Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher’s Epistemological Objection A Master’s Thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master’s in Philosophy Christopher S. Meyer August 2019 © 2019 Christopher S. Meyer. All Rights Reserved. 2 This Thesis entitled Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher’s Epistemological Objection by CHRISTOPHER S. MEYER has been approved for the Philosophy Department and the College of Arts and Sciences by James M. Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy Florenz Plassmann Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT MEYER, CHRISTOPHER S., MA in Philosophy, August 2019, Philosophy Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher’s Epistemological Objection Director of Master’s Thesis: James M. Petrik This thesis defends John Danaher’s version of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory (DCT). This objection asserts that DCT fails as a metaethical theory of moral obligation due to the fact that there is a group of persons, reasonable nonbelievers, who have knowledge of moral obligations while lacking the knowledge of divine commands required in DCT. The first part of this thesis focusses on this objection and explains how it applies to DCT. An underlying assumption of Danaher’s defense is the existence of reasonable nonbelievers, persons who do not violate epistemic duties in their nonbelief. The latter portion of this thesis defends the existence of such persons by considering and responding to the challenge that all nonbelievers violate at least one epistemic duty since their nonbelief is the produce of the culture in which they are immersed as opposed to rationally informed inquiry. In response to this challenge, it is shown that the existence of reasonable nonbelievers is the default position and that the burden of proof is on those claiming that all nonbelief is unreasonable. It is also noted that the high number and wide range of cases that qualify for nonbelief render the prospect of showing that all nonbelief is unreasonable rather bleak. Having shown that the cultural bias challenge is left wanting and that we should accept the existence of reasonable nonbelievers, the thesis concludes the epistemological objection stands as a as serious challenge to divine command theory. 4 DEDICATION Dedicated to Dr. Tom Christenson 5 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would first like to thank my advisor, Dr. James Petrik. I truly appreciate the guidance and generosity throughout this process. In addition to my advisor, I would also like to thank the rest of my committee: Dr. Jack Bender and Dr. Alfred Lent, for your encouragement, insightful commentary, and enlightening questions. Finally, I would like to express my great appreciation to my colleagues for their continued support and insightful discussions on this journey. 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 3 Dedication ........................................................................................................................... 4 Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7 Section 1.1: Divine Command Theory and the Epistemological Objection ................. 7 Section 2: The Epistemological Objection ....................................................................... 11 Section 2.1: What is the Epistemological Objection? ................................................. 11 Section 2.2: The Argument ......................................................................................... 11 Section 2.3: The First Premise .................................................................................... 12 Section 2.4: The Second Premise................................................................................ 18 Section 2.5: The Content-Not-Source Response ........................................................ 20 Section 2.6: Evans’s Modified Content-Not-Source Response .................................. 24 Section 2.7: The Probability-Possibility Response ..................................................... 27 Section 3: Reasonable Nonbelievers ................................................................................. 34 Section 3.1: Are There Reasonable Nonbelievers?..................................................... 34 Section 3.2: Examples of Violations of Epistemic Duty ............................................ 35 Section 3.3: Nonbelief as a Result of Cultural Immersion ......................................... 38 Section 3.4: Responding to the Cultural Bias Explanation of Nonbelief ................... 40 Section 4: Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 45 References ......................................................................................................................... 47 7 SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION Section 1.1: Divine Command Theory and the Epistemological Objection Divine Command Theory (DCT) or Divine Command Theories (DCTs) are a class of metaethical theories that explain the ultimate origin of some set of moral facts through God’s commands. It is a term, as Mark Murphy explains, that applies to “a family of metaethical theories, each of which is concerned with accounting for, explaining, or grounding the existence of one or more specific moral facts by reference to God’s commands.”1 To fully understand the range and nature of DCTs, it is important to distinguish between two types of moral facts: value-based and deontic facts. The former have to do with whether or not a state of affairs is good, bad, or neutral. The latter are related to whether or not a state of affairs is obligatory, forbidden, permissible, or supererogatory. While it is possible for DCTs to be formulated for both types of facts, this is, according to John Danaher, not the norm. Typically what a DCT offers is an explanation of deontic facts such that, “God’s commands are now thought to ground a limited set of moral facts, most typically the fact that some actions are obligatory, while other aspects of God’s nature are thought to account for other moral facts.”2 Given this focus on deontic facts, one common approach to express DCTs is to understand them as involving some version of the following claim; “if x is morally 1 Danaher, p. 2. The description quoted by Danaher originates from Murphy (2012) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-theological/. It should be noted that Danaher’s article is forthcoming, and page numbers refer to the page numbers of the draft copy Danaher made available online and not the page numbers they will be assigned once formally published. 2 Danaher, p. 3. 8 obligatory, then x is commanded by God,” where God commanding x is understood as the cause and grounds for x being morally obligatory.3 A slightly stronger version of this claim would be to understand the relation as a biconditional thus: “x is morally obligatory if and only if God issues a command.” Whereas the weaker version leaves open the possibility that God might issue a command that does not create moral obligation, the stronger version eliminates this possibility. In both of these forms, however, DCT is committed to holding that the only way a moral obligation is created is through an explicit command given by God. This is a claim found in all major forms of DCT and is the common core of such theories John Danaher needs in advancing the epistemological objection against DCT. As formulated by Danaher, the epistemological objection states that “DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God’s commands.”4 Since DCT holds that God’s commands are the only way moral obligations are created and that obligations can only be binding on agents if the agents are aware of the commands that create obligations, DCT entails that any agents who are ignorant of God’s commands are not subject to moral obligations. This is a problematic upshot of DCT since there are many apparently competent agents – Danaher calls them reasonable 3 See, for example, Morriston (2009), who asserts that divine command metaethics must hold that the moral obligations of all persons are fixed by God’s commands. Hence, no command means no moral obligations. This point, although not explicitly made by Danaher, seems to be an implied assumption within DCT, as allowing other metaethical theories to ground moral obligations would be a defeater against DCT as formulated in this discussion. As we will see later in the thesis, this causes issues for DCT, as this formulation is unable to account for the fact that we have persons, reasonable nonbelievers, who are morally obligated yet lack a divine command. 4 Danaher, “In Defense of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory.” Forthcoming in Sophia, p. 1 9 nonbelievers – who do not believe in God’s existence, and are, consequently, ignorant of God’s commands and thus would be exempt from moral obligations on DCT. It is, however, highly implausible to hold that there is a class of competent agents who are not subject to moral obligations; thus, the epistemological objection ties DCT to a highly implausible implication. For this thesis, we are focusing on two tasks. The first