa Army Air Field, fche San Marcos Army Air Field, and Camp Wolfcers, near Mineral Wells.-^^

Nofc only did black soldiers in Texas face discrimina­ fcion, bufc fche black cifcizenry in general also mefc sharp racial infcolerance. Black advancemenfc and whifce resenfc­ menfc caused acfcion which could be classified in some instances as mass paranoia. In August 1941 police placed two blacks, Herman Venters and Willie McNelly, in fche Camp Counfcy jail for allegedly making overfcures fcoward fcwo whifce women. A commifcfcee , which supposedly represenfced fche vesfced infceresfcs of fcheir sociefcy, seized and casfcrafced bofch men. In July 1942 a whifce housewife accused Willie Vinson, a black man from Texarkana, of afcfcempfced rape. As

•^-^Ibid. , 509-10, 568-69. •^^Ibid. , 578-81. 50 he ran from his pursuers he was shofc and fchen fcaken fco a local hospifcal. A mob of whifces prompfcly whisked him from his bed, fcied him fco a car bumper, and gleefully dragged him fchrough fcown before lynching him from fche winch of a cofcfcon gin.

A final example of whifce infcolerance fcoward blacks in Texas occurred from 1957 "to 1941. Bob Whifce, a black man from easfc Texas, was charged wifch fche rape of a whifce woman in 1957. He confessed affcer being beafcen for four con- secufcive nighfcs by his capfcors. A jury in Conroe senfcenced him fco deafch. The NAACP appealed fche case unfcil ifc came before fche Unifced Sfcafces Supreme Courfc. In Whifce v. Texas (1940) fche high fcribunal invalidafced Whifce's convicfcion on fche grounds fchafc a confession had been forcibly exfcracfced from him. In June 1941 fche sfcafce again fcried Whifce in Conroe, bufc before he could be convicfced fche husband of fche alleged rape vicfcim, W. S. Cochran, shofc and killed him. A week lafcer a jury fcried and acquifcfced Cochran. 15 Nofc only in fche prewar and early war years bufc fchroughoufc fche firsfc half of fche 1940's blacks in Texas mefc discriminafcion in nearly every conceivable fashion as a resulfc of an infcoleranfc sociefcy augmenfced by warfcime con­ difcions. Profcecfcing fche sancfcifcy of whifce womanhood provided only one of several avenues fchrough which

•^^Ibid. , 591-99. 31 intolerant Texans could visibly show fcheir resenfcmenfc over

changing circumsfcances wifchin a basically conservative sociefcy.

Despite the inconsistency of fighting to preserve the

democracy which they did not fully enjoy, black Texans did

fcheir part in the war effort. Bj 1946 over a quarter of a million black citizens in Texas had been registered by fche

selective service, and nearly 85,000 had been inducted.

These are impressive figures when compared with the total

number of blacks in Texas in 1940 which was 924,000, over

half of fchem women.

In fche midst of fche war producfcion as well as racial

animosifcy in Texas lay fche booming cifcy of Beaumonfc. In

1940 Beaumonfc confcained 59,000 cifcizens, wifch black resi-

denfcs formingfchirfcy-fcwo pe r cenfc offche fcofcal populafcion .

In fche decade from 1940 fco 1950 fche populafcion of fche cifcy

jumped fco 94,000 inhabifcanfcs, while refcaining an approxi- mafcely fcwo fco one whifce fco black populafcion rafcio. Ifc is

esfcimafcedfchafc by mid-1945 fche cifcy had grown fco aboufc

80,000, or an increase of 20,000 inhabifcanfcs in fchree 15 years. These figures spelled overcrowding in every way. ^

14 Ibid. , 568-71; U.S., Deparfcmenfc of Commerce, Bureau of fche Census, Sixfceenfch Census of fche Unifced Sfcafces, 1940: Populafcion, II, 762. 15 -^U.S. , Deparfcmenfc of Commerce, Bureau of fche Census, Sevenfceenfch Census of fche Unifced Sfcafces, 1950: Populafcion, II, 45-100; Morrison and Fourmy Direcfcory Co., Beaumonfc' Cifcy Direcfcory, 1945 (Dallas, 1945), 10. 32 The cifcy and ifcs surrounding area lifcerally seethed wifch war producfcion. Pennsylvania Shipyards, Inc., a pri­ vately owned ship repair and construction business thafc handled mosfcly cargo ships and builfc fche famous Liberfcy Ships, consfcituted by far the largest single war industry in Beaumont. The shipyard employed 8,500 men at its loca­ tion on fche Neches River and earned a repufcafcion for expedifcious ship producfcion. In 1945, for example, fche shipyards delivered eighfceen Liberfcy (CIA) Ships, four U.S. Navy minesweepers, and eighfc ocean-going fcugs. The yards held yearly governmenfc confcracfcs in excess of $100 million, and produced fchese vessels under fche auspices of the Marifcime Commission. Because of fche narrowness of fche river fche Pennsylvania Shipyards launched ships sideways, using bananas fco grease fche shipways.

The employees of Pennsylvania Shipyards organized under fche Mefcal Trades Deparfcmenfc of fche American Federa- fcion of Labor, which had agreemenfcs wifch mosfc soufchern shipyards. The AFL's hisfcory of racial discriminafcion may help explain why fchafc organizafcion represenfced labor in mosfc soufchern yards. Racial anfcagonism exisfced afc fche

Morrison and Fourmy, Beaumonfc Cifcy Direcfcory, 10; Ray Lacy (Sales Manager, Befchlehem Sfceel Shipyards, for­ merly Pennsylvania Shipyards) fco James A. Burran, April 10, 1975; Frederic C. Lane, Ships for Vicfcory^ A Hisfcory of Shipbuilding Under fche U.S. Marifcime Commission in World War II (Balfcimore, 195i;, 54-55. 33 Pennsylvania Shipyards bufc remained inconspicuous since the yards separated fche races to a degree and relegafced blacks fco lower posifcions. Many of fche whifce as well as black shipyard employees had moved fco Beaumonfc from other cities and sfcafces in order fco take advantage of employmenfc opporfcunifcies. This helped cause fche insfcabilifcy of the Beaumont population in general and of fche defense workers in parfcicular, which heighfcened fche pofcenfcial for racial discord. ' Ofcher war producfcion cenfcers in and around Beaumonfc included oil refineries of some of fche major pefcroleum com­ panies. The Infcernafcional Derrick and Equipmenfc Company of Beaumonfc held federal confcracfcs fcofcaling several millions of dollars. Ofcher shipyards included fche Samuelson Ship­ yards, a small privafce business engaged in building small fcugs and barges, and fche Consolidafced Sfceel Shipyards of Orange, Texas, which was fcwenfcy-six miles from Beaumonfc. Consolidafced, builfc as a parfc of fche Marifcime Commission's expansion program in 1940, launched ifcs firsfc ship in 1941 and generally consfcrucfced U.S. Navy vessels such as de- sfcroyers, desfcroyer escorfcs, and minesweepers. Ifc ulfci- mafcely became larger fchan Pennsylvania Shipyards or any ofcher neighboring shipbuilding facilifcy, wifch yearly

^Lesfcer Rubin, The Negro in fche Shipbuilding Indus- fcry, Reporfc No. 11 \ The Racial Policies of Americari Hisfcor^TT^^ y (Philadelphia, 1970;, 44-45. 54 no government confcracfcs totaling S240 million. Wifch such a profusion of war industries it should have been no surprise that Beaumont seethed with racial discord. The maze of businesses, both large and small, caused an atmosphere of overcrowding. Not only did there exist no housing in Beaumont for many war workers, but they had fco be transported to and from the city from outlying areas every day. Ben Jackson, owner of Jackson Motor Company of Beaumonfc, engaged in an agreemenfc wifch fche cifcy whereby he converfced aufco transporfc fcrucks infco makeshiffc buses in which many of fche war workers wenfc fco and from fcheir jobs. This arrangement was inaugurated in 1941 and had to be confcinued fchroughoufc fche war.1 9 A second general cause of racial animosifcy in Beaumonfc during fche war years was economic oppression. Wages reached an all-fcime high, jobs were plenfciful, for whifces afc leasfc, and in general a period of economic well-being exisfced. This condifcion was nofc confined fco Beaumonfc, of course, bufc prevailed in every war cenfcer. Wifch resfcric- fcions on many domesfcic commodifcies fche public was unable fco use ifcs economic affluence in accordance wifch ifcs

•^%orrison and Fourmy, Beaumonfc Cifcy Direcfcory, 10-12; Lane, Ships for Vicfcory, 54-33; Beaumonfc Lhfcerprise, November 7, 19^5, p. 1. •'•^Cafcherine McMasfcer (daughfcer of fche public relafcions officer for Pennsylvania Shipyards during fche 1940's Willard W. McMasfcer), fco James A. Burran, infcerview, Decem­ ber 20, 1972, Beaumonfc, Texas. 55 wishes. Since many ifcems of fche mafcerialisfcic sociefcy were unavailable, mosfc persons were forced fco be content with possession of a fat bank account and a prewar car with threadbare tires and an empty gasoline tank. Thus many people became dissatisfied wifch fche norms of a planned economy, and tempers grew shorfc as fche weighfc of wartime sociefcy began fco be felfc. City fcransporfcafcion furfcher sfcimulafced problems. The Beaumonfc Cifcy Lines bus service had been quifce adequafce in 1940, bufc wifch fche rapid growfch of fche cifcy fche bus sysfcem became overcrowded. Since no cars or buses were being produced for domesfcic use fche company could nofc expand fco meefc new needs. The overcrowding caused severe sfcrain be­ fcween blacks and whifces because when fche buses were packed blacks offcen had fco sfcand in fche aisles ahead of fche dividing signs for fche Jim Crow secfcions required by cifcy ordinance. Infcoleranfc whifces demanded fchafc fche law be obeyed fco fche lefcfcer, especially fco avoid confcacfc befcween black men and whifce women. Racial fricfcion ensued. In view of pasfc infcerracial relafcions in Beaumonfc, racial discord was nofc unusual since mob violence had occurred fcwice prior to 1943. On May 11, 1902, an excur­ sion train which had gone fco Lake Charles, Louisiana, from Beaumonfc became fche scene of fcerror on ifcs refcurn fcrip. A group of whifces, using rocks and ofcher assorfced missiles, forced the black passengers out of the Jim Crow car for no 36 apparent reason ofcher fchan personal amusement. The ter­ rified blacks sfcreamed into the nexfc car which was occupied by whifce people, and violence, erupted. By the fcime fche train arrived in Beaumont fchree blacks lay dead and several ofchers had been wounded, bufc fche whifce confcingenfc suffered only fchree casualfcies, none of which were serious. 20 Racial fcurbulence reappeared on July 14, 1908. On fchafc day a black man allegedly assaulfced a young girl who was found near deafch in the northern outskirts of the city. The police formed groups of men to scour the area of the alleged afcfcack, and defcermined fco apprehend a suspecfc by "arresfcing all idle negroes." As a manifesfcafcion of fcheir ire, whifce Beaumonfcers fchafc nighfc sefc ablaze fcwo amusemenfc parks in fche cifcy's black disfcricfc, a feafc which afcfcracfced 2,000 specfcafcors. Mob violence againsfc blacks was lafcer narrowly averfced. 21 These insfcances of infcolerance characfcerized fche afcfci- fcude of many Beaumonfcers, bufc ofchers began fco fcake a more moderafce view, afc leasfc in fche polifcical sphere, during fche decade prior to fche Second World War. In 1933 T. J. Charlfcon, fche black principal of all-black Charlfcon- Pollard High School, was picked for jury dufcy in fche fcrial of a white man charged wifch burglary. Charlfcon served wifch

^^Dallas Morning News, May 12, 1902, p. 2. PI "^ San Anfconio Daily Express, July 15, 1908, p. 5. 57 eleven whifce jurors and concurred in fche assessmenfc of a two year sentence. His service represented an unusual breakthrough in fche Texas legal sysfcem.

In 1942 fche appearance of blacks in line wifch whifces fco easfc fcheir votes in fche Democrafcic municipal primary in

Beaumonfc shafcfcered afcwenfcy-five yea r old precedenfc. The admission of black vofcers infco fche primary reporfcedly re­ sulfced from negofciafcions befcween fche black communifcy and local parfcy leaders. Only a few blacks vofced, and fcheir vote made no significant change in the outcome of the election. Bufcfchafc fchey did vofce suggesfced refreshing progressivism. Even more surprising was fche reporfc fchafc blacks also parfcicipafced in fche selecfcion of fche Democrafcic

Execufcive Commifcfcee of Beaumonfc.

This condifcion prevailed also in fche local and na­ fcional elecfcions of 1944. Blacks parfcicipafced in fche local

Democrafcic primary in February 1944 which feafcured a fchree way race for mayor. The winner, Fred C. Sfc one, won by a

700 vofce margin, bolsfcered by subsfcanfcial support from fche black communifcy.^^ The Jefferson Counfcy Democrafcic leader­ ship showed signs of moderate thought when it said: "There is no way of preventing the Negro from voting in the pri­ maries ... Ifc is nofc a mafcfcer of whafc we fchink; we musfc 25 obey fche law ..."

^^Sapper, "A Survey of Black People," 332, 78, 104.

^^Housfcon Informer, July 1, 1944, pp. 1, 8. 58 While fchese cases do nofc suggesfc a free hand by blacks in Beaumonfc polifcics, fchey do suggesfc a source of fcolerance and progressivism among fche whifce communifcy, alfchough many whifces became indignanfc afc such change, and fosfcered growing tension. The reasons for fchis progressive afctifcude are unknown, bufc fche possibilifcy exisfcs fchafc municipal leaders were anxious to creafce an amiable relafcionship wifch blacks since fche black populafcion of Beaumonfc con- sfcitufced aboufc one-fchird of fche fcofcal. To have such a sizeable percentage of the public on good terms pointed to continued political success for incumbent cifcy officials, in spite of fche facfc fchafc black advancemenfc angered many whifces. Bufc fche gains probably oufcnumbered fche losses since fche black franchise apparently excluded Republicans, a condition fchafc may have salved fche feelings of irafce whifces. Of course fche bugbear of whifce supremacy refcained considerable sfcrengfch. Wifch fche effecfc of fche war in fche cifcy, pasfc racial accord, even fco an admifcfcedly limifced degree, changed fco racial discord. New people flooding infco Beaumonfc, bofch black and whifce, as well as fche problems of overcrowded condifcions and fche fcension fchafc fche war inevifcably broughfc, provided fche main reasons for fchis discord. Black advance­ menfc and expecfcafcions in fcime of war and whifce reacfcions, especially from fche lower class, placed furfcher sfcress on fche already fcense sifcuafcion. CHAPTER III

ANTECEDENTS TO VIOLENCE

As fche machinery of war shifted infco full gear in an effort to crush the Axis, general fcensions and a social apprehension for mosfc Americans began to mount correspond­ ingly. The new order of society, which became more and more regimented as the war progressed, created a totally new experience for most United States cifcizens. And wifch fchis new order came a new sense of insfcabilifcy, displace­ ment, and insecurifcy in a war-renfc world. Ifc is nafcural, fchen, fchafc American sociefcy reflecfced during fchis period of social sfcress an aura of fcighfcened fcolerances, shorfcened tempers, and suspicions which pervaded all of World War II life. Beaumonfc proved no excepfcion fco fche effecfc of social sfcress since ifcs own atmosphere included elemenfcs of in­ sfcabilifcy, displacemenfc, and insecurifcy because of ifcs role as a crifcical area for fche war efforfc. The demographic change wifchin a cifcy seefching wifch indusfcry produced con­ difcions which could nofc be reversed, bufc only dealfc wifch in a haphazard maimer. Overcrowding in all aspecfcs of Beaumonfc life, coupled wifch fche facfc fchafc many of fche over­ crowded had come only for employmenfc, caused irrifcafcion among Beaumonfc cifcizens as well as fche economic aspiranfcs

59 40 who owed the cifcy no allegiance. And in Texas, as in every other area, the black cifcizenry wafcched and waited wifch a mixfcure of hopeful and apprehensive expecfcafcions. The up­ heaval of peacefcime America infco a boiling cauldron of acfcivifcy could only sfcimulafce black anfcicipafcion, bufc on the other hand could only increase white apprehensions. Blacks hoped for social change to augment the more general wartime redirecfcions. Many whifces exhibifced heightened sensifcivifcies aboufc change in general and opposed major alfcerafcions of sociefcy by fche war efforfc. This jungle of old and new expecfcafcions fcogefcher wifch real economic op­ porfcunifcies for whites and blacks constituted a general sefcfcing in which racial discord developed. The local con­ difcions of warfcime Beaumonfc only hasfcened fche erupfcion of the pofcenfcial racial cauldron. The firsfc signs of fchis erupfcion occurred during fche summer of 1942 and proved an ominous warning fco Beau­ monfcers. The mosfc obvious signs of discord appeared in relation fco fche fcransporfcafcion sysfcem of fche cifcy. The Beaumonfc Cifcy Lines bus service found ifcself in a pifciable plighfc since ifcs growfch could nofc keep pace wifch fche war­ time populafcion boom. The acfcual firsfc blood shed on fche buses fcook place in rafcher inconsequenfcial circumsfcances, bufc because of fche easily aroused public afcfcenfcion, fche subsequenfc incidenfcs received undue afcfcenfcion. On June 50, 1942, three alfcercafcions befcween blacks 41 and whites occurred aboard cifcy buses wifchin fche cifcy's black disfcricfc. An enraged black cufc one bus driver on the hand. A Negro armed with a knife chased another driver. An indignanfc black passenger cursed and struck a third bus driver. A lack of fcolerance on fche overcrowded vehicles apparently caused fchese confronfcafcions. Many fcimes fche buses became so full fchafc blacks were forced fco stand in the aisles ahead of fche Jim Crow signs. Bus drivers, as fche legal authorities aboard fche vehicles, faced fche obli­ gation of enforcing fche cifcy ordinances, which called for sfcricfc segregafcion of fche races aboard public fcransporfca­ fcion. Police arrested several blacks in connecfcion wifch fche assaulfcs. Rumors soon spread fchafc blacks had planned fche alfcer­ cafcions and were plofcfcing fco disrupfc fche cifcy's normal functions. Mayor Leslie Lowry and several ofcher members of fche municipal governmenfc mefc fco find a solufcion fco fche racial discord. On July 1 fchey decided fco appoinfc a com­ mittee of officials, headed by cifcy councilman W. N. Scarborough, to invesfcigafce fche racial difficulfcies wifch emphasis on cifcy fcransporfcafcion and, if possible, fco find a solufcion. The all-whifce commifcfcee underfcook fche problem 2 earnestly.

Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, July 1, 1942, p. 1. ^Ibid>, July 2, 1942, p. 1. 42 The next day, July 2, furfcher racial difficulfcies oc­ curred. H. T. Chandler, the driver of a Greyhound bus, told police tihafc while he was at -the Beaumonfc bus depot-a • black approached him fon admijssion onto his veMcle. Chandler refused the black entrance because he "appeared fco be drunk." As the driver walked around the bus checking his tires, fche black followed, cursing Chandler roundly for failing fco lefc him board fche vehicle. When Chandler reached for a pair of pliers, apparently wifch fche infcenfcion of disciplining his verbal assailant, fche black "made a pocket move." Chandler fchen called the police, who ar­ rested fche black and charged him wifch a variety of crimes. Upon furfcher invesfcigafcion police learned fchafc fche Negro, who was forfcy-seven years of age, had been arresfced nofc less fchan fchirfcy fcimes since 1914, and had afc one fcime been an inmate afc fche sfcafce penitentiary. This incidenfc merifced fronfc page coverage in fche Beaumonfc Enfcerprise. Also on July 2 police arresfced fchree black hofcel bus- boys for using abusive language. They allegedly fcold a black girl fchafc she "had befcfcer sfcick wifch us because we will run things and fche whifces will be working for us." Alfchough the blacks no doubfc had bragged fco impress fche girl, police booked and scheduled fchem for furfcher acfcion in corporafcion courfc.-^

^Ibid., July 5, 1942, p. 1. 43 These incidenfcs, along wifch fche earlier bus alterca­ tions , raised whifce eyebrows throughout fche cifcy concerning a plot by the black inhabifcanfcs fco incifce racial violence. This musfc have been fche prevailing senfciment among fche members of fche commifcfcee fco invesfcigafce racial violence when ifc made a public reporfc on July 14. In a pessimisfcic tone, fche commifcfcee asserted fchafc fcheproble m was a complex one and fchafct o avoid furfcher racial fcrouble on public transportation rigid segregation must be maintained. Posters subsequently placed in all city buses reminded fcheir occupants fchafc Beaumonfc had an ordinance calling for Jim Crow secfcions. The commifcfcee viewed fchis as only a

temporary solufcion, however, and soon glumly returned to 4 fche problem afc hand. On fche morning of July 27, police shofc Charles J. Reco, a black milifcary policeman afc home on leave from his sfcafcion in Nevada, for resisfcing arresfc. Reco, fcwenfcy-four years of age, enfcered a cifcy bus afc Shamrock Alley, where he lived, bufc according fco fchedriver , J. W. Kirl, refused to move to fche seafcs "designated by law" for Negroes. When fche driver ordered Reco fco move fco fche Jim Crow seafcs fche black soldier pulled a knife and cursed and fchreafcenedhim . Acfcually Reco probably enfcered fche bus and safc in fche seafc nexfc fco the Jim Crow sign where his knees profcruded infco

^Ibid., July 14, 1942, p. 5. 44 the whifce section. When Kirl ordered Reco to move, there seems to have been some question about whether the black soldier produced a knife and became belligerent. Kirl then senfc word for the police to arrest Reco. The bus had reached Orleans and Bowie Streets when four scout car officers arrived from the police station a short fcime later. After a brief scuffle, police forcibly removed Reco from fche bus. One of fche officers, Clyde Brown, suffered a broken hand in this affray. Reco con­ tinued fco struggle while being escorfced fco one of fche police cars, and afc one poinfc grabbed for Officer Billy Brown's nightsfcick and revolver. Afc fchispoinf c Brown pulled his gun and, wifch Reco's hand on fche barrel, shofc fche black man fchree fcimes. Officer Ben B. Whifce fchenshof c fche hapless capfcive an addifcional fcime, and Officer Clyde Brown, despifce his fractured hand, managed fco club Reco with his nightstick. Affcer fchis display, Reco fell unconscious and was transported fco fche police sfcafcion. Upon arrival fche of­ ficers expressed surprise afc Reco's condifcion: "This nigger is nofc dead." Unforfcunafcely for Reco, he regained consciousness and police forced him fco walk infco fche sfca­ fcion where he was charged wifch using abusive language. Police fchen fcransporfced fche wounded capfcive fco Hofcel Dieu hospifcal in Beaumonfc and, on fche same day, fcoForf c Crockefcfc near Galvesfcon where Reco evenfcually recovered 45 from his wounds.^ Police Chief Ross Dickey, who had only held that position since May, defended fche shooting with the comment: "I am not going fco have any of my officers cufc or beafcen while making an arresfc."

Ordinarily fchis case would have been filed away as another insfcance of unruly behavior on fche parfc of fche cap­ fcive, and fche obvious discriminafcion and rough fcreafcmenfc visited upon Reco would have been summarily dismissed. But Reco was in fche employ of fche United States Government. Upon his arrival afc Forfc Crockefcfc, Reco relafced fche inci­ denfc to his superiors who immediately made a complainfc fco fche War Deparfcmenfc. The War Deparfcmenfc subsequently placed fche matter in fche hands of Afcfcorney General Francis Biddle who on Augusfc 14, 1942, announced fchafc procedures for an invesfcigafcion would be underfcaken concerning fche policemen involved in fche alleged misfcreafcmenfc of Reco. The federal disfcricfc afcfcorney in Beaumonfc, Sfceve M. King, handled fche subsequenfc procedure which sefc an invesfcigafcion of fche Reco incidenfc by a federal grand jury for Ocfcober 26.'^ In fche meantime a district grand jury, called into being during fche days following fche Reco incidenfc, heard a

^Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, July 28, 1942, pp. 1, 5; Augusfc 15, 194^, p. 2; Walfcer Whifce, "Behind fche Harlem Riofc," The New Republic, Augusfc 16, 1943, pp. 220-22; Housfcon" Informer, Augusfc 1, 1942, p. 5- ^Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, July 28, 1942, pp. 1, 5. ^ihid. , Augusfc 15, 1942, p. 2; Augusfc 25, 1942, p. 5. 46 score of witnesses fco defcermine if fche policemen involved had violated Texas criminal statutes. Of those called upon to testify, all were white and many were cifcy policemen including Chief of Police Dickey. Disfcricfc Afcfcorney Melvin Combs made a complete file of the evidence gained during the hearings. Finally, and predictably, on Augusfc 19, 1942, the grand jury exonerated all four policemen involved in fche arrest of Private Reco of any criminal responsi­ bility. None of the four, according to the tribunal, had violated any of fche laws of fche sfcafce since fchey were justified in fcheir acfcions as keepers of fche peace.

Because of fche rafcher decisive resulfcs of fche grand ju2?y, and apparenfcly ofcher, more pressing matfcers, fche Afcfcorney General's office quiefcly dropped fche Reco case since fchere seemed "no prospecfc of convicfcion." Discrimi­ nafcion had once again emerged vicfcorious while fchosewh o saw fche acfcual course of race relafcions in Beaumonfc could o only grimace helplessly. Alfchough equal righfcs suffered anofcher defeat, fche incidenfc probably affecfced fche fcone of fche cifcy police force in Beaumonfc fco a considerable degree. Mosfc cifcy po­ licemen as nafcive Beaumonfcers felfc an inclinafcion fco defend fche local sfcafcus quo. When fche war began fco remold fcheir sociefcy fchey reacfced in a fashion nofc different from fchafc

^Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, Augusfc 20, 1942, p. 16; Whifce, "Behind the Mariem liiofc," pp. 220-22. 47 of others. The Reco incidenfc provided only fche mosfc no­ torious of fche visible signs of thafc reacfcion. Bufc wifch the accusafcions and fchreafcened acfcion of fche federal governmenfc againsfc four of fcheir number, fche police in general became more restrained and less given fco visifcing violence upon blacks in a haphazard and obsfcreperous fashion. While resenfcmenfc and discriminafcion confcinued fco smoulder wifchin mosfc of fchem, fche overfc acfcions of fche Beaumonfc policemen suddenly became less discriminafcory and more defensive, a condifcion largely produced by the nearly cafcasfcrophic Reco incidenfc.

Meanwhile fche Reco incidenfc also hurried along fche commifcfcee fco investigate fche fcransporfcafcion problem. Yefc ifc faced a quandary. Ifc could not recommend that the city purchase new buses because none were available. Ifc could not recommend fchafc people drive fcheir cars because nofc many people had eifcher fche cars or fche gasoline rafcion cards fco do so. The commifcfcee could nofc recommend fchafc half fche bus passengers walk, since many lived considerable disfcances from where fchey worked. Finally, the committee agreed on a fcrial procedure which later became permanent. On January 25, 1945, Beaumonfc City Lines began the operation of separafce buses for whifce and black pafcrons on fcwo separafce routes. The committee intended ifc as a means of increasing fche flow of fcraffic and prevenfcing racial fcrouble. Bufc of course it produced even more complete 48 segregation. The "separafce but equal" clause stood this plan in good stead, however, while from the viewpoint of preventing further racial trouble ifc did reduce black-' whifce confrontations.-^

In fche summer of 1942, fchen,racia l violence had oc­ curred to a limited degree in Beaumonfc. Bufc such incidenfcs easily could have precipifcafced large-scale violence. The question at this poinfc is why one of fche alfcercafcions on fche buses or elsewhere did nofc provide a spark for wide­ spread racial fcurbulence. A conclusive answer is impos­ sible, bufc speculafcion poinfcs fco fche possibilifcy that in 1942, unlike 1945, the pressures and fcensions of wartime America had not manifested fchemselves intensely enough to cause drastic social change and resulfcanfc fcension. Al­ though sociefcy had begun to change from a peacefcime fco a warfcime footing by fche summer of 1942, fcheUnifce d Sfcafces had been immersed in declared war only half a year. Per­ haps fche afcmosphere in Beaumonfc, while pofcenfcially flammable, was sfcill nofc combusfcible enough fco encourage racial discord on a large scale. The facfc fchafc fche incidents aboard city buses and elsewhere during mid-1942 were not of significant magnitude may help explain v^y racial problems did not grow beyond the simmering poinfc. While fche Reco incidenfc as well as fche ofcher flareups received considerable publicifcy and

"Beaumonfc Journal, January 25, 1945, p. 1. 49 caused some fcension, they did nofc seem imporfcanfc enough afc the time to invifce refcaliafcion by fche Beaumonfc white popu­ lation. These incidents did, however, prove to be of long-range significance because they added to fche smoul­ dering racial animosifcy in Beaumonfc accelerafced by warfcime condifcions. The remainder of 1942 and fche early monfchs of 1945 appeared relafcively calm in Beaumonfc, as well as fche sfcafce and nafcion, as fche counfcry worked feverishly fco achieve vicfcory. Bufc while building ifcself infco an arsenal of war, fche nafcion unknowingly produced a lefchal afcmosphere of sfcrain and suspicion among fche populafcion as sociefcy grew fco fifc fche needs of fche era. This afcmosphere devel­ oped fco as high a degree as anywhere in Beaumonfc, where fcradifcional discriminafcion and racial inequalifcy during the winfcer of 1942 and spring of 1945 made fche afcmosphere even more dangerous. While no blafcanfc evidence of racial discord appeared in and around Beaumonfc, discriminafcion in general helped perpefcrafce infcerracial fricfcion. The fcrial of J. C. Lomax, a fcwenfcy-four year old black man from Montgomery Counfcy, provided fche mosfc nofcorious example of discriminafcion in fche Beaumonfc area during fchese monfchs. Lomax allegedly raped a whifce woman on March 50, 1958, afc her home near New Caney. Broughfc fco fcrial fchafc

Richard Polenberg, War and Sociefcy, The Unifced Sfcafces, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia, 197^), 1*9-114, 131-140. 50 same year in Conroe, Lomax received fche deafch penalty. The Courfc of Criminal Appeals in Ausfcin reversed fche convic­ fcion, however, on fche grounds fchafc a confession had been forcibly exfcracfced from Lomax. In a new fcrial at Conroe, affcer allegedly forcing a confession from Lomax a second fcime, fche jury again as­ sessed the deafch penalty. This time the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld fche convicfcion. Bufc upon furfcher appeal the Supreme Courfc of fche Unifced Sfcafces dismissed fche con­ vicfcion on fche grounds fchafc Lomax had been forced fco confess. For a fchird fcime, in early 1945, fche sfcafce afc­ fcempfced fco convicfc Lomax, fchis fcime wifchoufc fche confcro- versial confession. Beaumonfc became fche scene of fche fchird trial because of a change of venue from Conroe. During fche fcrial, which occurred in early March, many witnesses fcesfcified againsfc Lomax. The sfcafce offered much circumsfcanfcial evidence, bufc wifchoufc fche confession could present no direcfc proof of guilt. In fact, much of the evidence appeared shaky. The alleged victim never saw her attacker's face because he had covered his head with a quilt prior fco assaulfcing her. She idenfcified Lomax by his voice only, oufc of a group of five suspecfcs. Because she was ill wifch pellagra afc fche time of fche afcfcack, fche be­ leaguered defense afcfcorney, Leslie Eason, argued she could have dreamed fche enfcire affair. Apparenfcly a physician had nofc examined fche alleged vicfcim for signs of rape. Her 51 word proved good enough, ifc seems, to convicfc Lomax. Ofcher witnesses testified thafc they had either seen Lomax in fche vicinifcy or had come across solid evidence in the search for fche woman's assailanfc. One piece of fchis so-called evidence was fche facfc fchafc bofch Lomax and fche alleged rapisfc had holes in fche soles of fcheir shoes. De­ fense Afcfcorney Eason emphasized thafc fchis and mosfc ofcher evidence was highly circumsfcanfcial, bufc could nofc sway fche jurors to his convicfcions. On March 2, 1945, despifce a lack of solid proof in a fcrial fchafc lasfced only fcwo days, fche jury found Lomax guilfcy and senfcenced him fco life imprisonment in fche sfcafce penifcenfciary. Aside from fche fcrial of J. C. Lomax, fche racial scene in Beaumonfc remained relafcively calm. Alfchough similar discriminafcion occurred in nearly every aspecfc of American sociefcy, ifc conformed fco fcradifcion, so fchafc only fche vic­ tims quesfcioned ifcs validity. Only larger instances of racial sensationalism, such as fche Lomax case, received much afcfcenfcion. Even fchough fche racial scene remained largely serene in Beaumonfc, fche municipal governmenfc faced a differenfc kind of crisis. On April 14, 1945, W. 0. Bowers, a prominenfc Beaumonfc afcfcorney, announced fchafc pefcifcions were

Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, March 2, 1945, PP. 1, 2; March 5, 1943, pp. 1, 2; Beaumonfc Journal, February 26, 1945, p. 17; March 2, 1945, p. 5. 52 being prepared for disfcribufcion for fche purpose of ob­ taining a recall election fco remove Mayor Leslie Lowry and several ofcher members of fche cifcy adminisfcrafcion. Mayor Lowry, who had recenfcly been inducfced infco fche army, probably could nofc have cared less whefcher he was recalled or nofc. Thus his fcemporary successor, Acfcing Mayor George Gary, and four cifcy councilmen received fche brunfc of Bowers' afcfcack. Long known as a haven for vice, Beaumonfc had grown even more nofcorious as a cenfcer for gambling, prosfcifcufcion, and narcofcics operations since fche beginning of fche war. Bowers charged the adminisfcrafcion wifch failing fco clean up fche cifcy and, as spokesman for fche recall group, urged all Beaumonfcers fco sign fche pefcifcions so fchafc fche currenfc officials could be ousfced and more responsible ones elecfced. Cifcy Manager G. Hughes Pefckovsek and Police Chief Ross Dickey, while nofc on fche lisfc of fchose being re­ called, began a massive clean up campaign in an efforfc fco lessen chances of fche elecfcion fcaking place. On April 16, police arresfced sixfceen persons for gambling and anofcher fcwenfcy-four for drunkenness. As soon as fche arresfcs were made Pefckovsek and Dickey announced fchafc vice was in- 12 fcolerable in Beaumonfc and would nofc be allowed fco exisfc. This clean up campaign confcinued feverishly for fche

^^Beaumonfc Journal, April 15, 1945, p. 8; April 17, 1943, p. 1. 55 remainder of April, wifch all arresfcs and similar informa­ tion being gleefully published in fche fcwo cifcy newspapers, "tbe Beaumonfc Enfcerprise and fche Beaumonfc Journal. The campaign proved polifcically unsuccessful, however, be­ cause on May 5 the cifcy clerk received fche recall pefcifcions and quickly cerfcified fche necessary number of signafcures. Bowers appeared openly confidenfc and announced fchafc fche guilty administrators would be ousted when fche elecfcion took place on June 19. The promise of possible disaster became a part of the thoughts of all cifcy officials, and especially Chief of Police Ross Dickey. The acfcual clean up of fche cifcy was Dickey's responsibilifcy, and his apparenfc lack of gusfco in ridding Beaumonfc of vice had broughfc him under indirecfc attack. This problem, coupled wifch fche nearly disasfcrous Reco incidenfc, proved an incenfcive for Dickey and fche po­ lice force as fchey began fco show more diligence and imparfcialifcy during fche firsfc monfchs of 1943, even fchough by fchen fche fcensionsan d anxiefcies of warfcime sociefcy had become oppressive. The police force by mid-1943 seemed « befcfcer condifcioned fco meefc unexpecfced confcingencies. As fche summer of 1945 approached, fche Unifced Sfcafces m had reached a full warfcime condifcion. Unemploymenfc was low, efficiency was high, and conditions were good when

•^^Ibid. , May 6, 1945, p. 1. 54 compared wifch those of the previous decade. But the changes brought aboufc by fche war, fche fcensions, suspicions, and insfcabilifcy of fche public in general, culminated in a highly combusfcible afcmosphere by fche spring of 1945. Race relafcions reached an especially dangerous level. New op­ porfcunifcies for advancemenfc by blacks had been realized because of fche economic changes produced by fche war. Bufc war condifcions sfcimulafced a sense of resenfcmenfc and frus­ fcrafcion in fche minds of whifce Americans. This afcmosphere had smouldered since early in fche war, bufc nofc unfcil fche summer of 1945 did ifc become so sensifcive fchafc infcer­ racial warfare erupfced. The resulfcanfc conflagrafcion spread fchroughoufc fche nafcion and lasfced fche enfcire summer, leaving deafch and desfcrucfcion in ifcs wake. The firsfc large insfcance of infcerracial warfare during World War II occurred in Mobile, Alabama, as fche beginning of a rash of riofcs during fche summer monfchs of 1945. The Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Company, which was en­ gaged in full fcime consfcrucfcion for fche governmenfc, had, as mosfc ofcher shipyards, employed blacks in fche unskilled jobs on fche shipways. In May 1945, however, bowing fco FEPC pressure fco promofce blacks and erase discriminafcion, fche firm assigned several black men fco posifcions as welders and pufc fchem on fche same job wifch whifce workers. Violence ensued on May 25 as fche whifce reacfcion fco black advancemenfc, and injured eighfc men, seven of whom were black. No one 55 was killed. Thafc nighfc the shipyard laid off its 7,000 black employees and fcold fchem fco go home unfcil an agree­ menfc was reached, while fche whifce employees remained on the job. As fche resulfc of a compromise fche FEPC sefcfcled for segregafcion of fche shipyards. Negroes held all skilled and unskilled jobs on four of fche yard's shipways while whifces manned fche ofcher ways. 14 This proved a poor sub- sfcifcufce for fche original principles of fche FEPC and imder- sfcandably mefc denunciafcion by fche black press. Those who promofce or condone or excuse segregafcion are nofc friends of America, of col­ ored people, or of humanifcy generally. Lasfc week in Mobile, Ala., whafc has been called a compromise was effecfced whereby work in fche shipyards, held up by recenfc racial fcroubles, was resumed. This so-called compromise was a surrender fco Negro segregafcion and fcherefore a defeafc suffered by fche Unifced Sfcafces. Here is proof again fchafcsegregafcio n ALWAYS means discriminafcion. The much lauded compromise in which Govern­ menfc officials fcook such a prominenfc parfc is acfcually a surrender fco fcheNaz i racial fcheory and anofcher defeafc for fche principle embodied in fche Declarafcion of Independence. 15 The second insfcance of large scale racial discord during fche summer of 1945 occurred from June 5 "to Jime 7 afc Los Angeles. Racial animosifcy had been high in Soufchern California for some fcime, especially againsfc Mexican- Americans, bufc also againsfc blacks. Warfcime condifcions

^\ew York Times, May 26, 1945, p. 25; Jime 15, 1945, p. 54. •'-^Edifcorial, Pifcfcsburgh Courier, June 19, 1945, p. 6. 56 and fche fcensions of the populafcion broughfc aboufc a series of racial spafcs during fche firsfc week in June. This series was largely sfcimulafced by fche leading newspapers of fche area, which in fche pasfc had been openly discriminafcory and derogafcory in fcheir coverage of minorifcy groups, especially Mexican-Americans. On June 5, a group of Mexican-American youfchs, known as "zoofc-suifcers" fco fche public by virfcue of fche Hearsfc newspapers, allegedly attacked and seriously beat a group of sailors on the streets of Los Angeles. Masses of pri­ vate cifcizens, soldiers, and sailors fchen roamed fche sfcreefcs in a frenzy for fche nexfc four nighfcs, seizing and beafcing all fche Mexican-Amerleans and blacks fchey en- counfcered. Only a fraction of fchose afcfcacked acfcually dressed in zoofc-suifcs. The riofcing culminafced on fche nighfc of June 7 as thousands of whifces moved aboufc fche cifcy afc- fcacking Mexican-American youths in movie fcheafcers, sfcreefc- cars, and homes, beafcing and fchen sfcripping fche vicfcims of fcheir clofches while policemen eifcher looked on as spec­ fcafcors or arresfced fche vicfcims. The area newspapers gleefully displayed pictures of naked, bleeding youfchs. Even mosfc of fche cifcy condoned fche acfcions of fche riofcers, as seen in fche sfcafcemenfc of a fcop adminisfcrafcion official: "All fchafc is needed fco end lawlessness is more of fche same action as is being exercised by the servicemen." After the rioting Governor Earl Warren appointed a 57 five man commifcfcee to investigate the "zoot-suit riots" so that recurrences could be prevented. The commifcfcee made a reporfc, but otherwise had no power to do anything else. Most of fche rioters and other guilty parties, therefore, 16 escaped punishment. During the turbulence at Los Angeles in early June, Beaumont began seething with ifcs own racial hatred as fche resulfc of an assaulfc upon a young whifce woman by a black man. On Friday, June 4, Curtis Thomas, a twenty-four year old black, beat and raped an eighteen year old telephone operator. About 11:50 p.m. that night fche girl finished work at the telephone company and began walking home along Laurel Street. As she reached the intersecfcion of Magnolia and Laurel, the zoot-suit clad Thomas seized the victim and then knocked her unconscious. Apparently Thomas had been waiting in ambush for the girl, because once she was unconscious Thomas dragged her to a secluded spot on the platform of a nearby meat storage warehouse where he had laid a quilt. The girl regained consciousness and began resisting her assailant. Thomas then pummeled and stabbed the hap­ less victim, after which he raped her. She remained semi-conscious mosfc of this time, and heard Thomas explain:

Hofstadter and Wallace, American Violence, 556; Carey Mc Williams, "The Zoofc Suifc Riofcs," The "Hew Republic, June 21, 1945, pp. 818-20; Pifcfcsburgh CouiTer, June 19, 1945, p. 8. 58 "The army is going fco gefc me, and if I do fchis, I'll get killed for this and I won't be going to the army." Ap­ parently fear of his induction into the service prompted the irrational Thomas fco vicfcimize fche young woman. ' After commitfcing fche assault Thomas fell asleep and allowed the girl fco escape fco her home, which she reached about 4:00 a.m. Her parenfcs, upon finding what had transpired, called the police sfcafcion and fcwo cars were sent to the scene while they rushed the girl fco St. Therese Hospifcal. The police cars quiefcly approached fche meafc sfcorage warehouse from differenfc direcfcions in order to quickly apprehend Thomas, but fche lighfcs and noise awakened fche assailanfc. In an efforfc fco escape, ap­ parenfcly having losfc fche desire fco die, Thomas evenfcually ran infco a dead end alley where fche police shofc him several times. Officers then transported him fco Hofcel Dieu hospifcal wifch lifcfcle hope for his survival. While fchere he confessed fco having commifcfced the rape and police promptly charged him with criminal assault. Police also disclosed, in a probable efforfc fco mainfcain fche sfcereofcype of black criminalifcy, fchafc Thomas had previously been an 18 inmafce afc fche sfcafce prison for burglary. Aboufc 5:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, June 6, a mob

•^'^Beaumonfc Journal, June 5, 1945, p. 1; Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 6, 1945, PP. 1» 7. •^^Beaumonfc Journal, June 25, 1945, p. 1. 59 began gathering at the Negro ward of Hotel Dieu. The crowd, which ultimately numbered about I50 members, ap­ parently gathered spontaneously fco seize Curtis Thomas and lynch him. Only one officer stood guard at the time, but after he telephoned the police station a stronger force was created. Police Chief Dickey arrived at the scene be­ fore anyone had entered the building. He walked through the bellicose crowd but saw no one he knew and apparently concluded that shipyard workers made up most of the crowd. According fco Dickey, only a lack of leadership kepfc the mob from being more dangerous. Wifchoufc a leader the mob simply milled around fche building, shoufcing for Thomas to be lynched, until Dickey verbally accosted the throng. Pleading for reason, Dickey asked the crowd to let the law take its course, for under fche laws of Texas, Thomas would surely gefc his reward. While addressing fche mob, Dickey no doubfc recalled fche fcraumafcic Charles J. Reco incidenfc of nearly a year before, in which he and fche police had been publicly crifcicized by fche Afcfcorney General of fche United States. Dickey also kept in mind the agitation over the city administration, of which he was a prime target. Both of these considerations persuaded Dickey to use every possible means of dispersing the crowd and thereby pre­ venting any widespread racial violence which would surely besmear his already tarnished record.

Affcer advising fche mob fchafc Thomas would be legally 60 dealt with fco the satisfaction of all, Dickey reminded the would-be lynchers that Thomas lay critically injured and probably would die. The members of the disgruntled aggre­ gation Xinally complied with Dickey's exhortations and dispersed. In the meantime the police whisked Thomas from his bed and spirifced him away fco fche cifcy jail where he was kepfc secrefcly unfcil he died on June 8. "

Dickey's infcelligenfc handling of fche mob proved a credifc which momenfcarily absolved him of personal crifci- cism. Even an influenfcial black newspaper, fche Chicago Defender, nofced: "Taken to Hotel Dieu where he /^homaoj was not expecfced fco live, he was placed under guard. A mob formed and wenfc fco fcake Thomas bufc Police Chief Dickey talked them out of it."^^ Aside from Dickey's behavior, however, two other factors loomed much larger in an explanation of why the mob did not gefc oufc of confcrol. If fchese facfcors had nofc been present Dickey might not have had any effect upon the mob, which mighfc have lynched Thomas and caused general de­ sfcrucfcion before fche sifcuafcion could be confcrolled. Firsfc, fche mob had no leadership. Alfchough one or more persons seemed more vocal fchan fcheofchers , fcheycerfcainl y provided no organizafcion or leadership. Because of fchis

^Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 7, 1945, pp. 1, 2; Beaumonfc Journal, June 7, 1945, p. 5. ^^Chicago Defender, June 19, 1945, p. 5. 61 Dickey kept the crowd contained as if it were a herd of cattle.

Second, fche common knowledge fchafc Thomas lay on his deathbed may have been an even bigger factor in explaining the lack of destruction by the mob. Thus Dickey's admoni­ tion that Thomas would die anyway effectively dampened the mob's mood. Had Thomas lived, there mighfc have been re­ peated attempts to lynch him before he was tried, and the possibility of widespread racial warfare would have been strong.

The events surrounding fche rape also increased racial tension in the weeks fco follow. Wifch fche rape of fche young woman on June 4 and fche deafch of Thomas four days later, before a trial, the crime seemed unavenged to many whites. The case fchus whetted fcheir tempers in anfcicipa­ fcion of any subsequent incident by which the will of the public finally could be effecfced. In an edifcorial on July 8, fche edifcor of fche Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, exhibifcing rare percepfciveness, summed up fche local sifcuafcion. Alfchough Chief of Police Dickey and Capfcain George Whifce of fche police deparfcmenfc persuaded fche crowd fco disperse, fche nexfc fcime a mob forms, assuming fchafc fchebadl y wounded man survives and is fcried here, ifc may have a leader. Then fchere will be riofcing and bloodshed. Because of fche large influx of workers drawn fco Beaumonfc and fche surrounding area by war indusfcries, fche cifcy's populafcion is less sfcable now fchan ifc has been at any time since the days of Spindlefcop—and may be less amenable fco reason and law.21

^^Edifcorial, Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 8, 1945, p. 6. 62 The sifcuafcion in Beaumont had reached a critical stage, similar to those of many other industrial areas where the war effort had caused social and economic redi­ rection. The sudden and extensive changes in society resulted in a widespread sense of instability and anxiety. Blacks, although still not considered equal by most whites, found opportunities by 1945 to move into the war­ time economy to a degree that further heightened white tensions. These conditions in general provided a founda­ tion for interracial discord. In Beaumont fchese general condifcions joined wifch local evenfcs fco creafce in fche cifcy a highly inflammable atmosphere. The summer of 1942, which included the bus altercations, the Charles J. Reco incidenfc, and fche furfcher segregafcion of fche bus sysfcem provided fche earliesfc indi­ cations of inward tension. Traditional discrimination, as shown most obviously in the J. C. Lomax trial, also con­ tinued to exisfc in early 1945. The widespread publicifcy given fche race riofcs in Mobile and Los Angeles only helped fan fche flames of racial discord. The Mobile riofc probably had fche greafcesfc influence since fche fcroublebega n in a shipyard, which emphasized fche similarifcies befcween that southern city and Beaumont. Finally, the events surrounding the Thomas case placed an unbearable weight on some Beaumonters, especially the many shipyard employees from out of town who owed no 65 allegiance to Beaumont and represented an extremely un­ stable part of the populace. The atmosphere by mid-June was so combustible that another racial incident might easily cause widespread violence and destruction. CHAPTER IV

"IT WAS LIKE HELL": THE RIOT

About three o'clock on the afternoon of June 15, 1945, the Beaumont police received a telephone call from a woman who lived on the Eleventh Streefc road near fche norfchwestern outskirts of the city. She told the desk sergeant, Willie Bauer, that she had been raped by a black man earlier in the afternoon. Bauer immediately sent a call for any of­ ficers in the vicinity to check the woman's sfcory. Two deputy sheriffs, Herman Crocker and Homer French, arrived at the scene first. Several police cars followed shorfcly thereafter. 1 The woman told the invesfcigafcors fchafc,af c aboufc 10:50 a.m. that morning, a black man came to her house looking for work. The woman sent him fco weed fche yard, and fed him afc lunch. The man had come from New Orleans wifchin the pasfc few days, hifcchhiking firsfc fco Silsbee, where his mother lived, and then fco Beaumonfc fco answer a draffc call. According fco the woman, the black entered her house about 2:00 or 2:50 p.m., as she put her fchree small children to bed for their nap. Entering the children's room, fche man

•^The idenfcifcy of fchis woman has yefc fco be discovered, despifce repeafced inquiries by fche aufchor. According fco newspaper accounfcs, fche woman's family moved fco Beaumonfc from Galvesfcon in April or May 1945, and prior fco fchafc resided in Porfc Arfchur. Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 16, 1945, p. 1. 64 65 grabbed fche woman and, while threatening her with a sharp file, dragged her into an adjacent room. The black then raped the woman, and escaped into a wooded area near the house. After recovering, the woman went to a filling sta­ tion about one-half mile away where she called the police and then her husband. Officers later took her to a local hospital for an examinafcion.

The woman's husband worked for the International Der­ rick and Equipment Company, which produced great quantities of bombs and other war goods. In July 1942 the federal government awarded this firm $5 million in contracts for war materials. This necessitated the addition of three hundred men to the work force and a $250,000 expansion program. The husband of the alleged rape victim no doubt came to Beaumont and International Derrick as part of the • 4. 5 expansion project.^ Immediately upon receiving the account of the rape, the police ordered roadblocks fchrown up along every road and highway in fche vicinity, and a search party of citizens armed with shotguns, as well as police and Texas Rangers, formed. It began combing the woods where fche Negro was lasfc seen. Ofcher officers searched fche house for finger­ prints, especially on the cup and saucer from which the assailant drank, but none were found. The police at that ^Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1945, p. 1. ^Ibid., July 14, 1942, p. 1. 66 point possessed only the woman's description of the black man as being of average build and features. The police continued to investigate in and around the scene of the alleged attack, but by late afternoon, except for those in the search party who continued their hunt on Wednesday with equally futile results, most of the law en­ forcement officers returned to their normal activities. As they returned, interested citizens became curious and learned fchafc an infcerracial rape had occurred, the second in ten days. Many people, especially those of the lower economic class most likely to come into contact with blacks, began to fume at the thought of the mistreated victim. Other citizens wondered how much more interracial discord would be tolerated, but refused to be driven to anger by a series of rumors. Many Beaumonters, fchen, knew of the alleged rape, but except for the resentful lower class workers, usually remained calm while attempting to find general causes for this fcurbulence which, until the summer of 1942, had seemed relatively unusual. A different situation existed in the Pennsylvania Shipyards. Night shift employees heard of fche alleged as­ saulfc while in fche city during fche day and from rumors and fabrications became armed with inaccurate information. In possession of sensational details, these men arrived at the shipyard at seven o'clock to begin fcheir shiffc, and shared fcheir informafcion among one anofcher as well as wifch fchose 67 who had just finished work. In this manner the employees at Pennsylvania Shipyards became excited and restive as they recounted the rape by Curtis Thomas, and now the vio­ lation of a young mother. This latest in a series of racial clashes in and around Beaumont caused mass anger among the lower class cifcizenry and, if not anger, dis­ satisfaction among the middle and upper classes who often remained somewhat defcached from infcerracial problems.

Aboufc nine o'clock on fche nighfc of June 15 over two thousand shipyard workers dropped their fcools and marched out of the yard. The walkout appeared to be spontaneous, with almosfc all whifce workers fcakingparfc . The loss of mosfc white employees broughfc fco a halfc mosfc acfcivifcy in fche yards. Foremen urged fcheir men nofc fco leave, reminding them that their work was too imporfcanfc fco easfc aside, but the men replied: "Our duty is for the protection of our homes." The mob crossed the bridge separating the ship­ yards from the rest of the city and continued down Pine and Main Sfcreefcs, picking up bysfcanders as ifc wenfc. These by- sfcanders seemed mainly interesfced in discovering fche infcenfcions of the mob, but as they swelled the ranks of the throng and learned the tainted version of the alleged rape, they also developed an ugly disposition. The mob at this time probably numbered from 2,000 to 5,000.

^Ibid., June 16, 1943, p. 1. 68 Clyde Rush, a city policeman who had gotten off duty earlier in the afternoon, went to the Liberty Theater on Pearl Street, a few blocks from the police station, to pass the time. As he walked out of the theater that nighfc on his way back fco the station to get his car. Rush spied fche mob marching down Main Sfcreefc fcoward the City Hall, police station, and Jefferson County Courfchouse, all sifcuafced only a few blocks from each ofcher. Rush scurried to the station and infoimed its occupants of the situation. They had no time, however, fco prepare for the onslaught.^ Captain of Detecfcives B. 0. Craft, Jr., in charge of the police sfcafcion afc nighfc, ran outside to halt fche crowd, bufc fco no avail. "They came out of the shipyards over there, 4,000 or 5,000 of them. They came righfc up fco fche police station and flooded in. We tried fco fcalk fco fchem and reason with them but they took charge."

By the time the mob reached the police station it had driven itself into a wild frenzy. A lack of organization and leadership fortunately prevailed, and fche mob simply milled aboufc fche cifcy jail secfcion of fche police sfcafcion, demanding fchafc fche alleged rapisfc be handed over to be lynched. Chief of Police Ross Dickey and Captain Craft, fearing mass desfcrucfcion, quickly called the alleged vicfcim

''Clyde C. Rush fco James A. Burran, infcerview, Decem­ ber 19, 1972, Beaumonfc, Texas. ^Housfcon Posfc, June 17, 1943, p. 1. 69 and broughfc her downtown to pacify the aggregation. When she arrived, the police escorted her through the city jail before she addressed the incensed mob. With her husband's arms about her shoulders the woman announced that the rapist was not in the city jail but was "sfcill in the woods over there" and urged the crowd to search for him at that location. Following this admonition the woman left, bufc the crowd simply moved from the jail entrance fco fchemai n en­ trance of the building. Desk Sergeant Willie Bauer spent fchis time frantically telephoning all off duty policemen and the Beaumont auxiliary police force, which numbered 150 members. People ran in and out of the building and pandemonium reigned, when one individual walked up to Bauer's window, shoved a pistol in his face, and informed him fchafc fche mob would momenfcarily fcake over the station. Bauer reached through fche window, grabbed fche individual's pisfcol, and knocked him unconscious wifch it, splattering blood on the window. Sergeant Bauer, like all other po­ licemen, remained on duty for the next several days without leave, and became completely exhausted. Some, however, such as the clever Clyde Rush, used the few inactive mo­ ments during the week to climb on top of the lockers in the 7 station where he slept unmolesfced for shorfc periods. ^Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 16, 1945, p. 1; Willie E. Bauer fco James A. Burran, infcerview, December 20, 1972, Beaumonfc, Texas; Clyde C. Rush fco James A. Burran, infcerview. 70 While collecfced in fronfc of the police station, members of the mob spied an unfortunate black "trusty" re­ turning from an errand. As the black tried to get inside the building, they pummeled and cursed him. Chief Dickey pushed his way into the crowd and personally rescued the man, an act which received unfavorable reviews from the mob. Some members of the throng then turned fcheir afcfcenfcion to a black who was in jail on a minor charge. Deciding to victimize this person in lieu of the rapist, some of the crowd broke out a window and began pulling the terrified black through the opening. Members of the be­ leaguered police force grabbed the man and, after a strug­ gle with the crowd, managed to pull him back into the jail o and safety. While the mob besieged the station, some of the crowd continued down Pearl Street to the fourteen story Jefferson County Courthouse, where they demanded that Sheriff W. W. Richardson release the alleged rapist to their custody. Richardson informed the throng that the rapist was not present, and that there were no suspects being held in connection with the assault. The mob then demanded a tour of the county jail. Why they wanted to see the prisoners is unclear, since none of the men would have recognized the alleged rapist had he been there. Satisfied that the ^New York PM, June 17, 1945, p. 5; Willie E. Bauer to James A. Burran, interview. 71 rapist was not present, those admitted to the jail rejoined the rest of their contingent and walked back to the police station.^

At the police station the woman, this time at the door of the main entrance to the structure, admonished the mob a second time, even though its disposition had grown con­ siderably uglier. She urged the mob to search for the black elsewhere because the rapist was not in jail. This plea also made no impression on the throng, which burst out of control. Even though no leadership exisfced in the crowd, it spontaneously reacted to the sifcuafcion in a fashion characfcerisfcic of earlier race riofcs. Someone in fche crowd shoufced, "You reckon they lefc her /fche alleged rape vicfcimj see all of fchem /fche black prisoners7?" Then someone shoufced "Lefc's go fco nigger town"^ and they sfcarfced oufc down fche middle of Wall Sfcreefc, wenfc over on Orleans and Forsyfche, and began breaking up.l^ Aboufc midnighfc, the crowd, which may have numbered over 4,000, began rioting through the nearby black dis­ tricts of the city. This rioting continued in widespread, uncontrolled fashion until about daylight on the morning of June 16. During these hours, pandemonium reigned as fche riofcers swarmed over mosfc of the downtown area, causing death and destruction.

"pitfcsburgh Courier, June 26, 1945, p. 1; Chicago Defender, June 26, 1945, p. 1; Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1. Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 16, 1945, p. 1. 72

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•vy 7/ Approximate downtown area and black district 73 Like most other race riots, the violence in Beaumont began and continued in an almost spontaneous fashion. No ringleaders guided the crowd. Several of those at the po­ lice station seemed more vocal than others, but the crowd listened exclusively to no one person or group of persons. This lack of leadership helped explain two points. First, the riot proved less destructive fchan it might have been with organization and leadership. A mob numbering probably between 5,000 and 4,000 at the police station certainly could have become larger once the actual rioting began, be­ cause of the arrival of addifcional infceresfced cifcizens. With a mob that size, the chances for a widespread holo­ caust appeared strong. But the lack of leadership con­ fcribufced fco the relative brevity and limifced desfcrucfcion by the rioters. A lack of leadership and organization also affected the overall patfcern of fcurbulence in Beaumonfc. The black disfcricts of the city encompassed much of the downtown, or older, area, but two general areas existed in which residential segregation forced blacks to concentrate. One area ran along Forsythe Street, and the other along Gladys Street. Since the two areas lay a considerable distance apart, an organized mob, or afc leasfc one wifch leaders, probably would have afcfcacked one at a time, or by splitting the crowd, might have attacked both areas simultaneously. But for lack of leadership the incensed aggregation losfc 74 its full force. The mob, once it resolved to riot while at the police station, broke up into small bands and roamed the downtown area all night. Each band, usually consisfcing of from five to twenty-five individuals, carried out ifcs own plan of desfcrucfcion. Very rarely did fchese bodies join infco a large fchrong to effect particularly devastating mayhem. Because two black areas existed, the riot in a general sense followed two courses; one contingent devas­ tated the Forsythe Street area while the other attacked the Gladys Street area.

Before leaving the police station, the crowd took as its first vicfcim an unfortunate black who attempted to drive pasfc fche scene in his car. Some of fche fchrong pulled the black from the vehicle, pummeled him, and fchen over­ turned his auto and set it ablaze. The aggregation then broke up and either went to Forsythe, the location of many black-owned businesses, or to Gladys, largely a black residential district. Along Forsythe, the crowd generally spent its fcime sefcfcing fire to buildings and autos, while beating every black they encountered. The mob set cars ablaze at the intersections of Forsythe and Neches, College and Trinity, Forsythe and Trinity, and Forsythe and Park Streets. The individual groups sefc fire to numerous houses and busi­ nesses, bufc much of fche damage remained relatively minor. Exceptions included the Willard and Willard, Inc., funeral 75 home which burned to the ground, the Dixon-Ford Funeral Home, and Fleming Funeral Home, Watkins Jewelry Store, and Sol White's Pharmacy. Sol White, a successful black businessman, purchased $11,000 in war bonds a month prior to the riot. His business suffered extensive damage. Against this onslaught most black inhabitants retreated to the inner areas of the black districts where fche riofcers dared not venture for fear of being surrounded. But many blacks remained to fight for fcheir properfcy and wounded several rioters.^^ On Gladys Sfcreefc, as on Forsyfche, pandemonium pre­ vailed. The riofcers, in small groups, roamed fche area in total darkness. This condition caused rioters to misfcake each other for blacks, so that rioters shot at least four other whites. Nevertheless, desfcrucfcion along Gladys Sfcreefc became more widespread than on Forsythe. "It was like hell," one white man asserted. The rioters over­ turned and set fire to an auto at the intersection of Magnolia and Gladys, and another car suffered a similar fate on Silver Street. The mob desfcroyed afc leasfc fcen black-owned autos during the rioting. Rioters set more fires on Gladys than on Forsythe, and the fire chief, S. D. 0'Conor, reported that the fire department spent the

-^•^Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1945, p. 1; Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1; Housfcon Informer, June 19, 1943, pp. 1, 8; June 26, 1945, p.TI 76 majority of its time at the Gladys Street area."^^ Fortunately, the rioters rarely heckled the firemen, but one fireman described a prevailing sense of despair. "We actually saw some of the fires being set, but if we'd start after the man setting the blaze, he'd dodge into the darkness and we couldn't tell him from anyone else."^ Some of the blazes became major, such as one at the Canton Cafe which rioters partially desfcroyed wifch axes, fchen set afire. On Gladys Street alone fifteen or sixteen major fires occurred. The whites broke into homes as well, and cars were seen speeding through the city with clocks, radios, and other assorted sfcolen goods. In some insfcances the rioters snatched jewelry from the hands and necks of black inhabifcanfcs. 14 Loofcers on Gladys Sfcreefc also swepfc through the Dew Drop Inn, owned by P. G. Thomas. When the mob first ar­ rived at Gladys, Thomas remained in his restaurant. A po­ liceman, who barely preceded the rioters, told Thomas fco lock up and escape, bufc because of a broken window which had occurred earlier, Thomas elecfced to stay and protect his business. Minutes later a group of rioters knocked

•^^Dallas Mominp: News, June 17, 1945, p. 1; Chicago Defender, June ^b, IW, p. 1; Beaumont Journal, June 16, 1945, p. 1. •^^Chicago Defender, June 26, 1945, p. 1. •'•^Pifcfcsburp:h Courier, June 26, 1945, p. 1. 11 down the front door of the Dew Drop Inn as a frightened Thomas looked on from a service window. The rioters looted the structure, taking groceries and utensils with them and destroying what they could not carry. Thomas escaped out the back door but remained just out of sight behind the building until daybreak. The mob had demolished his entire operation and source of livelihood. Other extensive damage included the destruction and looting of Perrodin's Radio and Sound Service, which rioters empfcied of all radios, clocks, fcools, and even an elecfcric fan and typewriter. The rioters also destroyed Bendy's Cafe and looted its contents. 1^5 Personal violence ran rampant along with fche destruc­ tion and looting of the black district. Leon Kennedy, a white shipyard worker, remained on the job after most of the men left; but when he heard of the actual rioting he quit work in order to look after the "safety of his family." As he walked toward his home on Valentine Streefc by way of Gladys a black shotgunned him as a presumed rioter. Milton Randall, a seventeen year old white youth, no doubt taking part in the rioting on Gladys, saw someone in an auto with whom he wanted to converse. Randall sfcood on the auto's running board as they talked, until suddenly armed blacks appeared and the car attempfced fco escape.

"^^P. G. Thomas fco James A. Burran, March 1, 1975; Housfcon Informer, June 26, 1945, p. 1. 78 The blacks shot Randall in the back, whereupon he fell through a window into the auto and was rushed to Hotel Dieu hospital.

A group of whites attacked Frank Hadnot, a forty- five year old black, and gleefully poimded his teeth out, smashed his jaw, and bloodied his head with a hammer. Rioters also wounded several blacks on city buses. They shot Oscar Lee in the ankle as he got off a bus, while Booker Addison received a head injury as he got on a bus to report for milifcary duty.

One of the mosfc concentrated periods of personal vio­ lence occurred at the Greyhound bus depot on Park Street. Fifty-two black draftees who had been in Houston for their physical examinations waited in the depofc for a bus fco their homes in Porfc Arfchur. Aboufc midnighfc a mob of three to four hundred crazed rioters appeared at the depot and determined to wreak havoc: "Here fchey are, a whole bunch of fchem. Lefc's get them." The rioters invaded the lobby of the depot and beat senseless every black fchey caughfc. Irvin Collins, a black draftee, experienced the utter panic at the depot and before he could run from the building was shot at and struck with iron pipes several times. He finally crawled under a nearby house where he remained un­ til the following day. Roy Ford, another draftee, received an unmerciful beating which might have ended his life had he not dashed 79 out of the lobby and climbed on top of the depot. There Ford remained until the next day, and experienced a hor­ rifying panoramic view of the violence from his lofty perch. When the mob approached another draftee, Alex Hubbard, he calmly faced the throng and confided that he would not run since he had nothing to fear. The puzzled rioters then ordered Hubbard to carry a "dead nigger" from fche station; from there he took the victim fco a friend's house where they discovered the man was not dead but un­ conscious. In the process of caring for the wounded man Hubbard escaped injury, Eotha Jones was in the phone booth when the mob ar­ rived at the bus station. A white man rushed the booth to break open the door, but Jones opened it at the lasfc second and the man fell in. Jones sfcepped fromfche boofch only to be clubbed several times aboutfche hea d and shoulders, wounds which temporarily blinded him. A white woman had been in the bus station when the violence erupted, and subsequently had been separated from her baby. The woman became hysterical, removed her shoes, and clubbed her way through the crowd. When she finally found her child she began clubbing her way out of the mob with a shoe in one arm and the baby in the other. Jones crouched and followed the mother through the violence and out of the building. When he arrived outside, a nearby police car caught him in its spotlight, apparently so the mob 80 could locate him, and Jones finally ended his visit to Beaumont at a friend's house with numerous injuries. Alex Mouton, a thirty-one year old black draftee, re­ ceived several blows while in the depot. He ran from the building, only to be chased by his assailants and struck several times with pipes and bats. He fell unconscious twice and awoke the lasfc time to find several men jumping on his head and chest. Mouton received a serious hearfc injury infche affray, and remained confined to his bed in 16 Port Arthur until his death on October 4. The bus station was not the only location at which serious injuries occurred. John Johnson, a black employee of the American Ice Company, had just entered his car after work when a group of whites ran up and shot him in the abdomen with a shotgun. He died on the operating table. Police found Ellis C. Brown, a white carpenter, dead in the fringes of the riot area on Pine Street near the shipyards with a crushed skull. Brown did not live to describe the attack, but speculation by the Beaumont Enterprise pointed tofche probabilit y that a group of blacks was responsible. This 'is not to suggest that blacks acted as aggressively as whites during the riot. Most blacks remained on the defensive, but a few no doubt used

-^^Houston Informer, June 26, 1943, p. 8; Beaumont Enterprise, October 6, 1945, p. 4. 81 the situation to vent their frustrations on whites such as Brown through retaliatory action. Another possibility exists that Brown may have been injured accidentally by white rioters, and left by those who did not want to be implicated either in Brown's death or the riofcing. ' Blacks suffered many casualties and witnessed much destruction as individual groups of rioters victimized black homes in ruthless and systematic fashion. "The men entered one home as if they were crazy. They tore up the furniture, hurled large pieces out of windows, and as soon as the occupants would run out, men who composed the 18 'second fceam' would fcake affcer fchem and beat fchem." This became standard procedure in the more than two hundred homes and businesses broken into on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning. Many persons were beaten, some sfcabbed or clubbed, and ofchers shofc. Hospital records showed only eleven men as victims of the riot, however, mosfc of fchem seriously injured. The reason for fche apparenfc confcradic- tion is that most of those who suffered wounds had them treated privately. Blacks especially feared furfcher beafcing or arrest for rioting if they entered the hospi­ tals. Hospital records, therefore, did not accurately reflect the number of persons injured. Estimates of those

'^Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1. •^^Pittsbur^h Courier, June 26, 1945, p. 1. 82 actually hurt in the rioting ranged upward to three or four hundred. -^

During the period of death and desfcrucfcion which lasted from midnight to daybreak, the law enforcement con­ tingents engaged in chaotic activity. Police Chief Ross Dickey called the regular force to duty and mobilized the 150 member police auxiliary. The sheriff activated his department, and city officials called the 18tb Battalion of the Texas State Guard, which consisfced of Beaumonfc cifci­ zens, to duty at the Beaumont High School where they were held in reserve until the rioting actually began. The four companies of the 18tb Battalion were under the command of Major Fred C. Stone, a local architect.

Unfortunately, during the height of rioting, these relatively scanty local forces had to batfcle fche holocausfc alone since mosfc ofcher confcingenfcs called in later from outlying areas did not arrive until the violence had sub­ sided. It was the police force that bore the majority of law enforcement efforts during the night, supplemented by the local guardsmen, state police, and sheriff's depart­ ment. The beleaguered police department found itself not only too undermanned to cope with this situation, but also responsible for coordinating all law enforcement efforts, which proved of limited value. Chief Dickey and the other

19 Beaumont Enterprise , Jiine 17, 1943 , P. 1. 83 police officers felt obliged to battle the rioters to the best of their limited abilities since they, along with Sheriff Richardson, Major Stone, and Captain L. H. Purvis of the Texas Rangers, were responsible for the strategy of quelling the violence. They arrested as many rioters as possible, kept outsiders from getting into the cifcy, and fcried to protect blacks. Ifc was esfcimafced fchafc on fche nighfc of the riot about 1,000 blacks left the city on foot and another 1,500 fled by auto. A considerable number of black shipyard and defense workers went back to Louisiana from whence they had come. Where ofchers wenfc is uncerfcain, though many left pemianently. But the vasfc majorifcy of 20 fche black population remained. Chief Dickey placed mosfc of the police force in the riot sections of the city where they atfcempfced fco curb fche violence. Mosfc patrolmen and Texas State Guardsmen per­ formed the same kinds of activities, but fche police wielded more power because of their experience and their role as professional peace keepers. Clyde Rush, a city policeman at the station when the riot began, experienced the utter pandemonium that ensued. He, along with many other po­ licemen, finally found themselves in the Gladys Street area where he watched over the burned buildings and tried to protect those which had not been burned or broken into by

20lbid. 84 the rioters. As the city firemen worked feverishly to ex­ tinguish the many conflagrations on Gladys Street, Rush and other enforcement officers also attempted to arrest the rioters. These proved virtually impossible tasks. Rush remained in the black district for several hours, but eventually returned to the downtown area where he searched incoming cars. Rush manned an intersection and stopped every auto that passed. If he found weapons. Rush climbed in the car with the would-be rioters and escorted them to the station. There police again searched the auto, impounded the weapons and ammunition, and, if necessary, incarcerated the occupants of the auto. The police used rather arbitrary guidelines in incarcerating men. Usually the criteria for arrest included slovenly appearance, bellicosity, the number of weapons found, consumption of alcohol, and the disposition of the officer. As a result law officials ultimately released many men who were guilty of rioting or other crimes but who failed to impress the policemen as being guilty. Despite the laxity of arrests, however, officers confiscated a considerable amount of firepower. Police and guardsmen impounded a total of 156 pistols, 56 shotguns, and 44 rifles, as well as 86 knives, 43 clubs, 11 brass knuckles, a huge quantity of ammimition, and other "miscellaneous weapons including hammers, pipes, sashweights, etc." 21 ^^Clyde C. Rush to James A. Burran, interview; Beaumont Enterprise, June 22, 1943, p. 12. 85 The local Texas State Guardsmen, aside from confis­ cating weapons and making some arrests, did little else since they spent fche remainder of the night attempting to organize for further acfcion. As soon as fche mob began to form around the police station fche cifcy adminisfcrafcion called fche 18tb Bafcfcalion, among ofcher groups, to action. Major Stone notified the four companies by radio or fcele- phone early on the night of the riot, and ordered them to congregate in the basement of the Jefferson County Court­ house where the guns and ammunition were stored. After arming the battalion. Stone transporfced it to Beaumont High School where it remained until after the rioting actually broke oufc aboufc midnighfc. Sfcone fchen moved his men fco fche cifcy hall, where fchey esfcablished fcheir main base on fche lawn, pifcching pup fcenfcs and unrolling barbed wire in spiral fashion along fche ground fco barricade fche area. A Salvation Army mobile canteen arrived and fed the battalion during its activation. After the guardsmen esfcablished fcheir base fchey joined fche pracfcically powerless cifcy police, police auxiliary, and the few Department of Public Safety per­ sonnel on hand in an effort to quell the rioting. Actually the law enforcement groups had little effect on the riot since during the most widespread violence too few men were available.

Most of the guardsmen, including the IStb Battalion 86 and the other forces that later arrived, spent their time patrolling the streets for would-be rioters. They found their task difficult and rioting continued unabated throughout fche area, alfchough fche riofcers never afcfcacked guardsmen or police diiring fche fcurbulence. The guardsmen did capture and jail some riofcers, bufc pafcrolling sfcricken areas of fche cifcy remained fche major responsibilifcy of fche ersfcwhile soldiers during fcheir acfcivafcion which lasfced unfcil the following Sunday, June 20. 22 As the nightmare wore on, the law enforcement con­ tingents began summarily arresfcing individuals fco keep fchem off fche sfcreefcs. They momenfcarily fcossed aside legal pro­ cedure and ignored innocence or guilfc as officers fchrew scores of men in jail for safekeeping unfcil fche sifcuafcion became less fcraumafcic. In fchis way, police quickly filled the city and county jails fco capacifcy. Chief Dickey, Sheriff Richardson, Major Sfcone, and fche ofcher ranking law officers fchen faced a quandary regarding detention fa­ cilities. Finally, they decided fco commandeer fche Harvesfc Club, a large building on fche counfcy fairgrounds in fche norfchern secfcor of fche cifcy. Affcer fche downfcown jails became packed, fche police herded fchose arresfced infco fche building, which was profcecfced by guardsmen. Throughoufc

Henry C. Anderson fco James A. Burran, infcerview, December 20, 1972, Beaumonfc, Texas; Gilberfc T. Adams, Sr. to James A. Burran, infcerview, December 20, 1972, Beaumonfc, Texas. 87 the period the captives constantly heckled the guards, since they found some humor in being guarded by their neighbors.

During the period of the rioting, officers arrested 206 persons and placed them in either the jails or the Harvesfc Club. This seems a low figure when compared wifch a conservative estimate of the number of law enforcement officials on hand that night, about 400. But the officers simply did not arrest many people because of fche laxifcy of enforcement, the utter confusion throughoufc fchenighfc , and the lack of space to house prisoners. Most of the rioters, therefore, escaped arresfc. This fcrend proved common fco many racial incidenfcs, such as the Chicago riofc of 1919 in which a fcofcal of 5,000 policemen and fchree regimenfcs of milifcia arresfced only 229 persons. The Easfc St. Louis riot exhibited the same trend, because with 52 policemen and several hundred guardsmen only about 200 25 persons found fchemselves in jail. -^ At the first signs of violence the city administra­ tion contacted the state government. Unfortunately, Acting Governor A. M. Aikin, Jr., occupied the governor's chair, a circumstance which only added to the pandemonium in Beaumont. The governor. Coke R. Stevenson, had left for

housfcon Post, June 17, 1945, p. 1; Beaumonfc Enfcer­ prise , June 22, 1945, p. 12; The Chicago Commission on Race Relafcions, The Negro in Chicago, 55-41; Rudwick, Race Riofc afc Easfc Sfc. Louis, 89-96. 88 Washington to discuss grievances with Selective Service Director Lewis B. Hershey, possibly to converse with FDR, and to witness the laiinching of the cruiser Housfcon. The lieutenant governor, John Lee Smith, was in the Midwesfc, most notably at Indianapolis and Cincinnati, on behalf of the Knights of Pythias, which he served as Supreme Chancel­ lor. Thus the president pro tempore of .the Texas Senate, Aikin, occupied the governor's office. He had held the of­ fice of acting governor only one day when the riot erupted. Aikin advised a wait-and-see attitude toward the riot, although he did give his approval to the order which called more than 1,600 Texas State Guardsmen to Beaumont. In the meantime, both Acting Mayor George Gary and Aikin atfcempfced to obtain advice from Stevenson, who was fcravelingb y train. The governor had barely left fche sfcafce when fche violence ensued, having crossed fche sfcafce line infco Arkansas afc 9:48 p.m. on Tuesday nighfc. When informed of fche fcurbulence,Sfcevenso n shifted the responsibility to an apprehensive Aikin, declaring that "they can do in Austin what I would do. I have confidence in the adjutant general and director of public safety acting wisely in the situa­ tion." The imperturbed Stevenson then continued his jour­ ney to the nation's capital while his own state blazed with racial violence. Disregarding Stevenson's nonchalance. Acting Mayor Gary, Acting Governor Aikin, and other ranking officials within the state kept in close contact with each 89 other, and with the situation in Beaumont. With the state administrators informed, guardsmen and DPS personnel from outlying areas pouring in, and the beleaguered local'"enforcement bodies swamped in chaos, fche rioting continued into the morning of the 16ib. After eight to ten hours of turbulence the violence subsided about day­ break on Wednesday. Rioting usually ends in one of two ways, either by outside control, such as milifcary and po­ lice acfcion, or by natural exhaustion. In the case of the Beaumont riot exhaustion prevailed.

Following much bloodshed, destruction, and general expenditure of energy and resources, the rioters gradually became physically exhausted as fchey expended fcheir fcargefcs in the black community. By daybreak on Wednesday most of those involved had gone home, excepfc for fche 206 who had been incarcerafced. The violence in Beaumonfc fchus came fco a temporary conclusion while the shattered and smouldering city held its breath as an uneasy peace was resfcored. A final bur sfc of turbulence came on Wednesday morning as law enforcement personnel poured in by the hour and city and county officials busily atfcempfced fco creafce some sem­ blance of order in fche shattered community. In the midsfc of fchis confusion and afcfcempfced resfcorafcion, a mob of about

^Beaumont Enterprise, June 16, 1945, p. 1; The State Observer, June 21, 19^3, p. 5; Dallas Morninp; News, June 17, 1943, PP. 1, 9. 90 200 gathered at the courthouse. Again shipyard workers formed most of this number as they sought to discover the alleged black rapist of the white woman the previous day. This throng, which collected about midday, filled the courthouse lawn and lobby. The crowd called for the black rapist, and demanded that the county jail be exposed to the scrutiny of all. Sheriff W. W. Richardson appeared on the front steps of the building with a pistol at his side and a submachine g\m crooked under one arm: -^ "I'm damn tired of all this," he shouted. "Break up and go back to building ships like you should be doing." Someone jeered. "Let the damn fool that said that step up here. ... Fact is, I'll take you all on—one at a time. And let me tell you, I'm going to keep law and order in this county. "26 Rebuffed, the mob dispersed. In a few minutes, how­ ever, most of these men congregated at Forsythe Street, only a few blocks away. This mob continued down Forsythe, apparently bent on making trouble, when it met a barricade manned by Texas Rangers. The Rangers, fearful of new vio­ lence, told the mob to disperse under no uncertain terms. The crowd, however, jeered at the officers and quickly grew vociferous and bellicose. The Rangers finally sprayed the mob with tear gas, an action which effectively ended the 27 activity of the throng.

^^Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1945, p. 1. ^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid. 91 With the dispersal of this mob, the rioting in Beau­ mont concluded. The violence claimed two lives; another man died later. Several hundred blacks and whites had been injured, with officials estimating that the injured were about evenly divided between the races. This seemed some­ what unusual since in mosfc white perpetrated riots fche blacks suffered fche majorifcy of fche casualfcies. In Beaumonfc fche black communifcy undoubfcedly received more casualfcies fchan fche whifce aggressors, bufc whifces received enough injuries fco characfcerize the riot as uncommon in this regard. The reasons for the large number of white casualfcies are not clear, but several suggesfcions can be made. Firsfc, fche facfc fchafc fche whifces acfced as fche ag­ gressors insured casualfcies, especially againsfc a black communifcy in which many members foughfc back. Also, the riofc gave indignanfc blacks an opporfcunifcy fco venfc fcheir frusfcrafcions on whifces. Third, fche confusion afc fche fcime, fcogefcher wifch fche facfc fchafc fche riofcers roamed in small, widely scafcfcered groups may have caused a number of whifces to be injured by fcheir companions. Ofcher resulfcs of fche fcurbulence included fche damage or desfcrucfcion of close fco two hundred black homes and businesses. The mob had stolen numerous articles, and had destroyed at least ten automobiles. Law officers arrested over two hundred men for rioting, although a total of several thousand rioters actually took part. 92 Bj nightfall on the 16tb about 2,400 law enforcement personnel occupied the city, 1,600 of whom were Texas State Guardsmen from Port Arthur, Houston, Liberty, Conroe , Livingston, Nacogdoches, Lufkin, and Baytown, as well as Beaumont. The remaining personnel consisted of city policemen, the police auxiliary, Texas Rangers, state po­ licemen, and the sheriff's department. About three hundred guardsmen remained on reserve in nearby cities. Because of the large influx of law enforcement personnel, to­ gether with the amount of rioting at the fcime, the police deparfcmenfc deemed ifc wise fco send fco Porfc Arfchur and Orange for large quanfcifcies of ammunifcion, which arrived 28 Wednesday by rail. The cifcy ifcself on fche one hand appeared fco be a milifcary camp and on fche ofcher as if ifc had suffered direcfc hifcs from fche enemy. Beaumonfc in general lay paralyzed, wifch nearly every funcfcion closed or cancelled. The all-imporfcanfc defense planfcs suffered from a lack of employees on Wednesday and Thursday. Afc fchePennsylvani a Shipyards producfcion virfcually sfcopped on fche nighfc of fche riofc. This condifcion confcinued on fche 16ti», when a few blacks showed up for work bufc were quickly escorfced oufc of fche planfc by sfcafce guardsmen. As a resulfc, fche shipyards cancelled producfcion on Wednesday, and kepfc acfcivifcy afc

^^Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1; Dallas Morning News, June 17, 1943, p. 1. 93 about half speed throiighout the remainder of the week. Willard W. McMaster, public relations officer for the yards, estimated that production would not return to normal before the end of the week.^ The shipyard workers largely responsible for fche riot remained an iinstable part of Beaumont society, and had to be dealt with carefully. After the riot ended the yards still smouldered with racial hatred. On the 17ti! Lieutenant Colonel Sidney C. Mason of the state guard made an address to the workers, in which he urged the men not to fcake any rash acfcion which mighfc revive fcension. This pafcriofcic talk was "not enthusiastically received by fche shipyard workers."" There were even rumors fchafc many yard employees wanfced fco march infco town and free the 206 men in jail. But this action never occurred, largely because of the 50 2,400 peace officers in the city.-^ To the chagrin of many blacks , city officials can­ celled "Juneteenth," a holiday for blacks in Texas which commemorated their emancipation. This holiday, held on June 19 of each year, in the past had been a sizeable oc­ currence and many blacks justly felt unhappy over the cancellation. Yet Juneteenth might have sparked another conflagration. The city recall election also fell on

^Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1943, p. 1. ^^Ibid. , June 18, 1945, p. 1. 94 June 19, which provided another reason for cancelling Jiineteenth as a precaution againsfc renewed violence.^ The riot temporarily altered fche daily routine of wartime life. Chief of Police Ross Dickey ordered all city buses, the scene of previous turbulence, off the streets on Wednesday and also diverted Greyhound buses around Beaumont. Major General Richard C. Donovan, com­ mander of the Eighth Service command, placed the city off limits fco all milifcary personnel, and sent milifcary police to Beaumont to avoid a series of riots with military par­ ticipation, as in the Los Angeles affray of June 5-7.

The failure of black employees fco appear for work caused many cafes fco close, and in some insfcances the cus­ tomers waited on themselves as the waitresses prepared the food. Most of the city's hotels reported a sizeable drop in their work forces on Wednesday, a condition which did not appreciably improve on Thursday. Laundries similarly lacked adequate help, and thus could not conduct normal operations. Only about one-third of the city received mail on Wednesday and Thursday, since most mailmen in Beaumont were black. Chief of Police Dickey asked the liquor stores in the area to close voluntarily, and guardsmen patrolled these places to see that no looting occurred. The city closed

^-^Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1945, p. 1. 95 all swimming pools, parks, baseball games, and other places in which people could congregate. Mayor George Gary sus­ pended all public gatherings for the remainder of the week. Downtown businesses, led by large department^stores such as the Fashion, White House, and Rosenthal's closed Wednesday to keep people off the streets. In short, most functions of the wartime society and economy either closed or operated on a severely restricted basis so that no large bodies of people could congregate and whites could be kept separated from blacks until the highly combustible 52 atmosphere cleared somewhat.^ •The rioting of the 15tb and 16ft affected not only Beaumont but also surroimding towns. In Orange, as a pre­ caution, city officials called state police and state guardsmen to duty at Consolidated Steel Shipyards, which told all blacks to stay home on Wednesday. Officials also closed all liquor stores in Orange for the period, and city officials made a formal request to Louisiana authorities to close all liquor stores in Calcasieu Parish, which borders Orange County to the east. In Port Neches, officials curtailed work at the rub­ ber plant, and foremen sent all 1,200 black employees of that business home on Wednesday. In Silsbee, the city government declared a curfew for 10:00 p.m. as a 52 Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1; Beaumont Journal, June lb, 194$, p. 1. 96 precautionary measure, as a result of the Beaumont riot and two racial incidents in that town on Tuesday night. A black threw a bottle at a couple in an auto, but no one was injured. Shipyard workers chased a hlack in the lobby of the post office, but local citizens stopped the action. Other nearby cities, such as Port Arthur and Baytown, took 55 similar precautionary action.^-^ In Houston, local officials feared a recurrence of Beaumont's racial violence in their cifcy as Juneteenth neared. City administrators placed in the Housfcon Posfc a full page proclamation signed by the mayor pro fcem, Joel Berry. Baseless rumors aboufc possible racial fcroubles are being circulafced by loose-fcongued, fchoughfcless people. There is no plan for any oufcbreak or riofc in the Houston area on Saturday, June 19, or at any other fcime. The Police and fche Federal aufchorifcies have fchoroughly invesfcigafced every rumor fchafc fchey could fcrace, and have found no basis for any of fchem. A group of well-known whifce and colored Housfconians on invesfcigafcion has con­ firmed fchese sfcafcemenfcs. We urge you—Don'fc do Hifcler's work. Sfc op circulafcing rumors which creafce fcenseness and infcerfere wifch war producfcion and afcfcend fco your own business.54 It is obvious that the fcensions, resenfcmenfcs, and general insfcabilifcy of warfcime sociefcy exisfced nofc only in Beaumonfc bufc also fchroughoufc soufcheast Texas as in much of warfcime

^^Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1. ^^ousfcon Posfc, June 18, 1945, p. 2. 97 America. Investigation of the story which precipitated the riot on Tuesday, June 15, proved an anti-climactic and ironic event and magnified the senselessness of the racial vio­ lence in Beaumont. The woman who telephoned police to report her rape by a black man subsequently underwent ob­ servation in a local hospifcal. While there, a reputable physician. Dr. Barker D. Chunn, gave her a complete examination. On the 17ib Chunn disclosed to the police that the woman had no signs of rape or attempfced rape on her body, and that she had not had sexual relations during the twenty-four hour period surrounding the alleged assault. Even though the examination proved her sfcory false, the woman maintained her version, but quickly vanished from public view. Yet, although her actions had precipitated the Beaumont race riot and she had been personally dis­ credited, her family remained in the city for a number of years afterward. Since the racial atmosphere had become so combustible by mid-June, of course, the riot might have been stimulated by some other incident if the woman had not made up the rape story, which may have salved her conscience. But she never explained why she reported a fabricated rape sfcory andfchus sef c off racial turbulence. She remained silent during the years following the inci­ dent, and her reasoning with regard fco her sfcory is sfcill 98 a mysfcery.^^

During fche hours following the end of the violence, as fche city held ifcs breafch and afcfcempfced fco reorganize, Beaumonfc officials kept in consfcant contact with Acting Governor Aikin, Adjutant General Arfchur B. Knickerbocker, and Department of Public Safety Director Homer Garrison. The acting mayor, George Gary, as well as other city of­ ficials, feared a repetition of Tuesday nighfc's violence on Wednesday nighfc, and told sfcafce officials thafc special measures would have fco be fcaken. Accordingly, Colonel Garrison announced fchafc he personally would fcravel fco Beaumont, Knickerbocker promised full state guard supporfc, and Aikin wondered whefcher a declarafcion of marfcial law might not be best. City and state officials ultimafcely defcermined fco declare marfcial law, and Aikin did so afc 5:55 p.m. on Wednesday, June 16.

Marfcial law placed fche cifcy under milifcary super­ vision, wifch all civilian aufchorifcies in fche cifcy legally inoperafcive. Lieufcenanfc Colonel Sidney C. Mason of fche adjufcanfc general's deparfcmenfc assumed command of fche cifcy. Aikin insfcrucfced Mason to work fully with Acfcing Mayor

•^'^Clyde C. Rush fco James A. Burran, infcerview; New York PM, June 18, 1945, p. 4; The quesfcion of black-wEifce sexual relafcions has been discussed by John Bollard in Chapfcer VII of Gasfce and Class in a Soufchern Town (New York, 1957). He suggesfcs fchafc fabricated rape sfcories by whifce women are in metny cases resulfcs of hysfcerical and masochisfcic fcendencies, fcogefcher wifch coverfc sexual afc- fcracfcion fcoward black men. 99 Gary, Chief Dickey, Sheriff Richardson, Colonel Garrison, and Captain L. H. Purvis, along with the other military and civilian officials in Beaumont. Aikin promised full cooperation, and assured Mason that marfcial law would be maintained in the city as long as he deemed it practi­ cable.^^

City, state, and national officials faced the fcask of discovering the underlying causes, trends, and effects of the race riot. They also hoped to return Beaumont to normal as quickly as possible, and to resume vifcal war indusfcries as well. It was necessary to minimize the traumatic effects so that racial tension could subside and sociefcy refcurn fco normal. What whites might consider normal, both before and after fche riofc, however, in fact bordered on the unbearable for most black members of society.

^^Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1- CHAPTER V

"IT EQUALS THE MEUSE-ARGONNE SECTOR": THE AFTERMATH

As a measure which would hopefully bring peace to riot-torn Beaumont, the declaration of martial law by Acting Governor Aikin on the afternoon of June 16 brought a heightened degree of crisis fco the city. Prior to the declaration, a group of cifcy officials and prominent citi­ zens debated whether marfcial law would be worfch fche trouble. On the one hand, the declaration might bring a sense of helplessness and futility to Beaumont, but on the other hand would be an almosfc certain method of ending Beaumont's racial trouble. In the end the group decided to declare martial law, which brought the cifcy under a milifcary confcrol which evenfcually proved effecfcive.

Lieufcenanfc Colonel Sidney C. Mason, military commander of the city, immediately issued a five point statement which gave an accurate indication to the public of what was likely to ensue. The first of these points noted that a state of martial law existed in the city. The second an­ nounced that all civil laws of the city and state would be unswervingly enforced during the period of duress. The third announced a curfew in Beaumont every night at 8:50 p.m. during the martial law period. This curfew included all citizens of Beaumont except doctors, hospital

100 101 employees, and those war workers on night shifts, as well as those "acting in cases of emergencies." In his fourth point Mason called upon all Beaumonters to act only in accord with the law and to "desist im­ mediately from such unlawful activities" as already had occurred. He also asked those visiting the city to observe the law. The final point prohibited any liquor in the area, and noted that none "shall be sold nor delivered to any persons in said area during the existence of this martial law." Lieutenant Colonel Mason thus effectively placed the city under an ironclad ordinance and notified his sub­ ordinates that compliance withfche directiv e would insure maintenance of order and peaceful conditions. Mason became a veritable commandant in Beaumont and through his leader­ ship kept the city incredibly quiet during the days following the martial law declaration. Chief of Police Ross Dickey became one of the most active supporters of Mason and a fountain of energy in general. Dickey, of course, expressed interest in re­ turning the city to normal as quickly as possible fchrough his civic responsibility. But a much more important factor contributed to Dickey's zeal—his personal reputation as a law enforcement officer. Since the summer of 1942 and the

•^Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1945, p. 1. 102 infamous Charles J. Reco incident, Dickey had been under fire, not as a racist, but because of his apparent in­ ability to maintain law and. order in the city. Dickey's apparent lack of ability and incentive in curtailing gambling, narcotics, and prostitution, had become public Imowledge. This, along with the alleged lack of abilifcy on the parfc of the entire city adminisfcrafcion, had led W. 0. Bowers and his followers to obtain a recall election. In the meantime, such turbulence as the Curtis Thomas inci­ dent and of course the race riot had, in the eyes of many, further magnified Dickey's ineptitude. Since the city administration appointed the chief of police, Dickey could not be voted out of office; but the recall election could spell doom for him as well as the entire administration if it proved successful. Since officials had scheduled the election on June 19, the riot occurred at a most inoppor­ tune time. Dickey therefore fellfco wor k as if he were possessed, even though he had not slept since the riot erupted. Both Dickey and Mason became highly vocal about the causes and effects of the rioting. Dickey proclaimed "It's by far the worst racial trouble Texas has ever had. It's just a rebellion of whites against blacks." While the Houston race riot of 1917 iiad been in fact Texas' worst racial trouble in this century, Dickey echoed the feeling of most Texans at the time, who looked upon the entire 103 affair as an oddity. Lieutenant Colonel Mason, while per­ haps more objective, often overstated the facts as witnessed by his widely publicized remarks after touring the devastated black sections along Gladys and Forsythe Streets. Mason noted that Beaumont had been "literally stomped into the ground," and that "from a destructive standpoint it equals the Meuse-Argonne sector of the first 2 world war." The general assertion that Axis sabotage inspired Beaumont's racial turbulence became more important in the local investigation. The city, a critical production area, spawned a riot that pitted American againsfc American and halted production, which stirred fears that Axis in­ fluence supported the city's recent violence. The riot effected disunity among the population and crippled vital war production, results which potentially pointed to sabo­ tage. In an editorial on June 17, the Beaumont Enterprise concluded that: By committing lawless acts and halting work in vital war industries, they /the rioter^Z played right into the hands of the enemy. Some of the men \^o said they had quit work "to pro­ tect their families" may have been the unconscious tools of enemy agents. There is a strong suspicion that enemy agents are trying to create racial friction here.

^New York PM, June 17, 1945, p. 5; Pittsburgh Courier, June 26, 1943, p. 16. 104 that they have been engaged in this kind of subversive work for months. Evidently their work is bearing fruit.5 Chief of Police Dickey echoed this opinion when he said "There have been rumors of fifth column activities here, and we have been checking up on them." Later, in a more vociferous tone, Dickey flatly charged that "there is some­ body behind ifc /^he rio^ and if I could get my hands on him I would wring his neck." Naturally Dickey would like to have found evidence supporting his statement, since it would doubtless have relieved him of some of the blame for the riot. Thus he began an investigation to discover any evidence of sabotage, an inquiry conducted even more ex­ tensively by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Agents of the FBI arrived on the 16ft and remained in the city for the remainder of the week. They naturally sought to determine if there was any truth whatever to the allegations linking the Axis with the riot. While at­ tempting to remain as inconspicuous as*possible, the FBI conducted an investigation of the racial turbulence. The bureau called upon many witnesses to give depositions, most of whom were black since Negroes were supposedly mosfc easily indoctrinated. Agents closely questioned them with regard to any Axis influence in the community. One news-

^Editorial, Beaumont Enterprise, June 17, 1945, p. 6. ^Dallas Morning News, June 18, 1945, p. 1; Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 187 1943, p. 1. 105 paper also reported that the FBI closely questioned the woman who claimed she had been raped by a black on June 15. The Beaumont Enterprise disclosed on July 8 that, after a thorough invesfcigafcion of many local persons as well as top city and state officials, the FBI concluded that there had been no connection between enemy agents and the riot. The bureau made no official report, but the newspaper noted that, according to "unquotable" but pre­ sumably reliable sources, "Because such riots obviously made good Axis propaganda, the FBI naturally watched for any sign of enemy activity—but it found little or none." Much to the chagrin of many, including Ross Dickey, the complaisant Enterprise immediately agreed in an edi­ torial on July 9: The fault lies at home and nofc abroad. The chief offenders are nofc foes of fchis counfcry bufc ifcs own citizens who may think fchemselves jusfc as loyal as anybody else. For years racial discriminafcion has been deliberafcely encouraged by persons who are in some insfcances misguided humanitarians, in others people who preach race hatred because they fchemselveshafc e or because fchey profifc by ifc. The race riot in Beaumont was imdoubtedly the product of "spontaneous or internal combus­ tion." The fires of racial hatred were fed by all kinds of preposfcerous rumors which neverfcheless

^Pifcfcsburgh Courier, June 26, 1945, p. 1; The invesfci- gafcion of fche riofc by fche FBI is apparenfcly classified material; the author was thus unable to examine it. 6 Beaumont Enterprise, July 8, 1945, p. 1 106 were believed. The people who started these reports and others who amplified them as they sped from mouthfco mout h may not have been intentionallyfcrying fco start a race riot, but are fco a large extent responsible for what happened.7 The newspaper thus correctly placed the blame for the riot upon the local citizenry, with emphasis upon the war workers. Chief Dickey received some of the blame that he had attempted to unshoulder on mythical Axis agents, but the amount of responsibility he and the city administration received eventually proved immaterial. While the FBI investigation continued during the week of the riot, an inquiry by the state simultaneously occurred. Mason received word from his superiors that a military court of inquiry was to be conducted during the week. This court would have the primary purpose of hearing the 206 prisoners who were held for participation in the rioting, including a few who were incarcerated for curfew violations after Wednesday by an industrious Ross Dickey and the police force. On Thursday, June 17, the military court of inquiry began hearing the prisoners. Lieutenant Colonel Royal G. Phillips, head of the Bureau of Intelligence of the Department of Public Safety in Austin, presided over the tribimal. Major Edward D. Konken and Captain James Kokernot assisted Phillips. During the hearings officials

"^Editorial, ibid,, July 9, 1945, p. 6. 107 took a full record of each person's draft number and sta­ tus, and forwarded that information to General Watt Page, head of the Selective Service in Texas. This was done ostensibly to check on the probability that the 206 pri­ soners included some draft evaders who could subsequently be given the opportunity of fighting the Axis since they were so adept at fighting at home. Beginning on the afternoon of June 17, Lieutenant Colonel Phillips heard fiffceen men before midnighfc and released all of them for lack of evidence. Phillips, recognizing the slow pace at which he was moving, deter­ mined that those who could be charged with crimes should be turned over to the proper authorities without delay. As a result, he divided thefcribunal infco two separate courts of inquiry to expedite the process. Working simultaneously, the courts quickly heard those in the city and county jails as well as the men at the fairgrounds. Bj early Saturday morning, June 19, the two courts had heard 184 prisoners, including seventeen whom the police arrested on minor Q charges after the declaration of martial law. By Sunday afternoon, June 20, the courts had heard all 206 prisoners, twenty-nine of whom were held for further action. The court bound one man over to federal authori­ ties for violation of firearms regulations, since police

8 Ibid., June 18, 1945, p. 1; J^e 19, 1945, p. 1. 108 fo\md him in possession of a shotgun measuring only thirteen and one-half inches. Thirteen other men found themselves in the custody of county officials, but were not tried until martial law was lifted. The city took the remaining fiffceen prisoners who faced minor charges which included loitering on private premises, receiving stolen goods, carrying firearms, as­ sault and battery, drunkenness, inciting to mob violence, and violation of martial law rules. The majority of those charged received fines of $25 plus court costs. Essen­ tially, then, the penalty for participating in the riot usually amounted to $50,20. Conviction and sentencing occiu?red in the courts of the city until July 10, when the last group of those in­ dicted received fines or jail sentences. No one received a penitentiary sentence, although the man turned over to federal authorities posted $1,000 bond before being re­ leased pending further investigation.^ On June 22 Phillips filed the report of the court of inquiry, his last official act as head of that tribunal. Of the 206 men heard, only twenty-nine faced conviction and none received serious sentences. The inquiry produced no arson charges, nor did it result in any murder charges for the deaths of Ellis C. Brown, John Johnson, or Alex Mouton.

^Ibid., June 19, 1945, p. 1; June 20, 1945, p. 1; July 10, 1945, p. 1; Beaumont Journal, June 19, 1945, p. 1. 109 The guilty parties remained undiscovered and, apparently after the close of Phillips' court, officials made no other serious effort to find the guilty persons involved in the large number of serious crimes committed on June 15 and 16. Justice remained undone. Aside from the investigations of certain aspects of the rioting by the FBI and the Department of Public Safety, little else occ"urred during the week following the riot. These days proved to be a period of unwinding public ten­ sion, of slow control reduction by Mason, and of sober reflection by all concerned. The editor of the Beaumont Journal concurred in the opinion of most when he, in an editorial on Thursday, ex­ plained that patriotism, the goal of victory, and indi­ vidual good will served as the primary forces in bringing the city back to a normal state of affairs. The duty of cooperation is upon all the population—new and old and Negro. Among all, our lives and property and peace must be pro­ tected. Outlaws have no place here. Outlaws of Europe and fche Far Easfc are enoiigh for our concern, wifchoufc division and fighfcing in our own ranks at home. Remedy is at hand, m our common sense, common decency, common justice; we can forget and go forward from the differences, rioting and bloodshed of the pasfc 48 hours, and ^-^ build a befcfcer community. Tomorrow is a new day.

IQBeaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 22, 1945, p. 12; The au­ thor was unable to exLine fche reporfc of fche ^^1^^^^.^^^^ of inauiry filed by Lieufcenanfc Colonel Royal G. Phillips because^ according fco DPS officials, it has disappeared.

^^Editorial, Beaimont Journal, June 17, 1945, P. 6. 110 If the city did not begin to bustle by Thursday, it certainly recovered some of its composure. The FBI and Phillips continued their investigations, but these events did not retain primary public attention. Most blacks re­ mained away from their jobs, but that was expected, at least until the beginning of the following week. Most businesses reopened on Thiirsday, but enough remained closed to produce an aura of prolonged slumber. And of course the 1,600 state guardsmen, along with the several hundred other officers of the peace, made Beaumont a veritable milifcary camp. In short, the city continued to appear as a tightly controlled area, but the populace either ignored or side­ stepped these conditions to a large degree. By Friday, business about the cifcy beganfco retur n to normal, although the quiet atmosphere remained. Nearly all Beaumont businesses, except the liquor stores, reopened that morning. The city buses again operated, but there were few passengers. At Pennsylvania Shipyards, about eighty-five per cent of the workers returned to their jobs. Willard W. McMaster, public relations director at the ship­ yards, estimated that the full work force would be on hand by the weekend. He added that helpers or other unskilled men formed a majority of those still absent, while those present included almost all of the seasoned workers. Colonel Mason, observing the orderly conduct of the citi­ zenry, opined that martial law might be lifted by Monday, Ill J\me 21, but definitely not before Juneteenth, even though all planned observances had been cancelled.1 ? Citizens became accustomed to the martial law air aroundfcown, an d by Friday seemed not to notice the khaki- clad soldiers and barbed wire. Many in fact spent their time at the city hall heckling the state guardsmen, who good naturedly returned the hazing. Some citizens even passed their days buying all the nationally circulated periodicals to check on the amount of publicity Beaumont received. Of the leading popular periodicals,fchese people discovered that Time included a short article on Beaumont's trouble, and Newsweek included an article as well as fcwo photographs. The American Mercury also discussed Beaumonfc to a small degree, as did Business Week, which nofced fche staggering loss of war production as a result of the riot.-^^ Of those periodicals with a more limited scope and circulation. The Crisis (the publication of the NAACP) mentioned the riot briefly. Others which either sent re­ porters or maintained telephone communications with

•^^Ibid,, Jime 17, 1945, p. 1; Beaumont Enterprise, June 18TT^45, p. 1. ^%ouston Post, June 17, 1945, p. 1; "Deep Trouble," Time, J'une 28, 1943, p. 19; "Riotous Rumor," Newsweek, TJune 28, 1945, pp. 42-44; Winifred Raushenbush, "How to Prevent Race Riots," American Mercury, LVII'(September, 1945), 502-09; "Race i^ofcs Hurfc." Business Week, June 26, 1945, pp. 102-04. 112 officials included The New Republic. Opporfcunifcy (fche peri­ odical of the Urban League), and Monthly News Summary of National Events and Trends in Race Relations. Accounfcs in all these publications usually remained brief and super­ ficial, and many times presented incorrect information. Speculation about the size of the riot ranged from jusfc over a hundred rioters, with one person killed and eleven injured, fco 10,000 rioters who leveled the entire city and killed and maimed thousands of people. Regardless of the facts, however, most Beaumonters expressed their main interest in seeing just how much of a splash their riot made, notwithstanding the fact that ifc was a rafcher hideous fashion in which fco gain publicity. Even the Enterprise boasted that the Associated Press and International News Service, among others, had correspondents in town, as did many newspapers. The Chicago Tribune and New York PM called regularly for information, factors which combined to make the Enterprise imply that ifc was pleased with the 14 riot since Beaumont now glistened on the map. Late Friday the press disclosed that while a few guardsmen who had pressing commitments at home had been

•"•^"The Riots," The Crisis (July, 1945), 197-200; Thomas Sancton, "The Race liiofcs," The New Republic, July 5, 1945, pp. 9-15; Julius A. Thomas, "Race Conflict and Social Action," Opporfcunifcy, XXI (Ocfcober, 1945), 165-67, 192; "The Social Fronfc," Monfchly News Summary of Nafcional Evenfcs and Trends in Race R'elafcions, 1 (Augusfc, 1945;, i-6; feeaumonfc Enfcerprise, June 17, 1945, P. 7. 115 dismissed, most rested as thoroughly as possible so that they would be fresh and alert for Saturday. Juneteenth ob­ servations had been cancelled, but officials feared some reaction to the holiday. In addition, the recall election on Saturday, while not considered potentially hazardous in itself, did give townspeople an opportunity to congregate at the polling places. Colonel Homer Garrison, direcfcor of the Department of Public Safety, also arrived in Beau­ mont on Friday. He announced thafc he would sfcay a few days and would keep his force of about seventy sfcafce po­ licemen in the cifcy "as long asfche civil and milifcary authorities wanted them." Perhaps state and local author­ ities deemed it advisable for Garrison to personally take charge of all DPS personnel on Saturday in the event that 15 something sparked new turbulence. ^ Saturday, June 19, proved a peaceful day in Beaumont, much to the relief of Lieutenant Colonel Mason and others. Blacks held no public observances of Juneteenth, and the recall election remained quiet and unobtrusive as only 2,051 votes were cast. Mason, Garrison, Dickey, and other officials noted the fact that as a day of potential racial discord, Saturday proved a test of the Beaumont citizenry. While peace keepers arrested a few men for agitating about the city, the day in general remained peaceful as Beaiunont

•^^Beaumont Journal, June 18, 1945, p. 1; Beaumont Enterprise, June 19, 1945, p. 1. 114 enjoyed quasi-normal activity. Milifcary and civilian leaders thus decided to ask for the lifting of martial law, to become effective on Sunday, June 20.^ The day proved gloomy for city officials, however, as the recall election ousted most of the top administrators. The voters recalled Mayor Leslie Lowry, a member of the army, as well as Acting Mayor George Gary. Two city com­ missioners, Woodrow Doiron and Roy Kirby, lost their offices. Councilmen W. N. Scarborough, W. C. Balston, and Gordon Kelly also fell from power. Essentially the entire upper structure of the city administration, excepting the city manager, faced recall by a public which obviously placed the blame for the recent problems in Beaimiont squarely on the shoulders of these men. Ray A. Coale, a former mayor of Beaumont from 1958 to 1940, replaced Lowry and Gary on June 22. Current or former city officials filled the vacant commissioner and councilman chairs.1 7 On the day following the recall election, June 20, Acting Governor A. M. Aikin, Jr., lifted martial law from Beaumont on the recommendation of Mason and Garrison. In a statement delivered on the night of the 19ft Aikin said: Martial law will be lifted in Beaumont as of 10 o'clock Sunday morning, June 20. I have

-^^Beaumont Enterprise, June 19, 1945, p. 1; June 20, 1945, PTT: ^'^Beaumont Journal, June 21, 1945, PP. 1, 4; June 22, 1945, pTTT 115 talked with the local officials. Col, Homer Garrison, Jr., director of fche department of public safety, who is there at this time, and Brig. Gen, Arthur B. Knickerbocker, adjutant general of Texas. Order has been restored and we feel the situation is well in hand and that the local officials are in position and well- able to preserve order.18

Vith this order the riot in Beaumont officially ended. Wartime tensions and instability among much of fchepopula ­ tion, together wifch the preceding racial incidents be­ ginning in the summer of 1942, caused a riot which resulfced in three deaths, hundreds of injiuries, and millions of precious war dollars in expenditure. Ifc was a cosfcly con­ sequence of the anger some Beaumonfcers felfc againsfc ofchers, ironically sparked by a myfchical incident. Beginning on Sunday, the 1,600 Texas Sfcafce Guardsmen from other counties departed for home, while about sixty highway patrolmen and a score of Texas Rangers remained for the next several days to maintain stability. Military leaders also demobilized the 18ft Battalion of the guard, but the Beaumont auxiliary police force remained on duty with regular policemen as a permanent arrangement. The barbed wire and other riot paraphernalia disappeared from the downtown area, and autos drove freely about the city without being checked. The city curfew ended along with martial law, but Chief of Police Dickey annoimced that persons on city streets after midnighfc for the next several

Beaumont Enterprise, June 20, 1945, p. 1 116 weeks would be questioned. Package stores and taverns re­ opened on the 22nd but owners voluntarily agreed to observe earlier than usual closing hours for the next few days. Finally, on July 6, Chief of Police Dickey returned all firearms confiscated during the riot by enforcement per- sonnel to their owners.1 ^9 On June 22, Lieutenant Governor John Lee Smith arrived in Austin from his tour of the Midwest. He occupied the governor's chair that same day, much to the relief of a haggard Aikin, who rushed home to Paris to recuperate. Upon departing Austin, Aikin jokingly noted that the salary of acting governor, $55.55 per day* was simply too meager 20 for the services he had rendered while in that capacity. Smith, upon his arrival, offered his interpretation of the rioting, which magnified his own political conser­ vative thoughts as well as those of others. The Beaumont Journal explained: That he /Smith7 bad been told by a former member of the German reichstag that it was part of Hitler's plan to incite riots and create labor and race troubles in industrial areas to stymie war production, and that the inciting incidents in recenfc race disfcurbances could well have been insfcigafced by fifth col­ umnists.21

^^Ibid., June 21, 1945, p. 1; June 22, 1945, p. 12; July 7,"T9^5, p. 12- ^^Beaumont Journal, June 21, 1945, p. 1; June 22, 1945, PTT: ^^Ibid,, June 22, 1945, p. 4, 117 While an unsubstantiated inteipretation, this explanation aroused a widespread following. Smith remained in the governor's chair until Coke Stevenson returned from the East a few days later. Even though the riot ended for both local and state officials, municipal reform in Beaumont, partially stimu­ lated by the riot, continued. On June 22, A, Z, Goolsbee of Beaumont announced that a petition would be circulated to obtain a recall election againsfc City Manager G. Hughes Petkovsek. Goolsbee cited the general ineptitude of Petkovsek, but especially charged that the city manager should be ousfced because of his failure to dismiss Ross Dickey as chief of police. Dickey ordinarily could not be removed by anyone except the city manager, thus the re­ moval of Petkovsek provided the only way Goolsbee saw to get rid of Dickey, In a statement made to the Journal on June 25, Goolsbee charged Dickey with failure to perform adequately in nearly every category: Certainly the chief of police is charged with the enforcement of laws. Certainly the widespread gambling and other forms of vice which engulfed Beaumont were violations of the law and nothing was done to remedy the situation. Either the police chief winked at these condi­ tions or turned his back. Further, we all know what happened lasfc week, when race riots placed one of the darkest spots in history on this city. For weeks, previous to the outbreaks, we knew they were coming. Rumors were afloat on all sides, sfcill nothing was done to prevent that black page m 118 Beaumont history; that reign of lawlessness on Tuesday night of last week.^2 Goolsbee thus placed the entire blame for the vice operations and the riot on the shoulders of the chief of police, Petkovsek saw they would stand or fall together. On Thursday, June 24,fche members of the police force met in the corporation courtroom of the Jefferson County Courthouse to express to Mayor Coale their confidence in Chief Dickey. On a vote, forty-five policemen cast bal­ lots, with forty-four expressing their desire to see Dickey remain as chief. The remaining ballot said it was imma­ terial who held the office of police chief. This vote of confidence served as one of three factors that helped restore public faith in Dickey and Petkovsek.2 ^5 The local news media's support of Dickey provided the second factor. Most notably the Beaumont Enterprise- Journal argued: That his own policemen have voted the chief their confidence, with the plea that he remain in office, substantiates the evidence of the chief's efforts to conduct his office as a public trust. He handled the riot troubles here probably as well as any police leader could, and troops were here in the shortest time possible.24 A sudden burst of warfare against vice in Beaumont by

^^Ibid,, Jime 25, 1945, p. 1. ^^rbid., June 24, 1945, p. 1. ^^Editorial, ibid,, June 26, 1945, p. 4, 119 the police department added the third factor which restored public confidence in Dickey, This series of events re­ called similar ones prior to the W, 0, Bowers recall petition of early 1943- On July 1^ the police arrested several men in an amusement club and charged them with the operation of gambling devices. Following the arrests Dickey blared "We are not going to tolerate gambling. The sooner these operators make up their minds that we mean business, the better off they will be because gambling is out," Again on July 6, the police apprehended fifteen women on "charges of vagrancy" and fined each of them $25 plus court costs, Dickey again emphasized the grave situ- 25 ation of all gamblers, prostitutes, and drug handlers. On the day of the election, September 7, the Enter­ prise published a final editorial urging the redemption of G. Hughes Petkovsek and Ross Dickey: The Enterprise understandsfchafc fche mayor and the city manager personally invesfcigafced charges leveled at Mr, Dickey, Both are con­ vinced of his competence and integrity, Beaumont would have to look far to find a cifcy manager or a better chief of police.26 The barrage of editorials, the outbursfc of arrests, and the police vote of confidence for Dickey obviously paid off for the voters overwhelmingly retained Petkovsek as

^^Beaumont Enterprise, July 2, 1945, p. 1; July 7, 1945, pTTT. ^^Editorial, ibid., September 8, 1945, p. 4. 120 city manager. The vote was light, with only 955 votes cast, but 776 of these opposed Goolsbee's recall move. The victory, however sweet, was for nought, because on November 27, 1943, Chief of Police Ross Dickey resigned his position. The city manager immediately replaced him on December 1 with Artie Pollock, a long-time city official.^'^ In his letter of resignation, which was published in the Enterprise, Dickey said: The reason for this resignation is that I have been dissatisfied for somefcime and was planning onfcendering m y resignafcion afcfche end of this administration. Since I have had no time off since being discharged out of the army in 1919 I have de­ cided to take a few days off. On January 1, I am accepting a position with the Bride Grocery company of Lake Charles, La., which in my ^Q opinion is a better position than I am holding, Dickey became a vicfcim of crifcicism that at points blamed him entirely for the June 15-16 riot, in which he acfcually did a creditable job. However inept Dickey may have been, and although he no doubt saw the antecedents of the riot and might have taken steps to prepare for it, he served as a sort of martyr to the riot in that much of the blame placed on him for its occurrence was unfounded. With the resignation of Ross Dickey the reform, trauma, and overall effect of the Beaumont riot ended. It did not, however, bring an end of racial turbulence in the

27Ibid, , September 8, 1945, p. 1 ^^Ibid., November 28, 1945, p. 1 121 United States, On Jime 20, the day Acting Governor Aikin lifted martial law in riot-torn Beaumont, a much larger race riot erupted in Detroit, This riot proved to be of much greater proportion than the incident in Beaumont, and was in fact the largest riot of the summer of 1945 in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. About ten o'clock on the night of June 20, unbearably hot and muggy as June 15 bad been in Beaumont, a fisfcfight erupted among blacks and whites on Belle Isle Bridge in Detroit. This fight quickly spread infco the ghetto of the city, known as Paradise Valley. During the remainder of the night the violence increased as rumors of atrocities by both races ignited the tempers of whites, resentful of black economic and social gains during the war, and blacks, who were frustrated since they still did not enjoy the full benefit of citizenship. Detroit had become known as the "arsenal of democracy" because of its heavy industrial capacity. Many blacks received economic advancement in defense plants during the period prior to the riot, and white resentment over economic competition with blacks was visible. The walkout of white workers at the Packard plant provided the most notorious example. These condi­ tions contributed heavily to racial animosity. By Monday, June 21, the city achieved temporary calm, and black leaders took the opportunity to ask Mayor Edward J, Jeffries to call in troops, Jeffries concluded that 122 this would not be necessary. Governor Harry F. Kelley of Michigan expressed his willingness to aid local author­ ities in curtailing the violence, but apparently felt that a declaration of martial law and the mobilization of state troops was unnecessary. On Monday afternoon. Governor Kelley finally pro­ claimed "modified martial law" after widespread looting and rioting occurred infche downtow n districts as well as in Paradise Valley during the day. That night, June 21, saw the riot reach a peak as police, whites, and blacks, blazed away at each other in pitched battles; white and black snipers picked off unfortunate citizens; and looters and vandals ran rampant. Finally, after most of the carnage had occurred, Kelley ordered federal troops into Detroit, and declared full martial law. The 22nd and 25rd saw sporadic violence as the troops brought the riotfco a close. The Detroit rioters wrote the bloodiest chapter in the history of race relations during World War II, Pre­ dictably, of the thirty-four persons killed, twenty-five were blacks. The riot injured thousands of persons and de­ stroyed or damaged millions of dollars of property, most of it white-owned. Horrified onlookers across the nation justifiably castigated the administrations of both the city and Michigan. The destruction of considerable property showed Detroit as exhibiting overtones of a "new style" 125 riot in which the rioters were black as well as white and in which property destruction was a major objective.^ The final World War II race riot occurred again in 1943 on August 1 and 2 in Harlem. Trouble had simmered in that ghetto of New York City for some time, largely because of the underlying frustration of blacks who felfc alienated in a whifce man's world, a condition which prevailed throughout the nation's black population. This riot fol­ lowed the "new style," unlike the others of 1945 excepfc Detroit to a limited degree, but similar to the 1935 Harlem riot. Pitched battles, as the primary form of violence be­ tween blacks and whites, did not occur and whites did not act as the aggressors. Blacks formed the main body of rioters who directed their hostility not at whites, but at white-owned property in and around Harlem. Whifces became involved in the violence, but only those who happened to be in the area at the time. On the night of August 1, a white policeman, James Collins, attempted to arrest Margie Polite, a black woman, for disorderly conduct in a Harlem hotel lobby. Private Robert Bandy, a black soldier, verbally accosted Collins as he observed the policeman treating the woman roughly. After Collins threw his nightstick at Bandy, the black

^Joseph Boskin, ed., Urban Racial Violence in the Twentieth Cenfcury (Beverly Hills, 1969;, ^0; Lee and Humphrey, Race itiofc, 27-48; Thurgood Marshall, "The Gesfcapo in Detroit," The Crisis (August, 1945), 252-55, 246. 124 soldier attempted to beat Collins with the weapon. Collins then shot Bandy in the shoulder, wounding him slightly. This series of events provoked the ire of Harlem's citi­ zenry, who heard the misfcaken rumor that Bandy had been killed by Collins in the presence of the soldier's mother and sweetheart. The riot erupted in Harlem that same night and finally ended on August 2, The riot would have been much larger were it not for three facts. First, New York's Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia acted quickly and intelligently. Unlike the riots in Detroit and Beaumont, the mayor dispatched hundreds of po­ lice to every dangerous block immediately upon hearing of the outbreak, and kept them there until all symptoms of trouble abated. LaGuardia also had the foresight to use as many black policemen, military police, and air raid wardens as were available, and even issued nightsticks and Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) armbands fco some 500 black civilians. The new patfcern of rioting, in which vdiites and blacks generally did not clash, provided a second factor which contributed to the relative brevity of the Harlem riot. The third facfcor which both distinguished Harlem from the other 1945 riots, and kept the rioting brief, was the fact that less notable "climate of intolerance," or racial bellicosity, prevailed among many white people of New York. The Harlem riot of August 1-2 proved large enough. 125 however, to result in the deaths of five persons; injuries occurred to at least 300 persons, fifty-three of whom were policemen; police arrested at least 450 persons; and rioters destroyed $5 million in property,^^ Although the rash of race riots during the Second World War ended with the Harlem turbulence in early August, the summer of 1943 held no monopoly on wartime racial vio­ lence. Individuals and groups vented racial feelings in many other instances, largely because of heightened black expectations which exceeded their limited advancement in the economic sphere and white reluctance about black ad­ vancement and sweeping social change. The Philadelphia transit strike of 1944 provided only the most notable of the other racial clashes which occurred during the war. Trouble had brewed in that city since the outbreak of the war. In Philadelphia, which produced "everything from battleships to braid for imiforms," a rapid population growth caused the citizenry to become in part a maze of unstable war workers by 1943. Between April 1, 1940, and that same date in 1945, 36,000 blacks moved to the city to man the industries, enlarging the black population to 500,000 in a total of 2,000,000. This occasioned greater contact between blacks and whites as the former group be­ gan to advance economically. As in Beaumont, Mobile,

50 Beaumonfc Enfcerprise, Augusfc 3, 1943, p. 1; Lee and Humphrey, Race Riofc, 98-100. 126 Los Angeles, Harlem, and Detroit, this contact proved a major irritant. In late 1943, as the rash of summer race riots left a wake of destruction, the black employees of the Phila­ delphia Transit Company (PTC), with the backing of the NAACP, demanded that blacks be trained for jobs previously unavailable to them. These jobs included drivers and operators of the company's vehicles. The president of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees Union (PRTEU), Frank P. Carney, dismissed the attempt on a procedural techni­ cality. After several other unsuccessful efforts, the NAACP called the FEPC into the matter as the white PTC employees prepared to strike because of imminent black ad­ vancement. On August 1, 1944, a general strike occurred and most of the company's white employees walked off the job. Blacks, who recently had been training for new positions as the result of a directive of the FEPC, at­ tempted to man the transit system, but their numbers proved too few, A few days later. President Roosevelt ordered the PTC seized by the governmenfc and manned by federal troops, an order which Attorney General Francis Biddle carried out. The troops remained in the city for ten days, at which time the white workers began drifting back to work for fear of both losing their jobs and prosecution under the Smifch- Connally War Labor Dispufces Acfc of 1945. Black fcrainees 127 continued to work without incident and were slowly but positively incorporated into the company's more pres­ tigious jobs. The possibilities and symptoms for a full scale race riot in the city obviously presented themselves at this time, and local, state, and national officials held their breath in apprehension. Butfche rio t never came, despite the fact that more actual racial discord existed than in the five cities which experienced riots in 1945. Two factors seemed especially crucial in forestalling mob action. First, the NAACP took a pacifistic attitude during the entire troublesome period as witnessed in its vocal admonition to "Keep Your Heads and Your Tempers." The ex­ pedient and efficient manner in which the federal govern­ ment, most notably the FEPC, interceded to apply temper dampening salve in the form of federal troops and threat- ened prosecution provided the other factor.^5 1 Although the symptoms in Mobile, Los Angeles, Beau­ mont, Detroit, and Harlem seemed less ominous than those of Philadelphia, riots shattered the peace in those cities, while it survived in Philadelphia. The summer of 1945, as one of several peak periods of race riots caused largely by wartime conditions in the United States, has been cor­ rectly labeled a period of infamy. Embroiled in a

^•^Allan M. Winkler, "The Philadelphia Transit Strike of 1944," Journal of American Hisfcory, LIX (June, 1972), 75-89. 128 full-scale war, the citizenry of the United States reacted to the social upheaval and resultant tension and fought one another in the streets of five major war production centers and in countless other individual instances. Racial tension and turbulence manifested itself everywhere as those imbued with a social conservatism reacted to the much deserved advances made by the nation's largest mi­ nority in a time of both social and economic opportunity and frustrated expectations. CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The race riots of May-August 1945 formed only one in a series of peak periods for domestic violence as a result of social duress and alteration. War has bred more vio­ lence than other eras of change in the United States, although reform movements such as abolitionism in the 1830's and civil rights in the 1960's also have been accom­ panied by heightened racial animosity. War stimulated social duress and upheaval, and sparked both favorable and tmfavorable responses to that upheaval. The largest riot in United States history occurred during 1863 in New York City, during a period when Americans experienced their most * profound social trauma, the Civil War. Similarly, the next large conflict helped bring racial discord in 1917 in the Houston and East St. Louis race riots, to name only the largest of several altercations in that year. The Red Scare, a sweeping domestic overflow from the war, brought racial clashes in Chicago, Charlesfcon, Longview, Washing­ ton, Knoxville, Elaine, Arkansas, and Omaha in 1919, and in Tulsa in 1921, The last great striiggle the nation endured. World War II, unfortunately did nothing to change the pattern of social duress and racial antagonism. Riots again exploded in Mobile, Los Angeles, Beaumont, Detroit, and Harlem—the

129 130 middle three within a three week period from June 3 to June 20, 1945- As in the riots of the Civil War and World War I, violence took lives indiscriminately and destroyed property worth tens of millions before it was checked. As in the previous wars of America's history, a series of common factors brought about the racial violence. Blacks, or in the Los Angeles affray, Mexican-Americans, saw society changing and began demanding their rights, which usually meant advancement in the economic sphere. Whites, who have for the most part been imbued with a social con­ servatism or a desire to maintain the status quo with regard to white-black social separation, stiffened in fcheir resistance toward black overtures. That in turn caused black frustrations and impatience to increase. A realiza­ tion that the United States might suffer defeat, especially in the Civil War and World War II, augmented competition between races as a source of anxiety. The very real pos­ sibility that the never-defeated USA might in fact be on the losing side fostered paranoia and a conservative de­ terminism on the part of many whifce Americans, a condifcion that did not allow much change in the domestic social structure and physically rebuffed any attempt to effect

change. Finally, the atmosphere of a planned economy at home contributed to the boiling racial cauldron during wartime. Shortages, overcrowding, high prices, long work weeks wifch 151 little leisure time, new jobs and strange cities, and more money but less to spend it on, the inherent conditions of a planned economy which the United States has witnessed thrice since 1860, helped stimulate tu?ban racial violence.

One of the most universal themes in the violence of this nation has been its social conservatism, or the reten­ tion of established social norms. This can be noted in race riots, most notably the riots prior to the 1960's. While the black riots of the last decade can be considered conservative in that they were not directed against the government, they were not conservative in other respects since they reflected frustrations with the status quo in the United States. But whites unleashed most rioting against blacks in an effort to frustrate new advances in the economic and social spheres. Most of the World War II riots followed this pattern, with Harlem being the only clear exception. In the past whites directed violence nofc only againsfc blacks, but Mexican-Americans, Orientals, Catholics, Jews, radicals, and any other group which might upset or redirect the dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protesfcanfc sociefcy of fche United States. For this reason racial vio­ lence for the most part may be termed conservafcive, because it has been an effort to retain the social status quo and 2 separation of the races. "•-Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy," 670. Hofstadter and Wallace, American Violence, 11. 152 Out of this pattern of social conservatism came the Beaumont race riot of June 15-16, 1945, Bred in a period of social duress, the Beaumont affray seemed to include all the symptoms of an old style, conservative race riot. The city had become a critical production area; its large black population increased; an enormous influx of workers caused the citizenry to become to a large degree unstable; and by background it fell within the traditional southern pattern of segregation and black subordination. It seemed to be one of those areas, in addition to its other tensions and irritants, whose society was "having to be dragged kicking and screaming into the twentieth century,"^ The Beaumont riot sprang from conditions common to most race riots which "are most likely to occur when social institutions function inadequately, or when grievances are not resolved, or cannot be resolved under existing institu- tional arrangements," The social institutions in Beaumont functioned inadequately, largely because of the conflict in purposes between black and white members of the population. Tensions, expectations and frustrations, and resentment helped cause the social fabric in Beaumont to weaken, and

^E. C. Barksdale, "The Power Structure and Southern Gubernatorial Conservatism," in Essays on Recent Southern Politics, ed. by Harold M. Hollingsworth (.Austin, 1970;,

Lieberson and Silverman, "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots," 568-69. 135 the municipal functionaries as well as the population could not see that immediate action in the form of real attempts at assuaging emotions were necessary in a time of insta­ bility.

The Beaumont riot, although different in some ways from the other riots of this century, generally appears to share several factors common to most of them. First, the aggressor group in twentieth century race riofcs defcermined the character of the riot. In Beaumont, the aggressor group consisted mainly of white lower class workers en­ gaged in shipbuilding or other manual trades. This group determined the character of the incident by invading the black district, thus forming an old pattern incident. In Harlem in 1945, blacks became the aggressor group. The black population, although quite large, still remained a minority in New York; to have carried the riot to whifces would have been invifcing defeat because of the much larger white population. The Harlem riofcers, like blacks in more recent altercations, victimized white property within or surrounding the black district so that little violence occurred between black and white persons. Climactic conditions intensified the social tension of the riot cities as a second factor. Invariably hot and muggy weather prevailed. No major twentieth century riot occurred during inclement conditions. In Beaumont, June 15 proved extremely hot and humid, but little or no thunder- 154 shower activity occurred either on Tuesday or Wednesday.^ Similar conditions prevailed for other riots, such as Chicago in 1919, Detroit in 1945, and Harlem in 1964. The long, hot summer months across the nation caused shortened tempers and physical discomfort, especially in ghetto areas where close physical proximity prevailed. Summer also meant outside activity, such as amusement in the streets and in the few recreational areas within ghettos, which gave people opportunities to congregate in one form or another. Summer weather thus augmented the symptoms for racial discord. Rumor provided a third factor which this century's riots held in common. The rumor that a black man had raped a young white mother sparked the Beaumont conflagration. The story that police had beaten to death a young black boy for stealing a ten cent knife precipitated the Harlem riot of 1955. The drowning of a black boy in Chicago in 1919, and the uncontrolled rumors which subsequently drifted over the city about atrocities by both races sparked the furious affray in Chicago. Bias and inefficiency by the police before and during the rioting served as another factor common to most twen­ tieth century racial turbulence. The Harlem riot of 1943, in which Fiorello LaGuardia and the city planned ahead and

"^Beaumont Enterprise, June 15, 1943, p. 1. 155 used police to quell the riot quickly and effectively, of­ fered the only exception. In Chicago in 1919 the police proved guilty of malicious crimes against the blacks, of never having enough men at the right place, of running away from embattled areas, and of gross ineptitude in general. The same held true for most major race riots since I9OO. In Beaumont the city police force collec­ tively represented a more competent organization than in previous months, but racist members who refused to inter­ vene on behalf of the black defenders reduced the overall effectiveness of the police. The police chief, while personally honest, failed to plan for a racial incident even though it seemed obvious that one might occur. The lack of proper planning and the racist attitude of some of its number thus supplied two conditions which helped make the Beaimiont police force less effective than it might have been. In most riots the policemen complained of being understaffed, which they usually were for riot control efforts. Invariably the riot cities enlarged their police forces as a result of the racial violence. Beaumont proved no exception, because on June 25, 1945, the police an­ nounced that the force was being enlarged by twenty-one men, bringing the total from sixty-two to eighty-three. Public pressure also helped bring the resignation of Chief of Police Ross Dickey, the recipient of much undeserved 156 criticism. Finally, twentieth century riots occurred in almost every instance within or around the minority communities. In the older pattern of rioting the white aggressor groups invaded minority areas to wreak havoc. Yet fighting usually took place on the fringes of the minority com­ munity, as in the case of Beaumont, because blacks fought back and because whites feared encirclement by hostile defenders if they entered the heart of the minority dis­ trict. In the more recent pattern of rioting, the blacks usually looted or destroyed white-owned property in and around the minority districts. The fighting naturally 7 occurred in these areas.' The Beaumont race riot easily fits the general cri­ teria for a typical twentieth century race riot. It does not, however, fit a completely uniform set of conditions, nor does any riot, in fact. Mob violence is commonly thought of in narrow terms, such as white aggression and black defense, but rioting is as diffuse as violence itself because of its spontaneous nature and varying local conditions under which riots occur. The Beaumont riot

Soskin, Urban Racial Violence, "Part One: Race Riots," /i-iii7; Allen D. Grimshaw, "Actions of Police and the Military Tn American Race Riots," in Racial Violence in the United States, ed. by Allen D. Grimshaw (.onicago, 1969), 2?6-?7; l^eaumont Journal, June 25, 1945, P. 1- "^Boskin, Urban Racial Violence, "Part One: Race Riots," /T-iiiTI 157 proved no exception.

Of the five race riots in 1945, the incident in Beaumont proved the clearest representation of what many considered a typical race riot in that most of its charac­ teristics followed familiar patterns. The alleged rape of a white woman by a black man precipitated the affray. Lower class white workers composed the main body of rioters who sought to maintain social distinctions between them­ selves and blacks during the war when economic differences seemed to be reduced. These whites spontaneously began the riot, and the police force proved largely ineffective, sometimes intentionally so. Violence ended more by exhaustion than by force, although force crushed the last insignificant spark of mob action on Wednesday morning. Contrary to popular characterizations of "old style" riots, but actually consonant with most twentieth century race riots, blacks fought back in the Beaumont affray and were not helpless defenders, although the majority of blacks did not engage in the violence. Enough did, how­ ever, either through sheer anger and frustration or protec­ tion of family and fireside, to cause the rioters serious trouble, as witnessed by the fact that blacks injured several white rioters and killed one white man, Ellis C. Brown, Also the probability that white casualties proved somewhat larger than usual for that kind of riot further substantiated the assumption that blacks took an active 158 part in the tiu?bulence,®

The Mobile riot proved the smallest of the five, but was significant in that it represented the first large scale riot of 1945 and World War II, and also because it was one of the most celebrated instances of FEPC interven­ tion. The results of the investigation, segregation of the shipways in Mobile, however, proved somewhat contrary to FEPC principles. The Mobile riot preceded the Beaumont incident by three weeks, and received publicity across the nation which no doubt strengthened latent racial tensions. The incidents in both cities proved somewhat similar in that both possessed shipyards and that shipyard employees provided the majority of the rioters. One may conclude that the incident in Mobile may have served to heighten interracial tension in Beaumont, even though inherent dif­ ferences appeared, such as the wide discrepancy in the size of the cities and the fact that white workers pre­ cipitated the Mobile affray primarily on economic grounds while social unrest played a larger part in the Beaumont riot. The Los Angeles riot appeared as the second race riot of 1945, ending only eight days before the violence in Beaumont erupted. This incident merited full coverage in the Beaumont Enterprise-Journal, but probably failed to

^eier and Rudwick, "Black Violence in the Twentieth Century," 405-04. 159 heighten racial tension in Beaumont to the degree that Mobile did, primarily because of the unusual characteris­ tics of the Los Angeles affray. Unlike Beaumont, Detroit, and Mobile, the aggressor group in Los Angeles consisted mainly of white servicemen, and the primary victims ap­ peared to be Mexican-Americans rather than blacks. Ad­ ditional differences proved to be the duration of the rioting, four days, as well as the lack of deaths, when compared with the Beaumont clash which lasted roughly fifteen hours and produced three fatalities. The Los Angeles riot, together with the Mobile affray, helped set the stage for racial discord in Beaumont. The Detroit riot provided the largest instance of racial discord during the war, when economic and social pressures combined with crowded conditions to precipitate the clash. In addition, overtones of "new style" violence presented themselves in Detroit in that black rioters proved a major factor and destruction of white-owned property abounded. Beaumont proved similar to Detroit in several areas, such as overcrowded conditions and white precipitated action, but differences between the riots also existed. First, racial tension among blacks and whites in Detroit did not exist to the degree that occurred in Beaumont. The Texas violence proved a manifestation of long-standing social abrasion as well as economic tensions and overcrowded conditions, while the Michigan affray 140 showed obvious economic overtones and de-emphasized social discord. Another difference between Beaumont and Detroit, the sanctity of white womanhood, provided a causal con­ trast between violence in the North and South during the war. The Beaumont affray had as its immediate cause the alleged violation of white women by blacks, while the question of interracial amalgamation did not present itself in Detroit. Notwithstanding these differences, the Beau­ mont riot served as part of the cause for heightened racial discord in Detroit since it ended but four days prior to the outbreak of violence in that northern city,^ The Harlem riot proved the most distinctive of the five riots in 1945 because it followed no precedenfc except that of 1955 in the same location and in Detroit to a smaller degree. It also occurred somewhat later than the other riots. It can be said that although Harlem proved entirely a "new style" incident, unlike the others of 1945, the four preceding riots constituted in part a cause for the outburst in Harlem. Beaumont served as a fragment of that factor even though it contrasted with the Harlem riot in several obvious ways. The fact that both were interracial in nature, however, proved enough of a simi­ larity to make the Beaumont incident important in the

^Allen D. Grimshaw, "Lawlessness and Violence in America and Their Special Manifestations in Changing Negro- White Relationships," in Racial Violence in the United States, ed. by Allen D. Grimshaw, (Chicago, 1969;, 22-28. 141 background for the Harlem clash. Whether instrumental in causation and effect upon other racial incidents or not, the Beaumont riot in itself represented a crucial factor in the history of recent race relations. On the local scene, the affray did not sig­ nificantly alter the racial sphere in Beaumont, partly because of an overriding social conservatism; a retention of the status quo that would not yield. Local citizens assumed that war brought racial turbulence and that peace would restore contentment. This of course did not hap­ pen, and in the postwar redirection blacks in Beaumont and Texas, as across the nation, became more frustrated and whites became more resentful than ever. The effect of the Beaumont riot in Texas underscored the unrest and impending change in racial relations. As the most recent and important of the three race riots Texas has experienced in this century, the Beaumont affray helped show the effect of the war and social upheaval in the state as well as the region and nation. The riot, however, served as only one fragment of this redirection. Additional factors included the other riots and racial turbulence during World War II, judicial decisions, presi­ dential leadership for civil rights, and more recently the Cold War, new scientific views on race, and the emergence of African nations. But Beaumont also provided a visible sign of these 142 changes as the New Deal and World War II era formed a watershed or turning point in race relations. The riots of World War II provided the most obvious symbol, or climax, to subtle redirections which stemmed from the First World War in some cases. Beaumont acted as only one of those incidents which served as a temporary setback to the upheaval, and helped make visible the effect of the change in race relations. The Beaumont riot may be placed in a regional setting with Mobile and together characterized as two of the few southern riots in this century. But to do so would not be entirely accurate, nor would it express the true impact of the Beaumont incident. The striking similarity of the two southern riots with the others of 1945, especially that in Detroit, suggests that by the middle of the war the South had begun to achieve a degree of homogeneity with the remainder of the nation socially, politically, and eco­ nomically rather than continuing as the distinct sector of preceding decades. Indeed, the mere fact that race riots occurred in southern urban areas during the time of northern and western incidents suggests a degree of national amalgamation heretofore unknown. Affected by national problems and changes, the South reacted to the overall pattern of race relations of 1945 rather than to purely sectional alterations and issues. The Beaumont riot provided a southern reaction to national racial alterations 143 as did Mobile, and taken together both represented the effect of these changes upon the South which proved essen­ tially the same as that in the North. This effect, visible to a large degree in the Beaumont race riot, foreshadowed alterations in race relations for Texas and the South which helped bring them closer to the national norms, though not to full conformity. In a general sense, it was only one of many racial alterca­ tions our society has fostered, but it served as part of the overall alteration of race relations and of society generally to a more amenable and democratic position, despite its cost. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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