Armor in the Invasion of North Africa Armor in the invasion of North Africa. Armored School, student research r-port. 1950. Z gj Thi's ocument / IS A HOLDING OF THE ..78/ ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO.N2146. 4 3 COPY NO. I CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-SM 13 Mar 51 /- t. 44$ +-:. .fdft~i:;~"'? ' ~ dt 1tN1 trt l) . A RESEARCH REPORT Prepared at THE ARMORED SCHOOL Fort. Knox Kentucky 1949- 1950 ( to M ( THE ARMORED SCHOOL 4HEADQUARTERS Fort Knox, Kentucky AKAB-4 22 August 1950 SUBJECT.: Letter of Transmittal. T 0 Comimandant Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Enclosed is an additional Research Study, .armior in the Invasion of North Africa, prepared at The Armored School, Which you may retain for your files. FOR TBE ASSISTAN~T COMMDA T0- Inc 1l a/s Lt Col, Inf Secretary w( f, COMBINED ARMS RESEARCHLIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 3 1695 00513 8052 0<.TAT T I : ,r:~A:Gi L uATH AFRICAc (2di AIJi wt DIVISION) A F SEARCH REPORT PRE~PARED BY CCLUVIITTE~ 25, OFFICE ADVANCED CCU RSE THE AM ORE 'SCHOOL 1949 - 1950 LI1Ui?~ ATNf COLONTEL JACK F. * ILI, M7AJOR JOFFPE L. GUE~t"ARD MAJOR LESLIE J. TIARNE.S MAJ OR RALPH N. ROSS MAJOR 1OR0j- R. SEIXTONy 14AJOR J.%tWS F. WIL~IA iS CAPTAINT AROLDP V. AiMIERS ON CAPTAINt JACK P. BRUBAUER CAPTAIN JOSEPH K . GRANT FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY 1AY 1950 TAI3LE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page 1 BAPQKGROUI D * . " a " .. " " " " 1 Strategic Considera'tions . a .' " " " Y Political Coniside~rations . f a" a. " " " " 3 Economic Considerations . ". a a" f a" a " 5 2 PRE.EMKT IONKPHASEPASE. .. .9 , . 12 Over-P11 Plrnnirng a f " . " " "a .a a 12 Training . a. * a * a .* "* . " . , a a 19 3 Lo.pD11 G * a a .: * . a * a " 28 4 OCEA-..P -OVEV1EN T *..... "... .... 53 General Plan. of Ittrck a a , " 54 Trr ining .?b, rd Shin . a a a" a a a 55 Selection o l the Bepchhierds ,aa a a 56 SubTsk Fccs.*.. " ",.. " " 57 Pre-Invrsi~n Tr'-ining . " a " a" a a. a" 59 .Air S jurort a a * . a * a " e a a a " a a a a a 60 jrTf'~l Oner~tions " " a a . a " a " " * . a 61 5 FEDAUP ND 1-.SAL P " "aa " . .aaaaaaa 66 The Lrndiy-,g Pl-n a a .a a f a o . 66 D Dry " & a a a a a a a a a . 69 D Plus 1 . "a a a a a " 76 D Plus 2 . f a f . a a a a a " . 78 D Plus 3 a a a a a a a a a a a a. a a a. 79 Enemy Strength -nd Attitude . a a . .a a . 84 6 TASK FOD:v DLGSTJIM a a a a . a a a a . a a a a 87 .7 LPIYDII GS AT T.IE-DTPPOELT LYP.TJTEY . a a a a 110 Int'plligence a a a " . 110 Operrtionrl Plrn a a a a . 4 117 Operrtions D Dry a a a "a a a a " 123 Operrtions D Plus 1. a a a a a . " 128 Oerrtions DPlus 2 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa 131 Cessrtion of Fostilities a a a a a a 134 8 COT\LU jS LOS ^ NYD RECO 71JPDT-N Da aV a a aN .a 139 Conclusions a a a a a 139. Lecom'lrdrtioris a a a a . a a a a a a a a a a 143 APPEIYDICES I. Order of B^ ttl e Ha Terrr~in _Anrlysis ITTI.Trrining. "morfndum ,Turmbcr 1 (Gori Post) TU. 1ovrment Orders, Shinmwnt 3324 V. 1H1ovr-rrnnt Orders, Ship.nt 3324..)" FOREWORD The expedition to Safi, North Africa was the wildest ad- venture I ever experienced.. While the opposition turned out to be light, the anxiety and suspense were as heavy as I ever felt. We were all so inexperienced.. Men, ammunition and gasoline were loaded together on the same ship. Due to the scarcity of ships of the right type crews of combat vehicles were not on the same ship with their vehicles. The leaders of both the Army and Navy of the expedition had only one thought--winning the campaign--hence cooperation was superior from start to finish. Regardless of the many discouraging factors, the expedition was a success. This brings out the lesson which I later felt proved itself to be true so many times--the picture is never really as dark as it can be painted and the enemy has his troubles also and is scared the same as you are. /s/ Ernest N. Harmon ERIEST N. HAR~ ON MIaj. Gen. (Retired) Liberty Hall, Woolford, Maryland, 10 February 1950 .7 Pt di I t I {4p ** , , All l r, M t 1 thy' ;r PREFACE This report concentrates attention on the use of armor in the invasion of North Africa. It deals primarily with the employment of the 2d Armored Division landing as part of the Western Task Force. It is about an operation that lasted only a short time and against indifferent resistance. Since this report deals with the use of armor, the infantry is referred to only as much as is necessary to insure clarity and continuity. No attempt is made to slight the part played by the infantry which made the initial assaults on the beach and engaged in the major part of the fighting. The fact that the infantry played the major role in the operation does impose certain limitations on the report. Most of the observer reports and other documents avail- able deal primarily with the use of infantry. Due to the shortness of the action a great deal of emphasis is placed on the planning stage of the operation. It is possible that this stage is the most important single phase of an amphibious operation, In any event later experiences in the war proved the necessity for detailed planning in an amphibious operation. The actions reported on are small, independent actions. It is felt that in an amphibious operation the initial employment of armor will be in small actions, There are many limitations to writing a report almost eight years after the action occurred. In the early stages of the war few reports were kept at divisional and lower headquarters. There is no after-action report available for the 2d Airmored Division in this action as there were for later engagements. For the most part memories are vague as to small details. This is no criticism of the people who were so helpful to the committee but the reader must bear in mind that the people who took part in this operation were by means finished with their war experiences. It is unfortunate that this report could not have been written soon after the action occurred, Much of the information is from unofficial reports. No diaries were kept at this time except by higher commanders and these do not fit the purpose of a report of this type. Acknowled gements, The committee wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the many individuals who assisted in making this report. yWVithour their help in sending narratives and personal files of documents the report could not have been written. Names of those who contributed information and assistance in the preparation of this report: Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes Gol., Ralph J. Butcher Lt, Gen, Lucien K. Truscott Col. Don E. Carleton Maj. Gen, Jonathan W. Anderson Cola Hugh J. Fitzgerald Miaj. Gen, Hobart R. Gay Col. Elton F. Hammond Maj, Gen. Ernest N. Harmon Col, Paul D. Harkins Ma. Gen. Albert W. Kenner Col, Kent C. Lambert Maj. Gen. Isaac D. White Col,. Thomas H. Nixon Brig. Gen. John F. Conklin Lt. Col; Lewis M. Flint Brig. Gen. Walter J., Buller Lt. Col. Frank M. Muller Brig. Gen. Harry H. Semmes Mlaj 4 Norris H. Perkins Col. 3 illiam R, Buster M,1aj. Alvin T. Netterblad, Jr. Capt. M.2ax R. M1achinicke CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND On 8 November 1941, elements of the 2d Armored Division began unloading at three locations in FRENCH MOROCCO. Although the armored units were not to be used in the actual assault they were landed early and played a vital part in the actual success of the invasion. This operation was conducted with speed of training and planning which proved an example for all such operations later in the war when troops were better trained, techniques improved, better and more adequate equipment available, and time: for planning more adequate. Before going into the part played by the 2d Armored Division in Operation TORCH it is necessary to show some of the reasons for the "most daring operation- to date in World War II." 1 SEVASTOPOL, last Russian stronghold in the CRIEA, had fallen to the Germans. President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were insisting that Russia be kept in the war.2 On 20 June 1942 TOBRUK fell to the Germans in only one day. 3 The British feared that the 4 Germans and Japanese would join forces somewhere east of the Red Sea. Strategic Considerations The President of the United States and the Prime Miinister of Great Britain had made the decision that our resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan. 5 The Middle East was the southern supply route to the U.S.S.R. and the main air ferry route to INDIA. The key to the Middle East was EGYPT: the best hostile avenue to the Persian Gulf. Here also was the most convenient base for reenforcing any threatened part of the Middle Eastern Area.