Armor in the Invasion of North Africa

Armor in the invasion of North Africa. Armored School, student research r-port. 1950. Z

gj Thi's ocument / IS A HOLDING OF THE ..78/ ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO.N2146. 4 3 COPY NO. I

CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-SM 13 Mar 51

t. 44$

+-:. .fdft~i:;~"'? '

~ dt 1tN1 trt l) .

A RESEARCH REPORT Prepared at THE ARMORED SCHOOL Fort. Knox Kentucky 1949- 1950 ( to M (

THE ARMORED SCHOOL 4HEADQUARTERS Fort Knox, Kentucky AKAB-4 22 August 1950 SUBJECT.: Letter of Transmittal.

T 0 Comimandant Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Enclosed is an additional Research Study, .armior in the Invasion of North Africa, prepared at The Armored School, Which you may retain for your files.

FOR TBE ASSISTAN~T COMMDA T0-

Inc 1l a/s Lt Col, Inf Secretary

f, COMBINED ARMS RESEARCHLIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

3 1695 00513 8052

0<.TAT T I : ,r:~A:Gi L uATH AFRICAc

(2di AIJi wt DIVISION)

A F SEARCH REPORT PRE~PARED

CCLUVIITTE~ 25, OFFICE ADVANCED CCU RSE

THE AM ORE 'SCHOOL

1949 - 1950

LI1Ui?~ ATNf COLONTEL JACK F. * ILI,

M7AJOR JOFFPE L. GUE~t"ARD

MAJOR LESLIE J. TIARNE.S

MAJ OR RALPH N. ROSS

MAJOR 1OR0j- R. SEIXTONy

14AJOR J.%tWS F. WIL~IA iS

CAPTAINT AROLDP V. AiMIERS ON

CAPTAINt JACK P. BRUBAUER

CAPTAIN JOSEPH K. GRANT

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

1AY 1950 TAI3LE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1 BAPQKGROUI D * . . " a " .. " " " " 1

Strategic Considera'tions . a .' " " " Y Political Coniside~rations . f a" a. " " " " 3 Economic Considerations . ". a a" f a" a " 5

2 PRE.EMKT IONKPHASEPASE. .. .9 , . 12

Over-P11 Plrnnirng a f " . " " "a .a a 12 Training . a. . * a * a .* "* . " . . , a a 19

3 Lo.pD11 G * a a .: * . . . . . a * a " 28

4 OCEA-..P -OVEV1EN T *..... "...... 53 General Plan. of Ittrck a a , " 54 Trr ining .?b, rd Shin . a a a" a a a 55 Selection o l the Bepchhierds ,aa a a 56 SubTsk Fccs.*.. " ",.. " " 57 Pre-Invrsi~n Tr'-ining . . " a " a" a a. a" 59 .Air S jurort a a * . a * a " e a a a " a a a a a 60 jrTf'~l Oner~tions " " a a . a " a " " * . . . a 61

5 FEDAUP ND 1-.SAL P " "aa " . .aaaaaaa 66 The Lrndiy-,g Pl-n a a .a a f a o . 66 D Dry " & a a a a a a a a a . 69 D Plus 1 . "a a a a a " 76 D Plus 2 . f a f . a a a a a " . 78 D Plus 3 a a a a a a a a a a a a. a a a. 79 Enemy Strength -nd Attitude . a a . .a a . 84

6 TASK FOD:v DLGSTJIM a a a a . . a a a a . a a a a 87

.7 LPIYDII GS AT T.IE-DTPPOELT LYP.TJTEY . a a a a 110 Int'plligence a a a " . 110 Operrtionrl Plrn a a a a . 4 117 Operrtions D Dry a a a "a a a a " 123 Operrtions D Plus 1. a a a a a . " 128 Oerrtions DPlus 2 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa 131 Cessrtion of Fostilities a a a a a a 134

8 COT\LU jS LOS ^ NYD RECO 71JPDT-N Da aV a a aN .a 139 Conclusions a a a a a 139. Lecom'lrdrtioris a a a a . a a a a a a a a a a 143

APPEIYDICES

I. Order of B^ ttl e Ha Terrr~in _Anrlysis ITTI.Trrining. "morfndum ,Turmbcr 1 (Gori Post) TU. 1ovrment Orders, Shinmwnt 3324 V. 1H1ovr-rrnnt Orders, Ship.nt 3324..)" FOREWORD

The expedition to Safi, North Africa was the wildest ad-

venture I ever experienced.. While the opposition turned out to

be light, the anxiety and suspense were as heavy as I ever felt.

We were all so inexperienced..

Men, ammunition and gasoline were loaded together on the

same ship. Due to the scarcity of ships of the right type crews

of combat vehicles were not on the same ship with their vehicles.

The leaders of both the Army and Navy of the expedition had only

one thought--winning the campaign--hence cooperation was superior

from start to finish.

Regardless of the many discouraging factors, the expedition was a success. This brings out the lesson which I later felt

proved itself to be true so many times--the picture is never really

as dark as it can be painted and the enemy has his troubles also

and is scared the same as you are.

/s/ Ernest N. Harmon ERIEST N. HAR~ ON MIaj. Gen. (Retired)

Liberty Hall, Woolford, Maryland, 10 February 1950 .7 Pt

di I t I {4p ** , ,

All

t 1

thy'

PREFACE

This report concentrates attention on the use of armor in the invasion of North Africa. It deals primarily with the employment of the 2d Armored Division landing as part of the Western Task Force.

It is about an operation that lasted only a short time and against indifferent resistance.

Since this report deals with the use of armor, the infantry is referred to only as much as is necessary to insure clarity and continuity. No attempt is made to slight the part played by the infantry which made the initial assaults on the beach and engaged in the major part of the fighting. The fact that the infantry played the major role in the operation does impose certain limitations on the report. Most of the observer reports and other documents available deal primarily with the use of infantry.

Due to the shortness of the action a great deal of emphasis is placed on the planning stage of the operation. It is possible that this stage is the most important single phase of an amphibious operation, In any event later experiences in the war proved the necessity for detailed planning in an amphibious operation. The actions reported on are small, independent actions. It is felt that in an amphibious operation the initial employment of armor will be in small actions,

There are many limitations to writing a report almost eight years after the action occurred. In the early stages of the war few reports were kept at divisional and lower headquarters. There is no after-action report available for the 2d Airmored Division in this action as there were for later engagements. For the most part memories are vague as to small details. This is no criticism of the people who were so helpful to the committee but the reader must bear in mind that the people who took part in this operation were by means finished with their war experiences. It is unfortunate that this report could not have been written soon after the action occurred, Much of the information is from unofficial reports. No diaries were kept at this time except by higher commanders and these do not fit the purpose of a report of this type.

Acknowled gements, The committee wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the many individuals who assisted in making this report. yWVithour their help in sending narratives and personal files of documents the report could not have been written.

Names of those who contributed information and assistance in the preparation of this report:

Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes Gol., Ralph J. Butcher Lt, Gen, Lucien K. Truscott Col. Don E. Carleton Maj. Gen, Jonathan W. Anderson Cola Hugh J. Fitzgerald Miaj. Gen, Hobart R. Gay Col. Elton F. Hammond Maj, Gen. Ernest N. Harmon Col, Paul D. Harkins Ma. Gen. Albert W. Kenner Col, Kent C. Lambert Maj. Gen. Isaac D. White Col,. Thomas H. Nixon Brig. Gen. John F. Conklin Lt. Col; Lewis M. Flint Brig. Gen. Walter J., Buller Lt. Col. Frank M. Muller Brig. Gen. Harry H. Semmes Mlaj 4 Norris H. Perkins Col. 3 illiam R, Buster M,1aj. Alvin T. Netterblad, Jr. Capt. M.2ax R. M1achinicke CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

On 8 November 1941, elements of the 2d Armored Division

began unloading at three locations in FRENCH MOROCCO. Although the armored units were not to be used in the actual assault they were landed early and played a vital part in the actual success

of the invasion.

This operation was conducted with speed of training and planning which proved an example for all such operations later in

the war when troops were better trained, techniques improved, better

and more adequate equipment available, and time: for planning more adequate.

Before going into the part played by the 2d Armored Division in Operation TORCH it is necessary to show some of the reasons for the "most daring operation- to date in World War II." 1 SEVASTOPOL, last Russian stronghold in the CRIEA, had fallen to the Germans.

President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were

insisting that Russia be kept in the war.2 On 20 June 1942 TOBRUK

fell to the Germans in only one day. 3 The British feared that the 4 Germans and Japanese would join forces somewhere east of the Red Sea.

Strategic Considerations

The President of the United States and the Prime Miinister

of Great Britain had made the decision that our resources would be

concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy,

and then Japan. 5 The Middle East was the southern supply route to the U.S.S.R. and the main air ferry route to INDIA. The key to

the Middle East was EGYPT: the best hostile avenue to the Persian

Gulf. Here also was the most convenient base for reenforcing any

threatened part of the Middle Eastern Area. Since Russia was slowly

falling back it was decided at a conference inLONDON in April 1942

to do everything practicable to reduce the pressure on the Soviet

lest she collapse and the door be opened wide for a complete conquest

of EUROPE. At this conference, attended by General George C. Marshall,

United States Army Chief of Staff, and Mr. Harry Hopkins, personal

advisor to President Roosevelt, a tentative target date was set for

a cross-Channel operation in the summer of 1943, It was called by

the code name RCUNDUP. Due to the immediate necessity for an

emergency plan, a diversionary assault on the French coast was planned

for a much earlier date. This plan was given the name SLEDGEHAIIER

and was to be used "only if such a desperate measure became necessary 6 to lend a hand toward saving the situation on the Soviet front." In

June 1942, General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General

Staff, came to Washington for a discussion of SLEDGEHATMER and ROUND-

UP, and a possible operation in the Mediterranean. During these dis-

cussions the Allied situation in NORTH AFRICA took a more serious

turn, The German successes in AFRICA and along the southeastern por-

tion of the Soviet front threatened a complete collapse in the Middle

East, the loss of the Suez Canal and the vital oil supply in the

vicinity of ABADAN. "It was a very black hour." In July, .General Marshall and Admiral King went to London for further meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff. It was felt that something must be done immediately to lessen the pressure on the

Soviet, whose armies were facing a crisis. Poverty of equipment, especially in landing craft, and the short period remaining when the weather would permit a cross-Channel movement of small craft, ruled out the diversionary operation SLEDGEHAMMER for 1942.9

It was therefore decided, with the approval of the President and the Prime Minister, to mount a North African assault at the earliest possible moment, despite the fact that it meant the abandon- ment of both ROUNDUP and SIEDGEHAIMER. This operation was to be called TORCH, The operation was favored by the British but not the

American lilitary leaders.10 Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was in London planning SLEDGEUHAMER and ROUNDUP, was directed on

13 August 1942 to proceed with operation TORCH. The target date was fixed for early November.

Political Considerations

There were two main political considerations to be taken into account by the planners for TORCH,; First was the reactions of the neutral countries of SPAIN, VICHY FRANCE, and FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. 11 SPAIN was pro-xis.. She was the main center for Axis Intelligence and there was more than a strong suspicion that urgently needed material was finding its way Northward across the PYRENNEES. SPAIN was certainly making available to the Germans radar stations on both sides of the Straits, the southern shore which was in Spanish hands. The British and American Ambassadors had assured General Franco

of our intention to respect SPAINt s rights and sovereignity, and

there were indications that the chief anxiety of the Spanish leader was

to maintain neutrality, for economic reasons. It might well be, how-

ever, that Axis pressure would prove too strong.

It was to guard against such a possibility as this that the

Combined Chiefs of Staff deemed it essential to capture CASABLANCA in

the initial stages as an opening for an auxiliary line of communi-

cations, and decided that considerable forces should be held in

readiness to seize SPANISH MOROCCO and hold it against a German on-

slaught. 1 2 The Germans considered it a serious mistake to occupy any part of ORROCCO or ALGERIA unless American or English troops attempted to do so.13

It seemed certain that the Axis would immediately occupy the whole of FRANCE and that their aim in doing this would be to forestall

a landing by us on the coast of the MIDI, to establish air and submarine bases along the French Mediterranean Coast, and above all, to

attempt to gain control of the French Fleet in TOULON. The French

fleet was also a problem to be considered. 1

The second main political consideration was the reaction of

the French people in NORTH AFRICA to the invasion, French feeling

had been inflamed against the British because of Axis propaganda

using the incidents of MERS, EL KEBIR, DAKAR, SYRIA, and MADAGASCAR.

The Americans had apparently escaped this opprobrium. America was still

maintaining trade and diplomatic relations with VICHY. The French people in NORTH AFRICA did not have the intense hatred of the Boche that was felt in Metropolitan FRANCE. The German Armistice Commissions in NORTH AFRICA were slowly depriving the population of everything except the barest necessities of life, and also stripping the armed services of the greater part of their equipment. There was reason to hope that French resistance would be no more than a gesture to the

Gallic sense of honor and that resistance to the Axis would materialize 15 in an effort of the French to retain the shadow of their Liberty.

Whether the French greeted us as liberators, or resisted our violation of their neutrality, it was clearly imperative that we should make an impressive display of strength; half measures would fail to inspire confidence on the one hand, or would encourage resistance on the other. Moreover, there was a greater chance of SPAIN maintaining her neutrality if she knew that sltong forces were at hand to counter any sign of hostility.

Economic Considerations

The main logistical problem was the shortage of landing craft. In early 1942 there were only enough available for one division. Since the basic plan called for a landing at three locations, the British felt the Western landings could not be launched until at least two or three weeks after the landings in the Mediter- ranean. They estimated that four airplane carriers, eight auxiliary carriers, and three battleships would be required for support. 1 7

At least six divisions were required for an action to help

Russia at all, Resources of England and the United States were search-

ed for vessels or barges that could be employed in the operation.

Outboard motors and marine engines in pleasure craft in the United States were appropriated for this purpose. An extensive building program for landing craft was agreed upon. This necessitated a heavy cut back or delay in the construction then under way of certain major combat ships for the Pacific Fleet. Also there were added to the production program in the United States a great many items which would be required for build-up--hospital setups, communication material, and a multitude of items to be required for airfields, campsdocks, and depots in the British Isles for the actual landing and for the support of our troops once they were ashore.18

Air Force units were already helping Montgomery fight Rommel,

Initially this was the only actual committment of American troops that had been made. There was an early plan to send an Armored

Division to AFRICA under Major General George S. Patton Jr. but this was later given up in favor of TORCH. Generous amounts of material were being sent to the Middle East. 1 9

The Plan

As has been stated before, the directive for TORCH was given to General Eisenhower on 13 August 1942, This necessitated a complete changeover from planning ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHA IER to the planning for

TORCH. General Eisenhower had been picked because of the known attitude of the French toward the British. The initial plan to employ

only American forces in the initial landing had to be modified because

of the shortage of trained American troops available for the operation.

The initial target date for TORCH was set for 1 October 1942

by the Americans while the British set a date for September 10. As will be seen later, both of these dates were overambitious. The main reason for the haste was the known weather conditions off the coast of NORTH AFRICA, which were generally bad all year around, especially in the late fallR Deception was carried out with alternate plans for NORWAY and DAKAR. Troops embarking fro the United

States and Britain were to be toldo that they were enroute to re- enforce the Middle East, with the possibility of a stop at DAKAR,

This would explain light clothes for tropic's,

The positive strategical concept of the NORTH AFRICAN operation, was stated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff;

1. "Establishment of firm and mutually supported lodge- ments" (a) between Oran and Tunisia on the Mediterranean, and (b) in French Morocco on the Atlantic, in order to secure bases "for continued and intensified air, ground, and sea operations."I 2, "Vigorous and rapid exploitation" of these lodge- ments, in order to acquire complete control" of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and extend offensive operations against the rear of Axis forces to the eastward. 3, "Complete annihilation" of Axis forces now opposing the British forces in the Western Desert, and intensification of air and sea operations against the Axis in the European continent.2

On the negative side, the purpose as we have seen was to deny the economic resources and potential bases in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA to the enemy..21

Not until 9 September, after making detailed arrangements with the Royal and Canadian Navies as to relieving our escorts on trans-Atlantic convoy routes, could Admiral King specify exactly what ships of the United States Navy would be available, In the meantime

D Day was moved on to 8 November; and that was the very latest day in 1942 for a landing on the iron-bound coast of MOROCCO, because of the aforementioned weather conditions. 2 2

By 9 September Operation TORCH had almost assumed its final form: It was broken down into three principal parts;

1.. TASK FORCE 34, Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, comprising WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE (Admiral Hewitt), with Western Task Force United States Army (Major General G. S. Patton Jr.),. Initially about 35,000 troops to be embarked in the United States, to land on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco and capture Casablanca and Port Lyantey. 2. CENTER NAVAL TASK FORCE, Commodore Thomas Troubridge RN, with Center Task Force United States Army (Major General L. R. Fredenhall). Initially about 39,000 troops, embarked in the United Kingdom, to capture Oran, 3. EASTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, Rear Admiral Sir H, M. Burrough RN, with Eastern Assault Force (Major General C. W. Ryder USA). Comprising about 23,000 British and 60,000 ,American25roops, embarked in,the United Kingdom, to capture Algiers.

From this point on this report will deal with the Western i

Task Force under Major General Patton.

About 9:00 AM, 30 July 1942, the late General George S. Patton Jr., who was the Commanding General of the Desert Training Center at Camp Young, California, called in a few of his staff officers including the G-4; and informed them to turn over their duties and be prepared to leave for Washington, D.C., that same day. General Patton accompanied by General Gay, Chief of Staff; Colonel Muller, G-4; and Colonel Conklin, Engineer, departed from Palm Springs, California by air about 3:00 PM, July 30. They arrived in Washington, D.C,, about 8:00 AM the following morning. By about 9:00 AM, they reported to the briefing room in OPD Munitions building, where a map of North Africa was 24 uncovered and general information on proposed plans presented. [It appears from this personal account of Brigadier General Walter J. Muller that General Patton was notified of the TORCH operation before General Eisenhower. Butcher in his book states that many communications were exchanged between London and Washington. PosSibly the OPD in Washington was merely doing advance planning. The staff of the Western Task Force had actually worked together as the staff of the I Armored Corps and other units during maneuvers and in the Desert Training Center. This helped them somewhat, however this was their first experience in combined operations.

There were many handicaps, such as operating on a top secret25basis with a headquarters located in five different places. Many officers assigned to the operation were sent to the headquarters without the slightest idea as to their duties, assignment, unit, or where they were to go.26 Many of the problems will be taken up more in detail in the following chapter. Suffice it to say that immediate action was necessary and long detailed conferences were out of the question at this level,

When the 2d Armored Division returned from the Carolian maneuvers in August 1942, they were ordered to Fort Bragg, North

Carolina for intensive training and field maneuvers, From here,

Major General Harmon was ordered to Washington for a secret conference, General Harmon's personal account of his first meeting 2 7 with General Patton emphasizes the manner of giving orders for the operation.

,..I went into a closely guarded suite of rooms and met General Patton studying a map of North Africa. General Patton remarked to me, "Ernie, do you want to go to war?" I replied, "Sure, when do we start?" 28

The 2d Armored Division was going to wart NIOTES FOP. CHAPTER 1

NW.F. Craven and J.- L.- Cate, The Army Air Forces in W.II vol II: TORCH .TQ P.OIPTBLAM( (Chic.ago; University of' Chicago Press, 1946),'p5.

2Capt. Harry C~ Butcher, USNR, My Three Years With Eisenhower ( New York, Simon & Shuster, 1946). p $,

30,xci Craven and Cate, p 35.

4 1bid, p 36.

5 The War Reports of' Marshall,- Arnold, King (Lippincott, 1947),

p1 3 6 bi d, p 15 4 , , .. 7 Terrain and Political Study NkTOUSA-MTOUSA (Command and General Staf'f' College, 1943), p 31,

8Q2 ityWar Reports of' Mar.9hall, Arnold, King, pp 153-154.

9bip 156. 10a ityButcher, entry f'or 14 July 1942, 1 1 Commander in Chief's Dispatch to the .Joint Chief's of' Staf'f' on the TORCH Operation (a report prepared 'by General of' the Army Dwight D Eisenhower. Nor~th. Af'rica, The documents section The Armored School). 1 2Ibid, p 5.

E3eport f'rom American vice consul Casablanca to Army Military Attache, Taier, radio intercept of' a message f'rom the German Armistice Commission in Casablanca. (Fort Knox, The Armored School docu~ments section).

14 ct Commander in Chiefs Dispatch, p 3~

15 lbid, p 4. 6 l Tbid, p 5.

17 it Butcher, p 37*

1 $0p cit, War Reports Marshall, Arnold, King, p 157. Op cit, Craven and ate, p ,13, 20 Litzenberg, Outline History World WKar II quoting Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive for Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Force.

21Samuel Elliott Morrison, Operations in North African Waters (History of US Naval Operations in V II) %l I,. (Atlantic Little Brow n, 1947) p 16.

22Ibid, p 18. 23- Ibid, p 19. 24 Personal comments Brigadier General alter J. Muller who was G-4 for Western Task Force and spent the entire war as a member of General Pattont s staff. (These comments have been placed on microfilm and are on file in the documents section, The Armored School)

25Ibid.

Personal interview Major k. J. Netterblad Jr, Aide to Major General Truscott for this operation. 27 Unpublished7 manuscript Ia jor General Ernest N. Harmon who commanded the Second Armored Division for the TORCH operation. CHAPTER 2

PRE-EMBARKATION PHASE

Over-all' Planning

Sometime during the latter part of the month of August 1942

the Headquarters Western Task Force at Washington, D. C. decided on

the task organization of the landing teams and the general scheme

of maneuver to be carried out for the invasion of North Africa,

The following participating units came from the 2d Armored Division which was stationed at this time at FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA:

41st Armored Infantry Regiment

66th Armored Regiment

67th Armored Regiment

14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion

78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion

17th Armored Engineer Battalion

82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Supply Battalion, 2d Armored Division

Maintenance Battalion, 2d Armored Division

Detachment, 142d Armored Signal Company

The general scheme of maneuver was a three-pronged assault

on the beaches of PORT LYAUTEY, FEDALA and SAFI with the Task Forces

GOAL POST, BRUSI[OOD and BLACKSTONE being given the abovQ assignments

respectively. All forces contained elements of the 2d Armored Division. The purpose of the three-pronged assault was as -follows:

r... The PORT LYAUTEY attack was diversional and calculated to protect the left flank, while the purpose of the FEDALA and SAFI attacks was a double envelopment of CASABLANCA with the 1 intent of thereby saving the harbor facilities at CASABLANCA....

Included in Major General Hobart R. Gay's letter to this committee was an interesting note on the planning of the SAFI attack:

,.,Sometime early in September perhaps around the 20th, higher authority desired that the attack at SAFI should be abandoned. Conference on this subject was held in the office of the Commanding General of TORCH, at this conference were: Generals Handy, Hull, Streett, and Patton, admiral Hewitt, Colonel Harkins and Colonel Gay, It was discussed and finally decided to eliminate the SAFI operation in which decision all were in agreement except the two latter who voiced feeble pro- tests. However, the matter was taken immediately to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, who, without a moment's hesitation, declared that the SAFI operation would go as planned....

With the actual assault plan decided upon, the organization and plans for individual Sub-Task Forces came next.

... The period of 19-20 September was spent at Headquarters Western Task Force preparing final drafts of estimates and outline plans and seeking information necessary to complete organization and detailed plans for the operations, embarkation and final training.... 3

It is evident that this task was an arduous one.

...,,This Sub-Task Force staff was organized on a provisional basis for control during tactical operations. It was not expected to have administrative functions, except those incident . 4 to establishment on shore which would be of a temporary nature...,,

In so far as the planning stage regarding the 2d irmored

Divisiont s part in this invasion is concerned very little material can be found. The secrecy dictated necessary security measures and the only apparent indication that something was afoot was evidenced by the accelerated training at FORT BRAGG and the con- tinually turning in.and drawing of equipment,

Colonel Ralph J. Butchers, G-4 of the 2d Armored Division during this operation, has this comment to make regarding secrecy in planning:

.. ,All of the operational plans and administrative matters connected with the operation were prepared under strictest security requirements, since it was the first active American operation*. Members of the 2d Armored Division were limited in this planning phase to those officers directly concerned and then only to the extent absolutely essential to handle their units. ...No files or notes, personal or otherwise were maintained except as absolutely necessary for official records and or immediate use. These were destroyed or picked up by Division Headquarters and (I believe) turned in with the unit report of the operation to the Adjutant General.. .*i can easily understand your comment that published data is extremely limited. It was then also. For example I do not recall ever seeing or hearing of a "Port Call." General Harmon (then commanding) made several trips to Washington for instructions. From then on everyone entered a daze of work, without exaggerating, which was literally on a 24-hour day, 7-day week basis, with little or nothing reduced to writing. Briefings, decisions, conferences and the like, held in Wash- ington were the source of information and orders. Never written directives, Division staff planning and orders followed this same pattern..,.5

The supply planning can best be discussed from the original level of "TORCH" Headquarters and followed from that point to see how the job of supplying the units was c arried out...

Supply plays an important part in the success of an amphib-

ious expedition. Western Task Force Headquarters decided upon the

following plan: The D Day convoy was combat loaded so that the

vehicles and their crews would be unloaded simultaneously and be

available for the assault with all guns blazing. Due to the limitations of various ships availabei this was not actually at- complished in that the drivers and vehicles were loaded on one ship; the crews on another--see Chapter 3 on Loading;

A school for Transport Quartermasters was established at

NORFOU, VIRGINIA under the supervision of the Staff of the Amphib- ious Force, to make sure that the loading would be performed properly,

In the Moroccan Expedition it was decided to furnish four echelons of supply. The first echelon was to consist of three cone voys based on the following data:

a. The first convoy was called the D convoy with an arrival date of D Day. The composition consisted of the assault troops, combat-unit loaded, with the Port of Embarkation as NORFOLK, VIRGINIA1

b. The name of the second convoy was D plus 5 with an arrival date set for five days after D Day. This convoy contained the additional anti-craft and combat engineer troops. The loading was of an organization_- nit load with troops, supplies and equipment on the same transports, This type of loading did not permit debarkation of troops and their equipment simultaneously. Some ships of this convoy also included some service troops which were convoy loadedo

Loading along this line included the troops on one ship and supplies and equipment on another ship. The Port of Embarkation of the D plus

5 convoy was ITE74 YORK CITY, ITh YORK,

c', The final convoy of this first echelon was called the D plus 20 convoy with an arrival date 20 days after D Day. This convoy included the remainder of troops and equipment of the units pre-

viously shipped in the other two convoys. In addition it carried

a 90 day supply level for all troops in the convoy. The convoy was

commercially loaded. This type loading meant that the equipment and supplies were crated requiring debarkation at a quay after the ports had been secured. The Port of Embarkation for this convoy was also

NIVEYORK CITY, i, YORK.

From reports on the supply situation it was decided to base the supply plan on the theory that supplies were not available locally and that the expedition would take sufficient supplies for a sixty- day period, Ninety-day level was to be maintained by later convoys.

Combat loaded ships of D convoy could not carry supplies for sixty days; hence, careful study was necessary to put aboard ships only essential supplies, the balance to follow in cargo ships. The assault troops of D convoy carried rations for 60 days but gasoline for only

15 days. Twelve thousand gallons of gasoline, in five-gallon cans, were carried in each transport to insure that, should some ships be sunk, all the gasoline supply would not be sent to the bottom, 6

Supply plans in the 2d Armored Division to accomplish the above schedule as it affected the Division could best be described in the following manner:

.. ,Turning in and drawing equipment w s a continuous process beginning at FORT BENNING, during FORT BRt1GG maneuvers, while staged at FORT BRkGG, and at the embarkation ports. Pie had been given high priority early so everyone was more than willing to cooperate. Actually local agencies couldntt do much, so, with prior approval from Aashington, I dealt directly with the large depots and in sorle cases with manufacturers themselves. You can appreciate what I mean when you visualize complete changing of all tracks, replacing all vehicles (GP) that would have more than 5,000 miles by outloading time, installation of combat tires on 1/4 tons, scout cars and half tracks, replacement of weapons, completing all OVM equipment, and tool sets, in addition to determination of NEE lists for our "teams" (not T/O units) and procurement of the lacking equipment. The bulk of the above had to be done while staged at BRAGG'where alert for African invasion was received. Some of work, primarily weapons replacement, preparations for rail movement and the like, had been done under a previous alert for movement (later found out to be for employment with the British VIII Army), At the Port rations, ammo, POL were drawn together with last minute items. This stuff though drawn in bulk was assembled on our determined basic loads from the individual to the largest vehicle. The biggest single error in this computation was overloading the man, his barracks bag or the vehicle. To guard against this, periodically I required test loads to impress on all ranks with the actual physical limitations existing. It was the most effective way to stop argument,7

It is readily understood from the above why Colonel Butchers describes his situation, "Each commander leaned on the heavy side and it came my way to be the I NO' man,"

Of the supply situation Colonel Butchers continues further:

...there werentt elaborate detailed directives furnished nor did we prepare any, and those we did have long since been turned in or destroyed. Action was simple and direct. If you needed 5,000 tires, you first telephoned the local depot and with their ok, arranged with Akron or some other place for your trucks to go at-a certain time and get them. If you were 'short- on machine guns, tonmmy guns or what not, you flew to Washington, saw (.then) Colonel Nixon in the Munitions Building and he'd tell you where there were a few hundred he wanted to get into Africa, In return for transporting them he'd give you what you were short, I imagine some of our procedures were wasteful. The kindest comment one could make is that records were inadequate for later accounting, Yet at that time results were the only criteria and direct dealing was the only way to obtain them,....

It is difficult to censure the lack of records when one considers the fact that from start to finish the complete "Torch" operation took but two and one-half months. Intelligence planning at the high level produced results that assisted each echelon down to platoon leaders of all sub-task forces. For the attack on MOROCCO our troops had beautiful maps.

The French in MOROCCO gave them to us so they could be "invaded."

We were given 1/50,000 contour maps in color, and also a commercial road map made by the French tire manufacturer, Michelin. This road map had been censored by the authorities because it showed the location of all the landing fields and airdromes in the area, A copy was found, transmitted to the Allies and reproduced in great quan- tity in WASHINGTON. Unfortunately, the printing in WASHINGTON was ordered very late and for several weeks all government presses printed nothing else but this chart. It was very hard to maintain secrecy.

In addition to these two above, there were detailed hydro- graphic charts, 1/10,000, aerial photographs and 1/10,000 city plans.

Tactical terrain studies of each beachhead as far as 20,000 yards inland were prepared and mimeographed as part of the Intel- ligence Annex to the Operations Plan, Each platoon leader received a copy with a set of maps to study on the boat. when crossing the

Atlantic. The study was in such detail that each platoon leader would know the terrain as if he had been there. The maps had neglected to show an important patch of woods along the NEFIFIK

RIVER between the road to MiANSOURIAH and the main highway, and approximately 1,000 yards wide; however, the terrain-board mentioned in the following paragraph brought out this feature vividly. ,,n interesting incident took place just as the convoy was

preparing to leave HJ2, PTON ROADS. The USS HENRY nilEN was already

out in the stream when a small boat bearing a large crate came along

side. a marine officer came aboard with the proper papers for this

crate and after completing the paper transaction the crate was hauled

on board, No one knew what the box could contain since all equipment

had been loaded at the pier. The "extra cargo" was found to contain

a complete built-up terrain map of the invasion area, Immediately

steps were taken to assemble all commanders down to battalion level.

Through the use of this board, briefing was accomplished that after-

noon while waiting for the remainder of the convoy to assemble.

Summing up the over-all staff planning phase of this opera-

tion General Hobart R. Gay has this interesting comment to make:

S. . It would take too long to enumerate the trials and tribulations that confronted the staff, who had spent the previous four or five months developing desert warfare, in their attempt to formulate plans for an amphibious landing; no one knew what air would be available and, if available, how it would be employed; no one knew how tanks could be transported; and the most interesting point of all was that this staff was informed that while LST's were known and some were available, they could not be considered for an ocean trip because of lack of seaworthiness. I make note of this because of what happened later, in that LST's went everywhere, and because, in my opinion if LST' s had been available to "Torch", CAS 1 BL:NCA would have fallen before noon th-t first day. . .10

Training

The 2d ,rmored Division received quite a thorough and diverse

series of training periods prior to being alerted for the "Torch"

operation. To cover the complete training phase of the 2d Armored

Division would be an arduous task commencing with the normal acti- vation training folloed down to and including the LOUISIANA and CtROLINA Maneuvers just prior to the special training for "Torch". although the above training and especially the Maneuvers did provide immeasurably to the combat efficiency of the division we shall concern ourselves primarily with that training received after the completion of the CAROLINA Maneuvers and just prior to the landings in MOROCCO.

This training was along directed lines specifically emphasizing an amphibious operation.

Training at FORT BRAGG:

The 2d Armored Division was assigned to FORT BRaGG, NORTH

CAROLINA as a temporary station at the completion of the CAROLINi.

Maneuvers sometime toward the end of August 1942. Generally

speaking, all units of the division conducted training along lines similar to the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment. A quotation from the regimental history states:.

S. . The Regiment assembled and moved into a pine woods on the FORT BRAGG Reservation. After a short period of rest a feverish period of drawing new equipment and intensified training developed to a peak never before imagined. . . . Long hardening road marches were engaged in. An obstacle course was gone over twice daily and for the first time the course contained a great rope ladder-like device which was suspended between two trees at a height of about twenty-five feet. It was a landing net and although comparatively easy to scale and descend it was the novelty of the course. Range work was intensified, each man firing until he had qualified with his individual weapon. The main emphasis, however, was on the firing of vehicular weapons. The great artillery ranges at FORT BRAGG made possible the firing of tank guns for the first time without necessity of having a safety officer check the sights of each gun before the round was fired. An elaborate moving tank course was set up. The gunners now had a chance to really try out the new gyrostabilizer. The Battalion had at that time one M-5 light tank. The "A" Company command tank. The crew itself was not sure at that time just how all the devices operated. Since the battalion anticipated the drawing of these tanks complete for each company; all the M-5 light tanks in the division were assembled from Division Headquarters, CC"A" and CC"B", Headquarters and "D" Company of the 82d Reconnais- sance Battalion. These tanks were placed at the disposal of the Battalion for training purposes until such time as new ones could be drawn. A machine gun course of .50 and .30 caliber was fired by all gunners. The Assault Gun and the Mortar Platoon fired on the artillery range. As each man and officer finished his prescribed firing he was given a seven-day furlough or leave...... After the order forming the combat teams arrived, during September; "B" Company, equipped completely with new 1-5 tanks, departed with the 2d Battalion for amphibious maneuvers on the Chesapeake Bay. The remainder of the 1st Battalion at this time engaged in a series of night maneuvers on the reservation. A small pond in the division area known as MOTT LAKE was the focal point of the problems. Night after night the combat team rolled down to one side of the lake, was ferried across by the engineers, established a beachhead on the other side and with the coming of dawn attacked the high ground beyond the beachhead. It was at this time that the morale soared for M.jor General Gebrge S. Patton returned to his old Division to give a speech that indicated that soon he would lead them into cambat.. .. 1

Several small units received diverse special training which is worthy of note. The Maintenance Company, 67th Armored Regiment began amphibious training in the middle -of September.

. , . , Men were sent to NORFOLK, VIRGINIA to school for loading of the different types of ships and water-proofing of vehicles. The remainder of the company spent many long hours training in mock-ups of LST' s and climbing down the side of ships using landing nets . , 12

. . . . The- Service Company of the 67th Armored Regiment in addition to performing its normal function of servicing the Regiment . , also hauled supplies from FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA to the Port of Embarkation at .L:EUPORT NEMS, VIRGINIA. This work proved to be excellent experience for the truck drivers who were soon to cover hundreds of miles in NORTH AFRICA. . . .13

Training at the Port:

The program of training at the Port or at a staging area nearby was far from uniform in that many of the various units of the sub-task forces involved did not reach the Port in time for such activities other than loading. Some units were sent to a staging area for final touch-up, this being the exception rather than the rule. The landing team of which the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored

Regiment was a part went through the following sequence of events before the final shove-off:

S. . . The Battalion loaded on trains at FAYETTEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA on the 30th and departed for TNE1PORT NEWS on the 1st of October. Upon arrival in the yards they loaded on the USS BIDDLE and USS ARCTURUS and joined a fleet that was practicing landing the 3d Infantry Division. The Battalion spent four days on the Bay (Chesapeake) but did not participate in the landing operations.. .

After unloading at BALTIMORE, they moved to CAMP PICKETT,

VIRGINIA. During the two week stay here most of the training accomplished involved the administrative agencies of the units in clearing up the unfinished details required in the Movement Order.

(See Appendix III)

. . . Then followed three days of property check. Indivi- dual clothing and equipment, organiizational equipment, vehicular spare parts, tools and accessories all were checked and requisitioned. Supply officers checked T/E and TBA for items that they never knew were authorized before. Supply agencies worked night and day. New (radio) frequencies had been assigned and all radios had to be tuned. The artillery, infantry, reconnaissance a nd engineers, divorced from their parent units, had none of the normal equipment that is needed to tune their sets. Thus this work fell on the communication personnel of the 1st Battalion and they responded perfectly. . .15

No further organized training was conducted by the 1st

Battalion until the unit was at sea on their way to NORTH AFRICA.,

Members of the 2d Armored Division that were assigned to

Sub-Task Force GOAL POST underwent many trials and tribulations in their brief attempt at amphibious maneuvers i the CHESPEAKE

BhY under Brigadier General L,. K. Truscott Jr. He has this to say concerning the amphibious training:

Final Training. Loading was completed on 15 October and the convoy sailed to SOLOMONS ISLAICD in CHE SAPEAKE Bi"Y for its final period of training prior to sailing. Dates and areas for this training were announced by Hq "FAF. Plans for the training were based upon these dates end in brief contemplated: one day--boat and net work by individual, ships; one rehearsal in daylight, following operation plan except the-t only a few vehicles of each type would be landed; one rehearsal (night) following operation plan as closely as practical except that only a few vehicles of each type would be landed. The night before the daylight landing was to take, place, I was informed that Adrliral Hewitt had forbidden landing of craft except on one small beach about 150 or 200 yards wide. I con- ferred with idmiral Kelly, and at my request, he sent a request to hdmir^l Hewitt for consideration which was refused in a reply received the following morning, accordingly, the daylight rehearsal was completely disrupted. We were able to land only the three battalions successively on the one small beach and immediately reembark them. I appealed to admiral Hewitt by telephone and received permission to use all beaches (and more) for the night rehearsal and plans were made accordingly. These plans were seriously disrupted by orders from Naval authorities ordering various ships in to port for "ttopping .offi," tigain I appealed to i,dmiral Hewitt and received permission to complete the exercises planned before any ship would be required to leave the convoy. The change in Naval plans which separated the transports and vich required sailing the Sub-Task Force one day earlier than I had been advised seriously hampered training, issue of final orders, and prevented some proposed visits to ships for purposes of addressing pv -sonnel. Final operation ordect-s were issued and final conferences with assault commanders were held on the USS ,lleen the afternoon and everng of 22 0c ober after final departure from the piers.

ApparEntly the 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment was among the units oarticipating in the bove practice lrndings, since the dat(es involvd coincide. Their mention of this traini111 is as follows: ... After the completion of loading, stowage and checking the USS HARRY LEE and the USS TITANIA left the dock and anchored in the upper portion of the CHESAPEAKE BAY waiting for the convoy to assemble. They remained in this area from the 16th until the 22d during which time the troops made several practice invasion landings without vehicles, using landing nets and assault boats. The practice in the quiet bay waters gave the troops some 6 idea of the difficulties to be expected in actual operations...

Training at Sea:

The prelude to the embarkation and subsequent sea voyage to

NORTH AFRICA took place the afternoon of Friday, 23 October 1942 when

... Ma jor General George S. Patton Jr. called a meeting of all commanders in a large room in one of the warehouses. This included all commanding officers aboard ships as well as all task force and combat team commranders...

These commanders returned

... from this meeting with the first information that anyone had had as to where they were going and what they were going to do. This information was not put out, however, nor were the pounds of maps that arrived that day opened until the ships were two days out at sea;... Life aboard ship passed quickly...since the officers had to be briefed as soon as the maps were broken down. There were a multitude of jobs and the big picture was to be given to the troops as well as their own particular job. As the officers were briefed in the various phases of the operation they held schools for the men. In addition there was a new weapon that had been loaded on at the last minute. It was called a Bazooka. It was supposed to knock out enemy tanks but no one had ever fired it or seen it fired. Classes were held constantly in its use. The Navy, too, had some new weapons. Experts in the large caliber weapons, the crew of the Biddle had never seen a .30 caliber machine gun. Classes were held by the Army instructors for the Navy on these guns.... These guns were to be the anti-aircraft protection of the landing craft in which the Battalion vehicles were to be set on the beach... 1 7

Some of the time on board ship was spent learning about NORTH

AFRICA and the language and customs of its people to better facilitate

the dealings with civilians. We had a blue book on a Guide to North ifrica thRt told just how to get along with the Arabs,18

. aIbandon ship drills and general quarters stations were a daily routine, .. .19

Most tr..ining on board ship followed a similar plan through-

out the whole convoy. Sub-Task Force GOAL POST issued a regular

Training Memorandum which prescribed in detail the daily training

hours. In general this included such subjects as: orientation

lectures, booby traps, customs of inhabitants, camouflage, training

in naval weapons, training in new weapons (rifle grenade and rocket

launcher) debarkation, physical training, identification of aircraft

and armored vehicles, behavior if captured, first aid and signal

training. A thorough study of this training memorandum (see

.ppendix III) will reveal that the spare time aboard ship was use-

fully taken care of with planned training.

The troops then were ready, the plans and training completed

all in the space of 79 short days of 24 long hours each. By direct deal-

ings, abrupt decisions and accelerated activity throughout, the

commanders, staff and troops performed the race against time and

weather with corrmmendable efficiency and with an amazing regard for

detail. This chapter has shown, to a degree, the intricate planning

in movement and supply that was necessary plus the varied and

detailed training experienced. If the reader is not convinced of

the magnanimity of the job performed, the writers are sure he will

have no doubt of it, after considering the following chapter on

Loading. This phase too, was included within those SHORT 79 days. NCJIT S FOR CHAPTER 2

1Major.G.,enral Hobart R. Gay, Letter to Rese-arch Comittee No. 25, dated 28 December 1949.

Ibid.

3 Lieutenant General-Lucien K. Truscott Jr., General Truscott's personal file on Sub-Task Force GOAiL POST, passim.

Ibid, pzassim.

5 Colonel Ralph J. Butchers, Letter to Research Committee No" 25, dated 14 N ovember 1949.

6 U. S. Landings in Morocco, a report prepred by the Tactics Department, The armored Force School, (.kpril 1943), pp5-7. 7 Opcit, Letter from Colonel Ralph J. Butchers,

Ibid.

9 Major Alvin T. Netterblad Jr., personal interview, November, 1949,

10 Op cit, Letter from Major General Hobart R. Gay.

11 History 67th Armored Regiment, a unit history prepared by members of the 67th Armored Regiment; (Brunswick, Germany: Georg Westermann, 1945), p 377.

Ibid, p 363.

Ibid, pp 169-1700

Ibid, pp 59-64. Ibid1, pp 59-64.

16 Op cit, Lieutenant General Lucien K. Truscott Jr. 17 p cit, History 67th Armored Regiment, pp 169-170.

1& Ibid, pp 59-64.

19 First Lieutenant John H. Cleveland, personal interview, January 1950.

20 Op cit, History 67th Armored Regiment, pp 59-64. CHAPTER 3

Certain inclusions in the G-4 estimate of plans and requirements prepared by Brigadier General Walter Muller (then

Colonel), G-4, Western Task Force, provided for the preparation and assembly of troops, supplies and equipment at ports of embarkation; practice loading for a combat loaded convoy; actual loading and the making of necessary modifications to fit shipping and operational changes and the embarkation of troops and supplies in accordance with the tactical situation. 1

In the early planning stage, units comprising the Task

Force were widely scattered. Some units were not yet activated when plans were being made and essential data as to personnel, vehicles, tonnage and measurements was unobtainable. Unit staffs were required to complete their unit Personnel and Tonnage Tables and

Loading Plans based largely on estimates.

The planning stage of the 2d Armored Division was initiated while the division was staging at FT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA, The loading plans were executed by the Asstt Chief of Staff, G-4, Colonel

Ralph J, Butcher, (then Lt Col) together with the Special and General

Staff Sections, especially with the Division G-3, Based on information available to the division, landing teams were formed from elements to be furnished by the 2d Armored Division, and allocations of personnel, vehicles and supplies were determined for each ship earmarked to transport these elements.. These planIs included the 2 priority for unloading in the landing phase. Colonel Butcher states,

..'.The Table of Organization for Operation BLACKSTONE was hand tailored to desired invasion teams'. I prepared the equipment portion based on expected needs, always leaning toward the heavy side (that is, as far as Colonel Muller would let me). Then both were pared down by'a constantly varied availability of shipping and boats..',

The division staff planning was similar to that planning in Washington; informal, limited attendance at conferences, with direct "yes" or "no" decisions'. Each commander also leaned on the heavy side, the Division G-4 becoming the "no" man. In the later planning stages, an SOP for landing was finally received by the division and included data from loading ships to debarkation for assault landings .

Selected officers were sent to the Transport Quartermaster

School to study and learn the fundamentals of combat ship loading.

Although the officers attending considered it an excellent school, they felt that the many complex duties of a Transport Quartermaster

(TQM) could not be fully covered in the short period of two weeks;

Upon completion however, the officers returned to the division where they were briefed by the AC of S, G-4, assigned to ships and given allocations as to when and what was to be loaded on their ships;

The desired debarkation priority was also furnished. TOQt s were then sent to their respective ports to board their assigned ships, secure the necessary nautical data to ascertain their loading plans, compile these plans and await arrival of the landing teams. While the division plans were being prepared, major problems

of a serious nature were confronting the commanders and staffs of

higher echelons. The Army and Navy could not agree on the princi-

ples of combat loading, each service having different concepts.

The Army had difficulty reconciling the Navy point of view--that

assault troops, especially if landed at night, should be very

lightly equipped and supplied, leaving the heavier equipment and

supplies to follow later--and the Army desire to get as much as possible ashore in the assault boat waves.

The necessity for combat loadings in the D Day convoy required that all vessels previously used as transports be altered in their interior arrangements. As a principle of combat loading, the

essential equipment, vehicles and supplies must be loaded in the

same ship with the assault troops who are to use them. Supplies must be stowed in such a manner that they can be unloaded in the

order most likely to be needed to meet tactical situations immed-

iately upon landing. Complications arose as the number of these

transports and the types of landing craft that were to be available were not known to Vice admiral Henry K. Hewitt, Naval Commander of

the task force, up to a few weeks prior to departure, Only fourteen

of the thirty transports and cargo vessels involved in the operation were actually in commission and assigned to the command on 1 August

1942. Of the other sixteen, some were enroute from the Pacific and

others were in the state of being turned over from Merchant Marine 6 Service. None were turned over in satisfactory condition. War Department Orders were issued .on 2 October 1942, directing movement of certain elements of the 2d Armored Division from FT BRAGG to specific ports of embarkation. Headquarters and

Headquarters Detachment, CCB and attached units in the approximate strength of 56 officers, 1079 enlisted men and 158 vehicles were 7 directed to report to the NORFOLK PORT OF EIBARKATION. Other elements of the Division, including Headquarters and Headquarters

Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment and specific detachments of the 2d armored Division in the approximate strength of 17 officers, 231 enlisted men and 209 vehicles were directed to report to an unannounced port of embarkation (NYPE).

As the directed strengths were approximated in WD Orders,

Major General Ernest N. Harmon, the Division Commander, was authorized to deviate at his discretion, subject only to the limitations of shipping space. Both elements were to proceed from FT BRAGG upon call of the respective port commanders.

The 66th and the 67th Armored Regiments were formed into armored combat teams and assigned to assault forces. .The ist

Battalion, 67th armored Regiment was assigned to the Assault Force

BRUSIRJOOD; scheduled to land in the center at FEDALA. The 2d and

3d Battalions, 67th Armored Regiment, were both assigned to the

Assault Force .BLACKSTONE; scheduled to land on the south flank at

SAFI. The 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment was assigned to the

Assault Force GOALPOST; scheduled to land on the north flank at PORT LYAUTY. The 1st Battalion of the 41st Armored Infantry

Regiment was split into three reinforcing infantry companies and

assigned to each assaulting force,

The element organized around Headquarters and Headquarters

Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment was directed to report

to FT HAIILTON, INM YORK not later than 10 October 1942, Units

scheduled to ship from NORFOLK, VIRGINIA arrived at staggered in-

tervals during the first few weeks of October. The ist Battalion,

67th Armored Regiment Combat Team departed for NORFOLK on I October

1942 and after several days of participation in landing operations

on CHESAPEAKE BAY, moved to CAMP PICKETT, VIRGINIA for a short stay.

The 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment Combat Team, arrived at

M~WPORT NEWS on 15 October and immediately began loading operations,

The Combat Team at CA~iP PICKETT returned on the 20th of October for loading and debarkation at 2INPORT IfLEWS. The 1st Battalion, 66th

Armored Regiment Combat Team arrived at NEWPORT EWS during the third week of October and immediately started loading. From the

other major element of the 2d Armored Division, the 41st Armored

Infantry Regiment, a supporting company of infantry and a shore party (platoon in strength) was assigned each of the assault forces.

These elements arrived at their respective ports of embarkation for inclusion in the loading operation during the third week of October.

The elements leaving from NEW YORK were to sail on the sea train (USS LAKEHURST). On 15 October 1942, this ship was ready for loading and naval supplies were taken aboard. On 16 October, crews began the loading of 60 days' ration, type B, and 5 units of fire for each weapon, as specified by unit movement orders, 9

The delay in the turn-over of a number of ships from the

Merchant Marine Service and the necessary alterations now had ad- verse affects on the loading plans, The misconception as to characteristics and capacities of the designated ships made it impossible to determine the amount of available space. The s.ea train allocation for example, called for some 300 vehicles, The majority were 2k-ton trucks, but also included, were 54 medium tanks, 6 Car- riage, Motor, M-7's and 12 Engineer Bridge Trucks (except for the cargo trucks, the above heavy vehicles were the only equipment of this kind in the Western Task Force), It was determined later that this ship could handle but 200 vehicles, but yet after actual planning had been completed, the maximum number of vehicles the sea train could carry was 156. This changed the entire setup, but it 10 was too late to stop movement of the vehicles to the port. Fur- ther difficulty was experienced in ascertaining the number and types of landing craft.

Boat employment plans for the landings were influenced by the following factors:1

Weather and surf conditions to be expected indicated the desireability of landing assault battalions as quickly as possible.

Shortage of LCMs required pooling of their craft and restriction to LCM loads. Uncertainty of beach conditions required delay in the landing of armor until the beachhead was established.

The nature of the resistance to be expected indicated the desireability of striking with maximum force initially,

The landing of aviation personnel and supplies would not be necessary until an airport had been captured,

Accordingly, the plan provided for pooling all landing craft for landing assault elements, then giving priority of LCM's

and LCV's to the armored landing teams.

In the meantime, on 28 September 1942, General Mark Clark, then Deputy Commander to General Eisenhower, held a meeting of key officers of the Western Task Force, to discuss logistical support of the United States Forces in this operation. At this conference, it was decided to reduce the level of supply to 45 days and the 12 ammunition level to 10 units of fire. This decision was not to be interpreted to change previously formulated loading plans which called for an excess in amounts of supply for initial combat troops.

These troops would move to the theater with whatever amounts of supplies and ammunition the Theater Commander desired. These levels were to serve as a guide to the Distribution Division to earmark supplies and to the port of embarkation serving the theater to ship 13 supplies to establish and maintain these levels, However, at 1500,

16 October, a directive was issued to cut the ration load to 45 dayst supply, in order to allow more ship space for the loading of vehicles and equipment. This resulted in an almost complete unloading of rations to determine a balanced ration for 45 dayst supply. A change in the amount and type of Class V supply also required unloading certain types of ammunition.

Another decision made by General Clark was to initially reduce organizational equipment of the Western Task Force by 50 percent. This reduced level could not expect an increase until after D / 90. In order to avoid congestion at the ports and also to facilitate loading of the vehicles required by the Task Force, the following solution was agreed upon by Colonel Muller, Task

Force G-4 and Colonel Magruder, Service of Supply, War Department: 1 5

Units of the Task Force would retain full organizational equipment until after the cargo convoy carrying the mass of that equipment had sailed in order to allow units of the Task Force to make last minute selections of items to be shipped.

Equipment for the units sailing in the D Day and D / 5 convoys would be shipped on those convoys and on the D / 20 convoy.

Thereafter, equipment for troops sailing in a troop convoy, would be carried in that troop convoy and on the cargo convoy sailing five days later.

The Chiefs of Service would remove this excess equipment from the port area unless they could arrange either for its use to complete equipment of units sailing later or its inclusion in maintenance supplies.

As the loading phase continued at the NIW YORK PORT, major and minor problems were numerous and varied. Lieutenant Colonel Frank Mi Muller (then 1st Lt); TM for the sea train state's

...The vehicles had been loaded at FT BRAGG on rail flat cars in predetermined sequence to facilitate the loading of the ship.. However, due to switching of the flat cars in the port area, this arrangement became jumbled. A string of flats was run along the pier where vehicles were then loaded aboard by use of the ships 100-ton boom, Due to combat loading, this involved considerable switching of flat cars to get the vehicles at the ship's side,......

Vehicles were water-proofed by ordnance specialist teams

and was accomplished efficiently.. Some delay was encountered on

the loading of anmunition. To insure completion of the loading on

schedule, civilian labor groups were augmented by military details.

In addition to rations and ammunition; Ordnance, Quartermaster,

IMedical, Engineer, Chemical and Signal, Class II and IV supplies were loaded in amounts predetermined by higher headquarters; gen-

erally 30 days' supply for landing teams, distributed among the

ships of the landing teams., All organic vehicles to be loaded had

their basic loads of ammunition, rations, signal equipment and ord-

nance spare parts. Vehicular gasoline tanks were 90 percent full.1 6

Because of the large number of vehicles shipped to NEW YORK for the sea train, loading was executed to take maximum advantage

of all available space, The tank deck or lower deck was loaded mainly with 2?-ton and Engineer Bridge trucks (Brockways). Two

jeeps were loaded on top of each bridge truck and trailers were

placed in any available space. Tanks were placed as close together

a s possible, allowing sufficient space to chain them down. Some

tanks and other heavy equipment were loaded on the superstructure deck by use of the shore crane, keeping in mind that only the ships organic equipment would be available for unloading, Inasmuch as the sea train had more cargo space in the forward portion of the ship, adjustment of the water ballast was made to balance the load, Even with careful conservation of space, 40 vehicles remained on the docks after the ship had been loaded. These vehicles were shipped by rail to NORFOLK for inclusion in the D / 20 convoy.17

The Transport Quartermasters who loaded out of NORFOIK experienced many of the difficulties encountered in NEN YORK. In

NORFOIK, both APA (Auxiliary Personnel, Assault) and AKA (Auxiliary

Cargo, Assault) ships were loaded by T,4ts of the 2d Armored Di- vision and other units of the Task Force. The loading of an AKA ship is considerably different from that of the sea train. Precise measurement of space is the criterion, while the sea train is similar to LST loading. The APA and AKA ships carried landing barges on davitsq These were used to unload personnel and equipment to the beaches, Actual loading operations consisted of calling on the port of embarkation for items which were then stacked on the dock by type and loaded in accordance with TjiA plans. Supplies arrived in driblets and were not delivered to the dock sufficiently ahead of time to permit loading prior to embarkation of troops. 1 8

Troop trains were slow and jumbled and the presence of troops aboard ship was a decided hindrance to loading crews.

Troops first boarded alphabetically listed but were later unloaded, placed in boat teams and re-embarked. Improper arrival order of supplies necessitated the shifting of cargo from hold to hold.

Ammunition promised for ballast, was late in arriving, causing

a return to port, to readjust ship loads after the shakedown

cruise in CIESAPEAKE BAY. Ammunition was scheduled to arrive in

cargo lots per vessel, but instead, came in cargo lots per type,

necessitating sorting, shifting and stacking prior to loading.1 9

Owing to the hazardous nature of the operation it was

essential that the loss of one ship should not jeopardize the op-

eration. Accordingly, all aviation units, all headquarter and

communications units, and so far as practicable, all armored

units were divided between two or more ships. This necessary pre-

scription complicated the preparation of loading plans.

One problem always present during loading operations at

both NEN YORK and NORFOLK, was the constant pressure of time.

Due to the rapid decision to assault North African Shores, a minimum of time was allocated to the combat loading of assault

units. Attached units, such as the Air Corps, Signal Corps and

Service Troops, were attached too late. They had received no

amphibious training, failed to submit personnel and tonnage tables

and equipment arrived at the various piers for loading without 20 advance data being forwarded to TQrs.I Because of this, officers

charged with loading the ships had not allowed sufficient space on

the transports for equipment which commanding officers thought nec-

essary to be loaded. Numerous revisions of the TQM plans were made

and final plans were not completed until completion of loading, That loading was eventually completed on schedule can be at- tributed to excellent cooperation and assistance given by port of embarkation officials to TQMs. When all ships were loaded, the convoy took a shakedown cruise in CHESAPEAKE BAY, adjusted loads where necessary and on 22 October 1942, sailed from NEWPORT

NEWS.

The sea train sailed on 19 October from IEW YORK and on the 24th of that month, joined up with the elements from NENPORT

NEWS to form the first great convoy of the war.

The convoy troop lists for the Western Task Force as of

22 October (day before sailing) provided for the shipment of the

2d Armored Division Landing Teams,. plus other special division troops, in the D Day convoy. The remaining units and equipment of the division were scheduled for shipment on the D t 5 (troops and fast cargo), D / 20 (slow cargo only) and the D / 40 convoys. With exception of the inclusion of two letter companies of the Division

Maintenance Battalion, on the D $ 20 convoy,, the remainder and bulk of the division sailed on the D / 40 and D / 65 convoys to join forward elements of the division in the CORK FOREST; 18 miles from

RABAT. A more detailed analysis of the convoy scheduling is as

follows and includes landing force assignments of the D Day 21 convoy. TABLE 1

D DAY CONVOY (Combat Loaded)

Force IXTT BLACKSTONE (Southern Landing Force)

Major General Ernest N. Harmon, Commanding

2d Armored Division Landing Team: Hq, CCB - 2d En, 67thArmd Iegt(Reinf) Trans Party; lst Blat, Co D, 17th Armd Engr Bn Trans Party, 2d Blat, Co I, 41st Armd Inf Regt 3d Plat, Btry C, 443d. AAA Bn Co B, 41st Armd Inf Regt Btry C,-78th Armd FA Bn 2d Blat, Co C, 82d Rcn Bn 2d Plat, Co C, 17th Amid Engr Bn 2d Bn Sec, Maint Co, 67th Armd Regt Mod Det,. 48th Armd Med En Shore Party, 2d Blat, Co D, 17th Ard Engr Bn

2dArnored Division Landing Team on sea train: Det, Hq Co, 67th Armd Regt 3d En, 67th Armd Regt (Reinf) (aI~emainder of personnel on transports) Etry B, 14th Armd Fk Bn Prov Engr Bridge Co, 17th Armd Engr Bn 5th Blat, Btry B, 443d AA Bn Dot, Co B, Div Mjaint Bn Med Det, 3d En, 67th Axrmd Regt Det, Div Qi Bn 1st Blat, Co A, Arrmd Sapply Bn Trans Party, Brov Plat, 17th rmd Engr Bn

Detachment 2d Armored Division: HIq and Hq Co,. 2d Armd Div Det, 142d krmd Sig Co Table 1 (Cont'd)

Force "Y" BUSIHvOOB (Central Landing Force)

Major General J. W, Anderson, Commanding

2d Armored Division Landing Team: 1st Bn, 67th Armd Regt (Reinf) 2d Flat, Btry C4,-443d AAA Bn 4th Plat, EtryC, 443d AAA Bn Co A, 41st Armd Inf Eegt 1st Flat, Co C; 32d Rcn Bn 1st Flat, Co C, l7thArmd Engr Bn Trans Farty, 2d Flat, Co B '17th Armd Engr Bn Trans Farty, ist Flat, Co I, 41st Armd Inf Regt Bet, Maint Co, 67th Armd Regt Btry A, 78th Armd FA Bn Det, 142d Armd Sig Co Med Bet, 48th Armd .Ied En Shore Farty, 1st Flat, Co B, 17th Armd Engr Bn

Force "Z" GOALPST (Northern Landing Force)

Major General Lucien K. Truscott, Jr., Commanding

2d Armored Division Landing Team: st- Bn, 66th grdRet(Rinf) 1st Flat, Btry B, 443.d AAA En 1st Fiat, Btry C, 443 d AA Bn Shore Farty, 3d Plat, Co B, 17th krmd Engr Bn Trans Farty, 3d Plat, Co B, 17th Armd Engr Bn Trans Farty, 3d Flat, Co I, 41st Armd Inf Regt Co C, 141st krmd Inf Regt Btry B, 78th Armd FA Bn 3d Flat, Co C, 82d Rcn Bn 3d Flat, Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn Bet, Maint Co, 66th Armd Regt Bet, 142d Armd Sig Co. Bet, 48th Armd MIed En Hq and Hg Co, 67th Armd Regt ( - Bets on sea train)

Those elements of the 2d Armored Division which were as-

signed to the three sub-task forces were broken down, generally

into two groups; a small detachment of men from each unit, together with the rmajority of vehicles from that unit. wore placod .board each ship utilized to tranepo:A equllpment,. The other group consisted of the flemaining personnel and a few vehicles which were placed aboard troop transports., Those vessels, both cargo and troop transport, which were used almost entirely by various elements of the division were: The Calvert, Lakehurst (sea train) and Titaria assigned to Operation BLkCKSTONE (Southern Landing

Force; SFI); the Arcturus and Biddle assigned to Operation BRUSH-

OD (Central Landing Force; FYDA.LA); and the Penn and Electra assigned to Operation GOALPCS.T (Northern Landing Force; PORT

LYAUTEY). Some elements of the 142d Armored Signal Company and the Headquarters and Headquartors Company, 67th Armored Regiment sailed on the Dix and Harris respectively; part of the Southern

Landing Force.

For a more detailed picture on the breakdown of personnel, vehicles, transports and attachments, refer to Table 2 below. 2 2

TABLE 2

Composition and Disposition of Those Elements of the

2d Armd Div Participating in Operation "TORCH" a

NO NAIEEOF FORCE UNIT 01 r TEH TPAISPORT DESIG aTTACHED TO Hg 2dirnmd Div 1 32 Harris X Unattached Renainder of Div H Plus H CCA (D / 40 convoy

Hq~ CCB' 1Q0 24 5 Calvert; X. Parent Org

aForce Designations are: X Operation BLACKSTONE; Y . Operation BRUSHWOOD; Z .Operation GOALPOST,

42 Table 2 (Conttd)

NO INAME OF FORCE UNIT 1 M VEH TRANSPORT DESIG ATTACME D TO

67th_ A77 ______t: Hq Det 67th A.R. 10 5 10 Lakehurst X CCB 4V.28 .0 Harris X CCB 1s t Bn 67th A. R HqC 0 17 Arcturus Y Parent Org HqC7 69 3. Biddle Y Parent Org 4 $1 1 Biddle Y Parent Org Co___A ___1__14_ 20 Arcturus Y Parent Org CoB____80_ Biddle Y Parent Org Co B15 21 Arcturus Y Parent Org

Co C (W'uith remainder of Re -t on D 40 convoy ______2d En 67th A tR.: ______1 653 T averF X Pare nt Org Hq and Hq Co 21 14 17 Titaria X Parent Org Co D 4751 3 Calvert IX Parent Org 11____2______20 Ti taria X Parent Org 4oE76 1 2 Calvert X Parent Org ij 19 19 Titaria X Parent Org Det' Co B 2d Bn'Vaint 1 2 60 13 1 akehurst X 2d En 67 ~ De dBuaii e 0' Titaria x Parent 'Org, ______0! 2 2____ Calvert X Parent Org

Co F (With Remainder of Regt on_D_$40_ y ______

3d 7hAIR.: - _____ 21111' 11.. Lakehurst Xj Parent Org Hq and Hq Co 814 b 0 ILakehurst X Parent Or g Cos G H and' I ,181375 1 60 takehurstjX Parent Org iMled DEt 3d Bh 67th AR ' 4.3 Lakehurst X Parent Org Det2' 1166an 2 Arcturus Y 3d En 67 AR De aitCo 67th AR 2 2 Arctus Y 3d En 67 AR 66th Arend Rent,: Pren-Or-- 10. 19 E'1ectra ZL aen r Hq and Hq Colst Bn 16164 0 Penn Z ParntOr Co A .3 6: 0 Penn z Parent Org ______25.____ 21 plectra Z Parent Org Co B 3 90 Penn Z_ Pare nthOr ______1 :31 21 Electra Z ",-Parent Org C o 34. 12 Penn Z Parent Org Det Maint Co 66th AR 1.j $ 2. Penn Z Parent .Org (Remainder of 6th AR 'onD740 convoy______Table 2 (C ont ,d)

r1O fI 1AEOF FORCE UN4IT 41st krmdIIf0 Ell VEH TRANSPORT DESIG ATTACHED .TO Meat- ~Y .1st En 67 AR Co A st Bn 1 .11 22 Arcturus ______4 15$ 1 Biddle Y. 16t En.67 AR Co B ls 12450 Titaria X dn67AR Coltn1 24 22 Calvert Y 2d Bn 67 Co.n516 st 0 Penn Z. lst Bn66bAR olsEn0 1$ 23 Electra Z 1 st En 66 4,R. lst Plat'Co 3d $n 1 0 Biddle Y lst n 67 AR (Trans Part)______2d Peat 'Co I 3d En' 1 24 0 Calvert 'X 2d En 67' AR (Trans Party 0 22 7- Titaria X 2d En 67 AR 3d Plat Co 13d' n' , Penn Z I-'1s tBn 66 AR

(Trans Party) ______(Remainder. of~ '4st Armid Inf 'Regt on D 70 cov Btr, E 10 3 13 Lakehurs t X 2dB67A Reainder of 14th AFA En on D $ 40 convo

78th krind PA Bn: ______Etry A 4. 89LI21 Biddle Y 1s t En 67 AR

Btr E4 'r T19' Penn ..... Z is t En 66 AR _ 2 2Eectra i Z lst En 67 A $try C '4 - Ti 19 21 'sitar'a IX{2d En 67 -AR (Remainder of 7&th AFA En on ID~.40 convoy

92d Armd FA En on D $ 0 convoy______82d Rcrn n: 7 0 14 Arcturus Y 1st Plat, Co C 2-y7-~ 0--~ Biddle .Y 1s t En 67 AR 0 1.1 12 Calvert X '2d En 67 AR 2d Plat, Co C 2 3 ' Titaria ' X. dE 7A

3PltCoC2 38.1' Penn 1 st En '66 AR 3d C0 6 10 Electra ___ 16tBn__h Re~ainerof 82d Rcn Bn on D ! convoy)

17t Arrn n l Arcturus 'Y 1st En 67 AR ls~a~ C F 4+5 7 fiddle Y 1st En 67 AR 1 45 7 ,'Titaria X 2dBn67 AR ______CoC 0 1 1 1 Calvert xl 2dBn 67 AR

3d Plat CoOC 1 6 a r Penn ' st Bn 66 AR lst Plat CoEB 1 46 0 iddle ' Y lstBn 67 kR (Shore Party) I______Ei, di Y lst . .n67AR 2d Plat Co E ' 1 46 .0) (TransParty)______Table 2 (C onttld )

NO NAME OF F ORC UUIIT 10 EVI VEF{ TRANSPORT DEL ATTACHED TO 3 d Plat .Co B ShrPr 1 4 0 Penn Z 1st Bn 66 AR 1s t Plat Co D UTans, Party) 11 461. 0 Titaria X 2d Bn 67 ARL 2d Plat Co D (Shore Party) 1~ 46 0 Titaria X 2d Bn 67 AR 3d Plat Co D (Trans Pat-T 1 46 0 Penn Z 1st Bn 66 AR Pr~ov En ;r Bridge Co 6--215 .43 Lakehurst X 3d Bn 67 AR Prov Plat (Trans Party 1 46 0 Penn Z 1s t Bn 66 AR Med Det 17th Engr Bn 0Q 10 0 Dix X 3d Bn 47 Inf (Remainder of 17th Arrid En r Bn on D 40 convoy)--______142d Arrad Sig Co:______Det 142 Sid Co Il 20 5 1Dix X 3d Bn47 Inf Detl4SiCo 0 6 1 1Penn Z *lst Bn 66 AR Det 142d Sig Co 0O 6 1 Titaria x 2d Bn67 AR Det 142d :Sig Co 0T 6 J. Biddle Y 1st Bn 67 AR De't12dSig Co 50O 10_ Harris X 1st Bn 47 Inf

_Reainerof_42 Sig Co on D 4 convo ______

45th Armd 'led Bn:______Det 48th Mred Bn 2{ 2 Biddle Y l st En 67 AR Det 45th Me'd EBn 30TiArtara X 2dtEn 67 AR De 48th %ed En Aro3Ttrias 2dB 67 AR Det 4 nth died Bn 3 2 5 Penn Z___ t En 66 AR Reainder of 48th h~ed En on D $40 convoyr

Det, Div QM . 17 4 Lakehurs-t X 3d En 67 AR7

Reniainder of Div .:I 13n on D 40 c onvo, ______

(The following information is furnished to give a general picture of the supply and transportation situation. Certain of the logistical -information was tentative at the time plans were prepared and of necessity revisions were made in accordance with directives issued. Due to lack of factual data on specific instances where this overall plan was amended or changed, this presentation is based on the accomplishment of the plan as prepared.)

Based on arrival dates at Western Ports, convoys for the transporting of troops, equipment and supplies were planned from

D Day to D / 95. Four echelons were established for shipments during 23 this period and are grouped as follows:

Ist Echelon Convoy: UGF 1 (D Day) UGF 2 (D 5) UGS 2 (D / 20)

2d Echelon Convoy: UGF 3 (D / 40) UGS 3 (D /45)

3d Echelon Convoy: UGF 4 (D / 65) UGS 4 (D / 70)

4th Echelon Convoy: UGF 5 (D / 90) UGS 5 (D / 95)

Each UGS convoy carried supplies for the UGF convoy in its group. After departure of the UGS convoy, equipment left behind re- verted to the Chiefs of Services after the entire unit to which the equipment belongs had sailed. For planning purposes, the assumption was made that all Table of Basic Allowances (TBA) equipment could be transported for the troops which would be in the theater by D / 95.

The D Day convoy consisted of assault troops which were combat loaded in 29 ships. These ships included 12 AP, 10 XAP and one sea train, with a personnel capacity of 35,000 troops and a cargo capacity of 149,000 tons. The major cargo consisted of supplies of all classes for the 35,000 troops in varying amounts, but averaging about 30 days' supply. Gas and oil ire carried in drums and cans. TBA equipment shipped, averaged about 40 percent, All wheeled ve-

hicles were included in the cargo.. The required ship tons of cargo

for the 30 dayst supply for 35,000 troops amounted to 49,000 tons and the TBA for the same number of troops amounted to 245,000 tons.

Of the requirements, only the 49,000 tons of the 30 days' supply was fully met.. Requirements for TBA were short by 100,000 tons.

The first follow-up was the D / 5 convoy which was organi-

zation unit loaded. This shipment included service troops principally with additional field artillery and anti-aircraft troops.

Troops, supplies and equipment were loaded on the same transport,

but not so as to permit a simultaneous debarkation of troops and their equipment. This convoy consisted. of nine transports carrying

32,000 troops. The cargo capacity of the transports and the cargo

ships amounted to 148,000 tons with the major cargo consisting of about 30 days' supplies of all classes for the 32,000 troops aboard.

TBA equipment averaged about 40 percent. Also carried were cargo handling equipment and gasoline facilities for 40,000 barrels of gasoline. Tonnage requirements for this shipment amounted to 45,000 tons for the 30 days' supply items and 244,000 tons for TBA equipment. Ship tons of cargo shipped was only 148,000, leaving a

deficit of 121,000 tons of TBA equipment for this convoy. This

convoy landed at CASABLANCA on 18 November 1942.

The D / 20 convoy for Western Task Force was primarily a

cargo shipment and was the first to be commercially loaded. Equip- ment and supplies were crated for debarkation after a port had been

47 secured. It was comprised of one tanker and 25 cargo ships having

275,000 tons capacity. The principle cargo consisted of 60 days' supply for the 67,000 troops already in the theater, Additional

TBA equipment for troops that sailed in the D Day and D / 5 convoys was included, bringing their level to about 75 percent of full allowances. Gasoline and oil drums were shipped along with gasoline tanks and pipe lines for storage of 240,000 barrels of gasoline.

About 7,000 tons of coal in bags were shipped in this convoy and plans were made for further coal shipments in all subsequent UGS convoys. The required tonnage for this convoy was 188,000 tons for the 60 days' supply for the 67,000 troops. This tonnage figure was met, and in addition, 87,000 tons of back-log shipping was transported, reducing the cumulative unshipped balance to 179,000 tons.

The 2d echelon convoy comprised of UGF 3 and UGS 3, was set for D / 40 and D / 45. The D / 40 (UGF 3) consisted of 11 transports, one sea train and two tankers for Western Task Force. UGF 3 had a personnel capacity of 23,000 troops and a cargo capacity of 17,000 tons on the sea train and 23,000 tons on the transports. The major cargo consisted of 10 days' type C rations, 5 days' type K rations and one unit of fire for troops in UGF 3. Also carried was 25 percent of the TBA equipment for the troops in this shipment. Tonnage requirements exceeded the capacities of this convoy as illustrated by the shipment of only 40,000 tons against 161,000 tons required,

Elements, but not the entire remainder of the 2d Armored Division sailed in this convoy, The D / 45 (UGS 3) convoy for estern Task Force consisted of 27 cargo ships and one tanker. The entire convoy for the theater consisted of 45 cargo and tanker ships; this number being based on the navy agreement to escort up to 45 ships in a cargo convoy. No troops were transported. The cargo capacity of the 27 cargo ships amounted to 297,000 tons. Cargo consisted principally of supply of all classes for 30 dayst including 7 1/2 units of fire for all troops in the theater which was approximately 90,000 at this time. The inclusion of TBA equipment for troops in UGF

1, 2 and 3 brought the totals up to about 85 percent of the authorized, Gas and oil were shipped in this convoy also and it was determined that these items of class III would be shipped in all subsequent convoys. The shipment of 297,000. tons included the

90,000 tons required for the 30 days' supply for the 90,000 troops and in addition made up 207,000 tons of back-log shipping which had increased due to equipment being left behind by UGS 2.

The 3d echelon convoy; UGF 4 and UGS 4, comprised the D / 65 and D / 70 shipments. The D / 65 convoy included 10 transports and one sea train for Western Task Force, with a capacity of 25,000 troops and 42,000 ship tons of cargo. Five thousand of the troops were replacements. For planning purposes, it was assumed that an equivalent number were dead or evacuated from the theater. The major cargo consisted of 15 days' rations and one unit of fire for troops in this convoy. TBA equipment for these troops averaged about 40 percent. Tonnage requirements again exceeded the cargo shipped leaving

49 a cumulative unshipped balance of 151,000 tons. The remainder of

the 2d Armored Division was transported in this convoy,

No troops were transported on the D $ 70 convoy. This con-

voy was comprised of 25 cargo ships having a cargo capacity of 275,000

tons. The major items of cargo included 45 days supply of all

classes for all troops in the theater. TBA shipments brought the

total to 90 percent of overall authorized allowances. General pur-

pose vehicles were carried in this and subsequent convoys based on

the assumption that the Task Force could receive and assemble ve-

hicles by the time this convoy arrived. A pool of these vehicles

was established near the NYPE. The cumulative unshipped balance

amounted to 69,000 tons after departure of this convoy.

The 4th echelon convoy (UGF 5 and UGS 5) was scheduled for

D / 90 and D / 95. The D / 90 convoy included 10 transports and one

sea train for Western Task Force, The transports had a troop carrying

capacity of 21,000 of which 5,000 were replacements. The cargo

capacity of all ships totaled 38,000 tons and included 45 dayst

supply of all classes for troops aboard, TBA equipment for these

troops amounted to about 50 percent of that authorized. There remained a 42,000 ton cumulative balance at this time.

The D / 95 convoy included 25 cargo ships for Western Task

Force and was capable of carrying 275,000 tons, The cargo consisted

of 45 dayst of automatic supply of Class I and III and the Class II

and IV supplies as requisitioned by the Task Force Commander. Class

V supplies were also shipped. TBA equipment shipped for UGF 5

50 brought the total up to 100 percent. A total of 212,000 tons was shipped in this convoy and it accomplished the filling of the back- log of requirements established for the period through D / 95. A cumulative balance of a plus 19,000 tons was thus created'. A

74 day level of supply in the theater was established after arrival of tis convoy;

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

1 Personal Commvnents of Brigadier General Walter J. Muller.

Lieutenant Colonel F. N. Muller, "Part I, Armiored Cavalry Journal, Volume LVI, No. 4 (July-August 1947) p 3.

3 Personal Comments of Colonel Ralph J. Butcher, G-4, 2d Armored Division.

4 0p cit, Muller, F. Mi.., Lieutenant Colonel, p 3.

$amiiuolElliot Mklorison, Oerations in North African Waters, (History of US Naval Operations in World War II), Vol II (Atlanta; Little, Brown and Comp any 1947) p 27....

6 ibid. p 26.

1War Department, Movement Orders, Shipment 3324, WD 370.5 (10-1-42) OB-S-E-M1, dated October 2, 1942.

8War Department, M~ovement Orders Shipent 324-!,,-WD 370.5 (9-31-42) OB-S-E-M1,, dated October 2, 942 . 9 O ct, Muller, F. V., Lieutenant Colonel, p 4. 1 0 Ibid, p 3.

1 1 Lieutenant General Lucien K .Truscott, Jr, Operations ofSub Task Force Goal-post, undated, Sec I p 3, l2War Department, Mvemorandum for General Hull,. Subject: Special Operation, 5 SPO PP, dated September 29, 1942. 13 War Department, Memorandum for the Distribution Division, Subject: Level of Supply, Task Force A,. dated October 1, 1942.

O.,ci~t, Iuller, F. MO., Lieutenant Colonel,, p 4.

l ar Deprtment, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, Subject: Transportation of Equipment and Maintenance for a Special Operation, dated October 6, l9420 Ib6Opcit, Muller, F. Z., Lieutenant Colonel, p 4.

171b d, p 4*c

1 7 Ibid, p 4.

1 9 Ibid, p 5.

20U Landigs in Morrocco, Tactics Department, The Armored Force School, April 1943, p 11.

2 1 Hadquarters, Task Force A, Memorandum to OPD, dated October 22, 1942.

22Loading Plans, Operation Blackstone, Brushwood and Goalpost, dated October 1942.

23 Convoy Plan, SOS, Logistical Requirements from D Day to D 95, undated. CHAPTER 4

OCEAN MOVEMENT

The loading of the Western Task Force at NORFOLK, Va, was

finally completed on the 24th of October 1942 and it set sail on that

date for the invasion of French Morrocco. The armada moved out of

the NORFOLK, Va, harbor through the swept and buoyed channel in a

very efficient and orderly manner.

The convoy consisted of about 100 ships led by the cruiser

AUGUSTA under the commnand of Admiral Hewitt. All transports were

grouped in the center of the formation with battleships on each

corner and with cruisers and destroyers around these transports..

There were about forty destroyers that formed the circle around the

transports. The aircraft carriers followed and all in all it was a

formidable formation.

The ships sailed in a column of lines and each ship was about

800 yards froci the one on the right and left and from front to rear..

The convoy was sailing under complete blackout conditions on a zig

zag course and the danger of ships colliding with each other was always 1 present.,

No one except the highest commanders of the task force knew what the plans of the task force were until the force was well out to

sea. The plans were then disseminated to all officers and men aboard

the ships. Additional messages were transmitted between ships at sea

by guard mail, At sea, blinker was one means of communications by day nd a rninmum of colored lights at night, Code flags by day sig- nalled changes of course and conditions of ships, etc.. Occasionally 2 a destroyer was used as a messenger boat, Everyone was kept busy reading the vast amount of intelligence material on hand and studying the plans of the coming operation,

General Plan of Attack

The general plan of attack for Task Force 34 w.as to attack

Western IAORROeCO, D Day was November 8th and H hour was at 0400 hours.

The mission of the Task Force was as follows:

"oTo seize and secure the Port of CASAI"IBINCA as a base for future operations to the north and northeast. The scheme of- maneuver for the first phase: to effect, under cover of darkness, three surprise landings, supported after daylight by naval gunfire. To eliminate or cripple the enemy air force by surprise dawn ,ttacks. To secure by dark of D day at least one airdrome as a base for land based planes. Beginning at D - 3 clays, three submarine reconnaissance patrols were to operate off the main landing beaches; FEDALh, ScFI, and PORT LYAUT'EY. There wivas also one submarine patrol off CASABLNCA and one off D.AKAR to .keep track of enemy shipping. The aveal Covering Group, consisting of the battleship MkSSA- CHUSEITS and one cruiser division, was to destroy hostile naval units in or near CjSxABItNCA by gunfire and the hostile batteries at EL HZkREK and OUKYSHh capable of ranging on the FEDALA BEACHS. The kir Group, consisting of the R AGER and four smaller aircraft carriers, was to assist the covering group, and destroy enemy aircraft and submarines. (180 planes wore stacked in the RAiNGER whereas she was supposed to hold only 85. The Fire Supp-ort Groups was to furnish Naval gunfire support to the lanlings. Navy ships had two instructions in addition to gunfire support; first, to fire on any illuminated searchlights, second to return the fire of any shore batteries that fired on them. The Transport Group was to land troops, equipment and supplies on the three beaches,3 Training Aboard Ship

During the voyage, training of the individual soldier was carried out on each ship. Some ships rigged up rope ladders and some had rope cargo nets strung up on the ships. The men received daily exercise by climbing these ladders and nets.

Task Force GOiAPCBT conducted training in such subjects as booby traps, respect of customs of the inhabitants, camouflage, weapons, debarkation drills, identification of friendly aircraft, behavior if captured, and first aid. (Appendix 3)

This same type of training was conducted on the ships of

Task Force BIECKSTONE and can be reasonably assumed that the same training was conducted on the ships of Task Force BRUSHvOOD.

An AGF observer for Task Force BLACKSTONE, reports that no provisions for exercising all troops daily was made aboard the troop- ship LYONS. after 10 days at sea, on the 18th and 19th of October, the LYONS stopped at COVE POINT and held short periods of calesthentics for the troops. Practically all deck space on the LYONS was taken up by craft or deck loads.

Some new weapons were issued to troops aboard the transports.

The 2.36 inch rocket launcher, with ammunition, was first seen at this time. No one knew how to shoot it and furthermore no one knew how to employ the weapon. Some commanders made every effort to acquaint the men with the weapon by firing it off the ship at floating debris.

New radios were issued to some units aboard ship,. The radio operators were not familiar with the operation of the new sets, and due to the restriction of radio silence, the sets could not be

checked or calibrated.

Selection of the Beachheads

There are three main ports in MORROCCO; CASABLANCA, SAFI,

and PORT LYAUTEY, in the order of their importance. The main port

is CASABLANCA, There are two small beaches near CASABLANCA (AIN

DIAB and AIN SEBA,) but these are subjected to rough swell and surf, and are too near the CASABLANCA coastal batteries. The beach at

FEDALA, 10 miles to the north, is good. The BAY of FEDALA is a protection against the surf and swell. From FEDALA, CASABLANCA could be attacked from the rear.

The port of SAFI could be attacked frontally, because it was not well defended, and there were several beaches in the immediate vicinity of the city.

PORT LYAUTEY is a river port 6 miles inland, on the river

SEBOU. There is a beach called Mi-IDIA beach north and south of the river mouth and an attack could be made from these beaches,

Thousands of photographs were taken by British reconnaissance planes over a period of a year and provided a good lot of hydro- graphic information and enabled the amphibious staff to choose the most feasable beaches. Photographs of the coastline from sea level were wanted but never obtained. These sea level photos would have enabled the assaulting forces to identify beaches and other land- marks at night, Sub-Task Forces

The assault elements of Task Force 34 were divided into three separate SubTask Forces. They were:. Sub-Task Force YOKE

(BRJS1iNOOD) caommanded by Major General J. W. Anderson; Sub-Task

Force ZED (GOALPOT) commanded by Brigadier General L; K. Truscott; and Sub-Task Force XF AY (BLACKSTONE) commanded by Major General Ep N.

Harmon.

Sub-Task Force Yoke (BRUSHOO)

This Sub-Task Force was under the command of Major General

J. W, Anderson and consisted of troops from the 3d Infantry Division and a battalion landing team from the 2d Armored Division.

It had the mission of affecting the main landing on the

FEDALA BEACHES, secure FEDALA, and initiate operations to capture

CASABLANCA from the rear.

The naval gunfire support was to be furnished by the cruiser

BROO, LYN and destroyers. They were to silence the French coastal batteries at CAPE FEDA'LA and SIDI MOHOHLIED BEN CHE RGUI (FORT BLONDIN.)

The Flagship AUGUSTA. would also be present to assist in the gunfire support of the landings.

The detailed plan for the operation was this: two regiments were to go ashore, one regiment and an armored landing team consisting of the 1st battalion 67th Armored Regiment to remain in floating reserve. Each of the two assault regiments had two battalions in the assault, which were to land at H hour, and one 6 battalion in reserve) wrhich was to land at H $ 3 hours,

57 Sub-Task Force Zed (GOALPCT)

This Sub-Task Force was under the command of Brigadier

Gencral L. K..: Truscott and consisted of troops from the 9th Infan-

try Division and one armored landing group, from the 2d Armored

Division.. This group had the mission of capturing and securing.

1,EIzTA BEACH and the airport at PORT LYAUTEY, to insure its use as a base for our planes not later than noon of D Day; to capture and

hold PORT LYAUTEY; subsequently to capture and secure the airport at

SALE; finally to protect the north flank.,

The attached troops for this operation consisted of:

Detachment, Ground Air SupportCommand. Detachme nt; Engineer Battalion, (Topo)." Detachment, Signal Company. Detachment, Broadcasting Station. Counterintelligence Group. PI Group,. Civil Government Personnel.

The naval gunfire support was to be provided by the battle-

ship TEXAS, cruiser SAVAJ

of neutralizing the French FORT OF TE KASBA and its coastal de-

fenses on the high ground commanding the LEIMIA BEACHES.

The armored landing team was to land inside the breakwater

at PORT LYAUTEY, where there would be no surf, imediately north

of the KASBA FORT as soon as the FORT was taken; then to proceed 7 south along the coastal highway to take the airports at RABAT SALE.

Sub-Task Force Xra (BlCKSTONE

This Sub-Task Force was under the command of Major General

Ernest N. Harmon and consisted of troops from the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, two platoons (one to each assault battalion) of the 70th Light Tank Battalion, and the 2d Armored

Division landing team.

The force had the mission of securing SAFI, and the airdrome east of town; insure the unloading of the armored elements aboard the sea train LiKEHURST; secure the crossing over the OUED ER REBIA, in order to insure participation of this force in the capture of CASA-

BLANCA and, finally, to prevent the garrison at LMARRAKECH from reinforcing CASABLANCA.

The attached troops to this Sub-Task Force consisted of about the same as for Sub-Task Force GOALPCOT.

The gunfire support for this Force was to be provided by the cruisers NEW YORK and PHILADELPHIA, and destroyers. They were to silence the French coastal batteries north of the port,

Pre-Invasion Training

After loading at NE PORT 1IWS was completed, the ships of

Force BLACKSTONE, went to the upper part of the CHESAPEAKE BAY for a short period of training in the movement from ship to shore prior to sailing. The Navy Amphibious staff worked out complete details for the entire trip and these details amounted to approximately the size of a Sears and Roebuck catalog in thickness. On arrival in the rendezvous area, Major General Harmon reported to Admiral Davidson on his flagship, the cruiser PHILADELPHIA, Admiral Davidson suggested that they forget the greater part of what was written in the volumi- nous notes and that they closet themselves in his stateroom and work odt together the details of the expedition They stayed there for

48 hours arguing and wrestling with the problem.

General Harmon says that his main concern at that time was to obtain training in debarking from the ships, forming waves in small boats, and the moving in an orderly fashion to the shore. The

Force anchored within a mile of the peaceful shore of CHESAPEAKE BAY and as evening came the lighthouse on shore gave them a beacon from which to guide their movements 4 In spite of this, only one boat arrived at the objective in the first practice exercise. This was the boat that General Harmon was in. It was supposed to have been in the third wave. The remainder of the waves were scattered up and down the coast and it took until noon of the next day to get them back to the ships.. This was very discouraging and showed up the inexperience of the young sailors and coxwains and many other defects in training. The attempt on the second night] while a little better, was still highly unsatisfactory. The plan for a third exercise had to be cancelled and the ships sailed down the harbor on the evening of the 23rd to rendezvous iith the remainder of the expedition in the harbor at ,EWPORT i2EWS.

Air Suooort

The air problem in this operation was crucial. The Western

Task Force was to approach a coast where the French had an estimated

168 planes operational at airfields very handy to the shore. This coast might also be within striking range of the larger Axis bombers.

The only possible means of providing air poiwer to this amphibious

60 operation was by aircraft carriers' The United States was very

short of carriers in October 1942, The Japanese had sunk the LEX-

INGTON, YORKTCdN, WASP and HORNET, and damaged the SAR.ATOGA and

ENTERPRISE; none of the new FSSEK class were in commission. U.S.S.

RANGER, the only large carrier in the Atlantic Fleet, became the

flagship of Rear Admiral Ernest D. McWhorter, commander of the

"TORCH" air group. The new SANGAMI-ON class of four escort carriers

converted from tankers, was thrown into the operation with less than

one-half the normal shakedown training. Their inclusion with the

air group also helped to solve the fuel problem, for even after con- version they retained an enormous oil capacity with plenty to spare

for other ships. Aill together the RzJMER and her four consorts

ccrried to MOROCCO 28 Grurman avenger Torpedo bombers (TBF), 36

Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers (SBD), and 108 Wvildcat fighter planes

(F4F-4), in addition to ferrying over 76 US Army P-40s for basing at the CASABLANCA airdrome as soon as it was captured. Most of the pilots were untried in combat. RNGERIS (ir Group 9, the best 10 trained; only reported on board the ship on the 3d October:

Naval Operations

Between the 3d and 11th October the Navy sent the covering group consisting of the battleship 'MSSACHUSETTS, the heavy cruisers

TUSCALOOSA and 7JICHITA, and four destroyers, to CASCO BAY and they later joined the convoy on the 25th October for the voyage. The air group along with one oiler and nine destroyers was sent to BERMUDA for training.. The three attack groups;. the covering group, the air group and the assault group all rendezvoued about 450 miles SSE of CAPE RACE and continued on their way,. When complete, Task Force

34 covered a span of ocean roughly twenty by thirty miles,

The route followed by Task Force 34 was planned to give the impression that it was just a troop convoy bound for England (Figure 1.)

It actually zigzagged all over the atlantic Ocean in order to miss any neutral shipping. Actually, several Portugese and Spanish vessels were encountered on November 7 and one or two had prize crews placed on board to prevent their broadcasting the convoy position.

On 23 October 1942, a meeting was called by Admiral Hewitt of about 150 naval and military leaders at NORFOLK in order to go over the main attack plan of the operation, The Navy's mission was stated along with the Airts mission and then General Patton, who was in command of the Army troops, got up and called upon the Navy to remember Farragut, and predicted that all the elaborate landing plans would break down in the first five minutes, after which the Army would take over and win through. He said

,..Never in history has the Navy landed an Army at the planned time and place. If you land us anywhere within fifty miles of FEDALA and one week of D Day, I1ll go ahead and win....We shall attack for sixty days, and then, if we have to, for sixty more. If we go forward with desperation, if we go forward with utmost speed and fight, these people cannot stand against us....11

On the 30-31 October the speed of the convoy was reduced to

eight knots and the capital ships were refueled with complete success.

This was accomplished by having the oiler come along side, make fast

62 N~ew'

AZQR

TRAC)K OF WESTER~N NAVAL TASK FORCE 24 Oc-rO6ERI.9 t O. MsER 1042 a 4 BASE 0, ON CHARTr#Y CTF 34 ACTONRI EPOR~T i AcT4LAL tTh

:i i and pump oil through large hoses into the tanks of the ship being

refuelled.

On 4 November the Task Force was nearing the coast of Africa

and the weather started to get bad. The wind was rising from the

northwest and the sea started to run very heavily. By 6 November the

heavy seas reported off the Moroccan coast made it doubtful if the

forces could be landed there. Admiral Hewitt had to consider one of

the alternate plans of landing the assault forces inside the Mediter-

ranean. At midnight 6-7 November, Admiral Hewitt decided to continue

with the original plan. That night the sea moderated.

The weather on 7 November was overcast, with a light wind

from the northeast, and the sea running a moderate ground swell. At

daybreak the SAFI attack group left the convoy and the rest of the

Task Force feinted toward the straits of GIBRALTER, Between 1300Z

and 1700Z, Companies K and L were transferred from the IYONS to the

destroyers BERMNADOU and COLE, respectively, by means of LCVP's, This was accomplished at sea while the vessels kept steaming at 5 knots.

No one was lost.

At 1600 on 7 November the northern and center attack groups parted for their respective landing places. The northern attack group

arrived at itts planned position off MEDIA at 2400, the southern

group made SAFI at 2345, and the center group was at FEDALA at 2353.

However some difficulty developed in these groups reaching their

exact areas assigned as the transport areas. Two of the three groups were brought into the transport areas by emergencgy turns which were very confusing on a dark and foggy night.- This-confusion delayed the unloadirng of the assault groups.,

On November 7th, the day before the attack General Patton

had instrutions. read to all members of the force. An extract

follows:

,It is not now known whether the French African Army, composed of both white and colored troops, will contest our landing. It is regrettable the necessity of fighting the gallant French who are, at heart, sympathetic toward us, but all resistance by whomever offered must be destroyed. How- ever, when any of the French soldiers seek to surrender, you will accept it and treat them with the respect due a brave opponent and future ally.° Remember, the French are not Nazi or Japs. During the first few days and nights after you get ashore,, you must work unceasingly, regardless of sleep, regardless of food. A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood. Attack by day and night to the limit of human endurance, and then continue the attack. The eyes of the world are watching us; the heart of Inerica beats for us; God is with us, On our victory depends the f~ee- dcm or slavery of the human race, We shall surely win..... N1OTES FOR CH1APTER 4

MT~anus cript written by Maj.. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, p 8,

2 Observcrs Report on- Landing Operations of Task Force Blackstone, Nov. 8 - 13 icl, by M~aj. James Y. Adams, p 3, app III.

3U. S.. Landings in French Morocco, TA S, Tac. Dept,, Fort Knox, Kentucky, p 7-8.

'Adams, Observers Report, cit, p 2, app III.

%SaruelElliot Mvorrison, 0 erations in North African Waters (History of US Naval Operations inV W' II vol II,. Atlantic Little Brown, 194.7, p 26. 6SLandings in Morocco, '2 cit, p 9.

7bd p 9-10.

$Thid , ssm*

9 Muaj . Gen, Harracon, op cit, p 9. 1 0 Mlorrison, Operations in North African Waters, cit, p 31.

llibid, p4l.

1 2 Ibidc 1II. 3 1US Landings in 11orocco, a ci, p 12,. CHAPTER 5

FEDALA AND- C5ASBLANCA

At 2357, 7 November the convoy reached its assigned area

off FEDALA (Figure 2). Preparations were underway for the landing

of the American forces who were to seize FEDALA (Figure 3), and move south to CASABLANCA, the key to the liberation of FRENCH

MOROCCO.

Conditions were ideal, The Sea, normally very turbulent in this area, was smooth and even the ground swells were exception- 1 ally small, Signal lights at FEDALA and CASABLANCA intended for a

French convoy moving out of CASABLANCA were a' welcome beacon to the

Navy that had moved the immense convoy across the ATLANTIC. General

Eisernhower's messagej the LOIO radio announcement of the invasion, and President Roosevelt's address had keynoted American feeling.

Hov would the French react? Would there be a fight?

The Landing Flan

Implementing landing plans soon absorbed the complete attention of ev:ryone. Major General Jonathon Anderson, Commanding

General of the 3d Infantry Division, was in command of the landing forces (code name BRUSHVFO0D). His landing team consisted of the 3d

Division reinforced by the Light Tank Battalion, 67th Armored Regi- ment of the Second Armorod Division; the 2d Battalion, 20th Engi- neers; the 36th Engineer Regiment; and the 436th Anti-Aircraft

Artillery Battalion (Figure 4). For coordination purposes beaches were designated by colors. Red and Blue Beaches were north of

FEDALA,. and Yellow Beach to the south. Principal beaches were part of one continuous sandy beach 4001 to 500' in depth, with a gradient of about ly to 40a, Rocks, reefs and other obstructions to the approach divided the shore into five beaches practical for landing. These were designated as Red 1, Red 2, Red 3, and Blue

1 and Blue 2. One mile west of POINT FEDALA was Yellow Beach, and three miles east of POINT BLONDIN was Blue 3. H Hour was set at

0400, 8 November, That is, landing craft were to cross the line of departure at that time. Landings were to begin simultaneously on all principal beaches 3 (Figure 2).

The transport area was six to eight miles off the beaches

(Figure 2). The first line of ships was made up of four destroyers with the mission of escorting landing craft to the line of departure.

The next line, consisting of four transports, THE LEONARD WViOD,

JEFFERSON, CABROL and DICKIAN, were loaded with the assault waves.

Back of these were the successive waves of reserves and supply ships.

First to be landed were four scout boats with a crew of a Chief

Specialist and four enlisted men. These men had been extensively trained at LITTLE. CREEK, VIRGINIA, by ist Lt. Lloyd L. Peddicord,

USA, and Ensign J. J. Bill, USN. Their mission was to mark the

beaches by use of infra-red signal lights.

Four hours were allowed for loading of landing craft and movement to the line of departure. Each assault ship was to load

fifty landing craft. Some of the landing craft were aboard the No \(1 A ir 1Poricc P hotois IK'~a~p-O,// the '-ir

~ Nriat )S t a li'i h\ RI. \.1. rcc( )lissnc ISSNCCi)ehL 14 Sc 1 )tcmbelCFI942, \'it1 legends addedI by\ p1hOt( in- tc rl)recr s. IhselR f'it I Cd toge~t her, were fiunistud to te fire s111 )port Ship)s ad~ Sp)otter planes, inl order to helpt) ;ir(,&t kit nilicmiat ItIand 1 )revcnt firing Ml churches and other civilian ptidryart of (apc IVedtla , A itts ivol tLinks, is seen at to\\ ecr part o- Idtio. Tlhe lbeach~es shO\\'ri are Red and Rved z.Ilo tlet \Miramiar, headt~tiartcrs tdich ( ecrnan \rinisice (:(oimVissit)I1, w\as an objecti'e (of thet assault trOmps r

z: TRANS POR TJ J. 'E S E. IUTLE4I E 0.LL. SCOTT ;.O JN,,O 1qervR vs O A6'RoLL L. too'iO d L("RRHYn wit A'6S 514iA(9Sdtr L u .L01 )

FLOArI(t'K RE CEAtJ

LA1tCD oq0 GALL 2 EEtO

®_. L.I

PL-Aqd FOR Ff4/-A/,' LAt/1) N6 o'o qoo Yo!. /94.Zu

I£ numfjes s(AP ' r Ly ships in which thoeir assault load was riding, however, in some cases landing boats from the second, third or fourth line of ships were to pick up their troop loads from boats of thc first line, etc,

This was apparently necessary because of a shortage of the proper type of shipping. It proved to be a -weak link in the well-laid plans.

Landing Teams One and Two, the First and Second Battalions respective3ly of the 7th Infantry Regiment, reinforced, were to land on Red Beaches 2 and 3 respectively, just east of FEDALA. This is a sandy open beach extending from the sea jetty east of FEDALA on the west to a rocky cape on the east, and is about one mile in length:,

Landing Team One was to clear out any small arms fire on the beach, then turn to the right (west) and clear out the town of FEDALA and capture POINT FEDALA, on which were located oil tanks, search lights, a three gun battery of 90 mmn guns and a 2 gun 75 mm. battery (Figure 3).

Landing Team Two was to move inland a mile or so, swing south and capture everrthing on the east bark of the CUED (river) 1ELILAH. These two teams were to be assisted by the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop and

Company L of the 7th Infantry Regiment.

The 3rd Reconnaissance Troop was to land at H Hour on Yellow

Beach (west of mouth of CUED LnLixH), which is west of FEDkLiA, attack

FEDALA from the west, and seize the bridge over the OUED ViMLLAH, which is on the main highway from FEDALAH to C~BkS}LANCA. Company

L (7th Infantry) was to land on Yellow Beach at H plus 60 and assist the Reconnaissance Troop in- the capture of the 90 mm. battery on the west of POINT FEDAIA. Landing Team Throee (3rd Battalion less Company L, 7th

Infantry) was to land on Red 2 at H plus 70 and support either Team

One or Two.

Landing Teams One and Two, the First and Second Battalions respectively, of the 30th Infantry Reinforced, were to land on

Beaches Blue 1 and 2 respectively (Figure 2) at H Hour. Landing

Team Two was to capture the coast defenses at POINT BLONDIN and the highway and railroad over the OUED NtFIFIKAH, a river running into the ocean about five miles east of FEDALA (Figure 2), Landing

Team One was to advance straight inland as rapidly as possible and seize the high ground about five miles inland, Company L of the

30th was to land at H Hour on Blue Beach 3, about two miles east of the mouth of the OUED NEFIFIKaH and swing to the southwest and assist

Landing Team Two. The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry, less Company L was in reserve and was to land on Red 3 at H Hour plus 90 minutes.

The 15th Infantry, the ist Battalion Landing Team of the

67th Armored Regiment (light tanks), and the 2nd Battalion of the

20th Engineers were in floating reserve with instructions to land on the Red Beaches on call.

Operations plans stated that ships were to be closed up and in position upon arrival at debarkation points. Because of naviga- tional difficulties, instead of heading into the transport area in the same formation in which the crossing had been made, two right 0 obliques of about 45 were given. The ships were then stopped dead in the water. The result was that in many instances where boats from one ship were assigned to take combat loads from another, the ooxswains were unable to locate the ships from which they were supposed to get their loads, Where troops were landing on boats that were part of the equipment of the particular ship they had traveled on, they were coordinated at the start, but where boats were sent from one ship to get troops from another ship for the first wave, there was great confusion. Boat crews' were drifting aimlessly from transport to transport, megaphoning, "Is this the ANCON?" , "Is this the LEONARD WOOD?". Even the navigator on the BIDDLE was unable to locate the BLISS, which was entirely out of position, Signal lights flashed, It would have been a field day for enemy air or surface craft. It would have been difficult to distinguish between friend 6 or foe. Fortunately no challenge was immediately forthcoming.

Due to the above, and the fact that the troops were inexperienced in loading into landing craft from the ships, considerable delay was encountered in getting landing craft started shoreward.

It was necessary to delay H Hour' thirty minutes. Amphibious scouts who were to mark beaches encountered difficulties and there was considerable confusion as to beach identification. Major Weaver, in charge of scouts, got permission to go in and do what he could about guiding troops to proper beaches. He got the first and second waves started right, but the third wave missed him completely and landed all the way from POINT FEDALA to CASABLNCA. Many boats landed on rocks and reefs, and were lost,

70 Despite difficulties Landing Team One of the 7th Infantry

began landing on Red 3 (instead of Red 2 as planned) at about 0500.

Many boats were lost on the reefs which separated Red 2 and Red 3.

Shortly after the landings began enemy searchlights focused on the

beaches, but fortunately a patrol boat was able to shoot these out

Sith 50 cal. machine gun fire.

Artillery batteries and machine gun fire from POINT BLONDIN

and POINT FEDALA hit the beaches at dawn causing considerable con-

fusion. However, the landing was opposed by only one company of

Sengalese Soldiers, who were poorly equipped and surrendered after

firing a few rounds. Landing Team One landed all of its elements

and took its objective. Company A of this team captured the

MIRAVAR HOTEL at 0630 hours with nine members of the German Armistice

Commission and many documents and other data, including up to date

troop disposition of every French unit in Morocco, Other documents

included complete data on railroads, spurs, cubic capacity of warehouses for raw materials, and a complete description of all French officers and their attitude toward the German government. "Hitler t s mission saved the American Army a great deal of work."9

After capture of the HOTEL MIRAMAR, Landing Team One proceeded through the town of FEDALA in an attempt to outflank the battery of two 75 mm. guns that was placing effective fire on Red Beaches. The

90 mm. battery had been put out of action by our Destroyers, but naval fire was not successful in silencing the 75's. The guns were finally captured by a company of Landing Team One, but in the Maneuver Company A of the team suffered several casualties from naval gun fire. Personnel of 90 bmm.battery surrendered to this team.

Landing Teara Two encountering the same loading and landing difficulties as Team One, landed at Blue Beach 3 instead of Red Beach

3 as planned. This team assisted Landing Team Two of the 30th which was making good progress in the capture of POINT BLONDIN, and then proceeded to its objective which it reached at about 100OO, having encountered little resistance.

No troops were landed at Yellow Beach. Company L of the 7th

Regiment landed about five miles northeast of FEDALA, and later joined the 3d Battalion which had come ashore and moved into an assembly area. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop landed on Red Beach in the late morning and participated in the attack on the POINT FEDALA batteries. It is believed that the failure of these two units to land as scheduled resulted in a delay in the reducing of the POINT F&DALA batteries with resulting casualties on the beaches.

Teams One and Two of the 30th Regiment landed on their respective beaches in approximately five waves. Principal difficulties after initial loading confusion resulted from boats crashing on rocks and reefs bordering the beaches. Team Two, because of delay, landed after daylight at the mouth of the OUED NEFIFIKAH and proceeded to the capture of POINT BLONDIN fwhich mounted batteries of four 138.6 guns, being assisted in the end by Red Team Two (7th), Uwhich had landed on the wrong beach. This battery had been heavily engaged by the

BROOKLYN at 0617.. Blue Tearas were successful in capturing all of their objectives early in th, day and by night the Regiment had dug in in the hill.s and east of POINT BLONDIN.

The 15th was ordered ashore about 1100 and at about 1600

General Patton ordered that all Infantry and Engineers be put ashore that night.. Artillery fire ceased to fall on the beaches at about

09C, but beaches and the road from CUD MFIFIKAH to FEDAIA were d"- strafed and baebed during the day by planes from the CASABLANCA AIR-

PORT. At least one burst of small bombs was dropped on landing boats during the forenoon, but there were no reported casualties. Our naval air seemed to devote most of its activities to gaining general air control, wrhich it effectively did, but as a result, was able to fly few air combat patrols. The few French planes that were up be- 10 came very annoying.

The 67th Armored Battalion Landing Team made the crossing on the ARCTURUS, which carried about 2/3 of their vehicles and about

100 men; and the BIDDI, which had 1/3 of the vehicles and the remainder of the troops. They awakened to the tune of heavy firing on the morning of the 8th and in their capacity of a floating reserve to land on orders, they were able to get a good view of the landing and some of the naval action.

At 1600, on the 8th, the Battalion Commanding Officer, MIajor

Richard E. Nelson, went ashore to a cormaanders' meeting. He took with him Captain W6ishard, his S-4 and Lieutenant Veenstra, Battalion

Liaison Officer Lieutenant Veenstra returned to the ship at about

1800 with instructions that the battalion was to start unloading irrunediateiy. This prove .d to be quite a..n una r,-kin By this tie the loss of almost half of the available landing craft was being seriously felt. One platoon of Company k was unloaded from the

AROTURUS, and landed on Red Beach, The platoon lead by Lieutenant

Walters was moved to the heights overlooking FEALA but did not con- 11 tact the enemy during the night. (Figure 4.)

By 1700, D day, 8 November, 7,750 officers and men, almost

4o7 of the 19,870 embarked on the twelve transports and cargo vessels of the landing force, had been landed.. FEDALA, POINT BLODIN, and the area betwvfeen the CUED lELLAR and the CUED NEFIFIKAH were in Amer- ican hands. Plans for the movement to CASABLNCA were being made and it was apparent that our troops were there to stay. Percentages, however, do not tell the whole story. Although the four ships in which the assault waves were landed, and the JOSEPH HUVIS had approximately 90/1 of their troops ashore, the remaining ships had landed very few troops and the total was far behind schedule.

The principal difficulty had been the expending of landing craft. Inexperrience, darkness and the falling tide, were the principal causes of boat losses, but even after the tide turned at 0744,

8 November, boats continued to be lost, Additional time was wasted by the temporary abandonmyrent of boats under air strafing or artillery fire.. Abandoned boats were frequently wrecked or broached on the beaches by the incoming tide.. Altogether, between 137 and 160 of 347 landing boats were expondd, the greay' mao.jority on D Day. Of the boat losses, only two or thrce were the result of direct hits by enemy batteries,. fE~644f Cgs4AY'1yc,w

7TSE' aifec'p yAS6 (0f/ffA/O//r'

39 to

~33

C -4Sep. e3

M P "t OY TEAMN 7,4AYg P681 /4A'i,9/4N6 Ti oo Ps

C--* 0 rKS U~j4-Cos '1-5 LT

{-A L F Tc@ '$ A qI

A~~ 7&

*O PLAT~rn3 i.cvs M1T (

Q 1

Beginning at about noon or D Day, 1 tndirvs weru concern- trated on areas within the FEAIA harbor and on Red Beach in order to better control the small boat traffic and conserve our dwindling supply of landing craft. This, of course, upset the plans of commanders and considerable criticism was leveled at Commander Jamis on, the beachmaster. Later General Pattonts comment that "Red" Jamison had "Saved the whole Goddamned operation", showed the true value of

12 the beachmaster's decision.

Another factor which had seriously hampered the landing operations was the fact that all troops were seriously overloaded. So much so that many troops lost their lives in the surf at the beaches for the sole reason that they were unable to regain their feet after being knocked over by the waves, Others perished when they fell into the sea while disembarking to get into their landing boats. Further evidence of overloading was that excess equipment was discarded on the beaches and quays, along the streets of town and across the hill- sides. Loads wore as follows:

Enlisted Iran fu11 .field less roll Officer - IMlussette bag Judes change of socks and under- (rith change of socks, clothes, toilet aticles.) underwear, toilet articles) 11/3 days K ration (Boxed) and belt, Entrenching tool 11/3 days K ration (boxed) Weapons (Rifle, BAR, TSG) Map case Trench knife (1-1917, a rib break- Trench knife er ;vreen hitting the ground) 2 canteens full of water 2 canteens full of water Field glasses and compass Helmet TSG and 15-30 rd clips of Ammunition (18 clips Il, or 32 ammunition (some carried clips 103, or 10-20 rd magazines only 20 rd clips) for BAR, or 15-30 rd clips for TSG) Gas mask Grenades (,-s many as desired - men Helmet drew then when unloaded, hence Grenades carried @ 6) MIG or mortar ammunition (to be dropped on beach) Enlisted - -. MIan.,_. (Contd.) Gas mask Field glasses, wire cutters, etc. To XCO - 2 chests of MG arnmunition or equivalent mortar amm.,.unition (to be dropped on beach) Table is taken from Landngs inMorco.

It is believed that men in leading waves should carry as

little equipment as possible. This is a difficult problem, but care

should be taken not to overload mnen. Arrangements must be made to get their equipment to thoe as soon after landing as possible.

D Plus 1

During the night of the 8th, Landing Team One (1st Battalion, 7th Infantry) was relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 20th Engineers and went into Division reserve. The 15th Infantry moved to the southwest and went into position on the left of the 7th Infantry, which had moved to position across the OUD TAELLAH. By 0730, 9 November, the attack for CAA.SABLrANCA jumped off! Light resistance consisting of mounted patrols was encouintered during the morning and this con- tineeod until afternoon when leading units came within the range of the fixed defenses around CASASBLiC, at which time some scattered artillery fire was recoived (Figure 5). The enemy at this time was largely preoccupied with preparing defensive positions in the CASA-

BLANC A area, At about 1400 hours the forward movement was halted by Major General Anderson because he lacked necessary supplies and ammunition with which to mako an alU-out effort to take CASABLANCA.

Supplies were coming up very slowly because of shortage of heavy transport vehicles and the inability of jeeps and 1/12 ton trucks to carry great enough quantities. The 30th Infantry, holding the general line of the CUED

NBEFIFIKAH, received continuous light attacks along the CUED

NEFIFIKAH by elements of the lst Chausseurs D1 Afr iue, which was

equipped with armored car, 50 calibre machine guns and approxima

8th and continued to harry the 30th until the cessation of hostilities.

The threat, however, was not serious -and no American tanks were moved

to that sector.

On the morning of the 9th, a French pilot brought the ARC-

TLIRUS into the FED ALA harbor to urload elem: ents of the 67th Tank Jj Battalion which vere loaded on the boat. This was a difficult piece

of navigation, but was finally accomplished with the assistance of the two landing craft acting as tugs (See Figure 3). Unloading of thne battalion then oroceded at a more rapid rate from the hRCTURUS and with the additional landing craft thus made available to the BIDDLE, the landing of the team was completed in the late afternoon, By 1900 the 9th of Novemboer, the 67th Light Tank Battalion Tean was in the assembly area betw,een the railroad and the inland road just east of

CUED 17ELLAH (Figure 5)o At this time orders were received to secure crossings of the CUED DELL~x1 .from possible infiltration, The Bat- talion was immediately moved to positions east of the river in the vicinity of the bridges and small security detachments were posted west of the river. Principal difficulties during the move resulted from blackout operations. No enemy was encountered (Figure 5). D Plus 2

At 1600, 10 November, the battalion was moved into position

just east of the QUED YELLAH near the inland road. Its mission was

to defend against possible movement against FEDALA pending employment in the coordinated attack against CASABLANCA. A "desert-spread" formation was adopted and anti-aircraft guns were spotted on high ground. One platoon of Company A was sent forward to assist the 15th moving on the highway. This platoon was involved in minor operations, but encountered no armor (Figure 5).

On the morning of 10 November, the 7th and 15th Regimental

Landing Teams continued the advance southwest toward CASABLANCA.-

They soon gained contact -ith enemiy patrols and from that time until the Armistice, they were in constant contact with the enemy. The

7th Landing Team, advancing on the right received heavy small arms and machine gun fire, and its right flank received bombardment from two French destroyers operating just out of the entrance to CASA- 15 BLTAICA HARBOR. By nightfall the 7th Landing Team was in position along the eastern. outskirts of C.ASABLAN CA. One company of the 15th

Infantry was held up at a crossroad southeast of CASABLANCA for a considerable time during the morning. This company had 14 men killed, including the company cormm.Tnder, and 10 men injured. The advance was continued and by nightfall the team had occupied the high ground south and southeast of the city QUL.LD CHUK IL iL0UK and BLID OULAD CI-LUK. '1

C,4S4'L 7/CA

FEOWL 4

/ / T1, /fNr1 c

017 /1

/ CA~t sLAM

o3 f

D' 3 11 A/b Fo#7u91

- *,r AWer4 pt9 vs :o j p~U~~; The main bridges leading into CASABLaCA had been mined

and there were a number of road blocks erected on the main high- ways leading into the city. On the whole, enemy activity on the 10th was negligible and consisted principally of patrol operations and

artillery fire from CASABLANCA. The artillery fire was from fixed

batteries and AA guns. The French apparently used no mobile artillery.

D Plus 3

During the night of the 10th the 67th received orders to move

into assembly positions southeast of CASABLANCA and be prepared to

participate in a coordinated attack on the city on the morning of the

11th. H Hour was set at 0730 instead of dawn in order to insure per- 16 fect coordination The attack was to be made by the 7th and 15th

Regimental Combat Teams and the 67th Tank Team, and was to be sup-

ported by naval dive bombers. All concerned were in position, and

the attack was ready to jump off when orders to cease fire and halt

in position were received. The French had surrendered. Naval planes were in the air and considerable difficulty was encountered in heading

them off in time to prevent their attack on the known artillery po-

sition in the CASABLANCA area.

It was, however, a close thing. Had the French delayed their

surrender only a few minutes, the action would have been started and

would have undoubtedly been costly to both sides. To indicate how

close the thing really was, Brigadier General i-rthur R. Wilson t s

report on the operation says: On the morning of Nov. 11,° the order to cease firing was given by Gen._ Patton at the 3rd Division command post. Al- though there had been many faults in communication especially from ship to shore, all elements of the command received the order before H hour. The cruisers and destroyers received it about 15 minutes before they were ready to open fire. A coordinated attack had been carefully worked out. At that time RLG Is 7 and 15 supported by light tank and medium artillery and the Armored Landing Team were in the eastern and southern outskirts of Casablanca prepared to attack, The French artillery positions had been definitely located and arrangements had been made for support from naval dive bombers. The cruisers and destroyers of our Navy were to complete destruction of all French naval craft. At 0519 the following message was sent from Gen. Patton to Adm. Hewett. "Urgent. Enemy may capitulate in next few hours stop. Please make arrangements to cause irmmediate cessation of air and naval gun fire action receipt of message from the text of which follows immediately after this message,." At 0700 the following message was sent. "Urgent to Augusta. Cease Firing immediately. Acknowledge immediately. Patton." At that time Gen. Patton was at the cormm and post of the 3rd Division. There were only 30 minutes to go until H Hour which was -nnounded at 0730. As soon as the Army capitulated the following message was sent by Adm. Hewett at 0755. "For Patton from Hewett. Please send following to commander French Naval Forces Casablanca. - tReport whether you intend forcing me destroy your ship and. shore installations and spill the blood of your people. The decision is your individual responsibity. If you join your Army in capitulation, report whether any mine fields exist to prevent my enterilng Casablanca and send pilot to my flagship immediately: Adm. Hewett, Commanding U.S. Naval Forces. .. Some difficulty was encountered in getting the message to Adm. Michelier, who commanded the French Naval Forces in the Casablanca area. But he finally sent word that the Navy would surrender and he would attend an Armistice conference. At 0805, Gen. Patton sent a message to Adm. Hewett requesting that he or his representative come to the Miramar Hotel, FedalAh, to attend a discussion of the Armistice terms. In order to gain time (while the Armistice terms were being discussed) in appraising the condition of the port of Casablanca as a result of naval bombardment, Gen. Patton sent a party headed by Brig. Arthur Wilson to that city which indluded one captain and one Lt. Commander of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces WTF, and a few other officers. They called upon the division commander of the French Division occupying Casablanca, paid their respects, secured his entire cooperation, including the immediate detail of army trucks to assist in clearing the supplies from the docks at Fedalah. A conference was, then held with the Chief of Staff, Contre-Adm, Missolffle, who assigned a naval captain, a merchant marine officer, and a member of the harbor board to inspect the harbor with our naval officers in order to estimate the number of ships which could be docked. A reconnaissance was made of the airfield at the same time and a message was sent to the carriers 'to land their planes on the Casablanca airfield. By 1600 the party had returned to Fedalah, and had made a complete report of the condition of the port, The Armistice Conference was still continuing. It ended about 1800 hours.

The occupation of CASABLANCA was orderly and few incidents occurred. General Patton ordered troops to move in imrriediately following the French surrender, His orders were to move into town and to attack anyone who tried to interfere, The occupation was completed by 1130 and CASABLANCA was in American hands.

During this movement into CASABLANCA, the 67th Tank Bat- talion Team, which had had practically no enemy contact, received several interesting assigniments. Company A was given the mission of occupying CASABLANCA AIRPORT, which they did with no difficulty.

Company B guarded the captured French batteries and set up several road blocks with tanks in town. The only real excitement occurred when a Navy Avenger plane dropped a message stating that a French unit was moving southwest from the CASABLANCA area. A platoon of

Company B was sent to investigate, and captured the unit without incident. This force was a weapons company of the RICHN INFANTRIE

COLONIAL DU iOPRAQU trying to escape (Figure 5).

Although direct contact with the enemy was infrequent and enemy defenses were generally poorly organized and defended, a wealth of incidents occurred, some tragic and same amusing; In his book

OPERATIONS IN NORTH AMEiRICAN WATERS (October 1942-1943) Samuel

Eliot Morrison cites several of these incidents, which are quoted:

Some of the landing teams that missed the right beach had strange adventures. Four landing craft carrying 113 officers and men of a Headquarters Military Police Company took off from the transport WILLIAM S. BIDDLE after nightfall and missed Beach Yellow, where they were supposed to land. Two of the boats entered the roadstead of Casablanca and hailed a French Patrol vessel, thinking she was one of ours, to ask the way. She opened up with machine guns, killed the M.P. Company Commander, sank both boats and took the survivors prisoner, The most fantastic adventure befell Ensign Harry A. Storts and a crew of coastguardsmen from the transport JOSEPH T. DICKMAN. With a support boat borrowed from another transport they were try- ingly, shortly after 0400 to excort three amphtracs to Beach Blue 2. These were experimental versions of the LVT, improved models of which in 1943-1945 served in many amphibious operations in the Pacific. The LVTts were supposed to get themselves and their crews ashore under their own power. But they frequently broke down and had drifted so far away from their destination by daylight that Ens, Storts was ordered to conduct them back along the coast and to land at the nearest available beach. He joined forces with two landing craft carrying anti-aircraft half-track batteries. They picked out a beach some ten or twelve miles east of Sherki and landed there at 1945, being strafed by an enemy plane during the process. Behind this beach were French troops, who made their presence felt at once. Ens. Storts's landing forces, which amounted to 32 army and 9 Navy and Coast Guard personnel, dug in, set up their "Buck Rogers" guns, and stood seige. French strafing planes appeared every half-hour until dark, and killed five men, but the survivors used their guns to such good purpose that several French armored cars were driven off o After dark, two men put off in a rubber boat to intercept a destroyer, while Ens. Storts and four others set out on foot for Fedalah, hoping to make contact with the American landing forces. The 29 men left behind shifted their position from the beach to a near-by concrete pig-pen. "That pen sure looked good", said one of the coastguardsmen, "we crowded right in with the pigs and didn't mind the company at all," And they held out for two days until their ammunition was spent. The rubber boats never caught their destroyer, but eventually returned to the Fleet. Ens. Storts and his party what with losing their way and taking cover from French planes, took Sunday night and all of Monday to reach an Army command post near Fedalah. After resting they wore provided by the 30th Infantry with a half-track, a 75 rm. gun and a rescue squad. Off they rolled Tuesday morning 10 Nov.., guided by Ens. Storts. On the way they captured ten French soldiers and took them along, only to find that those they were seeking to rescue on the beach had themselves been captured. So back they turned toward Fedalah, everyone on board the half-track. On the way they were neatly ambushed by 150 native troops led by French officers, who wounded or killed nearly everyone in the party, including most of the French prisoners, The captors conducted the surviving Americans to a French first-aid station at Bouznika, where their wounds were dressed. A French officer then loaded them on a farm truck, with the red cross painted on the hood, in order to take them to Rabat for questioning, One mile from Bouznika, the truck was strafed and disabled by an American plane, which did not see the red cross in time, and three more of the French were killed. The survivors walked back to Bouznika, carrying their wounded, and were then shipped by truck to Boulhaut, 14 m iles inland, Next day - Armistice Day - a man came in saying the fighting was over, A priest conducted Ens. Storts and one other survivor of the original amphibian party to Fedalah, where they reported on board ship. Such are the hazards of amphibious warfare, Of the numerous adventures enjoyed by the army landing teams, two will suffice. One, whose objective was the railroad bridge over the Oued Nefifikah, halted an early morning train and pulled off it 75 very surprised French soldiers going on leave to Casa- blanca. A unit of the 7th Infantry that landed before daylight made straight for the Hotel Miramar, headquarters of the German Armistice Commission. ,According to one story, the Germans were about to make a getaway in cars, and all but one of the four officers, as well as six enlisted men, were captured while running across the golf course to catch a plane, .They were sent on board the transport ANCON and brought to the U,S.; the first German prisoners to be taken by U.S. forces on land. One of the German cars came in handy for a plan that Col, Wilbur of Gen. Patton' s staff had very much at heart, The French Gen. Bethouart had been a fellow student of his at the famous Ecole de Guerre. Assuming that Bethouart had the military command at Casablanca (°which was incorrect), Wilbur thought that-if he could only contact his ANCIEN COMARADE and explain matters, the French would join us instead of resisting. Accordingly, he went ashore with the assault troops, commandeered a captured German car, and with a soldier as chauffeur and an impressed guide dashed through the lines to the French military headquarters at Casablanca, There he was coldly informed that the Navy was in command. This gallant escapade seems mildly ridiculous in view of the fact that Bethouart had been working on our side for weeks - a good example of the faulty cooperation between American civilian agencies and the armed forces, Despite all difficulties, in which inexperience was the major factor, 7,750 troops and a good deal of equipment were landed at Fedalah on D day, 8 Nov.; and by nightfall Maj. Gen. Anderson's 3rd Division had attained all objectives set down in the attack plan. American troops had control of the town, the harbor, bridges over the rivers at each end of the area and the high ridges that commanded the town and beaches. Yet the story of this debarkation is only part of the picture, even at Fedalah. Twice on 8 Nov. while the landings were going on, the French Navy at Casablanca tried to break up the operations, and they could have easily done so but for the effective work of the United States Navy.

Enemy Strength and Attitude

The following forces were encountered by the 3d Division during the action:

Cavalry Patrols

Five battalions of infantry

Two battalions of field artillery (75mm,); each of three batteries of four guns each.

One battery, 105mm. howitzer

Two batteries, 155mm,

Five batteries, 75mm,. AT., two guns per battery

Light armored units amounting to about 3 companies of old type Renault and Hotchkiss tanks numbering about 20 in all. (Two were captured and 4 destroyed; 5 were found broken down.)

Curtiss-type pursuit planes

Several 25mm. anti-tank guns

Coast defense guns at POINT BLONDIN (4 - 138mm,)

4 90mm. guns POINT FEDALA; 2, 75mm, guns POINT FEDALA

Naval gun fire from French destroyers17 Although these forves were considerable in number, they were generally equipped with antiquated weapons and their entire activity was characterized by piece-meal commitment; that is? where they were committed at all. In fact at no time during the operation did the

French offer determined ground resistance. Enemy artillery was their greatest force. The batteries at POINT FEDALA and POINT BLONDIN were effectively employed and were responsible for much of the confusion on the beaches. Had the French used their mobile artillery and available ground forces as effectively, we would have encountered considerably more difficulty in approaching CASABLANCA.

French resistance as a whole was not nearly as determined as it could have been. This can be accounted for in part by the surprise landing and partly by the fact that the desire of the French to fight the Americans was lacking. They fought because they had orders to, but immediately upon surrender, they were ready to join us, NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

'Appendix #2 this report.

2 Chapter #4 this report.

3 Report of Operations in North Africa, a report prepared for the Chief of Staff, U,S, Army by Brigadier General Arthur R, Wilson. Officer participated in the landings at Fedala as a member of General George Pattonts Staff, p 2.

4 Operations in North African Waters, June 1942-1943, a book prepared by 'Capt. Samuel Elliott Morrison, Naval Reserve Historian, p 58.

5Wilson, Op cit, p 3. 6 1bid, p 4.

7 U.S. Landings-in Morocco, prepared by the Tactics Department, The Armored School, Ft, Knox, Ky., in 1943, p 19,

id, p 22.

9 'ilson, Op cit, p 6.

1 0 Tbid, p"7.

"Machinicke, Max R. Capt., C.O. Co B, 67th Armored Regiment. Presently assigned The Armored School, Ft. Knox, Ky. Information obtained in interview.

1 2 Morrison, Op cit, p 80.

1 31Wilson, p cit p 8-9.

Capt., Machinicke, Op cit, interview.

15 Wilson, Oaccit, p 9.0

6ar as I Knew It, George S. Patton, Jr., Commanding General Landing in Morocco, p 9.

1 7 Wilson, 0 ?-t, p 11, CHAPTER 6

TASK FORCE BLACKSTONE

At about 2300 hours, Saturday, 7 November 1942, the convoy carrying Task Force BLACKSTONE arrived off the NORTH WEST AFRICAN port of SAFI. The French garrison in SAFI was apparently not aware of the impending attack as the lighthouse in. the port was still on at the time the convoy arrived. This light stayed on until about

0200 hours, Sunday, 8 November 1942.1

H Hour was set at 0430 hours, 8 November 1942.2 In order to minimize losses should the anchored convoy be attacked by enemy submarines, Major General Ernest N. Harmon, the Task Force Commander, had decided to embark the assault waves into their landing craft as early as possible, Consequently, the assault troops started to load 3 into landing craft at midnight.

What was the mission that was to be performed by these troops?

Task Force BLACKSTONE was actually given three separate missions. Its first task was to seize a beachhead at the port of SAFI and to secure the port for future operations; secondly, the Task

Force was to drive north and secure a crossing over the OUM ER RBIA

RIVER, and, lastly, they were to assist in the reduction of the city of CASABLANCA by attacking it from the south. 4

To carry out this mission, General Harmon divided the operation into three specific phases, The first phase was the landing itself. It included the initial landing of the assault troops and

a drive inland to a radial depth of 5000 yards from the beaches.

Once the troops had gained the initial toe hold of 5000 yards, they

were to continue to drive inland until a beachhead of 10,000 yards

had been established, This was called the beachhead phase of the

operation. The third phase of the operation was known as the future

operations phase and was to encompass all operations that followed

the establishment of the 10,000 yard beachhead.5

The troops available for the accomplishment of this mission

consisted of one regiment of infantry, the 47th from the 9th Infantry

Division, a force designated as the 2d Armored Division Landing Team

and the sea train (the supply ship USS LAKEHURST) which carried

additional heavy elements of the 2d Armored Division. There were

also several additional units, or attachments, to the above forces which brought the overall strength of the Task Force up to 327 Officers

and 6,091 Enlisted Men. The Task Force had a total of 779 vehicles 7 of all types.

For the landing phase of the operation four beaches had been

selected. (See Figures 6 and 7); These beaches were designated

as RED BEACH, just north of the port, BLUE and GREEN BEACHES, which

vere within the port area, and ELLOU BEACH, which was eight miles

south of the port. All of these beaches were very small, the largest

being only 300 yards wide.

To get a complete picture of the operation it is necessary

to examine the landing plans and missions of the various parts of PH@sPIy,4 ~r Dcc 113

dit ,

Zd y~/ T UE z r_

C-' 1- -g I V sue,

BARRk'

PcS T~/~~?F~$

At: C

NN TO YCXL, O - 3 the Task Force., As one would expect in an amphibious operation, the initial landings were to be made by the infantry elements assigned to the command, However, some light tanks were attached to the infantry to be landed with the assault waves.

For the assault landings the 47th Infantry Regiment was organized into three battalion landing teams. These teams were designated as the ist Battalion Landing Team (1st BLT), the 2d Battalion Landing

Team (2d BLT), and the 3d Battalion Landing Team (3d BLT). Further, two companies from the 3d Battalion were to be landed directly frcm two destroyers onto the docks of SAFI within minutes of the time that the assault troops crossed the beaches. Companies K and L, from the

3d Battalion, were assigned the mission of landing on the SAFI docks.

Company K, on the destroyer USS BERNADOU, was to enter the harbor of SAFI and debark at about H / 15 minutes. The mission of this company was to proceed south, avoiding the NATIVE CITY, and to capture, or destroy, the anti-aircraft battery located at the OLD

PORTUGUESE FORT. They were then to continue on and capture the

BARRACKS. ° (See Figure 6). Company K was further charged with the task of preventing a French battery, which was supposed to be 3000 yards south of SAFI, from moving to the north or east. (See Figure 8).

As a final requirement, this company was also to establish and defend road blocks to the south and southeast of SAFI. Tank elements of the Ist BLT were to give all assistance possible to this company.

Company L, on the destroyer USS COLE, was to enter the harbor of SAFI and debark at about H / 30 minutes. After debarking it was to seize the harbor installations, locate and destroy any enemy within 89 zoce

HORS

S PFCIAL M'.AP SA Fl

R ED -- Scade /:24;ooo BE.ACH

M p$E NVOR P1+

BEACH /4o

S ArF / 86°

,C2~.7

To se//rowB ec B the port area and prevent the burning or destruction of the docks

and the various dock facilities. It is interesting to note that

this company was also given the mission of seizing any and all stocks 10 of gasoline that might be within the port area.

The ist BLT with an attached platoon of light tanks (from the 70th Light Tank Battalion) was to land on RED and BLUE BEACHES at H Hour. (0430, Sunday, 8 Nov 42).. Immediately after landing they were to capture or destroy, the 75mm gun emplacements east of RED

BEACH. (See Figure 8). They were also to secure the high ground overlooking the beaches and then to continue their attack inland until the beachhead was extended to a radial depth of 10,000 yards.

The 2d BLT with an attached platoon of light tanks (from the

70th Light Tank Battalion) was to land on YELLO BEACH at H Hour, establish a beachhead, and then move north to assist in the capture of SAFI. (See Figure 9). They were to leave sufficient force at

YELLOW BEACH to cover the landing of the initial elements of the 2d

Armored Landing Team. 1 2

The 3d BLT (-Co's L & K) was to relmain afloat as the regimental reserve. No plans were made for its initial commitment. 1 3

The armored elements of the Task Force were designated as the Task Force reserve. The general plan was to land the 2d Armored

Landing Team in the area that would permit its being unloaded with the greatest rapidity.14 Therefore, this landing team was ordered to be prepared to land at SAFI or at YELLOW BEACH. Regardless of where they landed they were to assist in the capture of SAFI.15 P2. Tw SAFr (QdditionctI) MP11-JLE:

4- 75mm"How.

/ - Sydo2 cay. 16-A V~~ (6m fMo O/a1swPl)#. 2 LtMW s-c.)oZ / 2.Hvy. P46Gs /60 rnmMotr

A, n75n w DORT

3G:-s r °.oQ(Jor 4Guy, 6 atteies)

TSEcH %SA Ft AREA From fr //IIy ence A nnex

(NOT TO 5CALE)

To YELL~O The decision as to where and when they would land was to be made

by the Commanding General of the Task Force..

The sea train was to land on orders from Task Force Head-

quarters;, It was planned to unload all vehicles and personnel on 16 board the sea train at dock side in SAFE.. Such planning was

necessitated by the fact that all of the medium tanks of the Task

Force were on this ship and the landing craft available at the time

could not handle these heavy vehicles.,

It should be noted at this time that there was some hope 17 that the landings at SAFI would be unopposed by the French. Con-

sequently, all troops were enjoined not to open fire until such 18 time as resistance was met. Bases on this hope of no opposition, plans were made to land all elements of the Task Force, other than

the initial assault waves, on the docks of SAFI,

All landings in the SAFI area were to be covered by the

fires from two destroyers and one cruiser. The Gunnery Officers of

the ships concerned were to prepare fire plans to cover all known

French batteries and other installations within the SAFI area.

Furthermore, shore fire control parties were to go ashore with the

assault waves to direct naval gunfire on targets of opportunity.

As with the assaulting troops, naval gunfire would not be opened

unless the French fired first, 1l 9

Air support for the landings was also to be provided by the

Navy, The primary mission of the Naval Air Arm was to protect the

convoy and to gain air -superiority., Beginning at daylight on D Day (.0659 hours) the air was to perform secondary missions of observing

naval gunfire and reconnaissance. They were to pay particular attention to the movement of French reserves fromMtiOGADOR, MAZAGAN and

MARRAKECK 20 (See Figure 9).

As formerly stated, there was a hope that the French would not oppose the landings and that all concerned had been ordered to hold their fire until fired upon4 This order must have caused the commanders of the various units much concern, especially after studying the intelligence reports on the strengths and locations of the French garrisons in the area. As of 8 September 1942 the

French were reported to have one light tank battalion and one infantry battalion (- one company) in SAFI. Reserves, within supporting distance, consisted of two armored groups, five infantry battalions, three cavalry battalions, two light artillery battalions and supporting air craft. The bulk of these reserves were located at MARRAKECH, 21 about 97 miles from SAFI. (See Figures 8 and 9).

The reader will remember that the assault troops started loading into their landing craft at about midnight, 7-8 November, and that H Hour was set for 0430 hours, 8 November. During this same period it might be well to see what the French in SAFI were doing.

At 0320 hours the Commander of the French garrison in SAFI received the message, "Danger", from "Marine au Maroe." At 0340 hours a second message was received from the "Chief of Staff" which stated, "Alert for the Division of MARRAKECH.." At 0350 hours a third

92 0roccafl

2 M~oOccan

1I BLT, 4-17 th

(-)j 4.7 fh

,SaiEl Tiek [Ej21jroup L2d 8-T)Lf7 O3c Group. /e/ow

Mad~6 Se" N ~~~Ma~rakech fjr.L)

1 JMorK

SkETCH (;o SAFIAIAZAGANV AREA 2 (L; 1

P rooale F ech Forces O ir.±s(LtI t T 5/!- FORCEDBLACKS WIVE

(FrnG unit lcaCthonjs as of S Sept 42)- 1 (+IC4) Agadir I:-z,o000q5CAIL E 00°°

4 alert message was received, this one coining from the Naval Head-

quarters at CASABLANCA. Very shortly after receiving the first alert

Commander Deuve, the garrison commander, alerted his command for the defense of SAFI. Using the time of the first alert we find that

the garrison in SAFI had one hour and ten minutes to prepare for

action.

At 042$ hours the USS BERNADOU, with Company K, 47th Infantry,

on board, sailed into SAFI harbor. As the EERNADOU entered the harbor the French opened fire. At 0430 hours the BERN1ADOU ran aground

just off the PETITE JETTEE. (See Figure 1). In spite of the fact that she was aground, the BERT.NADOU, supported by the destroyer USS

J RVIBE, returned the French fire and within six. minutes the French 23 fires in the area were silenced or at least ceased. For the men of Task Force BLACKST01 the war was on--the landing was to be opposed.

Although the BERDTADOU was grounded it was still possible to disembark the infantrymen on board. However, due to the fact that all troops had to go down a single landing net it took nearly an hour to complete the disembarkation, In the mean time the USS COLE, with Company L, 47th Infantry, on board, steamed into the harbor at

0500 hours and berthed at the PHOSPHAVE DOCK. The infantry dis- embarked immediately and took over their 'duties of guarding the port 24 area,

By about 0530 hours Company K was completely ashore and they were moving out to accomplish their mission. While the BERN ADOU and the COLE were discharging their pas- sengers, as it were, an artillery duel took place between the French battery of 130mm guns at POINTE de la TOUR and the battleship USS

IVEW YORK. The French opened fire to seaward at 0440 hours and were immediately taken under fire by the NE YORK. The first salvo fired by the battleship destroyed the French fire direction center. The battery continued in action, though its fire was now very inaccurate,. until it had fired about one hundred rounds. At this time, due to the improved accuracy of the guns of the NEW YORK, the French gunners had to abandon their positions. 2 5

The first assault wave, consisting of elements of the 1st

BLT and the platoon of light tanks which were attached to the 1st

BLT, hit BLUE and GREEN BEACHES at 0530 hours. The tanks were landed on GREEN BEACH which turned out to be quite a blessing to the riflemen of Company K. The reader will recall that Company K had started out on its mission at about 0530 hours. As the tail of the

Company cleared the PETITE JETTEE, which was at the head of GREEN

BEACH, it became involved in a fire fight with a small French detachment,. As a result of this fight one Frenchman. was killed and three were wounded. The rest of the detachment surrendered. At this time an Arab bystander volunteered to point out the location of a house which contained some fifty French troops. On the strength of this information two light tanks were ordered to attack the house.. -26 This they did and the French defenders beat a hasty retreat.

As dawn broke the advancing troops came under French machine gun and rifle fire and the attack started to bog down, This was

94 largely due to the fact that this Wai the first action for the

Ameritans. This lack of aggressiveness is well illustrated by an account of a small unit action as reported by the French garrison

Commander,

The ensemble called generally "Front de Mer" includes the house serving as barracks for the sailors, situated to the left of the coastal route to MAZAGAN and, immediately on the other side of the road, a lookout post and two pieces of 75s without even any protection on them. Around these pieces were several, pits for automatic arms (2 machine-guns, 2 automatic rifles). Shortly before 0600, having been warned that the enemy was climbing the cliff, I had the pieces disarmed and stationed the men for the coming defense. About 0600, I heard English spoken all around the immediate vicinity of the position. About 0640, the crew of the northeast machine-gun was en- circled and captured by surprise along with the men nearby. Because of the response from the rest of the personnel (6 or 7 men), the enemy did not follow up his gain. 2 7

At 0740 hours landing craft ferrying troops ashore were taken under fire by the two French 75mm guns located in the vicinity of the OLD PORTUGUESE FORT. (See Figure 8). These guns were not taken under fire by the Navy presumably because Company K was supposed to capture or destroy them, For some reason this company had 28 not reached the FORT as yet.

It will be remembered that the 2d Armored Division Landing

Team, along with the sea train, had been held in Task Force reserve.

Further, that Brigadier General Gaffey, who was commanding Combat

Command B, 2d Armored Division, had-been ordered to prepare plans for the employment of the 2d Armored Landing Team either at SAFI or at YELLN BEACH. Since the landing was going so well at SAFI,

General Harmon decided to land the 2d Armored Landing Team at SAFI

95 rather than at YELLOW BEACH. Consequently, they were ordered ashore and the first wave went across GREEN BEACH at about 0900 hours,; D

Day.

As the tanks of the 2d Armored were coming ashore, the French within SAFI were still putting up a stubborn, but spotty, resistance.

According to Commander Deuve, located at FRONT de MER, the men with him at 0900 hours were nearly out of ammunition.. However, they were determined to hold out, hoping that relief would arrive from

MARRAKECH 29

Down near the OLD PORTUGUESE FORT the 75mm guns that had fired on our assault boats at 0740 hours resumed their fire at 0910 hours. Again they directed their fire on the landing craft. This time, however, the fire was returned by the Naval boat crews. A short time later these two guns were picked up by a naval air observer who directed such accurate naval gunfire on them that the French gunners were forced to abandon the position.

To insure that these guns were out of action some of the first 2d Armored tanks ashore were ordered to the vicinity of the

OLD PORTUGUESE FORT to investigate. Other tanks were ordered to investigate the condition of the 130mm battery at POINTE de la TOUR.

At both places the tankers found that naval gunfire had done its work--the positions were abandoned. 3 0

Due to many delays in lowering and loading their assault boats the 2d BLT failed to land at YELLW BEACH at H Hour. In fact, the first wave of the 2d BLT didn t t arrive on the beach until 0943 hours. (H Hour was at 0430 hours), The landing of the 2d BLT was unopposed, however, and the entire landing team was ashore by 1015 31 hours.31

Back in the town of SAFI the assault troops, by-passing small islands of French resistance, had pushed on inland and by 1000 hours had established their initial beachhead of 5000 yards., Ac- cording to plan they continued their drive on toward their final objective of a 10,000 yard beachhead.

The 3d BLT, less Companies L and K, was ordered ashore and given the mission of aiding Company K in the capture of the BARRACKS in the south portion of the town. (See Figures 6 and 8). The battalion landed at 1009 hours and, after assembling, moved out to accomplish its mission. (Note: At this time the 3d BLT consisted of

Company I, a rifle company, and Company M, a heavy weapons company.)

As the 3d BLT neared its objective Company I was ordered to attack. the BARRACKS from the north. Company K was already besieging the

BARRACKS from the south, their attack having been stopped by French fire. As ordered., Company I launched its attack but was pinned down almost at once. Apparently the attack of this company was not too well coordinated with the actions of Company K, According to Major

James Y. Adams, an official observer with the Task Force, Company I was stopped by, 'overs from K Company firing from house tops directly across the Barracks." 32

During the course of this battle at the BARPLRCKS, Company K captured a French light tank which was promptly turned into a pillbox and used against the French. (It is interesting to note just how

this French tank fell into our hands. The driver of the vehicle,.

for reasons unknown, ran into a wall and was knocked unconscious.

The remainder of the crew then abandoned the vehicle.) In addition

to this captured French tank one American light tank also took part

in this battle,

The mortars of Company M went into position at 1440 hours

to give additional fire support to the attacking companies. Mortar

fire turned out to be the straw that broke the camel's back, as the

thirty-one French defenders of the BARRACKS surrendered at 1500 33 hours.

While the battle at the BARRACKS was taking place the sea

' train, with the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment on board, sailed

into the harbor and berthed at the PHOSPHATE DOCK at 1400 hours-

At about the same time the USS TITANIA, with the remainder of the

2d Armored Landing Team on board, also berthed at the PHOSPHATE DOCK.

Both ships started to discharge their cargo of tanks almost im-

mediately. As the armored vehicles were unloaded they were sent to

an assembly area in the vicinity of HORSESHOE HILL (See Figure 7)

in the northeastern part of the town,3 4

The unloading of these two ships was not without its problems.

On the LAKEHUPST., which carried the sea train elements of the 2d

Armored, a winch jammed while lowering a tank to the dock. As it took

approximately fiv4 hours to repair this winch the unloading was slowed

down considerably. On the TITANIA it was a broken winch cable that

'' delayed unloading for some seven hours 35

98 All through the landing operations communications between

the units ashore and the Task Force Headquarters on the USS HARRIS were practically non-existant. Therefore, General Harmon moved his

Headquarters into SAFI at 1530 hours and established his command post in the dock area. Upon landing the General noticed that the assault troops still in the area were generally lacking in initia-

tive in that they were doing nothing about the many snipers still in the town. He accordingly took steps to correct this situation.

Motor patrols and, in some instances, tanks were dispatched to wipe out the remaining small pockets of resistance within the town.36

Shortly after BLACKSTONE Headquarters landed a lone French twin-engine bomber flew over the port area. This plane did not attack the port area and was probably on a reconnaissance mission.

The plane was forced down by anti-aircraft fire from the USS BERNADOU and the USS COLE. This was the only French plane seen in the air on D Day.

By 1600 hours the 1st BLT had secured its final objective, the 10,000 yard beachhead. At 1800 hours the 2d BLT, which had landed at SYLLOW BEACH, joined the 1st BLT and took over the southern sector of the beachhead line. (The 2d BLT started its northern movement on SAFI at 1153 hours. During their march from the beach to the town they encountered no resistance of any sort.) 3 7

Just prior to dark, on D Day, the Navy reported that their

reconnaissance planes had observed no movement by French reserves from MARRAKECH, M11iADOR or MVIAZAGAN. They did report the fact that

there were forty French aircraft on the airfield at MARRA1CH.

As night approached, the elements of the 2d Armored,, then

ashore, were ordered to move to the vicinity of BOJ GUEDRA.,. twelve miles east on the SAFI-MARRAKECH highway. Here they were to establish a security screen to protect the beachhead from any French threat that might develop during the night.

At 1800 hours, D Day, General Harmon sent the following message to Admiral Davidson who was in command of the Naval convoy that

carried Task Force BLACKSTOB3E:

SAFI garrison consisted of two batteries Second Foreign Legion Infantry; two companies Second Foreign Legion Infantry; one battery of three 155mm guns (mobile) destroyed by tanks; one battery of four 130mm Naval guns destroyed by Naval Gunfire; one battery of 75mm guns motor drawn captured; two companies of Second Moroccan Infantry and detachments 41st group trans- missions radio captured; one platoon of three Renault tanks type FT captured. French reinforcements from MARRAKECH long overdue. Town not fully taken . .as sniping continues.-,3 and (a) below.

During the night of 8-9 November all was quiet along the beachhead front. Unloading in SAFI continued although an observer with the Task Force reported that the unloading accomplished after dark was rather "sporadic," Thc same observer went on to state that

(a) The troops listed in this message do not completely agree with the report made by Commander Deuve who commanded the' SAFI garrison. (See Report of Operations, SAFI, French Morocco, $, 9, 10 Nov 42 (TAS files, doc. No. USA 157)). Commander Deuve reported that he had the following force: 104th Co., 2d Regt. Tirailleurs; Moroccins; 5th Co., 2d Regt. Tirailleurs., Moroccins; one Battery,, 75mm Portee (Foreign Legion); one Battery, 155mm GPF; one Pltt of FT tanks; one Flat. 75mm guns (Navy); one Battery, 130mm guns (Navy); D. A. T. de SAFI (Aerial Defense of the Territory of Safi). Approximate strength of the command-- 450 personnel.

100 the unloading generally:

... seemed haphazard and utterly confused; the plan made prior to landing could not be fitted to actual condions, and. coupled with a lack of service troops to implement any plan, resulted in chaotic conditions on beaches and docks where supplies and equipment were piled hi h without regard to segrega- tion in dumps or safe-keeping... . 9

The morning of Monday, 9 November 1942, was cloudy with a light rain falling. In spite of the unfavorable weather, a lone

French bomber flew out of the clouds at 0650 hours and attacked the port area. Two bombs and a few incendiaries were dropped before the plane was shot down. The damage done by this attack was relatively light.

The remainder of the morning was quiet. The main activity within the area was the unloading of the various ships in the port,

Emphasis was placed on the unloading of the armored vehicles from the sea train and the TITANIA.

At 1350 hours, Naval air reconnaissance reported that some fifty French trucks had been spotted moving toward SAFI on the main

SAFI-MARRAKECH highway. General Harmon immediately ordered General 40 Gaffey to oppose this force with Combat Command B of the 2d Armored.

The Naval air arm was also ordered to attack this column.

At 1400 hours this column was bombed and strafed from the air. However, due to the dispersion of the vehicles in the column the attack was not too successful,

A short time later, at 1413 hours, Combat Command B moved out of SAFI to intercept the French. The light tanks of the 2d

101 Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment were placed in the lead while the medium tanks of the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment were held 41 back in Combat Command reserve,

Contact with the French was made at 1700 hours just west of EL TLETA (See Figure 9) where a- small enemy force was defending a bridge. Lieutenant Colonel Stokes, with six light tanks, launched an attack against the defenders of the bridge who quickly surrendered.

Fortunately they did not destroy the bridge. The 2d Battalion continued on into EL TLETA which they found to be lightly defended.

EL TLETA was quic]ly cleared of all enemy just prior to dark. The remainder of the French force withdrew to the foothills of the ATLAS 42 MOUNTAINS to establish a defensive position. These positions were approximately twenty-five miles east of SAFI.

Early on the morning of D / 2 (Tuesday, 10 Nov 42) the French defensive positions in the foothills of the ATLAS LGUNTAINS were attacked by Naval air. Shortly after the air attack the 2d Battalion,

67th Armored Regiment, attempted to move east into the hills outside of EL ,12A, This attack was stopped, however, by heavy fire from an estimated battalion of French 75mm guns. The tanks then withdrew back into EL TLETA. In preparation for a second attack elements of the 14th and 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalions fired some 306 rounds of 105mm ammunition into the the French positions. Although this fire caused the French batteries to cease firing temporarily it did not knock them out nor did it cause them to withdraw from 43 their positions. It is presumed that this failure to drive off

102 or destroy the French artillery accounts for the fact that no new

attack was launched against these positions.

Returning to the activities in the port of SAFI, for a

moment, it should be noted that all of the vehicles of the 2d Armored

Division were finally unloaded from the sea train by 1700 hours.4

By 1800 hours all combat elements of the 2d Armored Division were

ashore.

At this time General Harmon, mwho had had no word from General

Patton since the beginning of the operation, decided to move the armor

north against MAZAGAN and then CASABLI NCA. (The 47th Infantry Regi-

ment was to be left to defend the por-C of SAFI.) Consequently, early

in the evening of Tuesday, 10 November 1942, General Harmon issued

an oral order to General Gaffey to march on MAZAGAN as soon as pos- b-"' sible. At 1900 hours, with the 2d Battalion leading, the Combat

Command began its march to MAZAGAN. (See Figure 10).

General Harmon had determined that the capture of iMAZAGAN

was of utmost importance. p If he was going to have to attack CASA-

BLANCA from the south it was absolutely necessary that he establish

a supply base as close to that town as possible. This was primarily

due to the fact that there was an acute shortage of trucks and that

it was not possible to carry sufficient supplies with the column

to support operations all the way to CASABLANCA. Further, the

distance from IMAZAGAN to CASABLANCA was only about forty miles and

what few trucks there were could be used to haul more supplies over

that relatively short distance than they could if they had to travel

all the way to SAFI and back.

103 To establish his base of supplies at MAZAGAN, which had a small port, General Harmon decided to use two destroyers as supply ships. One destroyer was loaded with some 300 tons of POL, rations and water.. The second destroyer was loaded with 300 tons of ammuni- tions, water and other supplies. These floating supply dumps were to parallel the march of the Combat Command and were to enter the MAZAGAN port as soon as that city had been captured.4 5

General Harmonts decision to disengage Combat Command B and move north was a risky one.. The overall situation was obscure to say the least.- His forces were currently in contact with the French some 25 miles east of SAFI and there were additional French forces at MOGADOR and MR AKRCH that could be moved against the force left to defend SAFI. As General Harmon has stated:

... It was a risky thing to leave the port and march out into the great unknown, However, I felt that Colonel Randle could hold the beachhead with his regiment of infantry backed by the gunpower of the naval warships in the harbor and at worst could fight his way to shore and get back on the ships.. So we went right ahead with the original plan, not knowing the fate of the forces to the north.

The march on NIAZAGAN during the night of 10-11 November was made without serious incident. At 0430 hours, Wednesday, 11 November, the advanced elements of Combat Command B reached the outskirts of the town. (See Figure 10). Rather than attempt a night attack on the town the column was held up and plans were made for a coordinated 47 tank-infantry attack to be made at daybreak--about 0630 hours.

As the units to participate in the attack were moving out to their attack positions General Harmon received an urgent message

104 8L,qCKS TONE (- 47IvF) MOVES To ASSEMBLY AREA 0800, // NOV

EJLEMENfTS To E/Z i 8RibG6E A T 0620) fl/NoV (3d 5k?.I 67 Arin'd Re .) r-,QAzq E1'M OW R

ADV. ELEMEyTS A'?q/vc 0 420O/ /Vo v. S,4ZqGAN fr70vas 7ro CAPI TULA TES AIAZAG AN O63o 0745r A~I' NOV. 42 I/VsN(- 4 1142k~c~'s

I5LACAS 7t 4AIZA GA! V 19001, /V OV, 42 &A.CKS T04'c 2-d BLr) L ANDS 8NO1V 42~ S-z----47ZNF (RAvo'p ESTy74 8&4 HH A CoMMENCILT.T'NGS 8 NHOL.4

Ojoo4 EI Houcit /80,8 No //o _AC 180

OVE'RLAY 32 5.: MAP --NkZAPQCA N _SCALE - (Fr °om 6-3 19P- &-Q,BLACrS ro1VE for 00"iout 072400 CC"B" OPPOSE'S MA9RRAAECH - //0730 Nv) GARRI9SON q'-1o NOV. 1~942

M ARRAI (E Cl-f\\

/0 fron General Patton. The message was a day old and it ordered him to be prepared to attack CASABLANCA from the south at 1100 hours, 11 November.$ General Harmon now had to act and act fast. He had four and a half hours to capture MAZAGAN, secure a crossing over the

OUM ER RBIA RIVER at AZE Mv!OUR resupply his command, move forty miles to CASABLANCA and launch an attack on that town.

Since speed was now vitally important the 3d Battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment, which was the Combat Command reserve, was immediately ordered to by-pass MAZAGAN and to move on AZEMOR..

The mission of the battalion was to seize a crossing over the OUM

ER RBIA RIVER and to hold it until the rest of the Combat Command arrived.

This action had no sooner been initiated when a second message was received from General Patton stating that there would be an armistice and that all attacks were to be stopped at once. Again time was vital. As General Harmon puts it, iTkt this moment oar tanks had just started to move up a gentle slope to attack the town. The staff and myself got into our vehicles and whizzed in all directions trying to stop the attack before any further killing was done." 50

Very shortlyr after the attack on MAZAGAN was halted the garrison in the town surrendered without firing a shot, This was at

0745 hours. Fifteen minutes later, at 0800 hours, 11 November, the armistice was declared Thus ended the fighting in FRENCH MOROCCO for Task Force BLACKS TONE.

105 In closing the book on the landings at SAFI it is interesting to note a quotation from a document prepared by the Headquarters of the 2d Armored Division shortly after the conclusion of the FRENCH

MOROCCAN operations.

The key to success in landing operations is speed and surprise*...From a study of the French report of the operation, it is evident throughout that the speed and surprise of the attack prevented the employment of certain well organized defensive measures which would otherwise have exacted a severe toll of lives, although it would not have prevented the eventual capture of the port: Armored elements should be landed in a port. The landing of armored elements in small boats on open beaches is impractical and unsound, although the presence of armored elements has a tremendous effect on the success of the operation. The impracti- cability on landing on open beaches was clearly indicated. Infantry, well supported by mortars and very light artillery, should secure the beachheads,... 5 1

Certainly speed and surprise are essential to the success of any landing made on a hostile shore. Further, the bulk of the troops making the assault landing will, of necessity, have to be infantrymen.

However, the statement that the, "landing of armored elements...on

open beaches is impractical and unsound,,,," is open to debate; The report itself states that, "the presence of armored elements has a tremendous effect on the success of the operation." If armored elements have a tremendous effect on the success of the operation then their use can hardly be considered unsound. In fact, it seems that every effort should be made to reinforce the assaulting infantry units with some tank elements just as the Ist and 2d BLT's of the 47th

Infantry were reinforced by a platoon of light tanks each.

The landings at SAFI were not the only landings made by the

2d Armored Division in the invasion of NORTH AFRICA. On D Day,

106 8 November 1942, other elements of the division were taking part in the operations at PORT LAYAUTEY.

NOTES FOR CHiAPTER 6

1 n ublished manuscri t written bZ Major General Ernest N. Harmon. p 9.

2 Field Order No. 1, Hq., Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, p 1,

3 Harmon, Op cit, p 9.

Opcit, Blackstone Field Order No. 1, p 1.

5Thid, p 1.

6 Observers Report on Landing Operations of Task Force Blackstone? ov 8-13 Incl.., byMlvlajor James Y. Adams, p 1. 7Mlemorandm, Hg., Task Force ""A, Room 2405, Munitions. Building, Washington D. C., dtd. 22 Oct 42, p 5.

8Field Order No. 1, Hq., Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, p 1 and Revised Field Order No, 1, dtd. li Oct 42, p 1, 9 Op cit, Blackstone Field Order No. 1, p 2.

1 0 Ibid, p 2.

11 1bid, p 3. 12 Ibid. p3.

13,city Blackstone Revised Field Order No. 1, p 3,

1 General Instructions to Troops, Hq,, Blackstone, dtd. 29 Oct 42, p 2.

1 5 0p cit, Blackstone Field Order No. 1, p 3.

1p ci Blackstone General Instructions to Troops, p 2,

107 17Op c it, Observers Report, by-Major J: Y. Adams., Appendix III, p 9. 'S~pcitBlackstone Field _Order No: 1; p 3.

9 ' AnneX.No. 3 to Field Order No. 1, Hq., Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, p 1. 20 Annex No.. 2 to Field, Order No. I, RIq., Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, .:i

2AnxNo. 1 to Field Order No. 1,Hq4 , Blackstone, dtd. 9 Oct 42, pp 1, 2.

2 Report, of Operations, SAFI, French Morocco 8, 9 10 Nov 42, by the Commander of the French garrison, Comrnander Deuve, p 2.

23., ad nMrco (Tactical Dept., The Armored School, Fort Knox,Kentuky7 12.

240pct Observers Report, Major J., Y. Adams, pp 1,2.

25bid, p 2.

26Ibd p 2.

270p Report of Operations, Commander Deuve, p 3. Opct Observers Report, Major J. Y. Adams, pp 2, 5:

z9 ct Report of Operations, Commander Deuve, p 3: 3 0 Final Report on Operations Blackstone for period 072400CZ- 11073OZ,_1942, q. Blackstone, dtd. 2$ ov 4 .p.3.

3 1 Ibid, p 3.

320p Observers Report, Major _J. Y. Adams,. p 2.

331idpp 2, 30

3O ctFinal Report on Operations Blackstone, p 3,

3 5 Harmon, Op ct pp 13, 14.4

36U. S. Landings in Morocco, pp 13, l4r 3 7 0p'cit, Final Report on .Operations Blackstone, p 2. Op cit, U. S:.. Landings in Morocco, p 14.

3 9 0p cit, Observers Report,, Major J. Y. Adams,. p 6.

0p cit, Final Report on Operations Blackstone, pp 4, 5.

41 Lt. Col. Briand P. Johnson, History 67th Armored Regiment (Brunswick, Germany: Georg Westermann) pp 171,. 231..

4 2 0 it, Observers Report, Major J. Y., Adams, p 4.

4 3 Johnson, Op cit,p 171.

Op cit, Final Report on Operations Blackstone, p 3.

450pit, Observers Report, Major J, Y. Adams, p 4. 466 Harmon,6 Op cit, p 1$.

4 7 Op cit, Final Report on Operations Blackstone, p 4.

4 $Ibid, p 4.

4 9 Ibid, P 4. 50 Harmon, Op cit, p 19,

5 1 Lessons from Operations Torch, Hq, 2d Armored Division, APO 252, dtd 26 Dec 42, p 2..

109 CHAPTER 7

LANDINGS AT MEI-DIA-PORT LYAUTEY 8-11 NOVEBER 1942

The forces which landed at MEHDIA-PORT LYAUTEY were commanded by Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott Jr. (then Brigadier

General). The commander of the naval forces,.Northern Attack Group 1 (Task Group 34.8), was Rear Admiral Monroe Kelly. This force had parted company from the main convoy at 071600 November and proceeded to the transport area seven miles off the WADI SEEOU.2 The convoy was late in arriving 'at the transport area, about 080030 November

(Saturday) instead of 072300 as scheduled. 3 General Truscottt's force, Sub-Task Force GOALPCST, was composed-of the 60th Infantry

Regiment (Reinforced) of the 9th Division; 1st Battalion 540th

Engineers; 1st Battalion 66th Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Division; and special units, a total of 9099 officers and men and 65 light tanks. They were transported in eight transports and protected by a battleship, a cruiser, destroyers and carriers. Before considering the plans and actual landing operations of GOALPCGT this report will review the intelligence picture as known to General Truscott,

INTELLIGENCE

Missions of $ub-Task Force GOAL'PST:

...Sub Task GOALPOST lands in the vicinity of the CUID SEBOU (80-49). Missions in order of priority: a. Capture and secure MEHDIA and the airdromue 3km NW of PORT LYAUTEY (KENITRA) to insure its use as a base for our planes not later than D Day. b. Capture and hold PORT LYAUTEY (KEITRA). c. Capture and secure the airdrome at SALE.

110 S d, Reconnoiter to E and NE to ga n contact with hostile forces in the area: (60 W Longitude, 35 N Latitude), EL KSAR-EL KBIR-MEKNES-FES-QUEZZANE to protect the North flank and to facilitate the subsequent advance of Task Force A to the East and Northeast ....

Terrain and weather played a very large part in the formu-

lation of the plan of operations. The coast of FRENTCH MOROCCO in

the vicinity of WADI SEBOU presented almost unlimited beach sites

with suitable gradient, fair exits and absence of obstacles such as

reefs. Ridges, wooded with scrub pine, paralleled the ocean. The

exits from these beaches were sandy and difficult for wheeled ve-

hicles, However, inside the SEBOU, there were two beaches suitable

for vehicles; one on the south bank near the coastal defense bat- 7 teries, and another further up the river adjacent to the airport.

> The chief drawback to the coastal beaches was the poor weather with

its resultant high surf which was normal for this time of year. In

fact the weather forecast called for only one or two calm days in

this period. Therefore rapid landing on a broad front was indicated.

Critical terrain features (See Figure 11) were the WADI SEBU, high

ground to its north and south, and the lagoon. The WADI SEBOU wound

down by PORT LYAUTEY and the KENITRA Airfield enclosing the latter on

three sides. On the fourth side was the high ground which extended

between PORT LYAUTEY and the lagoon. The river was navigable by

small freighters; but as it entered the sea between two jetties it

crossed a sand bar which had a depth of water of 191 feet maximum

at high water and only 13 feet at low water level. Its banks, other

C than at the two beaches mentioned above, were precipitous on the

111 ATLANTIC OCEAN

RED F/IURE]]l D AT *N

®7.Svie/ PLANY Sub-7skrfce L GOAL P0 ST/

T opf Ar-e

L I/ y -< 4/94y7 ?y¢ LL 31-a

° r ? ,, ,EBERLY ®'

I-. -/

S'c O vf' Soot

Jrush ~FOREgST 3 r~jt;iC opf0C /*IA RA f

\', RAVFN CoAnkiOak

(j,

YE LLOI

(1> JI /

Qo (3i

I p 2 3 s . I A4i/es 1? x22 north and swamoy on the south side, Across the river, inside the jetties, was a boom which had to be breached before vessels could 9 proceed up the river. The lagoon was a formidable obstacle as it was fringed with precipitous, wooded, cliffs which merged into soft sand rising from the beach. Between the north end of the lagoon and the WADI SEBOU, a distance of about 1700 yards, was a ridge which provided the shortest route to the airport. However, on this ridge was situated the KASBA and a concentration of coast defense guns.

The KASBA was an old masonry fort which had been built by the Portu- guese centuries ago on the edge of a high cliff above the river mouth, 10 about a mile inside the jetties. The KASBA and the adjacent defensive area had to be cleared before landing craft could enter the river to land tanks on BRO UN BEACH, and before we could advance on the airport. At the lower end of the lagoon the high precipitous ground dividing it from the beaches was broken by a neck of loti ground, approximately 175 yards wide, through which ran the coastal road which here turned inward to PORT LYAUTEY. Southward from this neck of land the inland cliffs continued for from 5,000 to 7,000 yards although there were roads and trails crossing it at various points. It appeared that a landing should also be made in the vicinity of this second avenue of approach and the troops advance astride the coastal 11 highway and then turn North up the East side of the lagoon. How- ever, this approach would be so easy for the enemy to defend with a sma force that an additional beachhead should be established further to the

South in this sector. A good beach was located eight miles South of

112 the river wv;.here it appeared that exits could be found for vehicles

and enemy defenses would liihcly be weak. North of the river there

were steep sand dunes and shale slopes leading inland some 1400 yards

to a road parallel to the beach. There appeared to be no buildings

or defenses in this area. Inlahnd of the sand dunes there was an area

of rough high ground which cornhandcd the river ard the low ground on

the Southern bank, incluiinrg the airport. This was probably difficult

terrain but it could be crossed by infantry and seemed to be of very

great tactical importance to the capture of the coast defense bat-

teries and the airfield. It was clear that some troops should be

landed to the North of the river in order to support by fire our

forces who would be operating to the South. These troops should in-

clude detachments especially s olected for agility and as marksmen, 12 and should be equipped with pack howitzers and $1rm mortars. This

high ground continued inland at an average height of 150 feet for

approximately 4,000 yards from the sand dunes; after which it sloped

down to Highway 206, which crossed the WADI SEBU Northeast of PORT

LYAUTmY on the only bridge ever the SBBOU in the vicinity;

Thrrmy situation. The enemy garrison known to be in the

vicinity of PORT LYAUTEY consisted of a regiment of Tirailleurs

Morrocains (Hq and three Battalions with twelve 25mm AT guns)j In

addition there was a four-gun 75mm battery of the Foreign Legion; a twelve-gun 75mm AA Group; a Battalion, and a Group of Engineers, and a Transport Company.13 Their known dispositions were: 1

113 (1) Beach pa trol units

(2) .Bridge guard NE of PORT LYAUTEY

(3) Coast defense garrison at MEDIA

(4) AA defense garrison West of KENITRA Airdrome

(5) PORT LYAUTEY garrison, gcnerally in

ilitary Camp Area, PORT LYAUTEY

Reinforcements could be expected from the folowing localities:

(1) SPAkISH MOROC CO Border

(2) IE ;PES (two regimental teams and one half

battalion of tanks).

(3) RABAT (one half battalion of tanks, about 45 tanks,

and 1,200 mechanized cavalry were reported in RABAT)

These reinforcements could arrive at PORT LYAUTEY as follows:

MlKNES: 'ToRegimental teams; D plus 4

One half battalion tanks; morning D plus 1

RABAT: One half battalion tanks and 1,200 mechanized

cavalry; towards end of D Day

It was unlikely that these reinforcements could arrive within 12 hours

of our initial assault but it was important to be ready to meet them with AT guns in the South, and that a portion of our tanks had been

landed to meet that contingency.

Probable courses of enemy action. The various possible enemy

courses of action were considered and it was decided that it was ex-

tremely probable that the enemy would defend strongly the two bottle-

neck exits from the beaches at either end of the lagoon. This would

114 be followed by stiff resistanc. further inland with the main French

forces on the high ground just South of the airdrome, Probable enemy

dispositions on this premise were expected to be one infantry company

in the area of the coast defense batteries; one infantry platoon at

the Southern end of the lagoon guarding the defile, with the remaining

platoons of that company at centers of communication; one battalion,

less two companies, held in the town of PORT LYAUTEY; and two complete

battalions deployed on the high ground which controls the airdrome

from the Southwest.15 In addition to above, there were beach patrols,

a guard at the bridge Northeast of PORT LYAUTEY and perhaps a company

North of the river.

Our courses of action. There were two alternate plans, each

of which was capable of many variations, which we could adopt. Plan Ao x Land all forces to the South; assemble them with supporting tanks and

artillery and move out as a unit for the airdrome. The advantages of

this plan were simplicity and landing away from the enemy defenses.

The disadvantages were that even when completely assembled we would

be approximately the same strength as the enemy. Further it would

take most of D Day to land and assemble and we would run the risk of

weather deteriorating and preventing the landing of sufficient forces.

Plan B. Land in a number of different areas as close as possible to

our objective. Then attempt to capture the airfield by speed, surprise

and exploiting success wherever achieved. Advantages of this plan

were speed, surprise, elasticity and the best possible insurance

against deterioration of the weather preventing sufficient forces

115 from landing. Its disadvantages were that it entailed a considerable

risk, required highly trained troops, was likely to got out of hand,

and comparative strengths were such that we could not be sure of

numerical superiority at any one point.

..,On balance it is considered that Plan B must be adopted since the weathcr is certarly as grave a danger as any opposition that can be encount, re" from the enemy. Further it is absolutely essential to takea advantage of fair weather in order to get supoly ships across the bar in readiness for arrival if our aircraft. Accordingly, the plan has been based on B....

Considerations on use of tanks. The concepts of the use

of tanks followed very closely present day doctrine. Reasons given

for not planning to use them on the high ground East of the lagoon

in the attack on the coastal defense area were:

(1) The area was very restricted.

7 (2) Concentration of coast defense guns in that area

probably augmented by mobile field and AA guns,

would give our tanks little chance of success until

these guns had been engaged by close range small

arms and mortar fire including smoke.

(3) Our tanks would be required elsewhere to protect

the rear and flanks against enemy reinforcements,

including arior, coining from the South.

On the other hand, it was stated, our tanks would be invaluable to

support the final infantry assault following the intensive bombard-

ment. "On balance, however, tanks should not be used unless it is

definitely found that our infantry cannot achieve their objective

116 without them." 1 7 Uncertainty of beach conditions required delay in landing armor until the beachhead was established.

OPERATIONAL PLAN

Missions to subordinate units. The Battalion Combat Teams

(BCT) of the 60th Regimental Combat Team and supporting units were assigned missions in accordance with Plan B above. Shown on Figure 11 is ccmposition of BCTs, landing beaches and schematic portrayal of mis, sions.. Included below is a brief description of those missions as give 18 in the Operation Order of Sub-Task Force GOALPOST.

3d BCT (less detachments) land at 040OZ at Beaches RED and

RED 2 with one reinforced rifle company on each beach and execute missions in following priority:

(1) Seize initial beachhead.

(2) Occupy high ground on North bank of river opposite

i~HDIA and assist 2d BCT by fire.

(3) Occupy high ground North of river overlooking the

airdrome, destroying AA Battery in that position.

Destroy by fire any planes on airdrome. Cooperate

with Raider Detachment.

(4) Seize bridge over SEBCU NE of PORT LYAUTEY.

(5) Reconnoiter to the North and hold enemy North of

line shown on Figure 11.

(6) Assist in capture of airdrome by crossing detach-

ments over the river in rubber boats.

117 2d BCT, with Naval Demolition Party, land at 0400Z on GREEN

BEACH and execute missions in following priority:

(1) Assault and capture coast defense batteries at

:,EHDIA with about two companies. If assault is

impractical or fails, capture by assault after

naval and air bombardment on call after 0615.

(2) Locate obstruction across river. Protect demolition

detachment.

(3) Seize initial beachhead.

(4) Advance and capture high ground overlooking air-

dronme, prepared to join coordinated attack on air-

drome at 1100.

1st BCT land one reinforced rifle company each, at BLUE and

- YELLOW BEACHES at 0400Z, Land remainder of BCT where beachhead is

first established:

(1) Advance rapidly NE, block Western exit from PORT

LYAUTEY and be prepared to join in coordinated

attack on airdrome at 1100.

(2) Reconnoiter to SW or SE to line shown on Figure 11,

and hold the enemy S and E of line shown.

Raider Detachment, aboard a destroyer, was to proceed up

the SEBOU as soon as possible after the coast batteries were silenced

and the obstruction cleared. The destroyer would support by fire

the advance of the 2d BCT and then after landing the Raider Detachment

at the airport support them by fire in the assault on the airport. 540th Engineers were to establish beach parties on GREEN,

BLUE, or YEL0. (as the situ ti-n indicated); furnish minih ijm troops

necessary to assist in retracting boats from RED BEAC ~; organize

shore parties on BROWNN BEI-C H as soon as situation permitted; establish

TV enclosures in vicinity of LUE, GREEN and1 BRQNN BEACHES; provide

for local defense of th e beach -:s, assisted by AA units on all beaches.

.,.3d Aroa-Led r; ir Team, L-nd oi order of the Sub-Task Force Commander begi_;n. ng about 0750 on beaches to be designated , (probably BROW), Rzonnoiter without delay to the S to the vicinity of RABAT-3kUL, Be proriared to protect the Sub-Task Force agai:nst host:ile fore:s advanicing from the S or S, to participate in the a tack to capture airdrome at PORT LYAUTEY: to capture airdrome in tue vicinity of R -BT-SALE and SIBI-YAHIA, and seize radio station at RAt1iBT-SALE.,

Reserve. As envisioned in Plan B, very little reserve could

be held out. The'3d Armored Landing Team (aLT) was considered as a

reserve. There was also one reinforced company of 3d BCT ready to

land on 30 minutes notice and a battaliion of the General Reserve of

Western Task Force earmarked for this Sub-Task Force.2 0

Naval fire su2port. The plan was drawn up allocating fire

support of one battleship, one cruiser and three destroyers to the

three BCTs with the provisions that one of these destroyers would

follow the 3d Armored Landing Team down the coast if it went to

attack RABAT-SALE. Shore Fire Control Parties (SFCP) were furnished

by the Navy to each BCT, Also air spotters were to be available to

control the fire of the naval ships. Fifteen concentrations were

planned, chiefly on the coast defense batteries and SVI of the air-

drome, whoere the greatest resistance was expected. Certain limitations

119 were placed on the naval gunfire support by General Truscott.

"He, unfortunately had strong doubts (to some extent justified by earlier performances) of the accuracy of naval gunfire on shore objectives; . . . 21 The Fire Support Groups (battleship, cruiser and destroyers) could fire on any enemy batteries firing seaward but for not more than three minutes without checking fire. Destroyers 22 only could fire at any enemy gun firing on approaching boats.. All other fires were to be on call from the SFCP or plane spotters on targets of opportunity.

Air Support. Naval aviation was to provide the initial air support. Its missions were somewhat the same as doctrine today would dictate. Initial missions included assisting the center Sub-Task

Force in the vicinity of CASABLANCA and protecting the carriers and transports. Support missions provided for isolation of the battlefield on return from initial missions. Provision was also made for close support missions after return from initial missions. These included:

... Attack coast defense batteries at MEHDIA by dive bombing after 0615; attack ammunition dump and AA defense in vicinity of the airdrome; attack by dive bombers and fighters, enemy troops that may impede the advance toward objective....

Army aviation, composed of the 33rd Fighter Group was to be prepared to fly from the carrier on order of Sub-Task Force, when airdrome was captured or required by tactical situation. Its missions were to destroy hostile planes on the ground or in the air; provide fighter cover for elements of the Sub-Task Force; or execute

120 any of the close support missions assigned naval aviation above.

The naval planes consisted of 9 TBFs, 9 SBDs and 12 Fy F-4s aboard the SANGAIAON while the army planes of the 33rd Group consisted of

77 P-40s aboard the C-FNANGO The CONTESSA contained a cargo of aviation gasoline and bombs. An interesting story is told about this ship. When its crew discovered, at NENPORT hNEWS, that she was to carry such a lethal cargo they jumped ship. Mr. Leslie, Naval

Liaison Officer, asked for volunteers from the NORFOLK naval prison, and got them. The CONTESSA, by this time, had missed the convoy so she crossed the ATLANTIC unescorted and made it on the 8th of November,

Logistics. Planning for initial logistic support was con- ditioned by the danger of weather preventing continued landings; hence each individual and vehicle in the assault waves was to take with him sufficient supplies for operation for several days. Detailed plans are covered in subsequent paragraphs.

Supplies to be carried ashore included: 1 1/3 rations on each individual; 2 1/2 rations on each vehicle; 2 1/2 units of fire of ammunition; 90%o full gasoline tanks on all vehicles plus two 5- gallon cans per vehicle; two filled canteens of water per individual and two 5-gallon water cans in each boat.26 It was planned to load additional supplies in each landing boat and as the infantry went ashore they were to take the supplies up on the beach and drop them.

These supplies would then be picked up by engineer shore parties and put in dumps.27

121 Evacuation plans covered casualties, burial, salvage, cap-

tured material, and Prisoners of War Casualties were to be evac-

uated by Army medical personnel to the beaches and from beaches to

ships by Naval personnel in empty landing craft. A clearing sta-

tion was to be estabished in the woods North of the lagoon. The dead were to be buried by organizations with graves registration details headed initially by the Chaplains, Salvage was to be for unit use and general salvage to BCT dumps. Captured material such as boats and railroad ec u -pr ent nias to be used to influence the situation, and if riot necr ssary, evacuated to BCT dumps. Ris were to be turned in to PFvI enclosures established by 540th Engineers on

GyENI, BLUE, and ERG~ N BGI2ACS.

Traffic plans dealt maily with emphasizing the necessity

for using the small number of ve.-dcles .landed initially to maximum extent to transport amunition forwiard and casualties to the rear.

Guards were to be posted to limit forward advance of vehicles.

Blackout lights only were to be used. M14ainatenance of roads to assault battalions was the responsibility of attached engineer platoons and organic pioneer sections.

The boat employment plan, due to shortage of landing craft, required the pooling of landing boats frn all transports to land the assault waves from the three leading transports, This plan was further complicated by the necessity of some boats making as many as five trips to the beach.

122 The overall logistic plan called for continuation of unloading of supplies according to an established priority, weather permitting, and contemplated the use of BRHiN BEACH as soon as it 28 was opened.

Operations D Day (Sunday, 8 Nov. 42)

The convoy, after arriving an hour and a half late in the transport area, lost further time in loading into landing craft.

Navy crews were inexperienced and Army personnel needed more training in unloading in darkness. The landing craft taking half of the Sub-Task Force staff from CLYMER to ALLEN was lost for four hours. About 0430 they finally boarded the ALLEN and immediately a conference was held in General Truscott ts office to discuss the situation. At this conference it was decided that surprise had been lost as the result of the following:

... (1) The Presidentts speech announcing our mission had been broadcast round the world over an hour before we started to embark, (2) Several French vessels which could have alerted the shore had sailed through our convoy without being stopped. (3) The fact that our convoy arrived an hour and a half late at the transport area causing delay of H Hour made it impossible for the combat teams to arrive at their objectives before daylight as originally planned..,

However it was decided to continue the operation as originally planned and that the two French speaking members of the staff, Colonel Crawford and Major Hamilton, should carry an ulti- matum to the French Comiander, (Colonel Crawford was killed by machine gun fire and Major Hamilton was captured.).

123 Meanwhile the unloading had continued. The waves formed up when ready and were convoyed in near the shore by the three guide boats.

...The combination of inexperienced landing craft crews, poor navigation, and desperate hurry resulting from the late- ness of hour finally turned the debarkation into a hit or miss affair that would have spelled disaster against a well armed enemy intent upon resistance.... 3 1

First contact was at 0523 on PLUE BEACH where a search light was

turned on and shots were heard (probably the Scout Boat shooting

the light out). Second contact was at 0545 when shots were heard,

a red flare was lighted and a searchlight on the North jetty illuminated Lieutenant Peddicord t s Scout Boat. About this time the detail which was to cut the net or boom in the mouth of the SEBOU was on its way up the river. The detail consisted of 14 blue

jackets and two Naval officers and was commanded by Lt. Col. Henney

of the Engineers. At 5-10 minutes of six, machine guns at the foot

of the cliff opened up on the party so vigorously that Colonel Henney

ordered the retreat before the mission was completed.32 This report will now trace the actions of the three Battalion Combat Teams.

(See Figure 12).

ist BCT. This team landed South of GREEN BEACH, and on

BLUE BEACH rather than on BLUE and YELLQN as planned. They moved inland around the South end of the lagoon. Reorganizing about

1045, they occupied the initial beachhead and set up road blocks

to protect the South flank. These road blocks were attacked by

French tanks and infantry which resulted in our loss of two anti-tank

124 7. Key:7 \ ~KPOUR 12 NUNN&T~ rct 7~k G4OALr ID7 P oswq 7'

Sli

\\ 2K. 7

YELLOW

squads and French loss of three tanks. The remainder of the 1st

..BCT advanced North about 2000 yards along the ridge East of the lagoon, where it was stopped by machine gun and mortar fire about noon. The hostile machine guns were located and removed by mortar and Naval gunfire late in the afternoon. The Battalion dug in and

outposted its position for the night. Just prior to dark, General

Truscott visited the ist BCT and ordered contact with the 2d Bat- talion, 2000 yards to the North, and an advance at dawn on the airport,

He also told ist BCT that the Force Reserve was on'its way to report and that the 3d ALT would take over protection of the South flank.

2d BCT landed on GREEN BEACH at 0540, at which time the surf was 5-7 feet high. Two assault companies advanced toward the

KASBA as planned, but were held up by gunfire from the destroyers

Lnd the SAVANNAH. "These ships were attempting to silence the two

138 mm guns before they could molest the transports."34 After much confusion the Battalion crossed the lagoon, occupied the high ground

South of the lighthouse and cleared the area around the KASBA. By this time the Battalion was seriously disorganized. Through mis- understanding of orders, the Battalion initiated its advance toward the airport, before reduction of the KASBA had been completed, and before reorganization had been effected. French infantry supported by tanks and artillery counterattacked the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of the native village and drove it back to the slopes South and West of the lighthouse. The situation of the 2d Battalion was critical during the late afternoon. Severe casualties had been

125 sustained, artillery and anti-tank weapons had not arrived, and the

Battalion was in danger of being cut off from the beaches. Quickly gathered reinforcements enabled the Battalion to hold the high ground

South of the lighthouse until nightfall, 2d BCT was ordered to assault the KASBA at dawn the next day.

3d BCT started up the SEBOU by mistake but was stopped and directed to RED 2 by Lieutenant Peddicord.3 5

..,The Battalion CO, seeing that the fire was coming from the immediate vicinity of the river, decided to land his entire Battalion on RED BEACH. Unfortunately, the landing boats failed to make the corr ct turn and the entire Battalion landed four miles North....

The Battalion moved rapidly inland from the point of landing and by noon occupied Hill 58 overlooking the airport. Exits prevented moving the vehicles from the beach until late evening when a road was opened. Artillery reached the Battalion at 2030, but SP mounts and AT guns did not arrive until 1400 the following day. Owing to the fact that the rubber boats had been left in the half-tracks at the beach, the Battalion made no serious attempt to cross the river, and dug in on Hill 58.

3d ALT commanded by Brigadier General Harry H. Semmes

(then Lieutenant Colonel), had landed by dark on BLUE BEACH with seven light tanks, He was ordered to the South flank to take command of the infantry and anti-tank elements there with the mission of holding . rench forces South of Route 214 East of the lagoon.

Only seven tanks had been landed because there were only seven tank landing craft and these were able to make only one trip due to the surf.

126 Naval gunfire suoport during the day consisted of counter lire as Prescribed in the piana No call fires were used because of difficulties or lack of commlunication. In the evening a message wia.s sent to admral Kelly informing him of the situation and requesting air and surface fire support the morning of D plus 1 on

French conceantrations using plane spot, as commiumications were poor to SFCPs.

Air support cr-ormed well, all that it w-as called on for during D Day.

...At 0630 hostile planes, fi.ghters and two-engined bombers, from RPBAT-°iLE a=rfield began to bomb and strafe our landing boats, .bout 20C) minutes later ROL and SAVANNAH were attacked ineffec-ively by two Dewoitone fighters. At 071? Adrrral elly asked for air supportl, and in 17 minutes tine at least 20 lilrcats from SAYKA1,0N and RANGER were in the area0 By 0900 they Ltf shot down about nine enemy aircraft and scared off the r,Fjt- They then attacked the PORT LYEUThTY a-nd RABT-SAl; airfields, to such good purpose that the Nor,,tciern landings were never again disturbed from the

Two major factors which served to slow down the operations the first day were the bre,@kdoin in signal cormmnunication and the movement of the transports 15 miles out to sea when fired on. Lack of comunuiications made coordination, control and firC, support extremely difficul-I, The distance to the transports required exces- sive time for trips by landing craft so that the unloading proceeded slowly.

Logistics. A provisional SOS unit had been organized but was not functioning,

127 ...Conditions on the beaches during the night presented a scene of undescribable confusion. Surf was rising so that about half the craft landing were not able to retract, Exit from beaches was possible only for track vehicles, vehicles and stores were piling up so fast the shore party could hardly keep them above high water mark. Elements supposed to land on GREEN BEACH or to land later when BRON BEACH might be open were landing on BLUE BEACH, wandering around seeking their respective units in darkness broken only by the glare of naval signal lamps and flashlights to seaward... 3

Operations D plus 1 (1onda , 9 Nov 42)

Ist BCT initiated its advance toward the airport at daylight, and by 0830 was on the high ground South of the Iv'EHDIA-

PORT LYAUTEY Road. Becoming involved there with hostile forces

South of this road and in the woods to the East, it made no further progress, and remained dug in most of the day. Company C;

70th Tank Battalion was detached from 3d ALT about 1430, ordered to join the Ist Battalion to assist its advance on the airport, and arrived about 1630. Naval gunfire and air bombardment of hostile forces prevented immediate advance, and the Battalion did not renew its advance until 2300, after receipt of further orders from General Truscott directing the advance to be continued.

2d BCT, The KASBA had been strongly reinforced during the night. The 2d Battalion was still badly disorganized as a result of the preceding days fight and each company could account for only 30-50 men. Several ineffective attempts were made to seize thL:IUS.A during the day, but without success. French attempts to seize OCRFEN BEACH were repulsed and the French detachments were driven from the ridge West of the lagoon. Trenches

128 South of the KASBA were cleared during the day, largely through aid of the detachment, Company L, released fron the Sub-Task Force

Reserve to the Regimental Commander. The Battalion was reorganized during the night preparatory to renewing the assault the following morning. The Commanding Officer, 60th RCT,- Colonel Frederick Joseph 39 De Rohan,39 was directed to have the 2d Battalion renew the assault

.on the KASBA at daylight,, and to personally supervise the operation.

3d BCT."- At daylight Monday, the artillery of the 3d BCT opened fire and silenced machine guns on the hills overlooking the airport. The Battalion remained on Hill 58 during the day, with reconnaissance to the North and toward the bridge. Receiving its rubber boats late in the afternoon, Company I was pushed across the river to the vicinity of the airport, but withdrew and dug in on the

South bank during darkness.

3d ALT. Monday morning Colonel Semmes moved his seven tanks to the junction of thu lagoon road and the RABAT-PORT LYUTEY.Road and led them into position on foot. Just after gettig into position at first light (0630) they were attacked by 14 French tanks of the improved Renault Lodel mounting a short barrel 37 mm gun.

These French tanks were from the re~serve at RABAT,, 41 They took hull defilac *oesr tons and opened fire at about 100 to 300 yards range,

The F-_- rchi _,r_ cold not penetrate the front ermor of the US light tanks, COL1EI &30!nCs later counted six to eight hits on the front of his tan,, O Kinks- were assisted by a naval spotting plane which placed 5-inch1 shells from the SAVAHN-IAH on the French tanks.

129 Four French tanks were destroyed and the rest withdrew. For his actions in this engagement, Colonel Semmes received the third cluster to his DSC. About 0815 Company C, 70th Tank Battalion and one section of Cannon Company, 60th RCT were attached to 3d ALT. 2 Two of the 70th's tanks were knocked out when they were ambushed by French tanks.. The French waited until they could fire at the side of the

US tanks and secured complete penetrations. About 0900 the French tanks reappeared but were again driven off after several hours running fight. Company C,. 70th Tank Battalion was detached at about 1430 to assist ist BCT.

Air support played a very small part in this day' s operations except in the form of naval spotter planes.

Naval fire support in addition to that covered above consisted of silencing a French battery situated near the bridge NE of

PORT LYAUTEY.

Logistics and special operations. On Monday the surf was very bad, some 18 feet high, so that more than 70 landing craft were lost on the beaches. When landing had to stop late in the afternoon, the imperative necessity for taking the KASBA and opening the river the following morning was obvious. The naval detail to remove the net was again requested and successfully accomplished the mission under fire about 0230. Heavy rains during the latter part of the night increased confusion and added to discomfort of the men.

130 Operations D plus 2 (T, sdy, 10 Fov 4

1st DOT. As ordered thle 1st Battalion moved to attack toward the airport at 2300, 1 ond-y night Progress was slow due to darkness -nd cornsstant enemy fire. Shortly after the start of their attack all units of the 1st Battalion lost direction to such an extent teat only Company r was a-ble to find its way back to the starting point to be on hand to attack next morning with the tanks of Company C, 70th Tank Batta.lion. Companies C and D had run into enemy machine guns near the POh T LYA'UTEY- LBthII Road and had taken them out in the dark with bayonct'sz Later those two companies had lost direction and found thmos e2;.vos at daylight near the South edge of tow;n, They had taken many pris oners from the 1st and 7th Regiment

Tirailleurs Morocai ns . It i-as during this attack that the Battalion

Commander got separa Led froni his unit. Next morning he was captured, but later escaped and made his way back. 45 Some time after daylight,

Company B with Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, attacked toward the airfield and were successful in gaining positions on the high ground overlooking it from the Southwest. There the Company Commanders' observed te US destroyer already in the river by the airfield.

They moved in and joined in its defense,

2d BCT. The 2d Battalion having received its 105 SP

Howitzers during the night, attacked about 0625, The attack drove almost up to the gates of the KASBA where it was held up by heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the Fort, Dive bomber attack was coordinated by radio and by flash of smoke shell against the Fort

131 to indicate target. "Bombers came over, recognized the target and in four minutes from time of first call placed an accurate bombing attack on the Fort."4 6 This attack was followed immediately by infantry assault and troops moved in and rounded up prisoners.

Planes were on air alert at the time. Our troops were within 100 yards of the point of impact of the bombs when they struck. This attack took place at 1050 and upon completion the 2d BCT was ordered by General Truscott to reorganize and seize the high ground to the

Northeast. This was accomplished against scattered enemy resistance.

3d BCT crossed Company I over the river on the late afternoon of the 9th, (Monday) however, due to swamp, a very black night and enemy artillery, the company dug in on the river bank to wait for daylight. Shortly after daylight, Tuesday, the company seeing the DALLAS moving up the river, advanced on the airport and assisted the Raider

Detachment from the DALLAS in occupying the airport by about 0800.

During the night the remainder of the Battalion had worked East of the airport and attacked the bridge fNortheast of PORT LYAUTEY. The bridge was heavily guarded by French artillery and machine guns and the 3d

Battalion was forced back to the North. This artillery fired on the

DALLAS the following morning but she quickly silenced it with 5-inch guns. Naval fire support from off shore and dive bombers assisted in silencing the remainder of the hostile elements in the vicinity of the bridge. "The two Eastern spans of the bridge were blown out by the

French at 1007,"4 7

3d ALT. During Monday night and early Tuesday morning nine nore tanks, the Reconnaissance Platoon and one platoon of 443 CA (AA)

132 were landed and joined the 3d ALT' before daylight. No enemy action occurred un l about 1100 Trhen about 20 enemy tanks were observed moving North on the RABAT-PORI' LYAUTEY Road. Six of our tanks were sent East of the road into the woods. They were accompanied by two assault guns. The other eleven tanks remained in firing position behind the ridge West of the road, Fourteen French tanks remained on the road and six went into the woods where they were attacked by our six tanrks and tvwo assault guns. The French were driven back on the road to the South,0 Naval gunfire wes placed on their position and the French w~rere forced to withdraw to woods further to the South. Again naval gunfire as placed on their position and they were forced to withdraw South. IYaone of our tanks were damaged by enemy action, It was estimated thca4t the enemy lost seven tanks, four by our fire and three byr naval gunfire. About 1600 four tanks were ordered to reconnoiter the valley Northeast toward PORT LYAUTEY for possible enemy cavalry troops. No enemy were located and the patrol was sent out again and contacted elements of the 1st Battalioin. No further action took place,

,ir uop ort played a very important part in reducing the

KASBA as covered above a nd also in bombing the artillery positions

North and East of PORT LYAUTEY. "WPhen it was learned that the PORT

LYAUTEY' field was secured Lt. Col. William-1L-. MIomyers P-4Os were ordered in from the CHEI

133 Logistics. With the clearing of the KASBA and the airport

and opening of the net across the SEBOU, the river was opened for

traffic and both BROWN BEACH and the airport (BROJw 2) could be

used for landing more troops and supplies. "During the afternoon

flood tide, S S CONTESSA moved upriver with her cargo of gasoline,

bombs and other aviation supplies." 50

The evening was spent in reorganizing and preparing for an

attack of PORT LYAUTEY and RABAT-SALE the following morning. At

2300, a report from Company B, 60th RCT in the outskirts of PORT

LYAUTEY stated that the Commanding Officer, 1st Regiment Tirailleurs

Morocains had been captured and desired to discuss cessation of

hostilities. Arrangements were made for a meeting at 0800 the fol-

lowing morning. At 0200 a message was received from our G-2, then in

.' the hands of the French, that Major General Mathenet had orders to

cease all resistance, and desired to see General Truscott at any time

and place designated to arrange terms. A meeting was arranged for

0800, 11 November 1942. Orders were issued to cease firing and re-

main in place until further orders.

Cessation Of Hostilities

At 0800 11 November (Wednesday, D plus 3), the meeting to

arrange the cessation of hostilities took place at the KASBA.

General Mathenet stated that he had received orders to cease all

resistance by direction of IMarshal Petain, and desired to arrange

details for termination in local area pending final decision as to

terms by higher authority. General Mathenet was informed that so

134 far as we were concerned it was not a question of French surrender; we desired their co-operation and had sought it by every possible means; that our sole purpose was to strike at the common enemy, the Axis Powers, and all who stood with them; that French units could retain their arms, and could return to barracks in areas not occupied by American troops, pledging only that they would not fight against us again. Agreement was reached on these points, and for exchange of prisoners, burial of dead, and for occupation and use of the port by American forces. Except for the latter, each side was to remain generally in the area occupied at the time. This oral agreement was to be binding pending arrangement of terms by 51 higher authority.

The above agreement successfully concluded the hostilities in the PORT LYAUTEY sector, This report will now concern itself with conclusions and lessons to be gained from the entire operation.

1.35 NOTES FC1 CHAPTER 7

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Atlantic, Little and Brown, 1947), P 36.

NWadi is Arabic for river. The French, Oued, is sometimes used.

3 1ajor Carl E. Bledsoe, "Observer Report"., p 5 4y 4As o called 60th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), divided into three Battalion Combat Teams (BCT).

5 Brigadier General Lucian K. Truscott Jr., "Operations Report, Sub-Task Force GOALPOST,"from 8-ll Nov 42, Appendix E.. 6 M1orison, op cit, History US Naval Operations, p 116.

7 See BROWIN and BRON 2 WACHES on Figure 11.

8Truscott, op cit, Operations Report, Appendix B.

9 lbid, passim. 10, Morison, op cit, History US Naval Operations, p 117.

liTruscott, op cit, Oprations Report, Appendix B.

1 2 Ibid, passim.

1 3 bid, Appendix B.

' 14bid, Intelligence Annex to Opn 0 No 1.

5ibid, Appendix B.

16bid, Appendix B.

17Ibid, Appendix B.

1 Ib, Opn 0 No 1, par 3.

1 9 Ibid, Opn 0 No 1, par 3f.

2 0 Ibid, Opn 0 No 1, par 3g.

136 2 1 Morison, opoit, History US Naval Operations, p 117.

22 Tru.cott 00i Operations Report, Annex 4 to Opn 0 No 1, Naval Gunfire Plan.

2 3 Ibid, Operation Order No 1, par 3e(l)(c)

2 ;esley Frank-Craven and Jaines Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol II (Chicago, University of Chicago press, 191+9 ; ' p 75:

2 5Morison, op cit, History of US Naval Operations, p 11.' 26m ±ruscott, op cit, Operation Report, Admin-0 No 1.

2 7Bledsoe, op cit, Observer Report, p 17.

2 $Truscott, op cit, Operation Report, Annex 1 to Admin 0 No 1

2 9 Bledsoe, o cit, Observer Report, passim:

3 0 Ibid, p 5,

3 1 Truscott, op cit, Operation Report, p 7,

3 2 Morison, op cit, History of US Naval Operations, p 122.

3 3 Ibid, p 122.

3 Ibid, p 124.

3 5 1id, p 122.

3 6 Instructional Phamplet, "U S. Landings in Morocco" Tactics Department, TAS, 1943, p 16.

3 7 1orison, op cit, History of US Naval Operations, p 123.

3 8Ibid, pp 126-127; and Truscott, op cit, Operation Report, p 10.

3 9Brigadier General Harry H. Semmes, Personal Letter to Chief of Committoe No. 25, 30 December 1949.

4 0 bid, passim.

4 1 Colonel Percy G. Black; G-2 of Western Task Force, Personal Letter to Lt. Col. Jack F. Willie., 28 February 1950.

137 ~Truscott, op ct,. Cpe ration Report, :Item 9,. Operations 3d ALT, p 1.

43Q c t, Ins-tructiona1 Phramplet, p 17,

441'i~dp 3-7.. 45 Tr.s cott, op ci GOperat ion Report, Item 3 , Operations 1st BCT, p 6. 4 6 Ibd 2

T Ibid, Item. 7, Op3ratilas 3d BCT, p 5.

4Craven and Cafe, op olt, Trhe . rnV Air Forces in World Tear II, p 77.

GT.!oris on, ov -ott,History of' US llaval Operations, p 131, 51 Truscott, :op c -t, Operat ionls Reoort, p 13.

138~ CHAPTER 8

CON CLUS IONS AND RECCMiENDATIONS

Conclus ions

Before going into the conclusions to be drawn from this

operation, it is well to remember that this operation was across the entire Atlantic Ocean; that inexperienced personnel were being used in their first combat role; that an absolute minimum of time was available for planning and training; and that equipment was at best inadequate for transporting tanks from ship to shore. Also

the uncertain reaction of the enemy posed problems which are not generally encountered in a landing on a hostile shore. Seldom is

the enemy alerted by a presidential Proclamation prior to the land-

ing.

This report indicates that armor should be landed with or

soon after the assault waves. The armor-protected fire power and

resultant shock action of armor proved invaluable in this operation.

The reason more tanks were not used was primarily due to a shortage

of landing craft. Tanks must land over the beaches and be immned-

iately available. To wait for the use of port facilities is both

foolish and dangerous.

It is apparent that the mission of armor used with the

assault waves should be twofold. Initially, and until such time

as hostile armor appeared upon the scene, tanks can render close

support to the assaulting infantry. Primary targets should be

automatic weapons. Tanks also could knock down those obstacles

139 erected by the enemy to delay the advance of the infantry. Tank fire could be used, in lieu of artillery fire, to aid in the assault on enemy positions located near the beach. Once hostile tanks appeared on the battlefield the role of our tanks would be changed from that of support to that of anti-tank.

From the study it is not felt that armored divisions should be employed in the assault phase of a landing on a hostile shore.

This is based on the realization that the number of landing craft that would be required to land an armored division, assaulting a beach, would be prohibitive. The general lack of infantry within the armored division further precludes its use as the assaulting force.

The armored division may well be employed as a floating reserve of a corps or larger unit. When so employed, every effort should be made by the assaulting troops to capture a port so that the armored units may be unloaded most expeditiously. However, as the enemy may, and most probably will, destroy or seriously damage all port facilities within the threatened area, plans must be made to land all elements of the division on an open beach. As a reserve, the division should be put ashore as early and as rapidly as possible so that it may be quickly available to counter-attack any enemy reaction to the beachhead or to exploit the initial successes of the assaulting units.

To be effective, armor must be able to move. All such movement requires gasoline in large amounts; therefore, means must be

140 made available to the arim orod units ashore to procure their POL rcqu iro gents, The mere fact that fuel and lubricants are available

on the beach or in port is 3f no avail if the armored units lack the necessary cargo vehicles to transport fuel and lubricants forward to the combat elerents..

As currently organized armored units have sufficient administrative vehicles to maintain a Continuous flow of supplies forward These vehicles, or a large portion of them, must be included in the boat loading plans when an armored unit is to be employed in an amphibious operation. Furthermore, if armored units are to be employed to their best advantage these vehicles must be given a very high priority in the unloading plan,

The lack of administrative vehicles at SAFI could well have curtailed the tactical use of CC B had it been necessary to employ that force inland rath er than along the coast. As it was, the bulk

of the supplies necessary to keep CC B operating had to be transported by the Navy on two destroyers--a risky undertaking when one considers

that there were enemy submarines in the area.

Arr -iored units of combat comand size and larger are well

adapted to making deep penetrations. This is especially true if the hostile resistance is initially weak. This capability of armor was

very well utilized by Major General Harmon when he ordered CC B to move from SAFI to the north to attack MAZAGAN, a distance of about

90 miles through hostile territory against unknown resistance. This

141 particular action, (attack on MAZAGAN), also illustrates several other capabilities or characteristics of armored employment such as:

(1) Leadership. Armored unit commanders must be highly

aggressive and must be willing to take calculated risks when-

ever such risks will possibly enable them to accomplish the

mission.

(2) Surprise. In spite of the noise and dust created

by the movement of large numbers of armored vehicles, sur-

prise can be obtained by an alert commander, Surprise may

be obtained in several ways, one of which is to suddenly

change the direction of attack as was done at SAFI. Sur-

prise was further achieved by the movement of the command

through hostile territory at night.

(3) Mobility. This is one of the chief characteristics

of armored units. Without it, the move to MAIZAGAN could never

have been made in a single night.

The principle of organizing combined arms teams was sketchily followed in the organization of CC B. When this unit moved on MAZAGAN. it had as major fighting elements, one light tank battalion, one medium tank battalion, two batteries of artillery and one company of armored infantry. Had the Combat Command encountered strong, stubborn resistance from a determined French force, this lack of infantry might easily have caused consideravle delay.

142 In the landings at PORT LYAUTEY-EHDIA, tanks were used in an anti-tank role, They were also used as an infantry close- support weapon.

It was found that ships were not properly combat loaded.

This was caused by several circumstances; shortage of trained T0;JL's

(Transport quartermasters); shortage of available shipping;. un- avoidable changing of plans at high level after the loading had be- gun; and general lack. of amphibious experience on the part of all personnel concerned. Shore and beach parties were undertrained and the system for unloading ships was not adequate.

Reports examined show that troops in the assault waves were overloaded. Radios were not calibrated prior to the landing. New weapons and equipment were issued in insufficient time to allow for training and testing. Many troops "froze" when hearing friendly naval gunfire and friendly artillery for the first time.

Recommendations

If at all possible all troops should have amphibious training every year. Tank and infantry units must work together on these problems. This training should include naval gunfire, artillery fire, and tank fire. While overhead fire may be dangerous, it will pay off. An observer report states that the fire of friendly guns affected the tankers less than the infantry possibly "due to the fact they (tankers) were more accustomed to the larger guns firing."

Tank and infantry radios must be calibrated prir to de- oarting the near shore. There is no time for this on shipboard due

143 to security restrictions, Troops must have the eapons they are to fight with in sufficient time prior to an operation to become fully acquainted with them.

Units v ere roouired to disperse on several ships, so that if losses occurred in landing or if ships were sunk at sea, a mini- mun of service support and combat el..emlents and equipmrrent would be assured. in practice this dispersion was too thorough. When the landis took place there wefas tho natural priority call for combat forces ashore. Since units were broken up and dispersed, it was seldom possible to load all required equipment twhere it could be readil.y urloaded, evren whnr:t it ws organic to the service units.

Many troops landed as 'Dattle conditions pe rrmitted without their means to operate. The lesson from this woas, and is, to always load a unit1 s organic equ ip _mnt on the same ship on zhich the unit travels; to load in such a manner as to expedite unloading in proper sequence at the far shore; and to never separate companies or working teams nor their equipmnt.

All equipment should be loaded on almost every ship to pre-

t vent spipttinxg all the eggs in one baskt and the loss of that item if one ship is sunk. However, troops should be loaded with their equipment so that both hit tho beach together.

Shore and beach party personnel should be highly trained specialists under one coimnder (Army). This training should be continuous.

,111 transports should be prepared to load boats at the rail no maaztter w,,jhat the planed rimethod of unl.aoading is.

14l-. Boats should be pooled and under centralized control. Con- trol of these boats, especially at night is essential. All boats should be equipped with TBY radios..

Boat coxswains must be trained personnel. Time is paramount in the initial unloading stages; every minute should be utilized to get more equipment ashore.

An adequate lighting system to permit unloading at night which is not visible to the enemy so as to endanger the ship, boats, and unloading personnel, should be provided.

Beaches and docks must be kept clear of supplies in order to unload other supplies. The loss of time by boats standing off await- ing their turn to unload appeared considerable. All cargo must be moved quickly to less exposed locations, The huge stocks of supplies on the beaches and docks not only created a bottleneck but a decided hazard in the event of enemy .ir operations.

Individual equipment of the assault waves should be limited to the bare essentials required for combat. Other equipment can be moved to these troops after the landing has been effected.

Transportation, especially 2 -ton trucks, must be available in sufficient quantities to clear the beachhead of supplies and supply the advance of the exploiting troops on the beach, especially in an armored division. The most vulnerable point of armor is its supply lines. The same amount of consideration must be given to cargo vehicles as to combat vehicles.

14 5 Transport Quartermasters should be superior officers, thor- - oughly trained, and preferably either Transportation Corps or Naval personnel, assisted by Transport Quartermasters of the respective units making the landing. The average officer does not know much about the combat loading of ships, nor can he learn this in two weeks. TQMas must be experienced maritime personnel; the responsibility is too great to delegate to officers of combat units. They do not have the necessary qualifications to accept this responsibility

Such TQV's (maritime) should remain with that ship and load it, unload it, as long as she remains in amphibious operations. It is much easier to teach Transportatio Corps or Naval personnel the essential characteristics and requirements of combat units than it is for an army combat officer to learn the characteristics and requirements of efficient loading and unloading of ships.

It is essential that the loading phase be definite and that loading plans be based on full knowledge of the characteristics of the assigned ships. It is imperative that these plans once formed, be adhered to as much as possible; changes result in delay, confusion and inefficient loading. It is also essential that all equipment and supplies be on hand when the actual loading is executed and that all necessary loading preparations have been completed.

Troops, supplies, and equipment must be arranged in proper sequence and amounts per an overall predetermined plan and so scheduled so as to arrive at the area for loading on time. Disregard of this principle results in loss of valuable time and a waste of personnel. 146 In summation, the lessons learned from the TORCH operation were not altogether new. Such mistakes were frequent in varying

forms before this operation and some are even today prevalent in

landing operations. A landing operation, whether over the Atlantic

Ocean or a small envelopment along a coast line, presents to a great

extent the same problems, and such problems are not unique to the

amphibious operation. These problems can be overcome by thorough

and conscientious plans. An amphibious operation is difficult,

control is the criterion, however, the majority of all problems

so encountered can be solved long before the first troops hit the

beaches. The answer is training and good sound planning coupled with

violent application.

147 APPENDIX I

ORDER OF BATTLE

I. Friendly Forces

a. Western Task Force

(1) Armored Units

2d Armored Dvision

70th Tank Battalion

756th Tank Battalion

757th Tank Battalion

603d TD Battalion

609th TD Battalion

702d ID Battalion

(2) Coast Artillery Units

536th Bn CA (AA) (NN)

443d Bn CA (AA) (AW)

676th CA (AA) Btry (Sep)

692d CA (Ali) Btry (Sep)

693d CA (AW) Btry (Sep)

694th CA (AW) Etry (Sep)

695th CA (AW') Btry (Sep)

697th CA (AWT) Btry (Sep)

(3) . Engineer Units

8th Engr Squadron

20th Engr Regt

36th Engr (C) Corps 175th Engr (GS)

426th Engr Co (dump truck)

540th Engr Shore Regt

(4) Field Artillery Units

58th FA Bn

62d FA Bn

(5) Infantry Units

3d Infantry Division

9th Infantry Division

(6) Ivedical Unit;, 8th Evac Hosp

11th Evac Hosp

Co A, 36th Amb Bn

(7) Ordnance Units

9th Ord Co (MR)

3d Ord Co (IMMl)

29th Ord Co (1210)

6th Ord Co (1211)

36th Ord Co (MjAMV)

43d Ord En, Hq & Hq Det (1,&S )

64th Ord Bn, Hq & Hq Det (Ammno)

83d Ord Co (M,1) Tank

185th Ord Co (Depot)

201st Ord Co (Depot) 602d Ord Co (Ammo)

603d Ord Co (Ammo)

604th Ord Co "Ammo)

608th Ord Co ( Ammoc)

(8) Quartermaster Units

22d ON Regt (Trk)

3d Bn, 22d U~I R~egt Co H, 22d 4JI Regt Co B, 22d k:Vi. Regt Co C, 22d ZI Regt Co D, 22d QI Regt

Co A, 23d. i Regt

1st Bn (less 2 Cols), 58th WI Regt I

Hq & Hq Det, 67th vI En ('1011)

Co C, 67th QPI Bn Co D, 67th QVI Bn 94th Q-I, Co (Rhd)

13 8th Wv Co ( Trk )

144th CD Co (Trk)

Co D, 208th .,' Bn (Gas Sur))

(9) Reconnaissance Unit

91st Rcn Sqdn

(10) Signal Units

1st Armd Sig En

71st Sig Co

72d Sig Co FRIEN DLY ORDER OF BATTLE BY TASK FORCE

a. Task Force GOtLPG8ST

Hq Task Force GO.J.''CST

(1) Elements of Task Force GOALPOIST (less Armd Landing 60th Im Regt

60th FA Bn

70th Tank Bn (L)

Hcq Det, 540th Engr Shore Regt

1s t Bin, 540th Engr Shore Regt

3 Plats , D Btry, 443d CA Bin (AA AW)

692d CA (AA) Btry (Sep)

694th CA (AA) Btry (Sep)

695th CA (AA) Btry (Sep)

696th CA (AA) Btry (Sep)

697th CA (AA) Btry (Sep)

Det, 56th Mded Bin

(2) Armored Landing Team

Hq Det, 2d Arrnd Div

Uq Go, 66th Ammd Regt

Co A, 66th Armd Regt

Co B, 66th Armd Re~gt

Co C, 41st Armd Inf Regt

3d Flat, Co I , 41st Armd Inf Regt

Btry B, 78th Armd FA Bn

3d Flat, C-o C, 17th Amd Engr Bin 3d Flat, Co C, 82d krmd Rcn En

1st Plat, Btry B, 443d En CA; (AA kW)

1st Plat, Btry C, 443d En CA (AA AWd)

3d Plat, Co B., MTaint En

3d Flat, Co D, 17th Armd Engr Bn

3d Flat, Co B, 17th Amd Engr Bn

Det, 66th Engr Topo Co b. Task Force BLACKSTON,

Hq~ Task Force BIv CKSTOTZ

(1) Elements of Task Force BLACKSTONE (less Airmd Landing Team and Sea Train)

47th In~f Regt

Tyro Flats, 70th Tank En (L)

(2) Armored Landing Team

2d En, 67th Armd Regt

Co B, 41st Armd ]inf Regt

Btry C,78th krmd FA En

Co A, 17th Armd Engr Bn

Flat, Co C, 82d Armd Rcn En

Flat, Btry C, 443d CA EN (AA A9)

Two Flats, Co D, 17th Armad Engr En (3) Sea Train

3d En, 67th Armd Regt

EtryT B, 14th Armd FA En

Co E, 17th Armd E~ngr En Pl'Iat, Co A, 2d Armad Sup En

Co B, 2d Armd Maint Bn

Blat, Etry B, 443d AS En (AA AN7N)

c. Task Force BRUS WOOD

Hq Task Force BR'JS H'IO0D

(1) Elements of Task Force BEUSITVIMD (less Armd Landing Tbeam)

3d Infantry Division

7th Inf Regft 15th Inf Regt 30th Inf Regt 10th FA En 39th FA En 41st FA En 10th Engr En 36th Engr Regt 2d En, 20th Engr Regt 3d C- En MBP Co Two Flats, 443d En CA (,AA AN) 436th En CA (AA A6)

(2), Armored Landing Team

Ist En, 67th Armgd Regt

Co A, 41st Arrmd Inf Regt

Etry A, 78th Armrd BA En

Two Flats, 443d En CA (AA AW )

Maint Sec, 78th Armd Regt

Blat, 17th Armd Engr En

2. Enemy Forces (.FRANCE)

a. SAFI Area

(1) SAFI Two Cols, 2d Foreign Legion Inf

ToATO Btry s, 2d Fore ign Legion kirty (8-75mm H-ow)

"No Ca'1s, 2d Moroccan Riflemen

One Etry, 410th Arty Bn (155 mm)

One Plat) Light Tanks (3 Renault--type TF)

One Naval Coast Defense Btry (4--138mm guns)

One Naval Coast Defense Btry (2-7 5mm guns)

Det (8 men), 41 s t Engrs Radio

Det (5 men), Air 'darning Service

(2) Y TU4MECH

One Dpi, 2d Moroccan Riflemen

One Bn, 2d Foreign Legion Inf

Croup Chasseurs d'Afriiue (no tanks)

Awtillery--10 me n ;' ith 8 -37m guns & 3-75mm guns

(3) IIZAGAIz and AZU1 CURE

One Bn, 2d I.orroccan. Riflemen~

One Co, Senegalese xIf b. F~iDALA area

Five IBhs Inf

Two Bn' s , rty (24 -75mm guns)

One Btr y, 105mm How

Two Etry'Is, 155mnm guns

Five Btry' s, 75mm AT guns (10 guns)

One Btry, Coast Defense Guns (4-.138.)

One Btry, Coast Defense Guns (4-90mm) One Naval Coast Defense Btry (2-75mm guns)

Three (approx) Cots tanks (total of 20 light tanks) c. PORT LYAUTEY area

Two Bns M.1oroccan Inf

One B try, 410th Arty Bn (155mm)

One Btry, Foreign Legion Arty

Naval Base Garrison (strength unknown)

Tv~jenty (approx) light tanks APPENDIX II

TERRAIN 4_'A'ALYSIS

The following terrain anlalysis of the area involved in the

W;estern Task Force zone is the actual terrain information that was

available to that headquarters during the operations. This study was extracted from "Brief Estimate-Operations of Task Force A" made

available to this committee by Major General B. N.- Harmon from his personal files.

O 9 52 Terrain. a, Roadnet. Inasmuch as the railway only serves a limited part of French 1,orocco, the roads wore designed as main system of land-communication. Principal groupings are as follows; 1 n arterial road connecting the Atlantic ports, running m ostlyT along the coast from Agadir northwards, and into Tangier, xcellent roads running inland from ports and serving great inland town of Marrakech, Mdeknes, and Fez. Roads traversing the Atlas Foothills; crossing the Atlas passes. Secondary roads and tracks serving fertile coastal areas. Main Roads--Routes Principales; usually 16 to 20 feet wide and designed to take heavy loads. Will take two-way military traffic except at bridges and railway crossings which are usually one-vay. Bridge crossings represent the main military hazards as they could easily be sabotaged. Secondary Roads--Routes Secondaire; about 1321 feet wide, reasonable heavy duty. Tracks--Pistes--Trails that are cleared and maintained. Not usable as a rule during rainy weather. The Moroccan roadnet is d ense, well maintained, and exceptionally suitable for ilitary traffic. Only possible bottlenecks occur at river crossings where bridges, as a rule, are one-way. From a defensive point of view the roads provide ways of rapid reinforcement to endangered areas, and in event of successful beachheads, enemy mechanized progress could be retarded by destruction of key bridges, particularly on thle coastal roads and river crossings. The river Oued-Rbia emptying above Mazagan is a serious obstacle, crossed byr high bridges. The remaining rivers are subject to deep water during wrinter mothis only. Hey- ever, thre crossings of all these, due to deep gorge spanning, are bottlenecks of transport at all seasons, Immndiate objective of an invasion force after landing must be the securing of the vital bridges and thereafter the important crossroads. All Routes Principales are good for twro-wray military traffic. Secondary Routes may be too narrow, for standard American military traffic, Pistes or trails are all one- Way. b. Suitbity for tars.

From Spanish frontier to Port Lyautey, the ground tends to be swvarruoy. This is typical lowr-lying river country, From Rabat, south to Casablanca is a rapid wtiratershed ith deep wadis. These river valleys are steep and run directly down to the sea. Casablianca south to Safi is a coastal. plain about 75 miles deep and which rises gradually in the east and s outh to the foothills of the Atlas Mountains. South of Safi towNards Mogador the hills approach the sea with a strong outcropping at Agadir. Around Port Lyautey and in the Rabat-1asba Tadle-: ekne;s triangle are oak and arbor Vitae woods. Otherwise the coastal region is culti- vated. and the hinterland semi-arid. Tanks should be able to maneuver easily anywhere in the critical areas, as even th)e forests are criss-crossed by a number of roads and innmumerable trails, and water is plentiful along the coast and sufficiently abundant inland.

0. 'stacles.

Bridges and deep ravines, mainly those on coastal road ever Cued ellah, Cued Jafifik, Cued Chevrat, Cued Yguem, and Cued Tensift and thae cOued Rbia. The woods in thLe Rabat-Kasba. Tadle-Meknes triangle are not very dense. Beaches

Rabat-Sale, Port tyadtey

l: 8o.Southsido of river, inside of break~water. Fairly steep gradient as it goes into ship charel. 'Width up to 100 yds, length about 200 yds. Approach to tov.n- steep and over seawtali.

No. 2. North side of river inside breakwater. 300 yds. long. Good approaches to town and fvst way to Airport.

No. 3. North side of Korthern breakwater. Covered at high tide. 300 yds long, 100-200 yds. wide. 4 ft. line 150 yds. inshore.

No.. 4. Starts about 6 miles NE Rabat. Cluster of small beaches belo,.w cliffs. Each about 100-200 yds long., Covered at high tide, 4 foot line about 75 yds. offshore. ieavy surf.

No. 5. Starts at mouth of Sebou River and runs S~v, for about 10 miles. 100 to 500 yds widoe. Dunes up to 100 feutC' high. Iorthern part bac1Is up against Forest and swamp. (During rainy season) 4 foot line about 100 yds. offshore. iJo.. 6.. Starts about 2 miles S Rabat, runs about 6 miles. Broken by cliffs.. Covered at high tide. 4 foot line about 100 yds out.. Heavy surf.. Bluff comes close to shore..

No. 7. Starts just 1North of Sebou Estuary and runs North a bout 30 miles.. Up to 400 yds wide. 4 foot line about 100 yds offshore.. Backed up by Forest and irrigated Swamp Land.. Heavy surf.

Water approaches: The coast is poorly surveyed 30 foot water is 500 yds offshore,. 12 foot water is 200 yds out. The coast is free from obstructions offshore.

Surf conditions and tides: The surf is always heavy but less so during the offshore winds.. The mean tidal range is 5.6 feet. Spring tides rise to 7.4 feet. During a calm, vessels are at times obliged to anchor in order to avoid being drifted on shore by the current setting along the coast to the southward. Note. On tactical maps 1:25,000 Port Lyautey Beaches No. 1 and 2 correspond to Beaches No. 5 and 7 respectively as listed above, Fedala

No. . Starting about 21 miles south of Fedal a and running about 2 miles SWI-lO 0Yds. or less wide. Covered at high tide. 4 foot line about 150 yds offshore.

No. 2. About 2 miles SVi Fedala, south about 1 m ile. General characteristics as above. Shoals offshore.

No. 3. Starting 1 miles SW Fedala. About a mile long. Characteristics as in Nos. 1 and 2.

No 4. One beach divided by rock. Starts- immediately at No. 5. breakvater, runs NE 1 mile to rock, then another rihile, 4 foot line 300 yards offshore. Heavy surf, probably covered at high tide.

No. 6. One beach divided by rocks offshore. Starts lI No. 7.* midles north of breakwater. Rock in center, each part Z mile, 4Efoot line, 300 yds offshore. Heavy surf, probably7 covered at high tide,

Leachies 4-7 are subject to flanking fire from guns on Cane.

NMo. 8. Louth of River _f ifikh. South bank has silted, forming a sturdy beach. About 300 yds long, 200 yds wiide. At tide it is possible to go all the way to railroad and highway bridges, about " mile upstream. Good for spot landings.

No. 9. Jbou.t 1 mile rE of River Nfififfh. 2 mile long Characteristics as in.No 1. tremely heavy surf.

'No. 10. River mouth at vIvansourish. About 100 yds wide. Up to 200 yds long.

ater aproaches. Thirty foot water is found 1000 yds offshore.

-Surf Conditions and Tides. Surf is heavy from November to March and moderate at other times. Fedala Bar is sheltered except when w-inds are frorr between. north and west, Tides rise on the average of 7 feet but during sp:rings they rise to 11'- fbet. SAFI

No. 1. Starting at base of Jettee Principal ard running south for 150-200 yards. Less than 100 yards twtide Fea 4 y surf 4

No. 2. Inside Jettees, silted-in area, about 200 yds saret No surf, steep gradient, being adjacent to' dredged area.

No. 3. Starting on North side of Jettee Transverse, about 500 yards long. Depth in the center, 200 yds. Backed up by bluff or cliffs. Light surf.

No. 4.. Starting 700 yards, north of Jettee Transversl is about O yards long, 200 yds w.ide. 4 foot line about 150 yds offshore.

All but Beach 2 probably disappear at high tide. Water approaches. The bay is free from shoals. Anchorage on a bottom of mud and sand is obtainable 1 mile offshore. Here the depth is 45 feet. Eighteen-foot water is found 250 yards offshore. Four-foot water is probably 150 yards offshore when beach is uncovered. Soundings are reported to be of doubtful accuracy.

Surf Conditions and tides, * The bay is exposed to swell, especially during winter nohths.. This anchorage is reported to hav4 smoother water thyani other anchorages in the area covered, Tides rise on the average 64 feet above the datum plane for soundings; spring tides rise 11 3/4 ft. ~T A DEJPPTNT fT We shinrrton COPY 1I-0.

October 2, 1:142

SUTBJICT: I ovement Orders, Shipment 3324.

Tnitl1s TO: The Comrnending, Genermls, 2d Arnmored Division; tii l . Fort Br~gg, VForth Cr onia

1o It is desirel thpt '-,aoh Potion ps 15 your responsibility be teken without delay to nrepsr~e for foreign service Pnd to move the units iand detrchraonts listed below to P port of embprket -n to be rnnomced pt the prover time to interested sgencies only. Such movemort wrill be m' de only unon oll of the eppropriefte port- com-xnnder, wh will inform the rgen..cies concerned of the time end d&te tl pt units end detFchmnn erp; desired ret the port-, tuthori ~dz C ode Comrndc r respon- S)trength Designrtion sibie for ire- Off . Um1it (Shi rment No. Present r"t7.2 nn move- end T/O rnd Intter) Stet 0r ment to thie nort V10~ 1 Ve

*Fci & Ho~ Det Cora- 3324-A Ft.Brrg ;, N.C. CGl, 2d Armd 7 21 7 17-1 bet Comd "B3" 2d Div (3.-1-42) A rmd. Div (less det)

*2d Bri 67th .I md 3Z4-B Ft. Bregg, Y1.0. CG, 2d A'rmd 21 277 67 17-2?5 .Regt (w/'etchd Div (7-1-) Fled (reirf) ) (less Co F)(lss dots)

*Co B, 41st Armd 3,324-C Ft. rpgg, V.0. CG(T, 2d A rm d 5 164 22 7-27 Irf (less dot) TA V (3-1~-42)

*1 Plat, Co I, 41st 3324-D Ft Brp gg, K.C. CG, 2 d .Arind 1 46. P!rmd Inf (less) Div dot) (Col 10)

*Btry C, 78th ArrB 34VF.}regg, 11".C. TA 2d Arrn d 4 84 21 FA 13n (less det) Di~v

*2d. Plat, Co, C, 82d 3324-F Fit Brogg,, IT.C, CGrt, 2d Prmd 2 44 12 17-37 Armd Ron Bn(reinf) Div (3,..42 )

± lolt, Co C, 17th 3324-G Ft Brpgg, 11. CG, 2d .Prm d 1 46 8 5-217 Arrnd Enigr Bn '1ivr (Col, 9)}

d UNCL fE Authorized Code Comnneir 'resnon- Strength Dnsignetion siblo for pre- Unit (Shinmgnt ?To. Present prret5.on. & move- rnd rind letter) Strtlon 'ment to the 'port W O Ei V

lst Plpt, Co D, 3324-H Ft. JBrpefg;, CG, 2d .Arrnd 1 46 0 5-2171 17th Armd Engr- TTCC. Div Bn (col 9?)

2d Plpet eo D. 3324-11 Ft. Brreg, CG, 2d Armnd 1. 46 0 5-217 17th P rmnd- Fngr P I C. Div Bn ('cl 9)

3d Pirt, Btry C, 3324.-L Ft. Bregg, C C, '2d Armnd 1 34 9 Sn-cjp1 443d Sgep CA Bn Di v (AA) (AW) (II)

5th Plet, Btry C 3324- Y Ft. r gg, CG, 2d P.rmnd 1 34 9 Specir'l 443d Sep CA Bn Div

Det,, 1.42d Armnd 3324-YT Ft. Bregg, CG, 2d .Arrcd 0 6 3 11-117 Sig Co IT c0 Div (3-1^42)

i Bn 67th Armd 3324-0 Ft. Eregg, CG, 2d .rmnd 10 223 0 17.25' Regt (less dets Div (3.1..42 and lessello and ho Co

* d Bn Seo Meirnt 3324-P Ft. Bre gg;, CG, 2d Arm d 2. 6 0 7-11. Co 67th Arid N{*C Div R~egt" (less dets) Prge 4 Col 10

Totel s 56 1079 156

* Comosit! n of deto hmnents will be determnine~l by the Commnding Generre 1, 2d Armd Diva

in issuing, instr,ctinns rnd dissernineting, inform-~ti n to subordinate echelons in conrecti ~n with this ord-r, the greptbst crre will be exercised to divulge only pertinent portions.

Code designation (Shipment No, end letter) will be used in referring to this movtement in iou of unit designption. (For mril eddress, see parograph 5).

2. All units 'and detrchments In this order rre pl-ced under the commend. -f Major Generel E. N, Marmon. This officor will perform the duties of P.fort imxnnder as outlined in Inclosure No. 1 and Ps additionally instructed.

3. Personnel

a. Wthere authorized strength, es shown in ppregreonh 1, differs from rabeOr~naz o onstrength, the riathorized strength will govern. The -ithorized strengths contpinnd in this order e intende d pF r~riy is o ide,, the Commrding. Generel, 2d Armored Division mry, Pt his discretion, Athorize devintioans from these strengths subject onl.y to the limiteti. ,ns of shiryping spece.

b., CuIefied pe:;,,onne1 not mrking the movement wvill be reported to the next higher herdi-urr'71rs for disnositionG

C-3 Personnel unrur lifiod for oversees service will be ronortrd to The P~diutent Generpl for disoositV~n, rind will, while i~igdi srosition, be dropped from the rolls of orgernizrtions And Pttechled to local str-tion. complements.

d, Th6 epproprif=.t6 ditinn . f The d.Jut;1nt Genrrels Office (Officers Diva sion or Clessificrtion rnid Enlisted Re~pIGceeiet Brrench) will. furnish., insof'ar rs prreoticrbi,2 officerr =end enlisted fillers to units on. orll from the Commending Officer of this sinnwnto

4,. This is 9 PEITLNIEE T chrngn of str ti -).

5,; All personnel affected by this order will be informed that they will continue to 'heve meil adrr ssod rs et present until r-ePeipt of further Instructions.

6. 11oveme~nt to thr; port will be mr de by motor end rail. Orgenic wheoled motor ve hicles will move under thrir own .nowr,.

7T. Direct comrnunioeti.ons is ruthorizr'd, ' n this connection., sre parngrarh 2, Inclosure No.' 1 (lRhvision of S-ptembrcr 1, 1942).

S. Pertinent pr ts of th. provisions of 'Incloour USo. 1 (Revision of September 1, 1942) trc: rpolicrblc to this movrmrnt es :icoificd below: 4. Reference, prrerrrh 6. T~eports of shortraes of cruizamE'nt c1rc;-cy submnitted nr~ t9TY r prg r sr~corgi tim. b. Delete prrrgrrph.9, (5).

c, Referenhce srmple. mrrking under prrgrrh 11., g, m~rklinpg w-vith the nsmeof a zvnecefic port will br, omitted.

d. Delete Pr rr gr^ nh 12, c, (e6).

Co. Delete n rrgrrph 15, substituting, therefor: "15 Perscnnl. NOT to eccompeniy Unit.

t lNo officers, we- fieso nitd mno mt assigne d to units in this order will be trr'nsferred hrefrom wivthout prior approvel of the Commr"nding Generr-l of the Tr-sk iPorto to which this ord!Irr pertains, except those belonging to the .following crtrgories:

(1) Those rbsrnt without ler'vr rnd those whoec physicel condition hes been detr-rminnd to b,- such thr't they will be unebleo to procerd oversers with their unit. !Vy~>~

(2) Those 1,v-r.t off°ioprs rrd rnl sted men wrho h~rvc peen. finelly selr-cted( tio rttend r spreo'fic clrss t -noffi crr crnrdid-tr, schop uzndoer eeuo'r Pllo-;od by thr W.-Ur Dr-nrrt arnt, in rccordrrce writh nrrgrrnhs 2 b 4) end 8 d; Ci.r,, 1.-r No. 126, Wr'rDelpr rtmert, 1942.

T.ihoses officers, wrrrernt officers, ^nd n list-d mrvn wtiho Poply for, ero f-AtYt -n urlified for, rnd sire ^ccepnd for Air Crew (flyimnl) ^nd ?z-1i dc=r Pilot T rFinin g,

(4) Enemy nlions a

b. 11i1th rofr~rence to fin^1 selection for officrrs t Cendidnte Schools ^nd method of trensfe r of enlisted men, woe ,-1.D. Circul r 126, .Apri. 28. 1942, and ..Da Circuzlrr 262, A/ugust 5, 1942.

c, A,=, soon ss nrcticrble Pfter roceint of wrrning orders tun> r omrnd rs thrcugh intrlligence ch(-rne-s vll. furnish to the^ TdJltnry Ir_ eJi1 gnc~ Snrvie. 7*er Ven.-rtrrt, the: nrmrs of indiiduelrs in their orgenazations wiho Prf* doer,,d to bei noten-,.tielly subversive !end rr therrforen ccmsi dered unfit for foreign service. The snecific frocts upon which this detiermninrtion is bmse.,d should ho stetrd in ernch 'xse.

d. Vith referePnce to instructions f~'ilitrting the n~turelztion of non-citi z n m.rmberz of the Army of thfl United Strtes who desire to beoome citizens of the-- United Sthtes, nttttizn is invited to letter ti-is office, June 9, 1942 AG 014.32 (5--30.42) FIA-B, subjF ct, i.Tturlizrtion of Crrte i.n lnon-Citizrns Srving in the? .rmy of the IUited Statr rnd letter) this offler, July 28, 1942,p AG 014.32 (6-24- 42) I~~iSresub.jr-ct

f ,. In connedti n with -n-rrgrrrh 16, e (3), (d),o, ersonnel not immunized agginst Typhus rt tres'ent strtions will br so imuniv-d rf1fr errivel rt the parts, re^0d Seor7et".

9. Intutoson Clothi ng, Es-uipment, Supplies r nd Ammnunition.

a~, To be Teke~n from Present Station:

(1) Clothing (w inter only) rnd individurl reeuip~mrnt will be tr kon by ^11 units Ps pry Scri bc d in Teble of 13si c a llowenc s Yo. 21, June 20, 1942, rnd Ch;)ngo No. 1 thercto, a~s modified below:

(p) iDeductions:

Ceps,- winter Drewers, wool Over: hoes, rotic Comfoters, cotton-fillerd UNC.4IIE - Additi i:

Glovns, wool on (one nrir ner PA, ^ totrl of two) Shpes, srrvice (one, nhir ner FT' ^ totrl of thrrr) S ocks, 1ight wool (threenpi r r r r EU , rtot-lI of s ix) Blpnke.ts, wool. OD (one nr r ind tvi.du-l, r totel1 of thre e) (Heirniets, stepl, IMl only ill1 br tekrn)

(2) Orgrri~eti n-1 e,-uipmrnt will be trken rs nrescribed in the prof er Trblps of B ~Pllow~nees .ndioc-ted below rnd rs modifierd b-mow:

Unit T.1B De Ho. of hhenges

A nnored 1?t 3-1-4a2 4 Engineer 5 6.1-42 2~ Fe 7-I-42 3 CA A)44 7-1-42 0

(r) Or.i.y she t ps rt- of thy- orgeizeticnrl" ecul pment essentiel Icr C 1(irb t Fnd thrt ~e-d for ho7U.seke'i ing enid messing nurpoons wi'l rccomc'm7 Fer. uni. All ot*rr orbenlzrtionrel c rti p -nFer will be m-rked with thf shin" ra nt numrr r'nd lett-r of ech anit end will. re tturnr d ov-er to the loed Fus s Commender for further disposition.« (Sep, orrgr^e:h 9 c b-.o.

(b) Det, 142d Prmored Si~gnr1 comn!-n~y rnd Fie . He Det Coribe-t Commend "B3", 2d !rind Dizv will trko su~ch -prrt of thn orprnizetionrJ. Fruiprnert of the perent unfits rsd~mr n(ec, ssrry by the Copmrmdin-a Officers thrrrof,

(c) The orgrnizeti onrl e-iprnrrt of crrteIn units in this shipmnn~t will be modified rs indicrte d in 7Memorrendr,. SPO" 475, subliet, Distribution of Eri-timrnt, det(e-d Sept~mber 14, 194 2, rnid Sptrmbrr 29, 1942.

(d) The: units in this shinmrnt will tike such rdditinnel. egzipfl jt~ -ndi suplies es h-ve be'en authorized for the fo by the Yrr Den- rtra ert-

(3) The following i'dditienrl Items 1wil1 rlso bi, ti kem.

B~edsroks or rnrttrrss covers (two p-r i.divi u-l) Comrrn-ss, wnj ch (one- per ICO, not othe-rrwise ruthoriz-d, not T echniciens) Boots rub'- r hip ( one, pr~zr Baer 100 taen) Bprs, raosm vbio, sen dfly typ, (OPC pC.,r indi idurl) IHeednets, reoscuito (one= per individu-T) Gloves, rnosozito (onie prir p er 20 individurls) Goggle s, rbb purpose, cleer lens, with rdditionel colored lnns (one prir n-~r individuel ) Respirrtors , dust (one, -o rr irdividur.1 not otherwise puthori Ue ) PAnti-grs Crpe (one r~pr individurl) Ointment, n'p otective (one tube pe r it dividuel)} Tmrorgnite , shoe (one tube; per indivi du l )

-5- °y (4) ~Pers -nnrl i.n this movremernt will be rrmridA with not morA thin one~ worreon ips follows:

,,Idiori nersonn-l -- Nne Pi.stols, rtomrti6~ Members of trnk' crewus rnd driers Odlibrr .45 of sdlf-nrorelled mounts.. Gun, sub-me chine w Officers of finld end compeny grede, Celiber .45 wrrr-nt officers, EO's of 1st three gredes (not Teclnicirns), TPl, now ruthorized r piistol under s or spreirl list of er-u prnn; -nd T now ruthori zerd gun, sulh-m^ chlne, C liber .45 Rifles, Cel-iber - Those VI now ^uthorized rifles, .30, 1741 Ce liber .30, l-1, under T/ BP Rifles, Celibnr .30 I12903 Other 0K4 of h11 units ex-.rpt "ledicel.

b. The Chiefs of Supply Services will ship th. followi.nr:

Eouipment rnd suplies' in rccordrncr with instructi-nis isvued prt ely.

co The Commending Officer of thr str-t~on listed: in onr-grenh 1 Pbove, upon rceript of further instructi. ens, will shin the repm-- inin4 orgenizrti. orne i eeuipmipnt which does not tcom ?rnry the ;?nits.

d, Instruct5ins Refrrncn Shirnts to thr Port.

(1) Shipments will be nv de to the Ports of F'.mbrrkrt,'on or. cdll of the Part Commanders,

(2) Shipmerts for P specific unit to .6 Port of Embrrketion will be merked es follows:

TO: PORT TRANS 0 P of E

FOR: 3324-( enter letter r s r ssigned in p4rer rrh J., ebovte, en~d Group niumber ^s prenscnribrd in Annox - Inclosure Yo. 2.)

(3) Shirments of r11 othe-r eruinmcert r - suppli es will be. rddressed rs indieted rbove(,, with necifi c rrkirngs in racordrn-.e, -with instructions issued s nrrtely.

e4. Othe;r Instructions,

(1) A list of the orgrni zr tonel eruiemrt trk, . by IDtf hrnic r~ indicrte d in pr rgrrenh 9 r (2) (b) rbbve will be m dp 'brthe- Commrn~art~g of the per(,nt unit# Two copies of the- lists will be furri shed thu orverU Gener-l, Services' of Supply, the Port Comm'iid'rs end the Force Co-mrndr. (2) Tho tote l weight-, ou'bege '-nd plr ce of storrege of rni eeutpment end supplies merked for shipmrrt to eeo% Port of Embrrketion for this force will be report(-d to the Commrnding Gen r^1, Services of Supply; the Port Comrnders Pnd the F.orce Coinninder.

(3) Seprrrte instructions concorning the locrding of thses units w ill be issued by the Vr r Drpr rtmenrt.

(4) Ammunition end p est control ee uipmrent shipped to the Port, mrerked "TO ACC TRPS" undcer seTprrp te instructions will br: ssiled to tropes prior to dobrkelti.on.

(5) Rptions shipored to the Port, mrrked "FORZ ISSUE", under serrte instructions. will be issued prior to emberketion.

(6) Two covers, protect: ve, individuri, ill bp crrtied in the gn s mr sk cp rrier of 'erch individur ll

10. Cost of tr#-ncnort~~tion of troops rnd in(rliduds inrcluding the shipment of things will b-- governe-d by the rrovisi ns of S,-otinn TTI, Circulrr 206, W. D. ,19 42 ,

By order of thn Sncre-tr ry of 1"Tr:

TTOM!'' S T.* ITTA±fDY, Pssistrnt Chief of Strff OFFIC IAL: Oprrtions ;)ivi sion, . DG.S .

s/ J.A. Ulio

J. A. UU@a, Mjor Genera! 1, The .Adjutrmt Generel1.

2 Inclosures Incl. No. 1 - Instructions Applicr'ble to Units Ordered Oversees (:frevis ion, of September 1. 1942) (furnished eddr(essors, stet nns, end units conet~rrd only) Inol. No. 2 - (1Annex) COPIES FU Rj'IS 1E.D: The Commending Genelsl1 Army Groun~d Forcens; Srrices of 'Supply; Fourth Servicr Commrnd; Alp for Gpnerr l E. N. IHr rmon; Chief, Armored Force; The Chiefs of Supply Servic-s, Srrvilcrs of "upply; The Chief of Trensport- ti.on Corps, Servicps of Supply; The Divisions of the T'r D-prrtment Genprrl. Strff. 7 Annex to IM1ovement 0rd~rs, Shipment 3324

UT\ TT Off

VTO E1 ye Ho& Ho Det Combtt Cmd "tB" 2d Armnd Div (less det) 7 21 7 2d Bnz 67th Atmd Regt (w/rtchd Med (roilnf) ) (less Co F 'pnd less acts) 17 223 11

3d Bn 67th Armd Regt (less dets) 10 223 0 co B, 41st Armd Inf (less aet) -4 145 -0

Det, Pl, Co I, 41st Armrd Inf 0 22 0

Btry C, 78th Amd FA- Bn (less det) 4 84 21

2d-P3.. Co C, 82d Armd Ron Bn (relnL') (less dpt) 2 33 0

2d P1. Co C. 17th Prrnd En3mr Bn (less drt) 1 45 7

1st P1. Co D, 17th 1Prmd Engr Bn 1 46 0

2d Pl. Co D, 17th Armd Fngr Bn 1. 46 0

3d P1. Btry C, 443d Sep CA Efn (A)) (1-) 134 9

Dot 142d Armd Si~g Co 0 6 1

2d Bn Se~c Mr~int Co 67th Prmd Rr'gt (1rss dot) 1 6 0 Tote 1 -9g-.' -34 - GROUP? 2 Det. Ho & Ho Co, 67th. Prmd Rrgt 2 14 1.7 Det. Co D, 67lth Armd Regt 1 21 20 Det. Co E, 67th Armid Regt 1 19 19 Det. Co B, 41st Armd Inf 1 19 22 1.P1. Co I,41st Armnd Inf (less det) 1 24 0 Det, 2d P1. Co C, 82d Armd En 0 11 12 Det. 2d P1. Co C, 17th Armnd Pngr Bn 0 1 1 5th P1. Btry C, 443d Sep CA En (AA) (1+M) (M) 1 34 9 Det, 142d Lrmd S~ig Co 0 0 2 Det. 2d Bn S~'o T~ri.nt Co 67th A rmnd Regt. 0 2 0 . Totr 1 Group, 2 ~ ' 45 102

Grrnd Totr l 56 1079 158 NOTE: In mr rkilng Pru { nrnt to Indictr ^ soeciflo grown, r dd number of g~roup to Shipment I\Tumer and hotter ( Exrm-ple: 3324-A-1)

UNCLASSWFIEb (2) Tho units flnd detrchm~ents. in this shi mpnt will tyke such orgeni rpetionrl end other ruthoriked erruiortent rs is deeraeid necess-cry by the Comm-onding. Generrl, 2d l'rmor"Ad Division. Other'e~uipment, vehicles end their lords will be shi-ned r s deterrnkned by the Commrnding General, 2d Prmored Division, rfter consultiltion with the Commrnding Generel, New York Port' oc kmberkction.

h (3) The following Pdd~tionel itemns will rlso be trken:

Bedsroks or covers, mrttress (two per indivi dul) <) e,.Compass, watch (one -orr N3O not otherwise Authorized) C !""r not technicirns) Boots; r bber, hip (one ppir per 100 mrn) 11-1Oe_. Bars, mosquito, snndfly type (one per individuial) , F Heednets, indsruito (one per individurl) Gloves, mosruito (one peir Aer 20 individurls) Goggles,ce tnll'nurpose, deeir lens, with rdditionel colored lensp5ersonnel.6' (one pair per individu^el' Rpspirrtors, 0dust (one Apr individuel not otherwise. rut' orized)1; 1:11ed

(4) P'~rsonnel in this novement will be Prred with not more then one weapon as follows-:

Yone Pistols, nutometic Mem~bers of terk crewis rnd drivers of self-nrooelled miounts only -Officers of fPld -rd cornp'rry grr-de, I~ cc 1.45 wrrr-nt offi cers, NICO's of ' 1st three grhdes (not technioirns) Ell now, ruth-. orized r rPistol tnder T/BI~ or specirl list of e. Mior nt, rnd EM now ruth" orized guans, pub-r,,chine crl-..45 Rifles, c;-l. .30 .. All othe~r R4 of the units --x^(-pt 141903 Medicel p'rrsonr'el , b. To Be Shipped to the I,ew York Port of Einb-rk-tion. :=

(1) The Curterm~ster Gpn~r^. will shini: (?Br %& end Lt~i1 ~~ sed on officers men) (a Mprked: 3324-W..C)M-I

60 days' Clpss I supplies, r" tions to be Tyne B (less BRR.AD component; substituting therefor: Type C BTSCTTTT) to include crrdy, tobecoo, toilet erticles, and other items list-d in WVD Cir. Vo. 245, 'July 25, 1942.

RE~GR.ADED UNC /SSEI~fIE by 4tthrt Par 2, 'CrculaiI ~ i 15dte 2 Ma hor6.t~,T o Xb. REGRADED (JNGLASSIF'IM $ 9 by Authority of Par 2, VTD Circ r 150 dated 28 11by 19 60 (b) Mr rked 3324-QMJ.-TO P CC TRPS G ai.C Cav. TA A

8 deys' rptions, Type C 1 day's rp tions, Type D 4 days' re tions Type K

(a) Marked; 3324.W..QM: III

G~soline V80, 175,000 g--s (to be shipped in 5 gri, contpiners)

(2) The Surgon Generpl will ship the following: (1'"sed on 250 officers %'nd men)

Mrsrke d: 3 32 4-.W-MF D

30 dpys' medic^l sunrl.es

(3) The Chief of Chemicrl Wrrfpre Service will ship the following: '._ , ..

(a) Marked: 3324.41-CWS

24 Mpsks, grs, service

(b) Marked: 3324--W1-VEHiICLE

340 Grenrdes, hand, smoke, HC, M8

340 Grenr des, heed, smoke, Hi, M8

(4) The Chief of Ordnence will shin the following:

(a) Marked: 3324- W-OR.D-III

Engi ne Oil (2.'104-A) SAE 30 in I rt orns 1200 gal1 Bnginr~e Oil (2-104A)'SiF- 50 in '1et errs 12670 g-l Univ Ge'pr Lubr W L-761, Cl I I, S.PE 90 in 25 lb pr ils 4180 lbs Grens e GP #1 '(2-.107) in 5 lb.:f c ,ns or 2030 lbs Gre~s(,GP #2 (2-108) in 5 lb clrns or 25 lb pf~ils 275 lbs

ON IFIED REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Authority MFIED of' Par 2Y, DCi~r ul r 150 dated TAS I 3M /4 200 lb s 5 lb cons or 25 lb n-ils Grpo'se, Wrter Ptlmo #1 (2-.109) in 1 10 lb s lb c-rns

(The items -bove will be nrcked ^s follows:

Engine Oil, 12 , lot cpns per cflse Univ Gepr Lubr .. 1 - 25 lb opil pier arse Grepses (extent 6 5 lb arts per arse, or Watet Pump Grease) 1 - 25 lb pril per cpse Wvpter Pumr Grep se - 10 -1 lb cons per case

(b) Ammunition will be shipoed rierked es-,indiaoted: 3324",W.n

ITEM 332 4..Deck VEHICLE TOTAL

Ctg, Ball, Cal. .30 (5 rd/clip) 52, 500 52,500 105,000 Ctg, Ball, Cal.. .30 (8 rd/clip) 935,424 935, 424 1,870,848 Ctg, A P & T,Ctel. .30 (belted, 9..1) 762,500 762, 500 1,5250000 Ctg, Ball), Ce).. .45 (20/ctn) 12,000 102,000 116,000 320,000 Ctg, AP & T, Ca)l. .50 (linked 9.-1) 70,755 70,755 141,510 Shell, HE, 37mm T & AT Gun 160 160 320 Shot, AP, 37mm, T & AT Gun 80 80 160, Canister, 37mm T & AT Gun 40 40 80 Shell, HE, 37mm Ai Gun 2, 700 2,700 5,400 Shot, SP, 37mm AAG un 300'. 300 600

Shell, HE, Light, 8). mm Mort r 150 '150 300 Shell, Smoke, TIP, 81 mm Mlortrr 600 6 00 1,200 Shell, HE, NC, 75 m T~nk Gun 2,550 2, 550. 5,100 Shell, Smoke, WP, 75mmi TvkkrGun 270 270 5:40 Shot, AP, 75 mm Tr'nk Gun 850 850 1,700 Shell, HE, 105 mm Howitzer 2.700 2,700 5,400 Shell, Smoke, TM, 105 mm Howitzer 675 675 1, 350 Signepl, Ground, Assorted 250 250 Grrne de, he'n d,frpg,, Mk I11 325 325 650 Grene de, hend, ofIfers.5vo, Mk lII ..) 400 400 800 Grenende, rul1e, AT, M9A 1 583 583, 1,166 Mines, PT, HE, Ml 770 770 1,540 3,9F8, 914 (c) In Addition, p m.munition erup1 to the totr]. for each tyne irdiccted, in col, 5, pr grnh 8 b (4) (b) cAbove, will be shipped, mn rked: 3324.IW-0RD-Vl.

(d) In rdditim), Ammunition erupl to the totel for erch tyrpe indiopted in col.. 5. t^rcgr rh, 8 b (4) (b) Above will be shipped, r rked:

(5) The Chi ef of Engineers will-ship the following:

Marked: FOR PORT PNGR 7)

250 - 2 oz cor, insecticide 250 -2 oz bottle, flying insect repellent, it I prREGRADIED UBsC1ASSIFI D by Authority O~ Par 2, 17D Circular 150 dated. 28 Aay 46. 7.Ya.CveT S

SInstructions Reference Shimpnts to the Port.

(1) Shipments will be prpred so as to rerch the, New York P-ort of' Embarkation on October 10,1942, but will be shiprncd on cs'll of the Port Commader .only.

(2) Shipments for t specific unit will be inerked Ps follows:

TO: PORT TRf!NTS 0 N Y P of' BROOKLYN, 11 Y

Enter here, "~ 3324-W" find i-nedirtely und:ernr---th, inclosed in,prrenthesep,, the shipment number rnd letter 'essigned the tretzel unit to which the eruipment belongs. For exr male: 332441 (1441l-B)

(3) A 11 other shipments of eruipmen.t and sup-lies will be addressed as above, with specific mnarkings Gs indim-'eted in sub-.prrgrrph b above*

d. Other Instructions.

(1) One dry's rrti-1ns, Type C; one day's rations, Type D; two drys' rations, Type K rnd 2,1units of fire for individunli md outo- metic wnpons in the hands of troops will be stored eboerd trpr~snorts so a s to be repdily evailrble during the voyrge. The units of fire for mdi- vidmial arms Pnd weepons will be issued to the troops pr~or to debrrkrtion.

(2) A list of orgs'nizetionnl i~nd other QutIhorized eruiometh trken by ech unit and detechment Pnd srlist of bbher eruipment, vehicles rend their loeds in this shipment w7.ll be mrele by the Conriprding Gorernl, Zd Air-pred Division. Two cooies of the list of eruivment will be furn~ished each, the Commanding Generel,. Services of Supnly send the: Port Comnn nder.

(3) The totpi w-eight, cubrgne rrd nl'ce of storrge of ell eruipment end supplies nrer-red for shirmernt to the ?-)rt if Erb~rkrtior for this movement will be reported to the Comrrnding Generrl, Services of' supply e nd the Port Commrrnder.

(4) S ep^ rpte irnstructions' coney rn lng the lording of the force will be issued by the Wf-r Depertment.

(5) Pest control erni-orient shipred to the Port prior to den-rture, will 'be plrced aboard shins by the Port 'ngineer Officer end will be issued to the troops prior to debarkation.

(6) Two cvr, protective, individual, will be carried in the gas mask cFerriea of etch individual, c)O A&& ~7f/~~ V t/C~ ,_.. UN . n REGRADED UCIASSIN]D by Authority of {.:. , Par 2, M C'D~ia r 150 dated 28 E'Iay 460

10. Cost of tr~rsrortption of troops 'end individurls including the shipment of things, will be governed by the provisions of Section NI, Circulpr 206, W.Da,2.942.

By order of the Secretpry of Wsar:

THOW4PS T. HA;,DY Assistrnt Chief ofSte.ff Op err~tions Division,W.D.G.S. OFFICIAL:

s/ J. A. Ulio

J. A . U11:1 Msjor Gen Frn l The Adjutnnt Gener&1.

1.Inclosure- Inc #1.. -instructions An-picenble yo Units Ordered Oversees. (Revisions of Septe'mber 1, 1942) (furnished Addrpss'hes, Sti'tion end Units concerned, only)

COIES FLJRrISH D: The Comme~nding Genrr is, Army Ground Forces; Services of Sunoly; Fourth Service Commpnd; Ft.. Bra gg, 'N.C. The Chief of the A~rmored Force; Distribution Division, SOS; Ple~ns Division, SOS; M'ovements Brsench, Plenm Division, 50 ; The Divisions of'the W~r Deprrtment Generr. Steff. Epch Stp'tlon Listed in p-r~grRph 1, FOR TNFORMlhTION ONLY. RGRADED TiC LAS I' IM byr Authority of Par 2, MD Circular 150 dated 28 ~ 46. Iva j CAS TAS3

WAR DEPPRTI-TIT COPY '.____40._ Wre shirgton_ WIVD370.5 (10-.9-42) OB-.S-E-I' October 10, 1942

SUBJECT: Amiendmnent No. 1 to Movement Orders, Shipment 3324-sW :Auth: T. A. G. InTitirls______TO: The Commending Generals, *Dete: 1N-..lO:. 2d Armored Division New York Port of Rmbnrkrtion The Chief of Trrnsnortrtion Corgis. Services of Sunnly The Chiefs of Supply Services, Spr'vicew of Supply

Letter, this office, WD 370.5 (9-30-42)03-S. E-sM, October 2, 1942, Suloject: Movement Orders, Shipment 3324-WV, is imerided vs'follows:

Change Supply Pnrrgrrph ps follows:

a. Under p erpgrnph 9 a (1) (a) del ete the following:

Drewers, wool,,

b. Add ptregreph 9 a (l) (c) =s follows:

Drawers rend un5Aershirts will be issued on th, following besis:

Drnwrrs "rnd undershirts, cotton. (3 rich rier EJ:A) Drrwers ,nd undershirts, wool (2 erch ppr EM)

c. Under 'pregrrrh 9 A (3) delete the following:

Anti-gps cerne (1 p er individurl# Ointment, protective (1 -tube per indl.viduel) Imprognite, shoe (1 tube r -r individual)

d. Addl nrrgreh 9 P (5) rs follows:

Irnnregn'-ted clothing end e-,uio'ert will ba issued to erch individupl in this riovemrnt on the following basis:

1.suit, outer clothing: (Shirt end Trousers, OD, wool, end leggings) 1 suit, working (one-piece herringbone *Ill, bes-d on T/BA puthorizetion for mneohFaics of A~F units Prid -perms. sonnel of Armored Divisions on>4

.l. Of A[1, ftU SR REGRADED U4C LASSIF IUD by Authority of Par 2,..M Ci . 150 dated 28 flay,46. 1daj. Cay.TA,

2 covers, protective, individir 1 1 hood, wool, Droteotire 1 -or, of gloves,cotton, protective 1 tube ointmeont, protectivp 1 tube innognito, shie

e. Chpnge th- ~Prroprii'te n-rt of prrgr-nh 9 b (1) to reed rs follows:

The Quarter",-'ster Generrl will ship:

(Breed on 500 Officers end rmen)

f~ Add p~rrt~'ph 9 d (7) rs fbllows:

Units nre Puthorizrpd to tike to ovr-rsers destinption r11 public Pddress ecruipment now in their possession.

By order of thie Sr-cretpry of Wrr:

TTTOMS T. iPNDY I!ssist-nt Chief of Stpf f Operations Division, 'iN. D. G. S. OFF1CIPL: sl J. A. Ulio

J. t. UL TO Maor Goner-1 The Adjutent Gener'-1

COPIES -FUJRIB'IS HED: The Conrmndi.ng Gener^ls, Lrmy Ground FPorces Services of Suroly Fourth Service Cor^d Ft. Bragg, N. C. The Chief of the Armored Force Distribution Division, SOS Plpns Division., SOS M~ovements Brench', Pl~'ns Division, SOS The Divisions of the Wr r Depp rtment Geneorl Steff Erch Strtion listed in pp'regreph 1, FOR INvFOMVT I1N ONLY. REGROAED UNCJASSIAED by Autkir~r y of Par 2, yC-"4 datcu gg S Dt 1946. 'Ma j Cav. TAB i. WPAR DP:RTENT COPY NO Uri ~TNEW YORK PORT OF EMBJ RKf T ION- BROOKLYN, N. Y. HW,/a js

SPTP.A, 370.5 - OPD' (TV4) October 6, 1942 SUBJECT: Movenent Orders, Shioment 3324-VT H C

TO The Cor iding Genorp1, . Initials s T.JO,: 2nd -Armored Division, Data: ZO« T a. Fort Bra gg, N. Co t

1. REFERENCE:

Secret Immedin te Action letter. from, the ,Adjutant Genera 1, WD 27. (9..30-42)oB.S.E.Mp deteii October 2, 1942, S ubject: As rbove, To: The mmE .d.. ing General a s above, and including others.

2. MOVEMENT AND STAGING OF PERS ONN

Confirming telephone instructions of October 5, 1942, from this Headquarters- to iHeacurteirs, 2nd 1Prmored Division, it i8 reruosted that Unit 3324.1V be moved from its p resent statiPcn to Fort Hamilton, New York, stra as to arrive not la ter the n 1600 on October 10, 194.2.

3 ,r PERSOVNNEL PROCEDURPE:

The p ersonnel p rocedure to be rccomiplished before derprture from home station is set forth in Sect .on 'I of "Embarkrtion 'Reguirtions, New York Port of Emberkstion, " a copy of which hp s be en mp iled to the Unit.

4. CLOTHTNG AND EQUIPrENT:

a. Cl-thing and individupl epuipment euthorized to be taken from home stations, both berracks bags, officers' foot lockers and bedding rolls, field ranges end kitchen equwhfbngnt end essentials administrative ecuipment which is to be carried aboard ship, will occompany troop s to the Stagizig Area.

b. Al1 1 organizationel eouipment (including vehicles, other tha n tha t referred to in Paragraph 4a, will be shipppd immedietely, by rail, to the Port. Transportation Officer,. New"York Port of Embarkation, Ba y Ridges Long Island, New York, to arrive not later thin October 10th.

c. The Unit Commander i. s recuestod to wite the Fort Transportation Officer the csar number and cont;nts ofMec cr conteaining organi.zational equipment and vehicles, end the route used, immedipte y uo hxmtof car~s f'rom home station.

NOTE: ATENTTON OF THE UNITS IS DIRECTED TO THE FACT T~FT B.RRaCKS BA-GS P.ND 1MCJRS'BGGEFIDRAGSADKTHNQUPN, INIIa~ EPOS, rA~ ASKS AND HELMETS , OINTMENT, PROTE7N V I .PREN1T E, SH ELL NT BE

-soI- ITS YDC .1ETRSSUB41T.PS FORCE GOAL1 POST-

21 October 1942 T1U TTG 1!EMOP2AADIJ)

1. GRBTV L

a. Durirng trig voyrge every ririleble moment miust be devoted to eve irntensive twtining orogrrm to the ernd rli in dividurls of this coilmmnder will be wmentelly end physically prenrred to rchieve VICTORlY regprdless of the hostile resister e, or nr~vettm-) involved, b. Becr-usp of szncce :li t ti ns ebo- rd shin.~ trrinir.g must be de. centrhlized in order thr^t -p11 mon recerive m-xtmiu'n benefits. Crreful Super- vision by brittclion rnd hir hc' r cormrders is necessry to echi-evo re ~ired strnderd. co Combet term co imnders f-nd commerndrers of trooos -bor~rd rll ships will conduct schools orch ni:-ht to discuss trrining of the day read mrthods of~ treininp' for following dry. N C.O. instructors us-d should cttend theso schools. d. Instruction wll include the following subj ects: (1) Booby Traps., Lecture i-rnd Deronstrrt' ns. Reference: Altteched rmimeogr%-pWsh ,Wbjfect "Booby Traps" under supervision of Engin~e (2) Respect of Custms~ of the Inh bitnnts. Le'ctures. Refereno.; ttacohed mimeogrrn sheo 3 rgr signed by Hobert R. Gey, Colonel, V enprel Ste~ff Cores. (3) Orientetion Lecture. Reference: 1,ttcched lemorsndum, subject, "Vittd Infon t*_ on*7a uct of U. S. Troops, H~ee doue rters Task Force "A", deted October 15, 1942" and namphlet "North Africa." (4) Cemouflege Demonstrrtions end Lectures. Plece Posters in Prominent Pil ces,. f71res ( r Attocshed letter seine subject drted October 13, 1942 (No heading).

(c) "C oneel1ment in Fiel d." (d) Cr mnouflr ge Bulletin No. 125. (e) List of Dot s end Don'ts. (f) "Lecture on" Concerlinent'- Y~o. 2,"Cetdin Army Trrining 1.emorendun Flo, 16, Jul~y 1942. (5) Y4eapcns. (Army) Opere-tio,:, Functioningr, end Firing' Gunrnery (ITv). X7 i1d'- 77 e z~ insrutinwFTFwi 1 include fir ng o -eneb hirm to nnrte -3 wP- pons*- A~n extre crow of soldiers will be- treined for each Nedver M:! gun including heevy Crliber end-:,50 Crliber MG. (Recuest cooperetion of Transport Gunnery Officer.) T'here possible Army AM guns will be mounted on deck to suppTement lT'vrl 111 Guns, Double crews willb( trained end essigned erch of-these guns. (6) Individu.wl Trein .ng in the New Wferoons. Qmb71F e nmndrs *71-^k Tm dipte steps to see that they hrve e proper orgenizrtionrl set-up for tho emnployment end trpining Sf'the rigle enti-trnk grenade end rocket grenade units; Fnd for the individ'u ~raining in their use. These wes-pons should- not be conoentrated, but should be ecuelly distributed throughout the Combat Teem. The 6Qcket grenade is- e vrercpon of opportunity, tadding tro-- mendous fire power tothe Combat Team. Crews should be -trained in the use of is weapon end it should be employed in oombpt, close up in rear Of the -sseult ?letbons where it can be used to supoplement mortrr fire- Os well ¢s to meet any tenk cittrcks thrt mpy Yhrerten the rssFUlt troons. These wrnO-tns should b-e ssigned to companies rnd emprloyed under the ordere of the Thmrry Gommender. There cre rt present 8 of theso werpons r. signed to ech brttr-lior' (7) Deb-rkrtion Drills. a uigti pri od -P 11 units will conduct regalrr scheduled debrrkrtion drills rt lerst twice e-ch d-y for first five drys rnd once Prch dry therprfter till D Dry. (b) Deberk.^tion drills will be c-inducted Ps follows: 1. Pt r specified time rnd rt cipll from ship's spepkDn system troops will rer~ot to borernn str'tion with r l the ervipnent they. ne to ce rry oshore. 2. lit next signel boet groups for 1st wave will move cuickly from their concedled positions below docks to their assigned nets. Each succeeding; wrve will be brought to the nets in rlike menner. The pre- oeeding boat group moving out of the wry so as not to interfere with the mover ment in generel. Borst groups must move to 'their essigned zets with no cross tr~ffic and no confusion. 3. A very ereful rnrlysis of ech ship must be mede by rll commernders :to determine the best bort groun steti_ ins, the best ammunition distribution points rnd the best routes of trrffic, (8) Physical Treinin.F Drill on. Nets rnd Celisthenics with Rifles and Submch '7 P.nets will. be set un on higher decks to enrble th e o clmup dn doyn nets for hrerdening exercises. Troop Commrndlers "e enc-mr~gnd to co)nduct contrsts in nret work, steedle ch-ses -rough rnd rqble fighting -- wrestling . boxing;, etc, 11'ni.m, m of physic'-l training - 2. -hour doily. Individurl combet, rrred nd uinrrrrd should be given snecirl Pttrntion. (9) Identification of Frie~ndly Pirorr ft end IPrrored Vehicles References: ( ) Idontifietion Chrrts. (b) Preinphlet Allied Borco Hendrurrters "Ground Identifi. etion of A~rmored VehicLost," (10) Behaviour if Captured. Reference: v:emorerndum Eeedruartets Task Force "A", drt dct

2. It is believed itht each ship is. sup-plied with certrin Tlotion pidt.. ure Training Films. As Frngerrnts should be mp de with the Executive Officer for the use of such of these-Pfims rs rr -ppropriete.

3. Training Schedules will be nreprred by Troop Oomrirnders of Trrns- povts besed upon the above progrem.. Insneotions will be Tw-d drily by Troop Commrnders to determine thrt the treining schedules r re being followed.

44 Signrl Trrining,

a, Treining of cormunietion personnel nborrd rll shins will be e resnonsibility of rdl Signrl Corps rnd Comunicrtions Officers. ??hsrs the training to, be esnecirlly covered vrer (1) Rm dio Oorrtors 3r Use of lnk cr11 sic ns - Rrdo Se-curity (b) Use of joint lriny- rvy Proc dure. -r 2 (c) Use of joint Aniericrn - British Procedure. (d) Luthentication, Phonetic IAlphebet, (e) Rtdiotellephone operrtion using phonos (EE--A) connecto'" in nets of 3.or 4. (2) 'Messrge Centrer Personnel., (r) U~se of nil t-rpes of node rnd cipher mreteripKL used by the units. Training should be towr~rd F'ccurreoy first en~d speed second, (b) Phonetic Alrhr bet, b. Generrl cl~sses of commuriertion personnel rend r11 officers show be held covering the writing of nessrgeg, !ph-onetic Plhbt prorpr methods c distruction of cryptogrmphic rnd signrl eruinment in the event of erpture, rn, complete nderstrnding by ell concerned of the commrunioetion networks to be i. ste led. c. Drily cheok of items of Sz gnr l Fruipmrnt will be neoes s -ry to insure its prop,-r onerrtion urnon lendin~g.

By commirnd of Brig-dier Gener'-l TRUSCOTT:

DOLT E. CPTRLETON, Colonel, Crvrlry Chief of Strff.

OFF IC LA L:

A/ Van H, -pond VAN H. BOND, i.Nr.j or, Infantry, AC of S, G-3

". 3q. RE~GRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Authority of P'ar.2 Ciroular 150 dated. 28 r.ay

It is requested tha t a 11. concerned be enjoined to comely with the provisions of secrecy in Peregrnph 3a of the "lkistructi.ons Applicable to Units Ordered Oversees,"(Revision 9-1-42), end of Pa regrtnh ib, pege 11, in Secti , I of the "Enberkation Regultions, New York Port of Em~kto,"1-112

For the .Commending, General:

CALVIN DeWjVITT, JR.,O Colonel, General Siaff Corp s, Chief of Stuff.

OFF ICTAL:

s/ H. Wright H.WR IGHT Capts in, T, C, Asst. AC of S, OPD._

DIS TRIBUJTION: Local 1 CG, AGF 1 -CG, SOS 12. AC of S, G--2 VID

2.- " G-4 .1 - Opns. Div, 1AUD. G.S . 1 - Plans Div, S .0. S. 5 - TA G 5 - CG, End P rmored Div 5 - CG, 4th SC 5 - C of Arnored Force 1' The Surgeon General1 12. C of Ord 12. C of Fin 1 -C of ClkZ 1 -C of Eng 1-C Sig 0

2 -QMG 5 - C of T S erv 1 - C of SS Br 2. C of Army Exr Serv 1 -IG 1 - PING 1 - CG, Ft Bragg, N.C.

6 -Old Meh Rods Div, 2nd S C 1 - Pass Branch 2.- Movements Br 5 - CO, Ft Hamilton, N.Y. 12. Lt Col Rowland 1 Major Iffllpch

2. .JAG

1 -Posta 1 Officer

2- __ SFE COPY NO* WAR DEPARTMENT We shington

WD 370.5 (9-30-42) 0BE-S'-E-M October 2, 1942

SUBJECT: MovementOrders, Shipment 3324--W

:AuthT T: A. G.. TO: The Comminding Generel8, In3,1 es______2d Armored Divisions;. :Date: l.24 New York Port of Embirkti on; The Chief of Trpnsportation Corps, Services' of-Supply The Chiefs of Suopiy Services

Lo It is desired ;thpt you take without delry, the Pction for which you are responlsible to prep~re for foreign service end to move the unit end detrchments and vehicles listed below to the New Yok~k Port of Embi'rk- tion (for further movement- by w~ter trrnsriort-stion) 'so es to r'rri've et .- time to be determined by the, port. cenmrnder. The Commend ing Geiaerel, New York Port of Emberk-tidn, will inform the rg~ncies concerned of the time end d-te unit, detrecbments rnd vehicles ocoomn-rying them rre desired Pt the port,

Code Commprder respon- Design -ti on. Present sible for pre-- Approximr~te (Shipment N'o, Strt1_on narrrt nn & move"- Strengths, UNIT end letter) ment to the port 0fT'FVTVe Hqs & Hqs C0,0 .3d 3 2~W F.lrrgg, N" C, d Armd 17 -231 209 Bn, 67th Armd Regt (and other'. stetion Div. (3-1-42) w,/dets of the 2d Armd or stetions if w C.l) Div attchd applicstle (8-.-.42)j (Composition end Sstrengths 'of de. trehments to be deterrined by the CG, 2d f rmd Div. ) In issuing instuctions end dissomineing informnrtion to subordinpte echelons in connection With this order, the gr~et~est core will be exercised to divulge only pertinent portions.

Code designation (Shipment-No. rnd letter) will be used in referring to this movement in Aieu of unit design-ption. (For mril Address, see Por.- 5 .

2. The -Commending General, 2d Prmored Divisi.on,E will design-te the commnnder of this shipment And will incform the Cdmmt'nding Generpl, New York Port of Emb-prket.'on, of the rction trken, without. deley.,4his officor will Derform the duties of P force commrrder _Ps outlined in Inclosure #1 , frd ^s additionally ins trusted. , 1.Z RJAED UNC1I SIFIED bv, Authority of 'far Z, WD; Circular fIN 150 dated. 28 May 1 9 4 6 , ° /.~ O 3. Personnel. The strengths shown in ptr.#l tire eoaproxcimate,-only. The Comnsnding (enersi, 2d Armored. Division, is Puthorized to mpke such adjustments in strength ss he deems necessary within the lifnits imposed by nweilrble shipping speee.

4. This is o PERMNENT chrenge of station.

5', All personnel t~ffected by this order will be informed thpt they will continue to hnve mail addressed Ps et present until receipt of' further instructions.

6. Movement to: the port will be' mr~de in' the ni!rner (ril pnd/or motor) determined by the Commrdng Gener~l, 2d Armored- Division. Pttention invited to W.D. Circular 193, 1942.

0. Direct cormmunicption is puthoriznd, In this c-nnection, see prr. 2, Inclosure #1 (Revision of September 1, 194?).

8. Pertinent pr'rts of' the provisions of Inclosure #1 (Revision of' September 1, 1942) are-wo-olieble to this movement re moftified below: PLO Reference per. 6 Reports on shortpges of' eeutpnwent rlreeidy sub- mitt~d need not be, reported P second time. b, Delete per. 9, g (5).

c, Delete pr r.n 12,, c ,(6)

d. Delete per.. 15, substituting.-therefor:

"15. Personnel YOT to/ eccomipeny Unit.

a. Yo. officers, wrrrent officers or enlisted men of' units rssigned to ur-its in this order will be trensferred therefrom without e~pprov). of' the Commending Generml of the Tosk Force to whicoh this order permins, extent those belonging to the following crtegories:

(1) Th~ose rbsen~t without lerive rind those whose physicrl condition-hre been determined to be such thrt, they will be ur.:ble, to pro- cued. ove-rsees with their unit.

(2) Those werrrnt officers, pnd enlisted men who hr-ve been finelly-selected to Pttend P specific cless rt rrn officer crndi- drte school under P ruotr rlloted by the' lr~r Dep~rtment, in Pecordmn with prrrgretphs 2 b (4) rrnd 8 d, Circular No. 126, IPrr Dfepnrtrnent, 1942.

(3) Those officers, wrrriynt officers rnd en~i. tedl ien who apply for, Pre Pnund rulified for, end rro rccepted for Air Crew (flying) -nd Glider Pilot Trrining.

(4) Enemy Mliens. f

REGROLDD NCL S$IFIED by liuthority of Par 2, VMD Circul.ar 150 dated 28 IHay 1946.9Y (i/{ 'b, With ref erpee to finol selection for Offi.cers Grndi datp Schools 7ird method of tr'-nsfier of ernlisted met., s-e W.D. Ciroulr 126, PApril 28, 1942 end T. D, ircu1l~r 262, Pugust 5, 194210.

c. As 'soon rs prrotio~bl( after rpccirt of wrrning orders unit commenders whrough intrlligence oh'-nnels will furnish to the Military -Intelligence Sevice, Wr r Dep-ortmernt, the xrmrs of individurls in their orgirnizrtioris who Pre de-med to be potentiallyysubversive end are therefore consider-d unfit'for foreign service. The specific facts upon which this determinotion is br~sed should be stated in ea.ch, ese.

d. With reference td instrulctiotans 'frillit-ating the naltur-l . iz~etion of non-citizen members of the firmy of the United Strtes who des ire. to become citzens of the United Stotes, attenrtion is invited to letter,this office, June 9, 1942, AG 014,.32 (5-30-42)A.B, -subject, Naturplizati.on of Certain Non-citizens Serving in the Army of the United States, and letter, this office, -July 28, 1942,EA 014.32 (6-X24-.42)EA..B, same subject

ej In connection with per. 16, a (3) (d) personnel not immunized P ainst Typhus st, present stptions will be so immunited after arrivpl at the port.

f# In par. 17, b, chang? tho-word "Confidentirl" to repad "Secret".

9, Additional Instructions on Clothing, Wm~ipment, Surnlies and Ammuniti on.

a~' To Be Taken from, Present St-ti on.

(1) Clothing (winter only) and individual eriimert will be taken by all unitd Ps prescribed in Table of Brsic 1\lower-ces No. 21, Juno 20, 1942, end eharge No. 1.theireto, as modified br-low:

(a) Reductions:; 4 ~,~~. ~ )~

)JI014AZ Caps, winter .:, $r f .r A~d~k Overshoes, rt . Comforters, ctic-ile

<5A~fl (b) Additions: 4, Gloves, wool OD (one pair Dnr MA, a total of two pairs) Sho*-s, service. (onP npir per EM, a total of three prirs) Socks, light wool (three pairs p er RM, t total of six prs Blankets,wool OD.(onF per individual, a total of three) (Helmets, steel, Mll only will be teken_)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by, Authority of Par' 2, V.'D Citcular 150 dated 28 May 1946..