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SWP Comments 2007/C 20, November 2007, 4 Pages

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SWP Comments 2007/C 20, November 2007, 4 Pages Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Croatia in the Run-up to the Elections Tomislav Maršić SWP Comments On 25 November 2007, a new parliament will be elected in Croatia. Following a change of party leadership for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in spring, the two mass parties have been competing in a neck-and-neck race. Against all expectations, the current negotiations with the European Union are not being instrumentalised in the election campaign; instead, classic domestic policy-issues dominate, like the economy and corruption. All the same, with EU accession looming, the question of identity again appears to be moving to the centre of discussion. Even before Croatia was elected a non- enduringly high levels of Euroscepticism permanent United Nations Security Council indicate that efforts to forge a Croatian member—with the full support of Serbia— identity may be exclusionary—defined by Ivo Sanader, Prime Minister and Chairman reference to common ideas which Croatians of the governing Conservative party, the do not embody. Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), in a Despite enacting the respective legis- speech before the Council expressed the lation by the government in Zagreb, prob- Croatian government’s disapprobation of lems persist on the local level with the the sentences imposed by the International implementation of minority protection and Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia antagonisms to co-operation with the ICTY. (ICTY) against three Serbs involved in mas- To what extent the principle of rule of law sacres against Croatian civilians in 1991. is incorporated on all levels of government The speech was held before middle-ranking will be closely monitored by the EU in the diplomats, although its primary addressee case of the lawsuit against Branimir Glavaš, was probably the domestic electorate. who is indicted of murdering Serbian The countrywide outrage upon which civilians. This applies in equal measure for Sanader was trying to capitalise reflects the the only process transferred from the ICTY continued sensitivity surrounding the ques- to Croatian authorities against former tion of identity in Croatian society—a phe- generals Mirko Norac and Rahim Ademi. nomenon that can be traced to the recent It is also against this background that experience of war in the country. The deep the Conservative Sanader has repeatedly rootedness of national-conservative values argued against the belittlement of the within large segments of society and the Ustaša (i.e., of those Croatians allied to the Tomislav Maršić is a Research Associate at the EU Integration Research Unit SWP Comments 20 November 2007 1 Nazis during occupation). He has thereby The multitude of affairs in which some left a strong mark on the ongoing process HDZ ministers are involved, coupled with of nation-building in Croatia. Criticism of Sanader’s belated improvement of his anti- Franjo Tudjman’s period in office as leader corruption record, has led to a deteriora- of the HDZ-dominated government in the tion in his credibility. As for the depolitici- nineties is currently deepening; it is espe- sation and professionalisation of the judi- cially here that the EU decisively strength- ciary, the commitment to these principles ened the respective forces and altered the of the HDZ under Sanader has been ques- domestic opportunity structure. tionable to say the least. While thereby cross-party and local reactionary currents are increasingly con- trasted with political secularisation, a Party Constellation in the Run-up to further remnant of the past—cronyism—is Parliamentary Elections being addressed rather inadequately. Ad- Generally speaking, a fragmented but mittedly, corruption at lower, administra- moderate and stable party system has tive levels is certainly being addressed; yet emerged in the last few years. Its protago- in the upper echelons of the political nists, the HDZ and the SDP, settle their system, the remnants of entrenched clien- differences in the centre ground. telistic networks can still be found. The Both of the two mass parties hold around insider-privatisations of the nineties have 30 per cent in polls, with the SDP maintain- become a synonym for illegitimate patron- ing a small but stable lead. Should this trend age; in many cases, individuals close to the be cemented in the long run, especially government lucratively exploited enter- against the background of diminishing sup- prises which they had acquired on the port for small Centre parties, the Croatian cheap, instead of rehabilitating them. party system will witness increasing A first strike against high-level corrup- concentration. tion occurred with operation “Maestro”, a Sanader has turned the semi-autocratic concerted action of the state prosecution, party that Franjo Tudjman led into a reform- the police and the Office for the Prevention ist and moderate mass party of the Centre- of Corruption and Organised Crime Right. Programmatic realignment is reflec- (USKOK), which has been handed executive ted in the diminishing Euroscepticism of competencies in the area. In the course of the HDZ’s supporters; traditionalist, nation- the action, seven suspects were arrested, al-conservative voters have increasingly among them three vice-presidents from the turned their backs on the party. Eurocriti- supervisory board, on which there are also cal attitudes can in turn be discerned, par- three cabinet members. Some of the in- ticularly within the Croatian Peasant Party cidents under investigation range back to (HSS) and the national-conservative Party of the period of the Social Democratic govern- Rights (HSP). Still, none of the parties ment, 2000–2003. Although the complete articulates explicit Eurosceptic positions. ignorance of the ministers present on the Since the election of the pragmatic and, board is doubtful, no further political-level to date, relatively unknown young former arrests have been made. There have, how- diplomat Zoran Milanović as chairman, the ever, been political ramifications, with SDP, for its part, finds itself riding a wave Sanader backing out of his earlier announce- of support. After the former Prime Minister ment to dissolve the Management Board and long-standing opposition leader, Ivica of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (HFP). It Račan, succumbed to cancer last spring, the remains to be seen how mercilessly the party leadership anointed Ljubo Jurčić—a matter will be investigated, especially former minister of economy and recent since the electorate is tired of party polit- recruit to the SDP—as candidate for the icisation. PM’s office. SWP Comments 20 November 2007 2 Compared to the popular new chairman, programmatic discussion is shifting to this rather technocratic prime ministerial economic topics, especially to the reduction candidate has been somewhat outshone by of unemployment and the generation of the dynamic Milanović, the more so as he growth. does not have a genuine power base within the party. Against this background, it remains to be seen if the initial advantage Economic Policy as an Important Jurčić had—that is, the credibility he en- Dimension of Electoral Competition joyed as a party-outsider and his status as Substantial programmatic differences be- an “expert”—does not eventually rebound tween HDZ and SDP are becoming visible upon him. in economic policy. The Centre-Right party At the same time, the present strength of pursues a “3x7” programme, so called be- the SDP needs to be put into perspective. Its cause it targets 7 per cent economic growth, positive standing in the polls can partly an unemployment rate of 7 per cent and be traced back to losses on the part of its the implementation of 7 growth-enhancing smaller, left-liberal competitor, the Croa- projects. This strategy of continuity with tian People’s Party–Liberal Democrats present policy is oriented foremost at the (HNS); this is a trend that is essentially the retention of a restrictive budgetary policy. result of an electoral shift within the left Within the context of the strategic camp. Meanwhile, the HDZ has maintained development programme for the financial its clear advantages in the Croatian diaspora, period 2006–2013, which the government which forms a separate electoral district. presented in Brussels in the framework of In this respect, and with specific refer- accession negotiations, the government ence to government formation, the arith- expects a gradual increase of the growth metic of coalition formation will play a rate to an annual 7.3 per cent between 2010 decisive role. Most small parties position and 2013—a very optimistic forecast! themselves in the Centre-Right—examples The SDP, by contrast (and contrary to all include the Croatian Party of Pensioners recommendations of the EU Council and (HSU) and the pre-electoral coalition of the international financial institutions), prop- HSS and the right-liberal Croatian Social agates a program of Keynesian “deficit Liberal Party (HSLS), although their posi- spending” and plans a temporary increase tioning does not predetermine the choice of public debt to 5 per cent until 2009. This of their potential senior partner. The role of is supposed to inject investment into in- the crisis-ridden and lately weakened HSP dustry as well as increase growth to 7–9 per remains somewhat unclear, as after the last cent. The SDP has additionally mapped out elections the EU suggested to the HDZ that changes in monetary policy, in particular a it abstain from forming a coalition with the devaluation of the constantly overvalued right-populists. The HSP moderated its kuna, in order to boost exports. Jurčić con- appearance mostly due to the governing siders a modification of the legal founda- ambitions of its chair, Anto Djapić; in many tion for the Croatian National Bank pos- instances it voted with the HDZ in parlia- sible (the bank is currently autonomous mentary ballots. Simultaneously, however, from political directives). it still represents extremist positions like With the exception of foreign debt, the support of Branimir Glavaš.
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