/ I
/ I p. I I _., • CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIP~lliNT FOR EITHER -SINGLE-ORIGINATOR OR MULTI-ORIGINATOR COMMUNICATION
1. a. Progress in the cryptologic field-during the.past fevT yea.,:s has .led to a basic change in cryptologic philosophy, a change Which has already oeen recognized by and is of im., portant interest to the ASA.
b. The t1~ust vrhich 'has heretofore been placed in the ordinary types of crypto-systems, the solution of which depends upon, or is directly or indirectly correlated with, the number of tests that have to be made to exhaust a multiplicity of , / hypotheses based upon keying possibilities, is daily decreasing. The beginning of this decreasing confidence i~ the degree of cryptographic security potentially offered by a vast number of permutations and combinations available of keying possibilities can be traced back to the advent of the application of ~abu~ lating machinery to the solution of cryptanalytic problems. _ Later, when specially designed cryptanalytic machines employ- ing electrical relays came to be constructed and applied, success fully to these problems, a real blow was struck at our former concepts of cryptographi·c security. And, now, the assurance that electronic cryptanalytic machinery can be a·pplied to ~?Peed up the solution 9f complex cryptographic systems is tend ing· slm1ly to undermine what faith was left in the systems or crypto-mechanisms currently considered as being the best there are, those using rotors with complicated stepping controls .. , ·· . c.- To sum this up, it can be said that, save for orie exception, cryptologic theory and practice during the past 'quar,ter of a c~ntury serves only to corroborat.E? the theoretical validity of·the century-old dictum first enunciated by Edgar Allan Poe: "Yet it may be r·oundly asserted that ht1.man ingenuity cannot concoct a cipher which human ingenuity cannot solve.11 2. The foreg9ing summatJon is, as noted, theoretical and pessimistic in outlook. From a practical viewpoint, it can be stated that, so far as concerns the currently-employed P,igh e~helon cryptog:r:aphic systems of the U.S. Army, there is every reason to believe that, despite the recent advances in cryptanalytic techniques and machinery, these systems are still quite sequre. .But for how many more years this may continue to be true is a matter of serious concern. ·The lead vrhich our cryptographic· techniques presently have over our cryptanalytic techniques is not sufficiently great to leave no room.at ail 'for speculation or apprehension as to the situation in Which we might· ·rind ourselves, say 15 or 20 years from now, when the nevr.ci'yptographic machines under development will have f~O~cl~~~Hied by NSN~S, ·r=- N~~e-~0 ;NOT_~~~~t'rovTeturi1ToJ1~~-' · - · ~~-· ~-~. ·-- · . f~ p p · and Records r,. · ,c n cal l tbrary when no'longer 02eded OeputyAssociateDtrector.vr o.cyfi))ib't,-'J::~.·;: ·,; ,[•("~ /1 , 7~ 7' :uco·. · • .:...... ~' On O~k(\ by_R!!\lflj.L,.,,Lr~ .,_;d..J \b!fwr~ u "·~· . /( .· rt··tf"_opyNo. . .,9 - ·,·D"o·wo -c;r::;::r- ·, .. v oR (>:.U'il'filt.~"li!.f: .,~ L- .t Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-16-2014 been completed. It is hardly necessary to note that the Research Laboratories Division is endeavoring to anticipate what the future may hold in store and is bending all its efforts to pro duce improved crypto-equipment that will be secure against a greatly advanced cryptanalytic art. Basically, these efforts are in the direction of increased sophistication and complexity in the present types of equipment, on the theory that this will always keep our cryptography in the lead of our cryptanalysis. But what if it should happen that because of unforeseen develop ments, in electronics and related fields, progress in crypt analytic techniques and machinery has actually been greater than that in cryptographic techniques and machinery? National security demands that we take all measures necessary to guard against such a contingency. 3. The sole exception alluded to in Par. lc above, in con nection ~ith Poe's dictum, appears to be involved in the case of ·what may be called a "holocryptic" system, that is; one which is theoreti6ally absolutely unsolvable b~cause a message in it can be read only by actual physical p6ss~ssion of.the key. In a truly holocryptic system, if the key consists .of a perfectly random, unpredictable sequence of all the elements · (letters or characters) of the language, the sequence being as long as the enciphered text itself·and being a primary sequence (that is, one not derived from the interaction of a limited number of basic components), the cryptogram appears to be un solvable in the cryptanalytic sense. It appears to be impos sible to present or to develop any pract;tcal technique fol the solution of a truly holocryptic system as defined herein. It is to be noted that in the thr~e foregoing sentences the phrase "appears to be 11 is used. It is empl'oyed. advisedly, for it would be somew·hat dangerous to insist upon a categorical state ment in the absence· of experimentation to demonstrate the positive validity of the statements made. -It is indeed possible _to conceiv~· a theoretical general solution for certain of the so-called holocryptic systems, but no further remarks will be made in this paper on that phase of the subject, except to in dicate the necessity for further study.· 4. a. It is to be noted that there are three conditions which a cryptographic system must fulfill before it can be terme~ a truly holocryptic system: (1) the key must consist of all the characters found in the plain. text of the language involved; (2) the keying characters must form a perfectly, or at least an entirely unpredictable, random sequence, so that it
1Even vrere telepathy established as a. practical reality, the reading of a cryptogram by this means vrould_,not constitute a cryptanalytic solution.
2··~ ~41272ji --:------....
must be a'primary sequence, not a secondary one derived frpm the interactiqn of a limited nuniber of basic elements; and (3) the keying sequence must be used onc_e and orily once. In our best rotor-type cipher machines.the first of these conditions is fulrilled; the thir~ is fulfilled to a degree which, for all practical purposes,, is quite ,satisfactory; but as regards the second condition:, it is obviou~ that although the keying characters in SIGABA, for example, form an unpredictable' sequence, for all practical purposes in the present state of the cryptanalytic art, it is not a primary sequence and there fore the SIGABA or any similar machine presently falls short of competing vTi th the truly holocryptic system in security. As time goes on, it is poss1ble that the competition will not lessen in favor of SIGABA or its successors. 'l1his point is worth so~e elaboration. .. b. It may·be stated,.in view of what is now practic able and of "tvha t may become practicable in the near future, that, at least theoretically, whatsoever be the nature or cons'truction of a crypto-mechanism, if it embodies within it. all the crypto-elements of the system, messages prepa~ed by · it can and-will ultimately be solved. Only when the crypto mechanism is controlled by some external keying means does it present truly holocryptic features--and then only if that external keying means is properly designed and employed. ,Even if an internally-controlled-crypto-mechanism is employed ·in a manner such that the internally-produced. keying sequence is employed only once, as in SIGHUAD for example, the system is still theoretically solvable because that keying sequence
is produced by th~ interaction, of a limited number of primary / keying elem~nts, that number being very small in comparison with the length of the secondary or resulta;nt keys. Therefore it cannot in the present state of the art be considered as . falling in the class of holocryptic systems and must be con sidered to be theoretically solvable. How soon i~ may becqme practically solvable is a questio!l that will be answerable only with the passage of a few more years. 9 5. From a practical viewpoint, it may be assumed that messages in a holocryptic system will never be solvable, no matter what the state of the cryptanalytic art may be. It would therefore be "ifise to extend the usage of such systems. Unfortlina tely, the last two condi ti.ons ·which must be fulfilled in a truly holocrypt·ic system impose practical limitations on the extensive emplo~!nent of such systems in military crypto communication. The large volume of communication required . and the large number of commands which must intercommunicate make it. wholly impracticable_ to prepare and to distribute
·:;7. . the multitude of lengthy primary sequences that would be pequired. Moreover, the keying s~quences can only be used once. If used more than once; even only two times in most cases, such a system is quite insecure. 6. · It is usual to refer to a system using a pad of sheets of paper on lvhich keying characters appear as a "one-time pad system", and systems using perforated tapes, such as the SIGTOT, as a "one-time-tape system". For the system using the SIGABA or similar equipment there is no analogous designation based upon the number of times a key is used, though supposedly such a system could be referred to as a "many-time system"--a designation technically too loose and inaccurate for the pur poses of this paper. The· real essence· of the matter is that, in the case of a one-time pad or one-time tape system, practical, almost...:absolutely-sure intercommunication is assured only when . there are but two copies of a pad or tape, one held by the originator of a message, the other by the addressee; and further more, an originator must not use as the keying sequence for any of his outgoing messages a sequence intended to decipher any of his incoming messages. So far as concerns the ability to originate messages that will' be absolutely secure, therefore, a true one-time_system must be limited in its distribution to one originator; for this reason such a system will hereinafter be referred to as a "one-originator system". A system such as the one employing SIGABA, for example, will be referred to as a "multi-originator system",' because many holders of ~he equip ment can originate secure messages and thus intercommunication among ~any holders can be pr'ovided. 7. a. The question arises: would it be possible, practical, and advantageous to have crypto-equipment which will, in the same basic machine, provide fqr truly holocryptic, one-originator systems as well as for_high-security, multi-originator systems? In other'words, what about.a single machine-which for the · greatest part would be .used for multi-originator communication, but which could, when special circumstances dictated, serve also for single-originator communication? · b. The possibility that such a machine can be devised has already been demonstrated in at least two cases. The first is to be noted in.the case of the obsolete Converter M~l34A, wherein the angular displacements of, the rO-tors of a 5-rotor crypto-maze were controlled by perforated tapes. Multi- . originator communication was provided for by issuing the tapes in sets of 48 and using them according to the variations in dicated in a key list. To employ such a machine by-the use of individual tapes according to the single-originator system is obviously possible, though it was actually not done when
4 Conver~er M-134A was in current usage.·. The s_econd example ·is to be noted in the case of SIGSALY~ .wherein holocryptic, single-originator communication was proyided for by the use of SIGRUVE records and high-security, multi-originator com municati'on was provided for by the so-called Busch machine. The latter was hardly ever used, however, for various reasons, mostly because of mechanical or electrical difficulties, not for secur_i ty reasons.
c. There seems to be l~ttle. question of the practic ability of the idea of a single machine capable of serving both functions. 'If the basic equipment is designed to incor porate the idea~ and is in·itself practicable, there should be no problem about providing for the dual function by means of suitaple a~apters or cooperating components. For example, in the case of SIGABA, it. is perhaps possible to provide a "basket" or crypto-component in which the control and index -rotors are replaced by a tape transmitter through whi~h could .be passed a 1-time,tape. With the normal component (present SIGIVI), the availability of SIGABA formulti-originator com munication \olOuld remain intact; yet, when occasion demanded the assurance of absolute·security, this could also be furnished by the special component.replacing the SIGIVI. d. As to the advantages and disadvantages of the pro posal, there is no doubt that.it would complicate matters to a certain extent, but the advantage of having a single machine capable of performing the. dual function and of affording not onl-y highly secure multi-originator communications but also nearly-absolutely-secure single-originator communication is obvious. Even now there would be a practical usa~e for such a machine. Recent cases wherein question has been raised with ' regard to the security of specific .messages demons~rate the point. "Eyes Only" messages also demand special treatment. But of' greater significance is the importance of having such a machine ivi th vrhich to face the future. For, should ·it turn out that 15 or 20 years from no~r the actual progress in crypt analytic techniques and machinery approximates or surpasses the · expected progress, we should not be caught unprepared. Our security equipment could still meet the·needs of security to a better degree than would be the case if we proceed-on the assumption that our cryptography can a11vays be advanced, by increasing sophistication and complexity of construction, .to be sufficiently in the leadof our cryptanalysis to permit our confidence in the security of our equipment to remain undis turbed. In short, the proposal here made is in the nature of an 'insurance policy against unforeseen contingencies--we ought not to allo:vr ourselves .to be caught in an unfavol'able. communi ca. tion security position becaus·e of lvholly unexpected develop ments or much more rapid improvement in our signal intelligence position. · ·
5 ".. ~lT:A41272i6....
8. It has been suggested that as an alternative to the dev~lopment of adapter-type components in equipment designed to be capable of performing the dual function outlined herein, it 1-Tould be possible to issue special key-lists and use a specific keying arrangement once and only once; this being nearly equivalent to th~ truly holocryptic single-originator system under discussion. There is no doubt that such a scheme would give added security, ·but it does not meet guite· squarely the issue presented her~in. The point has been touched upon in Par .. 4b and the argument· therein presented is equally applicable kere: · · , 9. If the principle or proposal advanced herein has merit, it could be adopted as a general policy to incorporate it wherever possible and practicable. 10. It is recommended that: a. The propqsal suggested herein, viz., that future development of security equipment be so directed as to .fn corporate features or components which will alternatively· .permit of' s-ingle-or•iginatol' and of multi-originat011 communi cations by the same basic machine·, be studied to ascertain its merits. b. If the proposal is found to possess advantages important enough to outveigh its disadvantages, l t be. considered for adoption as a general policy. . . c. Cons.ideration be given to the prop9sa;l in connec tion with the current ·revision. . of SIGIRA.
d. Som~ research and study be given to .the question of holocryptic systems to ascertain what might be accomplished by the use of' new machinery now only dimly conceived but perhaps possible of being constructed.· · e.· . Further research and study be devoted to a careful examination of the nature of our.present mechanisms for the generation of our 1-time keys and of the nature of the cipher alphabets employed in connection therewith for the encipherment of classified communications. · . \.w· ,~~.· \4I~RIEDMA~ Chief, Communications Research 2 May 1947
6 . . . ' ...... /1/-J-?"{;y/..:{ .til. INTER TO. FROM DATE SUBJECT Cryptographic Equipment for Either Single AS-20 .AS-14 2 Ma Originator or Ivlul ti -Originator· Communication· 1 paper is submitted at this time in connection with SIGIRA. 2 The ubsta of the paper .is to recommend that serious c·onsi eratio ·be to an extension of the potential u~age of 1/-t s·yst by. iding.adapters for use in connection with ·~a) c e,nt rypto chanisms now generally operating only as 'mult le-e unica on" equipment or (b) similar inechariisms noi.J in th and evelopment phase.- Cbt'x~a.G-~~ 1 WILLIAM F. FRIEDiviA'N - . - Ohief, Communications Research Ext 215 2. . ) . 1. The inclosed paper on Cryptographic Equipment Either Single-Originato·r or Mul ti-o'riginator Com ication has been studied l?Y Operatio:r;rs Division, · esearch Laboratories Division, and Security Division. to the reco~endations contained in paragraph 10 of the comments are made: n~zed that holocryptic systems provide the only systems. At·the present time~ however, the employment. s is accompanied by a number of serious operational as stril;mtion problems. · Further; in the case of low a requirement for the provision of infinite·security · ,,In the case of high echelon cryptomechanisms, it is ticable, holocryptic principle's should be embodied in· ent work on SIGIRA, account is being, taken of a basic a one~time mecpanism to ~ulfill the need for holocryptic ~In. :this conn~ctiori, the questi_on arises a~ to whe'!;her, devel<;>pment, it might be better to achieve speed a:lild l PAGE NO.--- '.!6 Nov 45 38900 LIFT HERE USE OTHER S_IDE TO FR.OM DATE SUBJECT \L: , -· _'~:~;·~:~·~127-zz""t------, . ~ /", ~i:fbiciEquipment for Either Single- Orj gi nator or Multi -Ori gi nat or Communi catj on ligh~-- evi:ce,. issu:i.ng. it to all hq;l,dE}rs _for: emergency ·u~e, rath·er ·than to burden IJi chine~ ~-qe~ign~gi pr~I!lar;ily··ror niul-:t;1,~o;r:::i,ginator 'll:se.,. : , Se~tle _en~.~~ '~i~ '.~u~~.. iqn;)P}iJ~~ ... Q~Vi9~f!!Y~·~w~i t a' -~9r~. a~~n~~ . .c. 1 -.+ ptov~m~n s i1;1 the methods of '.g;ene:rati~g. perf~ctly random, ~pr~d ci_ta~J,:e··· ·~y-·for 'u e -in .~o~~c~iQI+ .w~th_,#o.lo~rypt~c_s:ys'~em~' are .. no'1'under s~\idy.-- y Secuz:_t~ .. PiY'i;s's>~.._- · >··. ·"· .- .·- _·· : .;· r-, · ..... r' •...... :.·: • ·: ,"- .... . " . .. . ' : : .. :. . ·, ·-·- . . • . ·. . '...... -·- •.• - J . : : . : "~ •· .. G .'7 . " ... .-/ ~. -~:r:1; :vi ·Y!·~-·o_f -~~e.r ~~91.~·: .r.~~},_ar9.~.:~~ i;l).e ~ey~~o~~e~~ -o,~~"a:p_;c.mt~~/~P~ic dev1c~ 13Iiould' 1nclude:. onnderat1·on of.· hoJ,ocrypt1o prmo:z.ples :z.n··the··proV1s:z.on :''. '(.' , ·( -r -;~".,. .... r:;: '·i_:;) .....-.~~----·-·r· ·-- ...... , ·· · ·· ·· ··· . .,.. ··· -...-.-.-. ~ ·· " .. ,... ···.or.• -- -··- of dua . :sing;le originat r ~ multi-originator equipment;: '·In' this ·conriecti-on it is des ·red. th.a the· Chi f;· '¢9~unicS:tions_ Res~arcih<;seotio!r.oolitiritie.:to ·:Pu.r·sue ·. this m insU:re:, -through c'oordinatio'n: with -:the ·:vai:-iou~ ''op~ratini di vi- sions, tinuing onsi ,! :··:~·:·~·-T--·:: >-~:_,~a.--...... - .~/2~C ,._ .... . ' 1 Incl - . . PAUL E~· NEFF'. n/c Lt;· Colonel· :·:·gnil·:corps· -Acting. _Depu Qhi.ef Army Seoufi tY· Agency . _ .... Ext 498 • 2o AS·l4 - AS-23 21. Jul 47 : . Ma·jor Moak/ 462 . . L .· 'l'ha ·i~olosed paper. qn Cryptographic Equipment for Either· Single-Originator or Mul'ti~Originator Com-. munioa:tion has ~been studied by Operations ~i vision; Ras~arch: Labor~tories Division •. and .'.secur.ity. Division. : ·. . • ..• . ' l t l . . ' , •• 2o. With ref'orence ·.to t,ne -reoommendatlons. ootttained iri paragraph 10 of the inclosure~ :the- 'following .comments are made,: : · . . . •. . ' . :· - ' ,· a. ·rt is recognized: that holocryptio .syst~ms provide the.only theoretically unsolvable systems. At the·pr~sent.time~ .hoWever •. the employment· of holoceyptic pr,inoip~es-. is accomp.an~ed ·by a.· nurilb~r of' sari otis~ opE:~rational as· well as produc:*;~on arid. distribution ·problems.. F~rth;er, in the. oa.se of' low . echelon pryptq~echanis~ a requ_iremen.t for t}le :'pr9vi.sion _of'· infinite security ' _has ~ot been ~stablished.< I~ the cas.e. of high e.oh~ion, cryptom:eohanisms, it ·.is ~greed that, wh~never .. pra.ctioable. :·holoc.rypt~c pr,inoiplt:)s sh~lJ,ld be emoodied in multi-originator mechanisms.. . - . . b. In. the prese11t work on··~:.rGI.&~· .aocoUn.t is-b~ing taken of' a basic . mili ta.ry requirem~nt for ·a one'-tiine-_mechanism to fulfil.). .·the neeq for holbcryptic sy~tems where required. · In this ·connection;. th'e questi.on ar~ses as .to ~hether. , at tho present stage of: develo~.en,~, 11,A:;t~df!.ig"tr'lt)·Q.e bett~r to achi~ve speed and \1~&'~ A 2::i!cn:.~)LLA Vtz'~!A~A i+Z·io·.;{tY::s.u=:~e: . ;&rEi:'" . . ~JIKET · · . ~ ·;~);,~~ir·:r · SECR~E" .-·r~\"~4127221: ' : ' I • Cryptographic Equipment for Either Single- AS ... 14 AS.-23 21' Jul 47 Originator or Multi-Originator Communication • • '-~;,. 1' light weight in such a deviQe. issuing it t.o all- holders· for e:merg.,ncy _use,; rather ~han to burden ~chines, deslg;:ted p~bia.rily for multi-origin~tor use. . ·settlement of this -question must obviously :await a more· advanced stage in the . development of cryptographic' deVices now·~der considt?ration.·, · o c. Improvei!lents in the methods of generating.perfectly random11 unp~edictaple key for usa in connection with holooryptic systems are·~~ under study by Security Division~ · I . I ·3. In view of the apove. research-in the d~velopment of all .~rypt(lgraphio devices should incl'qde conside;rat~on of h~~ocryptic principles in _the' provision of dual Single-originator - multi-ori·gimitor equipment. In .this connection it ' is de.sired that the Chief. C'91.11Il1Ullications. Research Section: ·continue to pursue th,i"s ,matter. and insure,. through· coordination 'with the va:r'io~s· operating. divi siQns, . that continuing cons~dera~ion ia gfwn the .. recommendations· contained in the inclosed paper. 1- Inol PAUL E. NEFF .n/Q . Lt. Colonel.· Sig~l Corps Acting' 'Deputy Chief A~ Security Agency Ext 498 · ' . \fH!AL!t 2Ecrhl£U.. ;.. "'f•:.:~MCA . \'{E';l!:>;")r< ';,'!::J.LF~e ., . \ . ~ . . ··. i __.....,.RE ..... E.. ID:A4127221· CONFIDEN'II.AL DATE I?ROM --'- Commanding Officer -----Assistant Com."T!andant-~--~------~~ · ' ----~Dir of C~ili~ Research-----~~.-.?.·.~------Control 0 ------Administrative 0 -- Adjutant Intelligence----~~~--~~-~---- 0 . F r ovos t Mars ha-:;l------'---- 2nd Sig Se,rv Bn , ------~------Chief, Pers & TrnG Div ==:== Chief, Pers Er -----~---- Chief, Trng B1· ------Chief, Oper Serv Div ----- Chief, Communications---=------Er ·Chief, Laboratory Br ---- ·Chief) Machine I3r ------Property & Supply 0 ,.., / Purchasin1; & Contracting. Cf". .... -'>,.---- Fiscal & Certifying 0 .. ' OIC, Mail Section ~ ----~~------'• .~~- ,. :··. !·· . .-:· . "t·· ...... •.. · '•.. •, .. ,f ,.... , . C'hief', Securit~r Div· '· r;; ';··l· --,.--.'- ChiE;f, )P!;·otective S~c· Br . /Chief, yryptographic Br ---.- .r.~e·v;,.l B \,·1 ... ·1. ~.. -x ·c""·'1 11-':'e r··~:. J..i •• " opmep.1t , •• .r.. . , ' ' ,:' , ' .· .t. ·- . i . . ...,..,--.'-\ ---- ·i \ Chief, Intelligence Div' . Chiflf, Le.nl!,uage. Br . ------~--~,·.,··...... ,./;; ~-> Ti-;;_.: --.n~, .. I J.. , .• T~ .... Chlef, hli C17p~..amuyt1c ... r ---- ChieT~ Gen Cryptanalytic Br___ _ ---- Chief, T/A o.nd Contrcl Br1---- Chief, I & L Br------ • As disc\l,ssed --~'-.,.,. · As requested ------~ Conments and__ r_e-:t-u-rn -~-Information and file-~~------Information and forwarding-~~~~------Information and return ~------~ -----~,connenda t i oi1______VSee note on reverse --~-Signature if approved-~------~- ----~Your actipn '------~- SIS-SC~Fo1m rto. ~6 (Rev) .23 ·August 1 944 REF. ID., . A4127221 ..' .. ()./ . lf\ . . ' ...... - . ~ ·- - t ...... , ~ .. .' , ... -·· ... : .. .. ~ ' RE·F ID: A412 7221 Date et_( ~·ez&/f{(/" From~: L;;rlcs ;5Q?4; . . Col Corderman...__...... _ ___ ._ ~-· ' . .... . -~t .. > • :· ~. M,, o ' ·, • I' .• • ,. •' • • . ., • ~ ,' . -::• • •.. ~ • • ., ·_:.- :. · current Developmen't.s·~:j_n_-: -:i:rit·e~cept.·· :Equipment . . . . Lt·. :..:c~·oi~ ;Rose~- ~~iitiq~ed:a -~~~lee ·~rhich :is bei~g-, constr~c-. · · · .. ·· .ted-':.for· fu.ar.king :·the Baudot 'start. ,p.tilse p·osi tion on. u:hdulator · ·.. _tapes. < Thj_s ·devi:ce, 'if ._suc·c·e'ssful:/ \v.iil grea t·ly. ra:cili ta:te · . . , the reading of:_ta,_pe re9ordE?·,·of 5:,unit cod,e t'ransmissi_oris. At-· ·. :· . _ ·.GCCS. this mark+ng hL:done .by __ han~·.. _·, · · · , • ~ ' •· .' ,' ,. :· . •. • I • ,' .. • '•. . . ' • . ' ' : ~ ··. Mr.- ,Morris s-tated 'tha·t ·th~ :time delay rec-order _is under . '.going. test: a~ V;t11t Hill."· :(n,- a current security monitor-j_·ng . .·,·· : missiori_·.fn· _wh:tc:h,mul;t~;ton~· te.le.type trahsinissiqn .\vas_ trans-. mi tted 6n _·qne ~i-9-e ba,nd and/'s.peech::on -~h~ other, the delay •. !.. d~vJce made. possi:bl~ ·_an a:rr~nge~~nt by .which .. :al.l·: tele_phprie· oomin:uni:cation ."\.fas recorded· vri thout: the long ,intervals. which ·_ ·_acitually'o'ccur bet1~~~h ·:ti:'ari?mis~:i,"pn~ arid w:i, thout loss of apy . par.t of ·t_he- :comnni.n:icat":ion. _. -It ... was sugge'ste'd ~that_-· this. method -·_ .i.s __of. signiffqance- 'fn: conn~~tiorl_ -w.:tth telephone monitoring of -'; •.· .. any .sort.-: Mr. Frie:dman p:q:l,.ht out:'Y.:that ~this WE1~- a 'm$ans· :-6r. :. · ·a(Jcomplishing_ lvha;t Capt·. Rh_oads- had suggest'ed· in. 193.5-:··· thiq~ ·a· ·message be copied )y autom¢-tic ...!fl.ean;~ only where· such ari _iO.erit:i- · fying word as ETAT appears-. ;in the_::transmi~~:i;on,;· thus_ say.ihg. , - monit.oring tinie. Capt.· Wenger. re:Po!.'.ted that the P /L '•,equipment· : ·w:ill bE?, . set up·· tenipor.arily':·a.t ~k_9.gs I. vntil_-. ~6mething further --.. develop~. on sc:l;'ambl~d'~-~-~peech ,transmissio:p.~ ··Mr., lllorris said .. ·nf.. or}e';'-of •thE?~~lat te:r_,'.<'f .e_-.: ~~:Pan.~:.~-~~··e~igin-_, .hB:d' t)een: · o~·sE:n~v_ed or a.year~ · · / J .• .,. •.. ~ .... ·- ..... ·· -.. ~ j. :·· : ' .. , . ' •.· .• - ·.· ,·) ,· .-.. ···.·: ...... ' .. 1 : _' :~- .. ~. ' ...·- . . ' ·,·''I:, ! -. ·- . ! . .• I • ·.. ' ''" ~.. ~o;cl~~ifi~ci lJVNsNds :, ;. ;. .. . :. .·. ·' ,· ·~. • j ... ·. ; ~ ... : •· .~· . ' .' ;p~tY ~ocia~e Oirectoi for P.o_licy: ~n_d·Rec~r~~ ..,. : ·...... · 0 ~-.. .~ ... ' . . .. -.on·~P.U.J..~~5-:b~ -e~r ·-c· .·. ·_,_ '-·"' ...... ~ ! ' .. ..:.. -· ...... '· . . . . .~ ....._ .,, ' ·. ' .. ·: ...... '· .-. ....: .. · -~ .. ·. "?. •.••• '_ ..·: . ·.. . .· i. - .: . ' . . · ... .: • •• l .. • ': . I ·"""':.: ' ( ._- .... \.. .··•· ' ..... '>i' ·t~~ii?iie~·:·. ,, ~ .. · ~- . -:· · .--·-: :~ - · w-ltJ]~w··~ --:.. LiJJ.tlUJij·~-lC-1L'. ·_ >-: ., ·:, ·---.- · · -:.. · .- ·· _ .... ·. . ,. : . ·.' •. •. . . . ._-·. -: . .·.. .· ·. . . ~ . . . ' . ·~:...... ~ .· .. . EXTRAOT:·FROM FIFTH.-DETXNG OF·-·A.rua;;.NAVY ·cRYPTANALYTIC RESEARCH:'-:- .· .. ·.:._ .•• - ::-AND ·D~~C~)PBmNT QODJ:TTEE . 15· NQ~-i;R +944: . .-::·- ·; _>: ., - ...... ~- .. . ··:· ~ ' .· ··.... . -:.. . ,. - .. ": ._~ ' •: . .. ~- ·• . ' ' . . ..~ ..~. --~- .. . . ~.' !'", .. ' , • , '' ' ,I ;· ' ' . ~ • ' f' I ', ' - t ~.;. i• ·· • • , . , .. __ -- __ _--·. -·=·----_.;:*':·*--~---~{:b-:o·-:~·-o-·o -- · '·; ,.~·-·-·_ ---:·:," ..,_ - .,·,_-~ .: - - _-; ._: . _:._. :- - ,i" ,-.-:_ ,.:._ ; .: •. ·: ::::::-. ;:. ...,: .. - .. "". :-:';' _--. : :::_··.· ---< -.:: ~-- --· : __. . --.'; '-: ,,_-· Curr~nt- -DaveloP!ients in Int'ercept EgUipnient · . : _ · : · -.. ·- .• ' .,.. '. - . . .• • •• .0:.:' • • ~ . •• ·• -·'. ~.. • s. :::· . . .. -:- _Ltq,--Oolo·- ~os_en ·mant~_one_d _ra;·~~vice- 'tfhlcb.is -b~~g construe tad· toxo· fu.Qrking the Baudot· :start. pulse position on tmdulator - ·tapeao ~-;_-This device 9 -if s~cc.ess_t~l:~- wiil gr_eatly .facilitate ; th~. · read1ng :.of, tape reco~aa·- o.t ·s ·Uhi t cod~ tr.ansmissio~s-o · A-t -..• · GOCS.:this marking'·'is·- done,_~·by,_,~-~do'; . -... -::'' . :,_- :_. - · .. :. :- · ... . ._,. . . . . : . ~ -·· . ' . . ,_ . ·· > -~~-- Baorr.is stat~c{ t~-t ·the ti~~, -delay -;~~~rder fs. under~· . . .-: -- going test .~t;-Vi-nt·_lii_ll.'!. ·:_-;~:·.:a ;~uz'~e~t _sec~_:i.:ty monitoring- . · mission' in -.vhi_ch'mUltitone --~eletype .transmis's-ion··vas trans- ... •mitted on one side -ban.d,·_~d.)1p~e~h.. on the otherJ) the delay dev,ice -made pos~Jble ,an ar:ra.ngemcant by ·which ·all talephone - -communication. vas: recorded.-witho.ut· the ·long intervals -··which _,· .. .. li.C~ually. OCcur· between· txian~~ssi'ons and wfthout ~ l_OSS of any . pa.rt. or: th' comm'Unication·~ ·· "It was. suggested~·th.at this··method . i!ii of. signif~c&xioe in·--co.nne~.tion,with .. telephone monitoring -of . any sor.to 001"~ Prie-~n point: out _t~t· this- ·¥as·_~ means of. - · · ··· e.ccomplishing _wh$t papt .. 1Uloads-·had ·sugges-ted,_i.xf 1935&"._.·~~t ~- .__ , . ·.message be. CQpie~ by auto,matic .. mea.ns only :w:here .such ¥til -identt -·- - f'yillg vord a:a,ETA';l'-·appe!!Lz-s·i.D. -th~ .·transmission.»- thus· saving•·· ·· · ·. ·- _. monitoring._ time o -- . Capt o Wenger -:reported t~ t the_ P/L equipment --~-__ -'vill•·be,set-up-~empQrarily·.a:t 'Ska.gs I~ ·~t.il.'som~thing furthet' ·· .·.·, ...··. d0velopif·on-. l:lQ~a~pl~~~ -.S.l?.~~-~P.--:tr.'?>~~~ssiop.o .· .~.o. Morris_ saici ...... none ot --the.latter».~-i~-eo '"Japa.ne·~·a :orig~ 9 :",bad~be~n--observed. --.for a_.:yea~~:~ · .-.:.-~ _:. · -·--:->·.~-< -.;·,. -\·."· ·.::· .._._.· __ · .. -.- _ ·. -~ . . ., - .. ·· .. , . ,.._. . )' . '.•.:.:.... ·.··:: ...,!_' :.1·: ., ;- '', '"· . . ': --~:;· ;; . : . - ! • ~ • . . ·.~.· • '.:- .; --- . .. , ... . .: . .- t .• • . /"'- c : ·.·• • - ...... - . . . -;; ... -~. ·- -._ :.. . .·· ,•' .-:: '- . ~ --~\~ . :_...... · -~ -:~-. .- •. ·.:. . • . •. . . '- ~:.• .·. . :'! :. ... . .. ::· ·. 1: ~ -. ,• ~ -t • ·, .. ~ : "::.. • ~ . . . :• .. ;.."_:...... : .,, . ~- . . ; -... ' ~ _·: '·····-·· ·... •. -. ' '• ~-· ;:. '·. . ' ' - ·:t _!1· ••. ·-~ ~- .-~~- .... ~: -:~~ ~- .. '• : - '': ....:.- -·. ;, '' ~ ... ~ .. '...... ~- -· ) . ,·.- ·'·· -. . "', ·. ;'~ . ~ ... : . ,. ·~- ~.- t. t- .-_., . -: .· ...... ·, !','. . ._...... • - •• l - ·. . . ./' . . . • ,1:- ...~ • • . • . •.:~ .. ~-:·.'~~~J~-;-:::--.~~~':'·- . ··.' : ·t ,· ... ·-. - -· "J • • - • ' '. ~ j .• '·: · ... ,·... -~ .. : . '' ' .. ~ - ...... ; --- ' . ... : . _:·· .. '. - \ . ~·····.. : . •' ·, ' :... : ·;: :~: \. .. ~. ' ., ": '. : ~ - . •'' _·,· .. ···. ,..; .