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The Rise and Fall of Liberal Democracy in Turkey: Implications for the West Kemal Kirişci and Amanda Sloat

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The Rise and Fall of Liberal Democracy in Turkey: Implications for the West Kemal Kirişci and Amanda Sloat POLICY BRIEF The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey: Implications for the West Kemal Kirişci and Amanda Sloat Turkey was once a beacon of democratic consolidation in a volatile neighborhood, but its authoritarian turn is straining relations with key partners in the West. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY freedom of expression and media), and has become more conservative and less tolerant of diversity. After nearly two decades of rule in Turkey by the Erdoğan’s abandonment of inclusive politics in favor Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its of exclusionary policies further aggravated Turkey’s leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the initial promise societal polarization along conservative-religious of reform has given way to authoritarian and and secular-progressive lines, complicating efforts dysfunctional politics. The democratic and to defend shared democratic values. Erdoğan economic achievements of the AKP’s early years used the government’s response to the July 2016 helped launch membership negotiations with the coup attempt, which all political parties rejected European Union (EU) and made Turkey a model for as an assault on the country’s democracy, to neighboring states undergoing reforms. However, crush remaining opposition. The transformation this positive picture did not last long: Democratic of Turkey’s decades-old parliamentary system gains eroded, economic growth stalled, EU into a heavily centralized presidential one further accession ground to a halt, and relations with most removed checks and balances. neighbors grew acrimonious. Among external factors, the botched EU accession In this paper, the authors identify internal and process contributed to Turkey’s democratic external drivers that contributed to democratic regression. Destabilizing regional developments, backsliding in Turkey. On the domestic side, the especially in Syria, also played a role. In particular, country has a political culture that is willing to accept domestic politics were adversely affected by the “big man” rule, feels less attached to core civil arrival of over 3.5 million Syrian refugees, attacks liberties associated with liberal democracy (such as 1 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER THE RISE AND FALL OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST in Turkish cities by the Islamic State (ISIS), and the country closer to the trans-Atlantic fold; this the collapse of the ceasefire with the Kurdistan included launching EU accession negotiations in Workers Party (PKK). October 2005 and efforts by then-U.S. President Barack Obama to forge a “model partnership.”2 The paper also examines the consequences of Yet despite the promise of early reforms, Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian rule in Turkey. It has politics have grown increasingly authoritarian weakened the governance structures of state and dysfunctional. This policy brief discusses the institutions, harmed the previously strong economy, weakening of Turkey’s democratic institutions, and contributed to the prioritization of nationalist internal and external factors that contributed to this concerns in foreign policymaking. backsliding, and the political and economic effect As the political situation is unlikely to improve in of these negative trends; it also addresses how the the near term, the paper concludes that relations trans-Atlantic community should respond. between Turkey and the trans-Atlantic community will remain strained for the foreseeable future. CHALLENGES TO TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC The paper encourages these countries to retain a INSTITUTIONS long-term perspective given Turkey’s geostrategic Increasing powers of the president importance to the West as well as their current political, security, socio-economic, and cultural Although it is difficult to determine a particular integration with Turkey. In the short term, they date when Erdoğan’s authoritarianism became should continue addressing respective security evident, the government’s brutal reaction to the concerns, adopt policies that encourage rule of law Gezi Park protests in May 2013 was a critical improvements, and engage Turkish civil society. turning point. The demonstrations, described by In addition, regional organizations such NATO, the one political scientist as “the biggest spontaneous Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security revolt in Turkish history,” began as peaceful and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should actively opposition to the urban development plan for an engage Turkey in support of shared trans-Atlantic Istanbul park.3 Additional protests and strikes values. developed across Turkey in response to the violent crackdown by police as well as broader concerns INTRODUCTION about the government’s growing interference in citizens’ lives, including limiting freedom of the When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and press, expression, and assembly. Amid differences Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey within his cabinet about how to respond, Erdoğan in 2002, there were high hopes in the West about used the opportunity to purge more liberal AKP progress in this predominantly Muslim country members.4 This included then-President Abdullah on democratic governance, minority rights, and Gül, who preferred a more conciliatory approach economic reform. In the aftermath of 9/11, Western toward the protesters.5 Erdoğan denied him the leaders had welcomed Erdoğan’s statement that “I possibility to return to the party ranks after his do not subscribe to the view that Islamic culture presidential term ended in August 2014. Erdoğan and democracy cannot be reconciled.”1 These put himself forward as a candidate for Turkey’s first positive developments also inspired Turkey’s direct presidential election—enabled by an October neighbors, who were keen to emulate its experience 2007 constitutional referendum amending the after the Arab Spring uprisings. Given Turkey’s previous procedure whereby parliament elected strategic importance and economic potential, the the president—and articulated a clear agenda to European Union and United States sought to bring shift to a presidential system. 2 DEMOCRACY & DISORDER THE RISE AND FALL OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST By subsequently winning the 2014 election with 52 Despite growing resentment over Erdoğan’s percent of the vote, Erdoğan believed he represented authoritarian tendencies, all political parties and the the will of the electorate.6 He chose former Foreign majority of Turkish civil society nevertheless rejected Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu as prime minister and the coup as an assault on Turkey’s democracy.11 caretaker party leader. However, Erdoğan dismissed However, Erdoğan viewed the failed putsch as a him in May 2016 due to his reluctance to support “gift from God” and used new powers obtained Erdoğan’s ambition to end the parliamentary through the state of emergency to crush remaining system, his willingness to entertain a coalition opposition.12 government after the AKP lost its majority in the June 2015 elections, and his opposition to various The formal consolidation of Erdoğan’s de facto policy reforms.7 Erdoğan replaced him with Binali presidential rule began on April 16, 2017, when Yıldırım, a loyalist who was prepared to facilitate the Turkish citizens voted in a constitutional referendum constitutional amendments needed to transform the on a package of measures that shifted the political political system. system from a parliamentary to a presidential one.13 These reforms eliminated the office of prime Another important turning point in the consolidation minister and enabled the president to serve as of presidential power resulted from the attempted head of the ruling party. They gave new powers to military coup of July 2016, which the Turkish the president, including the right to issue decrees, government quickly blamed on officers and civilians propose the national budget, appoint cabinet associated with Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic cleric ministers and high-level bureaucrats without a and the spiritual leader of a transnational religious confidence vote from parliament, and appoint more movement known as “Hizmet” (translated from Turkish than half the members of the high courts. Experts as “service”).8 Gülen worked with Erdoğan after the at the Venice Commission and elsewhere expressed AKP was elected in order to rid the government and concern about insufficient checks and balances, military of the Kemalists and secularists, whom they given excessive concentration of power in one office, believed operated a “deep state.”9 The placement limited parliamentary oversight, and a weakening of of Gülenists in senior positions across the Turkish judicial independence.14 government helped ensure internal support. Erdoğan became the first head of this new system Following their successful joint effort to weaken in July 2018, after he won snap elections and bureaucratic resistance to a more Islamist agenda, installed his “enhanced presidency.”15 As a result, Erdoğan and Gülen began jostling for power in 2011. the taste of relatively liberal democracy that Turkey They launched an escalating series of attacks and experienced in the early days of AKP rule has counterattacks: Erdoğan refused to include dozens largely disappeared. Whatever democracy remains of Gülenists on AKP lists for parliamentary elections will be Erdoğan-style demokrasi, characterized by and shut down Gülenist prep schools (used for populism, majoritarianism, and a mixture of Islam fundraising and recruitment); Gülenist police and and intolerant Turkish nationalism.16
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