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Establishing a World Anti-Doping Code: WADA's Impact on the Development of an International Strategy for Anti-Doping in Sport

Establishing a World Anti-Doping Code: WADA's Impact on the Development of an International Strategy for Anti-Doping in Sport

University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor

Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers

2006

Establishing a World Anti-Doping Code: WADA's impact on the development of an international strategy for anti-.

Caitlin A. Jenkins University of Windsor

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Recommended Citation Jenkins, Caitlin A., "Establishing a World Anti-Doping Code: WADA's impact on the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport." (2006). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1959. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/1959

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email ([email protected]) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. ESTABLISHING A WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: WADA’S IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ANTI-DOPING IN SPORT

by

Caitlin A. Jenkins

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research through the Faculty of Human Kinetics in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Human Kinetics at the University of Windsor

Windsor, ,

2006

© 2006 Caitlin A. Jenkins

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While these forms may be includedBien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. i * i Canada Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Abstract

The use and prevalence of performance enhancing drugs is not unique to modem

sport. Reports of athletes striving to improve their physical abilities date back to third

century BCE. Endeavoring to address the growing problem of doping in sport, WADA

was created in 1999. This study evaluated how the formation of WADA impacted the

development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport. Conclusions were

reached through the analysis of three primary sources of data: personal and organizational

archives; media articles; and exploratory interviews. As revealed by the data, the

formation of WADA brought together the necessary players to reach a solution for

doping in sport. It provided a forum for sport and government to work co-operatively

generating ideas and focusing thinking. It led to an awakening within government and

sport to the complexities of doping; and it embodied an independent/credible

organization while raising/maintaining global awareness and interest in doping.

Ill

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This research study is dedicated to all of the athletes, around the world, who compete drug free!

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Acknowledgement

To all those individuals who have helped me along this academic journey, I

extend my utmost thanks. Specifically, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Scott

Martyn. Without his support, wisdom, encouragement and patience, the completion of

this project would not have been possible. Dr. Martyn, thank you for guiding me through

the learning process and believing in my potential. I would also like to express my

gratitude to my committee members, Dr. Darwin Semotiuk, Dr. Larry Glassford and Dr.

Marge Holman, for the time and effort they contributed. Their interest in my study,

suggestions and challenges contributed to an enriched learning experience. I would also

like to acknowledge all the individuals who participated in my study; thank you for your

co-operation, fortitude and patronage. Specifically, I would like to recognize Mr. Richard

Pound for granting me access to his IOC files. To my family, specifically my dad, thank

you for your unconditional support, and to Brad Davison, thank you for motivating,

supporting and encouraging me throughout this process. In closing, I would like to thank

the administrative staff from the Faculty of Human Kinetics as well as all of the people

who have made my time at the University of Windsor enjoyable and memorable.

v

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Page

ABSTRACT...... iii

DEDICATION...... iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...... v

LIST OF APPENDICIES...... ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... x

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 Emergence of Drug Use in Sport ...... 2 Anti-Doping Policy Development ...... 4 Prohibited Substances and Methods ...... 10 Individual Governments ...... 12 International Sport Federations ...... 14 The World Anti-Doping Agency ...... 15 Endnotes ...... 19

II. LITERATURE REVIEW...... 24 Section I Policy Development and Government Support ...... 24 Section II Education ...... 34 Section III Social Acceptance and Compliance ...... 36 Section IV Professional Sport and Anti-doping Policy Development ...... 42 Conclusion ...... 46 Endnotes ...... 49

III. METHODOLOGY...... 56 Methodological Framework ...... 56 Data Sources ...... 58 Limitations ...... 62 Delimitations...... 63 Operational Definitions ...... 65 Problem Statement ...... 65 Endnotes ...... 68

IV. RESULTS...... 70 From ‘ to Dubim’The Pre WADA Years ...... 70

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Events from 1998-2000: The lead up to WADA ...... 75 Events from 2000-2002: The Solidification of WADA ...... 82 WADA Start-up Initiatives ...... 84 Events from 2003-2005: The Implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code.. 93 Regional Anti-Doping Organizations ...... 100 The Richard ‘Dick’ Pound Factor ...... 101 Endnotes ...... 104

V. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION...... 119 Conclusions ...... 119 An Effective Mandate ...... 120 Achieving Independence ...... 123 Expert Personnel ...... 125 Transparency and Accountability ...... 128 Future Challenges ...... 133 Greater Clarity of Mandate ...... 133 Advances in Science ...... 134 Legal Challenges ...... 134 Monitoring Code Compliance ...... 135 Professional Sport ...... 136 Future Research...... 137 Endnotes ...... 140

APPENDIX 1...... 146

APPENDIX II ...... 150

APPENDIX III...... 161

APPENDIX IV...... 168

APPENDIX V ...... 169

APPENDIX VI...... 170

APPENDIX V II...... 175

APPENDIX VIII...... 176

APPENDIX IX...... 177

APPENDIX X ...... 178

APPENDIX XI...... 183

APPENDIX XII...... 185

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 202

VITA AUCTORIS...... 209

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix I ...... A Chronology of Anti-Doping Policy Development and the Formation of WADA

Appendix II ...... Historical Overview: Canadian Anti-Doping Program (1968-2005)

Appendix III ...... Questionnaire

Appendix IV ...... Interview Participants

Appendix V ...... WADA Organizational Chart

Appendix VI ...... WADA 2005 Budget

Appendix VII ...... WADA Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics 2003

Appendix VIII ...... WADA Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics 2004

Appendix IX ...... WADA Out-of Competition Testing Statistics 2005

Appendix X ...... Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport

Appendix XI ...... World Anti-Doping Code Acceptance

Appendix XII ...... United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) International Convention against Doping in Sport

ix

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADAMS Anti-Doping Administration and Management System

AIOWF The Association of International Olympic Winter Federations

ANADO Association of National Anti-Doping Organizations

ASDA Australian Sport Drug Agency

ASOIF The Association of Summer Olympic International Federations

BALCO Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative

BCE Before Common Era

CADO Canadian Anti-Doping Organization

CAS Court of Arbitration for Sport

CBA Collective Bargaining Agreement

CCDS Canadian Centre for Drug Free Sport

CCES Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport

COA Canadian Olympic Association

DCO Doping Control Officer

DFSC Drug Free Sport Consortium

EADC European Anti-Doping Charter

FIFA Federation Internationale de Football Association

GAISF General Association of International Sport Federations

IAAF International Amateur Athletic Federation

x

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IADA International Anti-Doping Arrangement

IDTM International Doping Tests and Management

IICGADS International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport

10 Independent Observer

IOC International Olympic Committee

IPC International Paralympic Committee

ISDC International Standards for Doping Control

ISF International Sport Federation

ISO International Standards Organization

MLB Major League Baseball

NADO National Anti-Doping Organization

NBA National Basketball Association

NFL National Football League

NHL

NOC National Olympic Committee

OOC Out-of-Competition

RADO Regional Anti-Doping Organization

SMCC Sport Medicine Council of Canada

TOP The Olympic Partners Program

TUE Therapeutic Use Exemption

UCI Union Cycliste Internationale

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

xi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. US AD A United States Anti-Doping Agency

USOC United States Olympic Committee

WADA World Anti-Doping Agency

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Chapter I

Introduction

Sport has always occupied a prominent position in the life and culture of civilized communities. The have become the highest symbol of all that is great and glorious in the world of sport. Competition has become fierce and zealous and big money has moved in. And, the secret desire to enhance bodily capacity has led to the pernicious phenomenon of doping. So various and ingenious are the forms devised that sports regulators are seized with serious concern, and mechanisms of control have been occupying minds of sports authorities for a considerable time.1

The Latin phrase Citius, Altius, Fortius has become known around the world as

the Olympic motto.2 In striving to go faster, jump higher and be stronger, athletes have

not only intensified their training schedules and improved their nutritional intake, they

have, in increasing numbers, turned to performance enhancing drugs. Doping, in all its

forms, has become a major factor in both professional and amateur sport, and according

to Richard Pound, Chairperson of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), is the most

critical issue facing the modem Olympic Movement and the single greatest danger that

faces sport today.3

The purpose of this research initiative is to identify how the formation of WADA

impacted the development of an international strategy for anti-doping. Specifically, an

analysis was undertaken to assess the impact and contributions that WADA had on the

development and implementation of a global strategy against doping in sport. Interviews,

newspaper articles and archived materials have provided the key resources required for

analysis. These materials were analyzed from three different perspectives: first from the

level of key or relevant personalities and individuals; second from the level of sport

agencies and institutions; and third from the level of forces acting outside the institution

of sport.

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Emergence of Drug Use in Sport

The use and prevalence of performance enhancing drugs is not unique to modem

sport; their use, misuse and abuse have long shaken the foundations of both amateur and

professional sport.4 According to Ancient Greek physician Galen, reports date back to

third century BCE where Greek, Egyptian and Roman athletes used a variety of special

diets, potions and stimulants to improve their physical abilities, thereby, gaining an

advantage over their opponent.5 The Egyptians ingested a special drink derived from the

hooves of an Abyssinian ass while Roman Gladiators readily used stimulants, including

caffeine and strychnine, to increase alertness and enhance recovery time.6 According to

Michele Verroken, the winner of the two hundred meter stade at the Olympic Games of

668 BCE used a special diet consisting of dried figs to enhance his performance.7 In the

early 19th century, swimmers and cyclists turned to such stimulants as strychnine,

caffeine, cocaine, alcohol and opium to gain a competitive edge. Reports of the first drug o related death occurred in 1896. The death of British cyclist Arthur Linton was believed

to have been the result of his coach administering strychnine, a strong poison which

prevents the proper operation of the chemical controlling nerve signals to the muscles

thereby delaying the onset of muscle fatigue.9 At the turn of the century, despite a

reported incident at the 1904 Summer Olympic Games involving American distance

runner Thomas Hicks, who collapsed but was ultimately revived after having eaten raw

egg whites and having ingested a combination of strychnine and brandy, the presence of

identifiable doping was negligible.10

The history of drug use continued to evolve in conjunction with the onset of The

Second World War when the East German and Soviet Governments funded the

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unregulated experimentation of drugs to help combat troops as well as members of the

military and armed forces gain an advantage over their combatants.11 The physical and

psychological benefits derived from the use of amphetamines and steroids quickly

evolved and were adapted for use within• a • sport context, a turning1 ? point for drug use in

sport. 1 3 The development of amphetamines and anabolic steroids reached their peak mid­

century.14 Amphetamines, administered to soldiers during the war, were intended to

enhance alertness and delay the onset of fatigue. As such, amphetamines quickly became

the drug of choice for athletes competing in endurance events such as cycling.15 Anabolic

steroids, although in use since the 1930s as a means to treat victims of starvation and

increase the aggressiveness and strength of German soldiers, did not emerge within the

arena of competitive sport until the 1950s.16 Interestingly, reports of increased use of

anabolic steroids coincided with the Soviet Union’s return to Olympic competition at the

1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki. The East German’s relative dominance at a majority of

Olympic festivals during the 1970s and early 1980s spurred widespread rumors and

suspicions of State-sanctioned doping practices.17 As evidence continued to mount that

East German athletes were indeed doping, sport authorities, government officials,

coaches, and athletes from other nations, unwilling to allow the inequality to continue,

began to follow suit. Despite the potential risk, athletes increasingly saw drugs as a

means to complement their traditional training regime, as a short cut to achievement, or

as a way to compete under otherwise arduous or impossible circumstances.18

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Anti-Doping Policy Development

Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and into the early 1980s, the problem of doping in

sport was perceived as one that could be conveniently and proficiently addressed in terms

of particular sports, countries or events,19 reinforcing the fact that the issue of doping in

sport was a relatively new problem with testing and other policy solutions having only

been recently introduced. Preceeding the 1960s, the idea of testing for performance

enhancing drugs was non-existent. Although Britain took the initiative by enacting the

Dangerous Drug Act in 1920, there were no mechanisms within the Act to deal with

drugs in sport. The primary focus was to restrict the availability of cocaine and opium to

prescnption only. Moreover, there was little discussion of drug abuse within sport

outside of a collective group of concerned individuals.21 Yet despite the lack of dialogue,

sports bodies such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International

Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) attempted to develop policies to make certain that

their competitions were drug free. In 1928 the IAAF took a stance against doping

becoming the first International Sport Federation (ISF) to ban the use of drugs.22

Although this appeared to be a significant step forward in combating drug use in sport,

and one that would soon be followed by other sport federations, the lack of effective

testing measures brought to a standstill the development of any further restrictions or

regulations.• 23 In addition to the group of sport bodies positioning themselves against the

use of drugs in sport, select national governments also expressed their concern.24 These

governments made concerted efforts to eliminate the threat of doping in sport in their

respective countries.

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Over the course of the last thirty-five years, significant steps have been taken

towards the development of an anti-doping policy. These steps have included the

development of the first official definition of doping, the initial stages of policy

formulation, as well as the introduction of both in-competition testing and out-of­

competition testing at major international sporting events. However, it was not until a

series of scandals and deaths in the 1960s that sports organizations were prompted to take

serious action against drug use by shifting their position from a stance of condemnation

and dismay to a more interventionist position.25

The deaths of Danish cyclist Knud Jensen at the XVII Olympiad in (1960),

British cyclist Tom Simpson in the 1967 , and one year later French

cyclist Yves Martin, forced both governments and sport bodies to critically assess and

address the issue of doping in sport.26 Clearly, political will was building and the need for

both a policy to challenge doping and the development of effective testing measures was

vital. In the ensuing years, the unfolding of political events relative to doping added to

the increasing momentum of the battle against drug use in sport. The end of the Cold

War, the gradual unraveling of the East German drug-based sport system,27 the shame

and scandal experienced by countries such as Canada and Australia, as well as the

growing awareness of athletes towards the problem of drug abuse in sport, heartened

attempts to move anti-doping policy beyond the confines of specific sport organizations,

events or countries. The announcement of Ben Johnson’s positive test at the 1988

Seoul Olympic Games, as well as the allegations of drug use at Australia’s government

funded elite training centre (The Australian Institute of Sport) raised the public awareness

of drug use in sport.29 In response to the scandals, both the Canadian and Australian

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governments were urged to establish official inquiries which prompted the development

of a far more effective anti-doping policy.30 While the move towards policy development

was growing, the deficiencies in appropriate technology to effectively test for

performance enhancing drugs became an obvious barrier.

The intervention by the Council of (the Council) in the 1960s was

significant in fostering a change in mentality and raising the international profile of the

issue of doping. Its involvement was in response to a wave of public concern about the

issue of doping in sport and encouraged European governments to treat the matter as one

of public policy as opposed to a private matter for sport governing bodies.31 In 1967 the

Council of Europe Committee Members adopted a Resolution on doping, the first

international text of its kind which stressed the moral, ethical, and health issues at stake

for athletes who dope. The actions by the Council acted as a sharp reminder to

international sports organizations that governments also had an interest in the issue of

doping. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Council continued to play an active role,

eventually being identified as the main non-sports forum for policy debate surrounding

the issue of doping in sport. Although the Council lacked resources, limiting its ability to

take a significant lead in policy development,32 it did in 1984 adopt The European Anti-

Doping Charter for sport (EADC) recommending that Member States and national

sporting institutions develop anti-doping regulations, educational programs and analysis

and research labs.33 The Charter, which on 16 November 1989 was re-designated to a

Convention, became a model for future policy development.34 Being open to signature by

non-members such as Canada and Australia, the Convention encouraged the beginning of

increased interaction and cooperation between groups.35 However, few governments and

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international federations had either the determination to tackle the issue of doping or the

scientific, organizational and financial resources to support the development of a policy.36

Moreover, the popular perception towards doping was that it was a manageable

‘nuisance’ and not the responsibility of federations or their domestic affiliates.

Despite the widespread attitude towards doping, there was evidence of limited

policy activity among select governments and ISFs. Ini 965, the governments of France

and enacted legislation in order to deal with a growing problem of amphetamine

use in cycling.38 In France, this first anti-doping law was titled Loi Herzog?9 A few

years later, in the early 1970s, Britain took similar action, identifying doping as an issue

for its newly formed Sports Council. Likewise, the governments of Italy and Turkey were

quick to follow suit by enacting their own rules and regulations as early as 1971.40

Among the major ISFs, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) was

one of the first to expand its drug testing program. At the 1966 World Cup in England,

FIFA introduced and conducted drug tests on competing athletes. The Union Cycliste

Internationale (UCI) followed FIFA’s lead and, in 1967, expanded their drug testing

program to include Medical Examination Regulations. The primary motive of the ISFs

was to ensure the integrity of their sports and sporting events and to retain control over

the controversial aspect of doping.41

Prior to the significant growth of commercialization in the Olympic Games during

the 1980s, the IOC lacked the necessary financial resources to tackle an issue as complex

as doping. Although recognizing that doping was a serious problem for the modem

Olympic Movement and sport in general, the IOC’s initial motivation to become involved

was to ensure the integrity of the Olympic Games. This would be accomplished through

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. limited testing. In 1967,42 through the establishment of the Medical Commission, the

IOC made a concerted effort to address the increasing problem of doping in sport.43 The

development of this organization played a significant role in staging the first official,

although rather limited, drug testing at an Olympic Festival. These tests occurred at the

1968 Winter and Summer Olympic Games respectively. At the Summer Games in

Mexico City, six hundred and sixty-seven drug tests were conducted with one positive

recorded; a Swedish entrant in the modem pentathlon, Hans-Gunnar Liljenwall, tested

positive for excessive alcohol.44 Likewise, these were the first Games where female sex

testing occurred.45 At the 1968 Winter Games in Grenoble, France eighty-six tests were

conducted with no positive results.46 Although restricted testing had begun, it was not

until the 1972 Games where the first reasonably successful drug testing program

was carried out. At these games, over two thousand tests were conducted, resulting in

seven athletes being disqualified.47

In 1972, paralleling the work of the IOC, the IAAF formed its own Medical

Commission. At the 1977 championships the IAAF’s Commission introduced mandatory

testing, and one year later, introduced an eighteen month suspension for serious doping

AO offences. The early action of the IAAF has resulted in its reputation of being the most

active international federation in anti-doping policy.

Thus the unfolding of the aforementioned events, between the 1960s and the late

1980s, encouraged attempts to move anti-doping policy beyond the confines of specific

sports or countries. A sharp focus was placed on the need for an international policy

across all jurisdictions. These efforts resulted in critical steps being taken in testing

procedures: laboratories received official IOC accreditation, testing procedures and

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technologies began to be refined and both in-competition and out-of-competition testing

was introduced. Building on the initiative of the Council of Europe, who in 1989 began

the move towards standardization of procedures for testing, The International Anti-

Doping Arrangement (I AD A) took the issue of an absence of standardization for testing

procedures a step further and outlined the International Standards for Doping Control

(ISDC).49 The International Agreement, which began in the early 1990s, was an

outgrowth of The Dubin Inquiry involving three countries with common interests in their

approach to anti-doping.50 Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, all recipients of

strong governmental support for national anti-doping programs, decided to establish a

government to government agreement to help advance the fight against doping in sport.

This agreement acted as a vehicle for intergovernmental co-operation, creating a forum

where government anti-doping officials as well as national program experts could come

together and pool their resources to fight doping.51 The ISDC prescribed best practice

policies and standards for all phases of the doping control process. In addition, they

introduced the idea that there ought to be quality management and International

Standards Organization (ISO) accreditation for anti-doping work.52 As such, in 1999 the

ISDC was accepted and published as an ISO Publicly Available Specification for doping

control in sport; meaning that the standard is now publicly available to all organizations

around the world and is expected to contribute to the harmonization of the anti doping

standard worldwide.53 WADA has endorsed these standards and for national anti-doping

organizations, certification by this standard is a main objective for international

recognition.54 However, it was also recognized that to effectively deal with the problem

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of doping in sport, considerable effort was needed to build on these initial steps (see

Appendix I).

Prohibited Substances and Methods

Drug testing, which began in the early 1960s, was predominantly carried out in

sports such as cycling to detect traces of amphetamines. Although amphetamines were

the drug of choice during the 1960s, use and abuse of anabolic steroids was escalating.55

Authorities were well aware of this trend; however, the lack of resources and a reliable

test to detect this class of drugs left them with few viable options. As stated by Houlihan,

based on the assertions of Verroken and Mottram, “early testing methods were relatively

unsophisticated: the technology available to analyze an athlete’s urine resulted in

inaccurate findings that failed to deter drug use.”56

The prohibited list of substances, which was first published in 1963 under the

leadership of the IOC, is the cornerstone of the current World Anti-Doping Code and a

key component of harmonization.57 Although the list was published almost ten years

prior, the first relatively successful drug testing was carried out in Munich, 1972. At these

Olympic Games, tests were conducted to detect narcotic analgesics and stimulants.

However, official tests were not carried out for anabolic steroids due to the lack of

reliable and effective testing measures. By the mid 1970s, a test developed to detect

traces of stimulants in athletes bodies was deemed sufficiently accurate for international

use; however, athletes had moved to a new drug and were now using and abusing

• co . « • • » • steroids. Despite the initial limitations, a consistent test to detect the majority of drugs

in the steroid class was soon developed by Professor Raymond Brooks.59 During the

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subsequent ten years, the IOC progressively added both substances and methods to the

prohibited list. The additions included testosterone (1983), caffeine (1984), beta blockers

and blood-doping (1985) and diuretics (1987).60 Pharmacological, chemical and physical

manipulations were added to the list in 1985.61 The inclusion of testosterone was

noteworthy given that prior to 1983 all banned substances were foreign to the body.

Annually, the prohibited list is reviewed and updated. The current list was

published on 1 October 2005 and came into effect on 1 January 2006.62 The list is divided

into four comprehensive sections. The first section involves the substances and methods

prohibited at all times, in and out of competition. These include anabolic agents,

hormones and related substances, beta-2 agonists, agents with anti-estrogenic activity,

diuretics and other masking agents. Section two consists of substances and methods

prohibited in competition, such as enhancement of oxygen transfer, chemical and

physical manipulation, and gene doping; whereas section three includes the substances

prohibited in particular sports. These comprise stimulants, narcotics, cannabinoids, and

glucocorticosteroids. The final section consists of specified substances which are

particularly susceptible to unintentional anti-doping rule violations because of their

general availability in medicinal products, or which are less likely to be successfully

abused as doping agents. A doping violation involving specified substances may result

in a reduced sanction provided that the athletes can prove that using such a substance was

not done for the purpose of performance enhancement.64 As it stands, caffeine is not

included on the list, but is included in the 2006 monitoring program.65

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Individual Governments

Motivated by numerous international doping scandals as well as IOC standards,

various countries established anti-doping rule books and guidelines. They set up

governing bodies and control agencies to establish, monitor, administer, and impose

sanctions in an attempt to tackle the pervasiveness of doping in sport. For example, the

drug testing conducted at the 1983 in Caracas, Venezuela, which

resulted in nineteen disqualifications of which two were Canadian weightlifters, brought

the first serious concern about drug use in sport to Canada (see Appendix II). As word of

the games having an effective testing program filtered throughout the national teams

present, many athletes walked out before the competition to avoid the risk of being tested

and sanctioned.66 As a result, Sport Canada announced its first anti-doping policy in

December 1983 and a revised edition in 1985 to include the prohibition of anabolic

steroids. The policy required National Sport Organizations (NSOs) to establish in­

competition testing at major sporting events and out-of-competition testing during

training. However, in practice, testing of Canadian athletes occurred only at major

sporting competitions. f\7 It was only in 1988, when Ben Johnson tested positive at the

Olympic Games in , and consequently had to give up his gold medal,

that the Canadian government revised their policy on doping in sport. The events in

Seoul triggered The Dubin Inquiry, a report commissioned by The Honourable Charles L.

Dubin to investigate and identify the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of

prohibited substances by Canadian athletes68

The First Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Sport, co-hosted by the

IOC and the Government of Canada, in Ottawa Canada 1988, symbolized the first joint

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action between Governments and the IOC. A proposed international anti-doping charter

was reviewed and endorsed as a model by the delegates attending the conference.69 This

future anti-doping charter, which identified the policies and practices required to counter

doping, was adopted by the IOC in September 1988 and subsequently re-named the

International Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport.70 As a means to review progress

since the Ottawa conference, and to continue the coordination of international efforts to

combat doping in sport, hosted a second permanent world conference in October

1989. This conference, which was convened by IOC member nations, focused on four

themes: out of competition testing, education and information,

ethics/rights/responsibility, and a model national anti-doping program.71

For their part, governments have entered into multilateral anti-doping agreements

to further raise the level of international cooperation. These arrangements involve

signatories sharing resources and expertise, conducting reciprocal drug testing

agreements, cooperating with the development and dissemination of information services

and education programs as well as collaborating on research initiatives.72 Examples of

such agreements include the Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention, the

Scandinavian Anti-Doping Agreement and the International Anti-Doping Agreement.

Increasingly though, these multilateral agreements are being supplemented by an array of

bilateral anti-doping and drug testing agreements between governments, national anti-

doping agencies and international federations.73 In 1985 the Nordic sport federations

composed of Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland, adopted The Nordic Anti-

Doping Convention. This Convention, one of the earliest and most comprehensive efforts

of its kind, represented the determination on the part of a select group of national sport

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bodies to attack the problem of doping in sport. Strict policies, procedures, rules and

penalties were enacted by which all Nordic sport federations must abide.74 An example of

a bilateral doping control agreement would be the agreement between the American and

Soviet Olympic Committees, signed November 1988.75 The agreement, which in 1989

was extended to include 9 additional nations, established a number of basic requirements

which members must adhere to in order to fulfill their responsibilities in the fight against

drug use in sport.

International Sport Federations

Throughout the 1980s, ISFs were also under increasing pressure from their

domestic affiliates to improve the administration of doping control procedures. This was

largely due to the fact that these National Federations were under pressure by both their

respective national governments and National Anti-Doping Organizations (NADOs).

Therefore, the abundant policy development that occurred at that time was due, in part, to

the recognition by governments and sports organizations that doping was a much more

intractable and complex problem than they had originally thought.76 The growing

pressure and expectations that governments were placing on sport’s organizations to

address and solve the doping problem also helped to facilitate the aggressive action.

Despite these initiatives, too few countries and ISFs were succeeding at implementing

anti-doping rules and policies and those who did were not necessarily seeking the same

objectives or basing their legislation on similar frameworks. This left a disproportionate

and uneven spectrum of compliance. As a result, doping scandals and positive tests only

became more frequent.

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The World Anti-Doping Agency

Although progress in anti-doping policy development continued throughout the

1990s, it required yet another doping scandal to recapture the lost momentum.77 The

incident at the 1998 Tour de France involving the seizure of banned substances acted as

the catalyst in launching a collaborative fight against doping on a global scale.78 During

the Tour, there were widespread rumors about illicit drug use among participants. As a

result, doping inspections were both intense and frequent, resulting in the withdrawal of

almost half of the participants.79 On 8 July 1998 Willy Voet, the Festina Team soigneur,

was stopped and searched by French Customs and found to be in possession of five

hundred doses of banned substances, including erythropoietin (EPO) and various

steroids.• 80 Team director, • Bruno Roussel, later revealed that he had orchestrated an

‘organized doping system’ which was administered to all members of his team. As a

result, the entire Festina Team was kicked out of the race prior to the beginning of the

seventh stage, thus launching what became known as the Festina affaire.81

The scale of blood doping that was exposed was all the more dramatic given the

active involvement of the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), the ISF for cycling, in

advocating the necessity and importance of drug free sport.82 Concerns were raised that if

doping was rampant in a sport whose ISF was considered one of the more responsible

federations in anti-doping procedures, what is stopping it from happening on a larger

scale among sports whose ISFs have adopted a passive approach to doping? The seizure

of performance enhancing substances at the Tour de France demonstrated, on an

international scale, that doping was considered normal throughout an entire sport.83

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The Festina affaire, adopting the status of the inaugural event which changed both

attitudes and perceptions towards doping,84 led to both a major reappraisal of the role of

public authorities in anti-doping affairs,85 at the same time, it highlighting the need for an

independent international agency to set unified standards for anti-doping work and co-

o / ordinate the efforts of sports organizations and public authorities. First, this meant

imposing upon governing bodies the responsibility of producing comprehensive,

workable and equitable anti-doping regulations. Second, but equally as significant, this

meant that in order to curb and control the seemingly prevalent doping practices in

various sports on an international basis, and to restore the elusive ‘level playing field,’ an

attempt should be made to harmonize these regulations and sanctions world-wide.

Following the Tour, the IOC set the groundwork for a World Anti-Doping

Conference to be staged in February 1999. There was hope that the conference

proceedings would help those in attendance manage the drug crisis and alleviate

pervasive• panic • resulting from the incident. 87The conference was an opportunity for ♦ the

IOC to recapture, from the governments, a long overdue initiative in anti-doping policy,

and to address a number of tensions regarding previous policy inaction.88 The mistrust of

the IOC was high on the agendas of many conference participants. General Barry

McCaffrey, the director of White House drug policy, was quoted as saying that “recent

examples of alleged corruption, lack of accountability, and failure of leadership have

challenged the legitimacy of this institution.”89 He went so far as to suggest that the new

independent agency be under the control of the United Nations.90 It quickly became

apparent to those in attendance that only if all countries, governments and ISFs agreed to

be pro-active and were made to adhere to a single system, would a successful anti-doping

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policy be effective. As a result, the conference culminated in an agreement to form The

World Anti-Doping Agency.

The agency’s principal task will be to coordinate a comprehensive anti-doping program at international level, developing common, effective, minimum standards for doping control... Among its duties, the new Agency is expected to commission unannounced out-of-competition controls in full agreement with the public and private bodies concerned. The Agency is expected to work with existing authorities to promote the harmonization of anti-doping policies and procedures...91

WADA was created at the end of 1999 to promote and coordinate the fight against

doping in sport, at the international level, in all its forms.92 This new world agency

brought together the three most significant players in policy development - the IOC, the

ISFs, and governments - in order to achieve worldwide harmonization in both the

Q'i development and implementation of uniform anti-doping rules. Although praiseworthy,

many observers were skeptical of WADA’s potential for success in carrying out this

mandate, specifically there were doubts in terms of what WADA could achieve, the

timeframe in which it intended to achieve its goals, and the bringing together of

government and sport.94

A key step forward occurred in 2004 when The World Anti-Doping Code, which

sets out to ensure the harmonization of anti-doping rules across all sports and all

countries, was officially implemented, with its unanimous acceptance and adoption

coming in 2003. More specifically, The Code articulates core anti-doping principles that

all signatories must adopt and apply in their own anti-doping policies and procedures.

This was a milestone achievement for WADA, as well as for all parties involved with the

fight against drug use in sport. The Code, which was drafted as a means to reconcile and

harmonize the major disparities that may exist within various sporting bodies’ legislation

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and governing entities’ regulations, represents a blueprint for international collaboration

and cohesiveness. Furthermore, it provides the basis for a symbiotic relationship between

sport and government.95 The Code is the core document that provides the framework for

anti-doping policies, rules and regulations within sport organizations and among public

authorities.96 Given the pervasiveness of doping in sport, a Code of best practices is

essential if international compliance is to be achieved.

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Endnotes

1 Raghunandan S. Pathak, “The CAS AD HOC Division at the Olympic Games, ” in CAS Seminar 2001, Lausanne, Conseil International de l’Arbitrage dans le Sport, 2002, p. 122.

2 Pierre deCoubertin created and edited a publication entitled "Bulletin of the International Committee of the Olympic Games." The first issue was released July 1894 and represented the first documented use of the Latin motto "Citius, Altius, Fortius" (Faster, Higher, Stronger). For more information on this please refer to The Modern Olympics: A Struggle for Revival, David C. Young. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

3 Richard W. Pound, Inside the Olympics: A behind the scenes look at the politics, the scandal and the glory o f the Games (Canada: John Wiley and Sons Canada Ltd., 2004) p. 45.

4 Gary I. Walder, “Doping in Sport: From Strychnine to Genetic Enhancement, It’s a Moving Target,” (paper presented at The Duke Conference on Doping in Sport, Durham, North Carolina, May 7, 1999).

5 Michele Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in sport,” Bailliere’s Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 14 (2000): p. 1.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 1. In this article the author refers to the 200meter stade as the 200metre sprint. However, it must be noted that in 668 BCE the 200m sprint did not exist; the event with the most similarities was the Stade. A stade-race, or a foot-race, is determined by the length of the at Olympia. This was the most ancient and indeed the only event at the first thirteen Olympiads. The winner of the stade-race had the Olympiad named after him and the esteem in which he was held is indicated by the custom of dating by the list of victors. For more information please refer to either The 2nd edition, Judith Swaddling.University of Texas Press, Austin, 1990; or Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources, Stephen G. Miller, Universtiy of California Press, , 1991.

8 Robert Voy, Drugs, Sport, and Politics (Champaing, 111: Leisure Press, 1991), p. 6.

9 Ibid., p. 6.

10 Ibid, p. 6.

11 Barrie Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” in Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives, ed. John O’Leary (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001), p. 125.

12 Barrie Houlihan, “ Dying to Win: Doping in sport and the development o f anti-doping policy ” 2nd ed. (Germany: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), p. 34.

13 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 125.

14 Michele Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in Sport,” in Drugs in Sport 3rd. ed,ed. David R. Mottram (London: Routledge, 2003). p. 31.

15 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 34.

16 Ibid, p. 34.

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17 Steven Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold: Inside the East German Doping Machine (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), p. 53.

18 Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in Sport,” p. 10.

19 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 125.

20 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 150.

21 Ibid.

22 WADA Website, “A Brief History of Anti-Doping,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=312 (accessed September 23, 2005).

23 Ibid.

24 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 153. (These governments included France, Belgium, Turkey and Italy).

25 Ibid., p. 150.

26 Ibid., p. 151.

27 Ibid., p. 149.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., p. 150.

31 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 126.

32 Ibid.

33 Follow-up to the Round Table o f Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport: preliminary study o f the technical and legal aspects o f an international anti-doping convention in sport, 18 July 2003, 32nd session of United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization “UNESCO” General Conference of 2003, 32 C/50, item 5.9.

34 Ibid.

35 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 126.

36 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 150.

37 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 126.

38 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 153.

39 Patrick Mignon, “The Tour de France and the Doping Issue,” in “The Tour de France 1903-2003: A Century of Sporting Structures, Meanings and Values,” ed. Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare, special issue, The International Journal o f the History o fno. Sport, 2 (2003): p. 237.

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40 Ibid. Italy adopted anti-doping legislation due to the drug problem in cycling. While Turkey adopted because of the growing drug problem in weightlifting.

41 Mignon, “The Tour de France and the Doping Issue,” p. 237.

42 Although the majority of academic sources indicate that the IOC Medical Commission was founded in 1967, Barrie Houlihan claims that the IOC Medical Commission was first established in 1962, but that there was little action against drug use in sport until 1967 when the IOC Medical Commission was re­ organized and re-established. For more information please refer to Houlihan’s 2002 book Dying to Win: Doping in sport and the development o f anti-doping policy or “The 2nd Worlded. Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” in Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives.

43 Olympic Website, http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/commissions/medical/index_uk.asp (accessed March 20, 2006).

44 Olympic Website, http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/past/index_uk.asp?OLGT=l&OLGY=T968 (accessed March 14, 2006).

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 126.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Joseph dePencier (Director Sport Services / General Counsel), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2006, interview 005, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario. The Dubin Inquiry was conducted in Ottawa, Canada 1989 to investigate the extent of drug use in Olympic Sport. This inquiry was a direct result of the Ben Johnson doping scandal at the 1988 Seoul Olympics where Johnson was stripped of his gold medal after having tested positive for stanolozol.

51 Paul Melia (CEO of CCES), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006, interview 007, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Ontario.

52 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

53 Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES) Website, http://www.cces.ca/forms/index.cfm?dsp= template&act=view3&template_id=147&lang=e (accessed February 2, 2006).

54 Michele Verroken and David R. Mottram, “Doping Control in Sport,” in Drugs in Sport 3rd ed., ed. David R. Mottram (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 320.

55 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 152.

56 Verroken and Mottram, “Doping Control in Sport,” p. 334.

57 WADA Website, “The Prohibited List,” http://www.wada ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?Page Category.id=370 (accessed October 22, 2005).

58 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 154.

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59 The break through came early in the 1970s when a team, led by Professor Raymond Brooks at St. Thomas Medical School in London England, developed a reliable test for many drugs in the steroid class. The analysis of urine by radiomunossay and then, by mass spectrometry and gas chromatography was piloted at the 1972 Games under the direction of Dr. Manfred Donike and was officially used at the 1976 Games in , with anabolic steroids having been added to the IOC prohibited list the previous year. Eight athletes were disqualified from the 1976 Games due to positive test results for steroids.

60 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 154

61 Verroken and Mottram, “Doping Control in Sport,” p. 36.

62 WADA Website, “The Prohibited List,” http://www.wada ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?Page Category.id=370 (accessed October 22,2005).

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 J. Barnes, Ottawa Law Review/Revue de Droit d’Ottawa 23, 3 (1991): p. 639.

67 Ibid., p. 641.

68 Charles L. Dubin, Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1990).

69 Ibid., p. 414.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 443.

72 International Summit Drugs in Sport: Pure Performance, “Discussion Paper - International Collaboration” (presentation, International Drugs in Sport Summit, Sydney, Australia, November 1999).

73 Ibid.

74 Dubin, Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, p. 422.

75 Ibid., p. 466.

76 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 126.

77 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 169.

78 Ibid.

79 Mignon, “The Tour de France and the Doping Issue,” p. 234.

80 Ibid.

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“Pantani’s Pride: Three years after breaking leg, Italian rider wins Tour de France,” CNN Sports Illustrated, September 22, 1998, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/cycling/1998/tourdefrance/news /1998/08/02/steels_stage21/._(accessed November 21, 2005).

82 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 133.

83 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 133.

84 Mignon, “The Tour de France and the Doping Issue,” p. 234.

85 WADA Website, “A Brief History of Anti-Doping,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2? pageCategory.id=312 (accessed September 24, 2005).

86 Wayne Wilson and Edward Derse, Doping in Elite Sport: The Politics o f Drugs in the Olympic Movement (USA: Human Kinetics Publishing, 2001), p. 213.

87 Jin-Kyung Park, “Governing Doped Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency and the Global Culture of Surveillance,” Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies 5 (2005): p. 179.

88 Ibid.

89 John Hoberman, “Learning form the past: The Need for Independent Doping Control” (paper presented at The Duke Conference on Doping in Sport, Durham North Carolina, May 7, 1999).

90 Ibid.

91 Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 138.

92 As summarized in an IOC press release issued on September 9, 1999; citation taken from WADA Website at http://www.wada-ama.org/en/ (accessed October 1, 2005).

93 WADA Website, “Organizational Composition,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/ (accessed September 29, 2005).

94 Minutes of the 113th Meeting of The International Olympic Committee General Session, 4, 5, 6 & 23 July, 2002, , Utah, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, .

95 Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in Sport,” p. 61.

96 WADA Website, “World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=267 (accessed October 24, 2005).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter II

Literature Review

The core elements of current anti-doping initiatives can be broken down into

three, somewhat overlapping and often intertwined themes of equal importance and

significance. These themes will comprise the three primary sections of analysis for this

literature review. A fourth and final section of the literature review addresses

professional sport’s approach and attitude towards anti-doping. The four sections are as

follows: Policy Development and Government Support; Education; Social Acceptance

and Compliance; Professional Sport and Anti-Doping Policy Development. The available

literature relative to each section was selected and reviewed in an attempt to concurrently

establish an astute foundation in the topic and demonstrate the need for this research

initiative.

Section I: Policy Development and Government Support

Sport participation plays an important function in our society. It can fuel local

economies, promote social cohesion, and compensate for the increase in both biomedical

and psychosocial pathologies resulting from the general population’s consumptive

lifestyles.1 In addition, modem sport is inextricably intertwined with government

policymaking. Therefore, in order to govern sport, international sport managers require

means by which to make effective choices among policy alternatives. According to

Laurence Chalip, it is therefore no wonder that sport managers have long been concerned

with matters of policy.3 Policy is a term that has been defined and interpreted differently

by various individuals. Brian Smith defines policy as the deliberate choice of action or

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inaction;4 whereas Thomas Dye defines policy as whatever governments choose to do or

not to do.5 William Jenkins, however, opts for a more restrictive definition. He defines

policy as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors

concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified

situation where these decisions should be within the power of these actors to achieve.”6

Although there are various interpretations, the underlying criterion remains the same; all

definitions share a common reference to the choices of decision makers for actions to be

taken in the future. Policy, which should be developed with achievable objectives and

within achievable boundaries, is the product of a pattern of decisions taken by key

decision makers.7

Barrie Houlihan writes, in his 1991 book The Government and Politics o f Sport,

that the development of domestic policy towards drug abuse by athletes must be

examined in the context of a broader international debate and policy process.8 Thus, the

development of policy at the international level remains a critical component in achieving

successful policy at the domestic level. The establishment and fostering of international

links between domestic organizations and both international governmental and non­

governmental bodies cannot be overlooked or undermined.9 In addition, Houlihan

suggests that the effective combating of doping depends not only on the resolve and

resources of individual nations or individual sports bodies, but the regular and consistent

development of policies and procedures from a multitude of national and international

organizations.10

In a paper written by Houlihan entitled “Policy Harmonization: The Example of

Global Anti-doping Policy,” a critical analysis of the transition of anti-doping policy is

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presented.11 The author documents the development of anti-doping policy from a

relatively narrow process to a global policy involving a complex network of relationships

of both governmental and non-governmental organizations. Doping1 0is presented as a

multi-layered and constantly evolving problem which often receives ambivalent public 1 T support and comprehension. The author firmly contends that the future direction and

momentum of policy development depends, more than ever, on the continuing

commitment of governments. The commitment, support, and co-ordination of

governments will eventually lead to harmonization and compliance of anti-doping

policy.14 In this particular paper, harmonization is considered an objective and

compliance is the process through which the objective is achieved.15 In a subsequent

paper published by Houlihan entitled “Anti-Doping Policy in Sport: The Politics of

International Policy Co-ordination,” he states that the major decisions at the heart of the

harmonization debate, such as what and who to test and which penalties to impose for

doping infractions, are controlled by the IOC, sport federations and occasionally

governments.16 This comment reinforces an earlier point suggesting that the overlapping

membership among key stakeholders contributes to the high degree of cohesion,

agreement and support.17

Similarly, in a chapter of John O’Leary’s Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-

Legal Perspectives, Houlihan states that the establishment of WADA represents a critical

step in the long term campaign to eliminate doping from sport. Despite the friction that

surrounded its establishment, there is no doubt that it marked a major development in

establishing an effective policy response to doping.18 The challenge of keeping a group of

policy actors united and working together towards the common goal of policy

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harmonization between countries and sports, still exists. However, he reinforces the point

that although the formation of WADA does not guarantee success, the failure to establish

such an organization would have been a failure in the fight against doping in sport.19

Although substantial progress in refining anti-doping policy and its

implementation has been achieved over the last fifteen years, anti-doping policy is at a

crucial stage in its evaluation. Houlihan, in his revised edition of Dying to Win: Doping

in sport and the development o f anti-doping describes policy, the core events, key

decision-makers and specific policies and procedures which were enacted to deal with the

problem of drug use in sport, over the past forty years.20 He credits the establishment of

WADA and its role in the development of anti-doping policy as positive progress.

However, he continues by asserting that doping control requires a re-evaluation of the

direction for future anti-doping policy, particularly in light of the establishment of

WADA.21 A core conclusion extrapolated from his book is that the founding of an

appropriate organizational infrastructure, focused around WADA, the commitment of

resources by sports organizations and governments, and the clear specifications of the

objectives and extent of the harmonization project, are all crucial to the future success of

the anti-doping efforts. WADA’s key stakeholders must continue working towards

international collaboration and carry on functioning as a cohesive group if progress is to

■j'y be made.

Another key factor, which received considerable attention, is the ongoing support

of the sports fans and the general public for the ideal of drug free sport.23 Houlihan

argues that possibly the greatest threat to the anti-doping campaign is that the public loses

interest in the issue; that the debate on the future direction of policy becomes too arcane

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for the general public and too much the niche of experts.24 By putting forth this claim,

Houlihan does not detract from the attention currently directed towards the legal,

technical and scientific issues generated by the harmonization debate; however, he wants

to ensure that the public stay educated and interested in the issue, thereby, ensuring

continued support.

Spawned by the Ben Johnson doping scandal at the 1988 Summer Olympic

Games in Seoul, South Korea, The Commission o f Inquiry into the use o f Drugs and

Banned Practices intended to increase Athletic Performance (The Dubin Inquiry)

established as its goal, to investigate the extent of drug use in Olympic Sport.25 From the

outset, The Honourable Chief Justice Charles L. Dubin firmly contends that government

has a legitimate and essential role to play in sport. Governments must not only promote

sport and physical activity for the general population, but provide equality of opportunity

to high performance sport and its athletes.26 Similarly, the report pointed to the failure of

leadership among sport organizations to prevent or deter drug use, as well as the

involvement/compliance of officials in drug use. Although the proceedings of The Dubin

Inquiry adopted a legal format, the information presented could be understood and

interpreted by individuals with a limited knowledge of the subject matter, as well as those

within the system who have extensive knowledge. The Dubin Inquiry represents a

Canadian Government investigation into drug abuse; nonetheless, there are sections

devoted to other countries and international sport federations which highlight the varying

approaches and perspectives towards drug use in sport.27 In the final section of the report

Dubin, who was commissioned to write the report, provides seventy recommendations to

combat drug use in sport, while clearly stating that the resolution of this problem cannot

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simply be left to those who govern sport nationally and internationally; the future of drug

free sport requires consolidated action and a joint commitment by sport, governments and

others.28

Casey Wade, former Director of Education and Planning at WADA, delivered a

presentation at a WADA Executive meeting, Bermuda May 2005, titled “Drug-Free

Sport.” The presentation covered a broad spectrum of topics relating to the development

of WADA and the World Anti-Doping Code. A time-line of events, data collected from a

National Survey reporting on Anabolic Steroid use among Canadian youth, a cohesive

organizational structure of WADA, as well as a detailed outline of WADA’s top priorities

and programs were all presented.29 More specifically, however, a three phase approach of

WADA’s goals and objectives, relevant to The Code, were discussed. Phase one, which

ran from September 2001 through February 2003, focused on the development of The

Code and its standards. Phase two, March 2003 through August 2004, dealt with world­

wide adoption and acceptance of The Code; and the final phase, phase three, which

concluded February 2006, centers on Code implementation.30 Phase three, which can

generally be stated as the implementation phase, Wade’s presentation clearly identified

the differing timelines for the Olympic Movement (the IOC, ISFs, IPC, NADOs) and

Public Authorities (governments, intergovernmental organizations and other public and

private bodies) to implement The Code. For the Sport Movement, “The Code would be

implemented for the 2004 Olympic Games in ; however, for Public Authorities,

they would have until the 2006 Games in Turin to recognize and implement The Code.”31

The overriding message gleaned from this presentation is twofold. First, to

achieve international compliance and harmonization concerning the use of drugs in sport,

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an independent anti-doping organization must be established, along with continued

Government involvement and support. Second, the five critical initiatives (research,

education, prevention, detection, and deterrence) must continually be applied and

monitored.32

The World Anti-Doping Code, which represents the core anti-doping document

providing the framework for anti-doping policies, rules and regulations within sport

organizations and among public authorities,33 was officially and unanimously adopted at

The Second World Conference on Doping in Sport, March 2003. Likewise, The

Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in (Copenhagen Sport Declaration) was

finalized at the same conference. Although having been adopted in 2003, The Code did

not come into effect until 1 January 2004. At a subsequent presentation given in 2005 at

McGill University, Montreal, Canada titled “Drug use in Sport” Wade highlighted and

elaborated on W ADA’s mixed composition as a private Swiss foundation. Wade

explained that given this status, the World Anti-Doping Code is not a legally binding

document and therefore many governments could not be bound by this non-governmental

document. To overcome this barrier, it was decided that a political document was

needed, through which governments could signal their intention to formally recognize

and implement The Code;34 thus, The Copenhagen Declaration was established.

The Copenhagen Declaration was identified as a temporary measure to unite

governments to recognize The Code and support the work of WADA until a legally

binding convention could be developed, ratified, and entered into force. This necessary

document took the form of The International Convention against Doping in Sport by the

General Conference o f UNESCO, which was unanimously accepted 19 October 2005.35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Convention, which is both binding and universal, supplies governments with both a

means through which they can align their domestic legislation with The Code, as well as

a legal framework for an international harmonization of efforts in the fight against doping

in sport.36

To officially enter into force, the UNESCO Convention must receive ratification

from thirty countries. It was a projected goal to successfully acquire thirty signatures by

31 December 2005 in order for the Convention to take effect at the 2006 Olympic Winter

Games in Turin, Italy. Despite significant efforts and given the aggressive time-line, this

goal was not achieved. Nonetheless, as of January 2006 one hundred and eighty-four

countries had signed the Copenhagen Declaration;37 these signatures are indicative of

government’s intention to ratify the UNESCO Convention. Currently, the governments of

Sweden, Canada, Denmark and New Zealand have ratified the Convention,

ID demonstrating their support for the fight against doping in sport.

As cited in the official proceedings of the second International Athletic

Foundation (l.A.F.) World Symposium on Doping inthe Sport, sports year of 1988 will

go down in history as “the year when the whole world opened its eyes and understood the

full seriousness of the problem of doping in sport.”39 From that point onward, researchers

began to devote time and attention to the problem of doping in sport and began

suggesting steps or procedures to correct the problem. However, at the annual General

Assembly of International Sports Federations meeting in October 1987, Dr. Robert Voy

presented a paper discussing the seriousness of the problem of drug use in sport and

outlined eight steps which, if properly employed and carried out, could create a lasting

effect in changing the face of drug misuse in sport.40 The eight steps included: increase

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the number of tests; test during training periods; secure cooperative agreements between

nations; develop an international testing agency; establish approved standards for the

collection and processing of specimens; implement consistent penalties; and adopt a

standard banned substances list. Each, as it may be noted, have striking similarities and

draw interesting parallels with research conducted and suggestions/recommendations

made following the incidents in Seoul 1988.41 Voy’s eight steps are important because

they represent insightful preliminary solutions that would later be imposed by decision

makers addressing the rapidly escalating problem of doping in sport.

As stated by Chalip, based on the findings of D. Duming, M. Kelly, and S.

Maynard-Moody, the inclusion of various stakeholder perspectives improve the process

and the product of policymaking.42 As a result of the recent strides made in the fight

against doping in sport, WADA is in a position to accept a leadership role in harmonizing

the anti-doping efforts among its key stakeholders.43 The coming years, when WADA

begins to carry out its worldwide leadership position, will be critical to determine if its

efforts will impact the significant number of athletes currently using performance

enhancing drugs.44

Jin-kyung Park’s essay entitled “Governing Doped Bodies: The World Anti-

Doping Agency and the Global Cultural Surveillance,” examines the background,

structure and governing practices of WADA.45 This piece of literature demonstrates how

WADA’s policies fundamentally work to police athletic bodies.46 Park concludes by

quoting Eugene Konig whose firm contention that “doping is a constitutive part of

modem sport and a natural evolution considering the nature of elite sport” is contrary to

the majority of literature pertaining to WADA’s policy development and

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implementation.47 WADA’s governance, he argues, which is substantively oriented to

address the unethical dimensions of doping, the artificiality of doped performance and the

protection of athletes’ health, needs to be reconsidered. In his concluding paragraph, Park

endeavors to drive home this key argument; it is an argument which has not been

addressed by other scholars publishing work on anti-doping in sport. Park suggests that

the actions taken by athletes to passively refuse WADA’s rules, code and standards can

become a point of departure for reinventing one’s athletic identity as well as producing

counter discourses that challenge WADA authority. This argument is important as it

highlights the necessity for WADA to continue to remain mindful of the athletes and their

rights amidst the organizations quest for drug-free sport.

In Michele Verroken’s article entitled “Drug use and abuse in sport,” an overview

of the long history of drug use in sport, as well as extensive information about specific

performance enhancing drugs, information which is not directly germane to this research

initiative, is presented.49 Nonetheless, the article does address issues which are critical to

the intended area of investigation. The author argues that, “the co-operation between

international and national sports federations and the newly created national anti-doping

organizations could provide one of the strongest deterrents to drug misuse.”50 Building

on this previous statement, Verroken, in David Mottram’s 2003 book, Drugs in Sport 3rd

edition, affirms that these organizations cannot overlook government involvement and

contributions. These elements not only foster the mutually supportive relationship

between sports organizations and governments, but are crucial to the ongoing success of

anti-doping activities.51 In another chapter of Mottram’s 2003 book, both Mottram and

Verroken cite the need for constant vigilance and continued adaptability on the part of

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organizations involved with anti-doping initiatives.52 The authors conclude the chapter by

declaring that the future of anti-doping is dependent on international collaboration

between the IOC, governments, and sports federations.

In his article, “Law and Athlete Drug Testing in Canada,” Joseph dePencier

touches on a number of legal issues pertaining to doping in sport.54 Although of interest

to the subject under investigation, the majority of information presented is not directly

related to this research initiative. Nonetheless, dePencier does shed light on the

complications National Anti-Doping Organizations face when athletes are tested outside

of their home country, an issue, it is argued, that could be efficiently dealt with through

ongoing policy development.55 He cites an example of an Australian cyclist who, after

being tested by the Sport Medicine Council of Canada, challenged the sample collection

procedure as inconsistent with, and contrary to, that conducted by The Australian Sport

Drug Association. The basis of the athlete’s argument was the variation which existed

between doping control procedures amongst individual countries.56 In his conclusion,

dePencier notes that the aforementioned incident is a driving force to further harmonize

doping control procedures among national doping control authorities. Moreover, he

suggests that this will ultimately result in unified procedures and documentations world­

wide, suggesting that such international standardization can only be beneficial to doping

control procedures in the years to come.57

Section II: Education

A paper published by Robert Dawson titled “The war on drugs in sport,”

questions the approach society is taking towards the use of drugs in sport.58 Dawson

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suggests that, instead of losing the war on drag use in sport, we should be fighting a

different war. He proposes that education rather than prohibition may be the answer.59 To

effectively deal with the problem of doping in sport, athletes should be educated on the

negative effects of using performance enhancing substances as opposed to simply being

told that drag use in sport is prohibited. Dawson determinedly believes that any

comprehensive doping control strategy should start during the early skills education of

children and teenagers and subsequently be carried through their competitive years.60

According to H. Striegel, G. Vollkommer, and H-H. Dickhuth doping has

developed into a widespread problem during the past few years, in both competitive and

high performance sport.61 As such, the authors suggest that if drag free sport is ever to be

achieved, sufficient anti-doping measures must be enacted. An effective and long term

solution to doping in sport requires not only the complete integration of athletes, but

consistent education as well as goal oriented and government sanctioned anti-doping

research in the form of an anti-doping law.62 The increase in testing as well as the

development of WADA is a positive step towards achieving drag free sport; however,

they argue that the importance of promoting closer cooperation on the international level

can not be overlooked.63

Doping, which pervades both amateur and professional athletics, is a problem that

exists at all levels of all sports, argues Tim Walker in “Missing the Target: How

Performance-Enhancing Drags go unnoticed and endanger the lives of athletes.”64 This

comparative analysis of the drag testing programs at both the amateur and professional

levels highlights their current inadequacies, while recommending suggestions to improve

current practices. This information emphasizes the need for a more cohesive and

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accountable approach to effectively deal with drug use in sport as well as highlighting the

need for drug education programs.65 “The current drug testing scheme is inadequate to

fight this war”, argues Walker, “much more needs to be done; mandatory education must

become a cornerstone for drug deterrence.”66 This point clearly identifies with a critical

component of WADA’s approach to achieve international harmonization in anti-doping.

Section III: Social Acceptance and Compliance

Relying on the work of Donald Macintosh, Tom Bedecki and C.E.S. Franks,

Chalip asserts that sport is a tool for nation-building. According to Chalip the national

pride associated with successful international sport performances, by athletes and teams,

is one of the most powerful forces driving sport policy development.68 Dubin, in The

Dubin Inquiry, supports this claim by discussing the benefits a country derives from

participating in international sport competitions. He states that,

It is clear that international athletic success has achieved a political dimension for many states; for at least some, success is a proof of the superior merit of their social and political structure. While this aspect of international sporting rivalry may be deplored, it cannot be discounted.. .The picture held in foreign lands of any country has come, to a remarkable degree, to be determined by that country’s record in .. .Competition in sports among countries has become inextricably entwined with matters of national prestige abroad, and national pride at home.69

The idea of using sport as a means of empowerment applies to the former German

Democratic Republic (GDR) and their approach to international politics and world

relations. Steven Unerleider’s Faust’s Gold: Inside the East German Doping Machine

(2001) follows the progression of the revelations, from mere suspicion that the athletes in

the former GDR were using performance enhancing substances throughout the 1960s and

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1970s, to the discovery of a master plan formulated with the full knowledge of the East

German government and senior sport administrators. It chronicles70 *the commitment • that

the East German government made to dominate sport while revealing the state’s

overwhelming involvement in doping practices.71 The book clearly illustrates that, for the

East German government, athletic victories would reflect the strength of the Soviet

System, garnering international respect and power. This book, which can be classified as

an informative narrative, recounts the health problems and ethical turmoil experienced by

doped athletes, but fails to examine the effects of doping on East German society and

does not examine the serious social consequences which evolved as a result of state

sanctioned doping practices. Today, many GDR athletes suffer drug-induced diseases and

reproductive difficulties including birth defects in their children. Similarly, there is a

serious divide and conflict of interest among former Olympians and their attitude towards

doping. Some express feelings of patriotism and a sense of pride and obligation towards

those individuals who helped them become superior athletes; whereas others feel a sense

of shame and embarrassment for having won medals unfairly.

A work on a similar topic, but written from a different perspective, is Jim

Riordan’s article “The Rise and Fall of Soviet Olympic Champions.”72 He identifies that

communist countries, aware of the possible advantages incurred from sporting success,

led governments to prepare their athletes accordingly. They adopted the mentality that

sport was a weapon of big time politics and therefore condoned state sponsored doping

throughout the 1960s and 1970s.73 The author’s access to a number of original

government documents adds a degree of credibility to his arguments. The information put

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forth is both interesting and useful in developing an understanding of the doping practices

incurred throughout East Germany.

In their article titled “Sport as a drug and drugs in sport” Eric Dunning and Ivan

Waddington, based on the findings of Glselher Spitzer74, describe the doping which took

place in the former East Germany as both mandatory and methodical. They support this

claim by arguing that all athletes competing for East Germany, at the international level,

were with or without knowledge and consent, given performance enhancing drugs. The

authors continue by declaring that for the number of athletes who were knowingly doped,

there were undoubtedly many more athletes who were unknowingly doped, including

individuals as young as ten years of age.

Moving away from the topic of social acceptance and more towards the issue of

compliance, Rollins refers to doping control as the anti-doping efforts of several national

and international• organizations. It 77has been argued by Mottram that to effectively deal

with the problem of drug use in sport, the concept of doping control must be supported by

<70 high quality research, effective educational programs and international collaboration.

Each individual component will not suffice; they must work together in a joint approach.

Since the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, there has been a marked increase in

research on drug misuse in sport, a very encouraging disclosure, remarks Rollins. As

well, he notes that the need for high quality education has been identified as a priority

among senior administrators in the sporting world. Educational70 initiatives should not

only address those competing at the international level, but filter through to grassroots

sport development programs as well.

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Although research and education are necessary, the most important area in

achieving change is the overriding need for international collaboration between the IOC,

governments, and international and national sport federations.80 Mottram notes that three

specific areas of focus need to be addressed in order to achieve change. These include:

developing some sort of uniformity in the rules and regulations regarding drug testing;

consistency in the application and level of sanctions and cooperation on the dissemination

of information; and, development of educational policies.81

The World Anti-Doping Code is the fundamental and universal document upon

which the World Anti-Doping Program in sport is based.82 The purposes of The Code are

to protect the Athlete’s fundamental right to participate in doping-free sport and thus

promote health, fairness and equality for, Athletes worldwide; and to ensure harmonized,

coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the international and national levels

with regard to detection, deterrence and prevention of doping.83 The World Anti-Doping

Program encompasses all of the elements needed in order to ensure optimal

harmonization and best practice in international and national anti-doping programs. Its

main elements are The Code, International Standards, and Models of Best Practice. The

Code provides a definition of doping and outlines WADA’s structure and objectives

through a four part division: Doping Control; Education and Research; Roles and

Responsibilities; and Acceptance, Compliance, Modification and Interpretation.84

Throughout his book, Inside the Olympics: A behind the scenes look at the

politics, the scandals, and the glory o f the Games, Richard W. Pound places emphasis

and importance on a number of issues that have negatively impacted both the IOC and

the Olympic Games. However his central argument, which is easily identified throughout

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the book, is that doping in sport is the most critical issue facing the modem Olympic

D C t Movement. Pound believes that strict rules must be universally accepted and adhered to

in order to effectively deal with the doping problem. He is firmly committed to the fight

against doping in sport and will not declare the battle won until ninety-nine point nine

percent of athletes compete dope free and the other 0.1% who do not are properly

penalized and sanctioned.

In keeping with another commitment, to the ethical values of the Olympic movement, there is a need to continue the fight against doping in sport. This is, in my view, the single greatest danger that faces sport today. It is the fight against doping in sport that distinguishes Olympic sport from entertainment sport and if we do not pursue this fight and win the war, I do not believe that true sport can survive.87

Pound identifies one of the main objectives of WAD A as harmonization across all

sports and in all countries. Regardless of the fact that prior to WADA’s development

various sports, select governments and individual countries applied their own anti-doping

rules and regulations, there was a lack of consistency in the application. The idea of

developing a World Anti-Doping Code, which could be adopted by all sports authorities

and enacted by governments, would provide the needed cohesion, compliance and

commitment• to achieve international • harmonization. Although O Q Pound presented and

advanced his argument in a balanced and fair approach, his involvement and position at

WADA, as well as his vested interest and extreme dedication to the problem of doping in

sport, could be seen as a bias by those who do not support his argument.

Genetic doping, a contemporary issue facing WADA, is defined in the World

Anti-Doping Code as the “non-therapeutic use of cells, genes, genetic elements, or of the

manipulation of gene expression, having the capacity to enhance athletic performance.”90

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Andy Miah, in his article “Genetics, Privacy, and Athlete’s Rights: An Analysis,” argues

that the genetic revolution is characterized by a host of ethical and legal issues that are

drawing attention across a multitude of disciplines.91 In a subsequent article, “Legislation

of performance enhancing drugs in sport,” Miah addresses a similar issue. He contends

that although WADA prohibited gene doping in 2003, while lacking a reliable detection

method, genetically modified athletes are expected to make their first appearance,

covertly, at in 2008.92 Miah supports his argument by stating that genetic

modification (GM) is just another performance- improving technology. “What, with

training methods, nutritional supplements and specialized equipment, the contemporary

elite athlete is already inherently technological. GM is only cheating insofar as it’s

banned by the WADA,” he argues, “but should it be?”93

In his book Genetically modified athletes: biomedical ethics, gene doping and

sport, Miah clearly explains the complex and evolving role of genetic technology in

sport, and its function as a performance enhancing drug. Similarly, he critically

scrutinizes and highlights both the practical and ethical inadequacies of current anti-

doping policies and framework. He goes on to suggest that the debate surrounding gene

doping is multifaceted.94 He argues that, although the prospect of genetically modified

athletes does incite alarm throughout much of the sporting world, there are others who

firmly contend that sport might benefit if they were unable to test for gene doping.95

Miah, who questions whether anti-doping policies can be sustained in an era of genetic

modification, identifies those who argue that the possibility of detecting genetic

manipulation, together with the cost in time and money that such testing would require, is

too cumbersome a burden for sport, thus rendering the enforcement of anti-doping policy

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nearly impossible.96 As such, he suggests that sporting communities would be forced to

reappraise and review the value of performance enhancement and possibly disregard the

fact that pharmacological enhancements are a component of an athlete’s performance.97

Section IV: Professional Sport and Anti-doping Policy Development

As argued by James W. Bovinet, professional sport is a business and in order to

QO survive, teams must make a profit. Similarly, as noted by Melinda Jones and David

Schumann in “The Strategic use of Celebrity Athlete Endorsers in Sport Illustrated: An

Historic Perspective,” professional sports have become one of the major spectacles of

media culture. As such, professional athletes are, and have been for years, held up to as

role models.99 The authors note that these great athletes are often idolized in the minds of

children, who often go to great lengths to imitate their athletic prowess or proudly wear

their hero’s numbered jersey.100 “Great athletes, because of their prominence in our

society, tend to play many different roles. They are not viewed simply as sports

entertainers, but are often expected to engender strong values and morals that conform to

our societal and cultural norms.” Therefore, whether endorsing a product or enforcing

particular values, professional athletes must be accountable for their actions. This opinion

can be applied to North American professional sport where the prevalence of doping

among athletes is having a profound impact on youth.

Although the issue of doping in professional sport is not germane to the primary

research question posed, it cannot be overlooked. The majority of literature reporting on

drug use in sport advocates the necessity of achieving international harmonization and

compliance. However, to achieve true international compliance, whereby all athletes are

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subject to the same rules, restrictions and sanctions, both amateur and professional sport

must be harmonized. According to Pound, North American professional sport leagues

approach, or deal with anti-doping from one of two perspectives. Leagues are either in

complete denial of the problem, or allege that their respective policies are vigorously in

favor of drug-free sport, a claimed which, Pound firmly believes, could not be further

from the truth.101

Zachary Coile argues that, as it stands, the National Football League’s (NFL) anti-

doping policy is viewed as being the toughest steroid policy of any major American

professional sport. Nonetheless, Coile draws attention to the policy’s gaps and loopholes

which allow players to cheat the system and use performance enhancing drugs.102 For

example, the league only tests for eight stimulants, while Olympic testing includes forty

* i m stimulants and amphetamines. Recently, the NFL has increased the number of random

off-season tests from two to six.104 A first positive test results in a four game suspension

without pay, followed by a six game suspension without pay for a second positive, and

lastly, a full season suspension without pay for a third positive.

The National Hockey League (NHL), which strongly disagrees with the proposed

American federal legislation to crack down on performance enhancing drugs, conducts

two “no-notice tests” every year on every player.105 A first offense results in a twenty

game suspension without pay and mandatory referral to the League’s substance abuse

program. A second offense results in a sixty game suspension without pay. A third

positive leads to a minimum two year suspension; however, players are eligible for

reinstatement following the initial two year suspension. What’s troubling about this new

testing program, which came into effect 15 January 2006, is that it will not be in force

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during the summer months, this enables athletes to carefully regulate steroid use during a

build up process and then taper use as competition approaches, thus avoiding a positive

test.106

In the National Basketball Association (NBA), players are subject to four no­

notice drug tests per season. A first time offence results in a ten game suspension, the

second a twenty-five game suspension, and the third results in dismissal from the league,

with reinstatement eligibility in two years.107

Mike Dodd and Dick Patrick note that Major League Baseball (MLB) did not

begin testing for steroids until the 2003 season.108 The testing in 2003 was anonymous

and included only a sampling of players. However, given the percentage of players who

tested positive for steroid use (five-seven percent) the policy was broadened to require all

players in the 2004 season be tested.109 MLB’s policy, which has recently been updated,

was as follows: athletes guilty of a first offense were suspended for ten games or fined up

to ten thousand dollars; a second offense resulted in a thirty day suspension or a fine

reaching twenty-five thousand dollars; a third offense resulted in a sixty day suspension

or a fine reaching fifty thousand dollars; while a fourth offense led to a year-long

suspension or a one hundred thousand dollar fine.110 In response to this policy, Richard

Pound, in November 2003, was quoted as saying: “Baseball’s policy on steroids is a

‘complete joke’ and an ‘insult’ to the fight against performance-enhancing drugs.”111

In an agreement reached in mid-November 2005, based on the principle of ‘three

strikes, you’re out,’ MLB and its player’s union made significant progress in combating

the use of steroids and other harmful drugs in their sport. In the new agreement, Jeff Blair

and James Christie expalin, a first drug offense results in a fifty game suspension; a

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second offense represents a one hundred game suspension; and a third offense involves a

lifetime suspension from the league. As it stands, the owners have unanimously displayed

their support through a vote, and hope that the union’s executive board will comply.112

Although a number of international professional sports’ anti-doping policies are

either Code compliant or are currently being amended to enforce harsher penalties on

athletes caught doping, continued progress and development is needed within the arena of

professional sport to match the sanctions imposed on amateur athletes.113 The

discrepancy among policies presents a challenge in the pursuit of international

harmonization, which can only be achieved if both professional and amateur sports apply

consistent rules and regulations.

The Drug Free Sports Act (HR 1862), introduced by Representative Cliff Steams

(R-FL), is one of two similar Bills designed to set minimum steroid-testing rules and

penalties for the major U.S. professional sports associations.114 This Bill would establish

a Federal dmg-testing policy using the standards adopted and enforced by the IOC. The

Drag Free Sports Act would require two random tests for illegal performance enhancing

drags per year, per athlete, and test for all substances banned by WADA. If adopted, it

would result in the suspension of first time offenders for two years and a lifetime ban on

repeat offenders, public disclosure of all positive test results and provide Government

Accountability Office access to study the use of performance enhancing drags in college

and high school sports and recommend whether mandatory testing programs are

necessary.115 Despite being a separate initiative, the listed penalties of The Drag Free

Sports Act have striking similarities to those sanctions and procedures imposed by

WADA. Any sports league failing to comply with the proposed rales could face an initial

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fine of five million dollars, followed by daily fines of one million dollars for every day

the league failed to comply.116

The Clean Sports Act (HR 2562) of 2005, sponsored by Representatives Thomas

Davis (R-VA) and Henry Waxman (D-CA), is the second steroid-related bill to be

presented before U.S. House lawmakers. 117 Although similar to The Drug Free Sport Act,

The Clean Sports Act requires athletes to be randomly tested three times during the

regular season and twice during the off-season. Those supporting this bill believe it will

be more effective as a result of the increased number of tests conducted on athletes.118

Another aspect where the two acts differ is the Promulgation of Standards. The Clean

Sports Act requires leagues to consult with the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) to

develop its drug testing protocols, whereas, The Drug Free Sports Act gives the Secretary

of Commerce the responsibility to issue regulations.119 The Drug Free Sports Act and

Clean Sports Act of 2005 emerged from the House Committees on Energy and

Commerce and on Government Reform, respectively. Although these bills were

introduced 28 June 2005, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce was

granted an extension for further consideration until 30 September 2005. At this point, no

further action has been taken. 17 n

Conclusion

Following a review of the pertinent literature, it was determined that although

there are a number of valuable sources addressing the issue of doping in sport, a

compilation approach was frequently used in a myriad of these works. While

advantageous to readers for a number of reasons, the disadvantages cannot be

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overlooked. When reviewing a piece of literature which has compiled a number of

sources, the quality of information presented tends to be excellent. Expert opinions,

insight and perspectives are argued and presented. However, the downfall is the quantity

of information. Books which employ this technique address a number of issues as

opposed to concentrating on one or two specific areas; therefore, the opportunity to

critically analyze and delve deeper into a specific subject area is absent.

WADA was established a mere six years ago. To date, the organization’s

development, progress, and accomplishments comprise an array of impressive

achievements. In the coming years, if WADA were to continue on a similar course of

action there is a distinct possibility that the presence and likelihood of doping in sport

would be significantly reduced. Nonetheless, challenges remain and will continually

arise. For example, WADA faces the complex challenge of researching new drug

detection methods, thus keeping pace with the pharmaceutical industry; gene doping is

WADA’s most recent challenge. Similarly, the organization must develop a policy which

is effective at both domestic and international levels. This policy would involve

approximately thirty International Sport Federations (ISFs) and a similar number of non-

Olympic federations, and would require the co-operation of over one hundred

governments who have a significant number of athletes participating in international

competition.• • 121 Consideration must also be given to financial resources and commitment

required to run and implement such a policy must be addressed. As stated by O’Leary,

“harmonization is the current buzzword on drug policy and an admirable ambition. It

may, however, prove difficult to achieve.”122

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The literature, although limited in volume, supports the notion that international

collaboration and co-operation between the IOC, governments and ISFs is critical to the

success of current and future anti-doping initiatives. Given that sport is practiced on a

world-wide basis, the fight against doping has become an international initiative,

requiring international co-ordination and commitment. Achieving this international

compliance and harmonization towards anti-doping in sport requires policy development,

government support, education, compliance, and social acceptance. Although the

creation of WADA, which represents a global organization through which every country

in the world has its say,123 was a significant step towards achieving international

harmonization, it does not guarantee success. However, as previously mentioned, the

failure to establish such an organization would have been a failure in the fight against

doping in sport.124 It is hoped that this research endeavour, which sets out to determine

how the formation of WADA has impacted the development of an international strategy

for anti-doping in sport, illuminates a subject that requires further understanding,

attention and discussion.

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Endnotes

1 Wendy Frisby, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Critical Sport Management Research,” Journal o f Sport Management 19 (2005): p. 3.

2 Laurence Chalip, “Policy Analysis in Sport Management,” Journal o f Sport Management 9 (1995): p. 1.

3 Laurence Chalip, “Critical Policy Analysis: The Illustrative Case of New Zealand Sport Policy Development,” Journal o f Sport Management 10 (1996): p. 310.

4 Brian Smith, Policy Making in British Government (London: Martin Robinson, 1979), p. 13.

5 Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy 2nd (Englewooded. Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 1.

6 William.I. Jenkins, Policy Analysis: Political and Organizational Perspectives (London: Martin Robinson, 1978), p. 15.

7 Barrie Houlihan, The Government and Politics o f Sport (London: Routledge, Champman and Hall, Inc., 1991), p. 5.

8 Ibid., p. 204.

9 Ibid.,p. 200.

10 Ibid., p. 198.

11 Barrie Houlihan, “Policy Harmonization: The Example of Global Anti-doping Policy,” Journal o f Sport Management 13 (1999): p. 197.

12 Ibid., p. 200.

13 Ibid., p. 198.

14 Ibid., p. 207.

15 Ibid., p. 205.

16 Barrie Houlihan, “Anti-Doping Policy in Sport: The Politics of International Policy Co-Ordination,” European Forum (1999):11 p. 329.

17 Ibid., p. 332.

18 Barrie Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” in Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives, ed. John O’Leary (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001), p. 143.

19 Ibid., p. 145.

20 Barrie Houlihan, Dying to Win: Doping in sport and the development o f anti-doping policy 2nd ed. (Germany: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), p. 149.

21 Ibid., p. 173.

22 Ibid., p. 176.

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23 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 180.

24 Ibid.

25 Charles L. Dubin, Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1990).

26 Ibid., p. 4.

27 Ibid., p. 500.

28 Ibid., p. 540.

29 Casey Wade, “Drug-Free Sport in Bermuda” (lecture, WADA Executive Meeting, Bermuda, May 26, 2005).

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 WADA Website, “The World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ code_v3.pdf (accessed January 21, 2006).

34 Casey Wade, “Drug Use in Sport” (presentation McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 2005).

35 International Convention Against Doping in 19Sport, October 2005,33rd session of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization “UNESCO” General Conference of 2005, chap. I, art. I.

36 International Convention Against Doping in 19Sport, October 2005,33rd session of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization “UNESCO” General Conference of 2005, pt. I, chap. I, art. IV.

37 WADA Website, “Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/ dynamic.ch2? pageCategory.id=272 (accessed January 23,2006).

38 Ibid. (As of 15 March 2006, the Governments of Nigeria, Canada, Demark, Iceland, Monaco, Norway, Swedan, New Zealand, Australia and the Cook Islands have ratified the UNESCO Convention).

39 Pasquale. Bellotti, G. Benzi, and A. Ljungqvist, “2nd I.A.F. World Symposium on Doping in Sport International Athletic Foundation” (official conference proceedings, Monte Carlo, 5-7 June, 1989). p. 2.

40 Robert Voy, “Education As a Mean Against Doping,” The Olympian 43 (1987): p. 44.

41 Ibid., p. 5.

42 Chalip, “Critical Policy Analysis: The Illustrative Case of New Zealand Sport Policy Development,” p. 312.

43 Douglas E. Rollins, “Drug Testing in Athletes at the 2002 Olympic Winter Games,” Journal o f Pharmacy Practice 16 (2003): p. 21.

44 Ibid.

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45 Jin-Kyung Park, “Governing Doped Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency and the Global Culture of Surveillance,” Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies 5 (2005): p. 174.

46 Ibid., p. 178.

47 Eugene Konig, “Criticism of doping: The nihilistic side of technological sport and the antiquated view of sport ethics,” International Review for the Sociology o f Sport 30 (1995): pp. 247-259.

48 Park, “Governing Doped Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency and the Global Culture of Surveillance,” p. 185.

49 Michele Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in sport,” Bailliere’s Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 14 (2000): pp. 1-23.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Michele Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in sport,” in Drugs in Sport 3rd ed. ed David R. Mottram (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 59.

52 Ibid., p. 352.

53 Ibid.

54 Joseph dePencier, “Law and Athlete Drug Testing in Canada,” Marquette Sports and Law Journal 259 (1994): pp. 259-299.

55 Ibid., p.295.

56 Ibid., p. 296.

57 Ibid., p. 297.

58 Robert T. Dawson, “The War on drugs in Sport: An Editorial,” BMC News and Views (2000): p. 3.

59 Ibid., p. 1.

60 Matthias Kamber, “Doping Control in : An Historical Perspective,” originally published in the German language in Doping: Spitzensport als gesellschaftliches Problem. A copy of this article was obtained from Mr. Jocelyn East personal collection, Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, Ottawa, p. 12.

61 H. Striegel, G. Vollkommer, H. H. Dickhuth, “Combating drug use in competitive sports: An analysis from the athlete’s perspective,”Journal o f Sport Medicine and Physical Fitness 42 (2002): p. 354.

62 Ibid., p. 357.

63 Ibid., p. 358.

64 Tim Walker, “Missing the Target: How Performance-Enhancing Drugs go Unnoticed and Endanger the Lives of Athletes,” Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 10 (2003): p. 183.

65 Ibid., p. 207.

66 Ibid., p. 209.

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67 Laurence Chalip, “Introduction: Thinking about National Sports Policies,” in National Sports Policies: An International Handbook, ed. Laurence Chalip, Arthur Johnson, and Lisa Stachura (West Port: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp. 8-14.

68 Chalip, “Critical Policy Analysis: The Illustrative Case of New Zealand Sport Policy Development,” p. 316.

69 Dubin, Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, p. 62.

70 Steven Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold: Inside the East German Doping Machine (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001).

71 Ibid., p. 201.

72 Jim Riordan, “The Rise and Fall of Soviet Olympic Champions,” OLYMPIKA: The International Journal o f Olympic Studies 2 (1993): pp. 25-44.

73 Ibid, p. 28.

74 Spitzer suggests that the people who ran the East German elite sports system ‘were breaking the sport laws and the national laws; they were criminals, but the athletes who didn’t know have no individual guilt in this illegal practice’. Indeed, it may be more appropriate to regard those who were administered drugs under these circumstances not as criminals or cheats but - especially in the view of the drug-related health problems experienced by some former East German athletes - as ‘victims’ or ‘dupes.’

75 Glselher Spitzer, “G.D.R.: Doping History and Conclusions of Total Body Engineering,” paper presented at a conference to mark the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the Hungarian Royal College of Physical Education, Budapest November 2000, as quoted in Eric Dunning and Ivan Waddington, “Sport as a drug and drugs in sport,” International Review for the Sociology o f Sport 38 (2003): p. 365.

76 Ibid, p. 365.

77 Rollins, “Drug Testing in Athletes at the 2002 Olympic Winter Games,” pp. 15-21.

78 David. R. Mottram, “Banned Drugs in Sport: Does the International Olympic Committee (IOC) List Need Updating?” Sports Medicine 27,1 (1999): p. 8.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82WADA Website, “The World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ code_v3.pdf (accessed October 12,2005).

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Richard W. Pound, Inside the Olympics: A behind the scenes look at the politics, the scandal and the glory of the Games (Canada: John Wiley and Sons Canada Ltd, 2004): p. 277.

86 Ibid, p. 279.

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87 Pound, Inside the Olympics: A behind the scenes look at the politics, the scandal and the glory o f the Games, p. 277.

88 Ibid., p. 278.

89 Ibid., p. 82.

90 WADA Website, “Science and Medicine,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynaniic.ch22page category.id=526 (accessed January 22, 2006).

91 Andy Miah, “Genetics, Privacy, and Athlete’s Rights: An Analysis,” Sports Law Bulletin 4, no. 5 (2001), http://www.media.paisley.ac.uk/andymiah/Miah2001GeneTest.pdf (accessed January 23,2006).

92 Bengt Kayser, Anne Mauron and Andy Miah, “Legislation of performance enhancing drugs in sport,” The Lancet: Medicine and Sport 366 (2005), http://www/thelancet.com/joumals (accessed January 23, 2006).

93 Ibid.

94 Andy Miah, Genetically Modified Athletes: biomedical ethics, gene doping and (London: sport Routledge, 2004). p. 13.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 James W. Bovinet, “Customer Communication in Selected Professional Sports (MLB, NFL, NHL, NBA): A Test,” Sport Marketing Quarterly 8 (1999): p. 42.

99 Melinda J. Jones and David W. Schumann, “The Strategic use of Celebrity Athlete Endorsers in Sports Illustrated: An Historic Perspective,” Sport Marketing Quarterly 9 (2000): p. 65.

100 Ibid.

101 Pound, Inside the Olympics: A behind the scenes look at the politics, the scandal and the glory o f the Games, p. 62.

102 Zachary Coile, “Praise, but it’s not perfect: House panel tackles NFL’s steroids policy, ” San Francisco Chronicle, April 28,2005, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/04/28/ MNGK2CGNGS1.DTL (accessed November 6,2005).

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Scott Laurie, “NHL unveils new drug testing policy,” CTV.ca, September 28, 2005, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20050928/NHL_doping_050928?s_name=&no_as (accessed October 19, 2005). Canada, in stark contrast to The United States of America, has less professional sport leagues/teams and therefore, has significantly less government involvement/activity relative to anti-doping legislation. However, there are discussions, and hope, that the Canadian Football League (CFL) and their new CBA will have an anti-doping program because as it currently stands, they

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have no anti-doping policy and show no interest in adopting one. As recently as May 2006, both The Winnipeg Blue Bombers and Toronto Argonauts (two CFL teams) have shown interest in signing running backs under doping suspensions by the NFL. Smith and Williams are repeat offenders of the NFL’s substance abuse policy, having repeated so often they’re both under year-long suspensions. The fact they’ve shown up on the CFL radar is no surprise to anyone who’s followed this league over the years. There’s a long list of players who leave behind their checkered pasts in the U.S. for a clean slate, not to mention a test-free environment, in Canada. For further information please consult Paul Friesen, “CFL needs to honour NFL Bans,” The Winnipeg Free Press, May 2006.

106 Jim Kemaghan, “Drug use penalty for Berard not high,” London Free Press, January 21,2006, http://lfpress.ca/newsstand/Sports/Hockey/2006/01/21/1404175-sun.html (accessed January 23,2006).

107 http://english.people.com.cn/200505/20/eng20050520_l 85972.html, May 20, 2005 (accessed January 31,2006).

108 Mike Dodd and Dick Patrick, “Critics: Palmeiro case exposes flawed policy,” USA Today, August 2, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2005-08-02-steroid-policy-critics_x.htm, (accessed November 6, 2005).

109 Ibid.

1,0 Ibid.

111 Associated Press, “Anti-doping head: Baseball drug penalties a joke and insult,” CBS Sportsline, November 14, 2003.

112 Jeff Blair and James Christie, “Baseball unveils three-strike drug policy,” Globe and Mail, November 16, 2005, http:www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20051116/STEROIDS 16 /TPSports/ (accessed November 23,2005). Three weeks after Major League Baseball's owners unanimously ratified a new drug policy restricting the use of performance-enhancing drugs and amphetamines, the players association followed suit and made it official.

113 WADA Website, “Code Compliance,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/(accessed October 12,2005).

114 Drug Free Sport Act, HR 3084,109th Cong., 1st Session., (June 28,2005).

115 Zachary Coile, “Bill seeks to toughen drug testing in pro sports: Olympic Standards for steroids would applying, including lifetime ban for second offense,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 27, 2005, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/04/27/MNGMICG0SSl .DTL (accessed November 6th, 2005).

116 Ibid.

117 Drug Free Sport Act, HR 3084, 109th Cong., 1st Session., (June 28, 2005).

118 Ibid.

1,9 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Houlihan, Dying to Win, p. 175.

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122 John O’Leary, “The State of Play,” in Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives, ed. John O’Leary (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001), p. 6.

123 David Howman (Director General of WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006.

124 Barrie Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” p. 145.

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Methodology

Methodological Framework

As argued by Edward Hallett Carr, in Marwick’s The Nature o f History, “history

is a dialogue between the present and the past.”1 It is not a separate mode of thought, but

rather the common home of many interests, techniques and traditions, devised by those

who have dedicated their best energies to the study of the past.2 Marwick goes on to

substantiate history’s place in academia by arguing that the fundamental justification for

historical study is that history is necessary. It meets a basic instinct and a need of people

living in society. Historians have often stressed the ‘educational’ value of their subject, as

a ‘training of the mind’ or as a practical guide to the problems of human society and

politics.3

A historical study is often classified as a branch of qualitative research.

Qualitative research, a dynamic process offering flexibility and advocating the benefits of

change, seeks depth rather than breadth and attempts to learn about how and why people

behave, think, and make meaning of their actions. It often falls within the context of

discovery rather than verification and spans the micro-macro spectrum dealing with both

structural and procedural issues.4 Qualitative researchers often pursue an inductive

approach, shifting their focus according to elements of the world rather than those

dictated by exact research.5 When proposing the usefulness of an academic discipline,

the need for a cohesive theory cannot be overlooked. However, as stated by Arthur

Stinchcombe, in his Theoretical Methods in Social History text, “one does not apply

theory to history; rather one uses history to develop theory.”6 This quote was relevant to

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the methodological approach of the present study as the timeline and unfolding of

historical events, relative to the development of WADA, provided more information

about the organization’s impact on the development of an international strategy, than

through the application of a singular theory.

A framework consisting of three levels of analysis and assessment was employed

to properly identify how the formation of The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)

impacted the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport. The three

levels are as follows:7

1) The level of personalities and individuals, in which significant individuals must be identified and both their contributions and the reasons for these contributions assessed.

2) The level of agencies and institutions, in which significant institutions both inside and outside the central core must be identified. Their interests and the goals and purposes towards which they work, must be identified and examined. The structure and process of interaction between the various agencies is part of the analysis.

3) The level of forces outside of institutions.

The first level dealt with key personalities and individuals involved with the

development of WADA. For example, this level comprised members of the IOC, the

International Paralympic Committee (IPC), various members of ISFs, National Olympic

Committees (NOCs), National Anti-Doping Organizations (NADOs), as well as select

government representatives. The second level involved those agencies and institutions

that influenced the development of WADA; these included the IOC, NOCs, ISFs,

provincial and federal governments and various NADOs. The Canadian Centre for

Ethics in Sport (CCES), the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), the Australian

Sport Drug Agency (ASDA) and UKSport, are examples. The third level was comprised

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of the broad societal forces shaped by events and media coverage of these events, which

took hold regarding the use of drugs in sport.

In this scholarly endeavour, triangulation was used as the research tool to further

solidify the validity and reliability of data collected and increase confidence in the

findings of this study.8 According to Jerry Thomas and Jack Nelson (2001) triangulation

is “...the use of more than one source of data to confirm a researcher’s conclusion.”9 As

stated by Lisa Guion, triangulation provides a balanced and detailed picture of a

situation.10 There are typically five different types of triangulation (data, investigator,

theory, methodological, and environmental). For the purpose of this research initiative,

data triangulation, which involves the use of different sources of data/information, was

employed. Information retrieved from archives, media sources such as newspapers, and

interviews were used to conduct the three levels of analysis previously identified.

Data Sources

Three primary sources of data were used to gather the relevant information.

Documented and private archives were searched, a collection of media articles have been

reviewed, and in-depth and exploratory interviews were conducted. Secondary sources,

such as books, novels, and journal articles were examined to gain a general overview and

understanding of the subject area.

According to Dwight Zakus and Synthia Slowikowski, based on Carr’s

contention, history cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some sort of contact

with the mind of those about whom he is writing.11 Archives, which traditionally house

valuable primary source documents such as letters, memoranda, minutes and reports,12

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provide the required contact and necessary information. Not only does searching an

archive force researchers to think critically and structure meaningful research questions,

it challenges one’s interpretive abilities.13 As stated by Barney, “research studies

underpinned by primary sources fundamental to arguments or points of view, in general,

receive more favorable response from reviewers/editors than research findings drawn

largely from the work of others or secondary work as the profession pointedly labels that

genre of information.”14

As such, a formal review of WADA’s online archives was carried out during this

research initiative. WADA’s online archives provided the researcher with access to

minutes from a number of committee meetings (Foundation Board, Executive

Committee, Finance and Administration, Ethics and Education, Health, Medical and

Research, Legal, and Standards and Harmonization), annual reports (2002, 2003, 2004)

as well as keynote addresses and presentations. Likewise, information related to the

development of WADA and the World Anti-Doping Code was available and reviewed.

Personal archives provide an additional and largely untapped source of

information. The added benefit of searching a personal archive is found in reviewing an

individual’s private opinions and perspectives, which may not yet have been accessed.

The researcher successfully secured access to the personal archives of Richard Pound,

Chairperson of WADA. Inspection of these documents and files, which included IOC

Executive Board Minutes, IOC General Session Minutes and WADA Reports, was a

critical component of the data collection process of this study. Resources reviewed

amongst Pound’s holdings provided invaluable information pertaining to the primary

research question posed, as well as other peripheral, but nonetheless important issues and

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events relative to WADA’s role and impact on the development of an international

strategy.

Newspaper articles were used to foster a more thorough understanding of the

social and political climate surrounding the development of WADA and the subsequent

development of The Code. Articles from five prominent newspapers were reviewed; these

included The Globe and Mail, The Montreal Gazette, The Sun, The New York

Times, and the London Times. More specifically, articles published within the specific

time frame identified for this study, July 1998 through December 2005, which recounted

the proceedings of significant events, relative to the development of WADA, were

analyzed.

The final component of the primary research, and one of significant importance to

this research endeavour, consisted of exploratory interviews. According to Thomas and

Nelson, interviews provide an ideal means for capturing personal experiences and the

meaning people bring to them.15 Influential people within the international anti-doping

movement were asked to participate in semi-structured interviews which lasted anywhere

between 30 minutes and 90 minutes, depending on the depth of the participant’s

responses (see Appendix III).16 Participants included: Richard Pound; The Honourable

Charles L. Dubin; David Howman; Neil McKenzie; Paul Meila; Joseph dePencier;

Victor Lachance; Andrew Pipe; Ole Sorensen; and Casey Wade (see Appendix IV).

Semi-structured interviews provided an opportunity for exploring issues indentified by

the interviewees, while maintaining a certain degree of structure.17 Recesses from the

interviews were granted as desired by the participant. Interviews were recorded using a

digital voice recorder and subsequently transcribed; for those participants who requested,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a written transcript of the interview was provided. Receiving a written or hard copy

enabled participants to review the interview, offer feedback, and make any necessary

changes or edits. Moreover, copies of the official transcripts are available in Leddy

Library Archives at The University of Windsor. A pilot interview was conducted; this

experience provided the researcher with an opportunity to ensure questions were

appropriately worded and easily understood, as well as to determine approximate time

requirements for subsequent interviews.

Personal interviews were the preferred approach, however telephone interviews

were employed in three instances as a function of the interviewees’ work commitments

and availability. Both open and closed questions were used. Closed questions were used

to establish and identify specific factual information such as a historical timeline, dates,

objectives/initiatives and key participants. Open-ended questions were used to gain

personal opinions, insight and experiences with and towards WADA. For example, an

open-ended approach allowed for greater exploration and interpretation of the

development/unfolding of events prior to and after WADA’s development in November

1999.

By conducting interviews, engaging in observational research and documenting

the happenings of human behaviour, qualitative researchers create openness with their

participants, gain insight by reflecting on their shared experiences and ascertain a level of

depth and detail not possible in quantitative research.18 As a result of the versatility and

flexibility it offered, the interview method was selected over that of a questionnaire.

Interviews created an environment in which direct lines of questioning and probing were

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pursued when new material surfaced.19 Thus, as stated by Thomas and Nelson, “the key

to getting good information is to ask good questions.”20

Limitations

Although there were many benefits to conducting interviews as a means of data

collection, limitations did arise. Each participant interviewed for this research initiative

was asked the exact same questions. However, the manner through which each

participant interpreted a question ultimately shaped and therefore, influenced their

response. At times, perceptions of certain events varied significantly from one participant

to the next, thereby producing contradictory answers to the same question. This created a

challenge for the researcher to accurately determine how events truly unfolded. These are

issues which were recognized and accounted for when transcribing the interviews and

were overcome by reviewing other primary and secondary source documents against

which answers were measured and compared.

Another limitation which presented itself related to the sample. All participants

were involved, directly or indirectly, with the development of an international strategy for

anti-doping in sport; therefore, the majority of participants were affiliated with WADA

and other NADOs. The specific criteria and parameters set out for participants led to the

development of a sample of convenience. This, in turn, resulted in the data collected

being biased towards those who have extensive background knowledge. Similarly, the

vast majority of participants are currently located and employed within North America,

leading to the development of another bias based on geographical location.

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An additional limitation, which had a slightly negative impact towards the

recruitment of eligible participants as well as the acquisition of important information,

related to the researcher’s position outside or external to the ‘anti-doping’ community. As

a result of the duration of this study, the researcher did not have an opportunity to

become an integrated, an active and an accepted member of their trusted community and

network; consequently, when conducting the interviews, occasions did arise when some

participants were reluctant to share relevant information. Additionally, a few participants

were skeptical of the researcher’s intent, what the researcher planned to do with the

information once it was obtained, and how, both positively and negatively, the publishing

or release of the acquired information could impact and or affect the community at large.

In addition to the above limitations, the duration of this initiative posed a challenge. The

researcher was limited in that this project was initially scheduled to conclude by the end

of May 2006.

Delimitations

As previously mentioned, the focus of this study was to determine how the

formation of WADA impacted the development of an international strategy for anti-

doping in sport. It was therefore necessary that the term ‘impact’ be delimited. For the

purpose of this study, impact was defined as the power of one body (WADA) to directly

or indirectly shift feelings, influence thinking, and/or have an effect on the formation of

another instrument (The Code) where a relationship can be established. The period of

time ranging from July 1998 through December 2005 set the boundaries for the unfolding

of significant events which impacted the development of an international strategy for

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anti-doping in sport. July 1998 was identified as a temporal boundary given the drug

scandal that unfolded at the Tour de France that year, and has been credited as ‘the

seminal• event’ which • led to the creation of WADA. 7 1 Given the topical nature of this

research study, the conclusion of 2005 was defined as the second temporal boundary as

appropriate and sufficient analysis could not be conducted upon events which transpired

shortly before the submission of this study.

A significant event and/or action was defined as something that, due to a

fundamental relationship with the event, had a tangible and identifiable impact on the

event itself. To measure impact, significant events were categorized into three major

groupings (Government, Sport and the Public) and then further sub-divided into smaller

categories. Government branched off to include the federal, provincial and international

governments. Sport was broken down to include the IOC, ISFs and professional sport;

from there each respective sub-category was split further. The IOC broke off to include

NOCs, Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs) and the Olympic

Partners. The ISFs were divided to include national and international sport federations

and finally, professional sport was divided by leagues, North American and

European/Oceania and Asia. The sub-category for the public was the media, which was

further sub-divided to comprise television, print and radio.

Although the events which occurred prior to July 1998 are important in

understanding the context for this study, they do not fall within the established temporal

boundaries. Nonetheless, pertinent events which unfolded in 1988 and 1989 were

addressed to develop a more comprehensive appreciation of the topic.

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Operational Definitions

Sport is a social and cultural phenomenon which many authors have attempted to

properly define. Historian Donald Guay defined “sport as a competitive and fun physical

activity practised in accordance to written rules and a particular spirit, the sporting spirit,

composed of fairness and equity, the desire to win, and loyalty.”22 For the purpose of this

study, the above definition of sport was utilized. The term international strategy has

often been associated with a number of varying definitions. Therefore, to ensure proper

use and understanding throughout this study, a clear and succinct definition was required.

As such, the term international strategy was defined as a long term plan of action or

policy agreed on and used by all or many nations to achieve a particular goal. Doping

involves prohibited substances or prohibited methods that enhance sporting performance,

risk health and/or are contrary to the spirit of sport. As such, for the purpose of this

study, ‘doping’ was defined as the occurrence of one or more anti-doping rule

violations.24 To provide a precise definition of performance-enhancing drugs is extremely

difficult for a number or reasons;25 as such, in this study, performance-enhancing drugs

were defined as dietary supplements, prescription medications, and illicit drugs.26

Problem Statement

The World Anti-Doping Agency is a relatively new initiative in the battle against

doping in sport. Consequently, little research has been undertaken to assess WADA’s

contributions to this battle. Indeed, while considerable research has been undertaken on

drug use in sport and the development/implementation of anti-doping initiatives, research

focusing on WADA and the importance/impact of an international strategy for anti-

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doping in sport is limited, thus, leaving a clear gap in the literature. Moreover, the high

profile of drugs and sport in the media and the necessity of attempting to project a

message to the youth of today about its harmful effects, both to individuals and society,

reinforces the importance of, and need for, such a study. In short, this initiative, which

has as one of its goals the illumination of a subject that required further understanding,

attention and discussion, successfully responds to the following research question:

How has the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (November 1999) impacted the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

A series of sub-questions were also addressed to facilitate an understanding of the subject

and contribute to the answering of the main thesis question. These include:

1) What were the central issues behind the development of WAD A?

2) Which governing policies and procedures were in place prior to the development of an international strategy for anti-doping?

3) What were the central issues behind the development of an international strategy for anti-doping?

4) What were the key agencies and institutions that impacted the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

5) Who were the key personalities and individuals who had a significant impact on the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

6) What forces outside of institutions affected the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

Working together, the sub-questions and proposed methodology exposed and

connected a variety of sources and information, thereby revealing W ADA’s impact on

the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport. Having employed a

qualitative methodological approach, which offered dynamism and flexibility during data

collection, the researcher had an opportunity to interact with and engage the participants.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. It is through these connections, interactions and established levels of analysis that

relevant information was retrieved from the source material, permitting the analysis of

WADA’s impact on the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68

Endnotes

1 Arthur Marwick, The Nature o f History (London, GB: MacMillian and Company Ltd, 1970), p. 1.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 14.

4 A.M. Ambert, P. Adler, P. Adler and D. Detzne, “Understanding and Evaluation Qualitative Research,” Journal o f Marriage and the Family, 57 (1995): p. 882.

5 Ibid.

6 Arthur Stinchcombe, Theoretical Methods in Social History (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 1.

7 The three levels of analysis were adapted from those utilized by Macintosh, Bedecki and Franks. Donald Macintosh, Tom Bedecki and C.E.S Franks, Sport and Politics in Canada: Federal Government Involvement Since 1961 (Kingston: McGill-Queens Press, 1987).

8 Stinchcombe, Theoretical Methods in Social History, p. 345.

9 Jerry Thomas and Jack Nelson, Research Methods in Physical Activity 4th ed. (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 2001), p. 345.

10 L. Guion, “Triangulation: Establishing the Validity of Qualitative Studies,” September 2002, http://edis.fas.ufl.edu (accessed October 12,2005).

11 Dwight H. Zakus and Synthia S. Slowikowski, “Alternative Research theories and methodologies for Sport History: From Mills and Carr, through Hesse, the Nonequilibrium theory,” in Method and Methodology in Sport and Cultural History, ed. K.B. Wamsley (Dubuque, IA: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1995), p. 19.

12 Robert K. Barney, “Studying Stuff: Research in Archive,” in Method and Methodology in Sport and Cultural History, ed. K.B. Wamsley (Dubuque, Iowa: Brown and Benchmark, 1995), p. 108.

13 Stephen R. Wenn, “Archival Wanderings: Rubbing Shoulders with History,” in Method and Methodology in Sport and Cultural History, ed. K.B. Wamsley (Dubuque, Iowa: Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1995), p. 124.

14 Barney, “Studying Stuff: Research in Archive,” p. 108.

15 Thomas and Nelson, Research Methods in Physical Activity4,h ed, p. 336.

16 REB Approval was granted for this study on 5 October 2005. The REB Number for this research study is 05-182.

17 Thomas and Nelson, Research Methods in Physical Activity41h ed, p. 336.

18 Ibid., p. 237.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

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21 Richard Pound (WADA Chairperson), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005, interview 004, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

22 Donald Guay, trans., La culture sportive (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), p. 124.

23 CCES Website, “Canadian Anti-Doping Program 2004,” http://www.cces.ca/pdfs/CCES-POLICY- CADP-E.pdf (accessed May 16, 2006).

24 Ibid.

25 David Mottram, “Drug use and abuse in Sport,” in Drugs in Sport 4,h. ed.ed, David R. Mottram (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 25. A precise definition of performance-enhancing drugs is extremely difficult to formulate for a number of reasons: 1) A particular drug which may be considered performance enhancing in one sport may well be deleterious to performance in another sport. 2) Should performance- enhancing drugs be defined by the fact that they are ‘synthetic’ or ‘unnatural’ substances to the body? This type of definition would exclude testosterone and other naturally occurring peptide hormones which are used for illicit purposes. Blood doping, the method by which competitors store quantities of their own or other blood in a frozen states and re-infuse it prior to competing in an attempt to increase oxygen carrying capacity, would also be excluded by such a definition. 3) Should substances used in special diets, such as vitamin supplements, be classes as performance-enhancing drugs? Certainly other naturally occurring substances, such as creatine and L-camitine, have been widely used in the expectation that they would enhance performance. 4) Perhaps the greatest difficulty in precisely defining performance-enhancing drugs concerns the prescribing and use of drugs which can be perceived as possessing performance-enhancing properties but which are used for legitimate therapeutic purposes. As such, the definition lies not in the words but in integrity of character; it encompasses the principle of cheating, defined in the anti-doping regulations of individual sports. For more information, please consult David Mottram’s Drug use and abuse in Sport 4th edition.

26 “Use of Performance-Enhancing Substances,” Pediatrics: Official Journal of The American Academy of Pediatrics 115 (2005): p. 1103. http://pediatrics.aappublications.Org/cgi/content/full/115/4/l 103 (accessed May 16, 2006).

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Chapter IV

Results

This chapter evaluates how the formation of WAD A impacted the development of

an international strategy for anti-doping in sport. It does this by critically reviewing the

significant events in the sporting world between 1998 and 2005 in terms of the six sub­

questions previously identified. However, one must first review and appreciate the events

which transpired at the 1988 Winter Olympic Games in Calgary, Alberta, thus setting the

stage for understanding Canada’s involvement and commitment to anti-doping.

From ‘Calgary to Dubin:’ The Pre-WADA Years

Pierre Harvey, a Canadian cross country skier who was expected to win a medal

at the Calgary Olympics, fell short of expectations. In stark contrast to graciously

accepting defeat Marty Hall,1 Harvey’s coach, accused the cross country medal winners

of using drugs, pointing predominantly to the East German and Norwegian athletes.2 As

host nation, the accusation resulted in shame and embarrassment for all of Canada; the

allegation stole headlines in both the national and international media.3 As a means of

political damage control, Canada’s then Sport Minister Otto Jellinek suggested Canada

host an international conference to address the issue of doping in sport. Spawning from

this suggestion, the First Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Sport was

hosted in Ottawa, Canada in June 1988.4 The conference was co-hosted by the Canadian

government and the IOC. This was significant considering the friction, relevant to the

administration of sport, which traditionally existed between the IOC and government, as

well as the prevalent notion that sport associations should maintain a strong independence

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from government.5 Two important outcomes arose from this conference. First, The

International Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport was developed. This was the first

comprehensive IOC anti-doping program which was headed up by the IOC Medical

Commission.6 At the First Permanent World Conference, thirteen countries adopted the

Charter; however more significantly, the IOC, the most visible and credible organization

in sport, put their name on the Charter thus adding credibility to its purpose.7 Second,

because the conference was attended by a number of European representatives from

various countries, including George Walker from the sport department of The Council of

Europe, an anti-doping convention sponsored by The Council of Europe was negotiated

and estalbished in 1989.8

Yet, three months after having hosted this successful international conference,

which resulted in the development of a series of important anti-doping documents,

Canada found itself involved in a major doping scandal.9 The Dubin Inquiry, headed by

The Honourable Chief Justice Charles L. Dubin, was called to investigate the drug

scandal that occurred at the 1988 Summer Olympic Games involving Canadian sprinter

Ben Johnson. Appointed by the Government of Canada, this was Dubin’s first experience

with doping in sport.10 His reasons for becoming involved in The Royal Commission

were simple; he “saw it as a challenge and thought doping was a very important issue.”11

For many of those involved in various anti-doping initiatives, such as David Howman,

the inquiry represented a watershed case focusing national and international attention on

the issue of doping in sport.12 Domestically, the impact was huge;13 according to Joseph

dePencier, The Commission acted as a catalyst for change within Canada.14 Therefore,

Canada, in general, was viewed as being proactive towards the doping problem for

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allowing a public inquiry into such a sensitive issue, and exposing its internal problems to

the world.15 Casey Wade, while speaking of the history of doping in sport, expressed that

Dubin indirectly led Canada to pursue a strong anti-doping program that became cutting

edge. 1 (\ Internationally, it sparked curiosity and raised public awareness of doping. 17

Likewise, it forced other countries to realize that if doping was rampant in Canada,

what’s stopping it from happening elsewhere?18 As stated by dePencier,

when talking to international colleagues, Dubin’s report has provided great intellectual encouragement and stimulation of ideas for policy development, for rules, and arrangements for national programs. There is no doubt that Dubin’s report has had a broad impact on the thinking of individuals who are now prominent leaders in the anti-doping world.19

Acknowledging that the inquiry involved hours of hard work, Dubin remarked that he did

come out of the experience with a great sense of accomplishment; the inquiry had an

international impact, made out-of-competition testing an essential element of doping

control, and raised public awareness towards drug use in sport.20

Although Dubin’s prescribed series of recommendations were particularly

restricted to Canada, international sport bodies, as well as the IOC were castigated in the

report. 21 One of his recommendations was that an independent international anti-doping

organization be set up in Canada. Established in 1991, the organization became known as 97 The Canadian Anti-Doping Organization (CADO). Dubin addressed the need for out-

of-competition testing and a collective agreement which would set out a policy and a

legislative approach. A similar recommendation, applicable at the international level, was

that, “The Canadian Olympic Association (CO A) encourages the IOC to sponsor the

establishment of an independent world doping control agency.”23 Based on this

recommendation, one could conclude that Dubin foresaw the creation of WADA, or at

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the very least, the need for an international body similar to WADA.24 While it is

debatable whether Dubin can be given credit for the creation of WADA, there is little

doubt that he planted the seed.25 In the final section of The Royal Commission, Dubin

wrote “If this Commission has accomplished nothing else, I hope that it has brought a

public awareness of the present dangers inherent in the use of performance-enhancing ")f\ substances and other banned substances.” When asked if this goal had been realized, he

quickly responded “well it didn’t eradicate the use of drugs but it certainly led the way to

Canada taking a lead in doping control.” 97

Prior to WADA’s development, there was a limited number of anti-doping

policies and procedures employed by governments and sport federations; however, these

• 98 policies and procedures lacked cohesion and resulted in a piecemeal approach.

Internationally, there were four major initiatives that can be identified: The International

Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport, The Council of Europe Anti-doping

Convention, The International Anti-Doping Arrangement,29 and the sporadic testing

* TO undertaken by individual International Sport Federations (ISFs).

The International Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport, although being an

international policy, it was only applied throughout the tenure of an Olympic festival.

Included in this Charter was a specific list of prohibited substances as well as

accreditation standards for laboratories which established specific rules and regulations;

yet, in isolation of the Games, these rules and regulations were simply seen as

guidelines.• • 1 The| goal of the Council of Europe Convention, enacted in 1989, was to

reduce and eventually eliminate doping in sport. The Council established some general

principles on doping which were employed by governments as the basis for their national

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programs. The International Standards for Doping Control (ISDC), developed through

the International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA), was a state of the art set of

harmonized procedures which national programs and international federations were

encouraged to adopt and employ. The standards were being held up as a model of best

practice for the collection of urine samples. These included everything from the type of

collection vessels, to the training of doping control officers (DCOs), and the necessary

acquisition of documentation and security. Increasingly, all nine national programs

comprising the IADA countries, as well as non-IADA countries such as the United

States, China and Switzerland, were using the ISDC.33 Canada was one of the first

countries to receive its ISO certification.34 These standards were the forerunner to what is

now the WADA International Standards for Testing,35 an important component of the

World Anti-Doping Code which will be further elaborated upon later in this chapter.

Where the ISFs are concerned, pre-existing WADA’s formation there were a

number of high profile sports conducting international testing programs; however, they

operated in complete isolation of government partnerships. Federations such as the IAAF,

FIFA and the UCI did take the initiative to conduct testing; however, their programs

focused solely on their own athletes. According to Howman, although select

governments, certain international sport federations as well as the IOC enacted policies

and/or imposed procedures which would benefit their respective organizations, there was

nothing in existence which amounted to an international anti-doping program with

cohesion, cooperation and harmonization among ISFs and governments.36

While inroads in anti-doping work were clearly being achieved, Prince de

Merode, a Belgian Prince who was Chairperson of the IOC Medical Commission,37

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firmly believed that “doping had been developing at an alarming rate and that by the year

2000 genetic manipulation would be introduced. The future held even greater problems

for the anti-doping movement.”

Admittedly the aforementioned section discussed affairs which occurred before

the temporal boundaries of this study. However, this information establishes a foundation

from which this study may progress. Likewise, this section provides the reader with

contextual information and a comprehensive overview and understanding of the topic.

Events from 1998-2000: The lead up to WADA

The problem of doping in sport persisted in 1998 with a number of high profile

drug-infused sporting events unfolding, the most significant one being the Tour de

TO ♦ • France. According to WADA Chairperson Richard Pound, the incident at the 1998 Tour

de France will go down in history as the ‘seminal event’ which led to the creation of the

WADA.40 Howman, Director General of WADA, stated that from a European point of

view, the event focused attention intensely on the problem of doping; “there’s nothing

like a local disaster to gel the mind into action.”41 Victor Lachance, former CEO of the

CCES indicated that the events at the 1998 Tour de France led to an awakening within

the International Sport Movement; it changed the environment by forging a link within

sport that something needed to be done to demonstrate that, “sport could look after

sport.”42 Fundamentally, it galvanized the international sport community and spurred

them to action.43 Lachance contends that

a solution to deal with the fallout from the Tour de France was already known, however what was missing was the political will and resources to implement the solution; the solution being to implement year round,

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unannounced randomized doping control that was conducted by an independent agency which was open to public scrutiny.44

As a means to direct the outrage stemming from the scandal ridden Tour, a World

Conference on Doping in sport was organized for early February 1999. The IOC

Executive Board, meeting in an emergency session on 20 August 1998 to address the

drug scandal that had tarnished the sports world that summer, called for the creation of an

Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency.45 Pound remarked that, owing to a lack of

trust towards the IOC, a new independent agency should be created.46

At two subsequent IOC Executive Board Meetings held in September and

December 1998, discussion surrounding the upcoming conference persisted. The

President stressed that, prior to the opening of the conference, the Olympic Movement as

a whole must be in agreement on the creation of the anti-doping agency.47 Thus, work

needed to be undertaken to harmonize doping related matters within the Olympic

Movement. Indeed, agreement amongst the IOC and ISFs was required if discussions

about cooperation and task sharing with governments were to proceed. Prince de Merode

therefore suggested that given that the environment for cooperation between the IOC and

ISFs was better than ever, consensus could be attained. Once this was achieved, he

suggested that the conference could focus on the issue of task sharing with

Governments.48 Government involvement was crucial as they could assist in areas where

the sport movement was powerless. For example, governments could monitor drug

trafficking, regulate substances, address the issue of liability within and among members

of the athlete’s entourage, and expedite the process of granting VISAs to testers, thus

ensuring rapid access into countries.49

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At the December 1998 meeting of The IOC Executive Board, Pound advised great

caution at the interface between sport and government authorities. He opined that

“governments loved to fill a vacuum and that there was a danger that the autonomy of

sport might be lost.”50 Instead of indicating that they could not do it alone, Pound

suggested that, “the IOC should set out what they had already done and proposed to do

and leave it to governments to present their own case.”51 He recommended that the

Olympic Movement take a new look at its own structures and ask itself whether the

NOCs and ISFs should have their own medical commissions, and whether or not an

independent body should be set up, at arms length, to supervise testing.52 He agreed that

there was a need for new faces and new perspectives. Finally, he intimated that

an international convention was a great idea but that there would have to be some form of obligation on the part of all members of the Olympic Movement to comply. So far the doping rules had not been enforced strongly enough. It was essential therefore, to inform various member organizations that compliance to common rules was a requirement if they wished to remain part of the Olympic Movement.53

Heading into the World Conference on Doping in Sport, the IOC had two primary goals:

to be prepared and unified and to know exactly what they wanted.54

In late November 1998, amidst the preparations for the World Conference on

Doping in Sport which was scheduled to commence 2 February 1999, the Salt Lake City

bidding scandal broke; it created tension and havoc within the IOC.55 Any hope the IOC

had for a successful outcome of the planned conference was dependent on a thorough

investigation of the scandal and a rapid resolution.56 Although apprehensions were high,

the conference proceeded as planned. Samaranch and IOC officials did, however,

struggle to keep delegates focused on the issue at hand as a number of government

officials from the forty countries represented took this opportunity to batter the IOC with

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criticism.57 Questions were raised as to how an organization that sought to ensure that its

athletes conducted themselves ethically, could head-up an anti-doping program when

they themselves were behaving in a non-ethical way.58 Newspaper articles which

questioned the appropriateness of the IOC’s involvement with the fight against drug use

in sport, made statements claiming that

An effective international anti-doping campaign will not originate in the I.O.C. because such activism requires committed leadership based on ethical convictions the I.O.C. leadership does not possess. For and his closest associates, doping has always been a public relations problem that threatens the lucrative television and corporate contracts that have guaranteed their prestige and their privileges since Samaranch’s accession to the presidency in 1980.

American drug czar Barry McCaffrey questioned the legitimacy of the IOC and, “urged

the organization to institute significant internal reform to salvage its ‘tarnished’

credibility.”60 Germany’s Interior Minister Otto Schilly openly called for Samaranch to

resign61 and Elsebeth Gemer Nielsen, Denmark’s Minister of Culture and Sport, said that

“the I.O.C. must stress the importance of values, not the importance of its leaders.” 62

To complicate matters, The Olympic Partners (TOP) Program, a group of eleven

sponsors63 responsible for generating a significant portion of the IOC’s revenue,64

expressed concern and “wanted assurance that the IOC understood the gravity of the

situation and possessed the determination to deal with the scandal’s underlying causes.”65

Major Olympic corporate sponsors suggested that the IOC deal with individuals affiliated

with the scandal, thereby preventing further damage to the Olympic brand.66 Michael J.

Klingensmith, President of Sports Illustrated, speaking on behalf of the corporate

sponsors stated

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We have weathered intense criticism from shareholders, employees, and our own editors, and would not look forward to doing so again. Nor can we imagine that other sponsors would be willing to endure this again. Therefore, addressing the matter of institutional reform now seems to us to be a matter of survival for one of the greatest organizations of all time: The Olympic Games.67

The message from the sponsors was clear: fix things, and fix them now.68 Among the

major issues identified by TOP sponsors as requiring urgent attention and immediate

reform, concerns for doping and judging were included.69

Despite conflict and adversity, the conference was a success. It produced the

Lausanne Declaration, a formal statement which among other recommendations called

for the creation of an independent international anti-doping agency to be fully operational

for the Games of the XXVII Olympiad in Sydney 2000.70 Moreover, it represented one of

the rare times in the one hundred and three year history of the modem Olympic

Movement that governments had a direct say in the internal workings of the IOC.71 At the

conference, governments firmly established themselves by suggesting that it would no

longer be business as usual.72 Recognizing and accepting this move by governments was

indicative of a major jurisdictional shift on the part of the IOC and the ISFs, as well as a

mental shift in terms of control of ones’ own sport. Agreeing to allow jurisdiction to rest

in an independent body (governments) and relinquishing a certain level of control would

be a momentous step for the Olympic Movement.73 Immediately following the

conference, at an Extraordinary IOC Executive Board Meeting on 4 February 1999, the

President, in remarking on the Conference, noted that “the most significant conclusion of

the conference had been the decision to appoint a commission to deal with governments

and inter-governmental organizations.”74

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Three months later, at an IOC Executive Board meeting in Lausanne, a working

group was established to look at and outline the new agency’s fundamental principles,

structure, budget and mandate. The working group, whose membership was global and

expansive,75 met several times and reached the following understanding:

■ The agency will be initially and temporarily based in Lausanne, while alternative cities are considered for its permanent home. ■ The IOC will establish the agency and meet its running costs until 31 December 2001. ■ From 1 January 2002, it is expected that the IOC and public authorities will have reached agreement on joint funding arrangements for the agencies annual running costs. ■ The agency will not supersede the roles and responsibilities of national anti- doping agencies where there is already an effective national anti-doping program in place. ■ A mission statement and legal statute have been agreed.76

A major point of contention surrounded the issue of sanctions, specifically whether

the new agency would have legislative powers in this area.77 The status of the agency was

intended to take the form of a private law foundation. Anticipating a number of practical

difficulties and complex administrative procedures before public authorities could

participate in or fund the administration of such an independent agency, it was decided

that the IOC should fund the new agency for its first two years. It was also expected to

ensure transparency and collaboration with other parties, which, it was felt, could be

accomplished through the development of a consultative committee.78 The proposed

initial name, International Sport Authority against Doping in Sport, had been quickly

dropped because the word ‘agency’ had been used extensively throughout the conference

proceedings. Thus, at the IOC Executive Board Meeting held in Athens, Greece October

1999 and in accordance with the Lausanne Declaration of 4 February 1999, The Working

Group (article 1.1, figure 4), stated that

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An independent International Anti-Doping Agency shall be established so as to be fully operational for the Games of the XXVII Olympiad in Sydney in 2000. This institution will have as its mandate, notably, to coordinate the various programs necessary to realize the objectives that shall be defined jointly by all the parties concerned. Among these programs, consideration should be given in particular to expanding out-of-competition testing, coordinating research, promoting preventive and educational actions and harmonizing scientific and technical standards and procedures for analyses and equipment. A working group representing the Olympic Movement, including the athletes, as well as the governments and intergovernmental organizations concerned, will meet, on the initiative of the IOC, within 3 months, to define the structure, mission and financing of the Agency. The Olympic Movement commits to allocate a capital of US $25 million to the Agency.79

Although the formation of this agency was perceived as a positive development in

the fight against doping in sport, critics and criticism were ubiquitous. Both European

Union officials and representatives from the United States reacted negatively to the IOC’s

plan for a world anti-doping agency. General McCaffrey accused the IOC of “attempting

to push through its own project for an anti-doping agency without consultation.”80 He

was quoted as saying, “I don’t understand what the IOC is doing.. .normally we do things

by consultation, by consensus, by common sense...I don’t understand what the apparent

arrogance of the approach is.”81 Likewise, McCaffrey challenged the agency on the

grounds that it was too closely linked to the IOC, what with IOC Vice-President Richard

Pound running the show. Despite public censure, The World Anti-Doping Agency was

officially launched on 10 November 1999. General McCaffrey, who at the outset was one

of WADA’s biggest critics, 83quickly changed his stance and publicly announced that

Pound was the right individual to head up this new agency stating that, “he brings the

experience to get this put together.”84 This about face was a direct result of a personal

meeting between Pound and McCaffrey, where McCaffrey was assured that WADA

would indeed be an independent agency.85 As stated by Pound, “I think what Gen.

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McCaffrey wanted out of this meeting was to be sure that this was going to be an

independent agency...and I think we gave him that.”86

Events from 2000 - 2002: The Solidification of WADA

The Inaugural meeting of the World Anti-Doping Agency was held in Lausanne,

Switzerland on 13 January 2000. During his opening remarks, WADA’s Chairperson

noted that:

This was the first time that all the elements required to achieve a solution to the problem of doping in sport had come together, the IOC, IFs, NOCs, athletes as well as intergovernmental organizations and national governments. All had the same determination to pool efforts and to bring to fruition the full 87 honor of sport.

He continued by explaining that neither public nor sports authorities could bring about a

complete solution to the problem of doping in sport through unilateral action; they had to

work together with a common objective to achieve what no one had achieved to date.

WADA was an independent agency which had to demonstrate through its actions and

commitment that it was worthy of public confidence and of the confidence of the athletes

whose interests and integrity it was charged with protecting. To win this confidence the

Agency had to be accountable, effective, transparent, and above reproach, one concerned

solely with the ethical integrity of sport.88

WADA was constructed as a unique hybrid organization that is governed and

funded equally by the Olympic movement and governments (see Appendix V).89 Thus,

governments are required to pay fifty percent of WADA’s annual budget, a condition

which was established as a direct result of governments’ demand for fifty percent control

of the organization.90 As previously discussed, prior to WADA’s formation the Olympic

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movement had come together to organize their role and responsibilities regarding the

administration of this new agency. Governments, however, were completely disorganized

and in need of assistance. Therefore, immediately following the 10 November 1999

announcement, the Government of Australia hosted a conference that brought together

representatives from twenty-six nations91 to discuss new initiatives in the fight against

performance enhancing drugs.92 The conference was titled The International Summit on

Drugs in Sport. Hosted in Sydney, Australia on 14-17 November 1999, the conference

was an opportunity for governments to get organized for their role in WADA.93

Outlined in the official Sydney Communique, following the summit, were the

conference outcomes. One outcome was the development of a detailed list outlining

government’s role and responsibilities in the fight against doping (policy commitment,

drug testing, International collaboration, research, education and reducing the flow of

illicit drugs). A major outcome was the decision to develop an interim govemment-to-

govemment organization. Thus, the International Inter-governmental Consultative Group

on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS), proposed by Canada, was established in 1999.94

The consultative group, representing an interim mechanism co-chaired by Canada and

Australia, was an inclusive group of nations representing all continental regions of the

world, with a particular sensitivity shown to nations who were not present at the Sydney

Summit or who are not represented in other inter-governmental arrangements.95

In essence, IICGADS was developed as an attempt to ensure that in and among

the various governments that were committed to addressing WADA, that there was a

consistent and concerted message and united effort.96 This Group, which represented a

govemment-to-govemment agreement as opposed to a formal charter, brought

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. governments together in order to articulate their role, responsibilities, vision and

expectations, as well as develop a funding formula and strategic plan, all with respect to

WADA.97 There were five world conferences, one in every political zone of the world,98

to help educate, sensitize and engage governments in the anti-doping work that WADA

would be doing.99 At the third conference of the IICGADS, held in Cape Town South

Africa on 30-31 May 2001, The Cape Town Declaration was established.100 It delineated

the funding formula for government contributions applied to the funding of WADA,

which was to commence in 2002. Ensuring a fair and equitable system, The Declaration

encouraged as many governments/public authorities as were able, to make contributions,

while taking into account each government’s capacity to pay and each nation’s level of

involvement in international sport.101 The formula provided for the following financial

allocations: Africa - 0.5%, Americas - 29%, Asia - 20.46%, Europe - 47.50%, Oceania

- 2.54% (see Appendix VI). Having run its course, the last conference of the

IICGADS was hosted in Moscow 2002. With the development of the World Anti-Doping

Code, a topic which will be discussed further, there was no longer a need for such an

organization. 103

WADA Start-up Initiatives

One of the central issues behind the development of an international strategy for

anti-doping in sport was the lack of trust and confidence in the drug testing mandate and

protocol employed by the IOC during the Olympic Games. Before the development of

WADA there had been a lingering suspicion that the IOC covered up positive drug tests

due to the negative publicity associated with drug abuse; this suspicion, which began in

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1984, spurred extensive mistrust among the public, governments and athletes.104

According to Pound, regardless of the fact that the IOC disqualified the most famous

athlete in the number one sporting event during the 1988 Summer Games,105 doubt and

skepticism persisted. To demonstrate its commitment to building and maintaining

confidence (athlete, sport, government and public), as well as upholding the ethical

integrity of sport, WADA successfully introduced an Independent Observer (10) program

at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.106 The 10 program helps improve and enhance both

athlete and public confidence in major sporting events by randomly monitoring and

reporting on all phases of the doping control and results management processes in a

neutral and unbiased manner.107 This initiative alone has helped establish a more open

and transparent doping control operation. Depending1 flR on the size of the event, an 10

team consists of a varying number of individuals representing the “eyes and ears of the

world.”109 Following an Olympic Festival or major international sporting event the 10

Team issues and publishes a public report. The report details doping related processes

and proceedings which transpired, and provides a series of constructive recommendations

for future improvements. Although a large undertaking, WADA’s 10 program has been

very successful;110 it marked a turning point in the accountability for testing under the

control of the IOC.111 Since the the XXVII Olympiad in Sydney, Australia, an 10 team

has participated in every Olympic Festival as well as a number of other major

• i m international sporting events. Through participation, the 10 team observes, monitors

and publicly reports on the respective events doping control.113

During the Olympic Games, drug testing is the responsibility of the IOC.

Although they partner with the host country, often make use of its national doping control

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program and work closely with WADA to carry out pre-game testing, the jurisdiction,

rules and regulations fall completely under the auspices of the IOC.114 For that reason it is

necessary to have the IO team present throughout the Games. However, this presence is

also required at other major international sporting events where ISFs maintain control and

authority over testing, sample collection and the management of results.115 As such,

WADA’s IO program is instrumental in validating public confidence in the drug testing

carried out at these events.116 It ensures transparent doping control procedures which in

turn guarantee that the rights of athletes are respected.117 As Silken Laumann noted, “the

110 presence of the IO certainly adds credibility to the testing.”

To complement the IO program, and to ensure they follow through with one of

their original responsibilities, WADA introduced an out-of-competition (OOC) testing

program in April 2000.119 The comprehensive, unannounced OOC testing program,

which aims to enhance testing programs currently undertaken by ISFs, is the most

effective means of deterrence and detection and is an important step in strengthening

athlete and public confidence in doping-free sport.

To expedite WADA’s implementation of an OOC testing program, immediate

assistance was required. When WADA was formed, many ISFs saw one of WADA’s

main roles as being a service provider for OOC testing, especially in view of the fact that

1 -n I only a very small number of ISFs were doing any testing, let alone OOC testing.

However, given the lack of personnel, WADA was in no position to conduct these tests.

As such, at its inaugural board meeting, held on 13 January 2000, it was decided that

during the interim period WADA should make use of the resources of existing anti-

doping agencies.122 Thus, a WADA program of OOC testing was initiated through a

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contracted agreement with a consortium of government sponsored national anti-doping • 17^ organizations. Canada (CCES), Australia (ASDA), and Norway (the Norwegian

Olympic Committee), recognizing an opportunity to provide WADA with a testing

service and to generate additional revenue, put together a proposal suggesting that they

would do all of WADA’s OOC testing for the first year as a service organization.124

This group of three countries, with highly respected NADOs and well established

international networks,125 became known as the Drug Free Sport Consortium (DFSC).126

The DFSC, whose principle objective was to promote drug free sport by assisting WADA

with program development and delivery through credible, competent and reliable

services, negotiated testing contracts with IOC accredited labs as well as with all summer

Olympic ISFs except football (soccer).127 The DFSC worked co-operatively with ISFs;

tests were carried out through the ISFs rules and regulations. However, The DFSC

received all of the test results to avoid any cover-ups.128 Although the announcement was

made at WADA’s Standards and Harmonization Committee Meeting on 27 July 2000

that The DFSC had been hired to coordinate the implementation of out-of-competition

testing, International Doping Test and Management (IDTM), a competitor company, had

been subcontracted as an additional service provider (see Appendices VII - IX).129

An initiative which spawned from the development of The DFSC was the

origination of the Association of National Anti-doping Organizations (ANADO).

Countries which were not involved with The DFSC, such as the United Kingdom and the

United States, began expressing concern, through the dissemination of rumours that The

DFSC was perhaps, making a profit on the backs of the other NADOs and countries.130 In

an attempt to dispel the rumours, The DFSC put forth a proposal that a professional

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. association of national anti-doping organizations be developed. At a November 2002

meeting, the fourteen NADOs present agreed that the proposed Association of National

Anti-Doping Organizations would be an international, non-political and non­

governmental membership-based association of NADOs.131 The organization would be

dedicated solely to the development of national programs and would provide a forum for

education and co-operation,132 for business and professional development, for problem

solving, and for addressing issues that were of mutual concern to NADOs.133 On 28 April

2003, with seventeen NADOs represented, AN ADO was founded; today the organization

includes fifty-six member nations.134 ANADO’s first Annual General Assembly took

place on 5 November 2003, in Strasbourg, France.135

At consecutive WADA Executive Committee Meetings held in 2001 and 2002,

contracts with The DFSC were prolonged with the final contract extended to the end of

2003.136 Thus, The DFSC helped WADA to establish its OOC testing program, achieve

its goal of contributing to an increase in public confidence in sport, and identify a number

of testing related areas of concern which needed to be addressed.137 The DFSC developed

the OOC testing blueprint, infrastructure, and systems that were eventually taken in-

house by WADA. The transition from a partially outsourced program to complete in-

house management was completed by January 2004.138

Pursuant to the terms of The Lausanne Declaration, The Olympic Movement

Anti-Doping Code, which came into force January 2000,139 exemplified the basis for the

fight against doping.140 However, at WADA’s Inaugural Board meeting on 13 January

2000, it was decided that WADA was to begin work immediately on drafting its own

anti-doping code.141 Thus, Richard Young, a lawyer from Colorado Springs, working

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with a project group from WADA, was hired to create The Code and travel the world

soliciting feedback, suggestions and recommendations.142 Many of the recommendations

were incorporated into the final version of The Code. The Code task force attempted to

ensure that The Code was meeting common interests and developing a common thread

connecting all current anti-doping programs.143 The most significant challenge that arose

was the issue of sanctions; however, the transfer of power from the ISFs to WADA

caused other problems.144

In reference to the issue of sanctions, WADA pushed for a uniform two year

penalty for a first doping offence; something that would not be overruled by state courts

as contrary to the fundamental principles of human justice and human rights.145 However,

federations such as FIFA and the UCI opposed this idea. The UCI suggested sanctions

that were appropriate to the sport, age and resources; somewhat of a sliding scale.146 A

consensus was reached whereby two years was deemed acceptable. This was not as much

as some countries and ISFs would have liked,147 yet, for others, this was more than

enough. Therefore, it was the normative sanction which was instituted.148 On behalf of

those countries and ISFs pursuing a longer sanction, a concession was made.

The organizations that wanted a four year sanction finally acceded with the perspective that it was far better for the world that the tide rises uniformly...and that we have an internationally consistent approach to addressing these issues and it is for us not to support that process and cling to our ways.149

To address concerns with the contention surrounding the transfer of power,

WADA holds the ability to appeal decisions to the Court of Arbitration for Sport

(CAS).150 Article 13.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code articulates the rules governing

appeals related to anti-doping rule violations.151 Cases arising from an international event

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or involving international level athletes’ may be appealed exclusively to CAS; the

• • 1 independent body identified as the forum for resolution of doping related disputes.

Where international level athletes are concerned, the following parties have the right to

appeal: the athlete, or person subject to the decision; the other party to the case; the

relevant ISF and any other NADO under whose rules a sanction may have been imposed;

the IOC or IPC where the decision pertains to Olympic or Paralympic Games and

WADA.153

Where national level athletes are concerned, cases may be appealed to an

independent and neutral national level body that, at minimum provides the following: a

timely hearing, a fair, impartial and independent hearing body, the right to be represented

by counsel and a timely, written, reasoned decision.154 With respect to cases involving

national-level athletes’ the following parties, at minimum, have a right to appeal: the

athlete or person subject to the decision; the other party to the case; the relevant ISF and

WADA.155 As stated by Maltas, the ISF and WADA also have the right to appeal the

national level reviewing body’s decision to CAS.156 Given that WADA is responsible for

ensuring compliance with The Code, their ability or provision to appeal all decisions

pertaining to anti-doping rule violations contributes to a greater level playing field for

athletes to compete drug free.157

Although WADA’s temporary headquarters were originally located in Lausanne,

a move was forthcoming. According to Dr. Andrew Pipe, international sport is too Euro-

centric;• 158 of the thirty-five ISFs, thirty-two are based in Europe, sixteen of which are in

Switzerland, twelve with offices in Lausanne. Lausanne is also home to the IOC and

CAS.159 Where amateur sport is concerned, there is a strong feeling that it is driven

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in Europe.160 This sentiment was expressed by various agents worldwide. Therefore,

where WADA and its permanent headquarters were concerned, a European, or

specifically a Swiss location it was felt, would spur great temptation for the IOC, or

Europe, to engulf the organization.161 There was a feeling that for WADA to be

independent, even though it responded to both government and the sports community

through the IOC, relocation was necessary. Moving outside of Europe would vividly

demonstrate WADA’s true independence.162 “Getting WADA out of Europe would send

the message that this was truly an independent body, that the effort to stamp out doping

was serious, not just another empty PR gesture designed to keep the cash flowing.”163

Considering that the IOC would fund the entire WADA budget for its first two years,

there was an agreement made with governments that its headquarters would start in

Lausanne. Governments agreed to this proposal; however, they insisted that once they

were organized and co-shared the payments with the IOC, an open competition to

determine where WADA would have its permanent office must ensue.164 Bidding cities

were requested to submit application forms before 23 October 2000. The Executive

Committee recommended potential candidates to the Board who then selected the final

candidates and gave these cities until the end of February 2001 to submit their final

bids.165 Ten cities, based on The Board’s selections, were considered initially, but this

was quickly narrowed down to five (Lausanne, Vienna, Stockholm, Montreal and Bonn).

Both Vienna and Lausanne had very strong bids; however, Montreal had Denis Coderre,

Canada’s Sport Minister at the time, actively and aggressively lobbying Board members.

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Of the original ten cities to put forth a bid proposal, Canada was the only non-

European city. Consequently, the competition quickly evolved into Canada vs. Europe.166

Montreal, hoping to avoid an anti-Europe campaign, centred their strategy on the idea of

wanting to ‘internationalize the fight against doping.’167 They pointed to the fact that if

the anti-doping program was driven by Europe, it would marginalize Oceania, Asia,

Africa and the Americas, four continents which could contribute to the goal of 168 internationalization of the anti-doping movement. As such, Montreal’s strategy was a

positive campaign; moving the anti-doping headquarters to another region of the World

would truly internationalize the fight against drug use in sport.169 This strategy resonated

very well with the four marginalized continents. In addition, the Canadian Government

agreed to contribute 1.5 million dollars a year, for ten years, towards WADA’s

infrastructure costs ($1 million from the federal government and $500,000 from the

province of Quebec).170 In addition to the direct financial incentive, Canada would grant

WADA employees diplomatic status (a tax free status), would meet the startup costs of

the office and would provide office space rent-free for ten years. Following171 an •

economic assessment of WADA’s impact in terms of job stimulation and revenue

generation, it was determined by the Government of Canada that the economic gains of

WADA being permanently housed in Montreal would, by far, return more than the

amount of money Canada committed in their bid. 111

In addition to the dedication, determination and hard work of Coderre, Montreal’s

bid also received assistance from Montreal International, a corporation funded by the

federal and provincial governments, as well as the City of Montreal. It was the mandate 11"\ of Montreal International to recruit headquarters of international agencies to Montreal.

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In the fourth and final round of voting, which took place in Tallinn, Estonia, August

2001, Montreal beat out Lausanne by a vote of seventeen-fifteen, thus securing the

WADA headquarters for Montreal.174 Although there were some misgivings about

moving WADA from Lausanne at the time,175 support and approval was evident

following the vote. According to Lachance,

A Canadian site would have credibility with athletes because of Canada’s long history of doping control, its respected lab work, its experience with unannounced tests for international bodies and its not Europe, so athletes may perceive it as being independent from the place where most international sport federations are governed.176

“As an international organization, WADA has an obligation to serve all its

constituents in all regions of the globe.”177 Therefore, Board members, having agreed to

move WADA’s permanent headquarters to North America, commented that to

completely and effectively carry out WADA’s mandate, regional offices in other parts of

the world were necessary. Following WADA’s move to Montreal, Canada, regional

offices were established. To serve the European region, a small office in Lausanne

remained open. One year later, to cover and serve Asia/Oceania, a similar office was set

up in Tokyo, . Likewise, Cape Town, South Africa was the third regional office to

be opened; it serves the African continent. A fourth regional office in Latin America was

launched in 2005 in Montevideo, Uruguay.178

Events from 2003-2005: The Implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code

With WADA established and operational, the World Anti-doping Code became

the core document in anti-doping, providing the framework for anti-doping policies,

rules, and regulations within sport organizations and among public authorities.179 Its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. official adoption on 5 March 2003 at the second World Conference on Doping in Sport in

Copenhagen, Denmark, signified success brought about by the work that had been done

from 1999-2002;180 according to Pound it was a “seminal moment in the long term

campaign against performance enhancing drugs.”181 The Code is intended to ensure, for

the first time, that all rules and regulations governing anti-doping will be harmonized

across all sports and all nations.182 In attendance at the conference were twelve hundred

delegates representing a melange of eighty national governments, the IOC, the IPC, ISFs,

National Olympic and Paralympic Committees, athletes, NADOs and International

agencies.183 All attendees unanimously accepted The Code without publicly proposing a

single amendment.184

WADA is a private organization that put together a set of private rules applying

predominantly to sport; this was accomplished through the development of The Code. As

such, Governments felt that they could not be direct signatories to The Code;m therefore,

a parallel government commitment was needed. Thus the Copenhagen Declaration was

created (see Appendix X).186 The Copenhagen Declaration is a political document

through which governments articulate their moral understanding and intention to formally

recognize and implement the World Anti-Doping Code.187 In addition to supporting The

Code politically, the Declaration included an undertaking whereby governments would

reach a new international anti-doping convention. This Convention would formally and

legally commit governments, under international law, to support WADA and support the

anti-doping movement, thus ensuring that their national programs and policies were

consistent with WADA’s programs and the principles of The Code.m The process of

developing an international convention, which represents the practical tool to align

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domestic policy with The Code, fell under the auspices of The United Nations

Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).189 At the conference in

Copenhagen, fifty-one country representatives signed the Copenhagen Declaration, with

a total of ninety-three governments signing on by year end.190

At the 115th IOC Session in Prague, 2-4 July 2003, not only did the IOC approve

The Code by acclamation, but they amended the Olympic Charter to reflect its ongoing

leadership role in the fight against doping.191 As stated by Pound, “There shall be no

place in the Olympic Games for Sports that do not accept the Code.”192 The formal

adoption deadline for the sport movement was the Summer Olympic Games in 2004,

whereas for government, it was the 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy. Non-compliance

after these dates would result in exclusion from the Games. As such, by the opening of

the Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, each of the 35 ISFs, 202 NOCs, 29 Recognized

Federations, the IPC, 59 NADOs, and various other bodies had signed the Code (see

Appendix XI).193

Concerning Code compliance, “the cycling and football federations have been the

most notably recalcitrant in accepting rules to create uniform testing and penalties for

every sportsman and sportswoman in the world.”194 However, a big step toward the

adoption of the first global Code against drug use in sports occurred in 2003 when

WADA and FIFA settled their differences over a drug program.195 Nevertheless,

questions surrounding FIFA’s compliance continued to circulate, questions which Pound

put to rest by confirming that FIFA, at a congress in Paris 2004, adopted The Code

unanimously without reservation.196 As a result of this adoption, FIFA was required to

change their medical and disciplinary rules to ensure that they aligned with those

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specified in The Code. FIFA quickly and effectively adjusted their medical rules;

i q n however, the disciplinary rules were only partially changed. This fractional change

fostered continuous problems regarding compliance.

The dispute centers on FIFA’s refusal to support the Code’s stipulation that all offending athletes are subject to an automatic two year suspension. FIFA’s punishment ranges from a warning to a life ban, however is premised on a case by case approach rather than a blanket ban.198

In response to FIFA’s adversarial approach, WADA declared FIFA non compliant

at their Executive meeting in May 2005. However, WADA afforded FIFA until their

upcoming congress in September 2005 to comply with global rules on sanctions for drug

offenders, or jeopardize the sport’s place in the Olympic Games and possibly affect the

World Cup.199 Since governments such as Germany are signatories to The Code, they

could deny FIFA access to stage events within their borders if they are deemed non-

compliant.200 In response to WADA’s ultimatum, FIFA responded that they had made the

required changes, and were thus Code compliant. However, after reviewing the changes

WADA decided that they were not in compliance with The Code. As opposed to

engaging in a court room battle, both WADA and FIFA filed a request for a CAS

Advisory opinion to settle the dispute. If CAS determined that FIFA was not Code

compliant, FIFA will be awarded a specified number of days to amend their rules.

Otherwise, WADA will notify its stakeholders who have the jurisdiction to apply the

necessary sanctions against FIFA.201

On 24 April 2006 WADA welcomed the CAS Advisory opinion on FIFA’s

compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code. A statement made by WADA

Chairperson Richard Pound affirmed that:

This independent opinion confirms that FIFA anti-doping rules do

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not comply with the World Anti-Doping Code. These rules differ with the Code in several key areas, including sanctions. We will now wait to see whether FIFA wishes our assistance in making sure that their rules are amended in time for their World Cup in Germany this summer and the commencement of the Olympic• qualifying » • tournament. 909

The CAS panel noted that a two-year sanction for a first serious doping offence is not

excessive and does not violate mandatory Swiss law, as claimed by FIFA. Likewise,90T

the panel agreed that to establish a credible deterrent against doping, a two-year

ineligibility period is essential. This opinion is shared by the majority of signatories to

The Code. As stated in the FIFA rules, the minimum period of ineligibility for an athlete

caught doping is six months. The CAS panel, in response to this rule, noted that a six

month ban does not serve as a deterrent against the use of prohibited substances or

methods, particularly due to the fact that this minimum period is not linked to ‘no

significant fault or negligence.’204 In addition to the issue of sanctions, the CAS panel

found that FIFA’s rules, in several other key areas, differ from The Code thus

demonstrating that FIFA has not yet fully implemented The Code,205

WADA has, as recently as 19 April 2006, extended to FIFA their assistance in 90f\ preparing amendments to their rules thus ensuring that they are Code compliant;

WADA has yet to hear back. FIFA can choose to remain non-compliant; however,

consequences will be enforced. 907 As opined by Pound, “The Olympic Charter provides

that no sport can be included or remain in the program of the Olympic Games if it does

not comply with the World Anti-Doping Code.”208 Moreover, regarding the influence of

governments, consequences could involve the withholding of financial assistance or

being denied the use of publicly funded .209

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WADA’s mission statement affirms that, “The World Anti-Doping Agency was

created to promote, coordinate, and monitor at the international level the fight against

doping in sport in all its forms.” Nowhere'y in in the mandate is WADA’s role as a

sanctioning/punitive organization addressed. This stems from the fact that WADA does

not have the authority to impose sanctions. The responsibility to penalize athletes who are

caught doping falls on WADA’s stakeholders, namely the IOC, governments, ISFs and

NADOs. Given that the majority of stakeholders are Code compliant, thus committed to

imposing a mandatory two year penalty for a first doping infraction, conflict over the

length of sanctions has been averted, until recently.

Given that The Code was unanimously adopted at the March 2003 World

Conference on Doping in Sport, the next step involved implementation of The Code.211

For the ISFs and NADOs, this meant changing existing anti-doping rules to be in

compliance with The Code. Although some ISFs made the necessary changes by the end

of 2003, others were in need of guidance on how to align their anti-doping rules with The

Code and the International Standards. Thus WADA representatives, having drafted

several models of best practice, made themselves available as consultants.212 The Code

works in conjunction with four international standards which, together, endeavor to bring

harmonization among anti-doping organizations. The four standards which, as a

collective, represent the World Anti-Doping Program, include the prohibited list, the

international standard for testing, laboratory standards, and standards for therapeutic use

exemptions (TUEs).213

As the implementation of The Code proceeds, WADA’s next hurdle involves

monitoring Code compliance. As it stands in 2006, an altogether effective monitoring

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system is not in place.214 WADA is looking to utilize The Anti-Doping Administration &

Management System (ADAMS) to create a component where stakeholders can self report 215 • their progress; the procedure is still in the developmental phase. ADMAS is the web-

based database management system developed for the purpose of coordinating anti-

doping activities and providing a mechanism to assist stakeholders with implementing

The Code,216 At the computerized level, a series of questions relevant to the monitoring

of The Code would be asked; if responses indicate any areas or reasons for concern, red

flags would be raised, at which point follow-up initiatives would be pursued. 217

As stated in the official text of The UNESCO Convention,

The purpose of this Convention, within the framework of the strategy and program of activities of UNESCO in the area of physical education and sport, is to promote the prevention of and the fight against doping in sport, with a view to its elimination 218

Although drafting of the UNESCO Convention began in 2003 and continued throughout

2004, its unanimous adoption did not occur until the 33rd session of the UNESCO

General Conference on 19 October 2005 calling for individual ratification from 19

December 2005 (see Appendix XII).219 Regarding the process of ratification, Pound has

opined that,

The UNESCO rule is that a Convention comes into effect on the first day of the month following the month in which the 30th country files it notification of ratification. So in order for this to come into force by 1 February 2006 and therefore be a Convention during the Turin Games, 30 countries have to ratify it before 31 December 2005.22°

Legally binding action can be taken against governments that do not sign on and do not

comply with the convention; as well, they face the possibility of being barred from

bidding to host the Olympic Games.221 In regards to governments not signing the

convention, IOC President Jacques Roggue inferred that, “Hypothetically, if they [the

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governments] did not [sign onto the convention], it would very clearly be paralysis for

WADA, and its existence would be called into question...non-compliance would mean

the end of WADA, which would be very sad.”

Regional Anti-Doping Organizations

In mid 2004, WADA launched its anti-doping development program. The intent

of the program is to assist countries and organizations in developing anti-doping

programs in parts of the world where there currently is little or no sample collection or

established quality doping control programs.223 Countries that do not have the means or

resources to set up a national program, or that have only a small number of elite athletes

would be worthy participants.224 WADA intends to achieve this through the

establishment of Regional Anti-doping Organizations (RADOs). Currently WADA has 3

RADOs under development, where it is trying to support a group of countries to put

together their own agency.225

Such an approach is intended to increase worldwide testing and promote long-term sustainability of testing and anti-doping education. The overall goal is to ensure that all athletes in all countries and in all sports are subject to the same anti-doping protocols and processes; and to collect samples from athletes in all countries throughout the world.226

These organizations will have a lead country from a management point of view.

For instance, Australia will take the lead towards the Oceania RADO. One of WADA’s 3

RADOs which is under development can be found in Oceania, specifically in Fiji,

involving 4 or 5 South Pacific countries (Fiji, Tonga, Papa New Guinea, Samoa, and the

Cook Islands). The second RADO is in Zone 5 of Africa. In regards to sport, Africa is

divided into 5 or 6 zones. Zone 5 is former British Africa countries such as Kenya,

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Tanzania and Uganda. The third RADO is in the Caribbean, with eleven Caribbean

countries participating.• • » 227

For the Oceania RADO, funding has been arranged from the Commonwealth

Secretary General, with expectations that it will be fully self-sufficient within 2-3 years.

However, being responsible for servicing the whole area requires appropriate personnel

on each of the islands who are trained for sample collection, and that the RADO is

equipped with the necessary contracts and connections with labs in the vicinity.

On 26-27 November 2005, in Doha (Qatar), WADA in cooperation with the Qatar Olympic Committee, convened Gulf States’ Governments and NOCs, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, to discuss the development of a RADO to serve the region. The project objective is to initiate anti-doping programs that will be strategically governed and directed by members of the Gulf States. The Gulf States RADO will facilitate the collection of samples throughout the region as well as develop educational strategies to promote doping-free sport. It will also enable a coordinated approach for translating materials, hosting seminars, testing at major events, standardizing anti-doping activities, and fostering a strong working relationship with WADA.229

According to Howman, getting a RADO up and running is not tremendously

difficult. The question, however, is how much money will it get on an annual basis to

conduct testing? Moreover, Howman opines, it is here that WADA is leaning on

developed nations to be of assistance given that that is the role developed nations ought

to be taking.230 “RADOs will serve anywhere between five to fifteen countries and by the

year 2007 WADA plans to have covered the world.”231

The Richard ‘Dick’ Pound Factor

As stated by Howman, WADA was the brainchild of some of the people at the

IOC, including Richard Pound, who persuaded Samaranch that it was a good idea that the

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the IOC and subsequent affiliation with WADA was an initial area of concern for some,

many conceded and realized that “someone of Dick’s character, stature and capabilities

was essential to get things done.” Generally speaking, he was the right person to have

in place during WADA’s founding years.234 His unanimous re-election as chairperson of

WADA’s Executive Committee in 2001 and again in 2004 clearly demonstrates that his

determination, contributions, and successes were well received by WADA members.235

According to IOC President , “Dick has done an outstanding job as

chairman of WADA and I think the continuation of his chairmanship is of a vital

importance for the momentum that WADA has achieved now.”236

Nevertheless, in compliance with WADA’s recently imposed policy addressing

the organization’s chairperson, Pound will be stepping down in 2007 and relinquishing

the chairperson position to a government representative. As this day approaches,

apprehensions and questions continue to flourish; for instance, will the incoming

chairperson have the means to hold together the important relationship between sport and

government? Will they bring the same level of visibility to the organization? What will

happen if the chairperson is voted out of office? Thus far, the conclusions reached

support the notion that the new chairperson will have a considerable task ahead as

WADA still faces a number of challenges. Nevertheless, as stated by Wade, WADA is

indeed bigger than Pound and it will continue to prosper and grow once he steps down.238

However, with Pound’s tenure quickly running its course, WADA must start building the

profiles of Directors within the organization, thus generating high visibility. In the

opinion of Wade, “Governments need to find someone secure; thus, a proposal to add two

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new board members (one from within the Olympic Movement and another from

Government) has been tabled.”239 Likewise, Wade stated that the public authority chair

would be a Bill Clinton or a Nelson Mandela, someone possessing credibility and

visibility which will add to and carry on the tradition of bringing forth high visibility to

the organization.240

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Endnotes

1 Ole Sorenson (Sport Canada), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2006, interview 001, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario. Casey Wade (former director of Education and Planning WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14, 2005, interview 003, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor. There was a conflict regarding the head coach’s name; Mr. Sorenson referred to him as Marty Hall; whereas Mr. Wade referred to him as Marty Holland.

2 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2006.

3 Ibid.

4 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14, 2005.

5 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

6 Joseph dePencier (Director Sport Services / General Counsel), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2006, interview 005, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

7 Victor Lachance (former CEO of the CCES), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006, interview 006, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

8 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

9 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

10 Charles L. Dubin (The Honourable Chief Justice), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, April 3,2006.

11 Ibid.

12 David Howman (Director General WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006.

13 Andrew Pipe (Medical Doctor / former Chair of the CCES), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2006, interview, 002, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

14 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

15 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

16 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14,2005.

17 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

18 Paul Melia (CEO of CCES), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006, interview 007, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Ontario.

19 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

20 Charles L. Dubin, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, April 3,2006.

21 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

22 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005. One of Dubin’s recommendations was that an independent international anti-doping organization be constructed in Canada. Dr. Andrew Pipe was asked, by Sport Canada, to chair the design and development group of that organization which eventually

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became known as The Canadian Anti-Doping Organization (CADO). CADO was formally launched in 1991 but became operational in January 1992. That same year (1992), CADO was re-named The Canadian Centre for Drug Free Sport (CCDS). In 1995 The CCDS merged with Fair Play Canada and is renamed the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES).

23 Charles L. Dubin, Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1990), p. 554; recommendations #33.

24 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

25 Ibid.

26 Charles L. Dubin, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, April 3, 2006.

27 Ibid.

28 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16, 2006.

29 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

30 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006.

31 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19, 2006; The lab standards accredited certain labs around the world to conduct analysis and detection of the various banned substances. The majority of countries were using the accredited labs, and as it stands today, there are 33 accredited labs in 30 countries worldwide.

32 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005; There are roughly 50 signatories to the Convention. It still exists today and its monitoring group meets twice a year in Strasburg France and is still the foremost International Intergovernmental forum on anti-doping in sport. The convention forms the legal basis for a number of national programs in Europe; for a number of countries there is not necessarily any national constitutional authority to enact anti-doping laws so what they’ve done is used being a party to this international convention as the basis for national anti-doping laws or programs. Therefore, it is still an important instrument, with roughly half a dozen non-European signatories, Canada being one of them.

33 The IADA International alliance includes the following nine countries: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, The United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and The . For further information please consult The Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES) Website, http://www.cces.ca/forms/index.cfm?dsp=template&act=view3&template_id=I47&lang=e

34 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19, 2006; Working with the Canadian Standards Board, Canada received ISO certification indicating that they, as a country, were carrying out their sample collection according to these standards.

35 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006.

36 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

37 Prince Alexander de Merode was head of the IOC Medical Commission for 35 years. He was elected to the IOC in 1964 and in 1967 was named chairman of the committee’s medical commission. His academic background was in philosophy and law, not medicine. He was bom May 24th, 1934 in Etterbek Belgium. He was a sports administrator and later a corporate director. He served the Olympic Committee as Vice President (1986-90) and a member of the executive board (1980-90).

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38 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 24-26 July, Lausanne Switzerland, 1988, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

39Wendy Long, “Drug cause widespread cynicism: Sports fans have almost come to expect that world-class athletes are using something besides weights to build muscle,” The Vancouver Sun, August 11th, 1998, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=222791321&sid=5&Fmt=3&clientld=2241&RQT=309&VName=P DQ (accessed February 20, 2006). If events since 1988 - sparked by the positive steroid test by Johnson in Seoul - have marked a loss of innocence in terms of the way spectators and fans view sport then news over the past eight months has surely taken us all around the block too many times. The year began with Chinese swimmers being bounced from the world championships in Australia for testing positive for diuretics and a coach caught smuggling vials of human growth hormone. In Ireland triple gold medalist Michelle Smith was subject to an out-of-competition drug tests which was found to contain a lethal concentration of alcohol. At the Winter Olympics in Nagano Canadian snowboarder Ross Rebagliati won the right to keep his gold medal after traces of marijuana were found in his sample, but a loophole in international paperwork did not have provision for punishment. Meantime, in Berlin proceedings were underway in a celebrated court trial involving two doctors and four coaches accused of affecting 19 East German athletes through forced use of performance enhancing drugs.

40 Richard Pound (WADA Chairperson), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005, interview 004, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

41 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006.

42 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16, 2006.

43 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

44 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16, 2006.

45 Associated Press, “I.O.C. Proposes Drug Agency,” New York Times, August 21, 1998.

46 Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 20 August, 1998, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

47 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 14-16 September, 1998, Seoul, South Korea, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

48 Ibid.

49 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15,2005.

50 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 11-13 December 1998, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

51 Ibid.

52 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 11-13 December 1998, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

53 Ibid.

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54 Ibid.

55 Scott Martyn and Stephen Wenn, “Establishing ‘A Narrative of Continuity’: The Salt Lake City Bid Scandal and the IOC’s Communications and Management Program” (presentation, 13th Commonwealth International Sport Conference, Melbourne Australia, March 9-12, 2006). In late November 1998, Richard Pound received a fax concerning a report, aired by Salt Lake City’s KTVX Channel 4, concerning a college sponsorship granted to the late Rene Essomba’s daughter Sonia, prior to the IOC’s Budapest Session in 1995 when Salt Lake City secured privileges for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games.

56 Scott Martyn and Stephen Wenn, “Establishing ‘A Narrative of Continuity’: The Salt Lake City Bid Scandal and the IOC’s Communications and Management Program” (presentation, 13th Commonwealth International Sport Conference, Melbourne Australia, March 9-12, 2006).

57 Ibid.

58 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

59 John Hoberman, “Offering the Illusion of Reform on Drugs: Failing to define doping out of Existence, Samaranch tries an Olympic-Size Gesture,” New York Times, January 10, 1999.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Paul L. Montgomery, “I.O.C. Credibility Questioned as Drug Meeting Starts,” New York Times, February 3, 1999.

63 The following companies were TOP partners for the Torino 2006 Olympic Winter Games: Coca-Cola, Atos Origin; General Electric (GE); Kodak; Lenovo; Manulife; McDonald’s; OMEGA; Panasonic; Samsung; VISA. For further information please consult the Olympic Website at http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/facts/programme/sponsors_uk.asp

64 Martyn and Wenn, “Establishing ‘A Narrative of Continuity’: The Salt Lake City Bid Scandal and the IOC’s Communications and Management Program.” TOP V (2001-2004) would jump from $40 million to $55 million.

65 Martyn and Wenn, “Establishing ‘A Narrative of Continuity’: The Salt Lake City Bid Scandal and the IOC’s Communications and Management Program.”

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid. The concerns about doping and judging were identified by Kodak, the longest standing Olympic sponsor, and UPS. Kodak’s role as an Olympic sponsor dates back to the first modem Olympic Games in 1896.

70 The sections of the Lausanne declaration are as follows: 1) Education, prevention and athlete’s rights: Educational and preventive campaigns will be intensified, focusing activities to fight doping, except for preserving the confidentiality necessary to protect the fundamental rights of athletes. 2) Olympic Movement anti-doping Code: the basis for the fight against doping. WADA rapidly developed the OMADC as suggested by the 1999 Conference. The Code came into force in January 2000. Despite its recent

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creation, it had now been replaced with the WAD Code, adopted in March 2003 with the expectation that it would be implemented by sports organizations prior to the 2004 Olympics. 3) Sanctions: a first doping offense will result in a 2 year suspension 4) International Anti-Doping Agency: this agency shall be established so as to be fully operational for the Games of the XXVII Olympiad in Sydney in 2000. 5) Responsibilities of the IOC, the ISFs, the NOCs and the CAS: The IOC, ISFS, and NOCs will maintain their respective competence and responsibility to apply doping rules in accordance with their own procedures, and in cooperation with the International Agency. Consequently, decisions handed down in the first instance will be under the exclusive responsibility of the ISFs, the NOCs, or during the Games, the IOC. With regard to last instance appeals, the IOC, ISFs, NOCS recognize the authority of CAS after their own procedures have been exhausted. 6) Collaboration between the Olympic Movement and Public Authorities For further information please refer to The Lausanne Declaration which can be accessed at http://www.sportunterricht.de/Iksport/Declaration_e.html.

71 Montgomery, “I.O.C. Credibility Questioned as Drug Meeting Starts.”

72 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

73 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

74 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, Extraordinary Meeting, 4 February 1999, Lausanne Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

75Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 4 May 1999, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec. Membership of the working group included representatives from the IOC, the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (COE), The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA), the Arabic Confederation of Sports (ACS), the World Health Organization (WHO), Interpol and the United Nation’s Drug Control Program (UNDCP).

76 International Summit Drugs in Sport: Pure Performance, “Sydney Communique” (presentation, International Drugs in Sport Summit, Sydney, Australia, November 14-17, 1999).

77 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 4 May 1999, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec. International Drugs in Sport: Pure Performance, “Discussion Paper - International Collaboration” (presentation, International Drugs in Sport Summit, Sydney, Australia, November 14-17, 1999).

78 Ibid.

79 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board, International Olympic Committee, 1-4 October 1999, Athens Greece, art. 1.1, fig. 4 of the Lausanne Declaration of 4 February 1999, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

80 “Drug plan gets criticized,” The Montreal Gazette, October 29, 1999, http://webvoy.uwindsor.ca :2048/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?did=19832031 l&sid=l&Fmt=3&cIientId=2241&RQT= 309& VName=PDQ (accessed February 20,2006). General Barry R. McCaffrey stepped down as the Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in January 2001. He was confirmed to the position by unanimous vote of the U.S. Senate in February 1996 and served as a member of the President’s Cabinet and the National Security Council for drug-related issues. As ONDCP Director, he coordinated the $19 billion federal drug control budget and developed the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy. Currently, General McCaffrey is President of his own consulting firm based in Arlington, Virginia. He serves as a national security and terrorism analyst for NBC News and writes a column on

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national security issues for Armed Forces Journal. Moreover, General McCaffrey is also an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. From January 2001 to May 2005, General McCaffrey served as the Bradley Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies. For further information please consult Washington Speakers Bureau http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/speakers/Speaker.cfm?SpeakerID=3145

81 Ibid.

82 “IOC’s drug agency drawing fire,” The Montreal Gazette, November 16, 1999, http://webvoy. uwindsor.ca:2048/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?did= 1983 5299 l&sid=]&Fmt=3&clientId=2 241&RQT=309& VName=PDQ (accessed February 20,2006).

83 Ibid.

84 “Pound heads drug agency,” The Montreal Gazette, December 2,1999, http://webvoy.uwindsor.ca :2048/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?did=l 983 80751 &sid= 1 &Fmt=3&clientId=2241 &RQT= 309& VName=PDQ (accessed February 20, 2006).

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, January 13, 2000, Olympic House, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

88 Ibid.

89 WADA Website, “Organizational Composition,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=296 (accessed March 1,2006). WADA is composed of a Foundation Board, an Executive Committee, and several Working Committees. The 36-member Foundation Board is WADA’s supreme decision making body. It is composed equally of representatives from the Olympic Movement and governments, as is the 12-person Executive Committee. WADA’s Foundation Board delegates the actual management and running of the Agency to the Executive Committee, including the performance of activities and the administration of assets. WADA’s Working Committees act as advisory committees and provide guidance for WADA’s programs.

90 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005. The original model for WADA’s structure consisted of six separate blocks of stakeholders (athletes, the IOC, ISFs, NOCs, Governments and maybe a mix of coaches, event organizers and pharmaceutical representatives). Governments adamantly opposed this model; they said it was completely unacceptable and if this model stuck, they would have no involvement with organization. Governments wanted fifty percent of the control or they would walk out. Although Samaranch thought this was a disaster, fifty percent of the control would equate with governments paying fifty percent of the organization’s financial costs. Governments agreed but needed two years to get their finances sorted. As such, the IOC funded WADA for its first two years and since then, there has been a 50/50 split between Governments and the Sport Movement.

91 International Drugs in Sport: Pure Performance, “Sydney Communique” (presentation, International Drugs in Sport Summit, Sydney, Australia, November 14-17, 1999).Conference participants included: Argentina, Australia, Canada, People’s Republic of China, European Commission, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Poland, Portugal, Republic of South Africa, , Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. Four Observer groups were present; the IOC, other members of the

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Olympic Movement, the Federation and the Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games.

92 Associated Press, “American Support for Fight on Doping,” The New York Times, November 15, 1999.

93 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

94 International Summit Drugs in Sport: Pure Performance, “Sydney Communique” (presentation, International Drugs in Sport Summit, Sydney, Australia, November 14-17, 1999).

95 Ibid.

96 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

97 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16, 2006.

98 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005; the sites of the IICGADS group meetings: Sydney Australia November 1999, Montreal Canada February 2000, Oslo Norway November 2000, Cape Town South Africa May 2001, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia April 2002, and Moscow December 2002.

99 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

100 WADA Website, “Government Funding,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=401 (accessed January 27, 2006).

101 Ibid. The first two years of operation (2000 & 2001), WADA was funded in its entirety by the Olympic Movement (18.3 million USD). The IOC agreed to this decision to allow governments time to get budgetary approval for their 50% contributions. WADA gross operating budgets from 2002 through till 2005 are as follows: 2002 (17,000,000 USD with government and sport paying an equal 8,500,000USD); 2003 (20,235,000 USD with government and sport paying an equal 10,117,500 USD); 2004 (20,235,000 USD with government and sport paying an equal 10,117,500 USD); and 2005 (23,275,000 USD with government and sport paying an equal 10,852,500).

102 WADA Website, “Government Funding,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=401 (accessed January 27, 2006).

103 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005. (Because WADA is made up of both the Olympic Movement and Governments, they can invite both sectors to the World Conference; so in a sense, WADA keeps the International debate going with their own infrastructure.)

104 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

105 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005. Referring to Ben Johnson’s disqualification from the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea.

106 Minutes of the 112th Meeting of The International Olympic Committee General Session, 13-16 July, 2001, Moscow, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

107 WADA Website, “Independent Observers,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=266 (accessed February 15,2006).

108 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Health, Medical and Research Committee, 15-16 October, 2000, Montreal Canada, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ 151000.pdf (accessed January 23, 2006).

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109 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14, 2005.

110 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Executive Committee, 13 November, 2000, Oslo Norway, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/131100-ENG.pdf (accessed January 30, 2006).

111 Michele Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in Sport,” in Drugs in Sport 4lh. ed.ed, David R. Mottram (London: Routledge, 2006). p. 61.

112 Events where WADA’s IO Team was present: 2000 - Olympic Games, Sydney Australia, 2001 - FINA World Championships, Fukuoka Japan, 2001 - IAAF World Athletic Championship, Edmonton Canada, 2001 -FIBA European Basketball Championship (MEN), Turkey, 2001 - Mediterranean Games, Tunis, 2001 - Cycling Road World Championships, Lisbon Portugal, 2002 - Olympic and Paralympic Games, Salt Lake City, USA, 2002 - FINA World short course swimming championships, Moscow, 2002 - Commonwealth Games, Manchester England, 2002 - FIBA World Basketball Championships (MEN), Indianapolis USA. 2002 - FIBA World Basketball Championships (WOMEN), Nanjing China, 2003 - FIS World Nordic Ski Championship, Val di Fiemme, Italy, 2003 - Tour de France, 2003 - Davis Cup Final, Melbourne Australia. 2003 - FIFA World Youth Championship, United Arab Emirates, 2004 - Olympic and Paralympic Games, Athens Greece, 2005 - IAAF World Championship, Helsinki Finland, 2005 - FINA World Championships, Montreal Canada. For fiirther information, please consult the WADA Website; http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=342

113 WADA Website, “Independent Observers,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=266 (accessed May 17, 2006).

114 Casey Wade (former Director of Education and Planning WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28, 2006, interview 009, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario. For example, at the upcoming Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver, Whistler 2010, the IOC has partnered with The Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) and The Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES), Canada’s national anti-doping agency, to conduct all the drug tests.

115 According to a December 2001 WADA Report, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec. This applies directly to FIFA and the UCI who keep all doping protocol in-house.

116 WADA Report, December 11/12, 2001, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

117 WADA Website, “Office of the I.O. Mission Report - XI FINA World Championships, July 16-31,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27pageCategory.id=342 “, 2005 (accessed February 21,2006).

118 Silken Laumann, “Taking necessary steps toward true credibility,” The Globe and Mail, September 27, 2000.

119 Jere Longman, “New Olympic Doping Accusations Cast Shadow,” The New York Times, June 22, 2000.

120 WADA Website, “Doping Control,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=328 (accessed March 1, 2006).

121 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of WADA’s Foundation Board, March 22,2000, Olympic House, Lausanne, Switzerland, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/ document/ 130100-ENG.pdf (accessed February 1,2006).

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122 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of WADA’s Foundation Board, March 22, 2000, Olympic House, Lausanne, Switzerland, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/ document/ 130100-ENG.pdf (accessed January 23, 2006).

123 Michele Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in Sport,” p. 61.

124 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006.

125 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

126 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006.

127 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005. The DFSC conducted 2043 doping controls on athletes from 82 countries across 27 sports in the 6 months between mid-April and September 10. ASDA conducted 600 of these tests on athletes living or training in Australia. The intention was to conduct unannounced out of competition tests;, however this proved difficult at times due to the quality of information coming from sports. For the first time ever at an Olympic Games, out of competition testing was conducted in addition to competition testing. Competitors were subject to random testing from 2 September - 2 weeks before the start of the Games, whether accredited or not and regardless of their location. For further information regarding the DFSC’s main objectives, please consult the CCES Website www.cces.ca

128 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14,2005.

129 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Standards and Harmonization Committee, July 27,2000, Lausanne, Switzerland, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/270700.pdf (accessed April 6, 2006). International Doping Tests & Management (IDTM) conducts Doping Controls all over the world. They deliver a global doping control service to keep sport free of doping. They are experts in conducting Out-Of-Competition and In-Competition tests, as well as handling the applications for Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUE), managing whereabouts and taking care of your Result Management. For further information please consult IDTM’s Website at http://www.idtm.com/

130 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19, 2006.

131 ANADO (Association of National Anti-Doping Organizations) Website, http://www.antidoping.no /anado/t2.asp?p=44615 (accessed April 21, 2006).

132 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

133 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006.

134 ANADO (Association of National Anti-Doping Organizations) Website, http://www.antidoping.no /anado/t2.asp?p=44615 (accessed April 21, 2006).

135 ANADO Website http://www.antidoping.no/anado/t2.asp?p=44615 (accessed April 21, 2006).

136 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Executive Committee, June 1, 2001, Cape Town South Africa; Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Executive Committee, November 24, 2002, Montreal Canada, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/241102-ENG.pdf (accessed February 23, 2006).

137 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19, 2006. Areas of concern which were identified included the following: athlete whereabouts and the location of athlete training; the fact that parts of the world did not have quality NADOS therefore a huge financial cost was associated with flying Doping Control Officers around the world to conduct sample collection; and problems getting past immigration.

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For example, in China there were a number of cumbersome bureaucratic processes which in addition to being time consuming, also alerted the Chinese sports system to the fact that sample collection was about to take place. Similarly, France was another problem and continues to be a problem today because they do not allow anyone other than French authorities to collect samples in their country.

138 World Anti-Doping Agency, “2003 WADA Annual Report,” WADA Website, http://www.wada- ama.org/rtecontent/document/ar_eng.pdf (accessed March 1, 2006).

139 http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/gateway/DRUGS/doping_code.htm (accessed November 25,2005).

140 Lausanne Declaration on doping in Sport, Adopted by the World Conference on Doping in Sport, 4 February 1999, Lausanne, Switzerland, http:///www.sportunterricht.de/lksport/Declaration_e.html

141 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of WADA’s Board, January 13, 2000, Olympic House, Lausanne, Switzerland, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/130100- ENG.pdf (accessed January 14, 2006).

142 Casey Wade, E-mail message to author, April 6,2006.

143 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

144 Ibid.

145 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005. The Restraint of Trade is a widely supported law and Human Rights concept in Europe. It states that you cannot unduly punish someone if it affects their right to work. It has been argued that aside from playing soccer, what else could these players do to make a living? Thus, to ban them for two years would be a violation of their rights. This is stated in the Charter of Rights in Europe. In summary, due to a legal precedent in Europe, a four year sanction would not fly because courts have consistently ruled that you cannot take away someone’s right to earn a living. Therefore, if you are a professional soccer player in German and you are banned from playing for four years, you have essentially eliminated that individual’s ability to earn a living.

146 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14, 2005.

147 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005. The following are examples of a country and International Sport Federations were forced to lower their sanctions to be in compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code: Canada went from 4 years to 2 years; Weightlifting and Swimming went from 4 years to 2 years.

148 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15,2005.

149 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

150 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28,2006.

151 WADA Website, “World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=267 (accessed May 19, 2006).

152 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

153 Ibid.

154 Alexander T. Maltas, “Implementing the World Anti-Doping Code: Issues and Challenges from a Canadian Perspective,” p. 12. Unpublished Essay, in possession of Joseph dePencier, Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, Ottawa, Ontario.

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155 Ibid.

156 Alexander T. Maltas, “Implementing the World Anti-Doping Code: Issues and Challenges from a Canadian Perspective,” p. 13. Unpublished Essay, in possession of Joseph dePencier, Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, Ottawa, Ontario.

157 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

158 Ibid.

159 Steven Keating, “Choosing Montreal ‘step back’,” The Globe and Mail, August 25, 2001.

160 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

161 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

162 Ibid.

163 Stephen Brunt, “WADA welcome, if it helps get rid of stigma,” The Globe and Mail, August 22, 2001.

164 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

165 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Executive Committee, August 2, 2000, Lausanne, Switzerland, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/020800-ENG.pdf (accessed January 23, 2006).

166 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

167 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

168 Ibid; Montreal felt that International sport was driven by Europe, what with so many ISFs located in there that they wanted to ensure the same problem did not happen with the anti-doping program.

169 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

170 Ibid.

171 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006; Casey Wade, E-mail message to author, April 6, 2006.

172 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

173 Ibid; The Mission of Montreal International; contribute to the economic development of Metropolitan Montreal and increase the region's international status. It’s Vision; Montreal International seeks to position the Montreal Metropolitan Community among North American leaders with respect to wealth per inhabitant.

174 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Foundation Board, August 21, 2001, Tallinn Estonia, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/210801-ENG.pdf (accessed March 10,2006).Regarding the vote to move WADA’s headquarters from Lausanne, there were four rounds before a decision was made. Round One: Bonn 0, Lausanne 10, Montreal 14, Stockholm 2, Vienna 6; Round two: Lausanne 12, Montreal 13, Stockholm 1, Vienna 6; Round three: Lausanne 11, Montreal 15, Vienna 6; Round Four: Lausanne 15, Montreal 17.

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175 “Drug test for Montreal,” The Montreal Gazette, August 22,2001, http://webvoy.uwindsor.ca: 2048/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?did=203280191 &sid=l &Fmt=3&clientId=2241 &RQT=3 09& VName=PDQ (accessed February 21,2006).

176 “Sports in Brief: Anti-Doping: Coderre wants Canadian lab,” The Globe and Mail, January 11,2000.

177 WADA Website, “Regional Offices,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=261 (accessed April 18, 2006).

178 Ibid.

179 WADA Website, “World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=267 (accessed March 14,2006).

180 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006.

181 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15,2005.

182 World Anti-Doping Agency, “2002 WADA Annual Report,” WADA Website, http://www.wada- ama.org/rtecontent/document/ar_eng.pdf (accessed March 1, 2006).

183 WADA Website, “World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=267 (accessed March 14,2006).

184 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14, 2005.

185 World Anti-Doping Agency, “2003 WADA Annual Report,” WADA Website, http://www.wada- ama.org/rtecontent/document/ar_eng.pdf (accessed March 1,2006).

186 Ibid.

187 WADA Website, “Copenhagen Declaration,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ declaration_en.doc (accessed March 14,2006).

188 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2005.

189 Richard Pound, “IOC Session: WADA Report” (presentation, Turin Italy, February 2006). There is a declaration which is not legally binding and represents the softest level of government (ex: The Lausanne Declaration). Next is the Charter which is a little more formal but still not legally binding. It is politically binding. The next level is a convention or treaty. This is the heaviest government agreement. It is legally binding and action can be taken against governments that sign and do not comply (ex: The UNESCO Convention).

190 World Anti-Doping Agency, “2003 WADA Annual Report,” WADA Website, http://www.wada- ama.org/rtecontent/document/ar_eng.pdf (accessed March 1, 2006).Richard Pound, by December 2004, 160 nations had signed, with a total of 183 nations having signed the declaration by year end 2005. UNESCO promotes international cooperation among its 191 Member States and six Associate Memebers in the fields of education, sceience, culture and communication.

191 Minutes of the 115th Meeting of The International Olympic Committee General Session, July 2-4, 2003, Prague, Czech, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

192 World Anti-Doping Agency, “2003 WADA Annual Report,” WADA Website, http://www.wada- ama.org/rtecontent/document/ar_eng.pdf (accessed March 1, 2006).

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193 ibid.

194 “Running scared; Drug-testing advances are bad news for the cheats,” The Times (UK), October 23, 2003. In a May 2004 article, published by the Montreal Gazette, titled No exceptions for FIFA, WADA Chief Pound says, the ” author writes that 26 of the 28 summer Olympic Sport federations had singed the World Anti-Doping Code. Only FIFA and the UCI had yet to sign, but that the UCI was expected to sign soon.

195 “Soccer compromises on world drug plan,” The Montreal Gazette, March 4, 2003.

196 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

197 Ibid.

198 Ashling O’Connor, “Sports Ministers to use presidency of EU to resolve FIFA row with WADA,” The Times UK, November 23, 2005.

199 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

200 Phil Couvertte, “FIFA given doping compliance deadline,” The Globe and Mail, May 17, 2005.

201 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15,2005.

202 WADA Website, “Decision regarding FIFA Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleId=3115263 (accessed April 25,2006).

203 Ibid.

204 WADA Website, “Decision regarding FIFA Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleId=3115263 (accessed April 25, 2006). The World Anti-Doping Code states that if an can establish that he or she bears no significant fault or negligence, then the period of ineligibility may be reduced by a maximum of one year.

205 WADA Website, “Decision regarding FIFA Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleId=3115263 (accessed April 25,2006). The following list of rules, applied by FIFA, differ from the World Anti-Doping Code: The absence in the FIFA Rules of a clause allowing complete elimination of the suspension in case of “no fault or negligence;” The option of a probationary sanction under the FIFA Rules, where there is no such option under the Code; The absence of a right for WADA to review the granting or denial of a Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) by FIFA; The absence of an appropriate channel of information allowing WADA to be advised of anti-doping decisions issued by FIFA bodies as a condition to exercise its right of appeal to CAS; and the impossibility for WADA to appeal to CAS ineligibility sanctions of less than three months pronounced by FIFA, meaning that the most lenient decisions cannot be appealed by WADA. For further information please consult the WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/

206 WADA Website, “WADA Welcomes CAS Advisory Opinion on FIFA Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleId=3115267 (accessed April 25, 2006).

207 Ibid.

208 WADA Website, “Decision regarding FIFA Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch27articlefrK3115263 (accessed April 25, 2006).

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209 WADA Website, “WADA Welcomes CAS Advisory Opinion on FIFA Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleId=3115267 (accessed April 25, 2006).

210WADA Website, “Constitutive Instrument of Foundation of the World Anti-Doping Agency,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/constitutive_instrument_foundation.pdf (accessed April 1, 2006). WADA’s key activities include: Monitoring acceptance of and compliance with the World Anti- Doping Code; Educating athletes through the Athlete Outreach Program; Providing anti-doping education to athletes, coaches, and administrators; Funding scientific research to develop new detection methods; Conducting unannounced out-of-competition doping control among elite athletes; Observing the doping control and results management programs of major events; Fostering the development of National Anti- Doping Organizations (NADO) and of anti-doping programs.

211 World Anti-Doping Agency, “2004 WADA Annual Report,” WADA Website, http://www.wada- ama.org/rtecontent/document/WAD A_2004_Annual_Report_en.pdf (accessed March 1,2006).

212 Ibid.

213 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.The Prohibited List is a cornerstone of the Code and a key component of harmonization. It is an International Standard identifying Substances and Methods prohibited in-competition, out-of-competition, and in particular sports. Substances and methods are classified by categories (e.g., steroids, stimulants, gene doping); The purpose of the International Standard for Testing is to plan for effective testing and to maintain the integrity and identity of samples, from notifying the athlete to transporting samples for analysis; The purpose of the International Standard for Laboratories is to ensure production of valid test results and evidentiary data and to achieve uniform and harmonized results and reporting from all accredited laboratories; The purpose of the International Standard for TUE is to ensure that the process of granting TUEs is harmonized across sports and countries. For further information regarding the International Standards, please consult WADA’s Website; http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=369

214 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28,2006.

215 Ibid.

216 WADA Website, “Anti-Doping Administration & Management System,” http://www.wada-ama.org /en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=265 (accessed April 2,2006).

217 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28,2006.

218 WADA Website, “UNESCO Convention,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/ dynamic.ch2? page Category.id=392 (accessed April 5,2006).

219 Richard Pound, “IOC Session: WADA Report” (presentation, Turin Italy, February 2006).

220 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15,2005.

221 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28,2006.

222 Minutes of the 117th Meeting of The International Olympic Committee General Session, 6-9 July, 2005, Singapore, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

223 WADA Website, Regional Anti-Doping Organizations,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic. ch2?pageCategory.id=438 (accessed April 15, 2006).

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224 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15,2005.

225 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

226 WADA Website, Regional Anti-Doping Organizations,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic. ch2?pageCategory.id=438 (accessed April 15, 2006).

227 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

228 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006.

229 WADA Website, Regional Anti-Doping Organizations,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic. ch2?pageCategory.id=438 (accessed April 15, 2006).

230 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

231 Ibid.

232 Ibid.

233 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006.

234 Ibid.

235 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Foundation Board Meeting, Lausanne Switzerland, 3 December 2001, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/031201-ENG.pdf, (accessed January 30,2006). Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Foundation Board, Montreal Canada, 21 November 2004, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.Org/rtecontent/document/211104- ENG.pdf (accessed January 29,2006).

236 James Stevenson, “Pound returns to anti-doping agency,” The Montreal Gazette, 4 August 2001, http://webvoy.uwindsor.ca:2048/login?urI=http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?did=203256521&sid=l&Fmt= 3&clientId=2241&RQT=309& VName=PDQ (accessed February 20,2006).

237 WADA has a mandate where the Chairperson rotates between representatives from the Sport Movement to Government in order to maintain equal representation.

238 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28,2006.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

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Chapter V

Discussion/Conclusion

In the preceding chapter, major events and their associated actions relevant to the

formation of WADA and the development of The Code were critically reviewed. Based

on this review, the central issues, the role of key personalities and individuals, as well as

the involvement of national and international agencies and institutions were assessed in

order to determine the factors that led to the creation of WADA and the subsequent

development of a World Anti-Doping Code. The purpose of this chapter is to conclude

how the formation of WADA impacted the development of an international strategy for

anti-doping in sport.

Conclusions

A modem, credible organization can be distinguished by the following four

characteristics: a clear mandate with effective tools to carry out that mandate;

independence to make autonomous decisions; expert personnel; and transparency and

accountability.1 Having operationalized these characteristics an organization establishes

legitimacy and trust, which in part enables it to deliver the desired results.2 As a modem

and credible organization exhibiting these characteristics, WADA has established itself as

an organization that has effectively promoted anti-doping in sport. When discussing these

four characteristics as they relate to WADA, an important point must be acknowledged.

While these characteristics could be viewed separately, each in fact, reinforces the other.

The remainder of this section draws together the research undertaken in this study

on the organizational structure and successes of WADA to demonstrate that these

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characteristics are, indeed, applicable to WADA. Moreover, as supported by relevant

literature, it is these characteristics working in tandem that have enabled WADA to

deliver on its stated mandate.

An Effective Mandate

From its inception in 1999, WADA’s actions have been directed by a singular

mission. Specifically, the organization’s mandate is,

to promote and coordinate at the international level the fight against doping in sport in all its forms including through in and out-of-competition testing; to this end, the Foundation will cooperate with intergovernmental organizations, governments, public authorities and other public and private bodies fighting against doping in sport, inter alia the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Sport Federation (IFs), National Olympic Committees (NOC) and the athletes; it will seek to obtain from all of the above moral and political commitment to follow its recommendations.3

Although this mandate is clear and succinct, hard work, dedication, compromise and a

bringing together of key players were necessary to achieve the level of consensus

required. The formation of WADA brought together all of the necessary players to

coordinate the fight against the problem of doping in sport.4 The organization provided an

internationally accepted forum where key players could work co-operatively in a concrete

manner, while focusing their ideas and thinking, thus enabling it to establish a clear

organizational mandate.5 As acknowledged by Pound,

... this was the first time that all of the elements required to achieve a solution to the problem of doping in sport had come together, the IOC, IFs, NOCs, athletes as well as intergovernmental organizations and national governments. All had the same determination to pool efforts and to bring to fruition the full honour of sport.6

To achieve what no other organization involved with anti-doping in sport had achieved to

date, it was necessary that each of these agencies, identified by Pound, work

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collaboratively toward a common objective.7 This conclusion is supported by the

available literature which argues that a resolution to doping in sport could not simply be

left to those who govern sport nationally and internationally. The future of drug free sport

required consolidated action and a coordinated commitment by those in sport,

government and others.8 Further support for this position suggests that “the co-operation

between international and national sport federations and the newly created national anti-

doping organizations (NADOs) could provide one of the strongest deterrents to drug

misuse.”9 Thus, it can be suggested that the imminent future of anti-doping is dependent

upon the continuation and development of the international collaboration between the

IOC, governments and international and national sport federations.10

The formation of WADA created an environment where collective input,

collective decision making and collective agreement could be achieved. It can therefore

be concluded that the formation of WADA impacted the development of an international

strategy for anti-doping in sport by creating an environment where a collective voice

could be shaped and heard, as well as applied throughout the development of The Code.

The establishment of this collective voice and the identified effectiveness is supported by

Chalip, who suggested that “the inclusion of various stakeholder perspectives improves

the process and the product of policymaking.”11

The formation of a clear mandate gave rise to the need for an effective means, or

tool, for WADA to carry out its stated mandate. The World Anti-Doping Code, a

document representing a uniform set of anti-doping rules,12 characterizes the effective

tools WADA required to achieve its objective. Possessing a core document that provides

the framework for anti-doping policies, rules and regulations within sport organizations

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and among public authorities signifies one of the most important achievements to date in

the fight against doping in sport.13 With the development of The Code the fulfillment of

WADA’s organizational mandate has become a reality.

Although challenges arose regarding the transfer of power from ISFs to WADA,

The Code was officially adopted at the 2003 World Conference on Doping in Sport,

hosted in Copenhagen, Denmark.14 Attending the conference were twelve-hundred

delegates, all of whom unanimously accepted The Code without proposing a single

amendment.15 The acquisition from its stakeholders of unanimous support for the

organization’s rules and regulations placed WADA in a strong position to achieve its goal

of promoting, coordinating and monitoring at the international level the fight against

doping in sport.16 By the end of 2005, the fact that over five hundred sport organizations

had adopted The Code and that one hundred and eighty-four governments had signed The

Copenhagen Declaration, a political document through which governments articulate

their moral understanding and intention to formally recognize and implement the World

Anti-Doping Code,17 clearly demonstrates that WADA had obtained the necessary means

to move forward as a credible organization.

In developing The Code, WADA introduced the internationally pre-eminent

policy towards doping in sport. Although this policy has and continues to induce positive

changes in the battle against drug use in sports, its success hinges on the organizations

commitment and willingness to stay engaged in the fight against doping. WADA cannot

give way; for The Code to uphold its title as the pre-eminent policy towards doping in

sport, WADA must remain actively involved, globally visible and committed to

addressing any and all challenges which present themselves.

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Achieving Independence

Independence is another key characteristic of a modem, credible organization. For

WADA, achieving independence was an immediate priority following its formation in

November 1999. However, in late November 1998, amidst the preparations for the World

Conference on Doping in Sport that was scheduled to commence on 2 February 1999, the

Salt Lake City bidding scandal broke onto the stage of public awareness.18 Not only did

the emerging scandal create tension among IOC members, it spurred widespread criticism

and distmst of the organization and its leadership.19 Subsequently, questions were raised

concerning the appropriateness of the IOC’s involvement with the fight against doping in

sport.20 Publicly, various stakeholders began to wonder how an anti-doping agency that

sought to ensure ethical conduct by athletes could be run by an organization that cannot

be trusted to conduct themselves ethically.21 Likewise, authorizing Richard Pound, Vice-

President of the IOC, to run the organization» presented an additional • challenge. • 99

As a result of the mounting criticism, WADA took steps to ensure a degree of

independence from the IOC, thus gaining trust among its stakeholders. Having reclaimed

its trusted status, it was eventually recognized that Pound was indeed the appropriate

individual to lead the organization.23 Furthermore, WADA was constituted as a hybrid

organization, which is governed and funded equally by the Olympic movement and

public authorities.24 This organizational structure prevented the IOC from exerting

greater influence or control beyond that of any other stakeholder.

Further attempts to demonstrate its independence included the relocation of

WADA’s headquarters.25 In total there are thirty-five ISFs: thirty-two in Europe,

including sixteen in Switzerland, with twelve having offices in Lausanne. A move

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outside of Europe, it was felt, would remove WADA from the Euro-centric influence

present in amateur sport and would clearly send a direct message that WADA can and

would act independent of the IOC. While7 7 there were a number of variables and

incentives at play, Canada, since The Dubirt Inquiry in 1989, has been seen as a leading

nation in the battle against drugs in sport.28 The Inquiry, which represented a watershed

• • 7Q • case from a domestic and international perspective, led Canada to pursue a strong anti-

doping program.30 As stated in the preceding chapter,

A Canadian site would have credibility with athletes because of Canada’s long history of doping control.. .and given that Canada is not Europe, athletes may perceive it as being independent from the place where most international sport federations are governed.31

Canada’s leadership and success encouraged the development of trust and confidence in

its approach to drug-free sport. Moving WADA’s headquarters to Montreal was seen as a

key step in reinforcing WADA’s mandate because of Canada’s strength, leadership,

success and commitment to the anti-doping movement.

Achieving independence, and through that gaining the confidence of its

stakeholders and the public at large, represented a significant step in WADA’s long term

campaign to eliminate drug use in sport. Indeed, its independence was considered critical

if it were to be seen as trustworthy and credible. Establishing a program that is run

independently, free from bias and conflict, and has full and open public disclosure is the

true test of credibility.32 It also visibly communicates to its stakeholders and the public at

large, that people are working towards fair, balanced and healthy sport. By achieving its

independence, WADA thus began the process of building the required foundation of

trust.

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Expert Personnel

Expertise is often defined by utilizing such terms as knowledge, experience and

competence.34 Having expert personnel with knowledge and skills in the requisite areas35

represents another of the four characteristics of a credible organization. Richard Pound,

arguably one of the most recognized and powerful men in the current IOC hierarchy,37

has an established reputation for integrity and has been a driving force in the campaign

for drug free sport.38

In sports parlance, “Pound has been the IOC’s ‘go-to-guy’ for the last twenty

years; the man called upon in times of trouble to solve the organization’s financial and

•2Q ethical problems.” While some could argue that he is “too deeply steeped in the culture

of the Olympic Movement to be able to establish the sort of assertive, iconoclastic and

vigorous agency that WADA needs to become,”40 his advocacy against doping, coupled

with his loyalty, proven ability and often brutal honesty, made him the leading candidate

for WADA Chairperson.41 However, when discussing Pound’s procurement as WADA

Chairperson, one must not discount IOC President Juan Antonia Samaranch’s comment,

made to the Spanish Press in July 1998, regarding doping and the drug scandal at the

1998 Tour de France. As stated by Samaranch,

Doping is everything that, firstly, is harmful to an athlete’s health and, secondly, artificially augments his performance. If it’s just the second case, for me, that’s not doping. If it’s the first case, it is.42

This comment served to focus attention onto the issue of doping and presented an

interesting juxtaposition between what Samaranch had always said in public and the

statement quoted above.43 This statement, along with the firestorm of attention which

ensued,44 led to an emergency meeting of the IOC Executive Board. Questions as to how

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this situation should be handled and addressed led to Pound’s statement/suggestion that

“nobody trusts anybody any more so we need an agency that is totally independent.

Otherwise this is not going to work.”45 Moreover, Pound suggests that, “getting stuck

with heading it [WADA] up was partly historical and partly my failure to avoid eye

contact.”46 That being said, his qualifications speak for themselves. For instance, he

proposed and developed both structurally and financially successful television and

marketing initiatives currently enjoyed by the IOC and handled the Salt Lake City

bidding scandal efficiently and professionally, thereby renewing confidence and trust in

the IOC and restoring its sullied image.47

Pound has been a driving force behind WADA. He encouraged the IOC to

establish an independent anti-doping agency, developed and proposed a potential model

for the organization’s structure and displayed persistence and determination at the 2003

World Conference. All of this greatly contributed to the unanimous adoption of The

Code.49 Likewise, he has generated significant visibility for the organization as a direct

result of his dynamic presence and personality, all the while keeping two powerful ‘egos’

in check and working together towards a common goal.50

His tremendous success as WADA Chairperson begs the question ‘is Richard

Pound WADA?’ Despite his obvious importance to the organization, the answer is no.

While Pound has been an effective force in the accomplishments WADA has achieved to

date, the contributions of other expert personnel cannot and should not be discounted.

WADA has become more than the sum of its parts and it will continue to grow, thrive

and succeed long after Pound’s departure.51 Yet, although many people agree that he is “a

profoundly competent chairperson,”52 disagreement does exist when assessing his

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importance. For example, the comment made in late November 2005 that “he suspects as

many as one-third of the NHL’s seven hundred players may take some form of

performance-enhancing substances,” raised questions regarding his forthright approach.

Some consider this accusation, initially made without providing supporting evidence, to

have contributed nothing constructive to the problem of drug use in sport.54 Yet, despite

the criticism, others argue that it was beneficial. It ‘stirred the pot,’ thus generating

greater awareness to the drug problem in professional sport, a future challenge facing

WADA which will be discussed later in the chapter. Pound’s assertion concerning the use

of performance-enhancing substances and the resulting media frenzy forced the NHL to

respond, thus drawing attention to its approach to anti-doping and highlighting its

inconsistencies with The Code.

Pound’s aggressive leadership style gamers support c from both sides of the

debate. However, “whether you love him or hate him, at the end of the day he got results

and got the job done.”55 With the task of getting WADA up and running accomplished,

having a new chairperson with different strengths, expertise and leadership techniques

could prove enormously advantageous for WADA.56

While Pound has been an important component of WADA’s achievements thus

far, the attraction of expert personnel to the organization has been a critical component of

its success. Such individuals as Brian Mikkelsen, Ame Lujungqvist, David Howman,

Vyacheslav Festisov, Richard Young and Harri Syvasalmi, to name a few, are and were

driving forces in WADA’s success.57 The advice, support and assistance extended to

WADA from a variety of expert sources cannot be overlooked. This includes ethicists,

lawyers, doctors, scientists, lab technicians, financial analysts and advisors, athletes and

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coaches. Without such professionals, WADA could not carry out its mandate. Moreover,

in addition to their individual contributions and expertise, these experts sit on committees

and boards which address important issues and make critical decisions concerning

WADA and the anti-doping movement as a whole. The commitment, determination and

resolve that these individuals’ possess, represent an important element of WADA’s

overall success. They are undoubtedly an integral part of WADA’s organizational

fortitude.58

Transparency and Accountability

Transparency involves the quantity and quality of information organizations

disclose both internally and externally.59 Such transparency permits stakeholders a

greater understanding of an organization’s operations.60 Once transparency has been

demonstrated, the doors are open to meet accountability requirements.61 At WADA’s

inaugural board meeting on 13 January 2000, Richard Pound stated that

WADA was an independent agency which had to demonstrate through its actions and commitment that it was worthy of public confidence and of the confidence of the athletes whose interests and integrity it was charged with protecting. To win this confidence the Agency had to be accountable, effective, transparent, and above reproach, one concerned solely with the ethical integrity of sport.62

Transparency and accountability, the fourth characteristic of a credible organization, is

clearly seen as critical to WADA’s success. To demonstrate the organization’s

transparency, WADA ensures that its stakeholders and the public at large have

unrestricted access to all of its resources. This is accomplished by publication of all

documents and materials online. For example, press conferences and releases,

conventions, minutes from meetings, presentations, testing statistics, annual reports and

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more are made available online shortly after their release. This unlimited access sends a

direct message to its stakeholder and the public at large that WADA understands the

importance of being transparent and that they are committed to ensuring that it is upheld.

As previously identified, WADA was constructed as a unique hybrid organization

that is governed and funded equally by the Olympic movement and public authorities.

As a result of this equal representation, no one stakeholder can exert greater influence,

power, or control beyond that of another. Transparency is therefore supported by

maintaining a balance of power among stakeholders and ensuring that open and public

disclosure is sustained. Likewise, implementing a protocol for a rotating chairperson has

helped to foster open and clear communication among stakeholders.64

Through the development and implementation of various programs and initiatives,

WADA has worked to ensure that transparency is promoted throughout the anti-doping

community. The need for such transparency was due, in part, to the unbridled suspicions

that the IOC had previously covered up positive drug tests.65 WADA, in an attempt to

regain the public’s confidence, as well as uphold the ethical integrity of sport,

successfully introduced an Independent Observer program (10) at the 2000 Sydney

Olympic Games.66 The 10 program helps improve and enhance both athlete and public

confidence in major sporting events by randomly monitoring and reporting on all phases

of the doping control and results management processes in a neutral and unbiased

manner.67 The implementation of this initiative alone has helped establish a more open

and transparent doping control operation,68 while marking a turning point in the

accountability for testing under the control of the IOC.69 Moreover, the program ensures 7 n transparent doping control procedures and adds credibility to the testing itself. To

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complement the 10 program, WADA introduced an out-of-competition testing program

which has been recognized as the most effective means of deterrence and detection and is

an important step in strengthening athlete and public confidence in doping-free sport.71

When WADA was established in Lausanne, Switzerland in November 1999,

stakeholders intended to make sure that its mandate would be global. To 77promote this,

WADA established regional offices in Lausanne, Switzerland, Tokyo, Japan, Cape Town,

South Africa, and Montevideo, Uruguay. These regional offices share core roles and

responsibilities with all other offices and carry out a number of duties in conjunction with

the head office in Montreal. 77 The establishment of these regional offices attracts a

greater number of individuals and organizations that have expressed a vested interest in

anti-doping. This, in turn, broadens WADA’s scope of responsibility, and thus the

number of stakeholders to whom they are accountable. Should one of WADA’s Regional

Anti-Doping Organizations fail, for example, WADA is accountable to all parties

involved.

The discussion surrounding WADA’s independence, trust, transparency and

accountability begs the question: Could WADA have created the World Anti-Doping

Code without first establishing itself as a credible organization? Likewise, could the IOC

have developed a World Anti-Doping Code? Based on the available information to date,

the answer to both questions is clearly no. Without the necessary elements (mandate,

tools, independence, personnel, transparency and accountability) an international strategy

for anti-doping in sport could not have been achieved. WADA is looked upon as

representing a collective voice; this voice would not be heard if trust and confidence in its

structure, programs and processes was lacking.

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Having established WADA as a modem, credible organization, this assumption

will now be addressed relative to the six sub-questions identified in chapter three. The

conclusions which answer questions one and two demonstrate the need for a credible

organization. The conclusions which answers questions three through six address the

impact that the credible organization has had on the development of an international

strategy for anti-doping in sport.

Prior to WADA’s development, there were a limited number of anti-doping

policies and procedures employed by governments and sport federations. Moreover, these

policies and procedures lacked cohesion and were in fact operating independently of each

other, resulting in a piecemeal approach.74 Such an environment saw little progress in the

fight against doping in sport, clearly demonstrating that the policies in place were having

a minimal effect on the elimination of doping in sport. The dissonance among policies,

the lack of trust towards existing doping protocols, and the unending doping offences

pointed to the need for a modem credible organization to be established, in order to

harmonize anti-doping policies and procedure and unite organizations.

As previously identified, one of the central issues behind the development of an

international strategy for anti-doping in sport was the lack of trust and confidence in the

drug testing mandate and protocol employed by the IOC during the Olympic Games.

WADA, in an effort to position itself as a modem credible organization, required it to

gain the tmst and confidence of its stakeholders. By establishing transparency and

accountability while achieving its independence, WADA has distinguished itself as a

credible organization which possesses the means to carry out its stated mandate.

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Therefore, the development of credibility created a foundation for trust from which the

harmonization of anti-doping efforts could evolve.

Without agencies and institutions buying into the position taken by WADA as a

credible organization, the movement as a whole would have had little chance of

achieving its mandate. By employing key agencies and institutions that believe and buy

into the values being portrayed, WADA is in a much better position to steer

organizational efforts to achieve its mandate. Moreover, without securing the necessary

personnel, an organization cannot achieve credibility.75 The acquisition of expert and key

personnel has led WADA forward thus enabling the organization to carry out its stated

mandate. Likewise, the fact that WADA is not structured as a governmental organization

will ensure that it is not significantly influenced by governmental swing; rather, it will be

directed by the collective voice of the key personalities and individuals who have a

vested interest and involvement in eliminating doping in sport.

To acquire and maintain societal trust, an organization must exhibit credibility.

Obtaining the required trust leads to the development of confidence which eventually

equates to greater organizational support. For WADA, garnering public confidence

enabled the organization to move forward with the necessary support, thus enhancing

their global image. This, in turn, has fostered the development of a more accepting

environment within which the promotion of an international strategy for anti-doping in

sport can be accomplished.

Therefore, it can be concluded that WADA has had a substantive impact on the

development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport. Current indications

suggest that WADA will continue to uphold its mandate and proceed forward playing a

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directive and significant role in the ongoing development, implementation and

monitoring of policies related to doping in sport.

Future Challenges

WADA is a relatively new initiative when considered against the long-term

campaign to eliminate drug use in sport. Although having achieved tremendous success

in its founding years, optimism must be tempered with an acknowledgement of the

challenges that lie ahead.7f t

Greater Clarity o f Mandate:

One ongoing challenge involves re-evaluation and refining of WADA’s

mandate.77 An unresolved issue remains: does WADA exist primarily to provide anti-

doping services to ISFs and countries, or is it a governing body/standards setting

organization that sets rules and polices them?78 This dual role does not fit comfortably

together. 70 If WADA’s future role is to set standards and police them, while reviewing

ISF and national programs, then it has a clear set of responsibilities. However, if WADA

is also providing services that are measured against its own standards, who ensures that

OA WADA meets those standards? Thus, it is important that WADA identify and work

towards an organizational framework that promotes clear lines of responsibility and thus

accountability, and avoids any conflicts of interest. An additional challenge involves

maintaining an appropriate balance between the sport and government relationship, thus

ensuring a complimentary and non-adversarial working environment.

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Advances in Science: O'! Science, and its ever evolving nature, presents another challenge for WADA.

Staying up-to-date with scientific advances is fundamental. More specifically, WADA

must be prepared to address gene doping and the advent of genetically modified athletes

who are expected to make their first appearance, covertly, at The Beijing Olympic Games

in 2008.84 Currently, some athletes are engaging in doping activities that are more

advanced and systematic than their predecessors.85 As such, continued research, funding

and education geared towards the ever-changing realm of performance enhancing

methods is required. In the last six years, WADA has contributed roughly $30 million US

to research alone;86 despite evidence that the scientific gap is closing, there is still work to

07 be done and progress to be made.

Legal Challenges:

A third challenge facing WADA involves the law and pending legal attacks based

on such things as tests, labs and sanctions. An example involves the recent Bay Area

Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO) scandal where numerous procedural obstacles

impeded the United States Olympic Committee’s (USOC) investigation.• The00 legal

challenges WADA has faced, and will continue to face, reflect issues of fairness, liability

and human rights. It has been argued that athlete consent has been dramatically

OQ overlooked. Some claim that athletes are asked to surrender rights that no other member

of society must relinquish.90 For instance, an athlete’s whereabouts must be known three

hundred and sixty-five days a year to ensure availability for testing. Yet, in no other

profession is this level of reporting required. Likewise, as identified by Lachance, some

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athletes contend that the testing to which they are subject is inconvenient and invasive.91

This begs the question, ‘What will happen if athletes worldwide unite to develop their

own convention or code?’

Through his research, which addresses the issue of protecting an athlete’s human

rights, Park suggests that actions taken by athletes to passively refuse WADA’s rules,

codes and standards could become a point of departure for reinventing one’s identity as

an athlete, as well as a means of counter challenges to WADA’s authority.• Q By ?

establishing an Athletes’ Committee, WADA has begun to recognize and address these

concerns. Nevertheless, continued action and adherence is required. WADA must

continue to be mindful of athletes’ rights amidst their quest for drug-free sport.93 The

limited literature which supports this notion suggests that if athletes, individuals who are

integral to WADA’s success, were to subtly erode confidence or support for the

organization, it would be detrimental to WADA and the entire anti-doping campaign.94

Monitoring Code Compliance:

Where The Code is concerned, a practical challenge facing WADA involves its

authority, that is, its ability to ensure that The Code is implemented consistently,

regularly and globally 95 WADA is striving to certify that within every country and sport,

rules and regulations are evenly applied. Likewise, an immediate issue WADA must

address is the process or mechanism through which Code compliance will be

monitored.96

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Professional Sport:

A final challenge that WADA faces involves securing the adoption of The Code

within all professional sports. While many professional sport organizations are already

onboard, there remains a predominant aversion to The Code in North American

professional leagues.97 Globally, there are a number of professional sports which are

Code compliant and financially sound, demonstrating that compliance does not prohibit

financial gains. Gaelic and Aussie Rules football, as well as both European and Asian

cycling, football, volleyball and basketball have each adopted The Code. OR The anomaly

lies predominantly within North America; Japanese and Korean baseball and sumo

wresting are also non-compliant."

The primary reason lies in the fact that professional sport, as compared with

amateur sport, is not beholden to international governing bodies, rules or standards and

typically places the business of entertainment above all else.100 Professional sport will go

to great lengths to ensure that a strong entertainment value is provided, including the

lenient treatment of drug abuse.101 Opting for non-compliance demonstrates that

professional teams have not yet recognized the inherent risks that doping can pose to their

players, organization, business and fans.

Recently, the foundation of Major League Baseball has been shaken as a direct

result of drug related scandals involving marquee players such as Barry Bonds, Mark

McGuire, Jose Conseco and Jason Giambi.102 Where doping is concerned, although an

investigation is pending, Major League Baseball along with other North American

professional teams have considerable ground to make up and major changes to

implement.103 According to Howman, the challenge is to break through the resistance

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encountered from the major leagues in the United States, which are essentially protected

by its private ownership and their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).104

I consider, and rightly so, that these [CBAs & private ownership] are not transparent, and that they are not owning up to public responsibility of ensuring that the public has the knowledge to believe these sports are as clean as they can possibly be.105

It is clear that much work and posturing needs to be done before WADA can

bring North American professional sports, and other professional sports, into compliance.

Future Research

Throughout this study, a number of areas for future research presented

themselves. Given that the study of anti-doping in sport is embryonic in nature, further

research is warranted. For example, accessing documents from the IOC headquarters in

Lausanne, Switzerland would likely provide significant material that could add

considerably to the existing knowledge base.

Beyond the confines of this study, important and interesting questions remain

unanswered. For instance, why did it take ten years for Dubin’s recommendation, for the

establishment an international independent anti-doping agency, to become a reality?

Given the delay, did professional sport, specifically North American professional sport,

affect the delayed development of an international independent anti-doping agency?

From an athlete’s perspective, who are the key athletes involved with promoting anti-

doping and what is their role? Likewise, do athletes perceive WADA as a credible

organization, and if not, what are the consequences? In addition, to evaluate the impact of

WADA’s anti-doping development programs, one could investigate the success of

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WADA’s grassroots development programs, specifically the Regional Anti-Doping

Organizations?

Furthermore, this study has identified areas which could be addressed in the

future. Specifically, where organizational leadership is concerned, how might Pound’s

departure as Chairperson effect, on all levels, WADA and the anti-doping movement

more generally?106 Moreover, what impact might the implementation of the UNESCO

Convention have on various governments’ approach to anti-doping? In six years time,

future researchers could ask to what extent has WADA matched the success it achieved

in its founding six years? As a result of the ever-evolving nature of science and its impact

on anti-doping, how will WADA address the advent of genetically modified athletes?

Despite the controversy that surrounded the establishment of an international

independent anti-doping agency, this research initiative has left little doubt that WADA

became a major force against the global and rapidly evolving problem of drug use in

sport.107 Prior to the formation of WADA, anti-doping efforts received only partial

support and were addressed through a limited number of fragmented programs. 10K

WADA, and the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport, are

representative of the ongoing battle against drugs in sport.109 This research initiative has

sought to address the gap identified at the outset of this study, namely, that research

focusing on WADA and the importance/impact of an international strategy for anti-

doping in sport is limited. As such, it is hoped that this study has, in part, contributed to a

greater understanding of the central issues which led to WADA’s inception as well as the

organization’s impact on the development of a World Anti-Doping Code. Although

controversy and criticism surrounding WADA’s usefulness, purpose and success will

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undoubtedly persist, this research study has provided a basis for undertaking further

analysis into what will be required to sustain worldwide progress against doping in sport.

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Endnotes

1 David Osborne and Ted Gabler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company) 1992; Paul Jenkins, “Globalization and Public Policy: Lessons from Central Banking,” (presentation, Wilmot Distinguished Lecture Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, November 14, 2005).

2 Jenkins, “Globalization and Public Policy: Lessons from Central Banking.”

3 WADA Website, “Constitutive Instrument of Foundation of the World Anti-Doping Agency,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/constitutive_instrument_foundation.pdf (accessed April 11, 2006).

4 Richard Pound (WADA Chairperson), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005, interview 004, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

5 Joseph dePencier (Director Sport Services / General Counsel), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16, 2006, interview 005, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

6 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, January 13,2000, Olympic House, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

7 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15th, 2005; David Howman (Director General WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006.

8 Charles L. Dubin, Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1990), p. 540.

9 Michelle Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in sport,” Bailliere’s Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 14 (2000): p. 31.

10 Michelle Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in sport,” Drugs in Sport 3rd ed. ed David R. Mottram (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 59.

11 Laurence Chalip, “Critical Policy Analysis: The Illustrative Case of New Zealand Sport Policy Development,” Journal o f Sport Management 10 (1996): p. 312.

12 WADA Website, “The World Anti-Doping Code,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2? pageCategory.id=267 (accessed February 15,2006).

13 Ibid.

14 Richard Pound (WADA Chairperson), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005, interview 004, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario; Casey Wade (former Director of Education and Planning WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28, 2006, interview 009, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

15 Casey Wade (former director of Education and Planning WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14,2005, interview 003, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor.

16 WADA Website, “Mission Statement,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=255 (accessed March 12,2006).

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17 WADA Website, “Copenhagen Declaration,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ declaration_en.doc (accessed March 14,2006).

18 Scott Martyn and Stephen Wenn, “Establishing ‘A narrative of Continuity’: The Salt Lake City Bid Scandal and the IOC’s Communications and Management Program” (presentation, 13th Commonwealth International Sport Conference, Melbourne Australia, March 9-12,2006). In late November 1998, Richard Pound received a fax concerning a report, aired by Salt Lake City’s KTVX Channel 4, concerning a college sponsorship granted to the late Rene Essomba’s daughter Sonia, prior to the IOC’s Budapest Session in 1995 when Salt Lake City secured privileges for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games.

19 John Hoberman, “Offering the Illusion of Reform on Drugs: Failing to define doping out of Existence, Samaranch tries an Olympic-Size Gesture,” New York Times, January 10,1999.

20 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

21 Ibid.

22 “IOC’s drug agency drawing fire,” The Montreal Gazette, November 16, 1999, http://webvoy .uwindsor.ca:2048/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?did=l 9835299 l&sid=l&Fmt= 3&clientId=2241&RQT=309& VName=PDQ (accessed February 20,2006).

23 “Pound heads drug agency,” The Montreal Gazette, December 2, 1999, http://webvoy.uwindsor.ca:2048/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb?did=l 983 80751 &sid= 1 &Fmt= 3&clientId=2241&RQT=309& VName=PDQ (accessed February 20, 2006).

24 WADA Website, “Organizational Composition,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2? pageCategory.id=258 (accessed April 13,2006).

25 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

29 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006.

30 Casey Wade (former director of Education and Planning WADA), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 14,2005, interview 003, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor.

31 “Sports in Brief: Anti-Doping: Coderre wants Canadian lab,” The Globe and Mail, January 11th, 2000.

32 Casey Wad, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28, 2006.

33 Ibid.

34 Stanford Web Credibility, “What makes a Website Credible?” www.webcredibility.org (accessed April 28, 2006).

35 Ibid.

36 Jenkins, “Globalization and Public Policy: Lessons from Central Banking.”

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37 Okey Chigbo, “The go-to guy, Richard Pound,” Strength Beyond numbers - camagazine.com August 2000, http://www.camagazine.eom/index.cfm/ci_id/6178/la_id/l.htm. (accessed April 7, 2006).

38 Barrie Houlihan, “The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success,” in Drugs and Doping in Sport: Socio-Legal Perspectives, ed. John O’Leary (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001), p. 145.

39 Chigbo, “The go-to guy, Richard Pound.”

40 Houlihan, The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success, p. 145.

41 Chigbo, “The go-to guy, Richard Pound.”

42 “Cycling: A Call for Doping Changes,” The New York Times, July 27, 1998, http://query.nytimes. com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0DEFDClF39F934A15754C0A96E958260 (accessed May 16,2006).

43 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005. According to Pound, what was interesting about what Samaranch said was the juxtaposition between what he had always said in public, which was “that doping is danger, doping is death, that doping is contrary to every ethical precept in sport, its dangerous”... and here he comes along and says “for me this is not doping.”

44 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 The following list summarizes Richard Pound’s IOC involvement: Member of the Executive Board (1983-1991,1992-1996); Vice-President of the IOC (1987-1991,1996-2000). Chairman of the following Commissions: Protection of the Olympic Games (1981-1983), Television rights negotiations (1983-2001), Marketing (former “New Sources of Financing”, 1988-2001), Coordination of the Olympic Games, 1996 (1991-1996), Olympic Games Study (2002); Vice-Chairman of the Eligibility Commission (1990-1991). Member of the following Commissions: Preparation of the XII Olympic Congress (1988-1989), Protection of the Emblems (1974-1977), Eligibility (1984-1987), Olympic Movement (1983-1991, 1992-1999), Program (1985-1987), Juridical (1993-), Study of the Centennial Olympic Congress, Congress of Unity (1994-1996), Sport and Law (1995-), “IOC 2000” (Executive Committee, 1999). The Olympic Program (TOP), now referred to as The Olympic Partners, is a sponsorship program that Pound devised to create a more reliable source of income for the Olympic Movement. Created in 1985, the TOP program, managed by the IOC, is the only sponsorship with the exclusive worldwide marketing rights to both Winter and Summer Games. TOP companies receive exclusive marketing rights and opportunities within their designated product category. They may exercise these rights on a worldwide basis, and they may develop marketing programmes with the various members of the Olympic Movement - the IOC, the NOCs, and the Organising Committees. For further information please visit The Olympic Website at http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/facts/programme/sponsors_uk.asp Although very successful, TOP is not considered Pound’s greatest Olympic marketing triumph; it is the millions of dollars generated for the Olympic Movement via the television rights deals Pound has struck with the networks. For example, TV contracts for the 1988 Calgary Olympics generated US$325 million; in Atlanta 1996, US$930 million and for Sydney 2000, Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008, Pound has negotiated with NBC a contract worth US$4.2 billion. For further information on this topic and others, please consult Chigbo, “The go-to guy, Richard Pound.”

48 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

49 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15,2005.

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50 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005. The two powerful egos represent government and sport; two organizations that traditionally have not work well together.

51 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28,2006.

52 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

53 Jim Kemaghan, “One-third of NHLers use drugs, Pound says,” The London Free Press, November 25th, 2006.

54 Paul Melia (CEO of CCES), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006, interview 007, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Ontario.

55 Victor Lachance (former CEO of the CCES), interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006, interview 006, transcript, Leddy Library, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario.

56 Ibid.

57 Brian Mikkelsen (Vice Chair of the Foundation Board and Executive Committee and Minister of Sport Denmark), Arne Ljungqvist (President of the IOC Medical Commission, member of WADA Foundation Board and Executive Committee), David Howman (Director General WADA), Vyacheslav Fetisov (Council of Europe Representative on WADA Foundation Board), Richard Young (Attorney Holmes, Roberts and Owens, member of WADA Foundation Board), Harri Syvasalmi (former Dircetor General WADA). For further information please consult the WADA Website, http://www.wada- ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=258

58 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

59 BJ Fogg, Jonathan Marshall, Othman Laraki, Alex Osipovich, Chris Varma, Nicholas Fang, Jyoti Paul, Akshay Rangnekar, John Shon, Preeti Swani and Marissa Trinenn “What makes Web SitesCredible? A Report on a Large Quantitative Study,” http://credibility.stanford.edu/resources.html (accessed April 28, 2006).

60 Jenkins, “Globalization and Public Policy: Lessons from Central Banking.”

6! Ibid.

62 Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Board of the World Anti-Doping Agency, January 13,2000, Olympic House, Lausanne, Switzerland, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

63 WADA Website, “Organizational Composition,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2? pageCategory.id=258 (accessed April 13, 2006).

64 Ole Sorenson, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13,2005.

65 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

66 Minutes of the 112th Meeting of The International Olympic Committee General Session, 13-16 July, 2001, Moscow, in the possession of Mr. Richard Pound, Stikeman Elliott Law Firm, Montreal, Quebec.

67 WADA Website, “Independent Observers,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=266 (accessed February 15,2006).

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68 Minutes of the Meeting of WADA’s Health, Medical and Research Committee, 15-16 October, 2000, Montreal Canada, retrieved from WADA Website, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/ 151000.pdf (accessed January 23,2006).

69 Michele Verroken, “Drug use and abuse in Sport,” in Drugs in Sport 4th. ed.ed, David R. Mottram (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 61.

70 Silken Laumann, “Taking necessary steps toward true credibility,” The Globe and Mail, September 27, 2000.

71 WADA Website, “Doping Control,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=328 (accessed March 1, 2006).

72 WADA Website, “Regional Offices,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=261 (accessed April 28, 2006).

73 Ibid.

74 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006.

75 Jenkins, “Globalization and Public Policy: Lessons from Central Banking.”

76 Houlihan, The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success, p. 145.

77 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006.

82 Ibid.

83 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

84 B Kayser, A Mauron and A Miah, “Legislation of performance enhancing drugs in sport,” The Lancet: Medicine and Sport 366 (2005), http://www.thelancet.com/joumals (accessed January 23, 3006).

85 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

86 Richard Pound, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

87 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

88 Ibid.; Victor Conte, founder of the California-based Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO), faced federal charges for distributing steroids and other illegal performance-enhancing drugs to athletes. His list of clients included such star athletes as Barry Bonds, Oakland Raider linebacker Bill Romanowski and Olympic sprint champion Marion Jones. For further information please consult http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=297995

89 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006.

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90 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

91 Victor Lachance, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 16,2006.

92 Jin-Kyung Park, “Governing Doped Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency and the Global Culture of Surveillance,” Cultural Studies, Critical Methodologies 5 (2005): p. 185.

93 Ibid.

94 Andrew Pipe, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 13, 2005.

95 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24, 2006.

96 Casey Wade, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, February 28, 2006.

97 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006.

98 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

99 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19,2006.

100 Paul Melia, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 19, 2006.

101 Ibid.

102 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 16,2005.

103 Ibid.

104 David Howman, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, January 24,2006.

105 Ibid.

106 Joseph dePencier, interview by Caitlin Jenkins, December 15, 2005.

107 Houlihan, The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success, p. 145.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

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APPENDIX I

A Chronology of Anti-doping Policy Development and the Formation of WADA

1920 • Britain enacted The Dangerous Drug Act. Its primary focus was to restrict the availability of cocaine and opium to prescription only; therefore, not addressing the issue of drug use in sport.

1928 • The IAAF becomes the first ISF to ban the use of drugs.

1963 • The IOC publishes the first prohibited list.

1965 • National Anti-Doping Legislation adopted by France and Belgium in order to deal with a growing problem of amphetamine use in cycling. In France, this anti-doping law became known as Loi Herzog.

1966 • FIFA among one of the first ISFs to introduce drug testing at the World Cup in England.

1967 • UCI introduces Medical Examination Regulation.

1967 • The Council of Europe Members adopt a Resolution on doping, the first international text of its kind which stressed the moral, ethical and health issues at stake for athletes who dope.

1968 • At the Summer and Winter Olympic Games the IOC employs, for the first time, a list of prohibited substances. Likewise, at the Summer Games the first ever, although rather limited, drug testing occurred.

1970 • Britain identified doping as an issue for its newly founded Sports Council.

1971 • Anti-Doping Legislation adopted by Italy and Turkey.

1972 • First full scale and successful drug testing carried out at The Munich Olympic Games.

1977 • IAAF’s Medical Commission introduces mandatory drug testing.

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1978 • The IAAF introduces an eighteen month suspension for serious doping offences.

1983 • Drug testing is carried out at The Pan-American Games Caracas, Venezuela. The testing resulted in nineteen disqualifications, two of which included Canadian weightlifters.

1983 • The Pan American Games incident prompts accelerated development by The Canadian Federal Government to implement a national anti-doping policy and program. • The Federal Minister responsible for sport issues a policy, Drug Use and Doping Control, in December 1983.

1984 • The Council of Europe adopts the European Anti-Doping Charter.

1985 • The Canadian Federal Government anti-doping policy is strengthened. The policy is extended to include all illegal and unethical physiological manipulations, and the penalties for first-time doping infractions involving steroids are extended from a minimum one-year ineligibility for federal funding to life time ineligibility.

1985 • Development of The Nordic Anti-Doping Convention; a multilateral agreement among Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland.

1988 • A bilateral doping control agreement is signed between the American and Soviet Olympic Committees. One year later, in 1989, this agreement was extended to include nine additional nations.

June 1988 • Canada hosts The First Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Sport. An outgrowth of this conference was the development of The International Charter against Doping in Sport.

September 1988 • Ben Johnson tests positive for the anabolic steroid Stanozolo at the Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea.

1989 • The Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (The Dubin Inquiry) unfolds in Ottawa, Canada. • Moscow hosts The Second Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Sport.

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November 1989 • The Council of Europe Anti-Doping Charter is re-designated as a Convention.

July 1998 • The incident at the 1998 Tour de France involving the seizure of banned substances acts as the catalyst in launching a collaborative fight against doping on a global scale.

1990 • IADA outlines The International Standards for Doping Control (ISDC).

March 1990 • The Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention enters into force.

February 1999 • The IOC hostsThe World Conference on Doping in Sport, Lausanne, Switzerland. • Development of The Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport. This document provided for the creation of an independent international anti-doping agency to be fully operation for the Games of XXVII Olympiad in Sydney 2000.

November 1999 • Pursuant to the terms of The Lausanne Declaration, The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established on 10 November 1999 in Lausanne, Switzerland to promote and co-ordinate the fights against doping in sport internationally.

January 2000 • Inaugural Meeting of The World Anti-Doping Agency.

August 2001 • WADA’s Foundation Board voted to moved its headquarters from Lausanne, Switzerland to Montreal, Canada.

April 2002 • Montreal headquarters inaugurated.

March 2003 • Second World Conference on Doping in Sport is hosted in Copenhagen, Denmark. • Twelve hundred delegates representing eighty governments, the IOC, the IPC, all Olympic Sports, National Olympic and Paralympic Committees, athletes, National Anti-Doping Organizations, and international agencies unanimously agreed to adopt the World Anti-Doping Code as the basis for the fight against doping in sport. • The Copenhagen Declaration was created. It is a political document through which governments articulate their moral understanding and intention to formally recognize and implement the World Anti-Doping Code. • In addition to supporting The Code politically, The

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Declaration included an undertaking that governments would reach a new international anti-doping convention. • This convention would formally and legally commit governments, under international law, to support WADA and support anti-doping; thus ensuring that their national programs and policies were consistent with WADA’s programs and the principles for The Code. • The Process of developing an international convention, which represents the practical tool to align domestic policy with The Code, fell under the auspices of The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

October 2005 • WADA welcomed with great satisfaction the unanimous adoption of the first International Convention against Doping in Sport by the General Conference of UNESCO. • The adoption of The UNESCO Convention is a strong signal of the commitment of the governments worldwide to the fight against doping in sport. • Until now, governments could not be legally bound by a non-governmental document such as The Code. Accordingly, governments drafted the UNESCO Convention, enabling them to align their domestic legislation with The Code and thereby harmonizing the sport and public legislation in the fight against doping in sport. • Under UNESCO procedures for this Convention, thirty countries must ratify the Convention prior to 31 December 2005, in order for it to become effective in time for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games.

December 2005 • One hundred and eighty-two countries have signed the Copenhagen Declaration. • More than five hundred and seventy sports organizations have already adopted The Code.

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APPENDIX II

Historical Overview: Canadian Anti-Doping Program (1968-2005)

Distinction Between Different Types of Testing

• Canada’s Domestic Program : The anti-doping program conducted at the national level pursuant to the Canadian Policy on Doping in Sport. • Major/International Games: Single-sport and multi-sport events that are conducted at the international level in Canada, such as, World Cups, World Championships, Pan American Games, World Student Games, Commonwealth Games and Canada Games. • Contract Service: Any other testing performed at the request of national and international sport organizations.

1968 • The International Olympic Committee (IOC) publishes first banned list of drugs for the 1968 Summer Olympics.

1975 • Canada's first positive test result for a non-steroid infraction occurs at the 1975 Pan American Games. A Bronze medal is withdrawn from the athlete. It is widely believed to have been an inadvertent positive arising from self-administration of a cold tablet containing a banned drug.

1976 • Extensive testing occurs during the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. Testing is carried out at the IOC-accredited laboratory in Montreal, developed specifically to conduct sample analysis for the Olympics.

1981 • Canada's first positive test result for steroids occurs at the Pacific Conference Games of Athletics in New Zealand. The test result is challenged by the athlete on the grounds that oral contraceptives may have produced a false positive. Attempts to replicate the circumstances through a research project were unsuccessful and the positive test result is upheld.

1982 • The Sport Medicine Council of Canada (SMCC) conducts an extensive survey on doping in amateur sport among 1,500 Canadian athletes, coaches, medical and para-medical practitioners. The response rate among athletes in sports where doping is regarded as possible is relatively low. Fewer that 5 percent of athletes stated they were using or had previously used performance-enhancing substances.

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1983 Two Canadian athletes in weightlifting test positive for steroids at the Pan American Games in Caracas, Venezuela. The departure of athletes from the Games following the announcement of doping controls prior to the start of competition generates speculation that athletes are deliberately avoiding testing. The Pan American Games incident prompts accelerated development by the Federal Government of a national anti-doping policy and program. The Federal Minister responsible for sport issues a policy, Drug Use and Doping Control, in December 1983. The Federal Government asks the SMCC to establish an Advisory Committee on Anti-doping in Amateur Sport. Four Canadian athletes in weightlifting are apprehended at Mirabel airport and charged with various offences related to importing banned drugs. All charges are later dropped.

1984 As part of the new Federal Government policy, national sport organizations are asked to develop policies and plans for their respective sport. Activities in the spring and summer of 1984 focus primarily on the development of policies and the testing of athletes in the period leading up to the summer Olympics in Los Angeles. The SMCC enters into a contract for the analysis of samples at the IOC-accredited INRS Sante Laboratory in Montreal. A slide show on Doping in Amateur Sport is produced along with a resource kit for use by resource persons with medical, scientific and sport backgrounds. Two weightlifting athletes test positive in tests just prior to the Los Angeles Olympic Games. The athletes are withdrawn from the Olympic team and return to Canada.

1985 The contract with INRS Sante Laboratory is extended for four years and includes sample analysis, research and consultative services. The SMCC Advisory Committee continues its work on the development of Standard Operating Procedures for doping control. Six Canadian athletes test positive for steroids: four in weightlifting, one in athletics, and one in swimming. Testing for doping is conducted at the Canada Summer Games for the first time, in two sports: cycling and athletics. Sport Canada and the SMCC co-produce a comprehensive anti- doping education package. Canada is formally represented for the first time at the Council of Europe's Committee for the Development of Sport/Expert Group on Doping. Canada gains first-hand knowledge of the experience of other nations in Europe working on anti-doping campaigns. Two weightlifting athletes from the Soviet Union are found to have large quantities of steroids in their possession during the course of entering Canada for a competition.

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• The Canadian Federal anti-doping policy is strengthened. The policy is extended to include illegal and unethical physiological manipulations, and the penalties for first-time doping infractions involving steroids are extended from a minimum one-year ineligibility for federal funding to life-time ineligibility.

1986 • Arbitration procedures are created to permit a further level of appeal for athletes wishing to challenge doping penalties. • National sport organizations continue the development and implementation of anti-doping plans. However, infractions for steroid use continue to occur: three in athletics and one in weightlifting.

1987 • The Canadian Olympic Association issues its policy on doping which respects the determination of positive test results by other sport governing bodies and provides for a hearing before the imposition of penalties. • The Canadian Weightlifting Federation begins out-of-competition testing on a short-notice basis. • The SMCC Advisory Committee successfully challenges the IOC decision to ban the use of norethisterone on the grounds that the inability to use this drug may impair the reproductive health of female athletes. • Testing of athletes is conducted in four sports at the Canada Winter Games - boxing, wrestling, weightlifting and cross-country skiing.

1988 • A system for training independent Doping Control Officers is implemented to ensure adherence with doping control protocols. • Canada hosts the First Permanent World Conference on Anti- doping in Sport. • Ben Johnson’s positive test for the anabolic steroid Stanozolo at the Summer Olympic Games in Seoul, Korea • Five test positive for steroids: four in weightlifting and one in athletics. These infractions lead to the Commission o f Inquiry into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (the Dubin Inquiry). • Federal and provincial-territorial sport ministers agree to pursue joint actions in the fight against doping in sport. 1989

1989 • Testimony at the Dubin Inquiry begins in January and lasts 91 days with 122 witnesses including athletes, coaches, sport administrators, IOC representatives, doctors and government officials. • At the 1989 Canada Summer Games, doping controls are conducted in five sports: athletics, rowing, cycling, canoeing and wrestling. Hereafter, drug testing becomes standard practice at all Canada Games.

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• The SMCC Advisory Committee revises the Doping Control Standard Operating Procedures and develops Canadian protocols for unannounced doping control. • The Second Permanent World Conference on Anti-doping in Sport is held in Moscow. Representatives of the Federal Government present "A Model for a National Anti-doping Program". • Four Canadian athletes test positive: one in athletics, one in bobsleigh, one in fencing and one in weightlifting.

1990 • Canadian national sport organizations approve anti-doping policies the conform with protocols for unannounced doping control as outlined in the Doping Control Standard Operating Procedures. • Justice Dubin releases his 638-page report on the Commission o f Inquiry Into the Use o f Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, containing 70 recommendations. • Athletes in 25 sports are requested to participate in unannounced doping control. • Fourteen Canadian athletes test positive: one in bobsleigh, two in boxing, three in CIAU football, one in cycling, two in football, two in weightlifting and three in bodybuilding. • The Federal Government signs a tri-lateral anti-doping agreement with Australia and United Kingdom.

1991 • The Minister of State for Youth, Fitness and Amateur Sport announces the creation of an independent anti-doping organization and approves a new Canadian Policy on Penalties for Doping in Sport. • Ten Canadian athletes test positive for banned substances: two in athletics, two in body building, one in boxing, two in CIAU football, one in junior football and two in weightlifting. • The new Canadian Anti-Doping Organization (CADO) is formally launched in September and becomes operational in January 1992.

1992 • CADO conducts approximately 2,600 domestic doping control tests covering 52 amateur sports, of which 55 percent are in the unannounced category with little or no notice to the athlete. • There are a total of 13 domestic doping infractions. • CADO is re-named the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport (CCDS). • CCDS publishes revised Doping Control Standard Operating Procedures.

1993 • Approximately 2,800 domestic doping control tests covering 52 amateur sports are conducted, with 63 percent in the unannounced category. This represents a 14 percent increase over the proportion

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of unannounced tests conducted in 1992. • A total of 20 domestic doping infractions are reported. • The contract for services with the IOC-accredited laboratory in Montreal is expanded and extended. • Standard Operating Procedures for Doping Control are further revised. Appeal mechanisms are refined and a procedure to review requests for reinstatement from doping penalties is created. • A Doping Control Handbook for athletes and coaches is published, along with a booklet summarizing banned and restricted substances and methods and a brochure illustrating doping control procedures.

1994 • Approximately 2,800 domestic doping control tests are conducted, with 72 percent in the unannounced category. This represents a 14 percent increase over the proportion of unannounced tests conducted in 1993 and the highest percentage of any comparable country worldwide that year. • A total of 14 domestic doping infractions are reported. • A national school survey polls over 16,000 young Canadians on their attitudes towards drugs and sport. • The CCDS contracts with the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) to provide doping control services throughout North and Central America. • A program to train and certify Doping Control Officers is launched. • New reinstatement provisions in the Canadian Policy on Penalties for Doping in Sport are introduced.

1995 • Approximately 2,100 domestic doping control tests are conducted, with 76 percent in the unannounced category, the highest proportion of unannounced tests of any comparable country worldwide that year. • A total of 11 domestic doping infractions are reported. • The CCDS merges with Fair Play Canada and is renamed the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES). • CCES conducts a survey of high performance athletes and finds high satisfaction with, and confidence in, the CCES' sample collection procedures.

1996 • A total of 1,819 domestic tests are conducted on Canadian athletes. Of these 1,819 tests, 1,393 (77 percent) are of the unannounced category while 426 (23 percent) are announced. Thirteen infractions occurred in eight different sports: two in athletics, one in blind powerlifting, two in bobsleigh, four in CIAU football, one in equestrian, one in junior football, one in rowing and one in water skiing. • A total of 309 major/international games tests are conducted on

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athletes at 29 events held in Canada during the year. All tests are of the announced category, with no infractions. • A total of 246 doping control contract services tests are conducted for nine client organizations. Seven infractions occur in two different sports: five in bodybuilding and two in powerlifting. • The CCES contracts the services of the Centre for Sport and Law, an independent authority, to coordinate appeals, reinstatements and case reviews under the Canadian Policy on Penalties for Doping in Sport, using independent adjudicators.

1997 • A total of 1,682 domestic tests are conducted on Canadian athletes. Of these 1,682 tests, 1,304 (78 percent) are of the unannounced category, while 378 (22 percent) are announced. Thirteen infractions occur in four sports: six in CIAU football, one in cycling, five in junior football and one in weightlifting. • A total of 415 major/international games tests are conducted on athletes at 46 events held in Canada during the year. All tests are of the announced category. One infraction is observed in athletics during the Canada Summer Games. • A total of 234 doping control contract service tests are conducted for 12 client organizations. Nine infractions occurred in two d ifferent sports: six in bodybuilding and three in powerlifting. • The International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA), an umbrella agency involving Canada and several other countries, completes a Quality Assurance Manual setting out international standards for doping control. It is hoped that widespread use of these standards among sport bodies and drug-free sport agencies will encourage more effective testing worldwide. • CCES enters into a trilateral agreement with the Australian Sports Drug Agency and the United States Olympic Committee to allow for joint research, education and monitoring activities concerning drug use in sport. • CCES handles over 850 medication and supplement inquiries from athletes.

1998 • A total of 1,732 domestic tests are conducted on Canadian athletes. Of these 1,372 tests (79 percent) are of the unannounced category, while 360 (21 percent) are announced. Nine infractions occur in five sports: three in bobsleigh, one in CIAU football, one in diving, three in junior football and one in weightlifting. • A total of 155 major/international games tests are conducted on athletes at 25 different events held in Canada. All tests are of the announced category. One infraction was observed in rugby during the Pacific Rim Series. • A total of 240 doping control contract services tests are conducted four eleven client organizations. Eleven infractions occur in two

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different sports: ten in bodybuilding and one in powerlifting. • CCES handles over 950 medication and supplement inquiries.

1999 • A total of 1,623 domestic tests are conducted on Canadian athletes. Of these 1623 tests, 1,294 (80 percent) are of the unannounced category, while 329 (20 percent) were announced. Four infractions were committed in four different sports: one in athletics, one in cycling, one in water skiing and one in weightlifting. • A total of 1,173 Major/International Games tests are conducted on athletes at 38 events held in Canada. All tests are of the announced category. One infraction occur in the sport of roller hockey during the Pan American Games in Winnipeg. • A total of 245 doping control contract services tests are conducted for eleven client organizations. Twenty-five infractions are recorded in three different sports: 20 in bodybuilding, four in hockey and one in weightlifting. • After extensive consultations with the Canadian sport community, a new Canadian Policy on Doping in Sport is approved, along with improved Canadian Doping Control Regulations, to take effect in January 2000. • After the 1998 Tour de France scandal, in which police seized a large number of prohibited medical substances from cycling teams and coaches, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) convenes a World Conference on Doping in in Sport Lausanne, Switzerland. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is created in November.

2000 • A total of 2,012 domestic tests are conducted on Canadian athletes. Of these 2,012 tests, 1547 (77 percent) are of the unannounced category, while 465 (23 percent) are announced. Sixteen infractions are recorded in eight different sports: three in athletics, one in bobsleigh, one in CIAU football, one in College football, one in equestrian, five in junior football, three in weightlifting and one in wrestling. • A total of 209 major/international games tests are conducted on athletes at thirty-four events held in Canada. All tests are of the announced category. No infractions are recorded. • A total of 201 doping control contract services tests are conduced for nine client organizations. Sixteen infractions are recorded in two sports: thirteen in bodybuilding and three in hockey. • The Canadian doping control program receives ISO 9002 certification (one of the first countries in the world to do so). • Three-quarters of the Canadian Olympic Team is tested prior to attending the Sydney Olympics in September, 2000. • Eight advisory notes are issued on topics ranging from nutritional supplements to the IOC List o f Prohibited Substances and Methods. • CCES assists the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) to conduct

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over 2,500 tests in 83 countries.

2001 • A total of 1,931 domestic tests are conducted on all athletes. Of these tests, 1,920 are conducted on Canadian athletes with 1,288 (67 percent) on an unannounced basis and 632 (33 percent) on an announced basis. Thirteen infractions are recorded in ten different sports: two in athletics, one in biathlon, one in bobsleigh, one in CIS (formerly CIAU) basketball, one in CIS field hockey, one in CIS football, one in CIS ice hockey, one in junior football, one in taekwondo and three in weightlifting. • A total of 921 major/intemational games tests were conducted at 36 events held in Canada resulting in 150 Canadian athletes and 771 foreign athletes being tested. No infractions are reported. • A total of 73 doping control contract service tests are conducted. One infraction is recorded in the sport of bodybuilding. • A total of 430 tests are conducted by the CCES on behalf of the World Anti-Doping Agency. One hundred and fifty-six tests are carried out on Canadian athletes and 274 on foreign athletes. All of these tests are conducted on an unannounced basis, and no infractions are recorded. • At the request of various international federations, the CCES conducts 45 tests on foreign athletes. All of these tests are conducted on an unannounced basis, and no infractions are recorded. • By a vote of 17-15 in the fourth round of balloting WADA's Foundation Board selects Montreal, Canada over Lausanne, Switzwerland (WADA's temporary home) as its permanent headquarters. • A policy on Pre-Games testing is initiated in Canada. Under this policy, all athletes selected to represent Canada at major games (such as world championships and Olympics, Pan-American and Commonwealth Games) are tested in the months before the games. • Briefs and full texts of all Canadian doping jurisprudence are published through the web site of the Centre for Sport and Law.

2002 Domestic Program • 1,610 total tests • 1,597 Canadian Athletes • 1,101 (69%) unannounced • 496 (31 %) announced • 7 infractions (Athletics, CCAA: Football x 2, CIS: Football, Cycling, Triathlon, Weightlifting)

Blood Testing • Pilot project

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• 14 blood/urine tests • Cycling, Athletics, Swimming

Major/International Games • 237 total tests • 27 Different Canadian Events • 27 Canadian Athletes • 210 Foreign Athletes

WADA Tests • 507 total tests at the request of WADA • 229 Canadian Athletes • 278 Foreign Athletes • All tests unannounced

International Federation Tests • 35 Tests on Foreign Athletes • 2 Tests on Canadian Athletes (one infraction in Triathlon)

Contract Services • 86 Tests outside of the Canadian Policy on Doping in Sport • Bodybuilding and Equestrian • 5 Infractions in Bodybuilding

2003 Domestic Program • 2106 Canadian Athletes • 1383 Unannounced • 723 Announced • 9 Infractions (Bobsleigh, Bodybuilding x 4, Boxing x 2, CIS: Football, Wrestling)

Blood Sampling • will be an integral part of the new Canadian Anti-Doping Policy when it comes into effect on June 1,2004 • 56 blood samples taken • 17 of these were for WADA

Contract Services • 569 Total Tests • 528 Canadian Tests (two times that of 2002) • 41 Foreign Tests

WADA • 237 out-of-competition tests

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• 37 of these were for other National Anti-Doping Organizations and International Federations • A significant portion of these tests were foreign athletes

Modafinil and/or Tetrahydrogestrinone (THG) • 200 urine samples went for further analysis for these drugs in December • all 200 tests came back negative

2004 Doping Control Statistics for January 2004 to March 2004 • 441 tests conducted for Canada’s domestic doping control program • 2 Anti-doping rule violations (CCAA Basketball and CIS Basketball)

Tests conducted in Canada for: • International Events held in Canada (36) • WADA (36) • Other NADOs of ISFS (5)

CCES fulfilled its first season of doping control for the Quebec Midget AAA development hockey league • 11 tests conducted • 0 Anti-doping rule violations

2004/2005 Doping Control Statistics for April 1 2004 to March 31 2005 (new fiscal year) • 2,279 doping control tests • 1,708 tests conducted under the domestic doping control program • 906 OOC (out-of-competition tests) • 926IC (in-competition tests) • 25 Anti-doping rule violations (3 females, 22 males): Athletics x 3, Boxing, CCAA Football x 2, CCAA Soccer, CIS Basketball x 2, CIS Football x 2, CIS Ice Hockey, CIS Soccer, CIS Volleyball, CIS Weightlifting, Cycling x 3, Junior Football x 6, Weightlifting.

Tests conducted in Canada for: • International Events held in Canada(294) • WADA (109) • Other NADOs and ISFs (112) • 56 conducted under contract

Doping Control Statistics for April 2005 to June 2005 • 804 doping control tests conducted • 685 tests conducted under the domestic doping control program • 389 OOC

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Tests conducted in Canada for: • International Events held in Canada (32) • WADA (80) • ISFs (2) • 32 conducted under contract

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APPENDIX III

€ % UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR

Establishing a World Anti-Doping Code: WADA's Impact on the Development of an International Strategy for Anti-Doping in Sport.

A research study in partial fulfillment of a Masters Degree in Human Kinetics at the University of Windsor

Subject Profile:

Name: Title:

Address: ______

Telephone #: _(_____ )______E-mail Address: ______Interview Date: Time Started: am/pm Completed: AM/PM

Briefing Paragraph:

An interview of approximately one hour will follow. Please note that you have the right to refuse to answer any of the questions. As stated in my previous communication with you, your confidentiality will not be guaranteed as it is your input and authority upon which this study relies.

Briefing Checklist: Right to Refuse Informed Q

Please answer YES or NO to the following statements. 1.1 (subject name) consent to participate in this interview. Signed Consent Received: Verbal Consent: Yes □ No □ Yes □ No □

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2 .1 give consent for this interview to be audio recorded. Signed Consent Received: Verbal Consent: Yes □ No □ Yes □ No □

3 .1 would like to review a transcription of this interview material. Yes □ No □

4 .1 would like to receive a copy of the results of this study. Yes □ No □

Questionnaire Outline:

> Based on your knowledge, how long has doping been a part of competitive sport?

> How were you involved with efforts relevant to the development of anti-doping policy?

> How were you involved with Canadian/American/Australian/UK Anti-Doping policy development and implementation prior to the 1988 summer Olympic Games? What were your primary areas of responsibility?

• Did those responsibilities change following the release of the Dubin Inquiry? Yes □ No □

If yes, how so?

• From a Canadian and International perspective, did the Dubin Inquiry act as a catalyst for change in the field of anti-doping policy development? Yes □ No □

If yes, in what way?

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> Did you attend the First Permanent World Conference on Anti-doping in Sport hosted in Ottawa, 1988? Yes □ No □

If yes, what was your level of involvement?

• What significant outcomes/changes, regarding anti-doping policy development, arose from this conference?

> What role did the Festina cycling scandal at the 1998 Tour de France play in the development of WADA?

• To what extent did the drug problem in cycling contribute to the need for an organization such as WADA?

> Were you in attendance at the World Anti-doping Conference in Lausanne Switzerland, February 1999? Yes □ No □

If yes, in what capacity did you participate?

• What were the significant outcomes of this conference?

> Why is WADA in Montreal?

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> Did you attend the International Drugs in Sport Summit in Australia, November 1999?

Yes □ No □ If yes, what was your level of involvement?

• A significant outcome of the ‘Sydney Summit’ was the establishment of an International Inter-governmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS). What is this group’s primary function?

• What other significant outcomes arose from this conference?

• What is the nature of the relationship between WADA and IICGADS?

• What was the Drug Free Sport Consortium and how did it contribute to the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

> WADA was formally established in November 1999. Prior to this, what type of international anti-doping program existed?

• Which governing policies and procedures were in place prior to the formation of WADA?

> Which countries, organizations and individuals have had the greatest influence on the development of WADA?

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> Which countries, organizations and individuals have had the most significant impact on the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

> Did you participate in the World Conference on Doping in Sport Copenhagen, March 2003? Yes □ No □

If yes, please elaborate on your involvement?

• What significant decisions or developments evolved from this conference?

• Did the decisions, stemming from the conference, impact or contribute to the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport? If yes, in what way?

> Are you a member of the Association of National Anti-Doping Organizations (ANADO)? Yes □ No □

If yes, could you please describe your level of involvement and the responsibilities you hold as a member?

• Are you a member of any other committees/organizations which impact(ed) the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport? Yes □ No □

If yes, could you please identify the committee/organization and describe its function relevant to anti-doping policy development?

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> How did the International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA) emerge?

• What role did/does the IADA play in the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

> What is the nature of WADA’s relationship with AN ADO and IADA?

> How does WADA plan on achieving world wide harmonization and international compliance when they are dealing with countries that have different religious beliefs, cultural practices and economic situations?

> Countries such Canada, the United States of America, Australia and Norway are advanced in their anti-doping initiatives, housing independent anti-doping agencies. Will the developments in these countries impede or add to WADA’s attempt to achieve international compliance and harmonization?

> What do you see as the biggest future challenge(s) facing WADA and NADOs?

> To what extent does the Canadian Federal Government exert influence on WADA and the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

> Is it a realistic goal to have all amateur and professional sports compliant under one anti-doping code, subject to the same rules and regulations?

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• What are barriers to this happening?

> In your opinion, how has the formation of WADA impacted the development of an international strategy for anti-doping in sport?

Conclusion:

> Is there any other information, relevant to the international strategy for anti- doping in sport, that you feel I did not address and upon which you would care to comment?

Thank you for your time.

participant requested opportunity to review transcript, read the following***) Over the next few weeks I will transcribe this interview and forward a copy for your review and approval. Following completion of your review, preferably within two weeks following receipt of the transcript, please email or mail me your approval, edits, comments and any other information that you feel pertinent to this study (if nothing is received, I will assume everything is satisfactory).

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APPENDIX IV

INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

NAME POSITION DATE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED Ole Sorenson Sport Canada: Doping Control Portfolio December 13,2005 Andrew Pipe Medical Director: Prevention and December 13,2005 Rehabilitation Centre, University of Ottawa Former Chairperson: CCES Casey Wade Former Director Education and Planning, December 14,2005; WADA February 28,2006 Richard W. Pound Chairperson of WADA December 15,2005 Jospeh dePencier Director Sport Services/General Counsel: December 16,2005 CCES Victor Lachance Former CEO: CCES, Senior Leader of January 16,2006 Sport Matters Group Paul Melia President and CEO: CCES January 19, 2006 President: ANADO David Howman Director General of WADA January 24, 2006 Neil Mackenzie Doping Control Officer: Windsor-Essex February 18, 2006 Region Charles L. Dubin The Honourable Chief Justice, O.C., April 3,2006 O.ONT., Q.C., LL.D

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX V

WADA Organizational Chart1

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------I XCllllISC ( (inimiluc t ll in Kn.li.ml I’ound \ l u I ll III Brian Mikkelsen \ ______

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1. WADA Website, “Organizational Composition,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic .ch2?pageCategory.id=296 (accessed May 16, 2006).

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APPENDIX VI

WADA 2005 Budget1

Contributions to WADA’s Budget 2005

Amount Amount Budgeted (USD) Received (USD)

Olympic Movement 10,852,500 10, 129,680 Public Authorities 10,852,500 10, 129,705

TOTAL 21,705,000 20,259,385

Montreal International Contributions 1,147, 349 1, 203, 958 (1,462, 308.00 CAD Exchange = 1.3 to USD)

% of Public Authorities Amount Amount Contributions Budgeted (USD) Received (USD)

AFRICA 0.50% 54,263 40,361

Algeria 2, 675 2, 675 Angola 1,178 Benin 369 341 Botswana 369 Burkina Faso 369 Burundi 369 Cameroon 1,178 1, 178 Cape Verde 369 Central African Rep. 369 Chad 369 Comores 369 Congo 369 Dem. Rep. of Congo 2,366 Djibouti 369 Egypt 2, 675 2, 675 Equatorial Guinea 369 Enitrea 369 369 Ethiopia 2,366 2, 341 Gabon 369 369 Gambia 369 Ghana 2, 366 2, 366 Guinea 369 Guinea Bissau 369 Ivory Coast 1,178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kenya 2,366 2,366 Lesotho 369 344 Liberia 369 Libya 2, 675 Madagascar 1, 178 Malawi 369 Mali 369 Mauritania 369 Mauritius 369 369 Morocco 2, 675 2, 675 Mozambique 1,178 1, 178 Namibia 1,178 1, 168 Niger 369 Nigeria 2, 675 2, 675 Rwanda 369 369 Sao Tome & P. 369 Senegal 1, 178 1,027 Seychelles 369 369 Sierra Leone 369 Somalia 369 South Africa 12,000 12, 000 Sudan 2, 366 Swaziland 369 Tanzania 2,366 Togo 369 Tunisia 1, 178 1, 178 Uganda 1, 178 Zambia 1, 178 1, 153 Zimbabwe 1, 178 1, 178

AMERICAS 29.00% 3,147,225 2,560, 884

Canada 786, 806 786, 806 USA 1,573,613 1,435, 500

Antigua and Barbuda 2,518 Argentina 52,559 Aruba 2,518 Bahamas 2,518 2,518 Barbados 2,518 2,518 Belize 2,518 2,518 Bermuda 2,518 2,518 Bolivia 2,518 Brazil 129,980 129,980 British Virgin Islands 2,518 2,518 Cayman Islands 2,518 2, 506 Chile 16, 995 16, 995 Colombia 26, 122 26, 122 Costa Rica 4, 091 Cuba 6, 609 6, 609 Dominica 2,518

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dominican Republic 5,350 Ecuador 5,350 El Salvador 2,518 2, 508 Grenada 2,518 2,518 Guatemala 4, 091 4, 091 Guyana 2,518 Haiti 2,518 2,518 Honduras 2,518 Jamaica 5,350 5,350 Mexico 314, 723 100, 000 Netherlands Antilles 2,518 2,518 Nicaragua 2,518 Panama 4, 091 4, 091 Paraguay 5,350 Peru 6, 609 Puerto-Rico 2,518 2,518 Saint Kitts and Nevis 2,518 2,518 Saint Lucia 2,518 Suriname 2,518 St. Vincent & the Grenadines 2,518 2, 493 Trinidad & Tobago 5,350 5,350 Uruguay 7, 868 7,304 Venezuela 78, 681 Virgin Islands 2,518

ASIA 20.46% 2,220, 422 2,120,304

China 240,510 240,510 India 93,595 93,545 Iran 23, 824 20,000 Japan 1,502, 800 1, 502, 800 Korea 115,150 115,150 Malaysia 21,555 21,555 Pakistan 15, 883 5, 100 Qatar 7,374 7,374 Singapore 18,719 18,719 Thailand 30,631 30, 631

Afghanistan 5, 000 4, 973 Bahrain 5, 000 Bangladesh 5,000 Bhutan 5, 000 5, 001 Brunei Darussalam 5, 000 Cambodia 5, 000 DPR Korea 5, 000 East Timor 5, 000 Indonesia 5, 000 4, 985 Iraq 5,000 Jordan 5, 000 5, 000 Kazakhstan 5,000 4, 985

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kuwait 5, 000 5,008 Kyrgyzstan 5, 000 Laos 5, 000 Lebanon 5,000 5,000 Maldives 5, 000 5, 000 Mongolia 5, 000 Myanmar 5, 000 Nepal 5, 000 Oman 5, 000 5, 000 Palestine 5, 000 5, 000 Philippines 5, 000 Saudi Arabia 5, 000 5, 000 Sri Lanka 5, 000 Syria 5, 000 Tajikistan 5, 000 Turkmenistan 5, 000 United Arab Emirates 5, 000 4,978 Uzbekistan 5, 000 Vietnam 5, 000 Yemen 5, 000 4, 990

EUROPE 47.50% 5,154, 938 5,132, 502

Albania 6, 186 6, 176 Andorra 3, 165 3, 165 Armenia 6, 186 6, 186 Austria 95, 325 95,325 Azerbaijan 11,099 11,099 Belarus 16,223 16,223 Belgium 114, 986 114, 895 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6, 691 6, 691 Bulgaria 14, 630 14, 630 Croatia 13,722 13,722 Cyprus 6,186 6,186 Czech Republic 37,281 37,281 Denmark 78, 767 78, 765 Estonia 6, 186 6, 186 Finland 60,978 60,978 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 6, 186 6,186 France 633,088 633, 088 Georgia 6, 186 6, 186 Germany 633,088 633,088 Greece 65, 195 65,195 Hungary 34,976 34, 976 Iceland 6, 186 6,186 Ireland 51,560 51,560 Italy 633, 088 633,088 Latvia 6, 186 6, 186 Liechtenstein 2, 727 2, 727 Lithuania 9, 222 9,222

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Luxembourg 9,351 9,351 Malta 6, 186 6,186 Monaco 1,928 1,928 Netherlands 191,052 191,052 Norway 82,381 82,381 Poland 118, 759 118, 759 Portugal 61,045 61,015 Republic of Moldova 6, 186 Romania 41,801 41,800 Russian Federation 633, 088 633,088 San Marino 1,531 1,531 Serbia and Montenegro 16, 114 Slovakia 15,243 15,243 Slovenia 10, 877 10, 877 Spain 309, 652 309, 652 Sweden 111, 852 111,852 Switzerland 120, 533 120, 533 Turkey 150,787 150, 787 Ukraine 68,184 68, 184 United Kingdom 633,088 633, 088

OCEANIA 2.54% 275,654 275,654

Australia 236,585 236,585 New Zealand 39,069 39,069

Donations 0

The Holy See

1. WADA Website, “Finance,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/Funding_2005_en.pdf (accessed May 16,2006).

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WADA Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics 20031

2003 WADA OOCT Testing Statistics

Aquatics FINA 291 115 Archery FITA 40 Athletics IAAF 266 99 Badminton IBF 55 B aseball IBAF 76 B asketball FI BA 102 Biathlon IBU 203 93 Bobsleiqh/Tobboganim FIBT 124 B oxing AIBA 100 C an oe ICF 147 39 Curling WCF 30 Cycling UCI 242 Equestrian FEI 31 Fencing FIE 40 Field Hockey FIH 65 FirA u G ym n astics FIG 115 Handball IHF 60 Ic e H ockey IIHF 70 Ice Skating ISU 247 107 Judo IJF 78 Karate WKF 15 Korfball IKF 15 Luge FIL 61 Orienteering IOF 15 Pentathlon UIPM 31 Rowing FISA 296 123 Rugby IRB 178 Sallinq ISAF 170 Shooting ISSF 60 Skiing FIS 327 140 Softball ISF 53 Table Tennis ITTF 50 T aekw on do WTF 62 T en n is ITF 32 Triathlon ITU 144 59 m m FIVB n m M i i i m s s m m : Weightlifting IWF 238 W restling FILA 100 TOTAL 4229 775 TOTAL for 2003 5004|

Agreement not signed

1. WADA Website, “2003 Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics,” http://www.wada-ama. rtecontent/document/Stats2003.pdf (accessed April 24,2006).

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APPENDIX VIII

WADA Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics 20041

2004 WADA OOCT Testing Statistics

Aquatics FINA 203 9 45 Archery FITA 15 Athletics IAAF 124 10 59 Badminton IBF 16 Baseball IBAF 15 Basketball FIBA 32 2 Biathlon IBU 92 25 23 Bobsleigh/T obboganing FIBT 66 Boxing AIBA 55 Canoe ICF 68 2 1 Curling WCF 12 Cycling UCI 128 5 93 Equestrian FEI 13 Fencing FIE 15 Field Hockey FIH 30 EIEA Sary*1*?!1. . . > .a ^— -i> i i .1 H r A Gymnastics FIG 46 Handball IHF 30 Ice Hockey IIHF 25 Ice Skating ISU 82 26 International Paralympic Committee IPC 51 25 6 Judo IJF 30 Korfball IKF 6 Luge FIL 16 Orienteering IOF 12 Pentathlon UIPM 23 17 Rowing FISA 161 20 49 Rugby IRB 80 Sailing ISAF 30 Shooting ISSF 14 Skiing FIS 28 22 Softball ISF 17 Table Tennis ITTF 15 Taekwondo WTF 27 Tennis ITF 8 Triathlon ITU 79 35

Weightlifting IWF 133 5 Wrestling FILA 51 TOTAL 1848 101 378

(Agreement not signed

1. WADA Website, “2004 Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/ document/2004_stats.pdf (accessed April 24,2006).

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APPENDIX IX

WADA Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics 20051

WADA 2005 Out-of-Coropetltion Testing Statistics

! # § § §

Aquatics FINA 246 215 14 0 0 Archery FITA 40 31 0 0 0 Athletics IAAF 240 222 45 0 32 Badminton IBF 36 27 0 0 0 Baseball IBAF 64 46 0 0 0 Basketball FIBA 50 13 0 0 0 Biathlon IBU 141 139 21 10 10 Bobsleigh/Tobboganing FIBT 131 68 0 19 0 Boxing AIBA 77 60 0 0 0 Canoe ICF 141 119 0 0 0 Curling WCF 12 0 0 0 0 Cycling UCI 168 132 15 0 0 Dance Sport IDSF 4 0 0 0 0 Equestrian FEI 20 5 0 0 0 Fencing FIE 32 0 0 0 0 Field Hockey FIH 35 30 0 0 0 iJotbbll FIFA M ..I Gymnastics FIG 42 32 0 0 0 Handball IHF 35 0 0 0 0 Ice Hockey IIHF 137 35 0 0 0 Ice Skating ISU 132 97 1 0 0 International Paralympic C IPC 63 2 0 0 0 Judo IJF 113 73 0 0 0 Karate WKF 17 12 0 0 0 Korfball IKF 16 8 0 0 0 Lifesaving ILS 15 0 0 0 0 Luge FIL 33 6 0 0 0 Orienteering IOF 7 7 0 0 0 Pentathlon UIPM 49 49 0 0 0 Rowing FISA 170 155 26 0 0 Rugby IRB 51 14 0 0 0 Sailing ISAF 54 48 0 0 0 Shooting ISSF 29 0 0 0 0 Skiing FIS 181 143 12 4 4 Softball ISF 25 13 0 0 0 Table Tennis ITTF 26 0 0 0 0 Taekwondo WTF 54 40 0 0 0 Tennis ITF 48 48 0 3 3 Triathlon ITU 111 111 0 0 0 Volleyball FIVB Agreement signed at the end of 2005, no testing conducted Weightlifting IWF 176 102 0 0 0 Wrestling FILA 93 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 3114 2102 134 36 49

Please note that blood testing may include more than one type of blood analysis on the sam e athlete The total number of athletes subject to blood testing was 162

1. WADA Website, “2005 Out-of-Competition Testing Statistics,” http://www.wada- ama.org/rtecontent/document/DOPINGCONTROL_2005_OOCT_Stats_EN.pdf (accessed April 24,2006).

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APPENDIX X

Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport1

Participants:

Conscious that sport should play an important role in the protection of health, in moral and physical education and in promoting international understanding;

Mindful that doping undermines the values of sport;

Concerned by the use of doping agents and methods by athletes through sport and the consequences thereof for the future of sport;

Bearing in mind the anti-doping regulations, policies and declarations adopted by national and international sports organisations;

Aware that public authorities and sports organisations have complementary responsibilities to combat doping in sport, notably to ensure the proper conduct, on the basis of the principle of fair play, of sports events and to protect the health of those that take part in them;

Recognising the progress made by governments in anti-doping to date, particularly in relation to the recognition, governance and funding of the World Anti-Doping Agency, the development and implementation of the Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention (ETS 135) and its Additional Protocol, inter-governmental cooperation on anti-doping, including the contribution of the International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS) forum, and the establishment of national anti-doping programs.

Recognising that in the Final Communique of the UNESCO Round Table of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport held in Paris on 9/10 January 2003 that argued for the acceleration of the preparation of an international Convention against Doping, based on the Council of Europe’s Anti-Doping Convention, if possible, before the Summer Olympic Games of 2004 and for adoption, if possible, before the Winter Olympic Games of 2006;

Determined to take further and stronger cooperative action aimed at the reduction and eventual elimination of doping in sport;

Have reached the following understandings:

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1. Scope

In pursuing all paragraphs of this Declaration, Participants act within the limits of their respective constitutional and other legal provisions and acknowledge the diversity in constitutional and legal systems between governments, combined with diverse approaches to the fight against doping in sport.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this Declaration is to articulate a political and moral understanding among Participants to: 2.1. Recognise the role of, and support, the World-Anti-Doping Agency (WADA); 2.2. Support the World Anti-Doping Code (the “Code”) adopted by the WADA Foundation Board at the World Conference on Doping in Sport (Copenhagen, 3-5 March 2003); 2.3. Sustain international intergovernmental cooperation in advancing harmonisation in anti-doping policies and practices in sport; and 2.4. Support a timely process leading to a convention or other obligation on points 3-8 below, to be implemented through instruments appropriate to the constitutional and administrative contexts of each government on or before the first day of the Turin Winter Olympic Games. This process should draw upon the expertise of representatives of governments from all the regions of the world and international organisations.

3. Support to WADA

Each Participant: 3.1. Recognises the role of, and supports, WADA; 3.2. Subject to modification through appropriate intergovernmental cooperation, declares its intention to continue the practices public authorities have followed in the governance and financing of WADA and, within this framework: 3.2.1. Supports the following allocation of public authority delegates to the WADA Foundation Board according to Olympic regions: 4 representatives from the Americas; 3 representatives from Africa; 5 representatives from Europe; 4 representatives from Asia; 2 representatives from Oceania.

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3.2.2. Supports the co-funding of WADA by public authorities and the Olympic movement as follows: 3.2.2.1. Public authorities contribute collectively 50% of the approved WADA annual core budget; 32.2.2. Public authority payments to WADA according to Olympic regions:

Africa: 0.50%

Americas: 29% Asia: 20.46%

Europe: 47.5% Oceania: 2.54%

4. Support for the World Anti-Doping Code

Each Participant: 4.1. Recognises the role of the Code as the foundation in the world wide fight against doping in sport; 4.2. Seeks to progressively adapt, where appropriate, their anti-doping policies and practices in sport to be in conformity with the provisions of the Code; 4.3. Encourages national and international organisations engaged in anti-doping in sport to adopt the code and to be in conformity with the Code, where appropriate; 4.4. Takes appropriate steps to withhold some or all government financial support related to participation in sport from sport organisations, athletes and athlete support personnel that are not in compliance with the Code or applicable anti- doping rules adopted pursuant to the Code; and 4.5. Supports the role of WADA to coordinate, harmonise and standardise anti- doping efforts according to the Code.

5. Measures to restrict the availability and use in sport of prohibited substances and methods. 5.1. Each Participant intends to ensure that regulations, administrative measures and, where appropriate, legislative measures are in place to: 5.1.1. Control the availability (including importation, exportation, distribution, trafficking and manufacturing) of prohibited substances and prohibited methods; and

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5.1.2. Enable communication of information to reduce the availability of prohibited substances and prohibited methods between agencies within their jurisdiction In so doing, any measures taken should not impede the availability for legitimate purposes of substances and methods prohibited in sport.

5.2. Each Participant encourages measures relating to the use of nutritional supplements in order that sports people are able to make informed choices to avoid ingestion of prohibited substances.

6. National anti-doping measures

Each Participant should provide, within their means, financial support for a national anti-doping program including doping control, education, research and information activities.

7. International cooperation in doping control

Recognising that the fight against doping in sport can only be effective when athletes can be tested with no advance notice and specimens obtained in sample collection can be transported in a timely manner to laboratories for analysis, each Participant: 7.1. Cooperates with WADA and other anti-doping organisations operating under its auspices, subject to relevant host countries’ regulations, to conduct doping controls on their athletes, whether on their territory or elsewhere; 7.2. Cooperates, where appropriate, to expedite the shipping or carrying across borders of bodily specimens obtained in sample collection; 7.3. Mutually recognises, where appropriate, the doping control procedures and test results management of any anti-doping organisation that is consistent with the Code; 7.4. Cooperates, where appropriate with WADA, on the international coordination of doping controls conducted by the various anti-doping organisations; and 7.5. Encourages and supports reciprocal testing arrangements between designated government or non-government anti-doping organisations.

8. Monitoring Compliance

Ongoing compliance with the commitments reflected in the convention or other obligation will be monitored as determined in consultation between WADA and the applicable govemment(s).

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9. Transition

In the period leading to a Convention or other obligation, participants may invite WADA to cooperate on a practical basis in order to assist in implementing the provisions of the Code in governments’ field of authority.

Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport

Signed on th e ...... day of ...... in the year

For the Government of:

by

Name:

Title:

1. WADA Website, “Copenhagen Declaration,” http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/ document/ declaration_en.doc (accessed January 12, 2006).

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APPENDIX XI

World Anti-Doping Code Acceptance1

Olympic Movement:

• The Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) Members (28/28) • The Association of International Olympic Winter Federations (AIOWF) Members (7/7) • IOC Recognized International Federations (29/29) • International Organizations o Members of the IPC (5) o Non-affiliated to the IPC (1)

• Major Games Organizations (9) • National Olympic Committees (202/202) • Other Organizations (2)

Government Funded-Organizations:

• National Anti-Doping Organizations (64)

Outside the Olympic Movement:

• International Sports Federations o For athletes with a Disability (6) • Sports for which the IPC is the International Federation (13) • National Paralympic Committees (161/162) • Commonwealth Games Association (19/71) • Non IOC Recognized GAISF Members (14/19) • Other International Federations (11) • Other Organizations (15)

Total = 586

Public Authorities (Government):

The Copenhagen Declaration - As of April 21,2006, 185 Governments have signed the Copenhagen Declaration. Provided is a Regional breakdown of signatories:

• Africa (46) • Americas (38) • Asia (38) • Europe (48) • Oceania (15)

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The UNESCO International Convention against doping in sport - As of May 11,2006, the following Governments have deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession for the UNESCO International Convention against doping in sport:

• Nigeria (Africa) • Canada (Americas) • Denmark, Iceland, Monaco, Norway, Sweden, Latvia, United Kingdom (Europe) • Australia, The Cook Islands, New Zealand, Nauru (Oceania)

1. WADA website, “Code Acceptance,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en /dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=270 (accessed April 15,2006).

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APPENDIX XII

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) International Convention against Doping in Sport1 m

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT

CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LE DOPAGE DANS LE SPORT

CONVENTION INTERNACIONAL CONTRA EL DOPAJE EN EL DEPORTE

M E/KTY HAP OJIHAR KOHBEHHIIH O EOPEEE C TOnilHTOM B CHOPTE

j O ttC u il

m m & to

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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT

Paris, 19 October 2005

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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT

The General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, hereinafter referred to as “UNESCO”, meeting in Paris, from 3 to 21 October 2005, at its 33rd session,

Considering that the aim of UNESCO is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science and culture,

Referring to existing international instruments relating to human rights,

A ware of resolution 58/5 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 3 November 2003, concerning sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace, notably its paragraph 7,

Conscious that sport should play an important role in the protection of health, in moral, cultural and physical education and in promoting international understanding and peace.

Noting the need to encourage and coordinate international cooperation towards the elimination of doping in sport,

Concerned by the use of doping by athletes in sport and the consequences thereof for their health, the principle of fair play, the elimination of cheating and the future of sport,

Mindful that doping puts at risk the ethical principles and educational values embodied in the International Charter of Physical Education and Sport of UNESCO and in the Olympic Charter,

Recalling that the Anti-Doping Convention and its Additional Protocol adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe are the public international law tools which are at the origin of national anti-doping policies and of intergovernmental cooperation,

Recalling the recommendations on doping adopted by the second, third and fourth International Conferences of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport organized by UNESCO at Moscow (1988), Punta del Este (1999) and Athens (2004) and 32 C/Resolution 9 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 32nd session (2003),

Bearing in mind the World Anti-Doping Code adopted by the World Anti-Doping Agency at the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Copenhagen, 5 March 2003, and the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport,

Mindful also of the influence that elite athletes have on youth

Aware of the ongoing need to conduct and promote research with the objectives of improving detection of doping and better understanding of the factors affecting use in order for prevention strategies to be most effective,

Aware also of foe importance of ongoing education of athletes, athlete support personnel and foe community at large in preventing doping.

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Mindful of the need to build the capacity of States Parties to implement anti-doping programmes.

Aware that public authorities and the organizations responsible for sport have complementary responsibilities to prevent and combat doping in sport, notably to ensure the proper conduct, on the basis of the principle of fair play, of sports events and to protect the health of those that take part in them,

Recognizing that these authorities and organizations must work together for these purposes, ensuring the highest degree of independence and transparency at all appropriate levels,

Determined to take further and stronger cooperative action aimed at the elimination of doping in sport,

Recognizing that the elimination of doping in sport is dependent in part upon progressive harmonization of anti-doping standards and practices in sport and cooperation at the national and global levels,

Adopts this Convention on this nineteenth day of October 2005.

I. Scope

Atiicle 1 -Purpose o f the Convention

The purpose of this Convention, within the framework of the strategy and programme of activities of UNESCO in the area of physical education and sport, is to promote the prevention of and the fight against doping in sport, with a view to its elimination.

Article 2 - Definitions

These definitions are to be understood within die context of the World Anti-Doping Code. However, in case of conflict the provisions of the Convention will prevail.

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. “Accredited doping control laboratories” means laboratories accredited by the World Anti-Doping Agency.

2. “Anti-doping organization’ means an entity that is responsible for adopting rules for initiating, implementing or enforcing any part of the doping control process. This includes, for example, the International Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, other major event organizations that conduct testing at their events, the World Anti-Doping Agency, international federations and national anti- doping organizations.

3. “Anti-doping rule violation” in sport means one or mom of the following:

(a) the presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete’s bodily specimen; (b) use or attempted use of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method;

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(c) refusing, or foiling without compelling justification, to submit to sample collection after notification as authorized in applicable anti-doping rules or otherwise evading sample collection;

(d) violation of applicable requirements regarding athlete availability for out-of­ competition testing, including failure to provide required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on reasonable rales;

(e) tampering, or attempting to tamper, with any part of doping control;

(f) possession of prohibited substances or methods;

(g) trafficking in any prohibited substance or prohibited method;

(h) administration or attempted administration of a prohibited substance or prohibited method to any athlete, or assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation or any attempted violation.

4. “Athlete” means, for the purposes of doping control, any person who participates in sport at the international or national level as defined by each national anti-doping organization and accepted by States Parties and any additional person who participates in a sport or event at a lower level accepted by States Parties. For the purposes of education and training programmes, “athlete” means any person who participates in sport under the authority of a sports organization. 5. “Athlete support personnel” means any coach, trainer, manager, agent, team staff, official, medical or paramedical personnel working with or treating athletes participating in or preparing for sports competition.

6. “Code” means the World Anti-Doping Code adopted by the World Anti-Doping Agency on 5 March 2003 at Copenhagen which is attached as Appendix 1 to this Convention.

7. “Competition” means a single race, match, game or singular athletic contest

8. “Doping control” means the process including test distribution planning, sample collection and handling, laboratory analysis, results management, hearings and appeals.

9. “Doping in sport” means the occurrence of an anti-doping rule violation-

10. “Duly authorized doping control teams” means doping control teams operating under the authority of international or national anti-doping organizations.

11. “In-competition” testing means, for purposes of differentiating between in-competition and out-of-competition testing, unless provided otherwise in the rules of an international federation or other relevant anti-doping organization, a test where an athlete is selected for testing in connection with a specific competition.

12. “International Standard for Laboratories” means the standard which is attached as Appendix 2 to this Convention.

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13. “International Standard for Testing” means the standard which is attached as Appendix 3 to this Convention.

14. “No advance notice” means a doping control which takes place with no advance wanting to the athlete and where the athlete is continuously chaperoned from die moment of notification through sample provision.

15. “Olympic Movement" means all those who agree to be guided by the Olympic Charter and who recognize the authority of the International Olympic Committee, namely the international federations of sports on the programme of the Olympic Games, the National Olympic Committees, the Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games, athletes, judges and referees, associations and clubs, as well as all the organizations and institutions recognized by the International Olympic Committee.

16. “Out-of-competition” doping control means any doping control which is not conducted in competition.

17. “Prohibited List” means the list which appears in Annex I to this Convention identifying the prohibited substances and prohibited methods.

18. “Prohibited method” means any method so described on the Prohibited List, which appears in Annex I to this Convention.

19. “Prohibited substance” means any substance so described on the Prohibited List, which appears in Annex I to this Convention. 20. “Sports organization” means any organization that serves as the ruling body for an event for one or several sports.

21. “Standards for Granting Therapeutic Use Exemptions” means those standards that appear in Annex II to this Convention.

22. “Testing” means the parts of the doping control process involving test distribution planning, sample collection, sample handling and sample transport to the laboratory.

23. “Therapeutic use exemption” means an exemption granted in accordance with Standards for Granting Therapeutic Use Exemptions.

24. “Use” means tire application, ingestion, injection or consumption by any means whatsoever of any prohibited substance or prohibited method.

25. “World Anti-Doping Agency” (WADA) means the foundation so named established under Swiss law on 10 November 1999.

Article 3 - Means to achieve the purpose o f the Convention

In order to achieve the purpose of the Convention, States Parties undertake to:

(a) adopt appropriate measures at the national and international levels which are consistent with the principles of the Code;

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(b) encourage all forms of international cooperation aimed at protecting athletes and ethic s in sport and at sharing the results of research;

(c) foster international cooperation between States Parties and leading organizations in the fight against doping in sport, in particular with the World Anti-Doping Agency.

Article 4 - Relationship o f the Convention to the Code

1. In order to coordinate the implementation, at the national and international levels, of the fight against doping in sport, States Parties commit themselves to the principles of the Code as the basis for the measures provided for in Article 5 of this Convention. Nothing in this Convention prevents States Parties from adopting additional measures complementary to the Code.

2. The Code and the most current version of Appendices 2 and 3 are reproduced for information purposes and are not an integral part of this Convention. The Appendices as such do not create any binding obligations under international law for States Parties.

3. The Annexes are an integral part of this Convention.

Article 5 - Measures to achieve the objectives of the Convention

In abiding by the obligations contained in this Convention, each State Party undertakes to adopt appropriate measures. Such measures may include legislation, regulation, policies or administrative practices.

Article 6 - Relationship to other international instruments

This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements previously concluded and consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention. This does not aflect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this Convention.

II. Anti-doping activities at the national level

Article 7-Domestic coordination

States Parties shall ensure the application of the present Convention, notably through domestic coordination. To meet their obligations under this Convention, States Parties may rely on anti-doping organizations as well as sports authorities and organizations.

Article 8 -Restricting the availability and use in sport o f prohibited substances and methods

1. States Parties shall, where appropriate, adopt measures to restrict the availability of prohibited substances and methods in order to restrict their use in sport by athletes, unless the use is based upon a therapeutic use exemption. These include measures against trafficking to athletes and, to this end, measures to control production, movement, importation, distribution and sale.

2. States Parties shall adopt, or encourage, where appropriate, the relevant entities within their jurisdictions to adopt measures to prevent and to restrict die use and possession of

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prohibited substances and methods by athletes in sport, unless the use is based upon a therapeutic use exemption.

3. No measures taken pursuant to this Convention will impede the availability for legitimate purposes of substances and methods otherwise prohibited or controlled in sport.

Article 9 - Measures against athlete support personnel

States Parties shall themselves take measures or encourage sports organizations and anti- doping organizations to adopt measures, including sanctions or penalties, aimed at athlete support personnel who commit an anti-doping rule violation or other offence connected with doping in sport

Article JO - Nutritional supplements

States Parties, where appropriate, shall encourage producers and distributors of nutritional supplements to establish best practices in the marketing and distribution of nutritional supplements, including information regarding their analytic composition and quality assurance.

Article 11 -Financial measures

States Parties shall, where appropriate:

(a) provide funding within their respective budgets to support a national testing programme across all sports or assist sports organizations and anti-doping organizations in financing doping controls either by direct subsidies or grants, or by recognizing the costs of such controls when determining the overall subsidies or grants to be awarded to those organizations;

(b) take steps to rvithhold sport-related financial support to individual athletes or athlete support personnel who have been suspended following an anti-doping rule violation, (hiring the period of their suspension;

(c) withhold some or all financial or other sport-related support from any sports organization or anti-doping organization not in compliance with the Code or applicable anti-doping rules adopted pursuant to the Code.

Article 12 -Measures to facilitate doping control

States Parties shall, where appropriate:

(a) encourage and facilitate the implementation by sports organizations and anti- doping organizations within their jurisdiction of doping controls in a manner consistent with the Code, including no-advance notice, out-of-competition and in- competition testing; (b) encourage and facilitate the negotiation by sports organizations and anti-doping organizations of agreements permitting their members to be tested by duly authorized doping control teams from other countries;

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(c) undertake to assist the sports organizations and anti-doping organizations within their jurisdiction in gaining access to an accredited doping control laboratory for the purposes of doping control analysis.

III. International cooperation

Article 1 3 - Cooperation between anti-doping organizations and sports organizations

States Parties shall encourage cooperation between anti-doping organizations, public authorities and sports organizations within their jurisdiction and those within the jurisdiction of other States Parties in order to achieve, at the international level, the purpose of this Convention.

Article 14 - Supporting the mission o f the World Anti-Doping Agency

States Parties undertake to support the important mission of the World Anti-Doping Agency in the international fight against doping.

Article 1 5 - Equal finding of the World Anti-Doping Agency

States Parties support the principle of equal funding of the World Anti-Doping Agency’s approved annual core budget by public authorities and the Olympic Movement.

Article 16-International cooperation in doping control

Recognizing that the fight against doping in sport can only be effective when athletes can be tested with no advance notice and samples can be transported in a timely manner to laboratories for analysis, States Parties shall, where appropriate and in accordance with domestic law and procedures:

(a) facilitate the task of the World Anti-Doping Agency and anti-doping organizations operating in compliance with the Code, subject to relevant host countries’ regulations, of conducting in- or out-of-competition doping controls on their athletes, whether on their territory or elsewhere;

(b) facilitate die timely movement of duly authorized doping control teams across borders when conducting doping control activities;

(c) cooperate to expedite the timely shipping or carrying across borders of samples in such a way as to maintain their security and integrity,

(d) assist in die international coordination of doping controls by various anti-doping organizations, and cooperate to this end with the World Anti-Doping Agency;

(e) promote cooperation between doping control laboratories within their jurisdiction and those within the jurisdiction of other States Parties. In particular, States Parties with accredited doping control laboratories should encourage laboratories within their jurisdiction to assist other States Parties in enabling them to acquire the experience, skills and techniques necessary to establish their own laboratories should they wish to do so;

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(0 encourage and support reciprocal testing arrangements between designated anti- doping organizations, in conformity with the Code;

(g) mutually recognize the doping control procedures and test results management, including the sport sanctions thereof, of any anti-doping organization that are consistent with the Code.

Article 17— Voluntary Fund

1. A “Fund for the Elimination of Doping in Sport”, hereinafter referred to as “the Voluntary Fund”, is hereby established. The Voluntary Fund shall consist of funds-in- trast established in accordance with the Financial Regulations of UNESCO. All contributions by States Parties and other actors shall be voluntary.

2. The resources of the Voluntary Fund shall consist of

(a) contributions made by States Parties;

(b) contributions, gifts or bequests which may be made by;

(i) other States;

(ii) organizations and programmes of the United Nations system, particularly the United Nations Development Programme, as well as other international organizations;

{iii) public or private bodies or individuals;

(c) any interest due on the resources of the Voluntary Fund;

(d) funds raised through collections, and receipts from events organized for the benefit of the Voluntary Fund;

(e) any other resources authorized by the Voluntary Fund’s regulations, to be drawn up by the Conference of Parties.

3. Contributions into the Voluntary Fund by States Parties shall not be considered to be a replacement for States Parties’ commitment to pay their share of the World Anti- Doping Agency’s annual budget.

Article IS — Use and governance o f the Voluntary Fund

Resources in tire Voluntary Fund Shall be allocated by the Conference of Parties for the financing of activities approved by it, notably to assist States Parties in developing and implementing anti-doping programmes, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, taking into consideration the goals of the World Anti-Doping Agency, and may serve to cover functioning costs of this Convention. No political, economic or other conditions may be attached to contributions made to the Voluntary Fund.

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I¥. Education and training

Article 19 - General education and training principles

1. States Parties shall undertake, within their means, to support, devise or implement education and training programmes on anti-doping. For the sporting community in general, these programmes should aim to provide updated and accurate information on:

(a) the harm of doping to the ethical values of sport;

(b) the health consequences of doping.

2. For athletes and athlete support personnel, in particular in their initial training, education and training programmes should, in addition to the above, aim to provide updated and accurate information on:

(a) doping control procedures:

(b) athletes’ rights and responsibilities in regard to anti-doping, including information about the Code and the anti-doping policies of the relevant sports and anti-doping organizations. Such information shall include the consequences of committing an anti-doping rule violation;

(c) the list of prohibited substances and methods and therapeutic use exemptions;

(d) nutritional supplements.

Article 20 - Professional codes o f conduct

States Parties shall encourage relevant competent professional associations and institutions to develop and implement appropriate codes of conduct, good practice and ethics related to anti- doping in sport that are consistent with die Code.

Article 21 -Involvement of athletes and athlete support personnel

States Parties shall promote and, within their means, support active participation by athletes and athlete support personnel in all facets of the anti-doping work of sports and other relevant organizations and encourage sports organizations within their jurisdiction to do likewise.

Article 22 — Sports organizations and ongoing education and training on anti-doping

States Parties shall encourage sports organizations and anti-doping organizations to implement ongoing education and training programmes for all athletes and athlete support personnel on the subjects identified in Article 19.

Article 23 - Cooperation in education and training

States Parties shall cooperate mutually and with the relevant organizations to share, where appropriate, information, expertise and experience on effective anti-doping programmes.

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V, Research

Article 24 -Promotion o f research in anti-doping

States Parties undertake, within their means, to encourage and promote anti-doping research in cooperation with sports and other relevant organizations on:

(a) prevention, detection methods, behavioural and social aspects, and the health consequences of doping;

(b) ways and means of devising scientifically-based physiological and psychological training programmes respectful of the integrity of the person;

(c) the use of aU emerging substances and methods resulting from scientific developments.

Article 25 -Nature o f anti-doping research

When promoting anti-doping research, as set out in Article 24, States Parties shall ensure that such research will:

(a) comply with internationally recognized ethical practices;

(b) avoid the administration to athletes of prohibited substances and methods;

(c) be undertaken only with adequate precautions in place to prevent the results of anti-doping research being misused and applied for doping.

Article 26 - Sharing the results o f anti-doping research

Subject to compliance with applicable national ami international law, States Parties shall, where appropriate, share die results of available anti-doping research with other States Parties and die World Ami-Doping Agency.

Article 2 7 - Sport science research

States Parties shall encourage:

(a) members of the scientific and medical communities to cany out: sport science research in accordance with the principles of the Code;

(b) sports organizations and athlete support personnel within their jurisdiction to implement sport science research that is consistent with the principles of die Code.

VI. Monitoring of the Convention

Article 28 - Conference of Parties 1. A Conference of Parties is hereby established. The Conference of Parties shall be the sovereign body of this Convention.

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2. The Conference of Parties shall meet in ordinary session in principle every two years. It may meet in extraordinary session if it so decides or at the request of at least one third of the States Parties.

3. Each State Party shall have one vote at the Conference of Parties.

4. The Conference of Parties shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure.

Article 29 -Advisory organization and observers to the Conference of Parties

The World Anti-Doping Agency shall be invited as an advisory organization to the Conference of Parties. The International Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, the Council of Europe and the Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and Sport (CIGEPS) shall be invited as observers. The Conference of Parties may decide to invite other relevant organizations as observers.

Article 30 - Functions of the Conference of Parties

1. Besides those set forth in other provisions of this Convention, die functions of the Conference of Parties shall be to:

(a) promote the purpose of this Convention;

(b) discuss the relationship with the World Anti-Doping Agency and study the mechanisms of funding of the Agency’s annual core budget. States non-Parties may be invited to the discussion;

(c) adopt a plan for the use of the resources of die Voluntary Fund, in accordance with Article 18;

(d) examine die reports submitted by States Parties in accordance with Article 31;

(e) examine, on an ongoing basis, the monitoring of compliance with this Convention in response to the development of anti-doping systems, in accordance with Article 31. Any monitoring mechanism or measure that goes beyond Article 31 shall be funded through the Voluntary Fund established under Article 17;

(f) examine draft amendments to this Convention for adoption;

(g) examine for approval, in accordance with Article 34 of the Convention, modifications to the Prohibited List and to the Standards for Granting Therapeutic Use Exemptions adopted by tire World Anti-Doping Agency;

(h) define and implement cooperation between States Parties and the World Anti- Doping Agency within the framework of this Convention;

(i) request a report from the World Anti-Doping Agency on the implementation of the Code to each of its sessions for examination.

2. The Conference of Parties, in fulfilling its functions, may cooperate with other intergovernmental bodies.

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Article 31 -National reports to the Conference of Parties

States Parties shall forward every two years to the Conference of Parties through the Secretariat, in one of the official languages of UNESCO, all relevant information concerning measures taken by them for the purpose of complying with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 32 - Secretariat of the Conference of Parties

1. The secretariat of the Conference of Parties shall be provided by the Direc tor-General of UNESCO.

2. At the request of the Conference of Parties, the Director-General of UNESCO shall use to the fullest extent possible the services of the World Anti-Doping Agency on terms agreed upon by the Conference of Parties.

3. Functioning costs related to the Convention will be funded from the regular budget of UNESCO within existing resources at an appropriate level, the Voluntary Fund established under Article 17 or an appropriate combination thereof as determined every two years. The financing for the secretariat from the regular budget shall be done on a strictly minimal basis, it being understood that voluntary funding should also be provided to support the Convention.

4. The secretariat shall prepare the documentation of the Conference of Parties, as well as the draft agenda of its meetings, and shall ensure the implementation of its decisions.

Article 33 -Amendments

1. Each State Party may, by written communication addressed to the Director-General of UNESCO, propose amendments to this Convention. The Director-General shall circulate such communication to all States Parties. If, within six months from the date of the circulation of the communication, at least one half of the States Parties give their consent, the Director-General shall present such proposals to the following session of the Conference of Parties.

2. Amendments shall be adopted by the Conference of Parties with a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

3. Once adopted, amendments to this Convention shall be submitted for ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to States Parties.

4. With respect to the States Parties that have ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to them, amendments to this Convention shall enter into force three months after tire deposit of the instruments referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article by two thirds of the States Parties. Thereafter, for each State Party that ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to an amendment, the said amendment shall enter into force three months after the date of deposit by that State Party of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

5. A State that becomes a Party to this Convention after the entry into force of amendments in conformity with paragraph 4 of this Article shall, failing an expression of different intention, be considered:

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(a) a Party to this Convention as so amended;

(b) a Party to the unamended Convention in relation to any State Party not bound by the amendments.

Article 34 - Specific amendment procedure for the Annexes to the Convention

1. If the World Anti-Doping Agency modifies the Prohibited List or the Standards for Granting Therapeutic Use Exemptions, it may, by written communication addressed to the Director-General of UNESCO, inform her/him of those changes. The Director- General shall notify such changes as proposed amendments to the relevant Annexes to this Convention to all States Parties expeditiously. Amendments to the Annexes shall be approved by the Conference of Parties either at one of its sessions or through a written consultation.

2. States Parties have 45 days from the Director-General's notification within which to express their objection to the proposed amendment either in writing, in case of written consultation, to the Director-General or at a session of the Conference of Parties. Unless two thirds of the States Parties express their objection, the proposed amendment shall be deemed to be approved by the Conference of Parties.

3. Amendments approved by the Conference of Parties shall be notified to States Parties by the Director-General. They shall enter into force 45 days after that notification, except for any State Party that has previously notified the Director-General that it does not accept these amendments.

4. A State Party having notified the Director-General that it does not accept an amendment approved according to the preceding paragraphs remains bound by the Annexes as not amended.

VII. Final clauses

Article 35 —Federal ornon-mitary constitutional systems

The following provisions shall apply to States Parties that have a federal or non-unitary constitutional system;

(a) with regard to the provisions of this Convention, die implementation of which comes under the legal jurisdiction of the federal or central legislative power, the obligations of the federal or central government shall be die same as for those States Parties which are not federal States;

(b) with regard to the provisions of this Convention, the implementation of which comes under the jurisdiction of individual constituent States, counties, provinces or cantons which are not obliged by the constitutional system of the federation to take legislative measures, the federal government shall inform the competent authorities of such States, counties, provinces or cantons of the said provisions, with its recommendation for their adoption.

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Article 36-Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

This Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States Members of UNESCO in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Director-General of UNESCO.

Article 3 7 - Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of one month after the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

2. For any State that subsequently expresses its consent to be bound by it, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of one month after the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 38 - Territorial extension o f the Convention

1. Any State may, when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, specify the territory or territories for whose international relations it is responsible and to which this Convention shall apply.

2. Any State Party may, at any later date, by a declaration addressed to UNESCO, extend the application of this Convention to any other territory specified in the declaration. In respect of such territory the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of one month after the date of receipt of such declaration by the depositary.

3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs may, in respect of any territory specified in such declaration, be withdrawn by a notification addressed to UNESCO. Such withdrawal shall become effective on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of one month after the date of receipt of such a notification by the depositary.

Article 39-Denunciation

Any State Party may denounce this Convention. The denunciation shall be notified by an instrument in writing, deposited with the Director-General of UNESCO. The denunciation shall take effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of six months after the receipt of the instrument of denunciation. It shall in no way affect the financial obligations of the State Party concerned until the date on which the withdrawal takes effect.

Article 40 - Depositary The Director-General of UNESCO shall be the Depositary of this Convention and amendments thereto. As the Depositary, the Director-General of UNESCO shall inform the States Parties to this Convention, as well as the other States Members of the Organization of:

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(a) the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession;

(b) the date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance with Article 37;

(c) any report prepared in pursuance of the provisions of Article 31;

(d) any amendment to the Convention or to the Annexes adopted in accordance with Articles 33 and 34 and the date on which the amendment comes into force;

(e) any declaration or notification made under the provisions of Article 38;

(f) any notification made under the provisions of Article 39 and the date on which the denunciation takes effect;

(g) any other act, notification or communication relating to this Convention

Article 41 - Registration

In conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of die United Nations, this Convention shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations at the request of the Director-General of UNESCO.

Article 42 - Authoritative texts

1. This Convention, including its Annexes, has been drawn up in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, the six texts being equally authoritative.

2. The Appendices to this Convention are provided in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.

Article 43 - Reservations

No reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of die present Convention shall be permitted.

1. WADA Website, “UNESCO Convention,” http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch27page Category.id=273 (accessed January 12,2006).

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Vita Auctoris

NAME Caitlin Alyssa Jenkins

PLACE OF BIRTH Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

YEAR OF BIRTH 1980

EDUCATION Lisgar Collegiate Institute, Ottawa, Ontario 1995-1999

Honours in Kinesiology University of Western Ontario London, Ontario 1999-2003

Master’s in Human Kinetics - Sport Management University of Windsor Windsor, Ontario 2004-2006

PUBLICATIONS Caitlin Jenkins. Review of “The Study of Medieval Sports, Games and Pastimes: A Fifteen-Year Reflection.” Sport History Review, Vol. 35, 2004, pp. 159-169, John M. Carter. Journal o f Sport History. In Press.

Caitlin Jenkins. Review of “Sporting Innovations: The American Invasion of British Turf and Links, 1895-1905.” Sport History Review, Vol. 35,2004, pp. 122-137, Wray Vamplew. Journal o f Sport History. In Press.

Caitlin Jenkins. Review of “Canada’s Everest? Rethinking the First Ascent of Mount Logan and the Politics of Nationhood, 1925.” Sport History Review, Vol. 35, 2004, pp. 95-121, Zac Robinson and Pearl Ann Reichwein. Journal o f Sport History. In Press.

Caitlin Jenkins. Review of “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics.” The Americas, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2004, pp. 159-188, Eric Zolov. OLYMPIKA: The International Journal o f Olympic Studies XIV (2005), pp. 122-123.

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PRESENTATIONS: Caitlin Jenkins. “Establishing a World Anti-Doping Code: WADA’s Impact on the Development of an International Strategy for Anti-Doping in Sport.” Paper presented at the 34th Annual Conference of The North American Society of Sport History (NASSH), Glenwood Springs, Colorado, May 19-22,2006.

AWARDS: University of Windsor Human Kinetics Graduate Alumni Award - Sport Management, 2006 University of Windsor Tuition Scholarship, 2005-2006

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