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Royalist Propaganda: Fabrication of Magna Farta

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Royalist Propaganda: Fabrication of Magna Farta The Hilltop Review Volume 11 Issue 2 Spring Article 9 August 2019 Royalist Propaganda: Fabrication of Magna Farta Daniel R. Palthe Western Michigan University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview Part of the European History Commons, Legal Commons, Medieval History Commons, and the Political History Commons Preferred Citation Style (e.g. APA, MLA, Chicago, etc.) Chicago This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Hilltop Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact wmu- [email protected]. Royalist Propaganda: Fabrication of Magna Farta By Daniel R. Palthe ABSTRACT: This paper examines the perception and usage of Magna Carta in interregnum England. The central question is whether or not Oliver Cromwell ever referred to this royal document as the "Magna Farta." While one of the most common posthumous charges against him was a disdain for Magna Carta and English rights, accounts of his calling it a "Magna Farta" are questionable. The ways in which the Magna Carta was actually used under Cromwell rather seems to indicate a different opinion. Essentially, this paper compares royalist propaganda with the Commonwealth's accounts. 88 Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell is often cited by scholars and politicians as referring to Magna Charta as the "Magna Farta." It makes us wonder how exactly a compact between the English people and the monarchy, which the Commonwealth of England abolished, fit into the young republic's policies. In reality, however, Lord Protector Cromwell never said anything against Magna Charta, but respected it as England's first great step towards a constitution. Whether he was the Royalists' tyrant or the Parliamentarians' champion of the people, Lord Protector Cromwell believed he fought under the authority of the Common Law. One of the places in which Lord Protector Cromwell is accused of saying "Magna Farta" is in Royalist propaganda. With printing easy and not too expensive, seventeenth-century Britain was flooded by pamphlets from supporters both of Parliament and of the Crown. Anyone could have things printed, though not always legally. At the end of the Protectorate, a pamphlet by the name of The English Devil: or, Cromwel and his Monstrous Witch Discover'd at White-Hall was published for a man named George Horton. This pamphlet describes Cromwell as a tyrant who murdered the king and stole the throne. On its very first page, it mentions "Magna Farta." The whole Nation was enchained in a more than Ægyptian Bondage: who compelled to submit to this Tyrant Noi, or be cut off by him; nothing but a word and a blow, his Will was his Law; tell him of Magna Charta, he would lay his hand on his sword, and cry Magna Farta.109 By this Horton means that Cromwell had enslaved the nation and ruled as he saw fit. If Magna Charta was to be cited in defense against him, he would defy it. George Horton's pamphlet makes grave accusations but presents no evidence. He gives no time or place for Cromwell's dismissal of Magna Charta, but only says "he would." A lot of pamphlets were printed in 1660, and this is just one of many. We do not even know who George Horton is. He had many pamphlets printed including a Royalist periodical called The Faithful Post. Here is an example from an early spring issue from 1653. The States of Holland are very busie in consulting of an Answer to the Letter sent from the K. of Scots, written with his own hand; wherein he condoles with them their great Defeat at sea, and desires he may have a Squadron of good ships to bear his flag, and that then He would serve in person at sea against the English. This is wel referred by many; and the Royalists give out, That He shall be taken in with all His Titles of Great 109 George Horton, The English Devil: or, Cromwel and his Monstrous Witch Discover'd at White- Hall (London: Robert Wood, 1660), 3. 89 Brittain, To. In the meantime the Ministers and common people are set on to sail against the present Government in England, crying out, that they ought to joyn with him against the Parliament; besides, they fancy him a considerable party among the Highlanders, which will be able to shuffle the Cards with the English in Scotland, whilest they play the Game at Sea.110 In 1653 the Stuart royal family attempted to take back the English throne by force with Scottish troops, but would ultimately be defeated by the Protectorate. This issue details the attempt of Prince Charles to gain Dutch support to "joyn with him against the Parliament." Evidently Horton was printing Royalist propaganda in London even in the heyday of the Protectorate. He is today, however, an unknown pamphleteer and we have no record of him aside from his name on his pamphlets, so what he has written must be read with scrutiny. As for the content of the pamphlet, it is a passionate mess of slander. Propaganda is not known to be factual, and the pamphlet says things Horton had no way of knowing for certain. For example, he speaks with authority about Cromwell's motives. He hated all Learning, and the Learned, because his Crimes were so black and horrid, that they went far beyond the mercy of the Book. He granted a tolleration for all Religions, because his own was to choose; and that he might not offend the Tender Consciences of his pretended Zealots and Favorites, who were true Vassels to the Lust and Villainy of such an Imperious Usurper.111 Horton offers no proof of these accusations, and the only proof one could really have of Cromwell's motives would be the words of Cromwell himself. Propaganda is not a reliable enough source of evidence to say Cromwell indeed said "Magna Farta" at all. The only reputable account of Cromwell's distaste for the Magna Charta comes from volume seven of The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England by Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon. Hyde writes that Cromwell acted without regard for the ancient laws and gives the example of a man who was sent to prison by Cromwell because he refused to pay a tax. The man, named 'Cony,' was summoned by Cromwell who tried to persuade him to pay the tax, but the man insisted that the tax is illegal. When he came to trial, the man's defenders brought the common law against his charges. 110 George Horton. "The sum of all Intelligence form the English and Dutch Fleets." The Faithful Post 1 Apr. 1653 [London] . 111 Horton, English Devil, 4-5. 90 Maynard, who was of council with the prisoner, demanded his liberty with great confidence, both upon the illegality of the commitment, and the illegality of the imposition, as being laid without any lawful authority. The Judges could not maintain or defend either, and enough declared what their sentence would be; and therefore the protector's attorney required a farther day, to answer what had been urged. Before that day, Maynard was committed to the Tower, for presuming to question or make doubt of his authority; and the judges were sent for, and severely reprehended for suffering that licence; when they, with all humility, mentioned the law and magna charta, Cromwell told them, with terms of contempt and derision, "their magna f------ should not control his actions; which he knew were for the safety of the commonwealth."112 Here Hyde clearly tells us that Cromwell did not care what Magna Charta says he can and cannot do, and actually said "magna f----." Hyde's history is considered the most comprehensive contemporary account of the English Civil War, and most historians do not question this account, but that does not mean that it is entirely true. There are several problems with Edward Hyde's account. First of all, he gives no specific information about the event, such as date or even year. He does not name the tax, or which court session it was questioned in, and only names the accused as 'Cony.' He gives no direct quotation, and could not anyway, because he was not there. If this is a true story, it is not a firsthand account, because Edward Hyde was not even in the country when Cromwell ruled. After the Royalists lost the battle of Torrington in 1646, he fled with Prince Charles to Jersey and did not return to England until the Restoration after Cromwell's death.113 We also must take into account Edward Hyde's bias against Cromwell. Initially, Hyde was a member of Parliament and was angry with Charles I. He was particularly furious about the Earl Marshal's Court, which he found unlawful. It was a court which handled only cases in which the nobility was slandered. He also opposed the Council of the North. Hyde equally defended the king's power to check the rapidly growing power of Long Parliament and opposed the Grand Remonstrance. He hoped to reconcile with the monarchy instead of abolishing it and would eventually become unofficial advisor to the king.114 Hyde continued to mediate between the King and Parliament until it was clear that Charles I had lost, and he was asked to flee with the teenaged Prince 112 Edward Hyde, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England. Vol. 7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1671), 294-296. 113 George E.
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