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ABSTRACT Virtues, Divine Commands, and the Debt Of ABSTRACT Virtues, Divine Commands, and the Debt of Creation: Towards a Kierkegaardian Christian Ethic R. Zachary Manis, B.A., M.A. Mentor: C. Stephen Evans, Ph.D. Though Kierkegaard's ethic in Works of Love frequently has been a target of harsh—and often uncharitable—criticism, a number of recent treatments have sought to defend both its viability and its relevance to the contemporary discussion. Increasingly, the literature is replete with interpretations that situate it within the traditions of virtue ethics and/or divine command theory. I evaluate these readings, focusing primarily on the issue of moral obligation in Kierkegaard's writings. I argue that both the virtue and divine command interpretations are deficient, though Kierkegaard's ethic indeed shares significant points of contact with both traditions. I explicate and defend an alternative account of moral obligation that seems to me most to warrant the label, “Kierkegaardian,” and attempt to expand the view, taking Kierkegaard's ethic as a foundation upon which to build a theoretically rigorous account of moral obligation. The resulting view, I argue, captures the best of both virtue ethics and divine command theory, while avoiding the most serious problems of each. Copyright © 2006 by R. Zachary Manis All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE…………………………………………………………………………... vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………….. viii DEDICATION…………………………………………………................................ x Chapter 1. Kierkegaard, Ethics, and Metaethics: A Survey of Objections and Preliminary Concerns…………………………………………………….. 1 Introduction “Kierkegaard's Ethics”: The Challenges of Pseudonymity The Ethic of Works of Love : Some Objections Kierkegaard, Metaethics, and Anti-theory Conclusion 2. Kierkegaard and Virtue Ethics…………………………………………...... 40 Introduction The Case for a Virtue Reading of Kierkegaard, Part I: The Theme of Becoming a Self The Case for a Virtue Reading of Kierkegaard, Part II: Essentialism and Teleology The Case for a Virtue Reading of Kierkegaard, Part III: Moral Vision and Other Themes Rival Versions of a Virtue Reading of Kierkegaard Challenges to the Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Reading of Kierkegaard iii The Problem of Moral Obligation for Virtue Readings of Kierkegaard 3. Kierkegaard and Divine Command Theory…………………………….… 96 Introduction Quinn on Kierkegaard and Divine Command Ethics Evans on Kierkegaard and DCT, Part I: The Social Theory of Obligation Evans on Kierkegaard and DCT, Part II: The Necessity Clause Positive Evidence Against the Divine Command Reading of Kierkegaard Genuine Affinities Between the Kierkegaardian Ethic and DCT 4. Towards a Kierkegaardian Ethic: Creation, Love, and the Infinite Debt to God ……………………………………………………………………. 160 Introduction Foundations for a Kierkegaardian View of the Right Expansion and Development Advantages of the Kierkegaardian Ethic Some Objections Conclusion 5. Conclusion: A Sketch of Further Applications…………………………… 254 Introduction On Moral Guilt On Repentance On Resignation On Worship iv 6. SOURCES CONSULTED………………………………………………… 266 v PREFACE The revival of interest in religious ethics in the past three decades is remarkable for several reasons, not the least of which is that it constitutes a rather surprising—and relatively sudden—shift away from the expected culmination of the historical progression of philosophical ethics leading up to it. As Linda Zagzebski notes, “. the history of Western ethics since the Enlightenment can be read as a series of attempts to ground morality in something other than God.” 1 And yet, at present, academic philosophy is replete with attempts to ground morality in God. The present project is one such attempt; it seeks not to explore or explain the shift, but rather to further its development. Though I will have little to say about general critiques of religious ethics, I will discuss at length problems that affect some particular versions of it. It seems to me that recent developments, especially those in theistic virtue ethics and divine command theory, have moved the discussion of religious ethics in the right direction, but that each of these approaches retains features that are unsatisfying. This seems to me especially true in the discussion of moral obligation, both in its normative and metaethical aspects. The present project is, in large part, an attempt to develop and defend a more satisfying ethic. The view I advocate will be developed by way of an exploration of Kierkegaard's Christian ethic, especially as it is found in the signed writings of the so-called second authorship. Some important recent treatments of Kierkegaard have emphasized his 1Linda Zagzebski, “Religion and Morality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, ed. William J. Wainwright (Oxford, New York, et. al.: Oxford University Press, 2005), 345. vi notable overlap with virtue ethics and/or divine command theory, and several commentators even have labeled him a “theorist” or “ethicist” of one or the other varieties. I will explore these possibilities towards the goal of explicating what, in my view, is the ethic Kierkegaard presents as his own, and I subsequently will defend a modified version of this ethic, arguing that it offers the most satisfying account of moral obligation for theists, in general, and for Christians, in particular. Thus, my project has two goals that are overlapping, though not, in the end, reducible to one another. The first is an interpretive goal—to understand Kierkegaard's Christian ethic—and the second a “constructive” goal—to formulate a defensible account of moral obligation that preserves broadly orthodox Christian intuitions while avoiding the problems that plague the most prominent, contemporary alternatives. These projects are overlapping because—I will argue—the ethic that is best able to accomplish this is one that is broadly Kierkegaardian. vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are many to whom I am indebted for the completion of this project: family, friends, and teachers at Hendrix, Texas A&M, Notre Dame, and Baylor, all have supported me in my studies and contributed in various ways to my philosophical development. I am grateful to my parents, who always encouraged my questions; to Doug Corbitt and Peg Falls-Corbett, who gave me the philosophy bug; to Hugh McCann and John McDermott, who mentored me during my time in College Station; and to my colleagues at Baylor, who made even Waco enjoyable. I am greatly appreciative of those professors who made my studies at Baylor so rewarding. Todd Buras gave selflessly of his time during his first two, undoubtedly most demanding, years at Baylor. Margaret Tate offered helpful advice and comments on my dissertation and helped to make my semester of study at Notre Dame possible. The philosophy department at Baylor is blessed to have such outstanding junior faculty. I would like to extend a special word of thanks and gratitude to Steve Evans and Bob Roberts, outstanding scholars and teachers who both encouraged me in my work and pushed me to become a better philosopher. Not many scholars, I think, would be as generous in allowing a doctoral student to pursue a project so focused on critical response to their own work, and even fewer would be as objective in assessing its merits. It has been a privilege to study with both and to write a dissertation under their direction. Most of all, I am grateful for my wife Lisa, who always supported me in my studies, who patiently endured countless requests from the study to “just let me finish this viii thought,” who even braved a bitter South Bend winter—pregnant—for the sake of my education . and who loves me more than I deserve. It is to her that this work is dedicated. ix To Lisa, who told me she would follow me anywhere— and then proved it. CHAPTER ONE Kierkegaard, Ethics, and Metaethics: A Survey of Objections and Preliminary Concerns Introduction Though Kierkegaard's view of moral obligation will be the primary focus of the discussion in the chapters to come, the question of the viability of Kierkegaard's ethic more broadly first needs to be addressed. This is the case for several reasons. First, Kierkegaard's view of obligation is interwoven into his broader ethic of love; thus any objection that inflicts a mortal wound to the latter—if there be such—can be expected to bear crucially on the former. Second, my reading of Kierkegaard's ethic largely is sympathetic, and thus the plausibility of my own view of obligation is tied, at least somewhat, to the viability of this ethic. Third, the sheer number and virulence of criticisms that have been aimed at Kierkegaard's ethic in the contemporary literature demand that any view that takes this ethic as a point of departure make some attempt to defend it. In the first section of this chapter, I will say a word about caricatures of Kierkegaard's ethic that arise from ignoring or misunderstanding the pseudonymity of his authorship. In the second section, I will give a brief defense of Kierkegaard's ethic in Works of Love by responding to some of the most prevalent and influential objections. In the third section, I will address a concern about appropriating Kierkegaard's writings to construct a theoretical account of obligation—a project that, some may worry, is 1 2 disconsonant with the spirit of Kierkegaard's authorship. Addressing these preliminary concerns will, I hope, lay the groundwork sufficiently for the project ahead. “Kierkegaard's Ethics”: The Challenges of Pseudonymity The objections that have been leveled against “Kierkegaard's ethics” in the literature are so many and varied that, at first glance, it is difficult to believe they are directed at the same view. And in fact, they often are not. What has been labeled “Kierkegaard's ethics” is in fact an array of views comprised of (1) the views represented and/or discussed by various Kierkegaardian pseudonyms, (2) Kierkegaard’s own Christian ethic, presented primarily in Works of Love and other non-pseudonymous writings, and (3) caricatures of Kierkegaard's view. (1) and (3) often are closely connected.
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