Remembering the crimes of the Holodomor

By Sarah Shah

Referred to as a ‘bloodless war’1, the Holodomor (1932-1933) was an incomprehensible tragedy which led to countless avoidable Ukrainian deaths. The nature of such an appalling famine becomes increasingly eerie when considering how Ukraine is the third largest grain exporter2 and points to this event being deliberately man-made by Stalin’s policy of collectivisation, imposed as a genocide to weaken Ukrainian nationalism. Furthermore, the outrageous cover-up is still in full force: the Russian Federation considers it part of the wider Soviet Famine3, downplaying the suffering of individual nations. Failing to recognise the specific devastation in Ukraine appears flippant, especially considering current tensions. As Conquest writes, ‘the silence must surely be seen as the silence of complicity, or justification’4. Regardless of this debate, the unjust hardship is undeniable. It is necessary to break the silence to remember an event which should have never been forgotten.

The Holodomor was undoubtedly significant on an individual basis, leading to as many as over 7 million deaths. Those who did live did not do so in luxury, as survivor Vera Smereka recounts ‘borscht… consisted of just water and herbs’5 and later attributes this to their swollen stomachs. This was very common, as many sources describe similar swelling due to use of water to combat hunger, and illustrates the extent of desperation to survive while also conveying an upsetting futility. Survivors were faced with difficult decisions which no doubt would later traumatise them in the long term, for example in Galina Smyrna’s account ‘my aunt went crazy – she ate her own child’6. Many historians and testimonies mention cannibalism, however this one depicts the struggle to survive as tragic and not only showcases physical starvation, but also the mental toll such an event would take. Living itself appears to have been a form of torture.

Reading these accounts, it is difficult not to sympathise; when reading accounts of how these people were treated by officials, it becomes clear why these deaths appear deliberate. Many accounts refer to how the living were taken away with corpses, as officials knew they would die and wanted to save themselves the journey. This complacent reaction also appears malicious, with Stephen Horlatch’s account of how his mother was beaten until she fainted due to officials suspecting they had hidden food because they ‘weren’t dead’7. The officials were expecting, or even wanted, them to die. Conquest writes how, in July 1932, the Ukrainian Central Committee ordered food to be given to those working in the fields, however when given to anyone else starving, it was ‘described in an official report as ‘a waste of bread and fish’’8. Such a disrespectful report in comparison to the harrowing survivor testimonies seems to indicate a resentment towards the Ukrainians, almost as if they were viewed as unworthy of life, which may coincide with what many historians view as one of Stalin’s aims of collectivisation – as Figes writes, ‘Stalin had a special distrust of the Ukrainian peasantry’9.

1 Doroshenko, Hanna. http://holodomorct.org/holodomor-survivor-eyewitness-accounts/ 2 https://web.archive.org/web/20131231235707/http://www.blackseagrain.net/data/news/ukraine-becomes- worlds-third-biggest-grain-exporter-in-2011-minister 3 https://sputniknews.com/world/20080402102830217/ 4 Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.330 5 https://www.augb.co.uk/survivor-testimony-vera-smereka.php 6 Smyrna, Galina. http://holodomorct.org/holodomor-survivor-eyewitness-accounts/ 7 http://www.holodomorsurvivors.ca/Video/video/Files/Horlatch_video.html 8 Cited in: Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.223 9 Figes, O. (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991. Pelican. p.215

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Moreover, the account of Kopelev, member of the Komsomol as cited by Figes, states how he and many others believed they ‘were realising historical necessity’10. This idea of ‘necessity’ furthers the acceptance of Ukrainian deaths and conforms with Montefiore’s interpretation of Stalinism in how people would ‘die and kill for their faith’11 . Along with Stalin’s paranoia regarding power, this interpretation makes genocide seem like a viable option. Earlier purges on intelligentsia were used to weaken Ukrainian identity, making this aim obvious. Due to this, the notion that collectivisation was introduced as a similar attack on the peasantry doesn’t seem absurd. Furthermore, one of the aims had been officially stated as ‘the destruction of Ukrainian nationalism’s social base’12. Dekulakisation, which also led to reduced harvests as a result of having fewer skilled peasants, may have been used to start this attack on the peasantry, as Figes argues, to eliminate ‘the defenders of the peasant way of life’13. Conquest’s interpretation that the Holodomor was inflicted ‘wholly on the collectivised ordinary peasant’14 (as all kulaks should have already been removed) interestingly exposes that there was no such thing in the first place – rather, this imaginary class had been demonised to hide the true intentions to weaken Ukrainian peasantry. Deception has always been used and, unfortunately, still occurs today.

Some historians argue the economic aims. Lynch refers to the ‘land crisis in Russia that predated Communism’15 (also seen in Figes’ citation ‘[old Russia] suffered because of her backwardness’16), therefore collectivisation’s enforced migration would allow the necessary shift to urban industries. However, during the Holodomor, peasants were unable to escape the famine due to a system of internal passports and the closing of the Ukrainian border. Fitzpatrick interestingly points out how Moscow had the habit to set ‘targets for economic output that were wildly unrealistic’17 during the Five-Year Plan, suggesting that high procurement quotas were applied with little consideration. However, in the 1928 Party Congress, Bukharin argued that these would be counter-productive, showing that there was some consideration but it was ignored. Fitzpatrick’s nuanced idea that ‘peasants habitually exaggerated local difficulties’18 and that many of the thefts were actually carried out by kolkhozniks ‘evidently motivated purely by spite’19, not kulaks, implies peasant resistance led to the law of the 7th of August, 1932, forbidding anything to be stolen from the kolkhoz. This is interesting because this interpretation makes the process leading to the Holodomor appear far less calculated. That being said, Fitzpatrick writes regarding all Soviet peasants, which may not always apply to Ukraine, making this less convincing. The enforcement of this law, however, displays cruelty (as seen in earlier eyewitness accounts) and Fitzpatrick recognises this harshness and cites how kolkhozniks were re-educated like teaching circus animals ‘to obey by starving them’.20

Despite Stalin’s intentions, it is obvious that the famine was man-made, whether for socio-political or economic reasons. If the Holodomor had not been planned, the failure to respond and purposeful

10 Cited in: Ibid. p.213 11 Montefiore, S. (2004). Stalin 1878-1939. Phoenix. P.88 12 Cited in: Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.219 13 Figes, O. (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991. Pelican. p.214 14 Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.220 15 Lynch, M. (2008). From Autocracy to Communism: Russia 1894-1941. Hodder Education. P.209 16 Cited in: Figes, O. (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991. Pelican. p.218 17 Fitzpatrick, S. (1996). Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivisation. Oxford University Press. P.71 18 Ibid. P.70 19 Cited in: Ibid. p.72 20 Cited in: Ibid. P.76

2 repression portrays the genocide as a result of Stalin’s opportunism. It seems he was prolonging the effects by ‘continuing to employ the policies which had produced the famine’21. Even the policy to ‘liquidate the Kulaks as a class’22 appears to have been a conspiracy. The lack of transparency creates suspicion and the fact that much of the suffering was avoidable clearly paints the Holodomor as an atrocity, if not a crime against humanity. As cited by Montefiore, Stalin repeatedly denied the existence of the famine, reportedly having said ‘fabricating such a fairy tale about a famine!’23. This denial alone was detrimental, as it prevented the USSR from public action and appeals (as were used during the famine of 1921), leading to unnecessary torment. Conquest’s citations regarding wasted grain makes this denial increasingly deplorable: gleaners were killed, leaving grain in railway stations to rot24. Moreover, Conquest writes how Ukrainian peasants faced ‘deprivation and exploitation’25, making it appear as though they were being mocked for the hunger imposed upon them. Representation of the famine in Soviet media was limited and instead depicted famines abroad, as cited by Fitzpatrick, with sensational headlines such as ‘hunger despite a good harvest’26. Perhaps this was typical propaganda to distract, however news reports of victims ‘trying to stage a famine’27 not only ignored the Holodomor, but actively denied it. In this way, it could be argued that the media was attempting to belittle victims by depicting them as kulaks, potentially leading Ukraine to be viewed with further animosity. This negligence alone indicates the deliberate intent needed to classify the Holodomor as a genocide. Regardless of Stalin’s initial aims, he took this convenient opportunity to make Ukraine submit.

This repression was not limited to Soviet newspapers. Shockingly, even victims were denied the truth, such as in Aleksandra Brazhnyk’s testimony: ‘Nobody could say that it was an artificial famine. They always said that everything was great’28. This was also prevalent in the presentation of the famine to the rest of the world with the creation of the Potemkin village, as described by Fitzpatrick as having ‘all the amenities and culture lacking in the real Russian village’29. These were used to hide the truth from western journalists and politicians, and evidently worked due to French politician Herriot’s description of Soviet Ukraine ‘like a garden in full bloom’30, which not only prevented foreign aid, but was also used as fuel for propaganda by the Pravda. Furthermore, official photographs depicted positive imagery of abundant grain and girls in fine clothes while the hidden ones show more stark images of dying children, starving animals and brutal guards31. Although evidence shows that the West was aware, the USSR’s distortion of information made it impossible for them to intervene: the Washington Soviet Embassy claimed that Ukraine’s population had increased by 2% per annum and had the lowest death rate in the USSR32. Seeing this blatant cover-up seems more sinister than just portraying Soviet glory: it seems to indicate guilt. These statistics appear so insanely unrealistic that they expose a desperate attempt to maintain a lie, but if this was just a regular famine there would be

21 Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. P.326 22 Montefiore, S. (2004). Stalin 1878-1939. Phoenix. P.46 23 Cited in: Ibid. P.87 24 Cited in: Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.266 25 Cited in: Ibid. 26 Cited in: Fitzpatrick, S. (1996). Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivisation. Oxford University Press. P.74 27 Ibid. P.75 28 http://www.holodomorsurvivors.ca/Video/video/Files/Aleksandra%20Brazhnyk_video.html 29 Fitzpatrick, S. (1996). Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivisation. Oxford University Press. P.16 30 Cited in: Courtois, S. Werth, N. Panné, J. Paczkowski, A. Bartošek, K. Margolin, J. (1999). The Black Book of Communism. Harvard University Press. P.159-160 31 https://education.holodomor.ca/educational-resources-list/photo-gallery/historical-photographs-of-the-holodomor-2/ 32 Cited in: Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.313

3 no need to try so hard. Even today, following Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation, it seems odd to avoid the topic if there is nothing to hide. However, the longer they wait to address it, the greater the guilt becomes as it is no longer only Stalin’s crime. This genocide extends past the destruction of Ukrainians; it now includes the destruction of the memory of the Holodomor.

In conclusion, considering all interpretations, it may be unimportant whether the Holodomor was planned or not: the damage has been done and has yet to be fixed. Perhaps the focus should shift away from politics and towards the human cost. Following the genocide, the impacts were still felt, such as psychological trauma and physical disability, as reported by Conquest in how ‘peasants being given bread in the late spring of 1933’ would sometimes lead to ‘fatal results’33. The management of this famine was so poor that it appears deliberate, and even today the effects of the propaganda are still at large. These repeated denials are certainly the biggest crime. The Holodomor must be acknowledged, not only to prevent repeating the past, but to allow the wound in Ukrainian hearts to finally heal.

33 Ibid. p.262

4 http://holodomorct.org/holodomor-survivor-eyewitness-accounts/ https://web.archive.org/web/20131231235707/http://www.blackseagrain.net/data/news/ukraine- becomes-worlds-third-biggest-grain-exporter-in-2011-minister https://sputniknews.com/world/20080402102830217/ Conquest, Robert. 2002. The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. https://www.augb.co.uk/survivor-testimony-vera-smereka.php http://www.holodomorsurvivors.ca/Video/video/Files/Horlatch_video.html Figes, Orlando. 2014. Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991. Pelican Montefiore, Simon Sebag. 2004. Stalin 1878-1939. Phoenix. Lynch, Michael. 2008. From Autocracy to Communism: Russia 1894-1941. Hodder Education. Fitzpatrick, S., 1996. Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivisation. Oxford University Press. http://www.holodomorsurvivors.ca/Video/video/Files/Aleksandra%20Brazhnyk_video.html Courtois, Stéphane; Werth, Nicolas; Panné, Jean-Louis; Paczkowski, Andrzej; Bartošek, Karel; Margolin, Jean-Louis. 1999. The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression. Harvard University Press. https://education.holodomor.ca/educational-resources-list/photo-gallery/historical-photographs-of- the-holodomor-2/

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