UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Transitional Justice And
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Matthew B. Murphy Committee in charge: Professor Ellen Comisso, Chair Professor Richard Arneson Professor Harry Hirsch Professor Patrick Patterson Professor Phil Roeder 2012 Copyright Matthew B. Murphy, 2012 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Matthew B. Murphy is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: _______________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ Chair University of California, San Diego 2012 iii DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to Ellen Comisso, in recognition that her advice, guidance, and patience went above and beyond the call of duty, and to my wife and daughter, for their love and encouragement over so many years. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page……………………………………………………………… iii Dedication………………………………………………………………….. iv Table of Contents………………………………………………………….. v List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………. viii List of Figures……………………………………………………………… x List of Tables………………………………………………………………. xi Vita…………………………………………………………………………. xii Abstract…………………………………………………………………….. xiii Introduction………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter 1: Theories, Models, and Arguments about Transitional Justice…. 8 1.1 The Question……………………………………………….. 8 1.2 Answers……………………………………………………. 10 1.3 Transitional Justice………………………………………… 13 1.4 Democratic Consolidation…………………………………. 22 1.5 Research Design and Methodology……………………....... 29 1.5.1 Cases……………………………………………………….. 31 1.5.2 Operationalizing Independent Variables………………….... 34 Chapter 2: Transitional Criminal Justice: Trials in Germany ……………… 43 2.1 Introduction………………………………………………… 43 2.2 Initial Consensus…………………………………………… 45 2.2.1 Trials in the late GDR……………………………………… 46 2.2.2 Unification Treaty………………………………………….. 48 2.3 Timing – Early and Protracted Prosecution………………... 50 2.4 High Intensity of Criminal Trials…………………………... 51 2.5 Criteria for Judging the Past……………………………….. 59 2.5.1 Criteria for Judging Border Guards………………………... 62 2.5.2 Criteria for Judging GDR Leaders…………………………. 69 2.6 Institutional Capacity………………………………………. 77 2.7 Decentralized and Closely Monitored Prosecution………… 80 2.8 Effects: Exclusion, Education, Symbolism………………… 81 Chapter 3: Transitional Criminal Justice: Trials in Poland………………… 84 v 3.1 Introduction………………………………………………… 84 3.2 Initial Contestation…………………………………………. 87 3.2.1 The Negotiated Transition and the “Thick Line”…………... 87 3.3 Timing – Early and Protracted Prosecution………………… 90 3.4 Low Intensity of Criminal Trials…………………………… 93 3.4.1 Intensity and Effects……………………………………….. 94 3.5 Criteria for Judging the Past………………………………... 96 3.5.1 Parliamentary Prosecution………………………………….. 98 3.5.2 Conventional Prosecutions…………………………………. 100 3.6 Institutional Capacity………………………………………. 104 3.7 Mixed Centralization and Decentralization………………… 112 3.8 Effects: Exclusion, Education, Symbolism………………… 112 Chapter 4: Transitional Justice Screening in Germany – Parliaments……... 116 4.1 Introduction………………………………………………… 116 4.2 Political Foundations of Screening, 1989-90 ……………… 117 4.3 Institutional Foundations of Screening – Unification Treaty and Stasi Files Law……………. 121 4.4 Screening of Elected Officials……………………………... 126 4.4.1 Initial Consensus on MP Screening………………………... 130 4.4.2 Timing ……………………………………………………… 131 4.4.3 Intensity…………………………………………………….. 133 4.4.4 Criteria for Evaluation……………………………………... 137 4.4.5 Strong Institutional Capacity………………………………. 144 4.4.6 Mixed Centralization and Decentralization………………... 146 4.5 Effects: Exclusion, Education, Symbolism………………… 148 Chapter 5: Public Sector Screening in Germany…………………………… 151 5.1 Introduction………………………………………………… 151 5.2 Public Sector Screening……………………………………. 152 5.3 Initial Consensus…………………………………………… 160 5.4 Timing ……………………………………………………... 161 5.5 Intensity……………………………………………………. 163 5.6 Criteria for Evaluation……………………………………… 168 5.6.1 Rigid vs. Flexible Criteria…………………………………. 170 5.6.2 Patterns of Criteria: Early vs. Late………………………… 171 5.6.3 Patterns of Criteria: Sectoral Variations…………………… 173 5.6.4 Patterns of Criteria: Summary……………………………... 175 5.7 Variable Institutional Capacity…………………………….. 176 5.9 Decentralized Public Sector Screening…………………….. 181 5.10 Effects: Exclusion, Education, Symbolism………………… 183 Chapter 6: Early Screening in Poland ……………………………………… 186 6.1 Introduction………………………………………………… 186 6.2 The Early Transitional Period, 1989-1991………………… 187 vi 6.3 Political/Institutional Context……………………………… 192 6.4 Failed Lustration in 1992 – The Macierewicz List………… 193 6.4.1 Initial Contestation on Screening………………………….. 196 6.4.2 Timing……………………………………………………… 199 6.4.3 Intensity……………………………………………………. 200 6.4.4 Criteria for Evaluation……………………………………... 201 6.4.5 Weak Institutional Capacity……………………………….. 203 6.4.6 Centralized Screening ……………………………………… 205 6.5 Effects: Exclusion, Education, Symbolism………………… 205 Chapter 7: Screening in Poland – The Lustration Laws…………………… 207 7.1 Introduction………………………………………………… 207 7.2 The Lustration Laws, 1997-2002………………………….. 208 7.2.1 Continued Contestation over Lustration…………………… 214 7.2.2 Timing……………………………………………………… 219 7.2.3 Intensity……………………………………………………. 220 7.2.4 Criteria for Evaluation……………………………………... 222 7.2.5 Institutional Capacity………………………………………. 225 7.2.6 Centralized Lustration……………………………………… 231 7.3 Effects: Exclusion, Education, Symbolism………………… 232 Chapter 8: Comparisons and Conclusions…………………………………. 236 8.1 Overview…………………………………………………… 236 8.2 Initial Consensus/Contestation…………………………….. 237 8.3 Timing……………………………………………………… 239 8.4 Intensity……………………………………………………. 240 8.5 Criteria……………………………………………………... 247 8.6 Institutional Capacity……………………………………… 254 8.7 Centralization/Decentralization……………………………. 259 8.8 TJ Effects – Intensity and Process…………………………. 261 8.9 Democratic Consolidation…………………………………. 271 8.10 Implications………………………………………………… 276 8.11 Further Research…………………………………………… 279 Bibliography……………………………………………………………….. 282 vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AWS Solidarity Electoral Action BAG Federal Labor Court Be Berlin BGH Federal Court of Justice (Supreme Court) Brand Brandenburg BStU Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR BVerfG Federal Constitutional Court CDU Christian Democratic Union ChD Christian Democracy Party Drs Publication FRG Federal Republic of Germany GDR German Democratic Republic GG Basic Law (German Constitution) HM Official Collaborator IM Unofficial Collaborator IPN National Remembrance Institute KLD Liberal Democratic Congress KPN Confederation for Independent Poland LAG State Labor Court LG State Court LPR League of Polish Families LStU State Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Services of the former GDR MfN Ministry for State Security (East Germany) MW Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania NVR National Defense Council (East Germany) PC Center Alliance PDS Party of Democratic Socialism PL Peasant Alliance POC Center Civic Alliance PP Plenary Protocol PSL Polish People’s Party PZPR Polish United Workers Party RIP Public Interest Commissioner SA Saxony-Anhalt Sax Saxony SB Security Service (Poland) SED Socialist Unity Party SLD Democratic Left Alliance SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany Stasi Ministry for State Security (East Germany) StUG Stasi Records Law viii Thur Thuringia TJ Transitional Justice UD Democratic Union UW Freedom Union VerfG Constitutional Court (State Level) WAK Catholic Electoral Action WRON Military Council of National Salvation ZChN Christian Democratic Union ZERV Central Investigative Group for Regime and Unification Criminality ix LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Primary and Peripheral Effects of TJ Policies…………………. 18 Figure 1.2: Post-communist Democracy scores…………………………….. 24 Figure 1.3: Democracy Scores – States with TJ……………………………. 25 Figure 1.4: Intensity of Criminal Trials and Screening…………………….. 36 Figure 5.1: Public Sector Screening………………………………………… 154 Figure 7.1: Lustration……………………………………………………….. 211 x LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Criminal Investigations and Indictments, by Land……………… 53 Table 2.2: Distribution of Defendants by Crime and by Region, 1991-2003.. 55 Table 2.3: Outcomes of German TJ trials, 2003…………………………….. 56 Table 4.1: Screening of Elected Officials - Intensity, Exposures, Resignations…………………………………………………………. 129 Table 4.2: Overview of Independent Variables, FRG and New Lander…….. 129 Table 5.1: BStU Screening & Dismissal of Public Employees, by Land, 1990-1997………………………………………………….. 155 Table 5.2: Overview of Independent Variables, FRG and New Länder…….. 159 Table 6.1: Sejm Seat Distribution & Governing Coalition (Dec 1991-June 1992)………………………………………………… 198 Table 7.1: Positive (Verified) Lustration Declarations, from Monitor Polski.. 212 Table 7.2: False Lustration Declarations, from Monitor Polski……………… 212 Table 7.3: Overview of Independent Variables, Polish Lustration Policies….. 214 Table 7.4: Sejm Seat Distribution & Governing Coalition, 1993-1997………. 216 Table 7.5: 1997 Sejm Electoral Results……………………………………….. 218 Table 7.6: 2001 Sejm electoral results…………………………………………