Issue No. 1302 16 February 2018 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Feature Item
“Navigating Dangerous Pathways: A Pragmatic Approach to U.S.-Russian Relations and Strategic Stability”. Written by James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine, published by the Center for a New American Security; January 30, 2018 https://www.belfercenter.org/node/103186 The ongoing integration of new technologies by U.S. and Russian militaries – particularly cyber, space, long-range strike, missile defenses, autonomous systems, and big data analytics – is creating new and growing strains on strategic stability between these two great powers. The inherent difficulty of managing these strains is exacerbated by the overall deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations. A previous report offered a framework for understanding the strains on strategic stability in this context of rapid technological change and difficult U.S.-Russian relations. This framework described the linked and changing dynamics of three interrelated pathways to crisis or conflict: (1) the future course of U.S.- Russian relations; (2) potential slippery slopes from peacetime to crisis and conflict; and (3) the possibility that conflict could escalate to attacks against each other’s homeland and even nuclear war. This report builds on that framework by offering concrete recommendations for managing each of the three pathways. A key insight that arose from earlier work is that stabilizing U.S.-Russian relations requires actions along each of the three pathways, conducted in parallel. Shaping and managing the overall relationship is fundamentally important. But whatever the course of U.S.-Russian relations in the future, there will remain a possibility (one, we argue, that is growing over time) of sliding into crisis and even armed conflict. Moreover, if a crisis or conflict does occur, there is a possibility (also growing over time) that escalation to strategic attack could occur. Whatever the course of U.S.-Russian relations in the future, there will remain a possibility (one, we argue, that is growing over time) of sliding into crisis and even armed conflict. The previous study examined how new technologies may create new challenges for managing one or more of the three pathways. To take but one example, offensive cyber operations are a critical tool for “gray-zone” efforts such as the Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which clearly had a major impact on U.S.-Russian relations. In addition, because of their potential for creating disruptive or destructive effects without directly producing casualties and potentially with delayed attribution, cyberattacks on weapons systems and supporting infrastructure are likely to be extremely attractive early moves in any conflict. In addition, if offensive cyber capabilities are themselves somewhat vulnerable, there may be substantial incentives to “go early” and “go big” in cyberspace. To the extent that either side feared that the other could use cyber capabilities to delay or deny its non- nuclear capabilities, incentives to use nuclear weapons early would rise; fears that the other side’s cyber capabilities could degrade or deny a nuclear second strike could create “use-or-lose” incentives that would drive early use of nuclear weapons and seriously increase risks of a nuclear exchange. Indeed, even the discovery of an adversary cyber implant in one side’s nuclear strike systems – and uncertainty about its effects or worries that there may be undiscovered others – could increase use-or-lose pressures. This example is emblematic of dynamics arising from technological advancements in space, long-range strike, missile defenses, autonomous systems, and big data analytics. This report reiterates some of the context regarding each of the three pathways but focuses primarily on concrete recommendations for managing them. The aim is to help shape the ongoing debate regarding U.S.-Russian relations and guide actions affecting U.S. nuclear posture, ballistic missile defenses, cyber deterrence, and space resilience. The recommendations also address the American role in NATO and NATO-Russian relations, both of which are of critical importance to all three pathways.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 2
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOE Requests More Money for Nuke Weapons Trump Proposes Bigger Budget for Pentagon, Nuclear Arsenal USAF to Retire B-1, B-2 in Early 2030s as B-21 Comes On-Line New Nuclear Warheads: Legislative Provisions US COUNTER-WMD Top Admiral: US Must Bolster Missile Defense to Counter North Korea Airmen Train for Nuclear, Chemical Contamination; Crescent Moon Exercise Takes Place in North ‘Never Been More Difficult’ to Keep Terror Groups from Getting WMD MDA $9.9 Billion Budget Request Geared to Address North Korean Threat US ARMS CONTROL A Ticking Clock: Rose Gottemoeller, Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Discusses Arms Control US Urges Russia to Honor 1987 Arms Pact, Warns of Collapse Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to U.S. Nuclear Stance ASIA/PACIFIC Japan's Plutonium Glut Casts a Shadow on Renewed Nuclear Deal Japan and Norway Agree to Jointly Work against North Korea’s Nuclear Program U.S. Intelligence Chief Says North Korea 'Decision Time' Is Near Washington Is Willing to Talk with North Korea, the South’s President Says EUROPE/RUSSIA U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis to Press European Allies on Military Spending Russian Military Test Fires New Upgraded Air Defense Missile — Media Belgium Seeks to Help Overcome Difficulties in Russia’s Relations with EU and NATO Russian Nuclear Weapons Engineers Caught • Minting Blockchange with Supercomputer MIDDLE EAST In U.S., Israel-Syria Border Clash Triggers New War over Iran Nuclear Deal Iran Just Revealed Nuclear Ballistic Missiles That Are Similar to North Korea’s West Used Lizards to Spy on Iran's Nuclear Program – Military Official With Russia's Help, Arab States Speeding up Nuclear Arms Race INDIA/PAKISTAN India-Pakistan, India-China Ties to Worsen, Says Report by US intelligence Chief Pakistan Developing New Types of Nuclear Weapons: US COMMENTARY The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Future of the Indo-Pacific Military Balance How to Keep US Missile Defense on the Right Track Why China Will Go Full Steam Ahead in the Nuclear Arms Race Trump's Nuclear Posture Review and China: No Way Forward? The Discrimination Problem: Why Putting Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons on Submarines Is So Dangerous Nuclear Posturing
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 3
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
US NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Albuquerque Journal (Albuquerque, N.M.) DOE Requests More Money for Nuke Weapons By Michael Coleman February 12, 2018 The White House is rolling out President Donald Trump’s FY 2019 budget request today and it would funnel $2 billion more to the agency in charge of nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy released topline budget numbers today and they show that the National Nuclear Security Administration would get $15.1 billion next year, an extra $2.2 billion compared to current year spending. Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico are overseen by the NNSA. The Journal wrote about what the budget and recently released Nuclear Posture Review could mean for New Mexico’s labs Sunday. The budget released today is just a wish list of the administration. The two-year spending deal approved by Congress last week does not necessarily reflect the president’s requests. We’ll have more after the DOE press briefing on the budget at 1 p.m. MT. Here’s the breakdown for NNSA that DOE provided moments ago: $11B for Weapons Activities, $1.8B above FY 2017 Enacted, to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile, to continue the nuclear modernization program, and to modernize NNSA’s nuclear security infrastructure. $1.9B for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, $17M below FY 2017 Enacted, to address the entire nuclear threat spectrum by preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, countering efforts to acquire such weapons or materials, and responding to nuclear or radiological incidents. The Budget Request also includes $220M to continue the orderly and safe closure of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and $59M to pursue the proven dilute and dispose technology. $1.8B for Naval Reactors, an increase of $369M from FY 2017 Enacted, to support the current fleet and create the future fleet. https://www.abqjournal.com/1132681/doe-releases-nuke-weapons-budget-request.html Return to top
Reuters (New York, N.Y.) Trump Proposes Bigger Budget for Pentagon, Nuclear Arsenal By Mike Stone February 12, 2018 WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump has proposed a military budget that is the largest since 2011 and focused on beefing up the country’s nuclear defenses and countering the growing strength of China and Russia.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 4
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
The proposal, part of Trump’s budget request for the U.S. government, would provide the Pentagon $617 billion and an additional $69 billion to fund ongoing wars in fiscal year 2019. That is $74 billion more than in the budget for the previous fiscal year. Critics, however, say that the proposed spending increase falls short of what Trump had promised during the 2016 presidential campaign, when he frequently depicted the U.S. military as underfunded. The budget documents specifically highlighted “reversing the erosion of the U.S. military advantage in relation to China and Russia,” which was a focal point of the National Defense Strategy unveiled by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis in January. Funds for the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal also increased. On top of the Pentagon’s $686 billion budget request was an additional $30 billion for non-defense agencies including the Department of Energy, which maintains the country’s nuclear weapons. The budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous wing of the Department of Energy, was $15.09 billion, an increase of nearly $1.2 billion from last year’s proposal. The Department of Energy said the money was needed to modernize and restore the country’s nuclear weapons complex. The Trump administration has called for an expansion of the U.S. low- yield nuclear weapons capability. The budget request must be passed by Congress, which controls federal purse strings and rarely enacts presidential budgets. Mackenzie Eaglen, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, said “this modest year-on-year increase will not allow the military to pursue anything resembling a rebuild along the lines touted by candidate Trump on the campaign trail to rapidly grow the Army, build a 350-ship Navy, and increase the combat Air Force.” CONCERNS ABOUT CUTS The Pentagon’s budget request earmarks $10.7 billion for the purchase of 77 F-35 fighter jets made by Lockheed Martin Co (LMT.N) as well as $2 billion to purchase 24 Boeing Co (BA.N) F-18 Super Hornets. The Air Force said it decided against pursuing a competition to replace its Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) battlefield management and control aircraft which involved Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman (NOC.N). Instead, the Air Force will look at a different array of sensors to track information from the battlefield. The budget request for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the agency tasked with protecting the country from missile attacks, was $9.9 billion, which is up from the $7.8 billion funding request for fiscal 2018. Last year, Reuters reported the Pentagon was evaluating the West Coast for new anti-missile defenses which would likely include the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti- ballistic missile system similar to those deployed in South Korea to protect against a potential North Korean attack. On Monday, Gary Pennett, MDA’s director of operations, told reporters at the Pentagon there was no funding in fiscal 2019 or currently a plan to install THAAD on the West Coast.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 5
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding levels were in line with industry expectations including building three DDG-51 destroyers for $5.2 billion. Destroyers are built by General Dynamics Corp (GD.N) and Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII.N). The U.S. Army’s request earmarks funds to modernize 135 Abrams tanks. The 2018 budget requested the modernization of 56 of the General Dynamics-made vehicles. As proposed spending for the Pentagon grew, 151 retired three- and four-star generals voiced their concerns on Monday about cuts to diplomacy and development spending and unfilled senior diplomatic positions. “Today’s crises do not have military solutions alone,” the generals said in a letter to congressional leaders, opposing cuts in the international affairs budget. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-defense/trump-proposes-bigger-budget-for- pentagon-nuclear-arsenal-idUSKBN1FW1YL Return to top
Air Force Magazine (Arlington, Va.) USAF to Retire B-1, B-2 in Early 2030s as B-21 Comes On-Line By John A. Tirpak February 11, 2018 With the Fiscal 2019 budget request, the Air Force is beginning an overhaul of its bomber fleet, planning to extend the B-52 beyond 90 years of service while retiring its younger B-1s and B-2s earlier than planned, in the early 2030s, as it brings on stealthy new B-21 aircraft. The Air Force is eyeing a bomber fleet of roughly 175 aircraft overall, although service officials said that number could go up with more generous budgets. The younger bombers would be retired early because the Air Force believes it must live with a bomber enterprise manpower footprint that is not much larger than it is now, meaning the new B- 21 must replace—and not be additive to—much of the existing bomber fleet. The Air Force had previously planned to operate the B-1 and B-52 until 2040, and the B-2 to 2058. In judging which older bombers to retain, USAF chose the B-52 over its younger stablemates because of the aircraft’s versatile conventional payload, comparatively lower maintenance needs and the ability to carry the new Long Range Standoff cruise missile, or LRSO. The B-1, meanwhile, is labor-intensive and treaty-prohibited from carrying cruise missiles, and the B-2 fleet, at only 20 aircraft, is considered too expensive per airplane to retain beyond the early 2030s. The Fiscal 2019 budget request will include the first monies necessary to begin equipping the B-52 fleet with new engines that will reduce its maintenance needs, extend its range and loiter time, and allow the aircraft to climb faster to cruising altitude. It would be retained into the 2050s. The Air Force envisions retaining all existing bomber bases, swapping out B-1 and B-2 aircraft as B- 21s become available. Very substantial military construction funds will be needed to accommodate the new aircraft, however. The revelations were contained in USAF’s “Bomber Vector,” (previously called the “Bomber Roadmap”) which has been in development for several years and plans the phase-in of the B-21, the phase-out of older aircraft, and the timing and scope of upgrades and new munitions needed for the bomber enterprise. A draft of the Bomber Vector was obtained by Air Force Magazine. The Air
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 6
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Force plans to release a synopsis of the Vector along with its FY ’19 budget request supporting materials on Monday. The Bomber Vector was to have been released last September at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference. It had been briefed to members of Congress by Global Strike Command chief Gen. Robin Rand during the summer months, and Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein announced at an AFA event in July that it would soon be released publicly. However, service leaders decided to wait to withhold it until after release of the Nuclear Posture Review and final decisions on the Fiscal ’19 budget request. The NPR was released in early February, validating the need for the LRSO and retaining the B-52 as its launch platform for the near future. The B-21 will also be able to carry the LRSO, and the NPR said the missile will ensure the US continues to have a means to strike any target on the globe even after adversary technological advances whittle down the B-21’s stealthiness in the decades to come. The draft version of the Vector said the B-2 would be retired “no later than 2032” and the B-1 “no later than 2036,” although service officials said those dates may have shifted somewhat. “Included in the decision calculus to retire the B-1 and the B-2,” the service said in the draft, is the need to try to maintain a “force-neutral manning structure,” and to do it, it must “harvest manpower billets from the retiring platforms.” Even so, the service sees growth in the bomber fleet from 157 aircraft today to at least 175, in order to provide the capability required by regional commanders, and so “some manpower growth is inevitable." Keeping all existing fleets and adding the B-21 to them—for a total of 257 aircraft—“is neither fiscally realistic nor desirable,” USAF said in the Vector draft, adding that Global Strike Command “must pursue the optimal bomber force mix.” Simply shaving down the numbers of each type isn’t effective, the paper said, since it would require keeping all four logistical trains in place, each with their separate people, parts, and vendors. The bomber force today numbers 10,500 operations and maintenance manpower authorizations. “Enterprise-wide reallocation of money, facilities, and other resources are necessary to facilitate B- 21 fielding and ensure the Air Force has a capable and effective future bomber force,” USAF said in the paper. It pegged the cost of modernizing the B-1 and B-2 to keep them capable to 2050 at $38.5 billion, “which is enough money to fund modernization upgrades for the B-52 and help fund bomber base modernization and nuclear infrastructure.” Upgrading the B-52 to last until 2050 would cost $22 billion, USAF said, but “this figure is offset by $10 billion cost savings from re-engining, which pays for itself in fuel, depot and maintenance costs, and maintenance manpower in the 2040s.” After the B-1 and B-2 retirements, the Air Force would field a fleet of at least 100 B-21s and 75 B- 52s.The timing also suggests B-21 deliveries will average less than one a month during production. The Air Force has said it plans to have a “usable” asset when the first aircraft is delivered in the “mid-2020s.” Assuming that production of the new bomber continues until the last B-1B is retired, a production window of 2025-2036 is likely. Dividing 100 bombers over 11 years suggests a rate of about nine aircraft annually. Former Air Force officials have hinted at such low numbers, explaining that the service wasted a lot of money tooling up to produce B-2 bombers at a high rate and then built only 21 airplanes, instead of the planned 132. At less than one B-21 a month, large savings can be reaped in facilitization, manpower, and tooling, although there would likely be offset costs in learning curve and economic quantity materials purchases.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 7
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Under the Air Force’s proposal, the 1963-vintage B-52s will receive a number of upgrades and improvements to keep them relevant in a world where they are too radar-reflective to get close to well-defended enemy airspace. With new engines, the B-52s would never have to stand down for engine overhauls, as the time “on wing” of the new powerplants would exceed the planned remaining service for the old bombers. The B-52s would also be equipped with new standoff weapons allowing them to shoot into enemy territory from well outside the range of enemy air defenses. Among these would be the LRSO, which the Vector identified as the AGM-180/181, a possible reference to the two competing versions being developed by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Goldfein, at the July event, said the new bomber force would be paired with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk to shoot targets at long range, yet with high accuracy. The Bomber Vector draft made no mention of hypersonic missiles or any other wonder weapons that could enhance the B-52’s lethality, although it did say the venerable aircraft would be perfectly fine in operations where enemy air defenses either did not exist or had already been beaten down by other systems. The Air Force said the decision to retire the B-1 and B-2 instead of the much-older B-52 was based largely on the maintenance track records of the three aircraft. The B-1s and B-2s have higher non- mission-capable rates than the B-52, driven in large part by “vanishing vendor syndrome” situations where components—especially electronics—are no longer made. In the case of the B-2, the fleet is so small—only 20 airplanes—that vendors don’t want to tool up to provide parts in such low quantities. Other pieces of key gear, such as gyroscopes on the B-2, for example, “are obsolete,” the Vector reported, and maintainers are already making do by cannibalizing parts. The B-1’s maintenance man hours per flying hour (MMH/FH) are the worst of the lot, at 74, while the B-2’s performance in this metric is 45, but that doesn’t count the hours needed to maintain its low-observable features, coatings, and materials, which the Vector did not state. The B-52’s MMH/FH rating was 62. The Air Force said the B-52’s mission capable and aircraft availability rates consistently outperform those of the newer bombers. The B-52’s aircraft availability has averaged nearly 80 percent over the last five years, while the B-1 and B-2 averaged about 50 percent. In mission capable rates— meaning the aircraft is able to exploit its full range of capabilities, without any non-working systems—the B-52 averaged about 60 percent, while the B-1 averaged around 40 percent and the B-2 about 35 percent. Cost per flying hour was another factor weighing against the younger bombers in USAF’s thinking. Both the B-1 and B-52 averaged about $70,000 per flying hour (USAF did not call out specific numbers and its charts were not fine-grained)—while the B-2 costs between $110,000 and $150,000 per flying hour to operate. Total ownership costs followed similar curves. As advanced air defenses proliferate, for the time being, only the B-2 can penetrate them to hold targets at risk worldwide, USAF said. However, that aircraft will “see its technological advantages diminish in the not-too-distant future.” By contrast, the B-21 has been “designed to operate in this highly contested combat environment.” The B-52, despite not having the ability to penetrate, offers a lot of capability through “its high weapons carriage capacity and vast munitions diversity” to be of value either as a standoff platform or in “less challenging environments.” The LRSO will provide “a highly survivable, standoff nuclear weapon capability for the B-52 and B-21.” Some money can be saved by not fitting the B-2 with the LRSO, as had been planned.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 8
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
The Bomber Vector pointed out that USAF’s bomber fleet has never been so small. Today’s fleet of 157 bombers (76 of which are B-52s) is only a tiny fraction of the 1960 bomber fleet of 1,526 aircraft. The Air Force said its bomber fleet is also spoken for many times over, on tap to support many missions all at the same time. “In the last five years, [Air Force Global Strike Command] has gone from supporting one enduring COCOM [Combatant Commander] requirement to an average of 12 annually, a 1,100-percent increase. To meet this level of demand, AFGSC’s operation and maintenance personnel and bomber airframes are managed at peak utilization rates,” USAF said. These add-on missions include nonstop bomber action in the Middle East against ISIS targets and an increasing tempo of bomber deployments to the Pacific, both as a messaging device to China and North Korea and to conduct the now-routine Continuous Bomber Presence mission, out of Guam. The Vector says that USAF’s preference is that “bombers replace bombers” at existing locations, since these bases are operationally and geographically “best suited” to the mission. Opening up new facilities or re-activating dormant ones would add a big cost penalty to build new weapons storage facilities, the service said. Even so, the price tag will be “several hundred million dollars per base” to properly modernize and add new “classified workspaces” at current bomber bases to protect B-21 technology, and to accommodate new weapons. To help manage the manpower transition among the four systems, the Vector recommended a “hybrid manpower approach,” while fielding the B-21, using personnel “from retiring platforms as well as a Total Force and Contractor Logistics Support approach as necessary to minimize manpower spikes and delays” to implementation of the Bomber Vector. http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2018/February%202018/USAF-to-Retire-B-1-B-2- in-Early-2030s-as-B-21-Comes-On-Line.aspx Return to top
Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.) New Nuclear Warheads: Legislative Provisions By Amy F. Woolf February 5, 2018 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identifies a plan to "modify a small number of [submarine- launched ballistic missile] warheads to provide a low-yield option" so that the United States could respond promptly and penetrate an adversary's defenses after a nuclear attack. The NPR contends that this capability would strengthen nuclear deterrence, while critics argue it would lower the nuclear threshold and increase the risk of nuclear war. This Insight reviews legislation addressing research and development on new or low-yield nuclear weapons and notes that under current law, an Administration must request specific authorization and appropriations from Congress before funding new or modified warheads. It does not address the policy debate on the benefits and risks of this capability. Background During the Cold War, the United States deployed low-yield nuclear warheads with troops in Europe and Asia for potential use on the battlefield during a conflict. Although the United States withdrew battlefield weapons from service in 1991, it retains B61 gravity bombs and nuclear-armed air-
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 9
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // launched cruise missiles that contain options for low-yield use. The United States has not designed or developed a new low-yield nuclear warhead since the late 1980s. 1993 – The PLYWD Ban After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, studies showed that the United States had a limited ability to destroy hardened underground structures. The Pentagon began to consider whether a very low yield nuclear warhead could destroy underground bunkers, and according to some reports, the Department of Energy began a concept definition study for an Aircraft Delivered Precision Low- Yield Weapon. Some in Congress, however, questioned whether this effort would undermine U.S. security and nonproliferation objectives. In its report on the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2401), the House Armed Services Committee argued that "very low yield nuclear warheads threaten to blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict, and could thus increase the chances of nuclear weapons use by another nation." It also argued that "the utility of very low yield nuclear weapons is questionable given the increasing effectiveness and availability of precision guided conventional munitions." Congress passed an amendment to the FY1994 NDAA (P.L. 103-160) banning research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons. The amendment, known as the Spratt-Furse amendment, or PLYWD, for Precision Low-Yield Weapon Design ban, states that "it shall be the policy of the United States not to conduct research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a new low-yield nuclear weapon, including a precision low-yield warhead." A low-yield nuclear warhead was defined as one with explosive yield of less than 5 kilotons. Some in Congress remained interested in the potential for low-yield nuclear weapons addressing threats from chemical and biological weapons. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 (H.R. 4205, Section 1044), Congress requested a study that assessed the U.S. ability to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets, including those that might house chemical or biological agents. Although the resulting study focused on conventional weapons, special operations forces, intelligence, and other capabilities, it also noted that some deeply buried targets could not be "held at risk with conventional highexplosive weapons or current nuclear weapons" and that "nuclear weapons have a unique ability to destroy both agent containers and CBW agents" if the fireball is located near the target. The report asserted that "given improved accuracy and the ability to penetrate the material layers overlying a facility, it is possible to employ a much lower-yield weapon to achieve the needed neutralization." Publicly available excerpts of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review noted that an underground nuclear warhead explosion could destroy many buried facilities with much lower yield, reducing fallout by a factor of 10 to 20. It also outlined plans to establish small "advanced warhead concepts teams" to evaluate evolving military requirements and assess options for new or modified warheads. The George W. Bush Administration then called for the repeal of PLYWD, arguing that it "undercuts efforts that could strengthen our ability to deter, or respond to, new or emerging threats." It also argued PLYWD had a "chilling effect" on efforts to "train the next generation of nuclear weapons scientists and engineers... by impeding the ability of our scientists and engineers to explore the full range of technical options" because it prohibited any activities "which could potentially lead to production by the United States" of such a warhead. 2004 – Current Law The Senate Armed Services Committee proposed a repeal of PLYWD in its version of the FY2004 NDAA (S. 1047). The full Senate defeated amendments that would either retain the ban or limit its scope – allowing research and development but banning engineering and manufacturing – but
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 10
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // specified that "the Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering development phase or any subsequent phase of a low-yield nuclear weapon unless specifically authorized by Congress." The House version of the bill contained a more limited adjustment, allowing some research, but continuing to ban engineering development. The conference report (H.Rept. 108-354) included the requirement that the Secretary of Energy specifically request authorization and appropriations for research, development, engineering, and manufacturing of a new or modified nuclear warhead, regardless of yield. According to current law (50 U.S.C. §2529), a new nuclear weapon is one that contains a pit or canned subassembly that was not in the stockpile or in production on December 2, 2002. A modified warhead is one that contains a pit or canned subassembly that was in the nuclear weapons stockpile as of December 2, 2002, and is being modified to meet a military requirement other than the military requirement it met when placed in the stockpile. Hence, the question of whether an Administration would have to request that Congress authorize and appropriate funding to modify an existing warhead would likely reflect assessments of whether the changes sought in the warhead constituted a "modification" and whether the modified warhead was intended to meet a new military requirement. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IN10854.pdf Return to top
US COUNTER-WMD
The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Top Admiral: US Must Bolster Missile Defense to Counter North Korea By Rebecca Kheel February 14, 2018 The top U.S. admiral in the Asia-Pacific region said Wednesday that projections of North Korea’s weapons capabilities in a few years mean the United States must bolster its missile defenses, particularly on Hawaii. “I do believe that we have that capability today in 2018,” Adm. Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, told the House Armed Services Committee, when asked about missile defense protecting the homeland. “But given where we think, without going into classified subjects, but given where we think the North Korean capability might be in terms of their missiles in three or four years or in the early 2020s, I think we must continue to improve our missile defenses, and that’s why I’m an advocate for the defensive Hawaii radar system and I’ve advocated for a study to look at whether we should look at putting ground-based interceptors or something like that in Hawaii. “And I think we must continue to improve and resource the capabilities of the [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] system that we have in Guam as well as the [ballistic missile defense] ships that we have in the Pacific, most particularly in Japan.” Harris has previously advocated for interceptors in Hawaii. But his renewed recommendation Wednesday comes after a year of significant progress in North Korea’s nuclear and missile program.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 11
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
In September, North Korea tested its most powerful nuclear weapon to date, likely a hydrogen bomb. The regime also tested an intercontinental ballistic missile in November that could reach the entire United States. Harris’ comments also come after Hawaiian residents spent 38 minutes in fear last month after a false missile alert was sent out -- though that incident was not raised during Wednesday’s hearing. A $1 billion radar for Hawaii is in the works and expected to be operational by 2023, which Harris said he is grateful for. But, he added, it would behoove the country to at least study whether to also add interceptor capability to Hawaii. “I am confident in our ground-based systems today to intercept and protect Hawaii -- and those ground-based systems are in California and Alaska -- but I think in the years ahead it do us well to at least study of putting some kind of interceptor capability in Hawaii,” Harris said. Harris said there are several options for missile defense in Hawaii, including Aegis Ashore, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and a ground-based system. But based on the trajectory of a missile from North Korea, Aegis and THAAD might not be the best options, he added. After the hearing, committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) said the United States has “lost so many years” that there’s not enough time for a study. He pledged missile defense will be part of the this year's defense policy bill, but said he would not mandate a specific system for Hawaii. “It is very important that we be able to defend all of the United States and it’s territories,” Thornberry said. “I hope that what we’re seeing is an increased urgency to deploy more of existing systems and to develop new systems.” http://thehill.com/policy/defense/373836-top-admiral-us-must-improve-missile-defenses-for-n- korean-weapons-in-three-or Return to top
The Times and Democrat (Orangeburg, S.C.) Airmen Train for Nuclear, Chemical Contamination; Crescent Moon Exercise Takes Place in North By Staff Sgt. Christopher Hubenthal February 11, 2018 NORTH – Airmen from New Jersey and South Carolina recently came together at the North Auxiliary Airfield to test their ability to operate in a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear environment. The airmen of the 437th Airlift Wing, Joint Base Charleston, and 621st Contingency Response Wing, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, combined capabilities and shared assets during Exercise Crescent Moon from Jan. 29 to Jan. 31. Lt. Col. Mike Durband, 321st Contingency Response Squadron commander, said North Auxiliary Airfield is an ideal location to conduct training like this, providing a quality environment and a chance to build upon partnerships.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 12
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
“The Joint Base Charleston airmen and CRW airmen have worked together all over the world,” Durband said. ”So Joint Base Charleston is a natural location. It’s a place we’re used to and we like to come here to continue our relationship.” The exercise tested mobility and contingency response airmen’s readiness to conduct mobility operations in a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear environment. Participants were required to complete airfield tasks during mission-oriented protective posture levels and while wearing personal protective equipment. Aircrews from the 437th AW provided C-17 Globemaster III airlift support to add realism to the training experience for airmen on the ground. Airmen were required to load cargo on and off a simulated contaminated aircraft safely while in MOPP level 4, a level where Airmen are required to wear all personal protective equipment. “For the 621st CRW, we provided a realistic environment where a plane actually came in, assault landed quickly, exited the runway and opened up to receive an on-load,” said 1st Lt. Dennis Parker, 14th Airlift Squadron executive officer and exercise participant. “It was definitely a challenge for both teams to operate under the limited communication ability which is incurred in that environment. This allowed them to experience and know what they might be dealing with,” he said. Staff Sgt. John Lee and Senior Airman Paul Chavis, both of the 628th Civil Engineer Squadron emergency management, set up a contamination control area, providing contingency response airmen an opportunity to get hands-on training. Lee and Chavis also provided instruction, if needed, and evaluated the airmen’s proficiency during the decontamination process. “If they get ‘dirty’ in a contaminated environment, the CCA is designed to help them get clean and safe,” Chavis said. “Learning the best practices through this exercise is going to help them in the long run. This is very important in terms of the mission and making sure we’re doing it safely. This CCA helps them do their jobs safely and securely without being contaminated.” From transporting cargo to decontaminating themselves, airmen of the 621st CRW sharpened their skills during Exercise Crescent Moon alongside aircrews from the 437th Airlift Wing. “Other units have supported us and now it’s our turn to give back and support them in their training,” Parker said. “Now airmen involved in both ground and air aspects of the fight know the difficulties and how to overcome them in these types of environments.” “Being able to operate in a simulated CBRN environment, the airmen learn and reinforce their training,” Durband said. “It really builds confidence. You can tell they’re a little unsure in the beginning but, by the end, they’re operating and doing their job. The CRW is proving it out here.” Situated three miles east of the town of North, the 2,400-acre North Auxiliary Airfield is owned by the U.S. Air Force and is used primarily for C-17 Globemaster III training by the 437th Airlift Wing and its Air Force Reserve "Associate" unit, the 315th Airlift Wing, at Charleston Air Force Base. http://thetandd.com/news/airmen-train-for-nuclear-chemical-contamination-crescent-moon- exercise-takes/article_64b5584f-fc20-502b-a278-d9c05ab296ae.html Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 13
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
HomelandSecurityToday.US (Oakton, Va.) ‘Never Been More Difficult’ to Keep Terror Groups from Getting WMD By Bridget Johnson February 13, 2018 Terrorist groups are as interested as ever in acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a global landscape where chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents have grown more difficult to track, senators heard from Defense officials last week. Assistant Defense Secretary for Homeland Defense and Global Security Kenneth Rapuano told the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that “rapid technological advancements and increased access to dual use technologies, expertise, and materials that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes heighten the risk that adversaries can more easily seek or acquire WMD.” “It has never been more difficult to prevent adversaries from acquiring the materials or expertise necessary to develop WMD or use CBRN materials in intentional attacks,” he said. “Additionally, the speed, volume, and coverage of international travel means that naturally occurring pathogens of security concern can spread worldwide in days, potentially having the same catastrophic consequences of a deliberate biological attack.” The Intelligence Community, State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy and Justice Department “all play critical roles in detecting threats, preventing attacks on the homeland, and working with foreign partners to stop and respond to incidents,” he added. Rapuano noted that best efforts at prevention only go so far, thus the agency coalition “must be prepared to contain and reduce CBRN threats once they have developed.” “DoD is postured to isolate, identify, neutralize, and dispose of CBRN threats before they can reach our borders,” he said. That includes concern about reports of ongoing use of chemical agents by the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, where “the U.S. and our coalition partners continue to exploit opportunities on the ground to better understand and disrupt their CW networks.” “We must anticipate that our adversaries will continue to evolve and develop increasingly sophisticated methods to pursue, develop, or deploy CBRN weapons,” Rapuano stressed. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Joseph Osterman, deputy commander of United States Special Operations Command, emphasized the importance of increased integration of intelligence, planning and assessments in a counter-WMD fusion center “dedicated to coordinating information flow and planning, fusing intelligence and operations, and providing the WMD community of action a single point of contact for DOD operational capability.” Chairwoman Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) asked Rapuano which WMD threat concerned him most at this point. Rapuano picked biotechnology, due to the “rapid advances and ubiquitous availability” today. “Things that you can buy on the web now and essentially do a paint-by-numbers instruction were the province of Nobel Prize-winning scientists only decades ago, and that really levels the playing field for any actor looking to develop biotechnology, biological agents and novelly engineered agents that can present a real threat,” he added. The assistant secretary confirmed that “both Al-Qaeda and ISIS are interested in chemical, biological, nuclear,” and “certainly would be if they had opportunity to acquire the materials and know-how.” He wouldn’t elaborate in open session.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 14
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Osterman said that “functional campaign planning” helps officials “observe where the technology transfer may occur between state and non-state actors.” “Also, where one non-state actor perhaps is working with another non-state actor in a different geographic location or in a functional capacity,” the general added. “So we try to weave that in with the translation of our strategy and policy to actual tactical application of interdiction in order to basically reinforce the larger protocol efforts that are in place.” The CBRN Response Enterprise is nearly 19,000 strong, consisting of National Guard and Title X military arranged into teams. “We have the WMD-CSTs, the civil support teams. We have the enhanced response teams. We have a range of teams with a different mix of capabilities that go from decontamination, detection, medical effects, medical treatment,” Rapuano said. “There is air transportation, ground transportation, the whole package that can be integrated that can either be commanded by the state National Guards and there’s at least one team in every state. Or they can be authorized under Title X and under DOD command.” Response teams are deployed “on a routine basis starting with National Special Security Events, the Super Bowl, other large events, Fourth of July.” “And these assets will be pre-deployed in the vicinity of activities for which there may be some concern that they would be the target of an attack that might include WMD,” Rapuano explained. “And they are prepared to respond in concert with all of the other assets that are typically deployed for those events — law enforcement and others.” DoD has been working “very closely” with Health and Human Services and DHS “to look at bio threats in general, including naturally occurring, to sync our research with them to ensure that we’re covering the full landscape of what’s naturally occurring and what perhaps could be intensified or developed for malevolent use,” the assistant secretary told lawmakers. Pressed on how the departments wouldn’t get caught off-guard, with the 2014 spread of the Ebola virus offered as an example, Rapuano replied that “we’re looking at ways that we can get quick production, just in time, but that’s very difficult because you need that base in terms of the manufacturing base.” Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) mused on whether ISIS stripped of its physical caliphate poses the same WMD threat. “Because, obviously, this is about talent as much as anything, and intellectual capacity,” Heinrich noted. Osterman replied that “they are still a threat, to put it simply.” “Really, when we look at pathways, we’re looking at intent, infrastructure and expertise to your point, production, weaponization, delivery systems in use,” the general added. “And they’ve demonstrated not only that capability over time, but even though as they lose the geographic caliphate, that those individuals that have the technical knowledge and frankly, the level at which they were working and had been working is not one that by loss of that geographic caliphate that it would undermine their ability to continue to pursue the weapons of mass destruction capability.” Osterman stressed that “it’s a very, very finite technical capability and human capital issue.” “And they are generally not front-line fighters. There are folks that were not necessarily easy to track, but they’re ones that we’ve been working on for a number of years here and have ideas where they are if we haven’t already basically taken them off the battle space,” he said. “So that’s where my concern is, and where we watch very closely again through the trans-regional approach
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 15
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // is to make sure they’re not leaving that area of operations and perhaps than becoming an export or, as we term it, an ex-ops threat to the United States proper.” https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/terror-groups-keen-wmd-never- been-more-difficult-prevent/ Return to top
Defense News (Washington, D.C.) MDA $9.9 Billion Budget Request Geared to Address North Korean Threat By Jen Judson February 12, 2018 WASHINGTON — The U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s $9.9 billion fiscal 2019 budget request is up by $2 billion over last year’s, in part to address a rapidly emerging threat from North Korea. MDA is beefing up its homeland missile defense system — the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system — with increased interceptors while adding radars to the Pacific to scan for threats. And MDA will invest in technology development to counter increasingly challenging threats such as hypersonic weapons, according to budget documents released Feb. 12. North Korea is developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that would be capable of posing a threat to the United States. Just last year, the country launched two Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missiles that landed in the Sea of Japan. It also fired off the larger Hwasong-15 ICBM that could reach all of the continental United States, if it could fly at a lower trajectory. North Korea is also developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile and has hundreds of Scud and No Dong missiles that can hit U.S. forces deployed in the region as well as U.S. allies. The FY19 request supports the National Defense Strategy, which directs investments to include a focus on layered missile defense and disruptive capabilities for both homeland and regional defense against threats from such places as North Korea, according to Gary Pennett, MDA’s director of operations, who spoke to reporters at a budget briefing at the Pentagon on Feb. 12. While there are many significant changes in the FY19 budget request compared to last year’s, it also continues to focus “on increasing system reliability,” Pennett said. “This year we have also made significant advancements in our engagement capability and capacity while at the same time continuing to do the research and development necessary to stay ahead of the evolving threat.” The budget also likely reflects what is in the Missile Defense Review, ordered by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis last year, which is expected to be released eminently. Defending the homeland Within the FY19 MDA request are plans to design and build two discriminating radars in the Pacific. One radar will be located in Hawaii and another somewhere else in the Pacific. MDA is requesting $95.8 million for the radar program. “One of the things that we need to do is maintain custody of the threat from birth to death, and so with terrestrial-based radars we have to put them in locations that we can maintain custody,” Pennett explained. Therefore, the MDA decided to put a radar in Hawaii and also another one somewhere in the Pacific to provide that coverage.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 16
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
MDA is calling the first radar the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, or HDR-H, which will optimize “discrimination capability in the Pacific architecture” and increase “the ability of [ground-based interceptors] GBIs to enhance the defense of Hawaii,” according to budget documents. GBIs are the interceptors for the GMD system located in both Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, to protect the homeland against ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran. MDA will competitively award the Hawaiian radar by the end of FY18, which is in line with its plans indicated in last year’s budget request. The HDR-H will be fielded in FY23 and integrated into the ballistic missile defense system framework. Military construction for the radar will begin in FY21. The agency will also initiate a prime contract award and development engineering for a Homeland Defense Radar-Pacific, or HDR-P, in fiscal 2019. Site surveys on possible locations for the radar will happen in FY19, according to Pennett. Site options have yet to be narrowed down. Military construction is planned for FY22 with fielding expected in FY24. As anticipated, the GMD system is getting a major boost — a total of $926.4 million in FY19 — with funding for 20 GBIs beyond the 44 already in place at Fort Greely and Vandenberg. The additional GBIs were requested by the Pentagon and the Trump administration and ultimately mandated by Congress in 2017. The plan is to bring the total number of GBIs to 64 by 2023. MDA is also requesting funds to add two silos in a missile field and purchase six additional configuration 2 boost vehicles for the GBIs. MDA is requesting $561.2 million to develop the Redesigned Kill Vehicle for GBIs. The RKV will increase the performance of the current exoatmospheric kill vehicle, or EKV, which has struggled in testing. The EKV is a component of the GMD interceptors designed to destroy targets in high-speed collisions after separating from the booster rocket. While it was previously expected for the RKV to deploy in the 2020 time frame, MDA notes in budget documents that it expects the RKV to deploy in the 2021 time frame. GMD will have another robust test in FY19, and MDA is asking for $81.9 million in FY19 for GMD testing to include the major test. The test in FY19, as Defense News previously reported, will be a salvo test where two GBIs will go up against an ICBM-level threat target. MDA is planning to take receipt of Long Range Discrimination Radar hardware in FY19. Initial fielding will begin in 2020, leading up to an operational readiness test in 2022. The Long Range Discrimination Radar is a midcourse sensor that improves the discrimination capability of the ballistic missile defense system. The agency is also asking for $149.7 million to extend the at-sea time of the sea-based X-band (SBX) radar in light of the increased missile threat from North Korea. According to Pennett, MDA is well on its way to increasing SBX time at sea from 120 days to 330 days, which was requested in last year’s budget. However, in the FY18 request, MDA planned to examine the feasibility of deploying an SBX radar somewhere along the East Coast, and Pennett noted it is not something MDA is pursuing at the moment. Regional defense MDA is well on its way to implementing an Obama-era regional missile defense strategy known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach. MDA has an AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey, but is also standing up two Aegis Ashore missile defense sites in Romania and Poland. Romania’s is
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 17
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // mission capable and Poland’s will be operational in FY18. The final phase will include delivering the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA to Aegis weapons systems and Aegis Ashore sites. MDA is asking for $767.5 million for the Aegis BMD program to include integration of the SM-3 Block IIA. And the agency wants another $95.8 million for Aegis BMD testing. The agency wants to spend $708.7 million to procure 37 SM-3 Block IB missiles and six SM-3 IIA missiles. Across the five-year budget plan, MDA wants to buy 204 SM-3 IB missiles and 39 SM-3 IIA missiles. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System program would get $214.2 million for software upgrades to address emerging threats. The agency wants to address specific efforts associated with a U.S. Forces Korea urgent need that “provides enhance[d] THAAD capability against specific USFK threats.” Among those enhancements is a capability to “increase” THAAD’s “defended area,” according to budget documents. The description implies the funding could go toward the much- talked-about THAAD Extended Range, a possible upgrade that has yet to become an official requirement or effort. MDA also plans to boost its THAAD interceptor procurement, asking for $874.1 million to procure 82 interceptors for a total buy of 196 interceptors across the five-year defense spending plan. Technology development MDA plans to tackle how to defend against hypersonic threats, which are emerging in countries considered by the U.S. to be adversaries, such as China and Russia. The agency wants $120.4 million to make near-term sensor and control capability upgrades that can help defend against such threats. The plan will follow the Defense Science Board’s recommendations to develop and deliver “material solutions” informed by near-term technology demonstrations, according to the budget documents. Solutions will include modification of existing BMDS sensors and the Command and Control, Battle Management and Communication system ― the network that ties together elements of the BMD system. MDA will continue to work toward putting a laser on a UAV to address boost phase missile defense risks. The Common Kill Vehicle program will get $189.8 million to develop technology capable of killing multiple threats from a single interceptor. MDA has awarded contracts to three major prime contractors to reduce the technical risk for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle product development. Space capability development crops up in the FY19 request, but despite pushes from Congress and other experts, the funding for space-based missile defense has not seen much of a boost, according to budget overview documents. The MDA is asking for $16.5 million for the Space-based Kill Assessment, or SKA, experiment, “which will use a network of high sample rate, infrared sensors to deliver a kill assessment capability to the BMDS tailored for homeland defense,” the document reads. The FY18 request saw similar funding ― a total of $17 million. The FY18 request also stated that the full SKA network was planned to be on orbit in FY17. The FY19 request says the network would be on orbit in FY18. Pennett said there have been some delays “in regards to getting the satellites up.” The only other program highlighted for space-related efforts is the Space Tracking and Surveillance System.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 18
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
MDA is requesting $37 million for satellite operations and sustainment. The Space Tracking and Surveillance Systems were launched in 2007 and continue to perform well, providing risk- reduction data for potential operational BMDS tracking and surveillance constellation, according to the budget overview. The program will also support “concept development activities for future space sensor architecture studies and analyses to address advanced threats,” the document states. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/13/mda-99-billion-budget-request-geared-to- address-north-korean-threat/ Return to top
US ARMS CONTROL
Atlantic Council (Washington, D.C.) A Ticking Clock: Rose Gottemoeller, Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Discusses Arms Control By Teri Schultz February 12, 2018 When the Doomsday Clock took its last big leap, moving from five minutes to three minutes to midnight in 2015, Rose Gottemoeller took it personally. She was then US under secretary of state for arms control and had spent her entire career negotiating with first the Soviets and then the Russians to keep the world further from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ “apocalypse.” “I was very cross,” she recalled with a self-deprecating laugh, “because of course I was responsible for arms control matters in the government and they still moved the clock back toward midnight. I was like ‘what do I have to do?!’” Gottemoeller said nonproliferation experts felt the Obama administration could have done more. When the “clock of doom” ticked forward thirty seconds in January, up to 11:58, Gottemoeller watched from Brussels in her post as NATO's deputy secretary general, no longer responsible but no less concerned. “I take it very, very seriously,” she said in an interview in late January. Not since 1953 after the United States and the Soviet Union both tested hydrogen bombs has the assessment been so dire. The year 2018 seems to be losing time already. Tensions are rising fast between the United States and Russia, with Moscow positioning nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad and continuing to violate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) raises questions about whether Washington's first choice of response to not just this dispute, but possible non-nuclear attacks, will be negotiation. Gottemoeller served as an adviser to the Trump administration on the NPR. Declining to comment on it specifically since the document had not yet been made public at the time of our interview, she urged a “close reading” of it, suggesting the new posture would still adhere to the longstanding principle that “nuclear weapons are not to be used. They are to provide for deterrence.” NATO signs on to pro-INF pressure on Moscow But the US certainty that Russia has been undermining the INF for many years is now shared by NATO allies, who were briefed with what's described as “very convincing evidence” by US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis last November. Gottemoeller knows this brief inside out. When then US President Barack Obama decided to confront Moscow about the accumulating evidence, which she
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 19
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // said showed “absolutely” that Russia was in breach, Gottemoeller was dispatched to have that conversation. She reported back that her Kremlin counterparts denied they possessed the ground- launched cruise missile in question, using the meeting to instead interrogate her about how much Washington knew about their program. The Kremlin has spent four more years unapologetically investing in that missile, known as the SSC- 8 in the United States and the 9M729 in Russia, which insists it does not violate the INF range limit of 310-3,420 miles. The Trump administration has warned that it will not tolerate the ongoing violation. Gottemoeller applauds the move. “I was very glad to see that the Trump administration picked that up and has even upped the ante,” she observed. “They've talked about some of the response measures they are working on and would be willing to take if Russia does not return to compliance with the treaty... There will be consequences if they don’t return to compliance with the treaty.” Trump has already authorized the research and development of an American version of a ground- launched, intermediate-range missile system to move forward if the Russians don’t relent. New START needed As a lifelong advocate for arms control, however, Gottemoeller hopes the US response remains in the realm of diplomacy and not a race to catch up to the Kremlin. “That's why it's important,” she emphasized, “for all of our allies and other countries around the world to underscore for the Russian Federation the importance of the INF Treaty.” On the thirtieth anniversary of the pact in December, NATO did issue a statement calling Moscow out on the breach and urging dialogue with Washington for a resolution of the standoff many see as the potential kickoff to a new arms race. As for her views on that possibility, Gottemoeller again dips back into her previous life. She was the chief US negotiator on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), concluded in 2010 and fully implemented in February, limiting Russia and the United States to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller remains a believer. “It's important that New START is in force,” she said. “There can be no buildup above those numbers. There can be no arms race as long as the treaty remains in force.” http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-ticking-clock Return to top
MarineTimes (Vienna, Va.) US Urges Russia to Honor 1987 Arms Pact, Warns of Collapse By The Associated Press February 13, 2018 BRUSSELS — The United States is urging Russia to prove it’s honoring a landmark nuclear arms treaty from the Soviet era or to prepare for the pact to collapse. Russia insists it is honoring the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. But NATO fears the 9M729 ground-fired cruise missile system Russia is developing would allow it to launch a nuclear strike in Europe with little or no notice. The U.S. ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, said on Tuesday that “if Russia doesn’t come into compliance, they will face the consequence of not having a treaty.”
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 20
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Hutchison warned of “a time-frame” after which the U.S. “will not be able to allow Russia to have the capability that we agreed neither of us would have without getting a deterrent opportunity as well.” https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/02/13/us-urges-russia-to- honor-1987-arms-pact-warns-of-collapse/ Return to top
The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.) Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to U.S. Nuclear Stance By Anton Troianovski February 10, 2018 MOSCOW — One of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest associates warned in an interview Wednesday that the U.S. and Russia are approaching a new arms race — the latest sign that geopolitical tensions are undermining nuclear arms control. Sergey Chemezov, a top figure in Russia’s arms industry, said he didn’t believe that the New START accord limiting the number of nuclear weapons deployed by the two countries could be renewed in the current political environment. “How can we talk about further negotiations about arms reductions when we don’t trust each other?” Chemezov said in the interview with The Washington Post. Chemezov is one of the most prominent Russians to express skepticism in recent weeks about the prospect for new nuclear arms talks with the United States. With Russian hopes dashed that President Trump would improve relations with Moscow, the Russian elite increasingly appears unsettled by his more muscular approach. For Russians, a new warning sign came earlier this month with the release of a U.S. Defense Department document recommending the development of new nuclear arms to counter Russia. “It will lead to another arms race, because we will have to do the same as the Americans,” Chemezov said, referring to the Defense Department’s Nuclear Posture Review. “And then a mere spark will be sufficient. With the number of weapons in the world today, there will be no winners; the world will be destroyed.” Chemezov heads Rostec, a state industrial giant that makes small arms, helicopters, radar systems and other weapons, and that controls Russian arms exports. He is also one of Putin’s key associates at the intersection of business and government and a longtime friend. The two served together in the KGB in Dresden, East Germany, in the 1980s and shared an entryway in a six-story apartment building. Chemezov is under U.S. sanctions imposed by the Treasury Department. It referred to him as “a trusted ally of President Putin” when it announced sanctions against him and several other Russian officials in response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Late last month, Treasury listed him as one of Russia’s “senior political leaders.” “They think that people on the list will start getting upset and come to the Americans and say, ‘Yes, we are with you,’ and ‘Let’s overthrow Putin together,’ ” Chemezov said, referring to the sanctions list. “On the contrary — it had the exact opposite effect. All the people who are on the list support Putin.”
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 21
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Echoing senior Russian politicians, Chemezov said he had been expecting a friendlier U.S. policy toward Russia after Trump took office. Loosened sanctions, Chemezov said, would have allowed his company to deepen its business ties with American companies such as Boeing, with which it already works to produce titanium airplane parts in Russia’s Ural Mountains. “Maybe he will gain the strength to create some opportunities that will allow him to change something regarding Russia,” Chemezov said of Trump. “We were expecting normal relations to be reestablished, as things were under George W. Bush.” Instead, Russian officials see the Nuclear Posture Review as the latest sign that Trump is failing to deliver on his promise of improved relations. Writing for the Valdai Discussion Club, which is close to Russia’s foreign-policy establishment, international relations specialist Dmitry Suslov said the new nuclear policy could not only bring about a new arms race but also “a dramatic military crisis fraught with a direct military clash between the US and Russia.” The Foreign Ministry in Moscow said Russia will “take measures to enhance our security” on the heels of the U.S. nuclear plans. Russia is already modernizing its nuclear arsenal, with upgrades to its bombers, missiles and submarines capable of delivering nuclear warheads. As tensions with the United States rise, Russian politicians and media personalities have said Russia’s nuclear arsenal ensures that the country will be taken seriously. “Under Obama, all these games by Russia around nuclear weapons were not seen with great pleasure, but also without much alarm,” Russian military analyst Alexander Golts said. “Now the situation has changed, and the endless Russian threats seem to be taken seriously.” Russian officials are still working to digest the Nuclear Posture Review and to divine Trump’s interest in arms-control negotiations. For Moscow, a key question is how Trump will proceed on the New START agreement, which expires in 2021. The treaty, which President Barack Obama negotiated with then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads by each country to 1,550 and institutes an extensive verification regime. The compliance deadline for the New START agreement was Monday, and both Moscow and Washington said they complied with required reductions. The treaty can be extended automatically for another five years if both presidents sign. The United States is concerned that Russia is violating other agreements, most notably the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and some U.S. officials doubt that Washington should sign an extension if other agreements aren’t holding. “It’s in Russia’s interest to maintain and extend the New START treaty after it expires,” said Igor Korotchenko, a Russian military scholar and a member of the Defense Ministry’s public advisory council. “If Trump wants to exit New START, then this would mean a new reality.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-ally-warns-of-arms-race-as-russia-considers- response-to-us-nuclear-stance/2018/02/10/23dd3cf2-0cf2-11e8-baf5- e629fc1cd21e_story.html?utm_term=.691a04b8741f Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 22
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
ASIA/PACIFIC
Nikkei Asian Review (Tokyo, Japan) Japan's Plutonium Glut Casts a Shadow on Renewed Nuclear Deal By Kazunari Hanawa and Takashi Tsuji February 14, 2018 American concerns about potential diversion of idle fuel leave the agreement at risk TOKYO -- The decision Jan. 16 to automatically extend a nuclear agreement with the U.S. came as a relief to a Japanese government worried about the prospect of renegotiating the basis for a cornerstone of its energy policy. But friction remains over a massive store of plutonium that highlights the problems with the nation's ambitious nuclear energy plans. The nuclear fuel cycle pursued by Japan's government and power companies centers on recovering uranium and plutonium from spent fuel for reuse in reactors. This is made possible by the unique agreement with the U.S. that lets Japan make plutonium. The radioactive element can be used in nuclear weapons, so its production is generally tightly restricted. "The agreement forms part of the foundation of Japan's nuclear power activities," said Hiroshige Seko, minister of economy, trade and industry, in comments to reporters Friday. "It's important from the standpoint of the Japan-U.S. relationship." America began sharing its advanced atomic energy technology with other nations in the 1950s, aiming to promote its peaceful use. Washington remains hugely influential in setting ground rules for military applications of nuclear material, including with regard to reprocessing. Countries including South Korea have sought special arrangements like Japan's. The lack of fuss over the renewal of the agreement, which had been due to expire this coming July, has masked concerns expressed behind the scenes. A Japanese official visiting Washington in December was asked by a U.S. nuclear policymaker about Japan's oversight of its plutonium stockpile. Japan has amassed roughly 47 tons of plutonium stored inside and outside the country -- enough for some 6,000 nuclear warheads. With the nation's nuclear power plants gradually taken offline after the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster, and progress on restarting them sluggish, Japan has been left with no real way to whittle down a pile drawing international scrutiny. Washington ultimately did not ask to change the nuclear agreement, which after the expiration date can be terminated by either side with six months' notice. Given the tense regional security situation, including North Korea's missile advances, "Japan and the U.S. apparently didn't want the world to see friction between them over nuclear power," said a Japanese government insider in contact with Washington. Tokyo's relief at the lack of American demands is dampened by the awareness that the deal could be scrapped at any time. "It's more unstable than before," an industry ministry official acknowledged. The best-case scenario for Japan would have been securing an agreement that set a new expiration date. But any such change would have had to go through the U.S. Congress, where lawmakers supporting nuclear nonproliferation might not have welcomed giving Japan -- which already has no
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 23
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // prospect of using up its existing supply -- carte blanche to keep reprocessing. This risk is likely why Washington opted for automatic extension of the existing agreement. The precursor to the current deal, signed in 1955, let Japan use American technology to kick-start its own atomic energy industry. A new agreement in 1968 permitted reprocessing of spent fuel with U.S. consent. A 1988 revision gave blanket permission for reprocessing for peaceful applications. But the nuclear fuel cycle policy this enabled has stalled amid chronic problems at key facilities. The Japanese government decided in 2016 to scrap the Monju plutonium-fueled experimental fast breeder reactor. And a reprocessing facility in northern Japan that would be critical to producing plutonium fuel usable by conventional reactors has faced repeated delays that have pushed back the completion date from 1997 to 2021. Reducing Japan's plutonium stockpile will be vital to assuaging international concerns. Seko asserted that plutonium consumption will pick up again as the Nuclear Regulation Authority clears more reactors to restart. But this may not work as well as Tokyo hopes. Just five reactors have met the stricter safety standards imposed in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi meltdowns, and not all of these use plutonium. The nuclear watchdog said Jan. 16 that it will devise new guidelines to better adhere to the government's principle of not possessing plutonium without a specific purpose. Critics of Japan's plutonium production will likely not be satisfied without a convincing, reality-based plan to deal with the issue. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-s-plutonium-glut-casts-a- shadow-on-renewed-nuclear-deal?page=1 Return to top
The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan) Japan and Norway Agree to Jointly Work against North Korea’s Nuclear Program Author Not Attributed February 14, 2018 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Norwegian counterpart Erna Solberg agreed Wednesday on the need to work together in maximizing pressure on North Korea to prevent it from pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. “We confirmed that we will raise pressure on North Korea to the maximum possible extent to make it change its policies,” Abe said at a joint new conference after the meeting in Tokyo. Norway maintains diplomatic ties with North Korea, while Japan has put itself at the forefront of international efforts to tighten sanctions on Pyongyang following a series of weapons tests in violation of U.N. resolutions. Abe said he and Solberg also agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in developing the Arctic region. “(Japan and Norway) will work in close coordination to maintain and strengthen an international order based on the rule of law,” Abe said.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 24
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Japan’s emphasis on the rule of law reflects its concerns about China’s expansionary maritime activities. Solberg said they “also discussed how we can further strengthen our trade relations, and I raised the issue of looking forward for an economic partnership agreement between our countries in the future.” Norway is not a member of the European Union with which Japan concluded negotiations on a free trade agreement in December. Japan and the 28-member union are trying to implement in early 2019 an accord that will eliminate tariffs on more than 90 percent of products traded between them, which together account for about 30 percent of global economic output. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/02/14/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-norway- agree-jointly-work-north-koreas-nuclear-program/#.WoReTujwY2w Return to top
Reuters (New York, NY) U.S. Intelligence Chief Says North Korea 'Decision Time' Is Near By Patricia Zengerle and Doina Chiacu February 13, 2018 WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. director of national intelligence warned on Tuesday that time was running out for the United States to act on the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. North Korea presents “a potentially existential” threat to the United States and is likely to conduct more weapons tests this year, Dan Coats said at the Senate Intelligence Committee’s annual hearing on “Worldwide Threats.” “Decision time is becoming ever closer in terms of how we respond to this,” Coats said. “Our goal is a peaceful settlement. We are using maximum pressure on North Korea in various ways.” The warning came despite an easing of tensions on the Korean peninsular after talks resumed between North and South Korea, and as the North participated in the Winter Olympics hosted by the South. While the Trump administration has stressed its preference for a diplomatic solution to the crisis over North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons that are capable of hitting the United States, it has warned that all options on are on the table, including military ones, to prevent this. Last month, CIA Director Mike Pompeo said North Korea could be only “a handful of months” away from being able to make a nuclear attack on the United States. Pompeo told Tuesday’s hearing that despite the North-South talks, there was “no indication there’s any strategic change” in North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s desire to remain a nuclear threat to the United States. Talk of preventative military strikes has eased since the Koreas resumed dialogue last month and Washington has appeared to endorse deeper post-Olympics engagement between the two Koreas that could lead to U.S.-North Korean talks.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 25
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
But it has also stressed the need to ramp up sanctions to force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. Last year, North Korea conducted dozens of missile launches and its sixth and largest nuclear test, in defiance of U.N. sanctions. However, it has now been more than two months since its last missile test in late November. Coats said North Korea’s repeated statements that nuclear weapons were the basis for its survival suggest government leaders there “do not intend to negotiate them away.” “In the wake of accelerated missile testing since 2016, North Korea is likely to press ahead with more tests in 2018, and its Foreign Minister said that Kim (Jong Un) may be considering conducting an atmospheric nuclear test over the Pacific Ocean,” he said. Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein asked whether U.S. intelligence has looked into what it might take to bring North Korea to the negotiating table, but Pompeo declined to discuss the subject during a public hearing. Feinstein said she had participated in a classified briefing recently on North Korea and described it as “difficult and harsh.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-northkorea/u-s-intelligence-chief-says-north- korea-decision-time-is-near-idUSKCN1FX259 Return to top
The New York Times (New York, N.Y.) Washington Is Willing to Talk with North Korea, the South’s President Says By Choe Sang-Hun February 13, 2018 SEOUL, South Korea — American officials told South Korea’s president they were willing to hold direct negotiations with North Korea, a spokesman for President Moon Jae-in said on Tuesday, indicating a shift in the Trump administration’s policy. The statement came just days after Vice President Mike Pence visited Pyeongchang, South Korea, which is hosting the Winter Olympics, and met with Mr. Moon. Since the vice president’s departure on Saturday, reports of an understanding between Washington and Seoul on the possibility of dialogue have appeared in the news media, but South Korean officials would not confirm them until Tuesday. “The United States too looks positively at South-North Korean dialogue and has expressed its willingness to start dialogue with the North,” Mr. Moon’s spokesman, Kim Eui-kyeom, told reporters. Dialogue with the North has been used by successive American administrations as a carrot — paired with the stick of sanctions — in the hopes of getting the isolated nation to end its nuclear weapons program. Until recently, Trump administration officials insisted no such meetings would take place until the North had first taken steps toward disarmament. President Trump recently described Mr. Moon’s overtures to the North Koreans as “appeasement.” And when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said in December that the United States was willing to hold a “meeting without precondition,” the White House insisted his comments were premature.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 26
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
But in an interview with The Washington Post after he left South Korea, Mr. Pence suggested that the United States was open to a meeting, even indicating that it would enter talks without preconditions. “So the maximum pressure campaign is going to continue and intensify,” Mr. Pence said of the punishing sanctions imposed on the North by the United Nations. “But if you want to talk, we’ll talk.” Agreeing to talks before the North Koreans have demonstrated a willingness to dismantle their weapons program would be a subtle but potentially significant shift in Washington’s approach, and a win for Mr. Moon, who has hoped to bring North Korea and the United States to the negotiating table. When Mr. Pence and Mr. Moon met last week, the allies apparently found common ground: They would agree to talks without set rules, but they will continue to use sanctions as leverage. “President Moon and I reflected last night on the need to do something fundamentally different,” Mr. Pence told reporters on Friday after meeting with the South Korean leader. The allies, he said, would demand “at the outset of any new dialogue or negotiations” that North Korea “put denuclearization on the table and take concrete steps with the world community to dismantle, permanently and irreversibly, their nuclear and ballistic missile programs.” “Then, and only then, will the world community consider negotiating and making changes in the sanctions regime that’s placed on them today,” Mr. Pence said. During Mr. Pence’s trip to South Korea, Kim Yo-jong, the sister and special envoy of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, also visited the South as part of an Olympic delegation. She extended an invitation from her brother to Mr. Moon for a summit meeting in North Korea. Mr. Moon, who invited athletes from the North to participate in the Olympics — where they marched with South Korean athletes under a united Korean flag during the opening ceremony — has seen the Games as an important step toward promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula. If Mr. Pence’s comments reflect official White House policy, it could mean that the Trump administration has been heartened by a lull in North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests in recent weeks and an emerging détente between the two Koreas. North Korea has not conducted any major weapons tests since Nov. 29, when it launched an intercontinental ballistic missile powerful enough to reach the mainland United States. Even if talks start between North Korea and United States, the gap between the countries remains wide. North Korea has said that it would not bargain away its weapons, and would only discuss mutual arms reduction. Some analysts said North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons, and that it would use any future talks with Washington to be accepted as a nuclear power and win large economic concessions, in return for agreeing not to advance its nuclear weapons program any further. Others analysts believe the North is willing to talk because it desperately wants to find a way to ease the sanctions that have taken a toll on its economy. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/world/asia/north-korea-pence-talks.html Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 27
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
EUROPE/RUSSIA
Reuters (New York, N.Y.) U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis to Press European Allies on Military Spending By Robin Emmott and Idrees Ali February 13, 2018 BRUSSELS (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis will press European allies on Wednesday to stick to a promise to increase military budgets as the United States offers an increase in its own defense spending in Europe. For the first time, NATO countries have submitted plans to show how they will reach a target to spend 2 percent of economic output on defense every year by 2024, after President Donald Trump threatened to withdraw support for low-spending allies. Fifteen of the 28 countries, excluding the United States, now have a strategy to meet a NATO benchmark first agreed in 2014 in response to Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region, following years of cuts to European defense budgets. It is unclear whether that will be enough to impress Trump when he attends a NATO summit in July. “We cannot outsource Europe’s security obligations to the United States,” British Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson told reporters at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting. NATO data shows that Britain, Greece, Romania and the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania meet, or are close to, the 2 percent goal, while France and Turkey are among those countries set to reach it soon. France plans to increase its defense spending by more than a third between 2017 and 2025, but Spain has said it will not meet the 2024 target. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Norway and Denmark are also lagging, while Hungary expects to meet the goal only by 2026. Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, plans a multi-billion euro increase in defense spending but this is not enough to take it up to the 2 percent target by 2024. Mattis is expected to take a tough stance with allies at the lunchtime meeting, said Katie Wheelbarger, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. “He will address those who don’t have national plans to meet 2 percent and suggest they really need to develop those plans,” she told reporters. NOT JUST NUMBERS The issue of low defense spending in Europe has long been an irritant in the United States, whose new national defense strategy centers on countering Russia after more than a decade of focusing on battling Islamist militants. Military analysts say Europe is now vulnerable to a range of threats, including Russia’s military modernization, Islamist militancy and electronic warfare on computer networks. One area of tension lies in the language of the NATO spending pledge of 2014. Allies committed to “move toward” 2 percent, but Trump now says 2 percent is the “bare minimum”. This week the Pentagon proposed its own increase of more than 30 percent in funding, primarily to deter Russia.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 28
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Some Europeans say focusing on the 2 percent figure is misleading as it does not take into account how money is spent. Much of Belgian and British defense spending is set to be taken up by costly upgrades to fighter jet fleets, which military analysts say could come at the expense of other capabilities, such as sea patrols and infantry. Germany is also one of the biggest troop contributors to NATO missions, from the Baltics to Afghanistan. “It isn’t just about dry figures,” Germany’s Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen told reporters. “It’s also about who is ultimately doing what.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nato/u-s-tells-nato-allies-spending-plans-still- falling-short-idUSKCN1FY013 Return to top
TASS Russian News Agency (Moscow, Russia) Russian Military Test Fires New Upgraded Air Defense Missile — Media Author Not Attributed February 12, 2018 The new upgraded air defense missile is capable of intercepting single and multiple strikes, including with the use of new generation intercontinental ballistic missiles MOSCOW, February 12. /TASS/. The Russian military test fired an upgraded air defense missile at the firing range Sary-Shagan in Kazakhstan, Russian newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda reported on Monday. "We have successfully test fired a new upgraded air defense missile," the newspaper quoted Andrei Prikhodko, the deputy commander of Aerospace Forces’ air and missile defense task force, as saying. "The missile’s tactical and technical characteristics regarding the range, precision and operational lifetime are significantly higher compared to present-day weapons," Prikhodko said. The new upgraded air defense missile is capable of intercepting single and multiple strikes, including with the use of new generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, he added. http://tass.com/defense/989548
Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 29
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
TASS Russian News Agency (Moscow, Russia) Belgium Seeks to Help Overcome Difficulties in Russia’s Relations with EU and NATO Author Not Attributed February 13, 2018 MOSCOW, February 13. /TASS/. Moscow values the efforts that Brussels has been making to help overcome issues in Russia’s relations with the European Union and NATO, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said following talks with his Belgian counterpart Didier Reynders on Tuesday. According to Lavrov, there was a rather thorough discussion of the situation in the Euro-Atlantic region, including Russia’s relations with the EU and NATO. "We value Brussels’ consistent determination to overcome the current issues in relations between Russia and the West, as well as to restore and strengthen trust and boost meaningful dialogue," Lavrov said. "We welcome our Belgian partners’ efforts to improve the situation in Europe. In any case, we are facing common threats and challenges," the Russian foreign minister added, pointing to the "Belgian leadership’s determination to boost dialogue with Russia." http://tass.com/politics/989813 Return to top
Ars Technica (New York, NY) Russian Nuclear Weapons Engineers Caught • Minting Blockchange with Supercomputer By Sean Gallagher February 9, 2018 The system—used for simulating weapons tests—was not supposed to be connected to Internet. Russia's Interfax News Agency reports that engineers at the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNC-VNIIEF)—the Russian Federation Nuclear Center facility where scientists designed the Soviet Union's first nuclear bomb—have been arrested for mining cryptocurrency with "office computing resources," according to a spokesperson for the Institute. "There has been an unsanctioned attempt to use computer facilities for private purposes including so-called mining," said Tatyana Zalesskaya, head of the Institute's press service. Zalesskaya did not say how many people were detained, and the Federal Security Service (FSB) has not issued a statement on the arrests or criminal charges pending. But reports indicate that the group was caught trying to harness the lab's supercomputer to mine cryptocurrency. The Institute is located in Sarov, a "closed" city east of Moscow where nuclear weapons research has been conducted since 1946. The facility is so secret that it was left off Soviet maps; Sarov is surrounded by fences and guarded by the Russian military accordingly. While the city is the home of Russia's Nuclear Weapons Museum, don't plan a visit anytime soon—access to Sarov is restricted, and no one who does not live in the city is allowed to visit without permission. Foreigners visiting on official business have to surrender their passports, cell phones, and other electronic devices at the city's checkpoints.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 30
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Because of the nature of the work at the Institute, technically none of the Institute's computers— including its 1-petaflop capable supercomputer, used for simulating tests of nuclear weapons designs—is supposed to be connected to the Internet. According to the Russian news service Mash, someone at the Institute attempted to connect the supercomputer to the Internet, and that attempt was detected by the FSB, launching an investigation. Cryptocurrency speculation and mining have generated so much interest in Russia that one businessman—Alexey Kolesnik—recently bought two power plants in the Russian republics of Perm Krai and Udmurtia to be used exclusively to generate electricity for Bitcoin-mining data centers. But there have been numerous other attempts recently in Russia to harness corporate and industrial computer systems for illicit cryptocurrency mining as well. Zalesskaya told Interfax that a large number of companies "with large computing capacity" have recently experienced attempts to harness their computing infrastructure for cryptocurrency mining, but the PR rep told Interfax that these sorts of schemes "will be severely suppressed at our enterprises. This is technically a hopeless and criminal offense." https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/02/russian-nuclear-weapons-engineers-caught- %C2%AD%C2%AD%C2%AD%C2%ADminting-blockchange-with-supercomputer/ Return to top
MIDDLE EAST
Haaretz (Tel Aviv, Israel) In U.S., Israel-Syria Border Clash Triggers New War over Iran Nuclear Deal By Allison Kaplan Sommer February 12, 2018 Republicans and pro-Israel camp point finger at Obama for being soft on Iran and Syria, while Democrats blame Trump for decertifying Iran deal Like every other issue in the United States these days, foreign policy discussion has become fiercely partisan. Every new problem or conflict around the globe triggers a flurry of finger-pointing and accusations as to whether the legacy of President Barack Obama or the current policies of the Trump White House are responsible. The stunning exchange of fire between Israel and Iran and Syria on Saturday – when Israel struck 12 targets in Syria, after an Israeli fighter jet was shot down and an Iranian drone intercepted in Israeli airspace – was no exception, reopening a Pandora’s box of accusations and recriminations surrounding the Iran nuclear deal. For Republicans and pro-Israel opponents of the 2015 agreement – two groups that often overlap – blame fell squarely on the Obama administration’s lap. It was the controversial Iran nuclear deal, they argue, that both emboldened and financially enabled Iran to set up its military infrastructure in Syria, bolster Hezbollah proxies in Lebanon and set the stage for Saturday’s skirmish. Their argument goes that it was the nuclear deal, together with Obama’s unwillingness to forcefully engage at an earlier stage of the Syrian civil war, that led to the chaos that gave Iran the opportunity to plant its flag in Israel’s backyard – with Russian support and agreement. For Democrats, it is President Donald Trump’s decertification and weakening of the Iran deal that’s to blame, sending Iranian leaders a message that they have little to lose by thumbing their nose at
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 31
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // the United States. They also point to Trump’s refusal to criticize or pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin’s support and protection of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime would, presumably, put him in a position to rein in the Iranians. Trump has been criticized by former Obama officials for failing to speak out more forcefully against the growing Iranian threat on Israel’s northern border, even after Saturday’s events. Daniel B. Shapiro, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, took to the media – as well as to Twitter – highlighting the “crisis” atmosphere in the Trump administration as the reason for what he sees as an insufficient response. “President Trump is obviously distracted by the Russian investigation and the White House staffing debacle,” Shapiro told the Daily Beast. “The State Department is generally sidelined from discussions with Israel. The U.S.-Israel relationship has generally been managed under Trump by only three or four people, which is just not a viable way to manage real time crises that require coordinated responses across the political, military, diplomatic and intelligence spheres.” The staunchest opponents of the Iran deal are splitting the blame for Iran’s empowerment equally between Obama and Trump. They are critical both of Obama’s efforts over the Iran deal initially, and then Trump’s unwillingness to move against it more forcefully. Despite his decertification of the deal last October, in mid-January Trump once again chose to waive U.S. sanctions on Iran, keeping the Iran deal alive in the short term. But at the same time, the U.S. president accompanied his waiver with a statement that it would be the “last time” he did it. Trump said it was his “strong inclination” to withdraw from the deal altogether, but he had chosen not to do so yet. He was ready to make the move, he said, if the deal’s “disastrous flaws” were not fixed – most notably, forcing Iran to curtail its ballistic missile program. But his proposal seems to be a nonstarter: the Iranian government has said it will not accept any modifications to the deal. And in the wake of Saturday’s events in Israel and Syria, Aaron David Miller – a former Middle East negotiator in administrations of both parties and now Middle East director at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars – laid out a possible doomsday scenario that could ensue if Trump carries through with his promise to end U.S. commitment to the deal. “Forget today’s headline re: Iran/Israeli/Syrian clash,” he tweeted. “Consider possible trend line: Trump withdraws from Iran nuclear deal; Netanyahu indicted and looks for diversion; Trump pushes for war against Iran; redlines collapse; and region trips into devastating Israeli-Hezbollah war.” https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/in-u-s-israel-syria-clash-triggers-new-war-over-iran-nuclear- deal-1.5808540 Return to top
American Military News (New York, N.Y.) Iran Just Revealed Nuclear Ballistic Missiles That Are Similar to North Korea’s By Melissa Leon February 13, 2018 Iran recently revealed new nuclear-capable, medium-range ballistic missiles during military parades over the weekend.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 32
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Experts say the missiles share similarities to technology coming out of North Korea and its missile program, The Washington Free Beacon reported. The missiles can reportedly strike Israel even if they are fired from Iran. Fars News Agency, Iran’s unofficial state-run media, reported that Qadr and Fajr 5 missiles were displayed in Tehran, as well as the newer, short-range anti-armor Toufan 2-M missile. The Qadr is the homemade ballistic missile that could reach Israel – it has a firing range of 2,000 meters, or nearly 1,243 miles. “The missile can carry different types of ‘Blast’ and ‘MRV’ (Multiple Reentry Vehicle) payloads to destroy a range of targets,” Fars reported. “The new version of Qadr H can be launched from mobile platforms or silos in different positions and can escape missile defense shields due to their radar- evading capability.” This doesn’t necessarily bode well for Israel, as tensions between the two countries run high, and Iran continues to fund terrorist organizations that are situated near Israel’s border. The Iranian people late last year spoke up and protested the Iranian regime. Protests began on Dec. 28, 2017, in Iran’s second largest city and one of Iran’s holiest places, Mashhad, due to the country’s high inflation, economic policies and economic inequality, and unemployment. The protests spread across the country, and the movement’s message turned more toward regime change. Despite the movement having calmed, there are still reports surfacing of protestors having been tortured and possibly even killed while in custody. And, many of those Iranians in custody are being held without charges against them. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces, has said protestors should cease their actions. The IRGC has also come out and tried to say the protests are over, but it is clear the Iranian people are still speaking out. U.S. President Donald Trump has called the IRGC a “corrupt personal terror force.” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has recognized the people’s right to peacefully protest but warned that security forces would not tolerate vandalism and chaos. And, the grave penalty for speaking out against the Iranian government is death, if convicted. President Trump and the White House supported the protestors, and they have criticized the Iranian government for sponsoring terrorist groups around the Middle East. Trump also warned that he and the United States are watching for human rights violations, and that the U.S. could impose sanctions if such violations occur. Trump has criticized Iran and called the country out for funding terrorists and creating a dangerous missile arsenal. The President has also pointed to the Iran nuclear deal that was drawn up in 2015, calling it “one of the worst” and “the most one-sided transaction the United States has ever entered into.” Trump said the “rogue regime” of Iran is only perpetuating terrorism around the world, and is becoming more aggressive in doing so. “The Iranian dictatorship […] remains the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism,” the President has said, saying the regime provides assistance to al-Qaida, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorists. Despite this, Trump recently upheld Iran nuclear deal, which means the U.S. will continue waiving nuclear-related economic sanctions on Iran.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 33
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
The sanctions were lifted per the landmark 2015 nuclear agreement, which Trump has called “one of the worst” and “the most one-sided transaction the United States has ever entered into.” https://americanmilitarynews.com/2018/02/iran-just-revealed-nuclear-ballistic-missiles-that- are-similar-to-north-koreas/ Return to top
Sputnik International (Moscow, Russia) West Used Lizards to Spy on Iran's Nuclear Program – Military Official Author Not Attributed February 13, 2018 Hassan Firuzabadi, former chief-of-staff of Iran’s armed forces, addressed the recent arrest of environmentalists on espionage charges. Responding to local media questions, the senior military advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that the West had often used tourists, scientists and environmentalists to spy on the country. "Several years ago, some individuals came to Iran to collect aid for Palestine… We were suspicious of the route they chose. In their possessions were a variety of reptile desert species like lizards, chameleons… We found out that their skin attracts atomic waves and that they were nuclear spies who wanted to find out where inside the Islamic republic of Iran we have uranium mines and where we are engaged in atomic activities," he told the ILNA news agency. His comments follow the death of a prominent Iranian environmentalist, Kavous Seyed Emami, who also held Canadian citizenship. Seyed Emami, who hanged himself while in solitary confinement in Tehran’s Evin Prison, was arrested two weeks ago, along with other activists accused of working undercover and providing intelligence to foreigners. Since 2003, Iran’s nuclear program has become a challenge to the non-proliferation regime, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first reported that Tehran did not declare sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities. Fears that Iran’s nuclear program was not peaceful had been growing for twelve years, when on July 14, 2015, following a series of intense negotiations, Iran and the P5+1, comprising Russia, the United States, China, France and the United Kingdom plus Germany, signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, ensuring the peaceful nature of Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. In January 2017, US President Donald Trump's administration announced that it would waive sanctions on Iran as it was required by the JCPOA, however, Trump said it would be the last time he signed the waiver unless the “terrible” deal was modified. Trump also announced his intention to toughen anti-Iran sanctions over Tehran's ballistic missiles tests. https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201802131061620507-west-lizards-spy-iran-nuclear- program/ Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 34
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Ynetnews.com (Rishon Lezion, Israel) With Russia's Help, Arab States Speeding up Nuclear Arms Race By Itamar Eichner February 12, 2018 Using Russian knowledge and technology, more and more countries in the Middle East and North Africa are building nuclear power plants, and not just for civilian purposes; according to Dr. Shaul Shay of IDC Herzliya, this is also the Sunni Arab world's way of dealing with the Iranian nuclear program. Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa are pushing forward with the construction of nuclear power plants, according to a new report released by the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya led by Major-General (res.) Amos Gilad. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) will be the first state to operate a nuclear reactor (made in South Korea). Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria are expected to follow in its footsteps, having declared their intention to build nuclear reactors. Each of these countries is in the process of implementing the plan. While these countries say they need the nuclear power plants to meet the growing demand for energy for economic purposes, the IPS report reveals this isn't the only reason for their efforts. The report's author, Dr. Shaul Shay, director of research at the IPS and a former deputy head of the National Security Council (NSC), says the purchase of nuclear technology is also the Sunni Arab world's way of dealing with the Iranian nuclear program. This trend is encouraged by Russia, which is interested in providing the knowledge and technology as a way of reinforcing its position in the region. Dr. Shay believes the information collected as part of the research supports Israel's claim that the fear of a nuclear Iran is prompting Middle Eastern countries to acquire knowledge and nuclear technology. This trend is particularly evident among Iran's rivals—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and the Persian Gulf countries. The world powers' nuclear agreement with Iran, which relaxes the sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic in exchange for a commitment to avoid developing a nuclear weapon in the coming decade, gives its neighbors time to develop a nuclear infrastructure of their own before the agreement expires. While Dr. Shay stresses there is a major difference between the ability to develop a nuclear program and obtaining knowledge, nuclear technology and a nuclear reactor for energy purposes, he says the existence of knowledge and a nuclear infrastructure could help speed up the processes aimed at turning the civil technology into a military technology. The first country in the Arab world planning to inaugurate a nuclear reactor is UAE, with South Korea's help. Its neighbor, Saudi Arabia, will be the second Arab country in the Persian Gulf with nuclear energy. In 2011, Saudi Arabia hired a civilian company to locate the optimal spot for the future reactors. The country has also signed cooperation agreements with the United States, France, Russia and other countries in the field of nuclear energy. Saudi Arabia has officially announced that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, it will follow in its footsteps. The Saudis have close strategic ties with Pakistan, which already has a nuclear weapon.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 35
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Saudi Arabia provided Pakistan with financial aid when the country was dealing with international sanctions, Dr. Shay notes, helping it move forward with the development of its nuclear program. Egypt to build 4 reactors The arms race is taking place among Israel's neighbors too. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi met several weeks ago with Russian President Vladimir Putin to sign a cooperation agreement for the establishment of a nuclear facility at Dabaa, near Alexandria. The agreement, which was signed with Russia's state atomic energy corporation Rosatom, states that Egypt will use the agency's services to build and operate the facility's four reactors in the next 60 years. This agreement joins additional cooperation agreements in the nuclear area which Russia has signed with Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia. Israel's eastern neighbor, Jordan, is also working to obtain nuclear technology with South Korea's help. Russia's growing involvement in the Arab world's nuclear arms race, Dr. Shay believes, has to do with Putin's efforts to restore Russia's position as a world power in the Middle East. Putin sends Russian advisors and exports to every country that has signed such an agreement with him, thereby reinforcing his ties with the Arab world. Putin, apparently, isn't hiding his intentions. In April 2016, Russia's nuclear energy agency announced that it was opening an office in Dubai to supervise the nuclear reactors being built with the agency's help across the Middle East. How is this arms race expected to affect Israel? "While at this stage the countries are developing their nuclear programs for civilian purposes," Dr. Shay explains, "they are largely doing it in response to the Iranian nuclear challenge. This means that in the future, if they wish to develop a nuclear weapon, these infrastructures will speed up the process. Security-wise, the affect on Israel will have to do with the nature of its relations with these countries." https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5108904,00.html Return to top
INDIA/PAKISTAN
India Today (New Delhi, India) India-Pakistan, India-China Ties to Worsen, Says Report by US intelligence Chief Author Not Attributed February 14, 2018 The US intel boss Dan Coats submitted a Worldwide Threat Assessment report in front of the Congress yesterday highlighting the worldwide threats to the US. The report mentions that Pakistan will continue to be a threat to the US by developing nuclear weapons. "Pakistan will continue to threaten US interests by deploying new nuclear weapons capabilities, maintaining its ties to militants, restricting counter-terrorism cooperation, and drawing closer to China," the report states.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 36
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Pakistan continues to develop nuclear weapons including "short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles" which could lead to tensions in the south Asian region. The report also states that terrorist organisations will continue to take advantage of the safe havens provided by Pakistan. These terrorist organisations will use Pakistan's area to conduct attacks against India and Afghanistan that can work against US interests in the area. Relations between India-Pakistan are also to remain tense due to ceasefire violations by Pakistan. "Relations between India and Pakistan are likely to remain tense, with continued violence on the Line of Control and the risk of escalation if there is another high-profile terrorist attack in India or an uptick in violence on the Line of Control," the report said. Speaking during the Senate Intelligence Committee's annual hearing on "Worldwide Threats", Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats discussed cyber-security, terrorism, and threats posed by other nations like Pakistan, China, and North Korea. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/india-pakistan-india-china-ties-to-worsen-says-report- by-us-intelligence-chief-1169152-2018-02-14 Return to top
Times of India (New Delhi, India) Pakistan Developing New Types of Nuclear Weapons: US Author Not Attributed February 13, 2018 WASHINGTON: Pakistan is developing new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical ones, that bring more risks to the region, America's intelligence chief warned on Tuesday. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats' remarks came days after a group of Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Muhammad terrorists struck the Sunjuwan Military Camp in Jammu, killing seven people including six soldiers. Pakistan is developing new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, Coats told lawmakers during a Congressional hearing on worldwide threats organised by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nukes, including short- range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles, he warned. These weapons will introduce new risks for escalation of dynamics and security in the region, Coats said, reflecting on the risks involved in developing such types of nuclear weapons. Coats also warned that Pakistan-supported terrorist groups would continue to carry out attacks inside India, thus risking escalation of tension between the two neighbours. "Militant groups supported by Islamabad will continue to take advantage of their safe haven in Pakistan to plan and conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan, including against US interests," Coats said during the hearing on 'Worldwide Threat Assessment' of the US intelligence community. Coats said North Korea will be among the most volatile and confrontational weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats to the US over the next year.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 37
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
North Korea's history of exporting ballistic missile technology to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance during Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor — destroyed in 2007 — illustrates its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies. In 2017 North Korea, for the second straight year, conducted a large number of ballistic missile tests, including its first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) tests. Pyongyang is committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. It also conducted its sixth and highest yield nuclear test to date. We assess that North Korea has a longstanding Biological Weapons (BW) capability and biotechnology infrastructure that could support a BW programme. We also assess that North Korea has a Chemical Weapons (CW) programme and probably could employ these agents by modifying conventional munitions or with unconventional, targeted methods, he said. Coats said state efforts to modernise, develop, or acquire WMD, their delivery systems, or their underlying technologies constitute a major threat to the security of the United States, its deployed troops, and its allies. Both state and non-state actors have already demonstrated the use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria. Biological and chemical materials and technologies — almost always dual-use — move easily in the globalised economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to design and use them for legitimate and illegitimate purposes. Information about the latest discoveries in the life sciences also diffuses rapidly around the globe, widening the accessibility of knowledge and tools for beneficial purposes and for potentially nefarious applications. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-developing-new-types-of-nuclear- weapons-us/articleshow/62906745.cms Return to top
COMMENTARY
War on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.) The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Future of the Indo-Pacific Military Balance By Eric Sayers February 13, 2018 Thirty years ago, the United States and Soviet Union successfully completed an extended round of negotiations that culminated in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987. Despite persistent calls from the Soviet Union during the negotiation that the treaty only limit ground-based intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe, American negotiators insisted that the treaty be global in scope after strong lobbying from their Japanese allies who worried that Europe’s missile dilemma would only be shifted to Asia if the systems were not globally eliminated. The final treaty prohibited the United States and Russia from the possession,
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 38
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // production, and flight-testing of ground-launched ballistic (GLBM) and cruise missiles (GLCM) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, as well as their associated launchers and support infrastructure. After seven years of negotiations, the treaty ushered in a new level of strategic stability in the European theater and beyond that, despite recent Russian actions, has remained intact to this day. Despite the Eurocentric nature of the treaty and the positive impact it continues to have in Europe, the debilitating impact it is having on U.S. policy beyond Europe can no longer be ignored. China is not a party to the treaty. For two decades, it has heavily invested in a conventional missile- based anti-access/area-denial strategy. According to testimony from Adm. Harry Harris, approximately 95 percent of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force missiles fall in the 500 to 5,500-kilometer range. Given China’s advantageous geographic position in Asia, this capability provides Beijing a relatively inexpensive conventional means to hold U.S. bases and ships at risk across the Western Pacific from the bastion of the Chinese mainland. As a result, America’s military superiority in the Indo-Pacific has come under considerable strain. While the INF Treaty has enduring merit in Europe and the United States should pursue an aggressive effort to get Russia back into compliance, the same cannot be said for Asia. This presents an inconvenient dilemma for Washington’s policy making towards NATO. But if, as the Trump administration holds, great power competition with both Russia and China should be the central organizing principles for U.S. foreign policy, the strategic and operational limitations the treaty levies on U.S. deterrence planning in the Indo-Pacific can no longer be ignored by the Department of Defense. To be clear, I am not advocating for the introduction of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles into the Asia-Pacific, but this treaty imposes limits on all intermediate-missiles, even conventional missiles. This limitation comes at too high a cost in Asia. And a conversation needs to begin about what the treaty means for America’s interests in Asia and what options exist for policymakers going forward. Indeed, absent a serious reassessment of the treaty and its application by the Trump administration, in the coming decade the growing conventional military imbalance could well mean that the United States will not be able to uphold its security commitments to allies or reassure partners in the Indo-Pacific in the face of an increasingly assertive China. Consider the military benefits, if the United States was able to deploy conventional ground- launched intermediate-range missiles in the Western Pacific. First, the U.S. military would have a relatively affordable option to bolster already insufficient offensive conventional fires in the Pacific Command theater. Today the U.S. military can only project power at long-range by fighter, bomber, or sea-based platforms, relegating the U.S. military to the highest end of the cost curve for this mission. For instance, an Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyer costs approximately $1.8 billion, but it only has 96 Vertical Launching System cells of which only a portion are loaded to contain Tomahawk cruise missiles to leave room for defensive weapons like the Standard Missile. Ground-launched systems with an intermediate-range in, for example, Guam, Japan, and Northern Australia, would provide planners with a means to augment air and maritime strike platforms with new land component capabilities at a fraction of the cost. In addition, it would free high-demand air and maritime forces to prioritize other missions such as anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and the anti-air mission. This is all the more important as the Pentagon continues to feel the pressure of sequestration and China doubles down on its quantitative military advantages. Second, other than expensive penetrating platforms like the B-2 bomber, the treaty limits the U.S. military’s ability to hold China’s interior geography at risk and thereby gives Beijing a pass to avoid
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 39
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // investing in costly defensive systems to protect the various military facilities and systems it deliberately bases inland. If the United States could deploy conventional ground-launched systems that could hold China’s interior at risk it would potentially force greater Chinese investment in missile defense systems to protect this military infrastructure. In short, every dollar spent on a defensive system is a dollar Beijing cannot devote to offensive systems along its coast or in its maritime and aerospace forces. That is the sort of competitive strategy American planners should be eager to exploit. Third, deploying these systems would complicate China’s military planning by presenting an offensive capability that can be deployed at locations across the first-island chain (including in the territory of allies like Japan and even the Philippines) and beyond (a ballistic missile could be deployed to Guam or Northern Australia and still hold most of mainland China at risk, just as bombers deployed to those locations do today). Instead of accounting for American and allied facilities in single locations like Kadena, Yokosuka, and Guam, this capability would ensure China’s military planners would have to devote limited reconnaissance-strike resources and worry about the potential deployment of these systems across the first-island chain and beyond. Finally, this type of capability would offer new opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners. Whether through the joint development of systems, Foreign military sales, or bilateral exercises, there are numerous opportunities the United States could exploit in this space to work with like-minded allies and partners in the region, including Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and Vietnam. When challenged, U.S. officials have insisted that the INF Treaty does not restrict the Pentagon’s ability to project power in Asia in ways that threaten American interests. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee last year, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Selva, argued that because under the treaty “we are not restricted from fielding ballistic missile or cruise missile systems that can be launched from ships or airplanes” the U.S. military can still hold targets in China at risk. These air and maritime platforms are in the U.S. arsenal and at the disposal of the commander of Pacific Command, but, as previously mentioned, Pacific Command has competing missions, limited magazine depth, and must project power over the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean. A mobile, ground-launched missile capability would only augment these forces while creating new options for enhancing deterrence and warfighting. Some argue that deploying intermediate range missiles would make the United States appear like the aggressor in Asia, further contributing to militarization and potential arms racing in the region. Given China’s huge investment in cruise and ballistic missile systems, it is hard to imagine such a criticism carrying much weight. Furthermore, while the deployment of these systems to the region would be a new development, there is no valid military distinction between a fight squadron or long-range cruise missile battery deployed to Kadena Air Base or a B-52 bomber squadron or conventional ballistic missile battery positioned in Guam. The benefits from a military planning and competitive strategy perspective in the Pacific are clear. But how should Washington proceed? While still a party to the treaty, the Pentagon can take steps today to increase the firing rates, capacity, and INF-compliant range of existing missile systems. Under the treaty, it can also commence research and development into non-compliant systems, including modifying existing and emerging air and sea-launched cruise missiles to ground-launched configuration; extend the range of existing ground-launch systems or develop new systems; and modify defensive interceptors to function in offensive mode, similar to the effort to allow the sea- launched SM-6 to function in an offensive mode in recent years. There are also innovative, treaty- compliant ways that the Pentagon could develop and deploy systems that have a boost range that is compliant with INF restrictions but a glide range that can substantially increase the weapons range.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 40
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
This is, perhaps, the most promising method to remain compliant with the treaty while also deploying longer-range systems. Short of full abrogation of the treaty, other diplomatic options exist to address the way forward. They range from the far-fetched — seeking China’s compliance with the treaty — to the less likely — renegotiating a new treaty with a geographic limitation in Europe that would allow limited or even unlimited INF system deployments outside of Europe or just in East Asia. How U.S. policy proceeds on the INF Treaty is a critical topic, but for too long consideration about this treaty has only occurred in the context of the European theater and our NATO allies. If the Trump administration is serious about the military competition with both Russia and China, then it must consider the uncomfortable questions related to INF restrictions and Asia. Given that the pace and scope of China’s military modernization shows no signs of slowing down, the U.S. military may have to soon choose between addressing the treaty’s debilitating impact on the military balance in Asia or, absent a major buildup of conventional forces that appears unlikely in the near future, allowing the credibility of American security commitments to erode away. https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/asia-inf/ Return to top
Defense One (Washington, D.C.) How to Keep US Missile Defense on the Right Track By Ian Williams February 13, 2018 Use the coming funding boost to smooth the development of a new kill vehicle and increase GMD testing in general. Recent budget moves will give the U.S. missile defense effort a major boost in funding over the coming year, likely allowing the purchase of additional Ground Based Interceptor missiles on top of the 44 already deployed for use by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system against ICBMs headed toward the U.S. homeland. The funding boost should also be used to smooth the development of a new interceptor warhead and increase testing of the GMD system in general. A GBI’s warhead — more precisely called a kill vehicle — is an intricate piece of equipment designed to hunt down and physically collide with an enemy missile in the vacuum of space. The ones currently deployed are called Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles, or EKVs. They are produced by hand, one-by-one, in a process that involves more than 130,000 steps. The EKVs have undergone several fixes and enhancements over the years. A somewhat staggered and uneven process, these incremental improvements have resulted in a mixed GBI fleet that employs three EKV variants — CE-1, CE-2, and CE-2 Block 1 — each with differing levels of reliability and capability. The GBI intercept test record has been mixed, with GBIs successfully intercepting ballistic targets in 10 out of 18 attempts since 1998. The test record of GBIs in the three configurations that are currently deployed is better: six intercepts in seven attempts. (To be specific: four successful intercepts in five tests for the CE-1, one in one for the reconfigured CE-2 with IMU firmware upgrades, and one in one for CE-2 Block 1.) Within a decade, however, the EKV is to be replaced by the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, or RKV. This program seeks to take what we have learned from the past 20 years of hit-to-kill missile defense development and simplify the GBI kill vehicle design, making it more easily producible, cheaper, and more reliable. A more reliable kill vehicle means that the system will be able to fire fewer
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 41
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // interceptors at an incoming missile to ensure its destruction. The RKV will likely commence flight- testing in 2019, with an intercept test in 2020. If these tests are satisfactory, initial deployments of the RKV could begin in late 2021 or perhaps 2022. The goal would be to replace almost the entire GBI fleet with RKVs in 2024 or 2025. The final result will be a nearly uniform GBI fleet, which would simplify engagement planning and long-term operations and maintenance. Some have argued that the Missile Defense Agency’s schedule for RKV is too aggressive, saying the timeline will create additional risk and lead to the kind of uncertainties in reliability that have affected GMD in the past. This caution is not without foundation. The first operational deployments of GMD in 2004 came less than two years after President George W. Bush’s initial decision to deploy missile defenses for the U.S. homeland. Missile defense proponents and critics alike must acknowledge that this rapid, politically mandated turnaround time contributed to EKV reliability issues later on. RKV reliability is too important to rush. Yet there are differences between then and now that make this an imperfect comparison. For one, the body of knowledge about hit-to-kill missile defense technology is today vastly greater than in the early 2000s. A Dec. 24 L.A. Times article, for instance, describes RKV as a “prototype” kill vehicle. This is a somewhat misleading characterization. Whereas the EKV was initially fielded as a sort of advanced prototype, the RKV will share many components with the most recent CE-II Block 1 variant, which the Missile Defense Agency successfully tested in 2017. RKV will also incorporate elements of other proven systems, such as the U.S. Navy’s Standard Missile-3 and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, both of which have undergone significant successful testing. The RKV might be better viewed as a much awaited, much-overdue design turn to refine the EKV prototype into a more streamlined and producible system. The RKV effort is indeed long overdue. Yet an EKV redesign has lagged because of GMD’s rushed initial deployment and uneven political and budgetary prioritization. An EKV redesign effort has also suffered against the competing need to fix reliability issues in the deployed GBIs uncovered during post-deployment testing. Other missile defense interceptors, such as Aegis BMD, benefited greatly from kill vehicle redesigns. The Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile, or LEAP, prototype, for example, underwent a major redesign to create the kill vehicles aboard today’s Aegis SM-3 interceptors. GMD, by contrast, has not been afforded this opportunity until now. The L.A. Times piece also highlighted that the Missile Defense Agency currently plans only one intercept test of RKV before deploying them. This appears quite a minimal testing regime, but one must not ignore the non-intercept flight-testing and ground-testing that RKV will undergo as well. Such tests, although they lack the same level of media attention, will provide significant information about the functioning of the RKV design. And to be sure, the Missile Defense Agency will not deploy the RKV if it fails to meet its test objectives. The United States, nevertheless, does need to test its homeland missile defense system more often. The more data points we have, the better we can assess confidence in the system. During the Bush Administration, a GMD test was conducted about twice a year. Since 2010, the testing cadence has declined to about once every two or three years. With the North Korean ICBM threat materializing at its current pace, a return to at least annual testing would be prudent. Not only would this improve confidence in the system, but would send Kim Jong Un a powerful signal that the United States will not allow itself to succumb to nuclear blackmail. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/02/how-keep-us-missile-defense-right- track/145921/?oref=d-river Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 42
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) Why China Will Go Full Steam Ahead in the Nuclear Arms Race By Cary Huang February 13, 2018 Cary Huang says China has the greatest incentive to boost its nuclear capabilities in the developing arms race between the world’s top nuclear powers. The build-up, however, undermines efforts towards non-proliferation and increases the chances of the weapons being used Has the cold war made a comeback? It may or may not have, but the resurrection of a cold war-style nuclear arms race is obvious, as the world’s three most powerful militaries are all now singing the same chorus, expressing their desire to enhance their nuclear capabilities. In its just-released 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration calls for strengthening its nuclear deterrence to counter the “growing threat” from the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, which are both scrambling to modernise their arsenals. Russian President Vladimir Putin is pushing a programme to upgrade 90 per cent of his country’s nuclear force, the largest in the world, by 2021. President Xi Jinping has just unveiled his ambitious programme to build a “world-class” military by 2050 to realise his “Chinese dream” of “national rejuvenation”. The calls from the establishment to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal are getting increasingly louder. The nuclear arms race was central to the cold war. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction explains how the sheer power of nuclear weapons and the fear that they evoke helped convince nations to refrain from engaging in a nuclear arms race, as there would be no winner in any nuclear war. It was perhaps the fact that the hydrogen bomb exploded by the United States in 1952 was 2,500 times more powerful than the Hiroshima atomic bomb that resulted in a worldwide nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation movement – the US-Soviet detente in the 1970s, the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 and the series of strategic arms limitation talks since the early 1970s. Still, there is fear that conventional war between nuclear-armed nations, as seen from the military conflicts between India and Pakistan, might also provoke a nuclear war. The fact is that while nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. The US policy review is likely to first spur competition among the major nuclear powers. As the top trio of nuclear powers begin to upgrade their nuclear arsenals, what will the United Kingdom and France do? And what about Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran? And the non-nuclear states? Among the big three, China has greater incentive to expand its nuclear arsenal, in view of its comparative disadvantage in nuclear force, which is incompatible with its fast-rising national strength. China has never declared the scale of its nuclear stockpile but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has placed it as the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, with 270 warheads. The US and Russia each have about 7,000 warheads. France has 300 and the UK has 215. China has long committed to the tenet of not being the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time under any circumstances” and has pledged to never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 43
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // nation. China maintains a “second strike” strategy, which means “to survive a first strike and then inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary” as a nuclear deterrent. But China, like past rising great powers, is also unlikely to accept decisive nuclear inferiority in perpetuity as it seeks to resume its historic status as a great world power. Moreover, America’s superiority and its capabilities to reduce or eliminate China’s ability to make a retaliatory strike might force Beijing to consider giving up its long no-first-use posture. China is likely to speed up its nuclear build-up and enhance its deterrent capabilities in a catch-up race, as the nuclear sabre- rattling persists. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2133033/why-china-will-go-full-steam- ahead-nuclear-arms-race Return to top
The Diplomat (Washington, DC) Trump's Nuclear Posture Review and China: No Way Forward? By Ankit Panda February 12, 2018 It’s strategy document season for the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. After issuing a National Security Strategy and a National Defence Strategy, the White House has released its long- awaited Nuclear Posture Review. The document succeeds the 2010 review by the administration of Barack Obama and is an ambitious departure from the status quo in U.S. nuclear thinking. In addition to calling for two new nuclear capabilities – a sea-launched cruise missile and a lower- yield warhead for existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles – the review expands the conditions under which the United States would use nuclear weapons to encompass more non- nuclear attacks, including cyberattacks and attacks on nuclear command and control. As with all U.S. reviews of this kind, the document thinks mainly in terms of Russia, the only near- peer nuclear power for the United States. The other two nuclear weapon states in a competitive and adversarial relationship with the United States – China and North Korea – both have far fewer nuclear weapons than the US. But China has come a long way as a nuclear power and the review notes that Beijing is “modernising and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces”. These include “entirely new nuclear capabilities”– presumably everything from advanced cruise missiles to hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and a new long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile. The review says that despite this build-up, China has shown “no transparency into its intentions”. While that lack of transparency may be well-placed, the Trump administration makes little attempt to show that it recognises known Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons. For instance, in underlining China’s determination to reclaim territory in the East and South China seas, the administration projects revisionist intent onto Chinese nuclear strategy. The review notes, for instance, that while “China’s declaratory policy and doctrine have not changed”, the rapid scope of modernisation raises question about “future intent”.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 44
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
Whatever we don’t know about China’s nuclear capabilities and debates within the country, the fact remains that Beijing’s observable nuclear posture remains wholly positioned around assured retaliation – China seeks to field a nuclear force that could survive a first strike and retaliate against any of its prospective nuclear aggressors, deterring would-be attackers in the process. While Western analysts are closely watching debates within China on the merits of it retaining its traditional “no first-use” nuclear posture, there’s little evidence that China’s leadership will adopt an explicit first-use posture any time soon. Even as China pursues salami tactics in the East and South China seas and modernises its conventional and nuclear forces, its thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in statecraft limits their role to deterrence. To be sure, the United States should rightfully concern itself with Chinese investments in advanced systems for theatre-wide nuclear strike capability. Beijing’s pursuit of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, precision hypersonic boost-glide missiles like the DF-17, antisatellite weapons, and a range of dual-capable medium- and intermediate-range missiles puts U.S. installations and aircraft carriers in East Asia at risk. As the review notes, if China’s overarching goal is to deny the U.S. military room for manoeuvre in East Asia, the modernisation of its nuclear forces supports that objective. The review ultimately presents little in the way of original thinking about how the U.S. can better understand Chinese intentions and work towards reining in China’s pursuit of advanced nuclear delivery methods, such as through bilateral arms control. The 2018 review will ultimately change little in the way China perceives nuclear threats from the United States. Instead, the document will vindicate China’s existing pursuit of vertical and horizontal force modernisation. https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/trumps-nuclear-posture-review-and-china-no-way-forward/ Return to top
War on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.) The Discrimination Problem: Why Putting Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons on Submarines Is So Dangerous By Vipin Narang February 8, 2018 The United States has the most diverse and potent nuclear force on the planet, capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating and destroying any military and any nation on earth. The Trump administration’s recently released Nuclear Posture Review doesn’t think that’s enough. Going beyond the modernization program that upgrades and maintains the existing force, the document calls for a variety of capabilities and missions for American nuclear forces that have long been on Republicans’ wish list. Specifically, the document places a renewed emphasis on expanding the role and size of the low-yield nuclear weapon force (with low yields not being all that low since they include 20 kiloton nuclear weapons, the same as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The most notable low-yield capabilities on the wish list include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which could be based on surface ships or submarines. The administration seeks to deploy low-yield nuclear weapons on both missiles to achieve the ultimate mission of the Nuclear Posture Review: to generate more flexible and tailored
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 45
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // nuclear responses to a wide spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies. Proponents argue that incorporating more low-yield nuclear weapons into the force posture gives the United States the ability to respond to various forms of aggression with more calibrated responses on the so-called escalation ladder (and in theory, deter or defeat that aggression without escalation to the strategic nuclear level). In other words, the Trump administration hopes to generate options beyond “suicide or surrender.” Although the aim of the low-yield SLBM and SLCM is to close this perceived “deterrence gap,” proponents of these capabilities have elided one key problem: how the adversary may perceive and react to their use. I call this the “discrimination problem.” Right now, all the SLBMs in the American inventory carry multiple — up to eight! — thermonuclear warheads. Mixing these missiles with one or several of the proposed low-yield warheads creates a very real problem: How will the adversary know which of the two is coming its way? It cannot. If the adversary sees a single SLBM headed toward it — even if that missile turns out to only be carrying a low-yield warhead — it must react as if it is facing the full brunt of American strategic nuclear use. It would be catastrophic— potentially nation-ending—to hope otherwise and be wrong. The new low-yield, or nonstrategic, nuclear weapons envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review would not be the first in the American inventory. There are already four types of aircraft-delivered tactical nuclear weapons in the force posture (three variants of the B-61 gravity bomb and an air launched cruise missile). So why does the review call for additional low-yield options? In a word: Russia. The administration’s basic concern is that Russia may try to use a low-yield nuclear weapon on American or allied forces without the United States being able to successfully respond in kind. This forces America into the “suicide or surrender” dilemma of either not responding at all or escalating directly to the strategic thermonuclear level by retaliating against the adversary’s cities (or against all its nuclear forces directly). The perceived gap in American capabilities is because U.S. aircraft- delivered B61s are vulnerable to Russian air defenses, limited by the range of the aircraft on which they are deployed, and cannot deliver a retaliatory blow as swiftly as ballistic missiles can. Therefore, the Nuclear Posture Review argues, the United States needs a new capability that can penetrate Russian defenses and deliver a low-yield nuclear weapon from anywhere within minutes. The basing mode that achieves this, without requiring a host nation, is at sea. In the near term this would involve modifying existing SLBMs to carry a low-yield variant of an existing warhead (for a variety of reasons, I assume the W76), while working in the long term to deploy a nuclear SLCM. The theory is that fielding this capability will deter Russia from its so-called “escalate to deescalate” nuclear strategy (insofar as that even exists), which is premised on the notion that using nuclear weapons early in a conflict, but in a limited way, will lead the United States to back down. If deterrence fails, low-yield nuclear options deliverable from American submarines provide a flexible and tailored response option to defeat Russian aggression. Here’s why it would be so dangerous to deploy the low-yield SLBM in particular. America presently fields one type of ballistic missile on its 14 nuclear weapons-designated Ohio-class submarines: the Trident II D5 missile. Each Trident missile can carry up to 8 independently targetable warheads, some combination of the W76 thermonuclear warhead (100 kilotons) or the W88 thermonuclear warhead (455 kilotons). Currently, if an adversary were to detect a launch of a Trident missile from an American ballistic missile submarine, there would be no uncertainty about what is coming its way: a strategic nuclear launch of at least about a megaton of yield, perhaps 3.6 megatons. This is, without question, a strategic nuclear launch by the United States aimed at destroying the adversary’s high-value cities, or perhaps its strategic nuclear force itself (also known as a counterforce strike). By reserving the SLBM for strategic nuclear use — and only strategic nuclear
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 46
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // use — there is no ambiguity about what a Trident launch means for both the United States and the adversary: all-out nuclear war. But if the United States starts deploying some Tridents with a single low-yield warhead and others with eight thermonuclear warheads, all on the same submarine, how will the adversary know what is coming its way? There is literally no way to tell which warhead yield is atop the missile — no early warning system can discriminate between the low-yield warhead and the strategic nuclear warheads at launch or in flight. Early warning systems can detect the point of launch and perhaps the type of missile fired. But not even the most sophisticated system can discriminate between a W76 or W88 warhead that is set to deliver hundreds of kilotons and a warhead that looks exactly the same but is set to deliver just 20 kilotons. The only thing an adversary sees is a Trident missile launch, which could now be anywhere from 20 kilotons of damage (designed to destroy a military base, for example) all the way up to 3.6 megatons (enough to destroy multiple cities and kill millions of civilians). Even if the early warning system could see that there was only a single warhead instead of eight, how confident are we that the adversary will believe their radars instead of fearing the worst? What does this mean? If the adversary detects even a single missile launch, it has no choice but to react as if the United States has decided to escalate to the strategic nuclear level. Even if the other side may hope or believe that the incoming warhead might just be a low-yield weapon, it must assume the worst, because the risks of guessing wrong include losing millions of people or potentially its entire nuclear force. It is unrealistic to assume and hope — in the thick fog of a nuclear war —that the adversary will wait until the warhead has landed, do a detailed yield assessment (even if 20 kilotons hits, how are they to know it wasn’t just because the second stage of a thermonuclear weapon fizzled?), and then choose not to respond because it was “only” 20 kilotons instead of 3.6 megatons. Think about it this way: if the United States detected that Russia had launched a missile off a submarine, that carried either a low-yield nuclear weapon or 8 strategic nuclear weapons, how would it react? Would it assume it is the low-realyield option and wait for it to hit the continental United States before reacting and retaliating? Of course not. Yet this is what America is hoping its adversaries will do. When it comes to waging a nuclear war, it is simply unrealistic to base a whole strategy on hoping that an adversary assumes the best-case scenario. The adversary’s most logical move is to respond as though full-scale nuclear war has started — which means that even if they were wrong, the end result and the consequences are the same. The use of a low-yield SLBM, supposedly built for a “small” nuclear conflict and to calibrate escalation, has now leapt to strategic nuclear war because of how the adversary is forced to react. Furthermore, mixing low- and high-yield nuclear weapons on Trident missiles, one of the key systems the United States would use in a counterforce mission targeting an adversary’s nuclear forces, poses a particular problem if an adversary is worried about the survivability of its arsenal (even Russia may worry about this given America’s persistent emphasis on counterforce and damage limitation capabilities). Such an adversary may experience “use-them-or-lose them” pressures at the sight of a single Trident launch (doubts about their early warning system could lead them to believe many more are headed their way). An adversary which fears that the United States is about to wipe out its arsenal may have no choice but to launch everything it has before even knowing what is actually incoming. This is certainly the case if the adversary is North Korea, it might be the case for China, and could plausibly be the case for Russia. The argument that an adversary might be nonchalant about “only one or two” Trident missiles headed its way makes delusional assumptions about how a state facing the most potent nuclear
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 47
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // force on the planet might react. For many nations, “one or two” Trident missiles with eight to 16 strategic nuclear warheads would be life-ending. They cannot afford to be complacent or assume best-case scenarios. This is why it is so important to load only strategic nuclear warheads on SLBMs, so there is no ambiguity about American intentions and about what is being launched at the adversary. The virtue of keeping SLBMs (and intercontinental ballistic missiles) single-assigned strictly with strategic nuclear warheads is that these missiles are the signal that the United States has escalated to the strategic nuclear level. The discrimination problem outlined here applies very specifically to mixing low-yield and strategic nuclear weapons on the same missile and same system, deployed on the same platform (in this case submarines). The same concern would apply equally to a proposal to load low-yield nuclear weapons onto intercontinental ballistic missiles. The low-yield cruise missile may be a less bad option in this regard, since cruise missiles have different flight profiles and only carry a single nuclear warhead. An adversary is less likely to mistake a single cruise missile launch for full strategic retaliation. However, proponents still need to explain why it is necessary — other than to try to develop a bargaining chip to force Russia back into compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. It’s unclear what deterrence gap the new SLCM capability will fill after the long-range standoff cruise missile with a low-yield option is developed to replace the current air-launched cruise missiles. In trying to deter more — and lower — forms of aggression with nuclear weapons and broaden the deterrence spectrum, the Nuclear Posture Review generates real risks of spirals of nuclear escalation in a crisis or war. It tries to reintroduce the idea of a calibrated “escalation ladder” — the notion that in a conflict the United States and the adversary can have various “rungs” of very precise and controlled nuclear exchanges of varying intensities without unintentional escalation. The heroic assumptions made by the idea of such a “ladder” are too numerous to address here. But a primary one is that it erroneously assumes the United States can alone control the climbing of that ladder without the enemy getting a vote. The concept fails to consider how the very existence of ambiguous nuclear systems — is it low-yield or thermonuclear? — can blow up the ladder. While the idea of a low-yield SLBM may be attractive in a sterile game theory seminar, in a real conflict with real decision-makers, it is a recipe for uncontrollable nuclear escalation. https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/discrimination-problem-putting-low-yield-nuclear- weapons-submarines-dangerous/ Return to top
Arms Control Wonk Nuclear Posturing By Michael Krepon February 7, 2018 The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, as advertised, is devoid of new diplomatic initiatives to reduce nuclear dangers and endorses new, low-yield nuclear warhead designs for sea- based delivery. It also expands the scope of potential U.S. military activities by establishing the requirement for “enforceable” arms control compacts. U.S. nuclear posture reviews have continuity from one administration to the next because acceptance of basic premises is a prerequisite to being part of the drafting process. Those who think that nuclear deterrence doesn’t matter enough to spend large sums on its upkeep, or that numbers are immaterial beyond a certain point, or that the Triad and its offshoots are not sacrosanct won’t
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 48
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 // be doing the writing and editing. Those looking for fundamental change on these matters don’t play inside baseball. This posture statement comes at a particularly rough time, reminiscent of the transition from President Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan. Back then, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan killed prospects for the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Well before the Red Army rumbled into Kabul, President Carter’s ambitious arms control agenda, which included negotiations on nuclear testing and space warfare, was already in tatters. As one who served in the Carter administration, I watched the downsizing of President Obama’s ambitions with a sad sense of déjà vu. Then as now, Washington and Moscow’s strategic modernization programs were out of phase, so one competitor or the other – in the late 1970s/early 1980s as well as now, that would be the U.S. nuclear enclave — felt obliged to play “catch up,” even when ahead in the competition. Then, as now, there was much talk of Russian violations of treaty commitments. Some of it was true back then; this problem is far worse now. Arms control and force reductions don’t happen in a vacuum. When the Kremlin rides roughshod over the sovereignty of neighboring countries, diplomacy to reduce nuclear force structure takes a hiatus. Here again, the parallels between Carter/Reagan and Obama/Trump are striking. Crimea hasn’t just been occupied, like Afghanistan; it has been annexed, while Russian troops help proxies to establish dominion in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere along the Russian Federation’s periphery. To make matters worse still, the Kremlin has baldly interfered in democratic elections, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Under these circumstances, Trump’s nuclear posture would not be a statement devoted to peace, love, and understanding. Like others drafted in Republican administrations, it lends the Bomb more credence in shoring up deterrence while ascribing greater risks to disregarding deterrence orthodoxy. As this litany goes, gaps must be filled and credibility shored up in the only ways challengers clearly understand – by spending large sums of money and taxing a production complex already straining at the seams. Military leaders dutifully salute the dictums of civilian nuclear strategists while (presumably and privately) coveting resources diverted to weapons for Armageddon scenarios. Conventional and sub-conventional warfare against violent extremist groups has proven to be a crapshoot. They instinctively know that these traps pale by comparison to detonating nuclear weapons on a battlefield. The drafters of nuclear posture statements are not encumbered by operational complexities. They can therefore seek refuge in the unreal premise that using nuclear weapons in battle will be an orderly business; otherwise, the entire exercise would lose any semblance of logic and cohesion. These civilian strategists are comfortable – or at least not terribly moved — by Kenneth Boulding’s warning that without the very real prospect of mushroom clouds, deterrence would be de-fanged. Cutting edge nuclear deterrence, in the view of the Trump posture statement, requires “tailored strategies” and “flexible capabilities.” These are not new concepts. They sound reasonable enough until we remember Boulding’s admonition and strip the veneer off. The flip side of deterrence, as Boulding warns, is mushroom clouds. Tailored strategies and flexible capabilities require assigning nuclear weapons to targets. The logic and cohesion of nuclear posture reviews break down when we shift from the declaratory to the operational level of nuclear deterrence. At this juncture, questions that must be avoided at all costs when writing nuclear posture statements become harder to dodge. What are the humanitarian consequences of targeting plans for nuclear weapons? And how is escalation to be controlled after these Gates of Hell are opened and the nuclear threshold is crossed?
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 49
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
If the defenders of nuclear deterrence and the drafters of nuclear posture statements cannot answer these questions satisfactorily, their handiwork is built on quicksand. Adding new warhead designs and targeting options only make these questions more pointed. Because nuclear orthodoxy cannot withstand public scrutiny on the fundamental questions of humanitarian consequences and escalation control, most of us wear blinders, seeking refuge underneath the warm, fuzzy blanket of deterrence. Our personal comfort depends on presuming that deterrence is sturdy – that there is a thick barrier between deterrence and battlefield use. But what if this thick barrier is in actuality a thin membrane that can be punctured by human error, miscalculation, and accident? The close calls we have thus far managed to survive suggest this is the case. Until we recognize how thin the margin of error is between deterrence and the appearance of a mushroom cloud, we will continue to live in this house of cards. This recognition – that nuclear deterrence is actually fragile, despite stockpile sizes, targeting options, and redundant force structure – is growing. It becomes more obvious with each near miss due to human error and intelligence miscalculation. The threats and the proposed remedies against which Trump’s posture statement is geared seem far removed from the dangers posed by breakdowns in command and control, accidents, thefts, and the potential for unauthorized use. Nuclear dangers are not reduced if the United States builds a fortress while others build sand castles. Where do we go from here? During the first Reagan administration, when arms reduction negotiations were suspended, when U.S. and Soviet forces were engaged in very dangerous military practices and the risk of accidents was high, a group of concerned citizens led by Senators John Warner and Sam Nunn, including Brent Scowcroft and Bill Perry, focused on the need for improved communication channels and nuclear risk reduction measures between Moscow and Washington. Underneath the superstructure of nuclear deterrence, they proposed modest but necessary steps to prevent accidents, miscalculation and the consequences of human error. (Before we co-founded the Stimson Center, Barry Blechman backstopped this initiative, and I helped with the drafting.) These conditions are once again evident, suggesting the same remedial approach, beginning with improved communication channels and the avoidance of dangerous military practices. Former Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and former Senator Nunn have suggested the pursuit of this agenda. They argue that the foremost nuclear danger of this era is not massive nuclear attacks like those postulated during the Cold War, but “fateful errors.” This is a very different paradigm than the one on which nuclear posture statements are constructed. Trump’s nuclear posture focuses on the strategic competition between major powers, not the appearance of a singular mushroom cloud based on human error, unauthorized use, or accident that could lead to cataclysm. One paradigm seeks safety in nuclear excess and punishment; the other in diplomacy and prevention. This is not an either/or choice, but budgetary allocations matter greatly. It makes no sense to recapitalize the U.S. nuclear deterrent, at a cost of well over a trillion dollars, while short-changing diplomatic and preventive initiatives related to war by accident, miscalculation, and human error. Safety from nuclear dangers requires a far wider aperture than the one now on offer. https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204727/nuclear-posturing/ Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 50
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1302 //
ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.
DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 51