PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 3 Monster or Hero? Far-right Responses to Anders Behring Breivik and the July 22, 2011 Terrorist Attacks By Lars Erik Berntzen and Jacob Aasland Ravndal Abstract This study maps and seeks to explain the evolution of far-right responses to the July 22 terrorist attacks in 2011. We identify substantial temporal and spatial variation in how different far-right actors responded between 2011 and 2021. These findings present us with four puzzles: First, why was Breivik rejected by the far right in Western Europe, while receiving substantial support in Russia and eventually also from online subcultures originating in the United States? Second, why did parts of the far right not only reject Breivik, but vehemently condemn him? Third, why did initial support for Breivik in Western Europe come from individuals outside the organized far right? And fourth, why does support for Breivik seem to increase with distance in time and space? We argue that the nature of taboos offers an elegant explanation to these puzzles. We propose that the strength of the macro-cultural taboo against violence provides an overarching explanation, mediated by three taboo-related mechanisms referred to as contagion, rebellion, and decoupling. In regions where the taboo against violence is strong, most future support for right-wing terrorism will probably continue to manifest itself through anonymous online spaces, while the more organized far right will continue distancing itself from taboo violators to avoid becoming (complete) social and political pariahs. Keywords: Breivik, cultural taboo, far right, political violence, terrorism Introduction For all the ways the far right has changed since World War II, one thing has remained constant: a particularly deep-seated animosity toward the political left.[1] Variously labelled “multiculturalists”, “socialists”, “globalists” and “cultural Marxists”, the left is generally understood as an internal enemy. They are the traitors causing moral and societal decay that – wilfully or otherwise – lets outsiders take over. When, on July 22, 2011, a 32-year-old white Norwegian man by the name of Anders Behring Breivik struck the governing Social Democratic Labour Party in two devastating attacks, one could therefore have expected that the far right had cause to celebrate and support Breivik. The fact that his manifesto mirrored the belief that Islam is a totalitarian ideology, and that Europe was being taken over by Muslims, lends further credence to the notion that Breivik would find support among the far right. These anti-Islamic beliefs had already come to dominate both West European radical right parties and far-right activists more generally.[2] It is therefore understandable that support for Breivik on the far right was raised as a major concern in the aftermath of the July 22 terrorist attacks. Yet, the flurry of writing and speculation along these lines was followed by little substantive empirical investigation. This article aims to narrow this gap by mapping the evolution of far-right responses to Breivik between 2011 and 2021. Our mapping exercise identifies four puzzling patterns. First, while Breivik was rejected by the far right in Western Europe, he received substantial support in Russia and eventually also from online subcultures originating in the United States. Second, parts of the far right, most notably leaders of radical right parties in Western Europe and members of the anti-Islamic movement, not only rejected Breivik, but vehemently condemned him. Third, initial support in Western Europe came from individuals outside the organized far right. Fourth, support for Breivik appears to increase with distance in time and space. We argue that the nature of taboos offers an elegant explanation to these puzzles. We therefore begin this article by presenting existing theory on cultural norms and the taboo against violence. Next, we describe the methods used in this article to map far-right responses to Breivik. We then provide an extensive overview of ISSN 2334-3745 37 June 2021 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 3 these responses organized into three subsections: (1) complete and partial rejection; (2) partial and complete support – Wave One; and (3) partial and complete support – Wave Two. Finally, we apply our taboo framework to explain variation in far-right support across actors, time, and place. The Violence Taboo As is widely discussed in introductory sociology courses, culturally transmitted norms guide and constrain human behavior in profound ways.[3] Within a society, people are motivated to follow cultural norms based on both internal and external reasons.[4] When internalized, norms are followed because they are an end in and of themselves. Externally, norms are followed for strategic purposes – achieving goals and avoiding sanctions by others. Some norms possess such strong moral valence and agreement within society that breaking them is considered taboo. The term taboo has its etymological origins in the Polynesian wordtapu – meaning “prohibited”. From the start, taboos have been understood as an effect of sacredness.[5] It is only taboo to transgress against that which is held to be sacred and holy. A common characteristic of taboo violation is that whoever violates the taboo also becomes taboo.[6] Taboo violation therefore has ripple effects, where the stigma transfers from the act onto the actor and then again onto those who become associated with the actor. [7] What is taboo and how many taboos a society cultivates vary considerably across different cultures and within cultures over time. While it has been argued that “Western” culture is characterized by having very few taboos,[8] it harbours a strong taboo against violence.[9] Several (controversial) studies indicate that Western societies have become dramatically less violent over the last few centuries,[10] and that this is in part due to the codification and institutionalization of this taboo.[11] A central thesis by Charles Tilly was that democratic values and institutions in Europe were deliberately developed to put an end to incessant violence and bloodshed.[12] Political theorists have also argued that, ideally conceived, violence is “anathema” to the “spirit and substance” of democracy.[13] Outside the realms of normative theory, empirical studies also demonstrate that democratic societies are overall less violent than autocratic ones.[14] Survey data from some Western European countries suggest that only very small minorities accept the use of political violence against their political opponents.[15] At the individual level, most will adhere to and uphold taboos. Some, however, have internalized them to the extent that they are willing to make extreme sacrifices to punish transgressions. In contrast, a small minority seem immune to social taboos. Sergey Gavrilets and Peter Richerson describe these extreme categories as the “oversocialized” and “undersocialized”, respectively.[16] A minority within this minority of “undersocialized” individuals can, for various reasons, also become motivated to actively rebel against taboos. The literature does not specify the underlying reasons for why some might be immune to or rebel against taboos, but sociological studies show that reasons for rebelling vary tremendously, depending on the nature of the taboo. Sometimes such rebellions can result in the dismantling and collapse of taboos. For instance, Western societies have witnessed major backlashes against “traditional norms and values”, such as the taboo against homosexuality. Notwithstanding the major substantive differences to the case under investigation here (the July 22 attacks), the implication is that we should expect similar patterns to play out in the case of the violence taboo. While this taboo will motivate most to reject violence and the perpetrators of violence wholesale, the very strength of this taboo may also drive a subset of the population to rebel against it and embrace violence.[17] Finally, the literature on the phenomenon of humor provides an important clue about the nature of taboos that has implications for our case as well. Emerson argues that jokes “provide a useful channel for covert communication on taboo topics.”[18] More recent survey-based studies indicate that while people initially respond negatively to jokes about specific acts of violence, natural disasters, and other traumatic events, they become more accepting with time.[19] This change is correlated with whether people still see the events as threatening or not. As time passes, these jokes lose their appeal and simply become stale. In other words, the connection between a specific transgressive act and the general taboo becomes weakened as the act becomes more distant. ISSN 2334-3745 38 June 2021 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 3 Mapping Far-Right Responses to Breivik Ever since the July 22 attacks in 2011, we have actively monitored and archived expressions of support for Breivik as well as negative responses. In total, the material we have gathered during this ten-year period amounts to an extensive collection of primary sources, including letters to and from Breivik, public statements, online support blogs, online message board archives, and far-right publications, supplemented with some secondary sources, most notably news articles describing far-right responses to Breivik. To promote transparency and replicability, primary sources cited or referenced in this article have been uploaded to