At dawn on a chill and misty morning in May, a Navy battleship,
the U.S.S. Montana approached New York harbor steaming first past
the Ambrose Light Ship and then the Statue of Liberty. Slowing as
she sailed deeper into the harbor, the Montana stopped and loosed
her anchor mid-stream in the Hudson River opposite the lower tip of
Manhattan Island, a park called "The Battery." On her deck lay 17
coffins, each neatly draped with the national ensign. As a silent
crowd watched, a tug slipped its moorings, moved to the anchored
warship, and lay alongside. Crewmen carefully and tenderly trans
ferred the coffins to her decks. The tug returned to the park and
the coffins were placed on waiting caissons.
Soon a solemn funeral procession began, and in it rode the
President of the United States. He was somber, grim-visaged, and
seemed to be almost in a state of shock. As the procession rolled
on he stared straight ahead, as a man alone, which, saddened, at this
turn of events resulting from one of his recent decisions, he was.
The year was 1914, the President Woodrow Wilson, and the funeral
that for the 17 Marines who died as they stormed ashore at Vera Cruz,
Mexico, to avenge an insult to the American flag, and in the doing,
give some teeth to Wilson’s displeasure at the undemocratic regime of
General Victoriano Huerta ruling the turbulent nation. The Mexicans had resisted fiercely, and while losing Vera Cruz to the combined
Marine assault and naval gunfire, had killed the 17 Americans. And yet that tragedy was not the only worry that troubled Woodrow
Wilson that cheerless day in May of 1914. Consider his burdens. In
the White House, his wife lay dying. In Europe the tense situation described by one of Wilson's aides as "militarism gone stark raving mad"
threatened to erupt into world war. At the same time along the border with Mexico, the federal military commander and three state governors
called for immediate reinforcement of regular troops to replace state militiamen, who it was feared, might soon clash with Mexicans living
in the border states and a force of about 5,000 interned Mexican federal
troops, as all factions reacted to the violence that had begun with the
1910 revolution. And to the north, 1,700 federal troops patrolled the
Colorado coal fields that day in May, beginning their third week of occupation.
In Colorado tragedy had compounded tragedy as bitter skirmishes followed the death of two women and eleven children at a burning tent colony of striking coal miners called Ludlow, just north of Trinidad, in an attack by the state militia. That all day battle, however, which came on April 20, 1914, was but the culmination of a bitter and prolonged labor dispute that since September of 1913 had seen dozens killed in clashes in Colorado's front range coal fields as each side used rifles, shotguns, machine guns, even armored cars. Early in the dispute Colorado's governor, Elias Ammons, ordered the state militia, with its decisive put-down of the 1903 coal strike one of its major battle laurels, into the fray to restore order as a neutral force.
2 But soon the governor changed his mind, announcing that in keeping out strike breakers, he had gone beyond the law. In the eyes of the miners, this meant that the governor and the guard had sided with management, and indeed, the militia quickly lost that sense of neu- trality so necessary to forces attempting to quell labor disputes and supported the mine owners, eventually even enlisting mine company employees into their ranks. Violence in the coal fields became fre- quent, fear of what might happen next almost constant. Reason and moderation seemed almost to desert both sides: each armed; each fearful of the other; each determined not to compromise; each carry ing a heritage of 20 years of labor violence in Colorado. Thus the
United Mine Workers, fresh from a victory in the West Virginia coal fields and sporting a healthy strike fund to finance the action, found themselves fighting not only the companies--led by one of the largest, part of the John D. Rockerfeller industrial empire, but a state militia acting less as a neutral constabulary and more like an active enemy.
News of the Ludlow Massacre flashed around the state and nation.
Many Coloradoans, repelled by the actions of their state troops, called on the governor to ask for federal assistance, their reaction less pro- union than anti-violence. Mixed within it was dismay and anger that the state militia had acted as it had. The Colorado Springs Gazette enquired "And now what is Colorado going to do about it? We stand today disgraced in the eyes of all nations. Not even Mexico has wit- nessed more barbaric, warfare." Governor Ammons, a weak and vacillating
3 executive, vacillated, torn between calling for federal help or using the discredited state forces again as new violence spread through the coal fields following Ludlow. Described by novelist Upton Sinclair, a vocal union supporter and hardly unbiased, as an "apparently kindly man, intellectual calibre fitted for the duties of a Sunday School teacher in a small village, " Ammons finally wired Woodrow Wilson for federal troops, admitting that the situation had passed beyond the state’s ability to control, but acted only after being besieged in his office by a delegation of angry and determined women demanding federal intervention.
Wilson had been attempting to arbitrate the strike intermittently since it began, and after Ludlow tried again, sending Representative
Martin Foster of Colorado to negotiate with the isolated and austere
John D. Rockerfeller, owner of the more important Colorado mines. But
Rockerfeller refused to even consider arbitration or union recognition.
Yet while the doomed arbitration attempt was in progress, Wilson and his capable Secretary of War, Lindley Miller Garrison, discussed the possibilities of sending troops to Colorado, and Garrison checked to see what few units of the already widely committed Army might be available and how quickly they could reach Colorado. Planning for possible Colorado troop deployment. Secretary Garrison worked into the night in the War Department. One late April evening, reflecting the tension of the many crises of the moment, Garrison attached to an
4 updated military situation report a note to the President asking
"Will you please communicate to me so soon as you have seen these and reached a conclusion. If I am not in the Department, I will be at the other end of the telephone where I can be immediately reached."
The next evening he wrote again "I will be down at the Department this evening . . . I can be reached by telephone instantly in case you want to talk to me about this situation." And all the while the mining areas of Colorado seemed to be edging closer to civil war, as miners and militia clashed along the front range.
And so that last week of April 1914, hardly passed pleasantly.
In Colorado storms of protest would not abate over the Ludlow attack and the state’s ineffective response to it. As Governor Ammons equivocated and the tired and stra ined President pondered his potential two-front war with Mexico, his wife's deepening illness, and the demise of Europe’s fragile calm that daily appeared more imminent, Secretary of War Garrison began preparing his instructions in case the order should come to send troops to Colorado.
Few troops remained available, since most units were part of the force of 8,000 soldiers and Marines ashore at Vera Cruz, or the larger group stretched along the border, or among those ready to reinforce
Vera Cruz if necessary. And little remained of an experienced command structure at the War Department to help the New Jersey lawyer judiciously apply the very limited military resources of the United States. For
5 with an uncanny inability to sense the press of events and the probable sequence of their unfolding, Woodrow Wilson had ushered out the top leadership of the United States Army just as that leadership was sorely needed. On April 21 the Marines attacked Vera Cruz but the next day, just two days after Ludlow, with calls for federal intervention in
Colorado already being raised, the Chief of Staff, one of America’s most competent and colorful soldiers, Major General Leonard Wood, outspoken and irascible soldier-physician, had left office as his term expired. No doubt Leonard Wood’s close ties to Theodore Roosevelt had much to do with Wilson's removal of Wood as soon as it could be arranged. Wood's Assistant Chief of Staff left with him. His temporary replacement, one Major General W. W. Wotherspoon, presided over the
Army while retaining the Presidency of The Array War College.
So as the Army's experienced commander departed, the Secretary of
War was forced to prepare to enter that legal and political twilight zone of federal military enforcement of state laws, assumption of state police powers, and perhaps even local civil government. Yet he had to do this with an exhausted President at the White House, an inept gover- nor at Denver, a threat of European intervention at Vera Cruz beginning to grow very real, and as state governors along the southern border called for more troops.
Meanwhile, as if to underscore the urgency of the situation, new fighting erupted in Colorado. And as the coded secret messages flashed
6 over the telegraph wires on late April 28, alerting those few cavalry
units in the West not yet deployed along the border, strikers attacked
the Forbes Mine, near Canon City, screaming "Remember Ludlow," to be met with rifle and machine gun fire. That battle left six non-union miners and three strikers dead. At Walsenberg 160 strikers defended
their positions atop a ridge surrounded by state militia in a battle
that saw the militia doctor dropped with one accurate shot from a
striker as the medic tended a wounded guardsman.
Finally, eight days after Ludlow, Wilson acted. The President had given the old entrepreneur a chance at high altruism, to lend his
support to arbitration, which Rockerfeller declined, steadfastly refus-
ing to give way on the question of unionism. Wilson, dismayed at
Rockerfeller's stubbornness in the face of a national storm of protest,
and bemused at Governor Ammons' lack of decisiveness, reluctantly
ordered the troops in.
With the decision made, Garrison announced his Colorado Command
system, which violated military precedents by not having an overall
field commander. Instead, Garrison ordered commanders of the various
cavalry detachments to report to him directly. In one instance this
involved a First Lieutenant in a mining camp communicating with the
office roughly equivalant to the current office of the Secretary of
Defense. The Secretary of War would virtually command each detachment.
The Colorado newspapers noticed the unusual command arrangements. The
7 Denver Post, for one, carried the headline "Secretary of War Has
Situation Personally And Gives All Orders For Trouble District--There
Is No Second In Command." Years later, when questioned on his unusual command system, Garrison replied that Colorado's geography and the isolated camps so required it. Yet it would seem reasonable that, given the international situation, he would have been happy to turn control of the strike zone over to a senior officer. But the Colorado situation was fraught with political dynamite and could explode to the embarassment of the administration at any time. And that administration was headed by a President who had to focus his attention on other prob- lems, while in Colorado, the governor was threatened with impeachment and excoriated daily in the Denver press. Garrison's tight control of the federal troops was most necessary.
While the troops of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments moved by train toward Colorado, the Secretary of War formulated his basic policy for them. The President, as required by law, had issued a proclamation directing all in the strike zone to "retire peacefully to their abodes," and not to take part in "unlawful proceedings" or "domestic disorder," the same phrases Lyndon Johnson would use three times in 1968 alone.
The President's power in these cases, such as the one Woodrow Wilson faced, was specific, and as old as the republic itself. Indeed, Shay’s
Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786 both played a major role in the move- ment for a new and stronger government than the one under the Articles of Confederation, and gave graphic evidence of the need for a govern-
ment with the power to move against domestic violence. The Constitu-
tion formulated the next year provided the central government the
authority to execute, not just to make, the laws, and in Article 4,
Section 4, authorized the President to call forth the militia "when-
ever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution
thereof obstructed." This law, passed to deal with the Whisky Rebellion
during George Washington's presidency, remains substantially unchanged
today, despite strengthening and clarification during various consoli-
dations of U.S. law. An 1807 change allowed the Army, as well as the militia, to be used, and today is Title 10 U.S. Code, Sections 331-334.
In Wilson’s presidency the same laws were Title 69, Revised Statutes,
Sections 5297 to 5300. Thus while dispatch of federal troops to states
in cases of domestic violence has never been common practice in America,
it certainly has formed a real part of the American experience and is
solidly rooted in both the Constitution and federal law.
Lindley Garrison, in applying these laws on behalf of Woodrow Wilson, used them to the fullest. He instructed his commanders that "your primary duty will be to suppress violence and maintain order," compelling
those engaged in violence to stop. Continuing, he directed them to stop actions, which, though they might be legal in themselves--such as open-
ing a strike-closed mine--might lead to further violence. Yet the
Secretary of War reminded his commanders "not to cause what you are sent to prevent or allay," and to act with caution and discretion.
9 "The measure of your authority," he emphasized, "is what necessity
dictates." He ordered that "state civil functions and processes should
not be displaced nor interfered with when they can be successfully
employed in the suppression of violence and restoration of order."
Implicit in these instructions was the injunction to displace any
authority deemed not acting in the best interests of order.
If the Army commanders had unprecedented authority at this point,
the Secretary of War, as the President's agent, gave them even more.
Garrison instructed his officers that they should turn over any prisoners
they took to state authorities as soon as possible. But that if upon
release they returned to foment more violence, "you may find it neces-
sary to retain in custody those whom you arrest." He added that should
a state court issue a writ of habeas corpus the officers should decline,
stating that the prisoners were held under federal authority. Only
federal courts could release Army-held prisoners. In that unlikely
event, the field commanders were to comply and then report to Washington.
Martial law was not declared. It seldom has been in American history.
It was hardly needed. The powers Garrison assumed on behalf of the
President were strong enough. The Secretary replied to one of his
Colorado commanders suggesting that martial law be declared writing:
"I do not know of anything that you can not do under the circumstances
that you could do any better if there was a written proclamation of martial law posted in your district." Seldom had federal troops been
given such widespread power to supplant civil authority in peacetime.
10 By noon of April the 29th, the first troops arrived, detraining
at Canon City, where the attack on the Forbes mine--with nine dead-- had ended just two hours before. By noon of the 30th, Major Williard
Holbrook, the most senior officer with the federal troops, had arrived
at Trinidad, the focus of the troubles. His immediate report noted
that the "days prior to the arrival of the troops here had been days of terror in this city. People did not dare to attend church, schools were practically closed, one bank was ordered by the strikers to remove a machine-gun from the 5th floor or take the consequences. The machine- gun proved to be a transit, but all the bank officials escaped from the building by side doors.
So the terror, the fighting, and the manifold uncertainties that perplexed both the strikers and the strike-zone citizens went on right up to the minute troops began arriving by train. Their coming had been preceded by a frank and public letter sent to Colorado’s indecisive chief executive by the President. In the letter Wilson stated that the cavalrymen would be totally neutral in the dispute. He also warned against the existence of two armed forces on the same field, directing that if the federals came the militia must leave. The Army was coming to make peace, not take sides. The President strongly reminded the governor that the strike was a state matter and that while the federal government would restore order, the state was expected to find a solution to the problem.
11 Major Holbrook— described in the Denver Post as a "tall lithe figure in khaki cap and uniform, a duplicate in appearance of Lord
Kitchner"--set the tone in applying the spirit of strict neutrality implicit in Wilson's public letter while simultaneously taking advan- tage of Secretary Garrison's wide-ranging instructions and of the mud, snow, and torrential rains along the front range seemed to be Mother
Nature's attempt at cooling things off as the federals sought to impose control. Among his earliest recommendations to Garrison, the major called for more troops, and the Secretary ordered out the 11th Cavalry, from Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia.
In some areas, the troops were met by union sympathizers with brass bands. A union paper at Trinidad, the Trinidad Free Press set a jubilant tone in an article reporting the arrival of a detachment of troops of the 11th Cavalry as it noted:
The third squadron of the Eleventh Cavalry from Fort
Oglethorpe, composed of companies I, K, L, and M, about
290 men and one goat mascot, reached Trinidad at 1:30
this afternoon. The train was held up enroute by wash-
outs. The special was made up of sixteen cars. The
officers of the squadron are Major Howze, Captain Rowell,
Captain Shelley, Captain McCree, Captain Carsell of the
Medical Corps, and Lieutenants McKinley, Kendall, McConnel,
Cox, and Crutchey. Lieutenant Estes is in charge of the
platoon of artillery. The goatlooks after himself.
12 So the same newspaper that a week before had been raging at the multiple Ludlow killings now found a journalistic respite in denoting
that the "goat looks after himself." It was typical of joyous welcome
the strikers gave the federal troops.
Holbrook was one of the first officers into the strike zone. A
former military governor of one of the Philippine Islands, he handled
things dynamically. Throughout the military occupation of Colorado
Major Hollbrook acted as the principal field adviser to the Secretary of War. While more troops arrived he talked at length with mine owners,
strikers, and by phone to Governor Ammons. He informed them, and the press quickly informed the public, that he was not there to decide
issues but to reestablish law and order. And as he assessed the strike situation, Holbrook directed Trinidad’s mayor to keep the saloons closed.
The mayor acquiesced. For Holbrook,keeping all factions sober served
the goals of restoring law and order.
The initial question was just how to reestablish law and order.
There was no one answer. All of the officers in charge of troops had to ensure that their men acted positively but cautiously, with force- fullness yet temperately. The federal troops must not act like the state troops had.
Soon two questions seemed to form into the keys for the establish- ment of peace. First concerned the coal mines. Would the mines reopen now that the federal troops were present to enforce order? The second
13 question concerned disarmament. How was it to be done? Which side
would be disarmed first?
Disarmament was the paramount issue. Major Holbrook urged
Garrison to go easy. First off, many of the miners were foreigners—
with little understanding of English or the terribly important dif-
ference between state and federal troops. Holbrook quickly arranged
for the Italian Consul from Denver to tour the strike areas explain-
ing the situation to his countrymen.
As the questions of mine reopenings and arms surrender were under
consideration between Washington and the field commanders, federal
troops fanned out to replace the militia units at the numerous tent
colonies near the mines. The militia left immediately after the
cavalry’s arrival. Union and company paydays saw federal troops pro-
tecting paymasters so that neither side would need to carry arms.
Soldiers patrolled the streets of Trinidad, and details of federals watched over the mines. And as the cavalrymen set the neutral tone of their occupation, they selectively disarmed police as they saw necessary
In all districts, responding to an order from Garrison and enforced by the troops, all saloons, gun shops, and gun outlets in hardware stores were closed: not by state law but Army proclamation.
By May 3, 1914, most of the area to be occupied had been delineated
The distance was a staggering 260 miles north to south, and from 40 to
75 miles east to west. In the first few days, only the hotspots were
14 patrolled, but as the full 11th Cavalry Regiment arrived, bringing the total force to about 1,700 cavalrymen, almost every mining camp along the front range had its contingent of federals guarding and patrolling--acting as classic constabulary. Civil government remained intact, and sheriffs, marshalls, local, and state courts still operated, but at the pleasure of the federals who patrolled to enforce the peace.
In essence, the presence of the federal troops served to stiffen the state laws and proclamations, precisely what the Colorado militia could have done had it retained neutrality. Some duties were onerous and boring--such as guarding mines and checking to see that no strike breakers reinforced the mining crews now that the federals controlled the area.
Other requests were more amusing, as one officer noted:
when we first arrived we were called upon to settle
many petty and trivial complaints. Mrs. Smith would
come to camp and complain that Mrs. Jones made a face
at her and she wanted her arrested, or some saloon
keeper whose place we had closed wanted to get out
his pet cat. These and similar requests were made
daily. It was some time before we could persuade
the people that they should call upon the town marshall
to settle their petty quarrels.
In that first week of May calm settled tenuously over the frag- mented society along the foothills, and Secretary Garrison, advised by Holbrook, decided that disarmament would begin only after the entire llth Cavalry arrived, so that sufficient forces could affirm the order.
15 At Canon City the Army issued a disarmament proclamation on
May 5, at Trinidad on May 6. Other commanders soon followed suit.
The results were hardly spectacular. No more than 2,678 arms were ever turned in, mostly by mine guards and private citizens. After a token surrender of arms, most miners buried theirs. Yet, for its limited success, disarmament remained a success. The miners, mine- owners, guards, and private citizens at least no longer openly carried arms. In those towns and camps where law officials were too openly biased against the miners, the troops disarmed them, too. Soon even union officials were confident enough that the situation had calmed that they informed Holbrook of a covert shipment of 300 rifles and
60,000 rounds destined for strikers to use. Holbrook informed Garrison that he would intercept it, Garrison agreed, and Holbrook, aided by union officials and the Santa Fe railroad, did. All weapons were receipted for and sent to Fort Logan.
The arms tally at Louisville was typical. It consisted of
42 shotguns, 26 revolvers, and 31 rifles.
Thousands of arms, the officers knew, had not been turned in.
Compulsory arms surrender would take place on 11 May the federal com- mander at Trinidad proclaimed, but significantly backed up his announce- ment with no action. By unspoken agreement, it seemed, there would be no forced disarmament. Yet by May 13, the local commander felt that the situation in Trinidad such that he disarmed the c i t y ’s police, and county deputy sheriffs.
16 In mid-May, with disarmament accomplished, the question of reopen-
ing mines was answered. In a proclamation to the public, the local commanders, acting on Garrison's specific instructions, announced that
the names of strikers and mine employees as of September 1913, when
the strike began, would be gathered. The two lists would be compared to see who was a strike breaker, who a striker, and who legally worked the mines. Those mines closed before the Ludlow incident would not reopen. Those closed in the violence following Ludlow would, but with no strike breakers. At Aguillar, the federal troops found six strike breakers working a mine, marched them to the next train, and saw them off. In essence, Garrison's gun policy would at least keep guns off the streets, the arroyos, and ambush spots near the mines. His mine policy would reopen no mines not open prior to Ludlow. Nor would it allow any new reinforcements to join the strikers in the tent colonies.
The Army would be neutral.
For the rest of May the soldiers watched, patrolled, waited, and seized these violating the anti-liquor laws. The faction-torn state legislature met in early May. They castigated the governor's handling of the situation, threatened his impeachment, and even passed a few anti-riot laws, but failed to take control of the strike zones. It seemed that the state of Colorado would not rule itself. With the state almost broke from lost mining revenue and the militia's expenses, and with a legislature divided beyond the capability to function efficiently, at least federal troops remained to care for the mine fields--and federal
17 troops cost the state nothing. There would be no choice in the matter
for the Army. The federals would stay until the strike was settled.
Later that summer Major Holbrook wrote in disgust and despair that
"the Commonwealth of Colorado has apparently lost all pride of power
and does not intend to assume charge of the strike situation so long
as the United States can be induced to retain control."
So portions of the 5th and 12th, and all of the 11th Cavalry
remained for the rest of the year as the Vera Cruz incident ended,
the border with Mexico temporarily calmed, and World War I opened.
Into January 1915 they retained their iron-handed neutrality, living, and patrolling near the tent colonies, enforcing the state gun embargo
that had been openly flaunted until backed by federal troops. Their mission remained the maintenance of peace and enforcement of the anti- riot measures against strike breakers and against open saloons. By summer the organization of the federal forces had evolved into one comprising four districts, with each district commander communicating directly with the Secretary of War. The 11th Cavalry patrolled the southern district, Huerfano, and Las Animas Counties. The central district at Canon City had 5th Cavalry units. The northern district, the Louisville, Lafayette, Boulder area, had 12th Cavalry troops as did the west district, near Oak Creek and in Routt and Fremont Counties.
The troops arrested saloon keepers selling liquor and delivered them to county authorities for trial in state courts. A repeated
18 violator in Trinidad suffered the destruction of his stock by the federal troops--an action affirmed by the Secretary of War. A cavalry captain interrogated other offenders at Trinidad, and turned the resulting affidavits over to the county district attorney for the trial. Civil courts heard all cases. Occasionally, federal troops give testimony.
In Pueblo a miner shot another and, as a gun-carrier, was pursued by federal cavalrymen, but escaped. Near Ludlow fighting between Greeks who were and those who were not on strike resulted in many arrests by the soldiers. Patrols to the mines came daily, and daily the troops checked rosters for strike breakers.
At least one writ from a state court was served on an officer, a writ of replevin to recover a confiscated supply of guns. The officer refused and Secretary Garrison backed him
Throughout the occupation there was no change in policy or in the neutrality of the troops. Peace prevailed, despite repeated efforts by the mine owners to circumvent the "no strikebreaker” rule.
While the troops retained tranquility in the strike zone, the Labor
Department worked to arbitrate the strike, yet failed. By December 10,
1914, the United Mine Workers, broke and beaten, could keep the men out no longer. The strike ended, the union lost, and the owners imposed their settlement. And in January, 1915, the federal troops left.
19 For all the bitterness, destruction, and death of the Colorado coal strike, the results were hardly spectacular. For the miners only a weak labor law resulted, although the companies allowed the lives of the miners to get a little bit better. The actions of the Colorado state troops saw the use of militia in labor disputes diminish through- the nation after Ludlow. The Democrats lost the Colorado state house to the Republicans. The companies involved earned an even deeper hatred among labor's rank and file in Colorado, but the union lost hope of real power in Colorado for years to come. For the Army the firm and neutral occupation erased some of the strike-breaker stigma the regulars had carried since the Pullman Strike of the 1890s— and would earn again to a lesser degree during America's participation in the Great War.
Garrison's tight control of the Colorado strike zone was questioned that August, and Garrison pointedly replied that his authority was:
The authority is that which is technically referred to as
the police powers exercised where martial law prevails. I
do not suppose it is necessary to point out to you that I
am the constitutional organ of the President in issuing
orders, and that the ultimate source of power is the
President. Under the Constitution, the President is
required to interfere if properly requested. When he
interferes and sends the national forces into a State, he
has full power and authority to do whatever he finds
necessary to restore public order and maintain it.
20 Succinctly stated, Colorado admitted both its inability and unwillingness to control the situation after Ludlow, and the Array took command. In doing this the federal forces allowed local civil government to exist and function normally, but insisted that civil authorities serve the end of restoring and maintaining peace. The military employed policies directed only at that end. They had executed the President’s dictum "that no person or persons, natural or artificial, shall be permitted to do that which may give rise to disorder.” Yet they had managed to gain and hold the good will of the inhabitants of the area they ruled so firmly, a people who had seen the state militia become the tools of one faction in the dispute, and who welcomed the military arm of the federal government as the final hope of peace. Ironically, the Army's welcomed presence had not aided the miners. It had simply kept them from being overrun by mine guards and the Colorado militia. In the end, they lost, albeit peace- fully. Significantly, the Army had enjoyed cooperation from all factions, and had not had to force state or local officials to act. The shock and shame of Ludlow and the ten-day near civil war which followed per- suaded all factions to support the federals.
Whether Garrison's broad interpretation of the President's consti tutional powers in regard to civil disorder would have worked as well in a community less accustomed to violent labor disputes, can only be speculated. Whether the absence of capable state government was a factor in the success of Garrison's firm control can also be a point of speculation. The fact that local authorities cooperated fully with the federals undoubtedly helped the Array’s effectiveness.
But all things considered the Army had done remarkably well.
Faced with virulent industrial warfare they had restored peace in an atmosphere filled with distrust, fear, and more intense hatred than many of the cavalrymen would ever find on the battlefield. Their authority had been the Constitution of the United States stiffened by their own force of arms and the iron will of Lindley Miller
Garrison.
22 1. This paper was o rig in a lly presented as "The Governor, The Secretary o f War, and the Colorado Coal S trike o f 1914" at Session 24 o f the 1976 Western History Association Annual Conference, October 13-16, Denver, Colorado. That session, "Civil-Military Relations in the West," also included a paper by Colonel William Strobridge, U. S. Army, e n title d "Troops t o Rescue in San Francisco, 1906 2. New York Times, 11 May 1914, p. 1. 3. The Colorado coal strike of 1913-1914 is the subject of numerous works, the most balanced and comprehensive being George McGovern and Leonard F. Guttridge, The Great C o a lfie ld War (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1972). The best known account remains Barron B. Beshor's Out o f the Depths: The Story o f John R. Lawson, A Labor Leader, (Denver: The Golden B ell Press, 1942), now available in a 1957 e d itio n . 4. 23 A p ril 1914. 5. W. Storrs Lee, Colorado: A Literary Chronicle (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970) p. 413. 6. Wilson's role in attempting to mediate the strike and in the intervention of federal troops is cogently and succintly covered in Bennett Milton Rich, The Presidents and C iv il Disorder (Washington: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1941), Chapter IX. The Judge Advocate General9s Department, U. S. Army, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, 1903-1922 (Washington: Government P rin tin g O ffice, 1922), provides a quick reference to the p o lic ie s o f the federal government in regard to the strike. 7. Memorandum, Secretary of War (to Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army) 27 April 1914, Lindley M iller Garrison Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 8. Garrison to Wilson, 23 and 24 April, Item 77, Press Copies of letters sent by the Secretary o f War to the President, Mexican Situation and Labor Trouble in Colorado, A p ril 21 to May 7, 1914, Record Group 107, O ffice o f the Secre tary of War, 17. S. National Archives, Washington, D. C. 9. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 340. 10. Letter of Instructions (Secretary of War to Unit Commanders) 28 A p ril 1914, AG 2154620, Record Group 94, Records o f the Adjutant General, U. S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. AG 2154620 comprises the three archival boxes of material containing the materials dealing with the federal intervention in Colorado. This is the major archival c o lle c tio n dealing with the coal s tr ik e . 11. Letter, with map, Holbrook to Adjutant General, 30 April 1914, AG 2154620. 12. Colorado newspapers printed the letter, and typed copies of the letter written by Garrison, were appended to the instructions sent to unit commanders ordered to Colorado, along with copies of the presidential proclamation. 13. The Denver Post, 30 A p ril 1914. 14- The Trinidad Free Press, 1 Nay 1914. 15. Holbrook to Garrison, 30 A p ril 1914, AG 2154620. 16. Telegram (coded) Holbrook to Garrison, and reply, 1 May 1914, AG 2154620. 17. William M. Grimes,"The Cavalry on Strike Duty in Colorado,” The Cavalry Journal, 1915, p. 476. 18. Telegram, Holbrook to Garrison, 2 May 1914, AG 2154620. 19. Telegram, Holbrook to Garrison, 22 July 1914, AG 2154620. 20. Telegram, Holbrook to Garrison, 22 July 1914, AG 2154620 21. Grimes, "Strike Duty," p. 476. Grimes’ article explains the daily rou tine of the federal troops in the strike zone through the nine-month occu pation. 22. Memorandum, Captain Harry W illard, 5th U. S. Cavalry, to Commanding Officer U. S. Troops, Trinidad, 3 January 1915. AG 2245719 (f iled with materials listed under AG 2154620). The six indorsements to this letter include approval from the Secretary of War of W illard's refusal to accept the w rit. 23. Judge Advocate General, Federal Aid, p. 312.