A Prelude to Samaranch Lord Killanin’S Path to Olympic Commercialism Scott G

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A PrelUDe to SamaraNch Lord Killanin’s Path to Olympic Commercialism Scott G. Martyn & Stephen R. Wenn lympic historiography reveals intense fascination developments in the Olympic world during their presi- Owith the International Olympic committee (IOc) dencies also contributed to patterns of historical research.1 presidential tenures of Pierre de coubertin, avery lord killanin, the IOc’s sixth president (1972-1980), Brundage, and, more recently, Juan antonio Samaranch. has not been the subject of an extensive amount of aca- While both the characters and personalities of these demic inquiry, certainly not in the manner provided by individuals explain this trend, events and evolutionary John Macaloon or David young on coubertin, or allen .Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal 4.

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 200 04.09.2009 14:00:28 vision concerning methods of enhancing the value of the Olympic brand, and Richard Pound’s spadework in the television negotiations and corporate sponsorship fi les, mark substantial chapters in the history of the transformation of the IOc to a corporate entity,5 killanin’s efforts prepared the ground for these men. Our overarching purpose is to “turn the spotlight” on lord killanin, an individual whose contribution to the Olympic Movement has been underestimated by the historical community on fi nancial matters. In his 2002 work entitled, Representing Sport, Rod Brookes observed that the “economic transformation” of the IOc was “super- vised” by the “charismatic” Juan antonio Samaranch.6 While one cannot take issue with the claim, in the same discussion Brookes fails to mention killanin and the manner in which he prepared the IOc for Samaranch’s mission. allen Guttmann, in The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games, criticizes killanin’s leadership and his performance on a number of issues that refl ects the view of some contemporary IOc members that the Irishman lacked forcefulness.7 yet, Guttmann pays scant attention to the IOC’s fi nance portfolio in the 1970s. In Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games, alfred Senn skips rather hurriedly through the 1970s concerning increased television rights fees and killanin’s role, and fails to address his initiative concerning corporate sponsorship.8 lord killanin altered the IOc’s modus operandi concerning television negotiations and its understanding Lord Killanin, IOC Archives of corporate sponsorship in the 1970s. This set of devel- Guttmann on Brundage,2 or the ever increasing number opments, combined with Samaranch’s own presidential of research pieces on Samaranch published in the wake agenda, created the environment necessary for the IOc of his presidency. Why does such a void exist? to accumulate heretofore-unimagined wealth. Despite what may seem a relatively easy question to answer, it is far more diffi cult than one might imagine. Killanin and television The former Irish Olympic committee President, who had avery Brundage, whose turbulent twenty-year tenure served on the IOc since 1952, is an interesting character as IOc president concluded in 1972, appreciated televi- study, someone with a far different demeanour than his sion revenue as a means of expanding the IOc’s ability 4. Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal predecessor, avery Brundage. he carried into this posi- to propagate its ideals, but he was loathe to embrace the tion a familiarity in both the worlds of business and fi lm. medium (and its fi nancial possibilities) without reserva- During his presidency, he was the fi rst to tackle in any tion. In a very deliberate manner, he kept the IOc removed meaningful way the necessary liberalization of amateur from television negotiations, leaving the responsibility regulations, inherited the fallout from the Munich mass- under the purview of Organizing committees (OcOGs), acre, faced Denver, colorado’s withdrawal as host city while retaining control over distribution of the funds. for the Olympic Winter Games of 1976, and experienced This policy irritated both Organizing committees (who the troubling political problems concerning the Montréal managed the negotiations) and the national Olympic and Moscow festivals. his was no easy ride. although committees and International Sport federations, whose reluctant to criticize his predecessor, killanin argued, leaders accused Brundage of failing to allocate suffi cient “the years from 1952 to 1972, when the IOc did very revenues to their operations. a noted disciple of Pierre de little more than mark time, were costly.”3 The political coubertin, and a passionate advocate of “amateur” sport, problems and traumas killanin encountered during his Brundage grew increasingly exasperated by the spectre of eight years as IOc president, took from him much of the Olympic commercialism in the latter years of his presi- time he “would have preferred to have spent updating the dency. he lamented the repeated claims for increased Movement.”4 shares of Olympic television money in the 1960s from This paper will explore critical developments within the national Olympic committee (nOc), International Sport IOc, as well as the greater Olympic Movement, spurred Federation (ISF), and OCOG offi cials. Killanin was not by killanin that charted out the IOc’s path to commer- encumbered by such philosophical misgivings concern- cial riches in the 1980s and 1990s. While Samaranch’s ing the encroachment of commercialism. augmenting

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 201 04.09.2009 14:00:29 the IOC’s fi nancial reserves was a priority for him. directly involved in television negotiations. he inter- killanin’s managerial approach to the television port- vened in the troubled negotiations process for European folio marked a stark departure from the conservative prac- television rights to the 1976 Montréal Olympics when it tices of his predecessor. he pursued maximum television appeared that the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) revenue, especially in the U.S. market, and intervened might walk away from the table as a result of Montréal’s personally in television negotiations or did so through efforts to parcel off television rights to fl edgling private a designate such as IOc director Monique Berlioux or networks in Europe.12 finance commission chairman, Jean de Beaumont. he Second, upon his election to the presidency, the IOc’s also pushed forward policy in 1977 that made the IOc fi nancial cupboard was not bare, but Killanin viewed a formal partner in the television negotiations process. the IOC’s fi nancial reserves ($2 million) as inadequate. for his part, he understood the fractious relationship that Television revenue, he knew, provided the most direct prevailed between Brundage and the Olympic partner means of alleviating this situation. and, it would be the organizations. nOc and ISf executives chafed under U.S. market to which he would look. By the end of his 4. Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal Brundage’s autocratic rule, and particularly resented tenure, the IOc’s reserves had been improved signif- his dismissive attitude toward their desire to play mean- icantly ($45 million), a circumstance in which he took ingful roles in Olympic decision-making. killanin con- signifi cant pride.13 sidered television money to be a valuable lubricant for With the advent of satellite technology in the 1960s, the Olympic machine, something that might facilitate and the seemingly insatiable desire on the part of U.S. better relations between lausanne and members of the networks for sports programming in the 1970s, the value Olympic Tripartite. In his 1983 biography killanin con- of television rights to the Olympic Games and other cluded that television money had been a binding force, a sport properties climbed. It was an era, after all, when glue of sorts, in keeping the Olympic Movement together american viewers turned ideas such as the “Superstars” in the 1970s, and provided nOcs and ISfs “a com- into ratings winners.14 Killanin benefi ted greatly from pelling part of their need to stay within the [Olympic] the managerial approach of aBc’s President of Sports, Movement.”9 The learning curve for the IOc concerning Roone arledge, who placed a premium on the acquisition its involvement in television negotiations and what form of U.S. Olympic television rights as the centerpiece of of involvement might serve the organization’s best inter- the aBc’s Sports Department’s operations in the 1960s ests proved vital, and efforts in managing the portfolio and 1970s.15 arledge left little to chance on the negotia- in the 1980s and 1990s built upon the foundation estab- tions front, working at different times to either play on an lished by killanin. OCOG’s fi nancial needs by making pre-emptive, close- There were three principal drivers that infl uenced to-market value bids, thereby shutting out his rival exec- killanin’s decision to enhance the IOc’s day-to-day utives from nBc and cBS from the negotiating process, involvement in television rights negotiations. killanin, or when negotiations among the three networks were unlike Brundage, considered enhancing the IOC’s fi nan- conducted, having inside information on his rivals’ bids. cial resources to be a worthy initiative. he was not aBc also presented the best option in terms of how wedded, as Brundage was, to the incompatibility of com- the Games would be presented. arledge’s team, accord- mercial revenue with “amateur” sport. Second, he iden- ing to industry consensus, was the preeminent force in tifi ed the need to improve the IOC’s revenue genera- the production of sports programming in the U.S. market. tion capabilities as an area requiring his attention. Third, cBS and nBc were regarded as second raters in the killanin was unwilling to accept the machinations of production of sport programming. a trade publication, Organizing Committee offi cials in the 1970s who fl outed Television Age, commented that “cBS Sports seemed to IOc regulations in the conduct of television rights nego- exist only so that nBc wouldn’t be last in everything.”16 tiations, often with the result of reducing the IOc’s pre- and, while Roone arledge assisted mightily in the execu- scribed share of Olympic television revenue. In order to tion of killanin’s mission to enhance the IOc’s reserves, protect the IOC’s fi nancial interests, Killanin moved to so, too, did IOc director Monique Berlioux and finance position the IOc as a negotiating partner in the 1980s. commission chairman, count Jean de Beaumont, who killanin had no aversion, unlike his predecessor acted as killanin’s eyes and ears at the negotiating table. avery Brundage, to the thought of large sums of money When killanin pressed the IOc to take a more hands-on fl owing into the Olympic till.10 he was, at least accord- approach with the television portfolio, it was Berlioux ing to documentation we have been able to unearth, and Beaumont who tackled the challenge.17 the fi rst IOC member to press Avery Brundage to con- The third, and arguably most signifi cant driver sider the possibilities for the IOc concerning Olympic behind killanin’s approach, was the need to respond television revenue and the sale of television rights in to the manner in which Organizing committees in the the mid-1950s.11 as IOc president, he advocated for the late 1960s and 1970s conducted negotiations and pro- pursuit of maximum television rights fees, especially in duced television contracts. killanin inherited a number the highly competitive and ego-driven U.S. sports televi- of problems from Brundage, and one of these was the sion market. He was the fi rst IOC President to become Munich Precedent. Willi Daume, president of the Munich

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 202 04.09.2009 14:00:30 Organizing committee, negotiated a $13.5 million Television negotiations for the 1980 Olympic Winter agreement for U.S. television with Roone arledge, but Games in lake Placid which played out in 1975 and 1976 decreed that $6 million was reserved for the Organizing reinforced killanin’s belief that the IOc’s interests were committee (referred to as a technical services fee) with best protected if it became a formal partner in the negoti- the remainder divisible according to the IOc’s formula ations process in the future. In desperate need of funds, for distribution (a formula that already set aside approxi- the lake Placid Organizing committee (lPOc) signed mately 66% for the Organizing committee).18 When the a U.S. television rights contract with Roone arledge IOc cried foul, Daume was steadfast. In exchange for (aBc) for $9 million, subject to IOc approval, that des- forgiving a loan of $274,000 to the IOc (yes, indeed, this ignated $3 million of this sum as payment to the IOc. The was a time when the IOc needed to borrow money from agreement eliminated the IOC as a benefi ciary of funds an Organizing Committee to keep its operations afl oat), secured from television negotiations with non-U.S. net- and guaranteeing that no other contracts from the world’s works. Rather, in contravention of IOc policy that called television markets would be structured in this fashion, for the allocation of one-third of all television revenue Daume retained this arrangement.19 to the IOc for distribution among the IOc, nOcs, and Even though the IOc obtained pledges from the ISfs, this money was to be shared by lPOc and aBc.26 Montréal Organizing committee not to proceed along arledge also negotiated the right to match any offer from Daume’s path, and made clear that any contract sub- NBC or CBS. When news of this contract fi ltered through mitted to the IOc for approval would not be accepted if it the U.S. sports television industry, cBS and nBc execu- included a technical services component, Montréal offi - tives pressed for an opportunity to bid, and eventually cials found a devious means of accomplishing the same took their grievances to federal authorities.27 Recognizing end. first, Roger Rousseau, president of the Montréal that the IOc again faced charges that aBc acquired Organizing committee, pressed the IOc to apportion Olympic television rights television rights in the absence 50% of aBc’s $25 million contract for technical ser- of a competitive process in the U.S. market (as had been vices fees. The IOc refused citing the aforementioned the case with Montréal), killanin approved an auction of pledge received at the time of the award of the Games to the rights. Beaumont conducted the proceedings in Paris the canadian city in 1970.20 The standoff continued until in May, 1976. While aBc captured the rights for $15.5 the IOc consented to Montréal’s wishes with the proviso million, it is clear that Beaumont permitted arledge to that the U.S. contract would be the only one devised with match the highest bid received.28 further frustration a technical services component. In effect, the IOc was with Soviet organizers of the 1980 Moscow Olympic willing to extend to Montréal the same terms granted to Games and discussions with U.S. and European televi- Willi Daume.21 Montréal offi cials agreed, but refused to sion executives, who believed the negotiations process set aside their desire for all of the world’s broadcasters to would be streamlined if the IOC assumed a higher profi le contribute to the construction of broadcast facilities. In in negotiations, prompted killanin and the IOc to take an annex to the contract sent to lausanne for the IOc’s action. killanin supported a policy in 1977 whereby the approval, an annex not discovered by the IOc’s lawyer IOc would negotiate future television contracts (1984 tasked to view the document, Montréal offi cials included cycle and beyond) jointly with representatives of future a clause that set aside 50% of all television contracts Organizing committees.29 In sum, killanin adopted a 4. Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal for technical services. The IOc lawyer duly signed the two-pronged approach to elevating the organization’s document rendering it a binding agreement.22 The chilly role in television negotiations: 1) establishment of IOc relations between the IOc and Montréal organizers on Sub-committee on Television; and 2) establishment of television matters require no elaboration. a policy of negotiating television contracts jointly with killanin recognized the only means of alleviating this Organizing committees.30 These were two initiatives that form of aggravation involved assuming a formal role in facilitated, in no small measure, the IOc’s transformation the negotiations process.23 Such a move would prevent to a corporate entity. actions such as Montréal trying to sell canadian television rights to the cBc for $1 and dragging negotiations Killanin and corporate sponsorship for European television rights to the games out until Despite its new partner status in television negotiations, 7 months before the lighting of the Olympic fl ame.24 killanin recognized the IOc’s unhealthy dependence on however, the IOc was ill prepared to “sit at the table” the television rights revenue stream during the boycott and required time to augment its knowledge base on era and investigated the possibility of opening a second the television industry. In 1973, killanin established the revenue stream for the Olympic Movement involving cor- finance committee’s Sub-committee on Television, porate sponsorship. killanin and the IOc soon discovered comprised of IOc members and members of the televi- that the requisite protection of the Olympic marks and sion community for the expressed purpose of improving their exploitation in the international marketplace was the IOc’s future ability to deal with television executives a far more complex and potentially mine-strewn under- in negotiations. he assigned much of the responsibility in taking than even he could have imagined. Samaranch, leading this initiative to Monique Berlioux.25 induced by the sports business acumen and persuasion

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 203 04.09.2009 14:00:31 of horst Dassler, recognized the declining interest in the had been noted well before 1977 and the alarmingly large governments of major Olympic nations to bankroll the increase in costs associated with staging the Games, par- Olympic festivals in the wake of the Montréal debacle, ticularly with respect to the Tokyo, Mexico city, Munich, and accepted killanin’s take on the IOc’s dangerous and Montréal Olympic festivals. Those responsible for dependence on television revenue.31 While killanin’s funding the Games had to explore every revenue-gener- early corporate sponsorship initiatives were unsuccess- ating possibility. The sale of Olympic event tickets, com- ful, it is clear that these efforts and the IOc’s infrastruc- memorative coins, and stamps, though important signi- ture changes resulting from his desire for increased soph- fi ers of the Olympic industry, represented minor revenue istication in television negotiations facilitated a steep sources. Television revenues, though providing impres- learning curve relative to corporate sponsorship. killanin sive fi nancing opportunities, fell far short of the total provided a foundation upon which the IOc could lever- funding required. This fact led in time to an energetic age funds from the corporate world in a relatively rapid expansion of an experimentally modest Olympic Games fashion when compared to its prolonged period of rela- Organizing committee (OcOG) fund raising initiative of 4. Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal tionship building with, and knowledge acquisition con- the past, corporate sponsorship, but with a twist - selling cerning, the television industry. exclusive rights to commercial fi rms to link products and Unlike the principal factors that infl uenced Killanin’s services to the Olympic mystique while protecting their decision to enhance the IOc’s involvement with televi- rights by law. In effect, the initiative offered a form of sion rights negotiations, it was the emerging importance guaranteed exclusivity. The thrust of this phenomenon did of television and the events of the 1970s, particularly the not originally come from the IOc, but rather a member 1972 and 1976 Games that dictated a new approach to of its constituent national Olympic committee (nOc) corporate sponsorship. family, along with the OcOG charged with the respon- By 1974, the IOc, under the presidential leadership of sibility of hosting, and paying for, the 1976 Olympic lord killanin, derived some 98% of its income directly festival. from the sale of television rights to the Olympic Games. Well before Juan antonio Samaranch formed a com- yet, despite his advocacy of the pursuit of maximum tele- mission to investigate new sources of revenue generation, vision rights fees, killanin’s commitment to put the IOc the subject engendered discussion inside the halls of IOc on a “sound fi nancial footing” forced the re-evaluation of decision-making. In response, the IOc experimented with the organization’s growing dependency on the revenues the international marketing of its symbols. Stemming generated by the sale of those rights.32 lord killanin, in from a failed attempt by the Montréal Organizing particular, recognized his organization’s precarious posi- committee to recover money spent on staging the 1976 tion. The almost complete reliance on the whim of tele- Olympic festival, the IOc purchased a collection of sty- vision executives, predominantly those in the U.S., made lised Olympic pictograms from Montréal for the purpose he and a number of his colleagues nervous. Elevating of establishing its fi rst international licensing program. the uneasiness within the IOC created by this fi nancial acting on killanin’s behalf, Monique Berlioux asked reality, was the prediction by some pundits that the spi- Stanley R. Shefl er, president of Intelicense Corporation raling rights fees would soon level off, if not decline. It Sa, to consider managing the newly proposed IOc was decided that the IOc should establish a more diver- licensing initiative. Shefl er accepted, and Intelicense and sifi ed revenue base from which to operate and fund the IOc agreed on a seventy-year marketing contract. the Games, indeed, the entire operation of the Modern keen to launch the new initiative, Berlioux directed Olympic Movement. Shefl er to design a series of new pictograms; Shefler although a topic of discussion at various IOc General immediately contracted graphic designer van Der Wal, Session meetings during Brundage and killanin’s presi- who set to work to create completely new stylized ath- dential terms, it was not until the late 1970s that an asso- letic fi gures. Upon completion of the project, Van Der ciation with the Olympic marks and logos sought by Wal signed his “creation rights” over to the IOc. With commercial business fi rms, stimulated by the increasing the pictograms now the property of the IOc, Berlioux success of television rights, resulted in tangible initia- wrote to all nOcs: “This letter will certify that Intelicense tives within the IOc Executive Board. killanin, having corporation Sa of Switzerland has been appointed by recognized the growing threat, supported the establish- the International Olympic committee to act as exclusive ment of laws of protection aimed at developing a second world licensing agent for the copyrighted offi cial I.O.C. revenue stream for the Olympic Movement involving Summer Olympic pictograms. The agent is authorized corporate sponsorship. approved at the Seventy-ninth to grant licensing rights on behalf of the I.O.c. and to IOc Session in Prague in 1977, a by-law to Rule 6 of receive royalty revenue for the support of the International the Olympic charter announced that the IOc “shall take Olympic movement.”34 Shefl er subsequently distributed every appropriate step possible to obtain legal protection “cooperation agreements” to all nOcs requesting them of the Olympic symbol on a national and international to survey the use of the pictograms in their territory. basis.”33 he also announced that each participating nOc would Despite the delayed action, the need for symbol protection receive a share of the total IOc income from the program,

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 204 04.09.2009 14:00:32 as well as an additional 10% of the total income derived been assigned by the Supreme court, issued its ruling in from manufacturers in their specifi c countries. Ten NOCs favor of the USOc.39 The case brought against the IOc by signed agreements immediately, including Greece, Intelicense, however, would take another fi ve years to be Mexico, and China, each a signifi cant prospective con- resolved. In commenting on the prolonged litigation and sumer market. Shefl er, Killanin, and Berlioux soon rec- its toll on the Olympic Movement, Samaranch remarked ognized, much as horst Dassler, Samaranch, and Richard that “the whole affair was utterly regrettable,” and that Pound did in the 1980s in their (ultimately successful) “he could not understand how the IOc had ever signed attempt to launch the worldwide corporate sponsorship such a contract.”40 he further chastised those involved, program known as TOP, that obtaining consensus from stating, “the signatories had demonstrated a high level all nOcs on a fund raising initiative, was no easy task. of incompetence.”41 In making this charge, one wonders and, the United States Olympic committee (USOc) pro- whom Samaranch had in mind – Monique Berlioux, or vided a signifi cant roadblock. possibly his predecessor, lord killanin. he further ques- as the 1980 Olympic Games approached, the looming tioned how “a rather small and insignifi cant affair had boycott weighed heavily on the Intelicense-IOc mar- grown out of proportion relative to its importance.” keting initiative. as the licensing program evolved, the contrary to Samaranch’s statements, assigning personal USOc wrote to the IOc registering negative concerns responsibility, according to françois carrard, former towards doing business with Intelicense. In response, IOc legal adviser, was a “fairly delicate subject,” as the IOc voiced its support for Intelicense and its work the IOc finance commission and Executive Board to achieve the goals of its president, lord killanin, and approved the original 1979 agreements with Intelicense.42 those of the entire Olympic Movement. Protecting its Though clearly signifi cant and educational in value, the own domestic interests, the USOc refused to cede terri- IOc’s initial exercise with the international marketing of torial access to the United States to Intelicense for licen- Olympic Pictograms is commonly regarded as a dismal sing the Olympic pictograms. In fact, it launched a suit failure. against Intelicense, as well as its two licensees in the United States. In response to the suit, Intelicense along Reﬂ ections with one of its licensees counter-sued the USOc, citing no discussion of the IOc’s ultimate success in harness- its offi cial authority as exclusive world licensing agent ing revenue from television and corporate sponsorship for the copyrighted offi cial IOC Summer Olympic pic- is complete without some comment on this money’s tograms.35 having bridged the presidential terms of lord infl uence on the Olympic enterprise. And, this infl uence killanin and Juan antonio Samaranch, the legal contro- extends well beyond the cornucopia of business adver- versy raised additional issues, including questions as to tising on Olympic telecasts, the effort to massage event why the International Sport federations (ISfs) were not timetables for the IOc’s television network partners, and consulted on the design of the pictograms. the needs of television networks when new sports are With the appearance of yet another offi cial Olympic considered for admission to the Olympic event program. marketing fi rm (ISL) intent on marketing the fi ve-ring While not without signifi cant challenge, a well-thought symbol following killanin’s retirement, Intelicense set out plan for capitalizing on the commercial possibilities its sights on the IOc, launching a court case against the of the Olympic Rings would reap fi nancial dividends, 4. Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal organization itself.36 Shefl er contended that the IOC had but how would the IOc adjust to its new-found wealth? no right to grant anybody other than Intelicense the sole The development of the IOc’s ability to generate revenue rights to market the Olympic rings alone, citing restric- through sophisticated business and negotiating prac- tions outlined in the Olympic Charter. as the argument tices in the television and corporate sponsorship arenas, portion of the legal cases concluded in the U.S., and many of them introduced by Juan antonio Samaranch with a preliminary judgement still a week away in the and Richard Pound in the 1980s and 1990s as a result Intelicense vs. IOC case, Shefl er approached the new of some of the lessons learned during the killanin presi- Olympic marketing fi rm (ISL) in hopes of establishing a dency, outstripped the organization’s ability to manage formal agreement of cooperation.37 Given the continued the results of this success. deterioration of his company’s relationship with the In august, 2004, the British Broadcasting corporation IOC, Shefl er proposed the possibility of ISL purchasing (BBc) aired an hour-long documentary detailing the Intelicense. concerned over the outcome of the pending results of a year-long undercover effort to explore litigation involving Intelicense, and the lack of a signed behind-the-scene activities regarding the bid process contract with the IOC, ISL responded to Shefl er’s over- for the 2012 Olympic Summer Games. This “sting” ture by stating that any decision on his proposal could operation, launched by the BBc, was in no way associ- take up to a year.38 ated with the london 2012 bid committee led by lord By november 1984, the case brought by the USOc Sebastian Coe. The BBC’s agents secretly fi lmed con- against Intelicense and its licensee had not yet been versations with four individuals who claimed to have an settled. finally, in the early months of 1985, the United ability to deliver members’ votes to competing cities. In States District court in vermont, to which the case had short, they asserted there were IOc members’ votes that

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 205 04.09.2009 14:00:32 could be secured through payment. The four men, Gabor enhancing drugs. notwithstanding the development of komyathy, Goran Takac, Mahmood el farnawani, and the World anti-Doping agency in the latter years of his Muttaleb ahmad, are not unknown to followers of past presidency, Samaranch never demonstrated the will to bidding processes. What has startled some observers, but confront in aggressive fashion this growing menace, and not all, is that these men purport that the bid process is still the resulting blight on the integrity of Olympic competi- compromised despite the IOc’s efforts to address ethical tion. It can be said that the IOc is now engaged in this transgressions brought to light by the Salt lake city bid issue, largely as a result of Richard Pound’s dogged lead- scandal.43 The depth of this problem will be addressed in ership of WaDa. Second, the growth of the Games as a the ensuing months when the IOc’s Ethics commission commercial and televised spectacle, with the possibility launches an investigation, and voracious investigative of signifi cant revenue for ISFs, encouraged sport offi cials reporters, who sniff the scent of further scandal, continue to seek means of expanding their place on the Olympic working their stories. event timetable. circumstances spurred others to cam- The BBc’s expose delivered yet another blow to an paign for the inclusion of their sports on the Olympic 4. Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal organization that only recently emerged from a media program. Samaranch’s decision to grow the Games, in crisis stemming from revelations concerning the bid part as a means of improving the number of female com- process for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games that resulted petitors, can be defended, indeed, applauded. however, in Salt lake city’s selection. It will provide critics of the his decision to open the Games to professional athletes, IOc, its structure, and its operations with more fodder. while thankfully shelving the conundrum of amateurism, Beyond the relevant questions that must be asked in light was also pursued as a means of selling the Games to U.S. of the BBc’s investigation, the substance of the story television and multinational corporations. Samaranch sub- further supports the conclusion that the IOc’s ability scribed to the belief that “bigger was better.” With respect to generate revenue exceeded its ability to manage its to the Summer Olympic experience, the number of coun- success in this area. tries with cities that could host an Olympic festival given The stakes involved in the bidding process were the infrastructure and logistical needs declined during his raised in the 1980s in the wake of Peter Ueberroth’s presidency. for the foreseeable future, the Games will wildly fi nancially successful Los Angeles Olympic fes- continue to be exchanged between north america and tival. financial possibilities accruing from Ueberroth’s Europe with the occasional foray to Oceania and asia model for marrying an OcOG’s operations with corpo- despite Jacques Rogge’s public comments in support of rate sponsors (at least a far more effective form of part- scaling back the demands placed on host cities. nership than had been the case in the past) encouraged yet, the story of the IOc’s marriage with commercial civic leaders from around the world to explore leveraging interests, despite the strident claims of some of the orga- the hosting of an Olympic festival as a catalyst for a city’s nization’s critics, cannot be portrayed solely in a negative image enhancement on the world stage and needed infra- light. commercial revenue allowed the IOc to expand its structure improvements in the late 1980s and 1990s.44 support to national Olympic committees such that more With the prospect of further funds from the IOc’s TOP athletes, especially those from developing nations, could program instituted in 1985, and spiraling television rights compete in the Olympic arena. While there is more to be fees, the number of competing cities grew and the fervor done in terms of improving the quality of that Olympic of the bid process exploded. Bid committees lavished experience, especially through a more concerted effort IOc members with parties, perqs, and cold, hard cash. to nurture the talents of athletes in developing nations, Many IOc members resisted the temptation of leverag- there is little doubt that this investment has extended the ing their status for personal gain, but others, as the fallout reach of the Olympic Movement. and, those who have from the Salt lake city scandal will attest, did not. Even been entrusted with staging Olympic festivals in the post- when IOc member Marc hodler cautioned Samaranch in Moscow era will confi rm that commercial revenue was the late 1980s and again in the early 1990s that the IOc central to their efforts to avoid burdensome debt for their needed to rein in these practices, no action was taken.45 communities (although for various reasons this does not however, it is not merely in the area of governance defi ne Athens’ experience). Olympic Games cannot be concerning IOc member conduct that Samaranch’s lead- staged solely on the public purse. The marriage of the ership proved wanting. Two signifi cant problems on IOC Olympic Movement with corporate interests, given the president Jacques Rogge’s agenda can also be linked to declining interest of governments in the 1970s to bank- Samaranch’s inability to grasp important consequences of roll the staging of the Olympic Games, was born of the IOc’s marriage with commercial forces. athletes’ use necessity. of proscribed methods of performance enhancement pre- In Fields of Vision: Television Sport and Cultural ceded Samaranch’s presidency, yet as the stakes for the Transformation, Garry Whannel concluded that Juan competing bid cities grew, so too did the possibilities of antonio Samaranch’s election “marked a new era in fi nancial success (in a number of premier sports) for gold which the Olympic Movement began for the ﬁ rst time medal-winning athletes. athletes were tempted by, and to grapple with and attempt to come to terms with moder- a good number succumbed, to the lure of performance nity and commerce.”46 Our analysis demonstrates that the

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 206 04.09.2009 14:00:33 onset of this new era occurred in the latter stages of avery amateurism, killanin’s words upon his election, “I am not avery Brundage’s presidency, in light of the establishment of Brundage” were prophetic. Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the organization’s finance committee in 1967, but is best the Modern Games, p. 142. reserved for killanin’s tenure. While his corporate spon- 11 avery Brundage to Members of the IOc Executive Board, 3 august 1955, avery Brundage collection [hereafter cited as aBc] sorship initiative with Intelicense proved less than suc- Box 114, Reel 62, International centre for Olympic Studies, cessful, the direction taken, towards the IOc’s embrace University of Western Ontario [hereafter cited as IcOSa]. The of corporate sponsors, was a portent of things to come. ability to conclusively prove he was the fi rst individual to raise Television revenue, and the best methods of generating the matter with the IOC President is made somewhat diffi cult as it is known that lord Burghley also had an interest in television and this money, received a large measure of his attention. It discussed this interest with Brundage. It seems those were discus- was killanin who intervened directly, or through desig- sions not committed to paper. nates such as Monique Berlioux or Jean de Beaumont, in 12 for a number of sources on this intervention, see “Olympians television negotiations in the 1970s to protect the IOc’s Reject $9.3 Million Tv Bid,” New York Times, 13 august 1975; fi nancial interests. It was also Killanin who launched the lord killanin to Roger Rousseau, 14 august 1975; charles curran (President, European Broadcasting Union) to lord killanin, IOc’s efforts to upgrade the organization’s knowledge 20 august 1975; IOc, lausanne to charles curran, 25 august base concerning the television industry, in the end devel- 1975; “n.4 Droits de Tv Montréal du 1.1.75 au 31.8.75” Binder, oping policy to place IOc representatives, in a formal International Olympic committee archives [hereafter cited as sense, at the negotiating table. Juan antonio Samaranch IOca], lausanne, Switzerland; and, “aide Memoire – lord killanin – Montréal – Tv,” 5 September 1975, “n.5 Droits de Tv casts a long shadow in the fi nancial history of the IOC, Montréal du 1.9.75 au 30.4.76” Binder, IOca. not without reason, but our research affords lord killanin 13 lord killanin, My Olympic Years an opportunity to emerge from it. ■ 14 Ben Rader, In Its Own Image: How Television Has Transformed Sports (new york: The free Press, 1984), pp. 128-129. first published in: Journal of Olympic History (vol. 16, no. 2, July 15 for arledge’s views on american television, see Roone arledge, 2008, pp. 40-46) Roone: A Memoir (new york: harpercollins, 2003). aBc’s involvement in Olympic television negotiations are covered Notes and References in Jim Spence (with Dave Diles), Up Close and Personal: The 1 It might be that many researchers share the recently published Inside Story of Network Television Sports (new york: atheneum view of Dick Pound that there have been “three great IOc pres- Publishers, 1988), pp. 33-50, 283-299. Richard Pound indi- idents,” coubertin, Brundage, and Samaranch, thereby steering cates that contemporary speculation was that a “close relation- the preponderance of research energies towards events associated ship” between Monique Berlioux and aBc’s European execu- with their presidential tenures. Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics: A tive George crozes, in part, provided the inside track for aBc. Behind the Scene Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the Glory Pound offered no opinion on the accuracy of the reports as they of the Games (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), pp. 234-235. predated his arrival on the scene as the IOc’s point person in tele- 2 See David c. young, The Modern Olympics: A Struggle for vision negotiations in 1983. Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics, pp. Revival (Baltimore: The Johns hopkins University Press, 1996); 172-173. John Macaloon, This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and 16 Terry O’neil, The Game Behind the Game: High Pressure, High the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games (chicago: University Stakes in Television Sports (new york: harper and Row, 1989), of chicago Press, 1981); and allen Guttmann, The Games Must p. 75. Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement (new york: 17 17 a thorough review of Berlioux and Beaumont’s activities in columbia University Press, 1984). killanin’s work, in general, is this regard can be found in Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the a focus of Geoffrey Miller, Behind the Olympic Rings (lynn, Ma: Five Rings, pp. 103-150. h.O. Zimman, 1979). 4. Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal 18 a series of letters traces the developments concerning the con- 3 See lord killanin, My Olympic Years (london: Secker & Warburg, tract. See, herbert kunze (Secretary General, Munich) to avery 1983), p. 20. Brundage, 11 april 1969; lord luke (chair, IOc finance Ibid.4 Ibid.4 commission) to herbert kunze, 3 november 1969; Willi Daume 5 Interested readers might wish to consult Richard Pound’s views to lord luke, 20 november 1970, aBc, Box 98, Reel 53, on developments in the television and corporate sponsorship IcOSa; and Marquess of Exeter (IOc Executive Board) to avery fi les during Samaranch’s presidency. See, Dick Pound, Inside Brundage, 17 november 1969; and avery Brundage to Exeter, 15 the Olympics, pp. 139-196. These developments have also been January 1970, aBc, Box 55, Reel 33, IcOSa. addressed in Robert k. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott 19 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Munich, G. Martyn, Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic 28 January 1971, p. 4; and Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism (Salt lake Executive Board, lausanne, 13-14 March 1971, p. 20, IOca. city: University of Utah Press, 2002), pp. 151-273. 20 “Extract – President’s visit to Montréal 3rd/7th november, 1972,” 6 Rod Brookes, Representing Sport (london: arnold Publishers, 10 november 1972; and lord killanin to Roger Rousseau, 8 2002), p. 67. December 1972, “n.1 Droits de Tv Montréal du 4.12.69 au 7 allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games 30.6.73” Binder, IOca. (Urbana and Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1992), p. 142. 21 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, lausanne, 1 8 alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games and 3 february 1973, pp. 7-9, IOca. (champaign: human kinetics, 1999), pp. 171-172, 181. 22 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Finance Commission, Paris, 9 lord killanin, My Olympic Years, pp. 21-22. Brackets ours. 12 June 1973, p. 2, IOCA. The fi nal decision to approve contracts with a 50:50 split (rights vs. technical services) was made 10 The evidence on this is quite clear. killanin improved the IOc’s in 1974. The IOc had tried to withhold approval on contracts long reserves from $2,084,290 to $45,142,752.21 during his presidency. enough that Montréal would drop its demands due to fi nancial exi- as for his thoughts on the money issue and other matters, such as gency. Problematic, however, was the IOC’s own fi nancial status

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Inhalt_Joh_Best_of_09.indd 207 04.09.2009 14:00:34 which prevented the use of this “stalling tactic” beyond this time. ISl Marketing file, IOca; see also Monique Berlioux, to Whom Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, lausanne, it May concern, 7 December 1979, ISl Marketing file, IOca. 9-11 february 1974, p. 12, IOca; and Minutes of the Meeting 35 Ems Magnus, (Marketing Manager, ISl Marketing aG) to horst of the IOC Finance Commission, Paris, 28 January 1974, p. 4, Dassler, 8 September 1983, ISl Marketing file, IOca. IOca. 36 The new fi rm was International Sports and Leisure Marketing 23 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, lausanne, (ISl) in lucerne, Switzerland. ISl was created shortly after the 2-5 february 1973, p. 9, IOca; and lord killanin to Monique fi nals of the 1982 Soccer World Cup, and specializing in sports Berlioux, 21 March 1973, “n.1 Droits de Tv Montréal du 4.12.69 sponsorship marketing. It had obtained exclusive contracts with au 30.6.76” Binder, IOca. the International football (Soccer) federation (fIfa) and two of 24 These two stories are covered in detail in Barney, Wenn, and the sport’s continental sub-federations, the European and South Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, pp. 115-123. american football Unions. In an effort to expand its global oper- 25 “notes on the Work of the Television Sub-committee,” 23 June ations, ISl had approached the IOc in hopes of developing a 1974, p. 1; and “Memorandum on Television Rights,” p. 4, “Tv/ worldwide sponsorship marketing program involving various Divers 1974-1985” Binder, IOca, “1974-1979” folder, IOca. multinational corporations, most of them from north america, Japan or Western Europe, that would generate suffi cient rev- 26 aBc Sports Inc. (Roone arledge) to the Organizing committee enues to provide a regular income for the Olympic family, and, .Spreading, Challenging and Safeguarding the Olympic Ideal 4. for the 13th Olympic Winter Games – lake Placid, 1980, “lake of course, enhance its own company resources and power in the Placid 1980/Tv-General 1976” Binder, IOca. world of sport business. 27 “Two networks Protest on 1980 Olympics,” New York Times, 13 37 Ibid. The Intelicense-IOC court case had its fi rst session on 30 March 1976; corydon B. Dunham (nBc legal counsel) to lord august 1983. killanin, 12 March 1976; Robert T. howard (President, nBc) to lord killanin, 25 March 1976; and, John Schneider (President, Ibid.38 cBS Broadcast Group) to IOc, 25 March 1976, “lake Placid ’80 39 See, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Berlin, Tv Dossier General” Binder; and fred B. Rooney to Monique 31 May, 1-3, 6 June 1985, p. 127, IOca. The award in favor of the Berlioux, 21 May 1976, “Television Rights lake Placid, “ annex USOc included $50,000 damages against ISM, $80,000 damages #4, p. 1, “lake Placid 1980/Tv-General 1976” Binder, IOca. against Intelicense, subject to an accounting, $74,000 in attorneys’ 28 “Director’s Resume of Meetings held in Paris, May 1976,” fees against ISM and Intelicense jointly, and $8,000 in attorneys’ “Television Rights lake Placid,” “lake Placid 1980/Tv-General fees against Intelicense alone. 1976,” Binder, IOca; and Roone arledge to Jean de Beaumont, Ibid.40 3 June 1976, “lake Placid ’80 Tv Rights aBc I” Binder, IOca. 41 Ibid. Samaranch’s comments were clearly directed at Monique The original bids were: $14 million (cBS); $15.5 million (nBc), Berlioux, IOc Director. and $12 million (aBc). See, 42 See, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Seoul, 29 The Moscow scenario is discussed in Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, 22-24 april 1986, p. 166, IOca. Selling the Five Rings, pp. 138-146. The joint negotiation policy was passed in 1977 by the IOc Session. See, Minutes of the 79th 43 Those who were not surprised by these revelations would point Session of the International Olympic Committee, Prague, 15-18 to Samsung’s unabashed support of Pyeongchang’s bid for the June 1977, p. 35; and annex #33, pp. 98-102, IOca. 2010 Olympic Winter Games. Samsung pledged money to developing nations (in support of athlete development) should the 30 It should be noted that the 1984 Organizing committees (Sarajevo South korean city receive the right to host the festival. This offer and Los Angeles) resisted this policy. The fi rst successful imple- is thought to have assisted the fi rst-time bidding city to achieve its mentation of this joint negotiation policy occurred in conjunction hard charging second place fi nish to Vancouver-Whistler. Despite with the negotiation of U.S. television rights to the 1988 calgary the IOc’s reform measures, observers noted at the time that the bid Olympic Winter Games. Seoul’s intransigence and efforts to dim- process was far from problem free. inish the IOc’s role in television negotiations pushed the IOc’s hand to assume control of television rights negotiations for the 44 Today, even the prospect of a failed bid intrigues municipal 1992 Olympic festivals and beyond. leaders. Case in point - while offi cials from Madrid, London, Paris, new york and Moscow are vying for the right to hoist the 31 See fernand landry and Magdeleine yerlès, “The Olympic flag in their cities in 2012, the city of Philadelphia is Presidencies of lord killanin (1972-1980) and Juan debating the merits of pushing forward with a bid for the 2024 or antonio Samaranch (1980-),” in The International Olympic 2028 Summer Olympics. If linked with preparations for the 250th Commttee-One Hundred Years: The Idea-the Presidents-the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, those in support Achievements, vol. 3 (lausanne: IOc, 1966), pp. 180-181. stress that even a failed bid provides the city both an opportunity 32 lord killanin, My Olympic Years (london: Secker & Warburg, to raise its profi le on the international stage and a framework for 1983), p. 9. discussing infrastructural renewal projects required over the next “33 “33 Minutes of the 79th Session of the International Olympic two decades. This discussion is highlighted in a 7 September 2004 Committee,” Prague, 15-18 June 1977, pp. 76-77, IOca. The spe- editorial from the Philadephia Inquirer posted on the newspaper’s cifi c by-law to Rule 6 referred to by the author reads: The IOC is web site (http://www.philly.com/inquirer/news/editorial/9597816. the responsible authority for the protection of the Olympic fl ag, htm?1c). Olympic symbol and Olympic motto that are its exclusive prop- 45 See, Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings: The IOC erty. It shall take every appropriate step possible to obtain their and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism [Revised Edition] (Salt legal protection on a national and international basis. It shall also lake city: University of Utah Press, 2004), “notes to chapter lend its support to efforts the nOcs must make to obtain the pro- 13,” n 31, pp. 392-394. tection of the Olympic fl ag, symbol and motto for the IOC within 46 Garry Whannel, Fields in Vision: Television Sport and Cultural their country. Transformation (london: Routledge, 1992), p. 174. Emphasis 34 Monique Berlioux, to Whom it May concern, 19 november 1979, ours.

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