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1 SUZANNE NOVAK,* New York Registration No. 292574 JONATHAN SMITH, California State Bar No. 286941 2 Earthjustice 48 Wall Street, 19th Floor 3 New York, NY 10005 [email protected] 4 [email protected] Tel: 212-845-7376/Fax: 212-918-1556 5 * Admitted pro hac vice
6 MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO,* New York Registration No. 2212579 Yale Law School 7 127 Wall Street New Haven, CT 06511 8 [email protected] Tel: (203) 432-2184 9 * Admitted pro hac vice
10 HEATHER M. LEWIS, State Bar No. 291933 Earthjustice 11 50 California Street San Francisco, CA 94111 12 [email protected] Tel: 415-217-2000/Fax: 415-217-2040 13 Counsel for Plaintiffs
14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 OAKLAND DIVISION 17 18 CALIFORNIANS FOR RENEWABLE ) Case No. 4:15-cv-03292-SBA ENERGY, ASHURST BAR/SMITH ) 19 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, CITIZENS ) FOR ALTERNATIVES TO RADIOACTIVE ) PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 20 DUMPING, SAINT FRANCIS PRAYER ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CENTER, SIERRA CLUB and MICHAEL ) 21 BOYD ) Hearing: June 14, 2017 ) Time: 1:00 p.m. 22 Plaintiffs, ) Judge: Hon. Saundra Brown Armstrong ) Place: Courtroom 210 23 vs. ) ) 24 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL ) PROTECTION AGENCY and SCOTT PRUITT, ) 25 in his official capacity as Administrator of the ) Environmental Protection Agency, ) 26 ) Defendants. ) 27 ) )
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Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment CARE v. EPA, Case No. 4:15-cv-03292- SBA
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... III
3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ...... 1
4 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 5 ARGUMENT ...... 2 6 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR FIRST 7 FIVE CLAIMS BECAUSE EPA’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REGULATORY DEADLINES IS BEYOND DISPUTE...... 2 8 II. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR SIXTH 9 CLAIM OF A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD 10 ACTION...... 5 11 III. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT PLAINTIFFS’ REQUESTED DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF...... 10 12 A. The Court Can and Should Grant Plaintiffs Declaratory Relief for All Claims. ...10 13 14 B. The Court Should Grant Injunctive Relief for the CARE and Sierra Club Complaints, and for all of Plaintiffs’ Pending and Future Title VI Complaints. ...13 15 CONCLUSION ...... 15 16
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page(s)
3 Cases
4 Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. Heckler, 5 789 F.2d 931, 943 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ...... 12 6 Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) ...... 6 7 American Center for Law & Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 8 No. CV 16-2516 (JEB), 2017 WL 1377909 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2017) ...... 6, 13 9 Arik v. Astrue, 10 No. C 08-5564 SBA, 2010 WL 6490066 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) ...... 10 11 Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) ...... 12 12 Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 13 279 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2002) ...... 12 14 Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Badgley, 15 309 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2002) ...... 10
16 Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Troyer, No. Civ. S-05-1633, 2006 WL 464084 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006) ...... 12 17 Campos v. Nail, 18 43 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1994) ...... 6 19 Center for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 20 571 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Armstrong, J.) ...... 10
21 Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992) ...... 12 22 23 Citizens Task Force on Timber Sales Review v. U.S. Forest Service, 894 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished) ...... 12 24 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 25 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) ...... 14
26 Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 27 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) ...... 8 28
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1 Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.D.C. 2010) ...... 7 2 DL v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 3 16-7076 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2016) ...... 11 4 DocMagic, Inc. v. Ellie Mae, Inc., 5 745 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ...... 9
6 Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, Civil Action No. 10-1941, 2011 WL 121936 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 2011), vacated in 7 irrelevant part, 781 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D. La. 2011) ...... 7, 8 8 Fixel v. Nevada Legislative Commission, 9 940 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished) ...... 9
10 Garcia v. McCarthy, 649 F. App’x 589 (9th Cir. 2016) ...... 14, 15 11 Garcia v. McCarthy, 12 No. 13-CV-03939, 2014 WL 187386 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014) ...... 14 13 Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, 14 811 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2016) ...... 5, 6, 9
15 High Sierra Hikers Association v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004) ...... 8 16 17 Independent Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2003) ...... 10 18 Independent Training & Apprenticeship Program v. California Dep’t of Industrial 19 Relations, 730 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2013) ...... 3, 4 20 21 McElroy Electronics Corp. v. F.C.C., 86 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ...... 3 22 Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 23 418 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2005) ...... 3
24 Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1994) ...... 12 25 26 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 542 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2008) ...... 2 27 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 28 966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992) ...... 11
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1 Nevada Association of Counties. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 3:13-cv-00712, 2015 WL 1130982 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2015), aff’d, No. 15- 2 15620, 2017 WL 1208591 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2017) ...... 8 3 New Hampshire v. Maine, 4 532 U.S. 742 (2001) ...... 14 5 Christopher P. ex rel. Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990)...... 12 6 Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 542 U.S. 55 (2004) ...... 15 8 Obrey v. Johnson, 9 400 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005) ...... 5, 6
10 Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 596 (2005) ...... 15 11 Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. Jackson, 12 922 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (E.D. Cal. 2013)...... 12 13 Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. McCarthy, 14 614 F. App’x 895 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) ...... 10, 12
15 Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ...... 6, 9 16 17 Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm, Inc. v. Nelson, 723 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ...... 6 18 Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of America, Inc., 19 697 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ...... 4
20 Public Utilities Commission of California v. FERC, 21 100 F.3d 1451 (9th Cir. 1996) ...... 12 22 Rosemere Neighborhood Association v. EPA, 581 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) ...... 11 23 Rutledge v. County of Sonoma, 24 No. C 07-4274 CW, 2008 WL 4414740 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) ...... 9
25 San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Haugrud, 26 848 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2017) ...... 14 27 Sanes v. Budget Finance Co., 481 F. App’x 387 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) ...... 2 28
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1 Seattle Audobon Society v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) ...... 10 2 Shakur v. Schriro, 3 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008) ...... 2 4 Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Commission, Idaho, 5 42 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1994) ...... 12
6 Sioux Biochemical, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Iowa 2005) ...... 9 7 8 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) ...... 12 9 Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 10 512 U.S. 504 (1994) ...... 3
11 United States v. Maricopa, County of, 151 F. Supp. 3d 998 (D. Ariz. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-17558 (9th Cir. 12 Dec. 31, 2015) ...... 6 13 United Steelworkers of America v. Rubber Manufacturers Association, 14 783 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ...... 12
15 Unknown Parties v. Johnson, 163 F. Supp. 3d 630 (D. Ariz. 2016) ...... 5 16 17 Vietnam Veterans of America v. CIA, No. C 09-0037, 2010 WL 291840 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010) ...... 12 18 Statutes 19 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) ...... 15 20 Other Authorities 21 22 40 C.F.R. § 7.115 ...... 3 23 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 ...... 14 24 Brief of Appellants, Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 11-17948, 12-17765), 2014 WL 2583551 ...... 7 25 Civil Local Rule 7-3 ...... 2 26 27 28
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1 Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for 2 Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft 3 Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27, 2000) ...... 4 4 EPA, External Civil Rights Compliance Office, Case Resolution Manual, https://www.epa.gov/ocr/case-resolution-manual ...... 3, 4 5 Nondiscrimination in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Assistance from the 6 Environmental Protection Agency, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,284, 77,287 (proposed Dec. 14, 2015) ...... 4, 14 7 8
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 INTRODUCTION
3 Plaintiffs demonstrated in their motion and memorandum for summary judgment, and 4 supporting evidence, (“Plaintiffs’ Motion” or “Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief”), Dkt. 98, that EPA failed 5 to issue preliminary findings regarding Plaintiffs’ underlying Title VI administrative complaints 6 within 180 days as required by law. EPA1 had missed that deadline by approximately a decade or 7 more for all of the complaints, and Plaintiffs’ Motion further showed that this egregious failure was 8 part of a pattern or practice of EPA’s unlawful withholding of preliminary findings within the 9 required time frame. Indeed, EPA began to resolve some of those administrative complaints only 10 because this lawsuit was filed.2 11 EPA submitted no evidence in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion. See Dkt. 100.3 Nor did EPA 12 deny that it failed to issue preliminary findings within 180 days, nor that it had a pattern or practice 13 of doing so. See id. Instead, it made a number of erroneous technical arguments, such as proposing 14 interpretations of the 180-day deadline that contradict both the plain regulatory language and 15 positions EPA has previously taken, and attempting to muddle Plaintiffs’ straightforward claims by 16 purporting to rebut straw man arguments Plaintiffs do not make. 17 EPA’s efforts at distraction fail, and Plaintiffs’ unrebutted evidence warrants summary 18 judgment in their favor. The harm Plaintiffs have suffered, EPA’s past actions, EPA’s positions in 19 this litigation, and Plaintiffs’ intentions to file future Title VI complaints together warrant the 20 declaratory and injunctive relief that Plaintiffs request. Plaintiffs should not have to combat EPA’s 21 22 23
1 24 Abbreviations used in this memorandum have the same meaning as those used in Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief unless otherwise indicated. 25 2 Plaintiffs refer the Court to their Opening Brief for a statement of the relevant facts and issues to be decided. See Dkt. 98 at 1–9. 26 3 See Defendants’ Consolidated Reply in Support of Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss and, in the 27 Alternative, Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims, and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“EPA Opposition”) (Apr. 17, 2017). 28
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1 persistent and unjustified refusal to abide by the 180-day deadline by filing a new lawsuit and 2 litigating the same arguments each time they file a Title VI Complaint.4 3 ARGUMENT 4 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR FIRST FIVE CLAIMS BECAUSE EPA’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REGULATORY 5 DEADLINES IS BEYOND DISPUTE.
6 Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their first five claims because EPA failed to 7 issue preliminary findings on, or otherwise resolve, their Title VI complaints within 180 days, a fact 8 EPA does not dispute in its Opposition.5 Even for the complaints EPA purports to have resolved, 9 EPA does not claim that it resolved them within 180 days, nor otherwise had a legally justifiable 10 reason for grossly exceeding the 180-day deadline and causing injury to Plaintiffs.6 EPA thereby 11 abandoned any contentions that it timely resolved Plaintiffs’ Title VI complaints “by not raising 12 them in opposition to . . . [Plaintiffs’] motion for summary judgment.” See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 13 F.3d 878, 892 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Sanes v. 14 Budget Fin. Co., 481 F. App’x 387, 387 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (arguments not raised in 15 opposition to motion for summary judgment are waived). 16 Instead, in opposition, EPA attempts to skirt its responsibilities under the law by 17 unsuccessfully arguing that: (1) the 180-day deadline applies only when EPA makes an affirmative 18 4 Because this memorandum is a reply in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion, and not a sur-reply opposing 19 EPA’s Motion, Plaintiffs do not herein respond to arguments in EPA’s Opposition made solely as reply in support of EPA’s Motion. See L.R. 7-3(c),(d). Plaintiffs do not concede or waive 20 opposition to such arguments. 5 EPA mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ argument with respect to the CARD, CARE, and Prayer Center 21 Complaints as one claiming that EPA failed to issue preliminary findings or otherwise resolve the CARD and Prayer Center Complaints at all. See Dkt. 100 at 13–14. Plaintiffs argue that EPA failed 22 to follow any of the “available pathways to resolution,” to borrow EPA’s phrase, id. at 14, within 180 days. See Dkt. 98 at 17–18. With respect to the CARE Complaint, Plaintiff argues that EPA 23 failed at any time to follow any of the available pathways because it neither informally resolved that complaint, nor issued preliminary findings about the complaint’s allegations that would allow it to 24 formally resolve or dismiss the complaint. See id. at 18–19. 6 25 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and declarations plainly assert that they suffered a procedural injury, see Dkt. 90 ¶¶ 26, 27; Dkt. 98 at 27–28, despite EPA’s protestations to the 26 contrary. Dkt. 100 at 2–5. But whether they made these assertions is of no import. The Ninth Circuit has held that standing requirements are relaxed for procedural injuries even where plaintiffs 27 do not expressly allege that EPA denied them any procedure, especially on a motion to dismiss. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 542 F.3d 1235, 1246 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). 28
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1 finding that a recipient failed to comply with Title VI, and not when EPA either finds insufficient 2 evidence of such noncompliance or informally resolves the complaint; and, (2) the 180 days are 3 counted only after attempts at informal resolution prove unsuccessful. See Dkt. 100 at 13–15. The 4 Court should not adopt EPA’s tortured reading of the law for several reasons. 5 First, “no deference is due to an agency interpretation that contradicts the regulation’s plain 6 language,” as is the case here. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 7 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). The 8 regulations unambiguously require that if a complaint has not been resolved within 180 days, EPA 9 must notify the recipient of “(i) [p]reliminary findings; (ii) [r]ecommendations, if any, for achieving 10 voluntary compliance; and (iii) [r]ecipient’s right to engage in voluntary compliance negotiations 11 where appropriate.” 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(c).7 The provision in no way limits the definition of 12 “preliminary findings” to only affirmative findings of noncompliance, as EPA contends. Id. The 13 regulations also state that the 180-day clock runs “from the start of the . . . complaint investigation,” 14 not from the conclusion of an unsuccessful attempt at informal resolution. Id. EPA’s position thus 15 finds no support in the text of its regulations. 16 Second, the Court should not defer to EPA’s litigation position that the requirement to issue 17 preliminary findings applies only to situations where it affirmatively finds discrimination because 18 this position is inconsistent with both the agency’s prior policies and its practice. See Indep. 19 Training & Apprenticeship Program v. California Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 730 F.3d 1024, 1034 20 (9th Cir. 2013) (no deference owed to agency’s newfound policy interpretation); McElroy Elecs. 21 Corp. v. F.C.C., 86 F.3d 248, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (no deference afforded when interpretation is 22 belied by prior practice). EPA’s Case Resolution Manual, the agency’s procedural guidance for its 23 civil rights case managers, and EPA’s Draft Revised Investigation Guidance, a 2000 statement by 24 7 EPA’s Case Resolution Manual states that EPA will suspend its complaint investigation when 25 parties enter into alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) proceedings, and will reinstate investigation upon the unsuccessful conclusion of those proceedings. EPA, External Civil Rights Compliance 26 Office, Case Resolution Manual (“Case Resolution Manual”) 21, 49 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/ocr/case-resolution-manual. Even so, no evidence exists that ADR 27 proceedings properly tolled the investigations into any of Plaintiffs’ complaints such that the 180- day deadline was not violated. 28
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1 the agency of the substantive standards investigators apply in Title VI investigations, explain that, 2 unless informal resolution is reached before 180 days, EPA must issue preliminary findings within 3 180 days following every investigation, even when EPA ultimately dismisses a complaint based on a 4 finding of compliance.8 And EPA’s practice is to issue detailed findings whenever it dismisses an 5 accepted complaint.9 These “conflicts between [EPA’s] current and previous interpretations” of its 6 regulations suggest that EPA’s “convenient litigating position . . . is no more than a post hoc 7 rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack.” Indep. 8 Training, 730 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 830 n.4 9 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 10 Third, EPA’s argument that it need only meet the 180-day deadline if it is issuing affirmative 11 findings of noncompliance defies logic and undermines the purpose of Title VI. Under its 12 interpretation, EPA must issue a finding of noncompliance within 180 days, but EPA would be able 13 to take all the time it wants to issue a finding of insufficient evidence or compliance. This makes no 14 sense: the determination of compliance and noncompliance are two sides of the same coin. EPA 15 would have to make the determination of compliance or noncompliance at the 180-day mark to 16 know if the deadline applied. The purpose of the 180-day deadline is for the complainant and the 17 recipient to learn promptly whether there was improper discrimination and to take appropriate 18 responsive actions. With a requirement to issue findings only of noncompliance within 180 days, if
19 8 Case Resolution Manual at 28–30 (discussing EPA’s issuance of findings both of noncompliance and of “insufficient evidence” of noncompliance, i.e., compliance); Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA 20 Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints 21 Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,670 § C.II.A.3 & 39,687 (June 27, 2000) (flowchart noting EPA must “issue[] preliminary findings . . . [within 180 22 days]” before a “complaint [can be] dismissed”); see also Nondiscrimination in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency, 80 Fed. Reg. 23 77,284, 77,287 (proposed Dec. 14, 2015) (“EPA Proposed Rule”) (EPA admitting that the 180-day timeframe of § 7.115(c) is a “self-imposed, inflexible deadline”). 24 9 See, e.g., Dkt. 101-1 (letter closing ABSCO Complaint and setting forth basis for finding of 25 insufficient evidence of noncompliance); Declaration of Marianne Engelman Lado, dated May 5, 2017 (“Lado Decl.”) Exs. 3, 4 (letters dismissing complaints with extensive investigative reports). 26 The findings in EPA’s June 6, 2016 letter concerning the CARE Complaint are not responsive to the complaints’ allegations and therefore do not qualify as “preliminary findings” under EPA’s 27 regulations. See Dkt. 98 at 18–19. Nevertheless, EPA’s issuance of these infirm findings is further evidence of EPA’s practice of issuing findings prior to dismissal. 28
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1 no findings are issued at that 180-day benchmark, the parties would not know whether EPA 2 determined compliance, or whether EPA had not yet completed its investigation. Thus, the parties 3 would not know which next steps might be appropriate.10 4 II. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR SIXTH CLAIM OF A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD 5 ACTION. 6 Plaintiffs demonstrated in their opening brief that they are entitled to summary judgment on 7 their pattern or practice claim because they demonstrated both that: (1) EPA has a policy or practice 8 of unlawfully withholding issuance of preliminary findings within the required 180 days for 9 unresolved accepted Title VI complaints; and, (2) that practice will harm plaintiffs in the future. See 10 Dkt. 98 at 13–14; Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 11 2016). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, one way in which a party may demonstrate that unlawful 12 conduct is part of a “pattern or practice,” and not just an isolated event, is to provide the court with 13 evidence of “similarly situated” people “who were also harmed by the pattern or practice.” Hajro, 14 811 F.3d at 1104, 1106; see also Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 2005) (to prevail in 15 pattern or practice case, plaintiff establishes that discrimination was company’s “standard operating
16 procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.”) (internal citation and quotation marks 17 omitted); Unknown Parties v. Johnson, 163 F. Supp. 3d 630, 639 (D. Ariz. 2016) (“A policy, 18 practice, or custom may be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated [actions]”); 19 Dkt. 98 at 13–14. Here, sworn, unrebutted testimony and evidence shows that EPA unlawfully 20 withheld issuance of timely preliminary findings (for approximately a decade or more, and in one 21 instance over two decades) in all five of Plaintiffs’ underlying complaints. See Dkt. 98 at 3–8. The 22 existence of the underlying pattern or practice is supported not only by EPA’s failure to meet its 23 deadlines in those five instances, but also by evidence and findings regarding similarly situated 24 people in other court cases, as well as governmental and investigative reports, including reports 25 10 Even under EPA’s novel interpretation of the regulatory language, the 180-day deadline applied to 26 the preliminary findings of discrimination in the Prayer Center Complaint, and there can be no dispute that EPA was grossly out of compliance with that deadline. See Dkt. 98-8 Ex. 4. And if 27 EPA were to issue preliminary findings of noncompliance for the Sierra Club Complaint, that too would violate the law under EPA’s interpretation. 28
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1 issued by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and commissioned by EPA itself. See id. at 8–9, 2 14.11 3 In opposition to this showing, EPA did not argue that no such pattern or practice exists, nor 4 that Plaintiffs’ pattern or practice claims fails because Plaintiffs will not suffer future injury from the 5 pattern or practice.12 It therefore waived such arguments. See supra Section I at p. 2. Rather, 6 lacking a substantive rebuttal to this evidence, EPA attempts to evade liability with a series of 7 technical arguments. Because, as discussed below, those arguments have no merit, Plaintiffs are 8 entitled to summary judgment on their pattern or practice claim. 9 EPA falsely claims that there is an absence of Ninth Circuit authority for “the availability of . 10 . . ‘pattern or practice’ claims beyond the FOIA context.” Dkt. 100 at 22. But the Ninth Circuit, and 11 indeed the Supreme Court, have recognized “pattern or practice” claims of unlawful conduct in a 12 myriad of contexts. See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814–16 (1974) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 actions against state officers for conspiring to deprive First Amendment rights); Obrey, 400 F.3d at 14 694 (employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); Campos v. Nail, 15 43 F.3d 1285, 1290–91 (9th Cir. 1994) (immigration judge’s unconstitutional practice of denying 16 changes of venue); see also United States v. Maricopa, Cnty. of, 151 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1021 (D. Ariz. 17 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-17558 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 2015) (discrimination in violation of Title 18 VI); Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm, Inc. v. Nelson, 723 F. Supp. 432, 451 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
19 11 EPA cites American Center for Law & Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State (“ACLJ”), No. CV 16-2516 (JEB), 2017 WL 1377909 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2017), Dkt. 100-2, a district court case in the District of 20 Columbia, to contend that Plaintiffs may not prove the existence of a pattern or practice with past instances of people who were harmed by the alleged pattern or practice. See Dkt. 100 at 22. But 21 such a proposition would contradict Ninth Circuit case law. See, e.g, Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1104, 1106; Obrey, 400 F.3d at 694. It would also make no sense—given that a policy or practice may be 22 informal, rather than an official statement or regulation, see Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988), how else would plaintiffs prove a pattern or practice claim other 23 than by showing prior instances of delay? In any event, ACLJ does not restrict the admissibility of such evidence. Rather, that court found that the plaintiff there had failed to “spell out the actual 24 thrust of its claim with greater specificity” in its complaint because it alleged only that the agency had a “reputation” for disregarding its obligations. 2017 WL 1377909, at *6 (emphasis in original). 25 Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs specifically alleged in their Complaint that EPA has demonstrated a pattern or practice of unreasonable delay and unlawful withholding of preliminary findings for 26 accepted Title VI complaints. Dkt. 90 ¶¶ 95–100. 12 27 EPA did argue, unpersuasively, that Plaintiffs could not establish future injury with respect to other claims. See infra Section III.B. 28
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1 (workplace raids by federal officers in violation of Fourth Amendment). Plaintiffs highlighted Ninth 2 Circuit cases involving FOIA pattern or practice claims in their Opening Brief because they are 3 analogous to Plaintiffs’ claim here—an alleged pattern or practice of an agency’s failure to take 4 discrete actions within a mandatory time frame. Courts outside the Ninth Circuit have similarly 5 recognized pattern or practice claims under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) resembling Plaintiffs’ claim here—for 6 an agency’s alleged failure to timely act. See, e.g., Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, Civil Action No. 7 10-1941, 2011 WL 121936, at *10 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 2011) (rejecting government’s motion to 8 dismiss pattern or practice claim for failure to timely decide permit applications for deepwater 9 drilling), vacated in irrelevant part, 781 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D. La. 2011). 10 EPA, on the other hand, has failed to point to any Ninth Circuit case law holding that a 11 pattern or practice of unlawfully withholding mandatory agency action under 42 U.S.C. § 706(1) 12 cannot, as a matter of law, be sustained. Nor has EPA identified any persuasive reason why the 13 Ninth Circuit would hold that a pattern or practice claim under § 706(1) regarding discrete 14 mandatory actions could not be sustained.13 EPA tries to hang its hat on the non-binding order in 15 Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.D.C. 2010). EPA 16 contests Plaintiffs’ distinction of Del Monte as a case where the action at issue was discretionary, 17 unlike the mandatory requirement here. Dkt. 100 at 23 & n.12; Dkt. 98 at 15–16. But the Del Monte 18 Court made that distinction itself, rejecting an analogy to Payne Enterprises., Inc. v. United States 19 because Payne involved “the repeated denial of Freedom of Information Act requests based on the 20 invocation of inapplicable statutory exemptions rather than delay of an action over which the agency 21 had discretion.” 706 F. Supp. 2d at 120. Ensco, which involved allegations of failure to timely act, 22 is more analogous than Del Monte. 23 EPA also tries to muddle the issue by claiming Plaintiffs are “assert[ing] the rights of other 24
13 25 Indeed, in Hajro, another federal agency took the position that “judicial remedies in a FOIA pattern and practice case are subject to the same limits as suits under the APA,” Brief of Appellants, 26 Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 11-17948, 12- 17765), 2014 WL 2583551, at *43, acknowledging that if the Ninth Circuit were to recognize a 27 pattern or practice claim regarding agency failure to meet a statutory deadline under FOIA, which it has, it likely would also recognize one under the APA. 28
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1 entities not party to this action” and are “seek[ing] wholesale improvement” of EPA. Dkt. 100 at 2 20–21 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Neither of these arguments has any merit. 3 Plaintiffs have not asserted the rights of others, and EPA’s reliance on Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, 4 & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), which addresses the question whether a non- 5 detainee plaintiff may assert “next friend” standing to raise claims on behalf of detainees, is grasping 6 at straws. Third party standing is wholly distinct from the right of a plaintiff to introduce evidence 7 to establish that a defendant’s behavior establishes a pattern or practice, which, as discussed above, 8 is permitted and routine. See supra at pp. 5–6. 9 Nor do Plaintiffs seek wholesale improvement of EPA or any of its programs. Rather, they 10 seek narrow relief only for themselves and only regarding the pattern or practice of particular 11 unlawful agency action that has harmed them and is at issue in this action—withholding of 12 preliminary findings regarding accepted Title VI complaints past 180 days. As the Ninth Circuit and 13 other courts have found, such a claim does not amount to an improper request for wholesale 14 improvement, and thus is proper. See, e.g., High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 15 639 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting defendant’s argument that challenge to series of specific, discrete and 16 similar agency actions amounted to improper programmatic challenge); Ensco, 2011 WL 121936, at 17 *10 (rejecting allegation of improper broad programmatic attack where plaintiffs challenged 18 repeated discrete agency actions and “merely [sought] an order from th[e] [c]ourt that tells the 19 government to make a decision on a small number of specific permit applications that directly 20 affect” plaintiffs); see also Nev. Ass’n of Cntys. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 3:13-cv-00712, 21 2015 WL 1130982, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2015) (recognizing viability of challenge to multiple 22 agency actions unlawfully withheld when challenged actions are discrete, but dismissing claims 23 where plaintiffs failed to allege a single event or particular instance where federal defendants 24 violated the law), aff’d, No. 15-15620, 2017 WL 1208591 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2017); Dkt. 98 at 13–21. 25 EPA’s final argument in opposition, that the pattern or practice claim is redundant of 26 individual claims of unlawful withholding, Dkt. 100 at 21, also has no merit. As the Ninth Circuit 27 explained in Hajro, a claim attacking a specific agency action of past unlawful withholding 28 “differ[s] from” a claim that an agency has a pattern or practice that will impair a party’s rights in
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1 the future, and they are “two separate claims” that can be brought in the same lawsuit. 811 F.3d at 2 1102–03 (discussing viability of pattern or practice claim if plaintiffs had standing, alongside 3 resolved claim that documents were previously unlawfully withheld in particular circumstances).14 4 Indeed, a claim is redundant of another claim only if it “marshals no new factual allegations nor any 5 new legal theories upon which [the plaintiff] could obtain relief.” DocMagic, Inc. v. Ellie Mae, Inc., 6 745 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Sioux Biochemical, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 410 7 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (claims not redundant if they “require proof of different 8 elements”). Here—and generally by its very definition—Plaintiffs’ pattern or practice claim 9 marshals both additional facts and a different legal theory than the five other claims, each of which 10 involve only one administrative complaint, and thus it is not redundant of any of Plaintiffs’ 11 individual claims. See, e.g., Payne, 837 F.2d at 491 (contrasting policy and practice claim with that 12 of an isolated mistake).15 In the effort to support its redundancy argument, EPA again grasps at 13 straws, citing cases that do not involve pattern or practice claims and are wholly inapposite. See 14 Fixel v. Nev. Legislative Comm’n, 940 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished) (concerning a pro se 15 defendant’s two redundant access to courts claims); Rutledge v. Cnty. of Sonoma, No. C 07-4274 16 CW, 2008 WL 4414740, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) (regarding redundancy between claims 17 18 19 20
21 14 EPA is incorrect in contending that Hajro’s only relevance is that it demonstrates that CARE, CARD and Prayer Center’s claims must be dismissed as moot. Dkt. 100 at 22. To the contrary, the 22 Court in Hajro held that “where a plaintiff alleges a pattern or practice of FOIA violations and seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, regardless of whether his specific FOIA requests have been mooted,” 23 the plaintiff could show injury in fact to sustain a pattern or practice claim. Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1103 (emphasis added); see also infra Section III. The Hajro Court concluded that one of the plaintiffs no 24 longer maintained standing only because, having been granted citizenship, the probability of harm to him from the unlawful delay of the production of documents to support a naturalization application 25 was, unlike Plaintiffs’ documented expected harm here, remote. 811 F.3d at 1102; see infra Section III. 26 15 Indeed, EPA itself cites Payne for the proposition that a party’s pattern or practice claim can still 27 be viable even if his individual claim is moot. Dkt. 100 at 22 n.11. That proposition would make no sense if a pattern or practice claim were merely redundant of individual claims. 28
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1 of false imprisonment and false arrest that were based on same infringement by same conduct).16 2 Plaintiffs have demonstrated, and EPA has not rebutted (or even argued to the contrary) that 3 EPA has a policy or practice of unlawfully withholding issuance of preliminary findings within the 4 required 180 days for unresolved accepted Title VI complaints. See Dkt. 98 at 13–14. Plaintiffs 5 further demonstrated that they will suffer injury in the future as a result of that practice. See 6 Schmitter Decl. ¶¶ 14, 17–19, 26–27, Dkt. 98-8; Boyd Decl. ¶¶ 16–19, 32–33, Dkt. 98-1; Fields 7 Decl. ¶¶ 5, 11, 19–20, 23–24, Dkt. 98-3; Reade Decl. ¶¶ 12–16, 21, Dkt. 98-7; Gosa Decl. ¶¶ 23, 33, 8 Dkt. 98-4; see also infra Section III.A. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary judgment on 9 their sixth claim. 10 III. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT PLAINTIFFS’ REQUESTED DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 11 A. The Court Can and Should Grant Plaintiffs Declaratory Relief for All Claims. 12
13 As Plaintiffs explained in their Opening Brief, this Court should grant declaratory judgment 14 as to all their claims because such relief is warranted to remedy an agency’s failure to comply with a 15 legally binding deadline. See Dkt. 98 at 17–18; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 571 F. 16 Supp. 2d 1105, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Armstrong, J.). The Declaratory Judgment Act is intended to 17 avert future litigation by “declaring in one action the rights and obligations of the litigants” where, as 18 here, “defendants . . . have faced numerous lawsuits.” Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 19 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Seattle Audobon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th 20 Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). EPA has been repeatedly sued over its delays in resolving civil rights 21 complaints. See, e.g., Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. McCarthy, 614 F. App’x 895 (9th Cir. 2015) 22
16 23 EPA claims in its Opposition that Plaintiffs made a “half-hearted” attempt to distinguish such redundancy in its opening brief. See Dkt. 100 at 21. Plaintiffs’ footnote in its Motion sufficiently 24 disposed of the issue. See Dkt. 98 at 15 n.7. Regardless, however, EPA is the party that had mentioned the issue of alleged “redundancy” only in passing, and thus failed to even present the 25 issue for determination in its opening brief. Dkt. 93 at 15; See, e.g., Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that appellant’s argument was not properly 26 presented on appeal because courts “require contentions to be accompanied by reasons”); Arik v. Astrue, No. C 08-5564 SBA, 2010 WL 6490066, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) (Armstrong, J.) 27 (“The bare assertion of an issue in an opening brief is insufficient to present the matter for determination.”). 28
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1 (unpublished); Rosemere Nbh’d Ass’n v. EPA, 581 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009). Future litigation is 2 likely because EPA refuses to admit fault, continues to violate the deadlines provided by its Title VI 3 regulations, and even disputes the clear meaning of those deadlines. See supra Section I. A court 4 order clarifying EPA’s obligations under 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.115 and 7.120 would serve the purposes of 5 the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1299 (9th Cir. 6 1992) (declaratory judgment appropriate when doing so would “clarify and settle the legal relations 7 at issue” and “afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy giving rise to the proceedings”). 8 EPA fails to argue that the Court should not grant declaratory relief to ABSCO or Sierra 9 Club, or to all Plaintiffs on their pattern and practice claim, and therefore waives any opposition to 10 those requests. See supra Section I.17 Furthermore, EPA’s arguments as to why declaratory relief is 11 inappropriate as to the other parties and claims all fail. EPA incorrectly asserts that CARE, Boyd, 12 CARD, and the Prayer Center should not receive declaratory relief because their claims are moot and 13 such a declaration would thus be advisory. Dkt. 100 at 8–9. These Plaintiffs’ claims, however, 14 remain live under the voluntary cessation doctrine because EPA has not met the “formidable burden” 15 of demonstrating that its unlawful delay will not recur. See Dkt. 98 at 31–33.18 EPA could establish 16 mootness only by showing that Plaintiffs will not file new complaints, or that EPA would timely 17 resolve them. See id. at 31–32; Rosemere, 581 F.3d at 1174 (burden on agency to demonstrate 18 plaintiff will not file additional complaints); DL v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4, 11–16 19 (D.D.C. 2016) (defendants failed to meet burden even where they had proven “robust” compliance 20 for past five years and, to prevail in future, plaintiffs would need to prove defendants’ bad faith), 21 appeal docketed, No. 16-7076 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2016). EPA has not even attempted to make such 22 a showing. See generally Dkt. 100 at 7–13.
23 17 On May 1, 2017, EPA filed a Notice that asserts that “the claims of Plaintiff [ABSCO] are moot.” Dkt. 101. EPA’s Notice makes no assertion as to whether ABSCO is entitled to declaratory or 24 injunctive relief. Id. 18 25 EPA’s contention that the CARD Complaint is moot also contradicts assertions it recently made in an Informal Resolution Agreement with the New Mexico Environment Department (“NMED”). 26 That agreement states that EPA will monitor NMED’s compliance with its contents, may reopen the investigation should NMED fail to comply with its terms, and will close the complaint via letter only 27 once it determines that the terms have been satisfied. See Ex. 3 to Reade Decl., Dkt. 98-7. EPA has not issued a letter closing the CARD Complaint. Lado Decl. ¶ 4 . 28
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1 EPA erroneously tries to shift the burden to Plaintiffs and falsely argues that Plaintiffs failed 2 to prove their plans to file Title VI complaints in the future, and that their plans are merely 3 hypothetical. See Dkt. 100 at 8, 11. EPA’s argument is patently refuted by EPA’s April 28, 2017 4 recognition of a new complaint filed by ABSCO and the unrebutted sworn testimony of other 5 Plaintiffs. See Lado Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 2; Boyd Decl. ¶ 28, Dkt. 98-1 (“CARE plans to file additional 6 Title VI complaints about the Los Medanos and Delta Energy Centers” with EPA.); Schmitter Decl. 7 ¶ 23, Dkt. 98-8 (“I plan to file a Title VI complaint with EPA regarding new developments at the 8 Genesee Power Station.”); Reade Decl. ¶ 19, Dkt. 98-7 (“I will definitely file another Title VI 9 complaint on behalf of CARD with EPA.”). 10 The cases EPA cites in support of its argument that declaratory relief should not be granted 11 are inapposite. Most of those cases concerned claims that were moot, in contrast to the claims 12 here.19 Further, in Vietnam Veterans of America v. CIA the court found that the plaintiffs—unlike 13 CARE, Boyd, CARD, ABSCO, and the Prayer Center—did not plead that they could face the same 14 injury in the future absent a ruling in their favor. Vietnam Veterans, No. C 09-0037, 2010 WL 15 291840, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010); see Dkt. 100 at 8; Dkt. 98 at 14, 22. The other cases cited 16 in EPA’s Opposition did not even involve declaratory relief. See Dkt. 100 at 9 (quoting Church of 17 Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992)); id. at 10 n.6 (quoting United Steelworkers 18 of Am. v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass’n, 783 F.2d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).20 The Court should grant 19 Plaintiffs declaratory judgment on all six of their claims.
20 19 See Dkt. 100 at 7–10 (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 21 U.S. 171, 172 (1977); Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002); Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes 22 v. Fish & Game Comm’n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1994); Native Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994); Christopher P. ex rel. Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 23 794, 802-803 (2d Cir. 1990); Citizens Task Force on Timber Sales Review v. U.S. Forest Serv., 894 F.2d 409, at *3 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished); Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Phila. v. 24 Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 943 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Troyer, No. Civ. S-05-1633, 2006 WL 464084, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006)). 25 20 EPA also misleadingly attributes the statement that “there is no useful purpose that would be 26 served by granting Plaintiffs’ requested declaratory relief” to the Ninth Circuit in Padres. Dkt. 100 at 9. The Ninth Court was merely quoting the District Court opinion, and was not stating its own 27 finding. Padres, 614 F.App’x at 896 (quoting Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. Jackson, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2013)). 28
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1 B. The Court Should Grant Injunctive Relief for the CARE and Sierra Club Complaints, and for All of Plaintiffs’ Pending and Future Title VI Complaints. 2 3 Plaintiffs demonstrated in their Opening Brief that the Court should issue an injunction that 4 requires EPA to both (1) issue preliminary findings for the unresolved accepted allegations of the 5 CARE and Sierra Club Complaints;21 and (2) comply with the 180-day timeline to issue preliminary 6 findings for any of Plaintiffs’ Title VI complaints accepted by EPA for investigation after the filing 7 of this action. Dkt. 98 at 18–22. EPA has not contested Plaintiffs’ entitlement to injunctive relief 8 for the Sierra Club and ABSCO Complaints and thus has waived any such argument to that effect. 9 See supra Section I at p. 2. 10 EPA incorrectly argues that the Court’s previous Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to 11 File Second Amended Complaint (“Order”), Dkt. 86, bars Plaintiffs’ prayer for prospective 12 injunctive relief. But prospective injunctive relief is a proper form of just and equitable relief for 13 EPA’s violations that need not be specifically enumerated in the prayer of the complaint. See Dkt. 14 98 at 19–22 & n.11. Indeed, ACLJ, a recent case EPA attached to its Opposition, supports Plaintiffs’ 15 argument that a court may draw on its general equitable powers, in addition to those provided by a 16 specific statute, to order prospective injunctive relief to “prevent [an agency] from engaging in a 17 policy or practice . . . insofar as it [affects] [the plaintiffs’] requests,” rather than those of the general 18 public. ACLJ, 2017 WL 1377909, at *3 (emphasis in original). 19 Moreover, in the Order, this Court held only that it would not allow a specific prayer for 20 prospective injunctive relief to be added to Plaintiff’s operative complaint based on the evidence and 21 allegations before it at the time. Dkt. 86 at 9–11. But the unrefuted evidence now before the Court 22 demonstrates that Plaintiffs will likely suffer injury in the future without such relief. See supra 23 Section II.A. EPA unpersuasively argues that such future injury is conjectural, relying only on cases 24 that, unlike this one, involve entirely speculative chains of events dependent on the actions of third 25
21 26 After Plaintiffs filed their motion, EPA closed the ABSCO Complaint investigation in a letter that made findings of insufficient evidence of noncompliance with Title VI. See Dkt. 101-1. 27 Accordingly, Plaintiffs no longer seek injunctive relief compelling EPA to issue preliminary findings for the ABSCO Complaint. 28
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1 parties or uncontrollable circumstances. Dkt. 100 at 6; see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 2 1138, 1148 (2013) (“respondents merely speculate and make assumptions about whether their 3 communications with their foreign contacts will be acquired under [challenged provision]”); San 4 Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Haugrud, 848 F.3d 1216, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 2017) (plaintiff 5 alleged a “series of contingencies in weather and water temperature” that leads to its injury). EPA 6 has accepted Plaintiffs’ Title VI complaints for investigation in the past, and Plaintiffs have concrete 7 plans to file future Title VI complaints that meet EPA’s jurisdictional requirements. See Dkt. 98 at 8 20 n.11, 22. In fact, on April 28, 2017 ABSCO filed a new Title VI Complaint with EPA concerning 9 the same facility at issue in its 2003 complaint, and EPA acknowledged receipt of that complaint the 10 same day. See Lado Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 2.22 11 EPA also incorrectly argues that this Court’s Order bars injunctive relief for Plaintiffs’ 12 second claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) that alleges unlawful withholding of a mandatory duty 13 required for the CARE Complaint.23 Dkt. 100 at 12–13. But the Order did not concern the second 14 claim. Rather, the Order concerned a proposed seventh claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) that 15 challenged how EPA acted, not EPA’s failure to act under § 706(1). See Dkt. 86 at 6–9. And the 16 claim at issue in Garcia v. McCarthy, 649 F. App’x 589 (9th Cir. 2016), on which the Court’s Order 17 chiefly relied, was also a § 706(2) claim. See Garcia v. McCarthy, No. 13-CV-03939, 2014 WL 18 187386, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014).24 The Ninth Circuit opinion in Garcia, in fact, allows for 19 22 Under EPA’s regulations, EPA must accept, reject, or refer a complaint to another agency within 20 20 days of acknowledging receipt of that complaint. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(1)(i). Moreover, EPA’s regulations require EPA to accept and “promptly investigate all complaints” that meet 21 jurisdictional requirements, unless the parties enter ADR. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120; see also EPA Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,287 (agency proposal, ultimately withdrawn, to modify § 7.120 to remove 22 mandate that EPA accept “all” complaints that meet jurisdictional requirements). 23 EPA also argues that the SAC should have updated the factual basis for Plaintiffs’ second claim 23 about the CARE Complaint, Dkt. 100 at 13, but EPA successfully opposed Plaintiffs’ attempt to do just that. See Dkt. 79; see also Dkt. 86, at 12; Dkt. 92. EPA is judicially estopped from deriving an 24 unfair advantage from this newfound position that is clearly inconsistent with its successful prior position. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001). 25 24 Plaintiffs cite to the district court order in Garcia only to demonstrate to the court that the claim at 26 issue in the Ninth Circuit opinion was brought under § 706(2). As Plaintiffs explained in their Opening Brief, the Garcia district court “order w[as a] nullit[y]” and thus does not constitute 27 persuasive authority. Dkt. 98 at 35 (citing Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 596 (2005)). 28
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1 judicial review of the procedural § 706(1) claims that Plaintiffs bring here. See 649 F. App’x at 592; 2 Dkt. 98 at 34–35. Nor does Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”), 542 U.S. 55 3 (2004), prevent the Court from granting injunctive relief for the second claim. As demonstrated in 4 Plaintiffs’ opening brief, Plaintiffs seek to compel a discrete agency action—issuance of preliminary 5 findings concerning the allegations in the CARE Complaint—that is expressly allowed under SUWA 6 and 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 61–65; Dkt. 98 at 14–15, 22.25 7 CONCLUSION 8 For all the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief and herein, this Court should grant 9 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. 10
11 DATED: May 5, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 12 /s/ Suzanne Novak 13 SUZANNE NOVAK* 14 JONATHAN SMITH 15 Earthjustice 48 Wall St., 19th Floor 16 New York, NY 10005 [email protected] 17 [email protected] 18 Tel: (212) 845-7376
19 MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO* 20 Yale Law School 127 Wall Street 21 New Haven, CT 06511 [email protected] 22 Tel: (203) 432-2184
23
25 24 EPA argues that prospective injunctive relief would lead to “programmatic review” because it may force EPA to comply with regulatory deadlines for future Title VI complaints of Sierra Club, which 25 EPA asserts do not “have anything to do with the Title VI complaints filed by Plaintiffs.” Dkt. 100 at 6 n.2. As much as EPA may wish to the contrary, Sierra Club is a Plaintiff in this litigation and 26 filed one of the underlying complaints. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not “seek . . . judicial oversight of EPA’s entire Title VI program.” Id. EPA cannot deny Plaintiffs’ warranted relief narrowly tailored 27 solely to Plaintiffs and solely for the issuance or preliminary findings by claiming “wholesale programmatic review” at every turn. See also supra Section II. 28
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1 HEATHER M. LEWIS, State Bar No. 291933 Earthjustice 2 50 California Street San Francisco, CA 94111 3 [email protected] Tel: 415-217-2000
4 * Admitted pro hac vice 5 Counsel for Plaintiffs 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 I hereby certify that on the 5th day of May, 2017, I electronically transmitted the foregoing 3 document to the Clerk of Court using the ECF System for filing. 4 5
6 /s/ Suzanne Novak SUZANNE NOVAK 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 1 of 187
1 SUZANNE NOVAK,* New York Registration No. 292574 JONATHAN SMITH, California State Bar No. 286941 2 Earthjustice 48 Wall Street, 19th Floor 3 New York, NY 10005 [email protected] 4 [email protected] Tel: 212-845-4981/Fax: 212-918-1556 5 * Admitted pro hac vice
6 MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO,* New York Registration No. 2212579 Yale Law School 7 127 Wall Street New Haven, CT 06511 8 [email protected] Tel: (203) 432-2184 9 * Admitted pro hac vice
10 HEATHER M. LEWIS, State Bar No. 291933 Earthjustice 11 50 California Street San Francisco, CA 94111 12 [email protected] Tel: 415-217-2000/Fax: 415-217-2040 13 Counsel for Plaintiffs
14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA OAKLAND DIVISION 16 17 CALIFORNIANS FOR RENEWABLE ) 18 ENERGY, et al., ) Case No. 4:15-cv-03292-SBA ) 19 Plaintiffs, ) ) DECLARATION OF 20 v. ~ MARIANNE ENGELMAN LADO 21 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL ) PROTECTION AGENCY, et ano., ) 22 ) Defendants. ) 23 24 25 26 27 28 Declaration of Marianne Engelman Lado CARE v. EPA, Case No. 4:15-cv-03292-SBA 1 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 2 of 187
1 I, Marianne Engelman Lado, do hereby declare as follows:
2 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of New York and was admitted
3 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to appear pro hac vice in the above-
4 captioned matter on July 23, 2015. I am employed as a Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at Yale
5 Law School and I currently represent Plaintiffs in this action and the Title VI complaints underlying
6 this action. This Declaration is filed pursuant to Local Rule 7-5 together with Plaintiffs' Reply in
7 Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in
8 this declaration, and, if called upon to testify as a witness, I would competently do so.
9 2. On April 28, 2017 at 2:53 PM, I emailed a letter brief to Betsy Biffl of EPA's Office
10 of General Counsel and Lilian Dorka, Acting Director ofEPA's External Civil Rights Compliance
11 Office. The letter brief presented legal arguments to rebut EPA' s anticipated closure of the 2003
12 Title VI Complaint of Plaintiff Ashurst Bar/Smith Community Organization ("2003 ABSCO
13 Complaint"). In addition, the letter brief raised a new claim on behalf of ABSCO alleging that the
14 Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") violated Title VI in granting a
15 permit renewal on February 22, 2017 for the Stone's Throw Landfill-the same facility at issue in
16 the 2003 ABSCO Complaint. The letter brief requested that EPA consider the new claim as part of
17 its ongoing investigation or open·a new case. A true and correct copy of the letter brief is attached
18 hereto as Exhibit 1.
19 3. The same day, I received an email marked 4:44 PM from Lilian Dorka that attached
20 EPA's letter closing the investigation into the ABSCO Complaint. Ms. Dorka's cover email stated
21 that "we are in receipt of the new information, letter brief and complaint, that you submitted this
22 afternoon. We will review and evaluate this information per our Case Resolution Manual. You will
23 be receiving an Acknowledgement Letter early next week." A copy of the closure letter has already
24 been submitted to the Court by EPA. See Dkt. 101-1. A true and correct copy of Ms. Dorka's cover
25 email is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
26 4. EPA's resolution agreement with the New Mexico Environment Department 27 regarding the CARD Complaint states, " [o ]nee the terms of this Agreement are satisfied, EPA will
28 issue a letter documenting closure of its monitoring actions in [the CARD Complaint] and closure of Declaration of Marianne Engelman Lado CARE v. EPA, Case No. 4:15-cv-03292-SBA 2 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 3 of 187
1 the complaint as of the date of that letter." Dkt. 98-7 Ex. 3 at 13-14. As of the date of this
2 declaration, I have not received a copy of any letter from EPA closing the CARD Complaint or have 3 otherwise been notified that the CARD Complaint is closed.
4 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy ofEPA's EPA's dismissal
5 letter and investigative report regarding a Title VI complaint of Plaintiff Saint Francis Prayer Center
6 not at issue in this litigation ("Select Steel").
7 6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of EPA' s EPA' s dismissal
8 letter and investigative report regarding a Title VI complaint about landfill permitting in Alabama 9 not at issue in this litigation ("Yerkwood").
10
11 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 12
13 Dated: May 5, 2017 New Haven, Connecticut 14
15 Marianne Engelman Lado 16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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28 Declaration of Marianne Engelman Lado CARE v. EPA, Case No. 4:15-cv-03292-SBA 3 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 4 of 187
EXHIBIT 1 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 5 of 187
April 25, 2017
Lilian Dorka Acting Director External Civil Rights Compliance Office Betsy Biffl Civil Rights and Finance Law OFfice Office of General Counsel U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Headquarters William Jefferson Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Mail Code 1201A Washington, D.C. 20460
Re: Title VI Civil Rights Complaint and Petition for Relief or Sanction – Alabama Department of Environmental Management Permitting of Stone’s Throw Landfill in Tallapoosa County, Alabama, EPA File No. 6R-03-R4
Dear Director Dorka and Ms. Biffl:
This letter has two purposes. First, it follows up on a January 19, 2017 phone call regarding the status of the investigation into allegations raised in the 2003 complaint filed by the Ashurst
Bar/Smith Community Organization (“ABSCO,” or the “Complainant”) against the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management (“ADEM”) under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VI”). Though External Civil Rights Compliance Office (“ECRCO”) staff provided information about ECRCO’s investigation during the call, the opportunity for a full discussion was limited, and by emails dated January 19th and 23rd, counsel for complainants Leah Aden and
Marianne Engelman Lado asked for more information about the investigation and time to provide additional evidence. We have not received additional information, and we thus write without the benefit of greater clarity on the reasoning outlined during that call. In this letter, we aim to clarify two issues that arose during the January 19, 2017, including ECRCO’s interpretation of ABSCO’s disparate impact claim and a factual assumption made in favor of ADEM. We also raise a new Title
VI claim relating to the February 10, 2017 permit renewal of Stone’s Throw Landfill.
Based on our understanding, ECRCO’s analysis of ABSCO’s disparate impact claim seemed based on both a mistaken legal belief and an unfounded factual assumption. As to the legal question, there seemed to be a belief that a finding of discrimination depended on the existence of Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 6 of 187 an independent obligation under state law requiring ADEM to evaluate whether the permit sought by Stone’s Throw Landfill had a disparate impact. However, ADEM’s obligation to evaluate whether the permit had an unjustified disparate impact springs from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and EPA’s implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. Part 7. Of course, procedural irregularities such as the failure to conduct an analysis required by state law may be evidence of discrimination.
As to the factual assumption, ECRCO seems to be making an assumption that the Tallapoosa
County Commission (“TCC”) must have evaluated racial demographics in considering the relevant
Solid Waste Management Plan (SWMP) because it was legally obliged to do so. Clearly, an investigation should not assume compliance with the law. Ultimately, though, ABSCO claims that the permit had an unjustified disparate impact on the basis of race, and Complainants ask EPA to make a finding of discrimination or continue its investigation and—to that end—provide ABSCO with an opportunity to collect and submit further evidence.
Some of these questions are issues of fact: did the Tallappoosa County Commission in fact analyze whether granting or renewing permits to Stone’s Throw Landfill had a disparate impact on the basis of race? Is there any evidence for the assumption that ECRCO seems to be making?
Since our January conversation we have been trying to obtain County Commission Records and have submitted public disclosure requests to make sure complainants – and EPA – have the full record. In the interests of time, however, we are submitting this letter, and will supplement the record once we receive additional factual information.
Second, this letter raises a new Title VI claim against ADEM. On February 22, 2017,
ADEM granted an application to renew the Landfill’s permit until 2022—once again, without conducting a demographic analysis or otherwise considering whether the permit or its terms have an unjustified disproportionate impact on the basis of race in violation of the law. ADEM’s failure and disregard for the mandates of Title VI and EPA’s regulations is all the more egregious given that
ADEM is currently the subject of a civil rights complaint because of the adverse disparate impacts of this very facility, and that ABSCO raised concerns about civil rights compliance during the
2 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 7 of 187 permitting process. ABSCO filed comments on November 17, 2017, which stated, among other things:
ABSCO maintains that ADEM’s grant of [the] current application would violate civil rights laws, regulations, and guidance. Indeed, the Tallapoosa County Commission’s siting of the Landfill in the Ashurst Bar/Smith community and the various permits granted to the Landfill by ADEM have had and will continue to have an adverse, disproportionate, and unjustified impact on the 98% Black population that lives in closest proximity to the Landfill.
Attached please find ABSCO’s comments, attached as Exhibit A. We urge EPA to find that
ADEM’s decision to permit the Stone’s Throw Landfill in the heart of the historic African-
American community of Ashurst Bar/Smith, without adequate protections for the health and well- being of the community, will have an unjustified disparate impact on African Americans in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and EPA’s implementing regulations, 40 CFR
Part 7.
I. ABSCO’s Claim Arises Under Title VI Federal Law Which Prohibits Discrimination, Not State Law Requirements
A. The Complaint alleges that ADEM imposed racially disparate harms on the Ashurst Bar/Smith community.
ABSCO’s Complaint alleges that ADEM administered its solid waste permitting program in a manner that failed to prevent, and imposed, a wide range of racially disparate harms on the residents of the Ashurst Bar/Smith community. First, the Complaint alleges that by failing to consider socioeconomic factors before issuing a permit renewal approval for the Landfill, ADEM engaged in a method of administering its program that had a discriminatory effect; and second, that the operation of the permit under the permit granted by ADEM has a disproportionate and adverse impact on the basis of race.
EPA agreed to investigate these allegations in a September 7, 2005 letter accepting the
Complaint for investigation. EPA combined the two prongs of ABSCO’s disparate impact claim,
3 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 8 of 187 and articulated the allegations thus: “ADEM’s failure to require the Tallapoosa County Commission to properly use the siting factors in the EPA June 2003 Title VI Investigative Report has created a discriminatory effect for the African-American citizens since most of Tallapoosa County’s municipal solid waste landfills are located in their communities.” EPA agreed to investigate both
ADEM’s failure to require the Tallapoosa County Commission (“TCC”) to use siting factors that consider social and economic impacts (as EPA recommended in EPA’s June 2003 Title VI
Investigative Report (“Yerkwood Report)”); and the discriminatory effect that failure imposed on
African-Americans in the Ashurst Bar/Smith community.
In the “Yerkwood Report”, EPA presciently stated that “the potential failure to consider safety or socio-economic impacts could lead to ADEM-permitted landfills that have an adverse disparate impact” on groups protected by Title VI. Yerkwood Report at 97. Indeed; this is exactly what happened with the permitting of the Landfill in the Ashurst Bar/Smith community.
As a starting point, the Complaint raises two interlocking claims of racially disproportionate harms that rest on Title VI and EPA’s implementing regulations, and stem from ADEM’s failure to require TCC to consider SES factors:
First, the Complaint alleged that ADEM administered its solid waste management permitting program for the residents of Ashurst Bar/Smith in a manner that failed to prevent—and increased the risk of—racially disparate harms. This included ADEM’s failure to provide an adequate opportunity for comment, id. at 5; ADEM’s failure to ensure that TCC considered statutorily required SES factors in approving the Permit, id. ¶ 34; and ADEM’s failure to
“undertake additional and independent analyses of such impacts during the State permitting phase for a facility if necessary,” id. (quoting Yerkwood Report at 94).
Second, the Complaint alleged a broad range of racially disproportionate harms caused by the landfill, including water runoff, Letter from unnamed individual to redacted recipient ¶ 8 (Sept.
3, 2003) (attached hereto as Exhibit 2); heavy truck traffic and unsafe road conditions, id. at ¶¶ 10-
14; proliferation of insects, rodents, and wild dogs that may serve as carriers of disease, id. at ¶ 16;
4 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 9 of 187 contamination of wetlands, natural springs, and groundwater, id. at ¶¶ 17, 25; negative effects on gardens and livestock, id. at ¶ 18; high methane gas emissions, id. at ¶ 19; and displacement of landowners, id. at ¶ 28. The Complaint cited census data to demonstrate that these harms have a disparate effect on African-Americans, noting that the community that surrounds the Landfill was
98% Black and that the communities serviced by the Landfill were 74% white. The Complaint questioned ADEM’s racially disproportionate imposition of the burdens of waste disposal on the
Ashurst Bar/Smith community:
Tallapoosa County is a majority white county why is the African-American population bearing the burden for waste disposal in this county? The continued failure of the Commission to comply with Title VI in preventing a disparate impact on majority African-American communities (protected communities by EPA Part 7 regulation) only concerns us more that ADEM . . . are not performing its duties . . .
Id. at ¶ 32.
In sum, the Complaint contains claims under Title VI that ADEM failed to administer its solid waste management program in a manner that prevents racially discriminatory effects, and the occurrence of such racially discriminatory impacts.
B. Title VI prohibits methods of administration that fail to prevent racially disparate harms and state actions that cause racially disparate harms.
Title VI and EPA’s implementing regulations prohibit ADEM from administering its programs and siting facilities in a manner that has unjustified racially disproportionate adverse impacts. Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000d. Section 602 of Title VI authorizes each federal agency to promulgate implementing regulations or issue generalized administrative orders that specify how the agency will determine whether recipients of federal funds are engaging in racially discriminatory practices prohibited by
Title VI. Id. at § 2000d-1. Pursuant to these regulations, EPA promulgated implementing regulations for Title VI:
5 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 10 of 187
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program or activity which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program or activity with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.
40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2016) (emphasis added). EPA’s implementing regulations impose a number of requirements on recipients of EPA funds, including, first, recipients must not impose racially disproportionate harms, and second, recipients must not “defeat[] or substantially impair[]” the objectives of such programs or activities in a racially disproportionate manner.
Recent 2017 EPA guidance re-emphasized the prohibition against disparate impact. As
EPA’s own External Civil Rights Compliance Office Complaince Toolkit states, “EPA's regulations clearly state that prohibitions against discriminatory conduct, whether intentional or through facially neutral means that have a disparate impact, apply to a recipient, whether committed directly or through contractual or other arrangements.” U.S. EPA's External Civil Rights Compliance Office
Compliance Toolkit ("Toolkit"). EPA’s implementing regulations unequivocally apply to ADEM, a recipient of federal EPA funding as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c). See also S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 145 F.Supp.2d 446, 476 (D.N.J. 2001). Therefore, ADEM’s administration of its solid waste management program should be evaluated according to the racially disproportionate harms imposed on the residents of Ashurst Bar/Smith.
C. ADEM Has Title VI Obligations Regardless of Alabama State Law.
Compliance with state law requirements is not a defense to a Title VI complaint. Title VI imposes obligations under federal law and Title VI and EPA’s implementing regulations clearly contemplate that even if ADEM’s permitting process for the Landfill were compliant with Alabama law, EPA can still find ADEM in violation of Title VI. As discussed in Section I.B, the statutory language of Title VI prohibits discrimination as defined by federal law, and nothing in Title VI requires the Complainant to demonstrate a violation of state law requirements, such as those enumerated in the Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”) and its implementing regulations, to prove a
Title VI violation. Nothing in Title VI allows ADEM to invoke its compliance with state law
6 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 11 of 187 requirements as a defense to a Title VI complaint. In fact, EPA’s implementing regulations for Title
VI, reproduced in Section I.B, clearly prohibit state actions that are racially discriminatory even if they were otherwise consistent with state law “criteria or methods of administ[ration]”. 40 C.F.R. §
7.35(b) (2016).
EPA’s focus on state procedures—namely, ADEM and TCC’s establishment of state and local SWDAs in the early 1990s—undermines Title VI in two ways. First, the permit modification challenged in the Complaint took place in 2003, about a decade after TCC and ADEM had established their SWMPs. Allowing ADEM to defend itself against a Title VI claim by pointing to a causally and temporally distant SWMP process ignores the essence of the Complaint: the unbearable adverse effects of the Landfill that the Ashurst Bar/Smith community endures every day.
Second, EPA’s interpretation is inconsistent with the “general . . . application and national . .
. scope” of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963). This framework was established for a remedial purpose, because “it ha[d] become increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national legislation is required to meet a national need.” Id. As the United
States Commission on Civil Rights noted in a 1963 report that helped drive contemporary legislative efforts, many states were complicit in discrimination across a wide array of government functions including education, employment, housing, the administration of justice, and the provision of health facilities and services. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Civil Rights ’93: 1963
Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights (1963). Against this backdrop, Title VI was designed to prohibit such discrimination “wherever Federal funds go to a State agency which engages in racial discrimination” and “insure the uniformity and permanence to the nondiscrimination policy.” 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Simply, Title VI applies uniformly to discriminatory actions throughout the United States, regardless of whether states approve such actions.
7 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 12 of 187
For these reasons, we urge EPA to center its investigation on the discriminatory harms alleged in the Complaint and ADEM’s abject failure to administer its solid waste permitting program in a manner that prevents or mitigates such harms.
D. ADEM has plenary authority over waste permitting in Alabama, vesting ADEM with the authority to secure Title VI compliance in Alabama.
ADEM has consistently relied on Alabama state law to disclaim authority over the
Tallapoosa County Commission’s (TCC) siting decisions relating to landfill permitting and absolve itself of its Title VI obligations. In particular, ADEM has consistently averred that the agency has no authority to consider socioeconomic factors, including disparate racial impacts, when making permit decisions. For example, in its response to comments for the February 22, 2017 permit renewal, ADEM stated that “it does not site landfills, the local host government approves siting . . . as did the Tallapoosa County Commission . . . . ADEM . . . only permits the operation of landfills in the State.” Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., Summation of Comments Received and Response-to-
Comments: Proposed Stone’s Throw Landfill Renewal Permit 62-11, at 6 (Feb. 10, 2017). ADEM also stated, “the governing body of a county or municipality has the responsibility and authority to assure the proper management of solid wastes generated in its jurisdiction in accordance with its
Solid Waste Management Plan.” Id. at 12.
It appears that ADEM’s statements may be an attempt to claim that TCC is the only state actor with Title VI obligations relating to the Landfill. However, ADEM’s limited view of its authority has no reasonable basis in Alabama law. ADEM holds plenary authority over an integrated solid waste disposal planning and permitting program that regulates nearly every aspect of solid waste disposal in Alabama. The SWDA makes clear that Alabama does not bifurcate duties relating to solid waste management between the state and local governing bodies. Rather, SWDA expresses a “legislative purpose” of “comprehensive local, regional, and state planning,” Ala. Code
§ 22-27-41, and a “legislative intent” “to develop an integrated system” in which the state and local
8 Case 4:15-cv-03292-SBA Document 102-1 Filed 05/05/17 Page 13 of 187 governing bodies work together to manage waste, id. § 22-27-42. Within this framework, ADEM holds broad supervisory powers: