Remembering the crimes of the Holodomor By Sarah Shah Referred to as a ‘bloodless war’1, the Holodomor (1932-1933) was an incomprehensible tragedy which led to countless avoidable Ukrainian deaths. The nature of such an appalling famine becomes increasingly eerie when considering how Ukraine is the third largest grain exporter2 and points to this event being deliberately man-made by Stalin’s policy of collectivisation, imposed as a genocide to weaken Ukrainian nationalism. Furthermore, the outrageous cover-up is still in full force: the Russian Federation considers it part of the wider Soviet Famine3, downplaying the suffering of individual nations. Failing to recognise the specific devastation in Ukraine appears flippant, especially considering current tensions. As Conquest writes, ‘the silence must surely be seen as the silence of complicity, or justification’4. Regardless of this debate, the unjust hardship is undeniable. It is necessary to break the silence to remember an event which should have never been forgotten. The Holodomor was undoubtedly significant on an individual basis, leading to as many as over 7 million deaths. Those who did live did not do so in luxury, as survivor Vera Smereka recounts ‘borscht… consisted of just water and herbs’5 and later attributes this to their swollen stomachs. This was very common, as many sources describe similar swelling due to use of water to combat hunger, and illustrates the extent of desperation to survive while also conveying an upsetting futility. Survivors were faced with difficult decisions which no doubt would later traumatise them in the long term, for example in Galina Smyrna’s account ‘my aunt went crazy – she ate her own child’6. Many historians and testimonies mention cannibalism, however this one depicts the struggle to survive as tragic and not only showcases physical starvation, but also the mental toll such an event would take. Living itself appears to have been a form of torture. Reading these accounts, it is difficult not to sympathise; when reading accounts of how these people were treated by officials, it becomes clear why these deaths appear deliberate. Many accounts refer to how the living were taken away with corpses, as officials knew they would die and wanted to save themselves the journey. This complacent reaction also appears malicious, with Stephen Horlatch’s account of how his mother was beaten until she fainted due to officials suspecting they had hidden food because they ‘weren’t dead’7. The officials were expecting, or even wanted, them to die. Conquest writes how, in July 1932, the Ukrainian Central Committee ordered food to be given to those working in the fields, however when given to anyone else starving, it was ‘described in an official report as ‘a waste of bread and fish’’8. Such a disrespectful report in comparison to the harrowing survivor testimonies seems to indicate a resentment towards the Ukrainians, almost as if they were viewed as unworthy of life, which may coincide with what many historians view as one of Stalin’s aims of collectivisation – as Figes writes, ‘Stalin had a special distrust of the Ukrainian peasantry’9. 1 Doroshenko, Hanna. http://holodomorct.org/holodomor-survivor-eyewitness-accounts/ 2 https://web.archive.org/web/20131231235707/http://www.blackseagrain.net/data/news/ukraine-becomes- worlds-third-biggest-grain-exporter-in-2011-minister 3 https://sputniknews.com/world/20080402102830217/ 4 Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.330 5 https://www.augb.co.uk/survivor-testimony-vera-smereka.php 6 Smyrna, Galina. http://holodomorct.org/holodomor-survivor-eyewitness-accounts/ 7 http://www.holodomorsurvivors.ca/Video/video/Files/Horlatch_video.html 8 Cited in: Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.223 9 Figes, O. (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991. Pelican. p.215 1 Moreover, the account of Kopelev, member of the Komsomol as cited by Figes, states how he and many others believed they ‘were realising historical necessity’10. This idea of ‘necessity’ furthers the acceptance of Ukrainian deaths and conforms with Montefiore’s interpretation of Stalinism in how people would ‘die and kill for their faith’11 . Along with Stalin’s paranoia regarding power, this interpretation makes genocide seem like a viable option. Earlier purges on intelligentsia were used to weaken Ukrainian identity, making this aim obvious. Due to this, the notion that collectivisation was introduced as a similar attack on the peasantry doesn’t seem absurd. Furthermore, one of the aims had been officially stated as ‘the destruction of Ukrainian nationalism’s social base’12. Dekulakisation, which also led to reduced harvests as a result of having fewer skilled peasants, may have been used to start this attack on the peasantry, as Figes argues, to eliminate ‘the defenders of the peasant way of life’13. Conquest’s interpretation that the Holodomor was inflicted ‘wholly on the collectivised ordinary peasant’14 (as all kulaks should have already been removed) interestingly exposes that there was no such thing in the first place – rather, this imaginary class had been demonised to hide the true intentions to weaken Ukrainian peasantry. Deception has always been used and, unfortunately, still occurs today. Some historians argue the economic aims. Lynch refers to the ‘land crisis in Russia that predated Communism’15 (also seen in Figes’ citation ‘[old Russia] suffered because of her backwardness’16), therefore collectivisation’s enforced migration would allow the necessary shift to urban industries. However, during the Holodomor, peasants were unable to escape the famine due to a system of internal passports and the closing of the Ukrainian border. Fitzpatrick interestingly points out how Moscow had the habit to set ‘targets for economic output that were wildly unrealistic’17 during the Five-Year Plan, suggesting that high procurement quotas were applied with little consideration. However, in the 1928 Party Congress, Bukharin argued that these would be counter-productive, showing that there was some consideration but it was ignored. Fitzpatrick’s nuanced idea that ‘peasants habitually exaggerated local difficulties’18 and that many of the thefts were actually carried out by kolkhozniks ‘evidently motivated purely by spite’19, not kulaks, implies peasant resistance led to the law of the 7th of August, 1932, forbidding anything to be stolen from the kolkhoz. This is interesting because this interpretation makes the process leading to the Holodomor appear far less calculated. That being said, Fitzpatrick writes regarding all Soviet peasants, which may not always apply to Ukraine, making this less convincing. The enforcement of this law, however, displays cruelty (as seen in earlier eyewitness accounts) and Fitzpatrick recognises this harshness and cites how kolkhozniks were re-educated like teaching circus animals ‘to obey by starving them’.20 Despite Stalin’s intentions, it is obvious that the famine was man-made, whether for socio-political or economic reasons. If the Holodomor had not been planned, the failure to respond and purposeful 10 Cited in: Ibid. p.213 11 Montefiore, S. (2004). Stalin 1878-1939. Phoenix. P.88 12 Cited in: Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.219 13 Figes, O. (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991. Pelican. p.214 14 Conquest, R. (2002). The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine. Pimlico. p.220 15 Lynch, M. (2008). From Autocracy to Communism: Russia 1894-1941. Hodder education. P.209 16 Cited in: Figes, O. (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991. Pelican. p.218 17 Fitzpatrick, S. (1996). Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivisation. Oxford University Press. P.71 18 Ibid. P.70 19 Cited in: Ibid. p.72 20 Cited in: Ibid. P.76 2 repression portrays the genocide as a result of Stalin’s opportunism. It seems he was prolonging the effects by ‘continuing to employ the policies which had produced the famine’21. Even the policy to ‘liquidate the Kulaks as a class’22 appears to have been a conspiracy. The lack of transparency creates suspicion and the fact that much of the suffering was avoidable clearly paints the Holodomor as an atrocity, if not a crime against humanity. As cited by Montefiore, Stalin repeatedly denied the existence of the famine, reportedly having said ‘fabricating such a fairy tale about a famine!’23. This denial alone was detrimental, as it prevented the USSR from public action and appeals (as were used during the famine of 1921), leading to unnecessary torment. Conquest’s citations regarding wasted grain makes this denial increasingly deplorable: gleaners were killed, leaving grain in railway stations to rot24. Moreover, Conquest writes how Ukrainian peasants faced ‘deprivation and exploitation’25, making it appear as though they were being mocked for the hunger imposed upon them. Representation of the famine in Soviet media was limited and instead depicted famines abroad, as cited by Fitzpatrick, with sensational headlines such as ‘hunger despite a good harvest’26. Perhaps this was typical propaganda to distract, however news reports of victims ‘trying to stage a famine’27 not only ignored the Holodomor, but actively denied it. In this way, it could be argued that the media was attempting to belittle victims by depicting them as kulaks, potentially leading Ukraine