The Impact of Naval Scares and Public Opinion in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain
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The Anatomy of Panic: The Impact of Naval Scares and Public Opinion in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain by Iain O’Shea B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2008 M.A., University of New Brunswick, 2010 A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of History ©Iain O’Shea, 2017 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This dissertation may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii The Anatomy of Panic: The Impact of Naval Scares and Public Opinion in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain by Iain O’Shea B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2008 M.A., University of New Brunswick, 2010 Supervisory Committee Dr. David Zimmerman, Supervisor Department of History Dr. Simon Devereaux, Departmental Member Department of History Dr. Lisa Surridge, Outside Member Department of English iii Abstract Supervisory Committee Dr. David Zimmerman, Supervisor Department of History Dr. Simon Devereaux, Departmental Member Department of History Dr. Lisa Surridge, Outside Member Department of English Popular navalism in nineteenth-century Britain was a natural but not inevitable outcome of the geographical reality of an island nation possessing a large maritime empire. The long-term evolution of democracy and the rapid growth of the mass-circulation press transformed the civil-military relationship in the last decades of the century, leading to a series of naval scares. These were episodes of intense public interest and engagement in naval affairs, manifested through Parliamentary speeches, newspaper and periodical contributions and in private correspondence. Naval historians have emphasized technological and strategic narratives in the modernization of the Royal Navy, and in the process neglected the dramatic political struggles in 1884–94 that provided the vital precondition for naval reform and expansion — money. The relevant question is not whether the naval scares were objectively justified, but how public discourses were employed by individuals and interest groups to transform the naval political economy by creating a ‘blue-water’ strategic common sense that would support the creation of ocean- going battlefleets designed to win and maintain ‘command of the sea.’ A triangular relationship between the Government, the navy and the public, connected largely through iv the press, rapidly evolved over the course of three naval scares, in 1884, 1888 and 1893. A pro-navy political equilibrium was constructed that raised peacetime naval expenditure to unprecedented heights and laid the foundations for the more widely known reforms of the twentieth-century ‘Fisher Era.’ v Table of Contents Supervisory Committee ...................................................................................................... ii Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ v Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... vii Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... viii Chapter 1 — Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 Nineteenth Century Context ........................................................................................... 5 Naval Historiography .................................................................................................... 22 Historiography of Navalism .......................................................................................... 39 Chapter 2 — The Navy and the Public in the Nineteenth Century ................................... 55 The First Scare: 1844–45 .............................................................................................. 65 The Second Panic: 1852................................................................................................ 72 Ironclads and Follies: the Ironclad Scare of 1859–60 .................................................. 80 The Turn to Economy: 1868–83 ................................................................................... 91 Chapter 3 — 'What is the Truth About the Navy': the 1884 Navy Scare ....................... 102 Narrative of Events, 1883–85 ..................................................................................... 108 'Official Optimism' versus 'Alarmism' in 1883 ........................................................... 142 W.T. Stead, New Journalism and the 1884 Navy Scare ............................................. 148 The Unsung Sequel: 'The Truth About Coaling Stations' ........................................... 166 Government Failure to Mitigate Navalist Demands, 1884–85 ................................... 174 Synthesizing Opinion in Monthly Magazines, 1884–85............................................. 180 Chapter 4 — Lord Randolph Churchill and the Campaign for Economy, 1885–87 ...... 189 Narrative of Events, 1885–87 ..................................................................................... 195 The Manoeuvres and the Reality of War .................................................................... 222 Home Rule and the Liberal Naval Administration ..................................................... 233 Administrative Reform and Randolph Churchill’s Resignation ................................. 239 Chapter 5 — The 1888 Navy Scare and the Naval Defence Act, 1889 .......................... 252 Narrative of Events, 1888–89 ..................................................................................... 257 Credibility and Celebrity: The Resignation of Lord Charles Beresford ................ 288 Invasion versus Blue-Water Strategic Planning ..................................................... 298 The Public Expert: Admiral Hornby and New Agitation ........................................... 309 vi The Government Responds: Why the Act of Parliament? .......................................... 320 Chapter 6 — The Second Interregnum: Responding to the Naval Defence Act ............ 329 Narrative of Events, 1889–92 ..................................................................................... 334 Battleship Design and Technological Improvement ................................................... 363 Personnel and the New Agitation ............................................................................... 373 The Spencer-Harcourt Debates over Battleship Tables .............................................. 384 Chapter 7 — The 1893 Navy Scare and the Fall of W.E. Gladstone ............................. 394 Narrative of Events, 1893–94 ..................................................................................... 398 The Mediterranean as the Two-Power Standard Test Case ........................................ 431 Harcourt vs Spencer — the Victory of the Admirals .................................................. 444 Gladstone's Resignation and a Blue-Water Consensus ............................................... 453 The Spencer Programme, Acts of Parliament and the Navy League .......................... 464 Chapter 8 — Conclusion ................................................................................................. 474 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 486 vii Acknowledgements The scale of the debts that I have incurred in the completion of this project is far beyond the magnitude that I anticipated when I began this journey so many years ago. David Zimmerman, my supervisor, has been endlessly patient and helpful as I have worked through the long process of writing and editing. I deeply appreciate the insight that you have brought to my work and the opportunities that you have given me to teach and share my knowledge. Thanks to my committee members, Simon Devereaux and Lisa Surridge, who saved me from many errors and greatly improved this project. Thanks also to Christopher Bell for his time. The office staff in the History Department has saved me from many paperwork blunders. A special thanks to the incredible Heather Waterlander for all her help. The research for this project could not have been done without the excellent support and advice of the staffs of the National Archives in Kew, the British Library, the Bodleian Library’s Special Collections, the Caird Research Library at the National Maritime Museum, the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge, the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh, and McGill University’s Special Collections in Montreal, Canada. The research was generously supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship. My family has been very patient through this struggle, and their support has been beyond words and price. I hope the trip to Britain was worth the hours that Darcy and Valerie O’Shea spent with me in libraries and archives. You have been incredible. Stephanie DiTomaso, my Bundth, I could not have done this without you. viii Abbreviations CDC Colonial Defence Committee DNI Director of Naval Intelligence DMI Director of Military Intelligence DNO Director of Naval Ordnance FIC Foreign Intelligence Committee IDA Imperial