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DAILY SITUATION REPORT 13 May 2008

DAILY SITUATION REPORT 13 May 2008

Strategic SSI -

DAILY SITUATION REPORT 24 JUNE 2010

SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES RELEVANT TO SSSI PERSONNEL AND CLIENTS

Various Threat Reports were received of possible attacks in Kabul over the past few days, and the insurgent’s intent and capability to conduct attacks in the Kabul City remains elevated. There are daily Threat Reports, but the received reports are mainly generic and lacking detail. It is possible that suicide attacks and indirect fire attacks can be expected in the city, but no time frames and/or specific targets were reported. Any attack in the city can be seen as a success for the insurgents, and they will make maximum use of the propaganda value of such an attack.

MAJOR COUNTRY WIDE EVENTS

Insurgency: 22 Jun, , Pd-3, Kabul University, propaganda leaflets were distributed in the University calling upon students to protest against foreign troops on Afghan soil.

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Threat Reports Received Last 5 Days

BOLO: 22 Jun, , Murghab District, according to the ANA, insurgents emplaced nine IEDs in Dashuri area and also five IEDs in Managan

BOLO: 22 Jun, , Pusht Rod District, reportedly five IEDs was emplaced in the Charbagh and Panji Gow village areas.

INCIDENTS REPORTED FOR PERIOD 23 TO 24 JUNE 2010

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Table illustrating the number of Killed and Wounded, Captured and Arrested as per the reporting’s of the SSSI DSR.

(Kindly note that these are from the SSSI DSR and are not official statistics and may differ from those released by ISAF or other agencies and organisations.)

SECURITY INCIDENTS REPORTED FOR PERIOD 22 TO 23 JUN 2010

CENTRAL REGION

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Insurgency: 22 Jun, Kabul Province, Pd-3, Kabul University, propaganda leaflets were distributed in the University calling upon students to protest against foreign troops on Afghan soil.

Success: COIN OP: 22 Jun, Kabul Province, Chahar Asyab District, ANP/IM arrested four insurgents and confiscated a vehicle and a tonne of ammonium nitrate.

Attack: 22 Jun, , , an IM patrol was attacked by insurgents, one insurgent killed.

Insurgency: Murder: 22 Jun, Daykundi Province, Gizab District, a local tribal leader and commander of a pro-GIRoA militia was ambushed and killed together with his two bodyguards by insurgents.

Success: IED Finds: 22 Jun, , , ANP found five IEDs.

Ambush: 23 Jun, Logar Province, , Begum, an ANSF/IM patrol came under attack by insurgents with small arms.

IED: 22 Jun, , Deh Yak District, a road construction contractor’s vehicle was hit by an IED. On local civilian worker was injured.

Ambush: 22 Jun, Ghazni Province, Qarah Bagh District, insurgents attacked an ANP patrol in the Lewani area, no casualties reported.

IDF Attack: 23 Jun, Ghazni Province, Ghazni City, insurgents launched two rockets towards the city centre. It landed between the NDS office building and a local government office building. No casualties reported.

Attack: 23 Jun, Ghazni Province, , Sardar Qaleh, an ANSF/IM vehicle patrol was attacked by insurgents.

Ambush: 21 Jun, , Deh Rawud District, an ANSF/IM patrol came under attack by insurgents in the Kai Toteh area. No casualties reported.

IED: 22 Jun, Wardak Province, Sayidabad District, Hashim Kheyl, an IM vehicle patrol was hit by an IED. No casualties reported.

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WESTERN REGION

Attack: 22 Jun, Farah Province, Pur Chaman District, insurgents an ANP Post with small arms in the Dehan Rud area, no casualties reported.

IDF Attack: 22 Jun, , District, insurgents launched four rockets towards Chaghcharan City, no casualties reported.

Ambush: 23 Jun, , , insurgents attacked an ANP CET of an UN food convoy, no casualties reported.

NORTHERN REGION

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IED: 22 Jun, Province, Chahar District, an IED exploded and a man on a donkey got killed.

Success: IED Find: 22 Jun, , , IM/ANSF patrol found and defused an IED.

Success: IED Find: 22 Jun, , Afghani District, during a search operation the ANP found four IEDs, ten rockets and a number of small arms.

Success: COIN OP: 23 Jun, Kunduz Province, Chahar Darreh District, Nahr-E Sufi, IM/ANSF attacked a group of insurgents, killing eight and arrested two.

Ambush: 23 Jun, , Pul-E Khumri City, an IM vehicle patrol came under attack in the Husayn Kheyl area, no casualties reported.

EASTERN REGION

Attacks: 22 Jun, , Barg-E Matal District, several ANP posts in the District came under attack by insurgents.

Success: COIN OP: 23 Jun, Nuristan Province, Barg-E Matal District, during an ANSF/IM an operation to clear the village twenty insurgents got killed.

IDF Attack: 22 Jun, , , the IM/ANSF FOB and District ANP Station came under attack. No casualties reported.

Attack: 23 Jun Kunar Province, Darreh Ye Pech District, Kandagal, an IM/ANSF Post was attacked by insurgents with heavy and small arms, no casualties reported.

IED: 23 Jun, , Behsud District, Highway 7, as local GIRoA member was hit by an IED leaving a graduation ceremony. One civilian killed and three injured.

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SOUTH EASTERN REGION

Attack: 22 Jun, Paktya Province, Jani Kheyl District, an ANP post came under attack by insurgents with heavy and small arms. One ANP member killed and one wounded.

IED: 22 Jun, Paktya Province, Jani Kheyl District, an ANP vehicle patrol was hit by an IED. One ANP member killed and one wounded.

IED: 22 Jun, , , Nar Kalay, an IM/ANSF vehicle patrol was hit by an IED. No casualties reported.

Success: IED Find: 22 Jun, Khost Province, Khost City, a sticky bomb (IED) was found and defused on a civilian vehicle.

Success: COIN OP: 22 Jun, , Sarhowzde and In Jani Kheyl District, Sar-E Kot, IM COIN operations against insurgent targets in the districts, thirty three insurgents killed.

Attack: 22 Jun, Paktika Province, Omnah District, the District ANP Station was attacked by insurgents with heavy and small arms. No casualties reported.

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SOUTHERN REGION

IDF Attack: 22 Jun, , Atghar District, insurgents launched several rockets at the IM/ANSF FOB.

Success: IED Finds: 22 Jun, Zabul Province, Qalat City, two IEDs were found and destroyed by the ANP.

IED: 22 Jun, Zabul Province, Shah Joy District, Highway 1, an ANA vehicle patrol was hit by an IED in the Hasan Karez area. Three ANA members wounded.

IED: 21 Jun, , Maiwand District, an ANP vehicle patrol was hit by an IED in the Kah Karez area, three ANP members wounded.

Ambush: 22 Jun, Kandahar Province, Daman District, Highway 1, at 06h00 an IM contracted supply convoy was attacked by insurgents in the Akhund Ziarat area. No casualties reported.

Attack: 22 Jun, Kandahar Province, Kandahar City, District 14, an ANP member was killed by insurgents in the Post-E Khana area.

IED: 22 Jun, Kandahar Province, Kandahar City, District 2, the Stadium, an IED detonated in the Mosadeh Area area. One civilian killed and one injured.

Success: Arrest: 21 Jun, Kandahar Province, Arghandab District, an ANP arrest operation captured an insurgent IED maker in possession of IED making components and initiation devices.

IED: 23 Jun, Kandahar Province, Neko Karez area, an IM vehicle patrol was hit by an IED.

Success: Arrest: 22 Jun, , Lashkar Gah District, Qala-Ye Sang, ANP arrested an insurgent while busy placing an IED.

Attack: 22 Jun, , Helmand Province, PB a patrol base came under small arms fire, one IM member killed. Privileged and Confidential 8 This information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. You are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this information is strictly prohibited without the explicit approval from StrategicSSI Management. Strategic SSI - Afghanistan

IED: 22 Jun, Helmand Province, Nahr-E Saraj District, Gereshk, An IED detonated as an ANP vehicle passes by, it missed the vehicle and instead wounded seven civilians.

IED: 23 Jun, Helmand Province, Nad-E Ali District, an IED exploded, killing a local tribal elder in the Chah-E Anjir area.

IED: 22 Jun, Helmand Province, Musa Qaleh District, an IM/ANSF vehicle patrol was hit by an IED in the Dehzor area.

Ambush: 23 Jun, Helmand Province, Musa Qaleh District, insurgents opened fire on an IM/ANSF vehicle patrol in the Mosulmani area. No casualties reported.

IED: 22 Jun, Nimroz Province, , an IED detonated out in the open with no target around. No casualties reported.

IDF Attack: 22 Jun, Nimroz Province, Khash Rud District, several mortars have been fired at the District ANP Station, no casualties reported.

SPECIAL INTEREST NEWS

THE AFGHANISTAN REBOOT: CAN OBAMA AND PETRAEUS WORK TOGETHER?

TIME - Nation By Joe Klein Thursday, Jun. 24, 2010

It is amazing how quickly General Stanley McChrystal became an afterthought. It happened minutes after he was removed from command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan for idiocy above and beyond the call of duty. He became an afterthought because of the brilliant, and in some ways diabolically clever, decision that Barack Obama made in naming his successor: General David Petraeus, the dominant U.S. military figure of our time.

It was the nature of McChrystal's blunder that made the reascension of Petraeus inevitable. It was the insular, locker-room puerility of McChrystal's team, spewing in a recent Rolling Stone article — the stone-cold belief that they had all the answers; that the civilians in charge, especially those who were members of the Democratic Party, were just a bunch of feckless chin pullers — that made the incident so dangerous; it cut far too close to the bone. It raised timeless questions about civilian authority over the military in wartime and a nagging one that has shadowed American politics since Vietnam: whether Democrats are too soft, too removed from the realities of military life, to pursue an effective national-security policy.

And that is why the Petraeus appointment is at once brilliant and clever — because his prickly relationship with the President has been the symbolic heart of this problem, and now it will take center stage, in Washington and on the battlefields of Afghanistan. How it is resolved, if it is resolved, will determine the fate of Obama's presidency.

Barack Obama's problems with Petraeus began in their very first meeting, in Baghdad during the 2008 presidential campaign. Obama was joined in that session by then-Senators Joe Biden and Chuck Hagel. Petraeus laid on one of his epic PowerPoint slide presentations, which annoyed members of the group. "It was propaganda, assuming we didn't know anything," one of those present told me. "We wanted to ask questions, and when we did, Petraeus treated us badly, interrupting Obama continually, taking a very hard stand." The meeting dissolved into a heated exchange between Obama and Petraeus over Obama's stated intention to withdraw all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by 2010.

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Ultimately, Obama's general view on the withdrawal prevailed; even Petraeus eventually came to believe Obama's policy was right, although he also believed it wouldn't have been possible without his 2007 surge in Iraq, which Obama opposed.

And now these two men are locked together for the foreseeable future, perhaps for history. In an odd way, their relationship — with its equal rations of respect and mistrust — reflects positive changes that have taken place in the Democratic Party and the U.S. military. For several decades after Vietnam, most Democratic politicians were antiwar by reflex and antimilitary by instinct. Even now, many Democrats — who come from the coasts, the big cities, the slums — are unfamiliar with a military culture rooted in the Appalachians, the South, the Plains. A moderate Democratic group called the Truman National Security Project offers a course called Military 101 to teach incoming Democratic members of Congress things like the difference between a battalion and a brigade.

Campaigning for the presidency, Obama was very much aware that a solution to his party's perceived military weaknesses was necessary after the Sept. 11 attacks. His answer had the virtue of being politically adept and substantively valid: Iraq had been the wrong war. Afghanistan was the right one, because it had been the home of al-Qaeda, and it had been neglected by George W. Bush. As President, Obama has abided by his campaign talk and has shown himself amenable to targeted but relentless use of force, in a manner that dismays his party's base. He won quiet praise from the people in uniform by retaining Bush's popular Defense Secretary Robert Gates and appointing Jim Jones, a retired Marine four-star general, as National Security Adviser. And Obama was applauded for supporting Petraeus, who was promoted from commander of the multinational forces in Iraq by Bush, in his new job as Centcom commander, a position that oversees American security interests in the most sensitive region in the world. He did so in large part because Petraeus was the exemplar of the creative new thinking that had, at least partly, transformed the U.S. military.

It isn't well remembered now, but Petraeus was an outcast midway through the Bush Administration. Donald Rumsfeld, Bush's wildly incompetent Defense Secretary, didn't like him; neither did many of his peers, who remained enamored of the Army they knew, a rumbling array of tanks and trucks and heavy artillery constructed to fight the Russians on the plains of Central Europe. Rumsfeld sent Petraeus out to pasture at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., which among other things serves as an Army think tank. There, Petraeus and a group of military intellectuals concocted the military's counterinsurgency field manual — a strategy waiting to be implemented as everything else in Iraq failed. The irony about counterinsurgency (which carries the unfortunate, jingling acronym COIN) is that it is a theory of warfare that should be more acceptable to Democrats — and it was, to smart ones like Hillary Clinton — because it emphasized protecting local populations, providing them with services like schools and health clinics and jobs. When Bush turned to Petraeus and COIN was implemented in Baghdad in 2007, it looked an awful lot like community policing and social services on the South Side of Chicago. And it worked.

But it was not the only thing that worked in Iraq. Petraeus' decision to purchase the Sunni tribes in Anwar province — the Bush Administration had considered tribes "part of the past" until then — undermined the insurgency and separated the professional, al-Qaeda terrorists from the indigenous population. Most important was the untold story of the spectacular success that the special-operations forces led by McChrystal suddenly began to have in rooting out the bad guys (this was, in large part, attributable to the resources President Bush devoted to cultivating human intelligence assets). The success in Iraq was attributable to what the military calls full-spectrum warfare, the use of all the tools in its kit, but it was COIN that emerged as the headliner — an oversimplification that has had dire ramifications in Afghanistan.

By 2009 the gospel of COIN had helped revive the phlegmatic Army. Its two chief promoters, Petraeus and McChrystal, seemingly could do no wrong. They stormed into Obama's extended Afghan-policy review intent on having their way. They sort of got it: 30,000 more troops, on top of the 20,000 Obama had initially dispatched — after a series of pitched battles between Petraeus, who was the most vocal military participant in the process, and Vice President Joe Biden, who was the most vocal civilian.

But the policy featured two caveats that have been misinterpreted — purposely, in some cases — by the military and oversold by the Obama Administration to the Democratic Party base. The first was the Privileged and Confidential 10 This information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. You are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this information is strictly prohibited without the explicit approval from StrategicSSI Management. Strategic SSI - Afghanistan

deadline of July 2011, at which time a transition would begin to Afghan control of the war. Petraeus, McChrystal and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen agreed to this because it wasn't really a deadline. There was no intention of actually pulling troops from the real Afghan war zones in the south and east in July 2011; the assumption was that if things were going well, some forces would stay for years, in gradually diminishing numbers, doing the patient work of counterinsurgency. The other caveat was more problematic: there would be another policy review in December 2010, to see how well things were going. "I wouldn't want to overplay the significance of this review," Petraeus told the House Armed Services Committee recently.

But Petraeus is wrong; in fact, the review is crucial. The implicit agreement was that if things aren't going well by December, the strategy will have to change. And things haven't been going well. So the military has been quietly working the press, complaining about the July 2011 transition date, pressing for more troops, complaining about the lack of civilian progress in Afghanistan — the failure of the Afghan government and U.S. State Department to provide security and programs for the populace — complaining about the failure of Richard Holbrooke to get all the recalcitrant neighbors (Pakistan, India, Iran and China, among others — what a bunch!) on board with a coherent regional strategy. A lot of this griping was at the heart of the Rolling Stone story. "When the military says withdrawals should be conditions-based, here's what they mean," says Les Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. "If things are going well, we shouldn't withdraw, because the policy is working. If things aren't going well, we should add more troops. What they really want is no decision on anything until July 2011."

The problem with the military position is that what worked in Iraq is not working in Afghanistan. The policy of funding the tribes is of limited value in Afghanistan because the enemy isn't led by foreign terrorists; it is a native insurgency. Funding some tribes and not others simply aggravates the feuding between them. And COIN depends on having a reliable local government running the security and social programs, which simply isn't going to happen so long as Hamid Karzai is President. The only part of the military spectrum that has worked in both Iraq and Afghanistan is McChrystal's special ops, which is stripping out midlevel Taliban leaders on a nightly basis.

This is the sort of moment that people write books about, a moment when the size of the personalities matches the scale of the stakes they're wrangling over. The real question is whether this Democratic President and the military, symbolized by Petraeus, can make the adjustments necessary to live with each other. It seems obvious that Obama is going to have to be less coy with the public about what is really going to happen in July 2011, even if that risks alienating his party's vestigial antiwar base. He is going to have to make it clear that "significant" troop withdrawals — a word bandied about in recent weeks — are not in the cards unless the situation on the ground changes dramatically, for good or ill. And Petraeus is going to have to reconsider whether the crown jewel in his tiara — the counterinsurgency doctrine — is really feasible in Afghanistan and what strategic modifications will have to be made in order to leave the place in the most stable, humane fashion.

These adjustments should not be difficult; they simply require the good faith and respect from both sides that have been lost, as McChrystal's crushing indelicacy so clearly demonstrated.

WEATHER FORECAST

Afghanistan Weather for Friday 25 June 2010 Kabul Jalalabad Mazar Kandahar Herat

Clear Clear Clear Clear Clear 33° C | 18° C 38° C | 23° C 38° C | 25° C 42° C | 27° C 41° C | 23° C

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Farah Khost Kunduz Gardez Faizabad

Clear Clear Clear Clear Rain 20% 44° C | 28° C 34° C | 22° C 37° C | 21° C 28° C | 18° C 35° C | 13° C

CALENDAR

20 Jul 10 - Kabul Conference 19 Aug 10 - National Day. 11/12 Aug-10/11 Sep 10 - Ramadan 18 Sep 10 - Parliamentary Election 08 Oct 10 - Parliamentary Election Preliminary Results Expected 30 Oct 10 – Parliamentary Election Final Results Expected 16 Nov - 17 Nov 10 - Eid-al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice).

Note. Muslim festivals are timed according to local sightings of various phases of the moon and the dates given above are approximations. During the lunar month of Ramadan that precedes Eid al-Fitr, Muslims fast during the day and feast at night and normal business patterns may be interrupted. Some disruption may continue into Eid al-Fitr itself. Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha may last up to several days, depending on the region.

NEWS / INFORMATION

McChrystal resigns in wake of Rolling Stone article An interview with Rolling Stone magazine has cost US General Stanley McChrystal his...

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Petraeus to take command of Afghanistan mission Gen. David Petraeus will replace Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in... Afghanistan disappointed with McChrystal's dismissal, hopeful about Petraeus Afghanistan is unhappy with the US' decision of dismissing Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal as the top U.S. commander in the... Obama fires top Afghanistan commander McChrystal US President Barack Obama Wednesday removed Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the top NATO commander in Afghanistan over a magazine article that portrayed him as dismissive of senior US officials for their concerns about the ongoing war... Top US commander in Afghanistan resigns US President Barack Obama Wednesday accepted the resignation of the top NATO commander in Afghanistan over a magazine article that portrayed him as dismissive of senior US officials for their concerns about the ongoing war... Obama fires top Afghanistan commander US President Barack Obama Wednesday fired General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, for speaking against the administration's policies in the war-torn... Pakistan's anti-terror efforts lauded by British foreign secretary British Foreign Secretary William Hague said Wednesday that Pakistan's commitment to the struggle against terror should be understood by everyone and criticized a recent report accusing the Pakistani secret services of giving support to the Taliban in... Australia may begin Afghanistan pullout in 2012 Australia Wednesday signalled it could start bringing some troops home from Afghanistan in two...

Afghanistan poppy crops hit by blight A parasite is threatening one quarter of Afghanistan’s poppy crops, according to the... Afghan support for General Petraeus Jun 24 2010 The Afghan government and Nato representatives have embraced the choice of General David Petraeus to run the war in Afghanistan following the dismissal of his predecessor. By naming...

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ACRONYMS

AA Anti-Aircraft MNF Multi National Forces AGE Anti-Government Elements (Generic term for MO Modus Operandi insurgent groups) MOD Ministry of Defence ABP AFGHAN Border Police MOI Ministry of Interior ADZ AFGHAN Development Zone (in Central NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation HELMAND around LKG) NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical AEF AFGHAN Eradication Force NBD Non-Battle Death ANA AFGHAN National Army NBI Non-Battle Injury ANP AFGHAN National Police NDA NAD-e ALI (in HELMAND Province) ANSF AFGHAN National Security Forces NFDK No Further Details Known ANSO AFGHAN NGO Safety Office NGO Non-Governmental Organisation AMF AFGHAN Militia Forces NSTR Nothing Significant to Report AO Area of Operations NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghan) AP Anti-Personnel OEF Operation Enduring Freedom (US Operation APC Armoured Personnel Carrier with a separate command structure and remit to AQ Al Qaeda ISAF, predominantly operating in the ASF AFGHAN Special Forces EASTERN region) AT Anti-Tank OP Observation Point BBRCIED Bicycle Borne Remote Controlled Improvised OPCEN Operations Centre Explosive Device OPSEC Operational Security BBIED Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device P2K PAKTIKA, PAKTIA & KHOWST BDA Battle Damage Assessment PAK PAKISTAN BME Bomb Making Equipment PB Patrol Base BP Border Post PBIED Person Born Improvised Explosive Device CAS Close Air Support PD Police District CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation PEF Poppy Eradication Force CNP Counter Narcotic Police PPIED Pressure plate IED CivPop Civilian Population PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team COIN (Ops) Counter Insurgency (Operations) PSAF Precision Small Arms Fire CoP Chief of Police PSC Private Security Company CP Checkpoint PSD Protective Security Detail CQA Close Quarter Assassination QRF Quick Reaction Force CWIED Command Wire IED Recce Reconnaissance DC District Centre RC Radio controlled / Remote controlled (as in DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration RCIED) DF Direct Fire RL Rocket Launcher DIAG Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade EF Enemy Forces (Generic term for insurgent RTA Road Traffic Accident groups) SAF Small Arms Fire EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal SAFIRE Surface-to-Air Fire FOB Forward Operating Base SAM Surface-to-Air Missile FP Firing Point SF Special Forces / Security Forces GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of SIOC Security Information Operations Centre AFGHANISTAN SOP Standard Operational Procedure GOA Government of Afghanistan SRA Security Risk Assessment GR Grid Reference (Provided in MGRS – Military SVBIED Suicide Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Grid Reference System) Device GSK GERESHK (in HELMAND) S Suicide i.e. SIED – suicide IED, SVBIED – HIG HEZB-I-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN suicide VBIED HME Home-made explosives (usually fertiliser- TB TALIBAN based) TBD To be determined HMG Heavy Machine Gun TTPs Tactics, techniques and procedures HQ Headquarters UGV Upper GERESHK Valley (HELMAND HVT High Value Target Province) IDF Indirect fire (Rockets and mortars) UN United Nations IEC Independent Election Commission UN DSS United Nations Department of Safety and IED Improvised Explosive Device Security IM (F) International Military (Forces) USV Upper SANGIN Valley (HELMAND Province) INGO International Non-governmental Organization UXO Unexploded Ordnance INS Insurgent(s) VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device ISAF International Security Assistance Force VCP Vehicle Check Point (Also, IVCP – Illegal IVO In the Vicinity Of (i.e. mil-speak for near) VCP) JEMB Joint Election Management Body VOIED Victim Operated IED JTF Joint Task Force WB World Bank KAF KANDAHAR Airfield WFP World Food Program KAIA KABUL International Airport WIA Wounded in action KCP KABUL City Police WHO World Health Organisation KIA Killed in action LKG LASHKAR GAH (in HELMAND Province) LN Local National (i.e. Afghan) MCIED Motor cycle improvised explosive device MCN Ministry of Counter Narcotics MEDIVAC Medical Evacuation MG Machine Gun MIA Missing in action Privileged and Confidential 14 This information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. You are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this information is strictly prohibited without the explicit approval from StrategicSSI Management.

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