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“Neo-Oligarchical” Ownership Regime in Putin's Russia

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“Neo-Oligarchical” Ownership Regime in Putin's Russia ABSTRACT THE “NEO-OLIGARCHICAL” OWNERSHIP REGIME IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL SECTOR by Mariia M. Semykoz This paper analyses specifics of the private property system, established in the Russia oil sector in the period of Vladimir Putin’s political leadership. The model of “neo-oligarchical” ownership regime is proposed as a conceptual tool aimed at capturing the basic features and effects of the state’s dominance vis-à-vis the private economic actors. An overview of the political sources, which might have led to the emergence of this system, as well as its relationship to the broader theoretical understanding of Putin’s regime in Russia is provided. THE “NEO-OLIGARCHICAL” OWNERSHIP REGIME IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL SECTOR A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science by Mariia M. Semykoz Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2012 Advisor: _______________________ Dr. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova Reader: _______________________ Dr. Venelin I. Ganev Reader: _______________________ Dr. Ora John Reuter Table of Contents Putin’s Promise: Oil Industry as a Locomotive for Russian Economy .................. 1 Puzzle: Efficiency of Russian Private Oil Firms ..................................................... 3 Model of the “Neo-Oligarchical” Ownership Regime ............................................ 8 “Neo-Oligarchical” Ownership: Did Russia Move Away from Political Capitalism? ............................................. 17 Concluding Thoughts ............................................................................................ 23 Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 25 II ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am grateful to Dr. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Dr. Karen Dawisha, Dr. Venelin I. Ganev, Dr. Philip Hanson, and Dr. Ora John Reuter for the support, guidance, comments and valuable criticism they provided in the course of this research. Nevertheless, all mistakes are mine only. III Putin’s Promise: Oil Industry as a Locomotive for Russian Economy In 2000, incoming Russian president Vladimir Putin’s popularity was based on Russians’ trust that this well-fit and disciplined man was able to deliver on his promise to “lift the country from its knees.” Many hoped that Putin’s security service background, experience in state management and a graduate degree in economics would help him to cope with this task successfully. The latter seemed to be especially relevant given the state of post-Soviet Russia’s long- troubled economy. Still suffering from the effects of the halfhearted post- communist reforms of the early 90s, the Russian economy soon found itself sinking in the rapid waves of the 1998 financial crisis, devaluing whatever thin savings and destroying whatever unsecure jobs many had. The business environment was almost unbearable by any Western standards. Pervasive corruption, massive ineffective bureaucracy, widespread organized crime and insecure property rights were just a few challenges plaguing post-Soviet economic actors. The remedy Putin publicly proposed for the Russian economy was fairly simple: the strong state must be able to enforce the “rules of the game” on everyone, including the infamous mighty business tycoons – the oligarchs. Secondly, the state must carefully and effectively guide the development of the country’s most important economic sectors. Arguably, thus far, Putin has failed to achieve the first goal. Under his leadership, the state was not able to successfully combat the blatant corruption corroding its bureaucratic apparatus and the judiciary since Yeltsin’s era; nor was it able to limit the scope of bureaucrats’ burdensome, and often arbitrary, power. (Holmes 2005, 86, Arbatov 2007). But what about the second part of his economic program, the state supervision of the development of certain economic spheres? In his first address to the Russian parliament, Putin stated: It must be admitted that the state will not be able to stop participation in several sectors of our economy for some time yet. I mean direct participation by the state. It will not be able to, and should not stop - in sectors such as the defense and industrial complex, for example. Strategically important industries will remain under the constant attention of the state (Putin 2000). 1 If we are to trust his opinion, expressed in his 1997 kandidat dissertation, Putin believed the natural resource industries could push Russia’s economy forward to modernization, growth and international competitiveness. In order for them to fulfill this function, the state must mobilize its resources to shape, direct and control the sector’s development. This would ensure the industry would be capable of taking “the lead in building up the economy, providing revenue and employment, and promoting economic integration across Russia, with the CIS and with the world economy.” (Balzer 2005, 216-217). In line with this position, Putin consistently refered to Russia’s natural resource industries, as well as to the military-industrial complex, as the “strategic” sectors. In essence, deeming an economic sector as “strategic” in Russian state’s discourse implies that the government considers it has a right to intervene in its development to the extent it considers it necessary. With regard to the mining industries, in 1999 Putin claimed that “[r]egardless of who’s property the natural resources are and in particular the mineral resources might be, the state has the right to regulate the process of their development and use.” (Cited at Balzer 2005, 218). Most observers would agree the actual policies Putin implemented within the first 12 years of his reign were consistent with this early statement, with the oil industry taking the top of the “strategic” sectors’ list. This became apparent after 2003, when, following the infamous Yukos affair, the state gradually increased its direct ownership in the oil sector, making the government-controlled Rosneft the world’s largest oil company in terms of proven reserves by 2010, with Gazprom’s oil-producing division exhibiting potential to become a close follower (Rosneft 2010). While simultaneously increasing the state’s direct stake in the industry, the government also developed legal and administrative mechanisms to control the activity of privately owned oil producers. As Reynolds and Kolodziej (2007) suggest, the state’s legislative policy since 2003, on balance, seemed to be aimed at reestablishing government control over the oil industry. In particular, the new legislation introduced during Putin’s leadership severely restricted opportunities for foreign investment in the petroleum sectors. It also broadened the state’s powers regarding uncompetitive administrative allocation of mining licenses, and cleared the way for nationalization of companies, through the selective application of penalties, envisaged for tax-evading firms. With regards to the latter, as experts suggest, nearly every Russian company that operated during the 90s could have been charged with tax evasion, due to the contradictions present in the pre-2001 tax 2 laws. (Reynolds and Kolodziej 2007, 946-947, Morozova 2009). Additionally, as far as restrictions on foreign investment are concerned, the analysis of the various Russian legislative provisions lead Reynolds and Kolodziej to conclude, …private ownership cannot be restricted to a single nationality of the owners in a globalized world market. If at any point in time a ‘‘Russian’’ owner is deemed to be ‘‘foreign’’ due to his investments abroad or due to foreign participation in his businesses, then the government can immediately take control of that business. Indeed, the only sure way to know if a business is fully Russian-owned is if it is owned by the government (Reynolds and Kolodziej 2007, 945). Thus, we might conclude that all the tools, Putin considered necessary to turn the Russian oil industry into the locomotive of the country’s economic integration into the competitive global environment, were at the state’s disposal. But what are the results? How competitive is the Russian oil industry on the global scale? The next section attempts to provide some answers to these questions. Puzzle: Efficiency of Russian Private Oil Firms For several decades, analysts have regarded the question of oil industry efficiency (and, thus, competitiveness of individual firms) in conjunction with the growing trend of greater government control over petroleum production worldwide. Since the 1970s, the National Oil Companies (NOCs) – state-owned firms, often holding a monopoly or at least exclusive status in oil production in a given country – have increasingly become key players in the world oil industry, ousting even the powerful international oil majors to the margins. For instance, in 2008, the NOCs took up almost one half of all positions in the Energy Intelligence Top 100 Ranking of the World’s Oil Companies (KPMG International 2008, 1). Similarly, in 2007, fourteen out of twenty top world oil producers were NOCs (Hartley and Medlock 2007). But why do an increasing number of analysts find the trend alarming? Their concern is based on the theory, first outlined by economist Harold Hotelling in 1931, known as “Hotelling’s rule”. (Hotelling 1931). The model implies that a finite resource, under market conditions, is likely to be depleted as a result of the physical exhaustion, but as a result of reaching a point
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