Epilogue the LEGACY of ANCIENT and MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT for MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY by Carrie-Ann Biondi
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Epilogue THE LEGACY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT FOR MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY by Carrie-Ann Biondi Many currents from ancient and medieval legal thought still direct the flow of conversation in modern legal philosophy. Recent centuries have deepened and developed in more sophisticated ways legal concepts and controversies that had their origins in ancient Greece, Rome, and the Near East and became transmuted during the medieval period through the influence of the Abraha- mic faiths. A brief survey of some central legal concepts discussed in this vol- ume—such as natural or divine law versus positive law, reason and rule of law, equity, and cosmopolitan universal law—reveals a historical current that has continued through modern and contemporary legal philosophy. The dramatically depicted tension between Antigone’s higher law and Cre- on’s positive law (see Chapter 1 of this volume) that only sharpened in the re- peated confrontations between Socrates and various Sophists (see Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume), continued to play out most prominently in twentieth- century debates between legal positivists and moral realists. Located at the heart of the decades-long exchange between preeminent legal positivists H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992), Hans Kelsen (1881–1973), and Joseph Raz (b. 1939) and their crit- ics—such as John Finnis (b. 1940), Lon Fuller (1902–1978), and Ronald Dwor- kin (1931–2013)—are the “separability thesis” and the source of law’s authority. The separability thesis separates claims about the moral evaluation of law from claims about its legal validity. Laws are valid if they “were enacted in proper form, clear in meaning, and satisfied all the acknowledged criteria of validity of a system,” and as valid they must be obeyed, even if they are judged by individuals to be “morally iniquitous” (Hart 1961, 203). Picking and choosing which laws to obey or reject on moral grounds—which is how positivists view the implica- tions of natural law theory—would create enormous social and political upheav- al. Hart is influenced here by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), and John Austin (1790–1859), who all share a deep fear of anarchy. Glimmers of legal positivism are present throughout the history of legal thought, but it did not garner a strong intellectual foothold until modern legal philosophy, when prominent and influential thinkers theorized about the modern state. Le- gal positivism thus grew apace with the rise and crystallization of the Westpha- lian state system and the dominance of territorially large, multicultural states.1 1 See Volume 8, Chapter 6 of this Treatise, esp. 174. 378 TREATISE, 6 - FROM THE ANCIENT GREEKS TO THE SCHOLASTICS Carving out a morally tolerant legal space in these political entities facilitated the popularity of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) “harm principle” that requires individuals to be left alone unless their actions would cause harm to others (see Mill 1985, chap. 1). The harm principle, famously explored in Joel Feinberg’s landmark Harm to Others (Feinberg 1984), has been a linchpin of Western legal and political thought for over 150 years.2 The source of legal authority also divides legal positivists and their moral- ist critics. Positivists anchor authority in the sovereignty of law per se, while moralists locate it in some higher-level normative principles, be it universal morality, abstract principles of political morality, or religious ethics. This issue is deeply connected to the medieval conflict between Thomas Aquinas’s (ca. 1226–1274) intellectualism and William of Ockham’s (1280–1347) voluntarist critique of Aquinas, which later influenced Jean Bodin (1530–1546) (see Chap- ter 13 of this volume). Intellectualism holds that the authority of law resides in its being consonant with a higher moral law, which is apprehended and jus- tified by reason. Voluntarism holds, instead, that legal authority flows from a sovereign’s will, whether that sovereign is God, a king, or the people. This debate arises prominently in sixteenth-century scholastic debates among Do- minicans and Jesuits over the proper role of reason and will in law’s authority (see Chapter 14 of this volume), and again in muted form in the rival political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (1632–1704) (see Chapter 8, 217–8, and Chapter 5, 130, respectively, in this volume). The positivist juris- prudence of John Austin follows directly on Hobbes’s and Bentham’s “com- mand theory” of law, which explained that the commands issued by a sover- eign correlatively oblige citizens to obey the law.3 H. L. A. Hart criticizes but then develops Austin’s insight about commands in the direction of authority as distinct from mere power.4 Raz (1986, chap. 2) further develops the will theory by introducing “content-independent reasons” and explains how law as such provides “authoritative reasons” (Raz 1979) for obedience.5 Various moral (especially natural law) theorists have responded to the posi- tivists’ emphasis on legal validity and the authority of law per se with a call for legal legitimacy on grounds of justice and morality apprehended through reason. Broadly speaking, there are two types of natural law theory in conflict with legal positivism: substantive natural law (held by Aquinas and Finnis; see Chapter 12 of this volume) and procedural natural law (held by John Duns 2 See Riley in Volume 10, Chapter 15 of this Treatise for further discussion of Mill’s philoso- phy of law, and Feinberg (1984, 5) for the compatibility of his theory with legal positivism. 3 See Austin 1967. See Riley in Volume 10, Chapter 3 of this Treatise on the legal philosophy of Hobbes; and Lobban in Volume 8, Chapter 6 of this Treatise on the legal theories of Bentham and Austin. 4 See Hart 1961. See Postema in Volume 11, Chapter 7 of this Treatise on Hart’s critical posi- tivism. 5 See Postema in Volume 11, Chapter 8 of this Treatise on Raz’s theory of law. EPILOGUE 379 Scotus [1266–1308] and Fuller; see Chapter 13 of this volume). Substantive theories aim directly at promoting certain values and guiding a citizenry to- ward the good in relation to a specific set of moral principles, while proce- dural natural law theories aim at devising morally just legal processes consis- tently with natural law. As a procedural natural law theorist, Fuller maintains that for something to count as law, it must meet eight “desiderata” (e.g., be- ing publicly promulgated, not retroactive, etc.), which comprise “the internal morality of law” limiting “the kinds of substantive aims that may be achieved through legal rules” (Fuller 1964, 4, 38–9).6 These eight desiderata are com- patible with various different substantive moral theories, such as Thomism or Aristotelian eudaimonism. Substantive types of natural law can be sub-divided further between theistic and naturalistic theories, though most modern natu- ral law theories have been naturalistic rather than theistic (with the exception of neo-scholastic theories, such as those of Jacques Maritain [1882–1973] and Yves Simon [1903–1961]). Aquinas deliberately fuses Aristotelian natural te- leology with Catholic theology (see Chapter 12 of this volume), and both Ar- istotle and Aquinas have inspired many early modern natural law theorists, including Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), Gott- fried Leibniz (1646–1716), and Christian Wolff (1769–1754).7 The influence is even more direct in recent natural law theorists such as John Finnis (1980).8 According to Finnis, we must look to what is good for human beings in order to create a legal system that addresses law’s genuine purpose. Among the “ba- sic goods” of human life that law should facilitate are life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship/sociability, practical reasonableness, and “re- ligion” (Finnis 1980, chaps. 1 and 4). Natural law theorists of all varieties ap- peal to moral principles in order to drive a wedge between immoral positive laws and obligation, citing a “higher” moral authority as the justification for civil disobedience. They thus resist Bentham’s dictum “to obey punctually; to censure freely” (Bentham 1838, 230)—they censure freely, to be sure, but obey punctually only if the injustice falls beneath a morally specified threshold. It should be noted that the legal validity/legitimacy split is a somewhat exagger- ated dichotomy. Many of the legal philosophers discussed here wrestle (with varying degrees of success) with integrating concerns of stability and justice in legal systems. While not a self-identified natural law theorist, Dworkin has been one of legal positivism’s sharpest critics. His distinctive “interpretivist” approach to adjudication calls in “hard cases” for judges to draw upon the “best interpreta- 6 See Postema in Volume 11, Chapter 4 of this Treatise for Fuller’s theory of law. 7 See Scattola in Volume 9, Chapter 1, 15–41 of this Treatise for an overview of modern Eu- ropean natural law philosophers; and see also Riley in Volume 10, Chapters. 2, 5, and 6 of this Treatise for fuller discussion of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Leibniz. 8 See Postema in Volume 11, Chapter 12, 547–62 of this Treatise on the legal theory of Finnis. 380 TREATISE, 6 - FROM THE ANCIENT GREEKS TO THE SCHOLASTICS tion” of “principles of political morality,” which he argues constitute an im- portant part of a state’s legal system that is wider than positive law (Dworkin 1977, 1986). Dworkin holds that law properly embodies integrity as a substan- tive value of political morality, which explains why governmental directives have normative force. What Dworkin shares with natural law theorists is their dissatisfaction with settling for the authority of the positive law by itself, as well as their reliance on reason to make moral determinations that ensure that legal systems move toward moral goodness and satisfy the requirements of jus- tice.9 The role of reason in law as a bulwark against majoritarian prejudices or the whims of dictators derives from the “rational order” or “right reason” of ancient Greek thought (see Chapters 2–5 of this volume).