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Danger & Opportunity

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Danger & Opportunity PUBLISHED BY THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS OF AMERICA January /February 1993 Volume XXJ Number 1 Danger & Opportunity . -~~'HJ J0 se LaLuz on prospects for democracy and justice in the Americas Eric Lee on the Arab-Israeli stalemate Bogdan Denitch on the collapse of Yugoslavia Francis Adams andAnne Peters ontheperilsofNAFI'A INSIDE DEMOCRATIC LEFT INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLES On the Left The Perils of NAFT A by Harry Fleischman ... 9 by Francis Adams & Anne Peters ... 2 Who Wants Peace in the Middle East? Radical Democracy in the Americas: by Eric Lee... 10 an inteNiew with Jose LaLuz. .3 The Collapse of Yugoslavia: 1993 Directory of DSA Locals. .7 an inteNiew with Bogdan Denitch. .12 DSAction... 8 Janie Higgins Reports ... 16 cover photos by Tordai and Kathleen Foster/Impact Visuals Expansion of the export sector is rable access to capital, economies of EDITORIAL then expected to stimulate other sec­ scale, advanced technologies, or tors of the Mexic~ economy, in­ marketing skills. Small landowners creasing employment opportunities, will also be displaced as production THE PERILS OF raising real incomes, and laying the of cash crops for export replaces the foundation for genuine national de­ production of staples to meet local NAFTA velopment. needs and the best lands become Unfortunately, there have been concentrated in the hands of a small BY FRANCIS ADAMS AND few attempts to examine the differen­ group of foreign and local exporters. tial effects that NAFTA is likely to The cost of living is already soaring in ANNE PETERS have inside Mexico or to seriously Mexico. This combination could re­ The recently completed North consider the social and political re­ sult in declining real income and in­ American Free Trade Agreement percussions of the agreement. creased unemployment. (NAFTA) among the United States, NAFTA may be as devastating for Moreover, it is important to con­ Canada, and Mexico is sure to spark Mexican small business and agricul­ sider the type of jobs that foreign intense and emotional debate as it ture as it is likely to be to many indus­ corporations are likely to bring to moves toward congressional review trial and agricultural communities unskilled Mexican laborers. The later this year. across the United States. maquiladoras presently operating There has already been consider­ On the one hand, certain sectors along the nation's northern border able speculation about who will be of the Mexican economy will clearly are already notorious for low wages, the primary "winners" and "losers" benefit from liberalized trade and poor health and safety conditions, in this country from the creation of a investment regimes. Entrepreneurs continued on page 15 regional trading bloc. The initial in industry and agribusiness will assumption is that while American benefit from access to American and DEMOCRATIC LEFT businesses and consumers will gen­ Canadian markets, while profession­ erally benefit from the accord, some als and skilled laborers will find ex­ Founding Editor American assembly jobs will be lost panded employment opportunities Michael Hanington (1928-1989) as corporations shift their operations in multinational corporations, possi­ Managing Editor to Mexico and U.S. farmers will face bly with significantly better wages Michael Lighty and benefits than they now enjoy. increased competition from im­ Production ported fruits and vegetables. At the same time, it is not at all Dnid Glenn At the same time, most analysts clear that the gradual reduction of UitoruJJ Committee have declared Mexico the clear-cut tariffs and other barriers to trade and investment would benefit the major­ Dorothee Benz, Joanne Barkan, winner in the accord. Access to for­ Howard Croft, Mitcl\Horowitz, ity of working class and poor rural eign markets will stimulate local Sherri Levine, Neil McLaughlin, Mexicans. export production and expanding Maxine Phillips foreign investment will bring an infu­ NAFTA is likely to lead to the !lomacnic Loll (l!5N 016'0310'1) It~ elx Um I ,...111.S sion of much-needed capital and dismantling of a broad array of o..t. St. t 500. NY. NY 1003I. So<oad~u ix-&• paid II Now Yark. NY Subocnp«ocno; SI nsunr; $15 lnolilUliOlloll "-: advanced technology, modernizing manufacturing enterprises in Mex­ Siad ad.sr- <hue• ID 15 Dulch St., I 500, 1'"Y. N'r 1aa.. Domocnb< t..nlapubbahodbylho Domocntlc-ol"-1Q. the nation's industrial base and in­ ico, as the transnationals drive out 15 D<*llSt.. 1500, NY, NY 10038(212)962-0J90. ~ ortdot..,.­ creasing productive capacity. small scale artisans without compa- u...,...... a( 1M --.~100t~O.-a(IM~ 2 DEMOCMTIC LE.FT 11 The Most Participatory Way" . Prospects for Radical Democracy in the Americas: An Interview with Jose Laluz emocratic Left: The mainstream in the hemisphere, and those are the people who press has written extensively about have to become the subject, not the object, of how democracy has come to Latin democracy. They have to become protagonists and South America, yet in some re­ of this political project that has yet to be imple­ D mented in our hemisphere, which calls for an spects they praise a very narrow, limited vision of democracy. What are the prospects for a expanded role in the civil society. That is our broader vision and program, a "radical" democ­ understanding of democracy. racy in the Americas? DL: Let's make this country-specific and LaLuz: The various forces that are emerg­ first talk about Venezuela. What's your view of ing in the hemisphere, the voices that are in fact democracy in Venezuela in light of the recent putting forth an alternative vision of what de­ coup attempts against the social democratic mocracy is, the Workers Party in Brazil, Causa government of Carlos Andres Perez, what are Radical in Venezuela, the Party of the Demo­ the prospects in Venezuela for a radical democ­ cratic Revolution in Mexico, and others, have racy? been insisting that Latin America has never LaLuz: The best example of what we mean truly experienced democracy, because democ­ by democracy has to do with the fact that grow­ racy means that citizens are able to participate in ing sections of the people in Venezuela, particu­ any and all institutions, and that includes politi­ larly the working class and poor people, do not cal parties most certainly, it includes trade un­ see the political project of our sister party in ions, and most fundamentally the state. They Venezuela, the Accion Democratica, led by conceive democracy in the most participatory President Perez, as one that speaks to their way, so that people are involved in decision legitimate aspirations and interests. These at­ making at all levels; particularly when it comes tempted coups d'etat by sections of the military to economic planning, planning for develop­ did not enjoy popular support; it wasn't like the ment of the respective countries. People should civic military insurrection in the '50s that over­ be involved in formulating policies and pro­ threw the military dictatorship in Venezuela, in grams that affect their daily lives, that affect which our sister party played in fact a promi­ their standard ofliving, the quality of their lives. nent role. However, growing sections of the And that calls for, in fact, as you characterize it, people identify with some of the goals of this a radical approach to democracy. It's not just a military element that led the coup, because in matter of exercising their right to vote every fact they call for a participation of people in the four or five or six years. economic integration processes that are being What we're discussing here is participation promoted by President Perez himself, and by by all sections of the population, particularly his party in his administration. those that have been deliberately and con­ As a result of this crisis, we see some very sciously disenfranchised: workers, poor people interesting developments. In the most recent who live in marginalized communities - these elections in that country, the gubernatorial and are the people who have yet to benefit from this municipal elections, the opposition, which in­ experiment in what we call a radical democracy cludes some elements that were formerly in the 1993 3 Accion Democratica, and now are part of this think of particular interest to the American left new party, called Causa Radical, which func­ has been the rise of the Workers Party in Brazil, tions and operates more like a movement. and its very charismatic leader, Inacio da Silva, These are the ones that have put forth a vision of known as Lula. What can you tell us about their program in the context of radical democracy, what we're talking about is a and specifically their prospects for electoral process that allows citizens to success in Brazil? LaLuz: That is a fascinating case in point, participate fully in developing because when it comes to Brazil, what we're their own programs ... talking about is the legacy of corporatism, simi­ lar to the fascism through a populist party that radical democracy and of the need for people to dominated the state under the dictatorship of participate fully and in any and all processes Vargas, in which the trade unions in fact were that affect their lives, especially economic deci­ part and parcel of that political project. And sions such as those that have to do with trade now the birth, or the rebirth if you will, of the and investment in the Andean region (President Brazilian left was the result of the thrust to­ Perez and our sister party are part of this An­ wards democratization, of not only the state dean economic integration project in that region legacy of corporatism, but also the democratiza­ of South America).
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