Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher’s Epistemological Objection

A Master’s Thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master’s in Philosophy

Christopher S. Meyer

August 2019

© 2019 Christopher S. Meyer. All Rights Reserved. 2

This Thesis entitled

Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher’s Epistemological Objection

by

CHRISTOPHER S. MEYER

has been approved for

the Philosophy Department

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

James M. Petrik

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Florenz Plassmann

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

MEYER, CHRISTOPHER S., MA in Philosophy, August 2019, Philosophy

Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher’s Epistemological Objection

Director of Master’s Thesis: James M. Petrik

This thesis defends John Danaher’s version of the Epistemological Objection to

Divine Command Theory (DCT). This objection asserts that DCT fails as a metaethical theory of moral obligation due to the fact that there is a group of persons, reasonable nonbelievers, who have knowledge of moral obligations while lacking the knowledge of divine commands required in DCT. The first part of this thesis focusses on this objection and explains how it applies to DCT.

An underlying assumption of Danaher’s defense is the existence of reasonable nonbelievers, persons who do not violate epistemic duties in their nonbelief. The latter portion of this thesis defends the existence of such persons by considering and responding to the challenge that all nonbelievers violate at least one epistemic duty since their nonbelief is the produce of the culture in which they are immersed as opposed to rationally informed inquiry. In response to this challenge, it is shown that the existence of reasonable nonbelievers is the default position and that the burden of proof is on those claiming that all nonbelief is unreasonable. It is also noted that the high number and wide range of cases that qualify for nonbelief render the prospect of showing that all nonbelief is unreasonable rather bleak. Having shown that the cultural bias challenge is left wanting and that we should accept the existence of reasonable nonbelievers, the thesis concludes the epistemological objection stands as a as serious challenge to divine command theory. 4

DEDICATION

Dedicated to Dr. Tom Christenson

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my advisor, Dr. James Petrik. I truly appreciate the guidance and generosity throughout this process.

In addition to my advisor, I would also like to thank the rest of my committee: Dr.

Jack Bender and Dr. Alfred Lent, for your encouragement, insightful commentary, and enlightening questions.

Finally, I would like to express my great appreciation to my colleagues for their continued support and insightful discussions on this journey.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract ...... 3 Dedication ...... 4 Acknowledgments...... 5 Section 1: Introduction ...... 7 Section 1.1: Divine Command Theory and the Epistemological Objection ...... 7 Section 2: The Epistemological Objection ...... 11 Section 2.1: What is the Epistemological Objection? ...... 11 Section 2.2: The Argument ...... 11 Section 2.3: The First Premise ...... 12 Section 2.4: The Second Premise...... 18 Section 2.5: The Content-Not-Source Response ...... 20 Section 2.6: Evans’s Modified Content-Not-Source Response ...... 24 Section 2.7: The Probability-Possibility Response ...... 27 Section 3: Reasonable Nonbelievers ...... 34 Section 3.1: Are There Reasonable Nonbelievers?...... 34 Section 3.2: Examples of Violations of Epistemic Duty ...... 35 Section 3.3: Nonbelief as a Result of Cultural Immersion ...... 38 Section 3.4: Responding to the Cultural Bias Explanation of Nonbelief ...... 40 Section 4: Conclusion ...... 45 References ...... 47

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

Section 1.1: Divine Command Theory and the Epistemological Objection

Divine Command Theory (DCT) or Divine Command Theories (DCTs) are a class of metaethical theories that explain the ultimate origin of some set of moral facts through God’s commands. It is a term, as Mark Murphy explains, that applies to “a family of metaethical theories, each of which is concerned with accounting for, explaining, or grounding the existence of one or more specific moral facts by reference to

God’s commands.”1

To fully understand the range and nature of DCTs, it is important to distinguish between two types of moral facts: value-based and deontic facts. The former have to do with whether or not a state of affairs is good, bad, or neutral. The latter are related to whether or not a state of affairs is obligatory, forbidden, permissible, or supererogatory.

While it is possible for DCTs to be formulated for both types of facts, this is, according to

John Danaher, not the norm. Typically what a DCT offers is an explanation of deontic facts such that, “God’s commands are now thought to ground a limited set of moral facts, most typically the fact that some actions are obligatory, while other aspects of God’s nature are thought to account for other moral facts.”2

Given this focus on deontic facts, one common approach to express DCTs is to understand them as involving some version of the following claim; “if x is morally

1 Danaher, p. 2. The description quoted by Danaher originates from Murphy (2012) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-theological/. It should be noted that Danaher’s article is forthcoming, and page numbers refer to the page numbers of the draft copy Danaher made available online and not the page numbers they will be assigned once formally published. 2 Danaher, p. 3. 8 obligatory, then x is commanded by God,” where God commanding x is understood as the cause and grounds for x being morally obligatory.3 A slightly stronger version of this claim would be to understand the relation as a biconditional thus: “x is morally obligatory if and only if God issues a command.” Whereas the weaker version leaves open the possibility that God might issue a command that does not create moral obligation, the stronger version eliminates this possibility. In both of these forms, however, DCT is committed to holding that the only way a moral obligation is created is through an explicit command given by God. This is a claim found in all major forms of DCT and is the common core of such theories John Danaher needs in advancing the epistemological objection against DCT.

As formulated by Danaher, the epistemological objection states that “DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God’s commands.”4 Since DCT holds that God’s commands are the only way moral obligations are created and that obligations can only be binding on agents if the agents are aware of the commands that create obligations, DCT entails that any agents who are ignorant of

God’s commands are not subject to moral obligations. This is a problematic upshot of

DCT since there are many apparently competent agents – Danaher calls them reasonable

3 See, for example, Morriston (2009), who asserts that divine command metaethics must hold that the moral obligations of all persons are fixed by God’s commands. Hence, no command means no moral obligations. This point, although not explicitly made by Danaher, seems to be an implied assumption within DCT, as allowing other metaethical theories to ground moral obligations would be a defeater against DCT as formulated in this discussion. As we will see later in the thesis, this causes issues for DCT, as this formulation is unable to account for the fact that we have persons, reasonable nonbelievers, who are morally obligated yet lack a divine command. 4 Danaher, “In Defense of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory.” Forthcoming in Sophia, p. 1 9 nonbelievers – who do not believe in God’s existence, and are, consequently, ignorant of

God’s commands and thus would be exempt from moral obligations on DCT. It is, however, highly implausible to hold that there is a class of competent agents who are not subject to moral obligations; thus, the epistemological objection ties DCT to a highly implausible implication.

For this thesis, we are focusing on two tasks. The first is to provide a clear reconstruction of Danaher’s epistemological objection, with some attention paid to refining a few problematic points in his version, as well as responding to critiques raised against it.

Once we have explained Danaher’s argument, the focus will shift to the second task of defending a critical presupposition of the argument: the existence of reasonable nonbelievers. For his part, Danaher merely assumes that there are such individuals. He also notes that this might be a point where an advocate of DCT could push back against the epistemological objection. That is, the proponent of DCT might “challenge the reality of reasonable nonbelievers.”5 In the second half of this thesis, I attempt to block this potential avenue of escape from the epistemological objection. My argument starts by clarifying how “reasonable” and “unreasonable” are used in this context and then proceeds to consider and respond to the challenge that there cannot be any reasonable nonbelievers because their nonbelief is arrived at through a cultural bias and thus violates an epistemic duty to form one’s belief through a fair consideration of the evidence.

5 Danaher, p. 29 10

Having presented a refined version of Danaher’s epistemological objection and defended a key assumption behind the objection, the thesis concludes that the epistemological objection stands as a serious and presently unanswered challenge to divine command theory.

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SECTION 2: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTION

Section 2.1: What is the Epistemological Objection?

Recall that Danaher states that this objection shows that “DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God’s commands.”6

DCT, according to Danaher, entails that an obligation exists for an agent only if the agent has specific knowledge of both the obligation-creating command and its proper source

(namely God), and that lacking this knowledge leaves one in the position of not being able to differentiate between moral obligations and supererogatory acts;7 thus, an agent’s possessing this knowledge is an essential part of the creation of moral obligations via

God’s commands. This requirement of knowledge, not only of the command itself, but also that the command is of the proper source, is what leaves DCT open to the epistemological objection. This epistemic condition on God’s creation of moral obligations runs afoul of the fact that there are reasonable nonbelievers who are subject to moral obligations and yet do not possess the requisite knowledge. That, at any rate, is

Danaher’s allegation. Let us look at how he builds his case.

Section 2.2: The Argument

Danaher begins by giving a canonical statement of the epistemological objection to divine command theory as follows:

P1: DCTs, either explicitly or implicitly, include an epistemic condition in

their account of moral obligation, viz. you must either know or successfully

6 Danaher, p. 1 7 Danaher, p. 3 12

receive communication (implying knowledge) of divine commands in order

to be morally bound.8

P2: There are such things as reasonable nonbelievers (i.e. nonbelievers who

do not violate any epistemic duty in their nonbelief) and for those

reasonable nonbelievers, satisfaction of the epistemic condition of DCT is

not possible.9

C: Therefore, on DCT, there are no moral obligations for reasonable

nonbelievers.10

Given that the conclusion is implausible – it seems clear that there are reasonable nonbelievers who are subject to moral obligations – the argument above serves as an indirect refutation of DCT; that is, the argument shows that DCT entails an untenable conclusion. We next discuss each premise in turn.

Section 2.3: The First Premise

The first premise asserts there is a knowledge requirement involved in all forms of DCT. Due to the dependency between a divine command being communicated and the creation of a moral obligation, an agent knowing the nature and source of a command is a necessary condition for the creation of an obligation.

Danaher is quite explicit on this point.

It is important to understand what this means. It is not simply that it would

be a good or desirable thing for people to know what God has

8 Danaher, p. 4 9 Danaher, p. 5 10 Danaher, p. 6 13

commanded. It is that without knowledge of the command, moral

obligations fail to exist.11

Danaher presents three arguments to show that DCT requires an epistemic condition as specified in the P1. The first of these refers to the prominent version of

DCT defended by Robert Adams (1999), a highly influential version that explicitly includes an epistemic condition. Adams’s version is rooted in social and communicative requirements. The social requirement is an interpersonal relationship between two (or more) individuals, in this case God and the recipient of the command.12 The communicative requirement is comprised of Adams’s three components constituting a divine command. These components are the following:

A1: A divine command will always involve a sign, as we may call it, that is

intentionally caused by God

A2: In causing the sign, God must intend to issue a command, and what is

commanded is what God intends to command thereby

A3: The sign must be such that the intended audience could understand it as

conveying the intended command13

In sum, in order for one to know they have a moral obligation, the person must be explicitly told what is being required of them, and this is communicated

11 Danaher, p. 5. Additionally, Danaher states that this way of understanding the creation of moral obligation and the requirement of knowing the obligation originates in a divine command indicates and intimate connection between the ontological component and the epistemological component of divine command theory. This connection is continued through Danaher’s work, and the discussion of how a thing comes to be and how we come to know a thing is discussed further in the “content-not-source” response to Danaher’s objection. 12 Danaher, p. 5 13 Danaher, p, 12. See also Adams (1999) 14 through a divine command (often by way of a sign). Moreover, the only entity with the authority to issue such a command is God. This requires that the person being commanded know of, or have access to, God’s commands. The epistemic condition, Danaher points out, is thus built into the communicative standard of

Adams’s version of DCT. Anyone wanting to defend this version would have to accept P1 as presented by Danaher.

Though Adams’s version is highly influential, there are other versions of

DCT;14 thus, pointing out that Adams is committed to an epistemic condition does not show other versions of DCT are similarly committed. Recall that Danaher says his objection applies to all forms of DCT as metaethical theories. The second and third of Danaher’s arguments for an epistemic condition widens his case in that they are arguments that would apply to any version of DCT.

The second argument points to two widely endorsed metaethical principles, each of which entails a knowledge component.

The first principle is that moral obligations must be inherently motivating that is, they must have the capacity to move a person towards actions that satisfy the relevant obligation. However, if a person is ignorant of the command, and by extension is ignorant of the obligation, it is unclear how these divinely created moral obligations can play a role in motivating that person to act. On this point, it

14 One such example that Danaher answers is provided by Philip Quinn (1978, 2006), who says that knowledge of the content and the source of the command are separable, and one can be obligated with only the command content, while finding out the source at a later time. Danaher answers this by saying there is still an epistemic component, and that the epistemological objection is modified, not rejected, on Quinn’s account. The “Content-Not-Source” section of the thesis goes into a more detailed discussion. 15 seems that the epistemic condition is required so that a person has the proper knowledge that would motivate them towards fulfilling the obligation given in the command.

The second metaethical principle is that ought implies can; that is, in order for a person to be morally obligated in a situation, it must be possible for the person to act in a way that satisfies the obligation.15 This principle entails a general knowledge requirement such that, in order for a person to have the ability to act on an obligation, they must not only be able to act in a way to satisfy the obligation, but also be able to know what the obligation demands of them.16 When applied to

DCT, Danaher alleges, this means an individual must be aware of the obligation- creating divine command in order to act upon it; thus, the obligation exists for the individual only if the individual is aware of the obligation-creating divine command.

The third and final argument Danaher gives for a knowledge requirement revolves around contemporary work in metaethics and the assumption that a metaethical theory requires a plausible account of how we come to know moral facts.17 Danaher exemplifies this by discussing the debate in metaethics between the non-natural realists18 and the antirealists19 regarding how moral facts come to be known.

15 The origin of this principle is attributed to Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. (1998), A548/B576. 16 Danaher, p. 8 17 Danaher, p. 9 18 See, for example, Erik Wielenberg (2014), 19 See, for example, Richard Joyce (2006) 16

For the non-natural realist, moral facts are abstract, mind-independent, and metaphysically necessary features of reality that do not depend for their existence on other more basic metaphysical facts. By contrast, antirealists claim that moral facts are constructed out of practical realities shared by most people. The problem for the non- natural realist is that their position fails to provide a plausible account of moral epistemology, or so the antirealists argue. The non-natural realists do tend to agree that we must have epistemic access to moral truths, but the challenge they face is explaining how this comes to be the case. For the non-natural realist, the agreement between moral facts and the fact that we have knowledge of non-natural moral facts appears to be inexplicable, a lucky or random turn in which we evolved naturalistically cognitive faculties that track non-natural moral facts. Realists, of course, attempt to dispel the ad hoc feel of this stipulated correlation by offering explanations of how the correlation might have naturally emerged. Danaher, however, is not interested in taking a side on this particular debate; rather, he uses it to show that both sides of the debate believe that metaethical theories must have a plausible account of how we come to know moral facts and thus subscribe to an epistemic condition in their metaethics.20 Without an account of how we come to know moral facts, a metaethical theory is much less plausible.

For Danaher, the proponent of DCT is in the same position as the non-natural realist; they can ignore moral epistemology if they desire, focusing on what the command is and not how we come to know the command, but this would mean that the attempt to provide a grounds for our morality is lacking, thus leaving the theory much less plausible.

20 Danaher, p. 9. See also David Enoch (2011), a non-natural realist who also makes this contention. 17

This response falls a bit short of directly supporting P1 of the epistemological objection.

That a metaethical theory lacks an epistemology of obligation shows that there is an epistemic condition on the plausibility of the metaethical theory; however, it does not show that every metaethical theory is committed to holding that the ontology of obligation involves an epistemic condition. Nonetheless, even though this argument does not directly support P1, it does call into question any version of DCT that includes no account of how all moral agents come to know their obligations. Moreover, it seems that not knowing these moral facts originate from God, which are the grounds offered in

DCT, hinders a critical component of DCT; namely, moral obligations are grounded in reference to God’s commands. It would seem, then, that one cannot dismiss how we come to know of our moral obligations if one wants to promote DCT.21

Having completed this review of Danaher’s arguments to show that the existence of moral obligations is contingent on an epistemic condition that must be satisfied by any agent subject to these obligations, we will now discuss Danaher’s defense of the second premise that asserts the existence of competent agents, his reasonable nonbelievers, who could not satisfy the epistemic condition of a DCT.

21 Recall that part of Danaher’s goal with this argument is to show there is a connection between the epistemic component and the ontological component of moral facts. However, the above argument does not make this case as strongly as Danaher would like it to. While it does show there is an epistemic component, as presented, in the type of plausible metaethical theory that Danaher is discussing, the ontological component is not as developed. This does not mean we should dismiss this part of Danaher’s argument. Instead, we should take note that, if Danaher is correct in his commentary on this discussion of metaethical theories, then there would still be an epistemic component in DCT that must be accounted for if DCT wants to remain a plausible metaethical theory. Danaher’s point is that DCT is a much less plausible theory if it lacks the connection of the epistemic component and the ontological component. While he does appear correct that the theory is less plausible while lacking the epistemic component, we should be cautious against making the additional leap in ascribing the ontological component as well. 18

Section 2.4: The Second Premise

The epistemological objection states that there are certain moral agents, namely, reasonable nonbelievers, who lack epistemic access to God’s commands. Consequently, according to DCT, either they do not know or cannot know that there are moral obligations. This would imply that reasonable nonbelievers are a class of competent agents who are not subject to moral obligations. This, however, seems clearly false.22

There are in fact reasonable nonbelievers who have, and act on, moral obligations, without having any knowledge of being commanded by God. Remember that P2 of

Danaher’s epistemological objection says the following:

There are such things as reasonable nonbelievers (i.e. nonbelievers who do

not violate any epistemic duties in their nonbelief) and for those

reasonable nonbelievers, satisfaction of the epistemic condition of DCT is

not possible.23

This premise is divided into two assertions. The first is that there are in fact reasonable nonbelievers. Danaher assumes this point for the sake of argument; however, I will provide a defense of this claim in the next section. The second assertion is that these reasonable nonbelievers lack epistemic access to God’s commands.

To defend the second assertion of the second premise, Danaher begins by restating what he means by reasonable nonbelievers, namely, persons who do not believe in God and who “violate no epistemic duties in their nonbelief.”24 It follows from this

22 Danaher, p. 4 23 Danaher, p. 5 24 Danaher, p. 11 19 definition, according to Danaher, that reasonable believers “cannot interpret anything in the world as being a command emanating from God,” since they deny the existence of the very being necessary for the possibility of such commands.25 In phrasing the matter thus,

Danaher is guilty of being a bit careless. He notes that reasonable nonbelievers cannot interpret anything as a command from God, a claim that suggests that a nonbeliever cannot engage in interpretive acts relevant to the texts and doctrines of various religious traditions. While it may be what he intended, I think the claim would be more plausible if

Danaher instead explicitly said that reasonable nonbelievers do not accept anything as a command from God. This allows for the reasonable nonbeliever to engage with the available religious texts and religious authorities, perhaps even being trained to read the texts in their original languages,26 yet still reject the claim that anything is a command from God.

Setting this minor qualm aside, it is clear that Danaher believes the basic argument for the assertion that reasonable nonbelievers do not have knowledge of divine commands is quite simple. “The prima facie defense of it,” Danaher writes, “is straightforward: reasonable nonbelievers do not believe in God. Consequently, they cannot interpret anything in the world as being a command from God.”27

Having stated a basic justification for this part of P2, thereby showing DCT entails an implausible conclusion, and that we have an indirect refutation of DCT,

25 Danaher, p. 10 26 Bart Ehrman (Chapel Hill) is a scholar I would offer as an example of a reasonable nonbeliever who is not only trained in reading the texts, but a former believer as well. 27 Danaher, p. 10 20

Danaher proceeds to consider two responses by advocates of DCT: the content-not- source response and the probability-possibility response. Each will be taken in turn in the next sections.

Section 2.5: The Content-Not-Source Response

The “content-not-source” response states that being morally accountable requires only that one know what is being commanded, but not necessarily the source of the command.28 Moreover, moral obligations can be presented in ways that do not make explicit reference to their being grounded in commands from God.

One variant of the content-not-source response is offered by Adams (1999), who, as we saw earlier, lays out the following as the components for the successful communication of a divine command.

A1: A divine command will always involve a sign, as we may call it, that is

intentionally caused by God.

A2: In causing this sign, God must intend to issue a command, and what is

commanded is what God intends to command thereby.

A3: The sign must be such that the intended audience could understand it as

conveying the intended command.

Taken together, these three components create a proper divine command that is successfully communicated in such a way as to create a moral obligation. The first two components are unproblematic for Danaher as far as the epistemological objection is concerned. Consequently, he focusses his critique on A3.

28 Danaher, p. 13 21

To see why Danaher thinks A3 is problematic, we must first elaborate a bit more on the nature of the content-not-source response. According to this response, recipients of commands need only know the content of the commands, and not necessarily the source of those commands in order to be morally obligated. Moreover, there are a variety of ways in which these commands can be communicated (different types of ‘signs’). God could, for example, command us via moral conscience. If this is true, then proponents of

DCT are given a possible avenue of escape from the epistemological objection. So long as an agent receives a command and interprets it as a command and not just a suggestion, the agent can be said to know what is being commanded of them even while being ignorant of its source.29

To exemplify the plausibility of being able to separate knowledge of a command from knowledge of its source, consider a traffic law that mandates stopping at a red light.

Let us suppose that the only entity with the proper authority to issue that command and create an obligation is the state legislature by way of issuing a legislative decree; however, I am ignorant of how laws are created and don’t know anything about the ultimate source of the obligation to stop at red lights. Nevertheless, my driving instructor says that I am to stop at all red lights, and I take this directive to heart. The content of the command is known to me, and followed as if it were an obligation, even if I, as a driver,

29 When it comes to moral conscience, the nonbeliever can simply intuit an obligation from “the voice in their head,” and awareness of God is not necessary to the nonbeliever. On DCT, however, this does not suffice to create a moral obligation, since this creation requires a divine command. Hence, if “the voice in your head” of the nonbeliever is not God, then no moral obligation is created in a DCT framework. The obvious problem here is that the nonbeliever can intuit, and follow, obligations without knowledge of God’s commands. If the theist wants to say that “the voice in your head” really is God, and not simply an “intuition,” this would require that the theist show the intuition originates from God; hence, there is still an epistemic component. 22 have no idea that the command originates in a legislative decree. I am acting on a legal obligation while its source remains unknown to me.

Similarly, one might become aware of the content of a moral imperative while being ignorant that it originated in a command from God. On the content-not-source response, this knowledge of the command content would suffice for adhering to an obligation because an agent does in fact know of the command’s existence and considers themselves obligated to follow the command, even though they are unaware that it was commanded by God.30

Danaher, however, is unconvinced by this maneuver and points out there is a difficulty that stems from how one reads Adams’s third component. On Adams’s presentation, while an agent must know the content of the command, it seems that they must also know the form of the command; that is, an agent must know that they are being commanded to do something. This is problematic because it seems unlikely that a nonbeliever can know both the content and form of a divine command while denying

God’s existence. To return to my previous example, I must know that I am being

30 One might ask why one should feel obligated to follow a command from an unknown source. Danaher discusses this in greater detail (pg. 19) with an example from Evans (2013), but the essence is this. Someone comes across a sign, located on the border between Iraq and Iran. The sign commands that no one leaves the current path. Now, you have no way of knowing who is making this command, but you feel obligated to follow it (out of fear of repercussions). Proponents of DCT make a similar claim about communicated commands that lack the source of the command being known. While we do not go into detail in this thesis, the essence of Danaher’s rebuttal to this is that it unjustly assumes a shared background (we all know the dangers of the Iraq/Iran border). This idea of shared background cannot be assumed between the believer and nonbeliever, so this particular response does not present a challenge to the epistemological objection, as one would still need to know if a command originates from God on this analogy for DCT to succeed. 23 commanded to stop at a red light, and not that this is just helpful advice, concerning, say, cautious or courteous driving.

This point can be stressed further by modifying the example of stopping at a red light given above. Consider the following: you are coming up on a red light, and the roads are perfectly clear – there are no cars, no persons crossing the crosswalk, and no stoplight cameras. You haven’t (yet) been informed by the proper source that there is an obligation to stop at the light; all you have is the memory of the directive given to you by the driving instructor. If you wanted, you could “blow through the light,” without posing a risk to anyone; however, you feel a twinge of moral conscience and stop at the light.

While it might be thought that you are acting on a legal obligation in such a case, you are not clear on whether a command has been issued at all. This twinge of conscience may simply be you recollecting the directive of your driving instructor. Moreover, even if you do interpret the directive as an actual command, unless you know the instructor has the authority to issue the command or is legitimately acting as an agent for those who do have the proper authority, knowledge that the driving instructor has issued a command does not result in the imposition of a legal obligation.

We can shed further light on this issue by returning to Adams and his modified divine command theory. This version insists that God has the right nature31to issue moral directives. These moral directives can be expressed in many ways, such as our moral conscience or culturally shared practices. While it may be the case that God can issue moral directives in a variety of ways, this would not satisfy the requirement of DCT –

31 Or “right authority.” See Quinn (1978) 24 which grounds moral facts in God’s commands – as any of these ways would not create a moral obligation unless it is known that the directive does in fact come from God. Relate this back to our stoplight example. The state legislature is the only proper authority for creating legal obligations, and a decree must be given to create said legal obligations.

However, like the variety of signs God could give, the directive to stop at a red light could be given a variety of ways: a driving instructor, a police officer, or a driver’s education manual. While all of these are ways in which the command can be made known to us, unless we also know that the state legislature has passed a decree and that these outlets have the seal of approval of the legislature, it is unclear if a legal obligation to stop at a red light has in fact been created. In the same way, this version of the content- not-source response leaves moral obligations unclear until one knows that any command issued has the proper authority, God, backing them.

Section 2.6: Evans’s Modified Content-Not-Source Response

Danaher next considers whether the problem with Adams’s version of the content-not-source response is a function of Adams building into his version an explicit recognition that one is being commanded. Perhaps a more extreme content-not-source response that separates knowledge of the content even from awareness that it is a command can avoid the worries raised above. In fact, such a version of the content-not- source response has been proposed by C. Stephen Evans (2013).32 For Evans, if a one wants to be a proponent of DCT, one must;

32 Evans, C. Stephens. “God and Moral Obligations,” (2013). Oxford University Press. 25

Defend the claim that God’s commands can generate obligations even for those

who do not recognize those commands as coming from God. To do this, two

distinctions must be made. First, one must distinguish between a recognition of a

moral obligation and the recognition of a moral obligation as a divine command.

This distinction in turn requires that one distinguish a recognition of a moral

obligation from an explanation of the existence of a moral obligation. The

defender of DCT… must hold that it is possible for a reasonable non-believer to

recognize a moral obligation without realizing the obligation is in fact a divine

command. This ignorance… may prevent the non-believer from being able to give

an adequate explanation of the existence of the moral obligation, but there are

many cases in which a person may reasonably accept the existence of something

but lack an adequate explanation of the existence of something.33

Thus, in Evans’s response, recognition of moral obligations can be separated from an explanation of the origin of these obligations. This separation makes it possible for a proponent of DCT to hold that there are reasonable nonbelievers who are aware of their moral obligations and thus subject to those obligations while being ignorant of the ultimate source of those obligations.

According to Danaher, however, this proposed separation of the recognition of moral obligation from an explanation of its origin is not possible on DCT. Danaher first distills the essence of Evans’s response more concisely as follows:

33 Evans, pp. 112 – 113. 26

On DCT, a reasonable nonbeliever can have knowledge of a moral

obligation M, provided that they can recognize M is a moral obligation;

they do not need to have an adequate explanation of why M is a moral

obligation in order to have the requisite knowledge.34

To show why this separation is not possible, Danaher draws an analogy to someone who wishes to only consume organic food.35 Such a person may be able to recognize something as “food” but in order to know that the food they desire is properly organic, a customer would not only have to see indicating markers (such as a packaging label), but also know the method of organic food production to know that the food they want to consume is, in fact, organic. The process not only explains why the food is organic but is also essential for the consumer to know that the food is organic.

For Danaher, a person knowing that they are under a moral obligation without knowing (a) that a moral obligation must originate in a divine command and (b) that a certain rule originated in a divine command, would be like a person knowing that food is organic without knowing (a) what organic means and (b) that a certain food was produced in a way specified as organic.

Once again, the problem comes down to the need to know the proper source of an alleged moral obligation. In order for an agent to know that an obligation is a genuine moral obligation, the agent must be able to explain that the obligation has been created by a command from God. This, in turn, would require having epistemic access to that

34 Quoted by Danaher, pp. 16-17 35 Danaher, p. 18 27 command. Knowing the content only goes so far without the proper source. On DCT, recognition and explanation of moral facts are thus not separable in the way required to avoid the epistemological objection.

Having handled this understanding of Evans’s content-not-source response to the epistemological objection, Danaher next addresses a very different way of understanding the response Evans offers. Though he – Danaher – is unsure whether this different way is what Evans had in mind, Danaher believes it is a potentially serious response to the epistemological objection and thus must be considered in a complete defense of the objection. This potential response and Danaher’s answer to it are the subject of the next section.

Section 2.7: The Probability-Possibility Response

The second response – which Danaher calls the risk asymmetry argument – attempts to show that a person who assigns a low probability to God’s existence, and thus cannot be said to believe, let alone know, that God exists, might still nonetheless be subject to moral obligations imposed by God’s commands if the following conditions are met: (a) following the presumed command imposes no significant risk of harm and (b) not following the assumed command has potentially severe consequences. In such a situation, it might be correct to think that the person has reason to follow the obligation that would be created by a command even though they don’t know God exists or that God is the source of the command. Danaher develops this challenge in light of contemporary 28 work in moral uncertainty, noting that what is presented is effectively a moral version of

Pascal’s Wager.36

To develop the risk asymmetry objection to his own second premise, Danaher introduces two examples common in the contemporary literature on moral uncertainty.37

Poisoning: Alice is caring for her sick friend Bob. She has a bottle containing

what she believes to be useful but non-essential medication. But she is only 90%

certain of this. She knows that there is a 10% risk that the bottle contains a lethal

poison that would instantly kill Bob.

Vegetarianism: Rotimi is invited to a meal at her friend’s house. Steak is on the

menu, but there is also a vegetarian option. She is 90% certain that eating meat is

morally permissible but accepts that there is a 10% risk that eating meat is

gravely morally wrong (nearly as bad as killing and eating an innocent human

being).

The first example emphasizes factual uncertainty – whether or not it is true that the medicine is lethal – while the morality of the case is not in question. Alice may be uncertain about the contents of the medicine, but there is no question about the morality of killing Bob. Many people agree that the facts of the matter should influence the outcome we decide on, especially if the facts indicate an outcome that would be a grave moral failing. Other things being equal, we know that Alice should not kill Bob. Since the medicine is non-essential and administering it poses a 10 percent chance of a lethal

36 Danaher, p. 24 37 Danaher, p. 22 29 outcome, it is clear that Alice should not risk giving Bob the medicine. To do so would be like playing “Russian Roulette” with, say, a bottle of Tylenol where every tenth pill is a cyanide capsule.

The second example involves a case of moral uncertainty; that is, one is uncertain about the moral standing of a particular action – in this case, the moral permissibility of eating meat. The situation is as follows: Rotimi is certain that there is nothing morally objectionable about not eating meat; however, she is uncertain whether eating meat is a serious moral transgression and assigns a ten percent chance to that probability. In this case, Rotimi should refrain from eating meat since (a) there is no harm in her refraining from eating meat and (b) not refraining stands a ten percent chance of her committing a serious moral transgression. Essentially, given two choices, one of which involves a non- negligible probability of making a seriously immoral choice, while the other choice is obviously permissible, an agent should not make the choice that would risk committing a seriously immoral act.

According to proponents of this response, this type of asymmetry regarding moral uncertainty also applies to assessing the risk of obeying (or disobeying) a divine command. Assume that a similar risk analysis is run on a presumed command, where you are 90% certain the command is not from a legitimate source. This of course means that there is a 10% chance the command is from a legitimate source. Following the examples above, this should suffice to create a moral obligation, especially when the repercussions for disobeying a legitimate command are severe and the repercussions for disobeying an illegitimate command are trivial. Given the severity of disobeying a legitimate command, 30 one should follow the command even if one cannot verify its source. For the believer, this seems rather clear. Presumably, the nonbeliever should also adopt the same reaction to the severe implications of disobeying a legitimate command. Ten percent may seem to be a comparatively low probability, but the seriousness of the repercussions should suffice to generate an obligation to obey the presumed command. In such circumstances, even if the nonbeliever cannot be said to know that the command comes from God, they are still subject to the obligation.

Danaher raises four points against this type of response. The first is an issue in theology, where it seems God is risking excluding certain persons from being moral agents. The second focusses on the problematic nature of the alleged role moral uncertainty plays in our decision making. The third response revolves around the slippery slope of accepting non-negligible probabilities. Finally, the fourth response notes that some reasonable nonbelievers assign a vanishingly low probability to God’s existence.

Regarding the first response, the theist must explain why God would not issue explicit and unmistakable commands and thereby avoid running the risk of excluding certain persons entirely from the realm of moral accountability. Danaher anticipates that theists might address this concern with a strategy often used to address the problem of divine hiddenness; namely, they might say God’s not issuing explicit and unmistakable commands respects human freedom and allows us the chance to develop freely as morally responsible agents. Having anticipated this response, Danaher argues that it fails because it defeats its own rationale. Without a direct command from God, there is the risk that an agent would never come to know any obligations and thus no obligations would 31 exist for the agent. This means there would be no starting point from which an agent can morally develop.38

Danaher’s second response points out that the impact moral uncertainty plays in our obligations is highly disputed. While it is argued that we should not risk immoral outcomes based on a degree of probability that such an outcome is possible, it has also been argued that such uncertainty does not alter the content of our obligations.

Weatherson, for example, argues that if one incorporates moral uncertainty into one’s moral deliberation in the manner described above, the result is a type of moral fetishism, according to which one acts for the “moral good” (whatever that may be) and thus not for the typical reasons that motivate one to act morally.39 In the case of consuming meat, you are going to act in whatever manner you see as morally permissible, regardless of the uncertainty involved.

The third response involves the contention that the risk asymmetry argument leads to a slippery slope. Even if one wants to assert that the source of a command does not need to be known, there still needs to be a way in which the content is communicated

(any one of many signs, for example). The problem with this is that many things could seem to be a sign and differentiating between a legitimate sign and one that is illegitimate would rest on knowing that the sign is of a proper origin. This causes more of an issue for the believer than the nonbeliever, as this raises the issue of a false sign, and by extension command and obligation. The believer places a higher probability on God’s existence,

38 Danaher, p. 26 39 See Weatherson “Running Risks Morally” (2014) 32 but also on the existence of the Devil. If a sign, and by extension a command, is given by the former, then there is a legitimate obligation created. If, however, the sign originates from the latter, then the sign would not convey a proper command and would not create a legitimate obligation. Thus, the probability that a sign really is divine is counterbalanced by the chance that the sign is issued from a malevolent spirit and not God. This means that there is a chance that acting on an apparent divine command may, in fact, not be harmless and thus is unlike the case of refraining from eating meat.

The fourth response Danaher raises is simply that the probability of God’s existence to some nonbelievers is truly negligible.40 Danaher doesn’t say much about this point, and simply assumes it is the case for many nonbelievers. If the probability of

God’s existence is negligible, then the risk of condemnation for violating one of God’s commands is likewise negligible; thus, there is no obligation created by a non-negligible probability nor is one committing a grave transgression by violating a supposed divine command.

For these four reasons, then, the probability-possibility response does not sufficiently challenge the epistemological objection.

Having countered all the serious responses raised to the epistemological objection, Danaher concludes that the objection succeeds. He also notes, however, that an undefended assumption of his version of the objection is the existence of reasonable nonbelievers. Danaher, in fact, ends his paper by noting that the existence of reasonable nonbelievers is a place that proponents of DCT might focus their efforts to rebut the

40 Danaher, p. 27 33 epistemological objection by, as Danaher puts it, “challenging the existence of reasonable nonbelievers.”41

The next section defends the existence of reasonable nonbelievers. This will be accomplished by considering and responding to the challenge that all nonbelievers arrive at their nonbelief as a result of a cultural bias and thus violate an epistemic duty.

41 Danaher, p. 29 34

SECTION 3: REASONABLE NONBELIEVERS

Section 3.1: Are There Reasonable Nonbelievers?

A crucial element of the epistemological objection is that there are persons who qualify as reasonable nonbelievers. Danaher defines such persons as “nonbelievers who violate no epistemic duty in their nonbelief.” For the sake of his argument, Danaher assumes the default position that there are in fact reasonable nonbelievers, even making it a point to say “I like to think of myself as a reasonable nonbeliever, someone who was once happy to believe but who lost their belief in the course of an honest search for the truth.”42 Thus, it is understandable that Danaher treats the existence of reasonable nonbelievers as an obvious empirical claim and the default position.

While it seems empirically evident that reasonable nonbelievers do in fact exist, there are plenty of cases where things that seemed empirically evident turned out to be false; thus, this section of the thesis is devoted to evaluating what sort of case might be made against the empirically evident belief that reasonable nonbelievers exist. An important first step in this task is getting clear on what it means to be reasonable in nonbelief.

Taking Danaher’s definition as our starting point, the challenge to address is whether a person is violating any epistemic duties in arriving at their nonbelief. If no violations occur, then we would say the person is being reasonable. If, however, they do violate an epistemic duty, this would imply being unreasonable in arriving at their nonbelief. We should take note of how “unreasonable” is being assigned in this context.

42 Danaher, p. 10 35

It is not meant to imply that a person is inherently unreasonable in the sense that their rational faculties are largely deficient or compromised. Instead, “unreasonable” is applied to a specific belief (or lack of belief) that person has, or, more precisely, the manner in which the person arrived at their nonbelief in God’s existence. In the case of nonbelief in

God’s existence – where this doxastic state is taken to cover both cases of believing that

God does not exist and cases of simply lacking belief in God’s existence – if a person has violated an epistemic duty in arriving at their nonbelief that person would not count as a reasonable nonbeliever. If all those who lack belief in God’s existence violate an epistemic duty in their arrival of that state, this would refute Danaher’s assumption that there are reasonable nonbelievers.43

Section 3.2: Examples of Violations of Epistemic Duty

To get clear on the notion of unreasonable nonbelief, it is worth pausing to consider what such a violation of an epistemic duty might look like regarding a particular belief. Let us start with an example unrelated to theistic belief; whether vaccines cause autism. It is widely accepted in the medical community that vaccines do not cause autism.44 There are, however, persons who do not accept this and appeal to the limited, and discredited, evidence to the contrary.45 Such persons appear to violate an epistemic

43 Although not explicitly stated, I think it is reasonable to note that Danaher is not claiming that all nonbelievers are reasonable. To satisfy the epistemological objection, we need only show that some competent agents are reasonable nonbelievers. 44 https://www.popsci.com/measles-vaccine-autism-link-research#page-2. For the original research, see https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2727726/measles-mumps-rubella-vaccination-autism-nationwide-cohort- study?searchresult=1 For the editorial about the research, see https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2727208/further-evidence-mmr-vaccine-safety-scientific-communications- considerations 45 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2831678/ 36 duty, either by outright denial of the evidence that there is no link between vaccination and autism, or by not giving the vaccination studies the attention they are due. Individuals maintaining that there is a link despite the overwhelming evidence might be perfectly reasonable in the vast majority of their other beliefs, but on this particular issue they are violating an epistemic duty in their dismissal or refusal to consider the overwhelming evidence that is contrary to their conclusion.

Another example we can look to is the effects of global climate change and the climate-deniers. The scientific evidence is rather clear – humans are negatively impacting the Earth’s climate.46 There are, however, skeptics, who (among other things) question the science of climate change as well as the motives of the scientists conducting the research into climate science.47 These skeptics would also be violating epistemic duties in their approach to the topic of climate change, either by failing to consider the evidence, denying the evidence outright, or not giving the proper weight to the studies on climate change.

What is important to note about both of these cases for present purposes, however, is that both groups guilty of violating epistemic duty contain individuals who are otherwise largely reasonable in how they conduct their affairs and arrive at their beliefs. It is, thus, not uncommon to find people who violate one or more epistemic duties in the formation of a particular belief and thus are unreasonable with respect to that belief but are otherwise rational agents. As it relates to our discussion of reasonable

46 See https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ and https://www.ipcc.ch/ 47 For a humorous example of an exchange between climate Scientist Dr. John Holdren and Climate deniers/doubters Reps. Bucshon and Rohrabacher, see; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lPgZfhnCAdI 37 nonbelievers in God’s existence, this explanation of reasonable nonbelief makes it possible for a believer to claim that a nonbeliever is reasonable in formulating most of their beliefs, but when it comes to their nonbelief in God, this doxastic state is arrived at by violation of at least one epistemic duty. Keeping this in mind, the critic of Danaher’s assumption might allege, dispels some of the prima facie implausibility of maintaining that there are no reasonable nonbelievers. The charge of irrationality alleged by the theist attaches only to the nonbeliever’s acquisition of a specific belief (or lack thereof) and is not a general indictment of the cognitive faculties of the nonbeliever.

Nonetheless, even if we grant this narrower way of construing the denial that there are reasonable nonbelievers, it still seems implausible to hold that all nonbelievers are unreasonable in the acquisition of their nonbelief. In addition to Danaher, whom we quoted earlier, it seems clear that there are there are many persons who arrived at their nonbelief by thoughtful and critical evaluation of the evidence. A partial list might include, philosopher Graham Oppy, a former Methodist turned atheist,48 historian Bart

Ehrman, who grew up a believer before converting to atheism,49 and physicist Sean

Carroll, who also grew up in a believing household before converting to atheism.50 We can also include Paul Draper, a scholar in philosophy of religion,51 Wes Morriston, also a scholar in philosophy of religion who did work in reasonable nonbelief,52 and J. L.

48 https://research.monash.edu/en/persons/graham-oppy 49 Ehrman recounts this story in his work “Misquoting Jesus” (2005) 50 Carroll recounts this story in his work “The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself.” (2016). See especially Chapter 50, “Existential Therapy.” 51 See www.cla.purdue.edu/philosophy/directory/?p=paul_draper 52 See Morriston “The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers.” (2008), and “What If God Commanded Something Terrible? A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics.” (2009) 38

Schellenberg, who’s made major contributions to the discussion of nonbelief with his work on Divine Hiddenness.53

Even on the narrower construal of unreasonable nonbelief outlined above, given the number of highly intelligent and educated individuals who apparently arrived at their nonbelief in a thoughtful manner, it still seems fair to count the view that there are reasonable nonbelievers as the default position; that is, barring a convincing argument to the contrary, we ought to side with Danaher’s assumption that there are such individuals.

In the next section, we will consider one attempt a critic of Danaher might make to provide an argument showing that the default position is wrong and that there are, in fact, no reasonable nonbelievers. After laying out the argument, we will explain why it does not pose a serious challenge to the contention that there are reasonable nonbelievers.

Section 3.3: Nonbelief as a Result of Cultural Immersion

The proponent of DCT might defend the claim that all nonbelief is unreasonable by contending that nonbelievers have a bias against theism as the result of the culture in which they are immersed, so much so that they cannot help but violate at least one epistemic duty. While it is fallacious to simply dismiss a person or their argument solely on the basis of their cultural circumstances, it isn’t inappropriate to consider whether they are subject to cultural biases. In the field of science, for example, a significant number of scientists do not believe in God compared to the general public (41% of scientists do not believe in any type of God or higher power, compared to just 4% of the population).54

53 See J.L. Schellenberg “The Hiddenness Argument” (2015). 54 https://www.pewforum.org/2009/11/05/scientists-and-belief/ for a full account of the research, see; https://www.people-press.org/2009/07/09/public-praises-science-scientists-fault-public-media/ 39

Similarly, philosophers tend to have a significant number of atheists, reportedly around

62%, although that number has been indicated to be higher in other surveys.55 This suggests that scientists and philosophers work in a cultural setting that that might predispose them against belief in God’s existence.

To see this matter more clearly, let us consider an example unconnected to theistic belief. Imagine a culture that is pervasively racist – to keep it simple, a small, closed off community where everyone shares in this common prejudice. Within this community, such a person might think that they are being reasonable when it comes to their belief in the inherent inadequacy of a particular race. Now imagine that a person from this culture leaves and ventures out to a much more accepting community. This person is presented with the evidence that runs contrary to their deeply rooted racist beliefs; yet, they are so entrenched in the beliefs of their culture that they refuse to accept or even consider that a non-racist outlook is even a possibility. Clearly, this conclusion is not only false, but there is a violation of epistemic duty to account for the available evidence to the contrary.

Analogously, a theist might contend that nonbelievers are so entrenched in their culture that the very idea that God exists cannot adequately be considered, despite the fact that there is ample evidence at their disposal. Even if the concept of God’s existence were to be considered, it is not given a fair hearing. Perhaps the nonbeliever politely nods

55 This percent is noted during an interview with Alvin Plantinga for the New York Times. See; https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/is-atheism-irrational/. For a fuller discussion on some of the topics discussed, see Plantinga, A. “Where the Conflict Really Lies” (2012). It should be noted that the study the interview mentions is one conducted by PhilPapers. However, in the most recent survey reported by PhilPapers, which can be found here, https://philpapers.org/surveys/, the actual study that PhilPapers links to is by Bourget and Chalmers, “What do Philosopher’s Believe?” (2014). That study reports “Atheism” to be at 72.8%. Perhaps the interviewer simply erred in the number. In either case, we have a high percent of philosophers that are atheists. 40 while the theists speaks, and then responds, “yes, well, that’s all nonsense and I don’t have to take your view seriously.”56 Such a nonbeliever would clearly be violating an epistemic duty by not being open to contrary evidence or arguments offered by the theist.

The theist, moreover, might suggest that all nonbelief is similarly based in nothing more than the cultural influence that causes the nonbeliever to simply disregard the evidence at their disposal. All nonbelief in God’s existence might thus be alleged to violate an epistemic duty.

Section 3.4: Responding to the Cultural Bias Explanation of Nonbelief

As a first move in responding to the suggestion that all nonbelief is the product of a cultural bias, a nonbeliever might note that the same sort of cultural bias might be alleged against the theist. If a theist, who has only known a certain form of Christian theism, is going to assert that the culturally immersed nonbeliever is being negatively disposed to the evidence of God’s existence, it seems possible that the theist is likewise guilty of being so immersed in their doctrine that they cannot fairly consider the possibility that God does not exist, even when there is evidence to the contrary that should at least be considered. Furthermore, regarding the possible cultural bias of the theist, one might consider the role that non-rational faith plays in many religions. The widespread religious practice of promoting the value of non-rational faith might make the theist more susceptible to the influence of cultural bias; that is, believers are frequently

56 This could, in a broader context, not violate an epistemic duty, provided the dismissal is grounded in a prior sober appraisal of the “evidence” presented by the theist. While the nonbeliever might be guilty of violating norms of polite dialogue, the nonbeliever would not have violated an epistemic norm. However, in the case imagined here, the nonbeliever is stipulated not to have any argument to back up their assertion and thus is violating the epistemic duty to at least consider the contrary position. 41 encouraged to set aside their critical faculties and accept certain doctrinal matters on the basis of faith alone. In this respect theism, or at least this sort of theism, seems much more likely to violate an epistemic duty that comes with being entrenched in one’s own culture. We should not, of course, conclude that all theists are inherently subject to this sort of influence and have acquired their belief in God as a result thereof. What does seem clear, however, is that, on the surface, making the case that this is a possibility for all theists seems more promising than making a similar case for the possibility that all nonbelief is the result of cultural bias.

Moreover, even if one does not accept this last claim, the argument underscores an important point about the theist’s proposal that all nonbelief is the product of a cultural bias. The theist’s proposal that all nonbelievers are under the sway of a cultural bias is nothing more than the presentation of a possible explanation for nonbelief in God’s existence. The crucial question, though, is how plausible the explanation is, especially when it is presented as a universal explanation of nonbelief.

A first step in seeing that the theist’s cultural bias explanation is, in fact, highly implausible occurs when one clarifies how ‘nonbelief,’ and by extension ‘nonbeliever,’ is being used. Danaher simply says that nonbelievers “do not believe in God.”57 It is important to note, however, that ‘nonbelief’ would include (a) those who deny God’s existence, (b) those who are aware of the proposition that God exists but abstain from either affirming or denying God’s existence, and (c) those who never entertained the proposition that God exists. All of these are cases of nonbelief in God’s existence; thus,

57 Danaher, p. 11 42 reasonable nonbelievers might be found in any of these classes of people. Since the number of possible reasonable nonbelievers in each of these categories is no doubt enormous, recognizing that reasonable nonbelievers might include individuals in all three categories underscores the challenge facing the critic of the default position, namely, showing that no individual in any of these classes has arrived at their nonbelief without violating an epistemic duty. Morriston does a nice job of exploiting this fact to emphasize the implausibility of maintaining that all nonbelievers are unreasonable.

I shall assume that the evidence for God’s existence is not so widely available and

compelling as to make it unreasonable for a normal, well-informed adult to not

believe in God. By this standard, there are lots of perfectly reasonable

nonbelievers. Some – Theravada Buddhists, for instance – have been brought up

in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the

assumptions of their own traditions. Others, including many western philosophers,

have explicitly considered what is said in favor of God’s existence, but have not

found it sufficiently persuasive. Still others have never looked into the question in

a serious way and have seen no pressing reason to do so. I shall assume that many

persons in each of these categories are reasonable nonbelievers, at least in the

sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to any violations of any

epistemic duty on their part.58

Morriston is exactly right. The advocate of DCT would be committed to holding that (a) in all of these cases God provided the individual with evidence sufficient to believe that

58 Morriston, p. 2 43 all obligations are the product of God’s commands and (b) their nonbelief is the product of a failure to consider the relevant evidence. Put in these terms, the allegation of a universal cultural bias amongst nonbelievers seems much more a merely logically possible explanation rather than a plausible proposal.

A final point that can be made to sharpen the point that the theist’s proposal is the presentation of a mere possibility and not a plausible explanation emerges when one considers another possible explanation of nonbelief in at least some cases. The theist uses the fact that a majority of scientists and philosophers are nonbelievers to support the view that their nonbelief is a result of a culturally reinforced bias and that the majority of support for the position of nonbelief in this group is a self-supporting cultural artifact as opposed to a justified conclusion. There is, however, a rival explanation for why such a high percentage of scientists and philosophers are nonbelievers; namely, such individuals are trained intensively in the application of the rules of proper reasoning and evidence, and therefore arrive at their nonbelief through the application of this training. The second of these explanations seems much more plausible then the first, but I will not make the case for that here. What I will insist on is that simply asserting without additional argument that nonbelief in these cultures – that is, cultures explicitly committed to following the principles of proper reasoning – is to be guilty of begging the question in favor of the claim that all nonbelief is unreasonable. Making such an unsupported accusation against the nonbeliever would, thus, itself be guilty of violating an epistemic virtue. 44

Hence, when it comes to the overall implications of culturally entrenched biases, while we should consider the possibility that culture does influence a person’s outlook, we should equally consider that this does not mean a person’s beliefs that line up with their entrenched culture were not reinforced by fair and informed reflection. Further, even if we accept the influence that culture has on the formation of many human beliefs, including the nonbelief in God exhibited by many, this does not mean that all nonbelievers succumb to this influence. Thus, we can accept the default position that there are reasonable nonbelievers.

45

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

The goal of this thesis was to present and defend John Danaher’s epistemological objection to divine command theory. In the first section, we looked at what DCT is and how the epistemological objection applies. We followed Murphy in characterizing DCT as a label referring to “a family of metaethical theories, each of which is concerned with accounting for, explaining, or grounding the existence of one or more specific moral facts by reference to God’s commands.”59 We then noted that the epistemological objection alleges that any DCT has the following implausible implication: there is a certain class of competent agents – reasonable nonbelievers (i.e. persons who lack access to God’s commands while still having moral obligations) – who would not have moral obligations on DCT.

The second section looked at Danaher’s reconstruction and defense of the epistemological objection. Danaher says that all variants of DCT are vulnerable to the objection on the grounds that they all share the following epistemic condition: the creation of moral obligation is contingent on the relevant divine command being known by those subject to the obligation. This epistemic condition and the existence of reasonable nonbelievers thus entails the aforementioned implausible conclusion: there are competent agents, reasonable nonbelievers, who do not have moral obligations. Thus, we have an indirect refutation of DCT.

Danaher’s argument, however, assumed, but did not argue for, one of his critical premises; namely, that there are persons who would qualify as reasonable nonbelievers.

59 Danaher, p. 2 46

Consequently, in the third section of the thesis, this claim is defended. This claim was defended against the theist’s challenge that nonbelief stems from a violation of epistemic duty that is the result of the culture in which the nonbeliever is immersed. While we didn’t dismiss the influence that culture has on a person, we showed that the theist’s supposition that all nonbelievers arrive at their nonbelief through cultural bias is highly implausible. Its implausibility was revealed by noting the wide range of cases covered by nonbelief and also by considering a rival explanation for nonbelief amongst scientists and philosophers. Given this, we can accept the default position that there are, in fact, reasonable nonbelievers.

Having supported the claim that there are reasonable nonbelievers, I conclude that

Danaher’s epistemological objection poses a presently unanswered challenge to divine command theory.

47

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