NATO's Operation Sea Guardian Alessandra
Vox Collegii CONTENTS
Editorial 2
The Commandant’s Corner 3
A Deep Insight:
NATO, Russia, and the Warsaw Summit: The Return of Deterrence by Jeffrey A. Larsen 4
Implementing the Alliance Maritime Strategy in the Mediterranean: NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian by Alessandra Giada Dibenedetto 10
The Libya Intervention of 2011: Why NATO, not the EU? by Antonio Calcara 15
Life at the College 20
Highlights:
Our Courses 23
Our Main Guests 27
Our Publications 29
Editor: Proofreading: Jessica Rossi (ITA C) Caroline Curta (FRA C) Peter G. Mead (GBR C) Assistant Editors: Sergio Tagliata (ITA C) Graphic Design & Printing: Giulia Sciancalepore (ITA C) Grafich Communication S.r.l. Francisco J. Marin-Barrena (ESP C) (Fondi -LT-)
Photography: NATO websites Allied Defence Forces websites United Nations websites Flickr NDC Reproduction Section The Editorial Vox Collegii
Carta, was a success thanks to the effort of intergovernmental decision-making in EU and dedication of all NDC personnel and security and defence policy. Finally, it focuses also to the tireless work put in by the interns on CSDP's main operational and strategic and VEROs, who contributed with massive shortfalls for tackling high-intensity military amounts of enthusiasm. crises.
Concerning Vox Collegii, the first article of To conclude, we want to express our this edition is about NATO’s adaptation gratitude to the NDC Commandant MajGen measures in response to Russia’s behaviour Janusz Bojarski, whose mandate at the on the international scene. The author College came to an end in November. On analyses the initiatives taken at the behalf of all NDC staff, a big “thank you” Warsaw Summit in July 2016 to deal with for his leadership over the last three years, the changed security environment. and an enthusiastic welcome to the new Commandant, LtGen Chris Whitecross of the The second article explains NATO’s new Canadian Armed Forces. maritime mission in the Mediterranean, Operation Sea Guardian, outlining its Jessica Rossi Dear Reader, genesis and its cooperation with the EU mission. By including the operation within Last time we went to press, we announced the Alliance’s Maritime Strategy, the article the imminent celebration of the 50th assesses expectations, prospects for success, anniversary of the NDC’s relocation from pending issues and the areas in which the Paris to Rome and the 65th year since its operation will be a test case for the Alliance. foundation, in conjunction with the holding of the 63rd Anciens' Seminar. In the third article, the author investigates the main elements of the Libyan crisis in The event was celebrated on 13th and 14th 2011, and how the EU intervened in the October 2016, in the presence of the Italian areas concerned. The second part of the Head of State and other national dignitaries, article deals with the institutional problems as well as NATO authorities. Moreover, there was a special opportunity to host representatives from the Middle East and North Africa during two high level panels on 14th October, which provided the audience with an interesting overview of the reality and the security issues in the MENA Region.
The celebrations marked one of the biggest events in College history. LtCol Alberto Alletto, Head of the Public Affairs Office until October 2016, orchestrated the ceremony: without him, it would have been an almost impossible task to accomplish. Since it was his last big challenge here at the NDC, we wish him the best of luck for his next assignment.
The event's planning and execution, led by the Director of Management BGen Salvatore
2 Volume XIV The Commandant’s Corner
I was both honoured and humbled to accept the position and responsibilities of Commandant of the NATO Defense College on 29 November 2016. Over the course of my three year term, I very much look forward to working with the College staff, students and Anciens, in addition to the number of significant stakeholders committed to NDC activities. I am committed to the continuing evolution of the quality of our learning programmes, our Research production, and our Outreach initiatives; as we look to the changing NATO environment.
Accepting the post of Commandant is also a tremendous opportunity for Canada I am now committed to carry on the superb increase the ability of individual NATO and to re-affirm its commitment to and place work of Major General Bojarski in creating Partner officers (and officials) to productively in the Alliance. Canada has consistently greater unity within the Alliance, and would work together and achieve our common pledged significant contributions to NATO like to extend to him our sincerest wishes for goals. We will embrace diversity, not just in since the founding of the Alliance in 1949. success and happiness in his retirement. thought, but in our working environment. I feel privileged to be entrusted in carrying Diversity strengthens operational success. this legacy of united effort forward into our As did my predecessor, I intend to uphold Likewise, a working environment, founded common future. the tradition of excellence in education on mutual respect and honourable conduct, and professional development for which with a commitment to learning, brings I wish to commence my period of the NATO Defense College is known. In greater cohesion to any military unit, be it command by acknowledging the great a real sense, the Alliance starts here. The one from a single country or one combined accomplishments of my predecessor, College is an institution providing world- under an allied command. Major General Janusz Bojarski, in making class professional education and training, impressive strides in furthering the tradition wherein the connections and networks The NATO Defense College’s commitment of excellence at the NATO Defense College. established between colleagues and friends to learning, coupled with these values, Since his appointment as Commandant will form the underpinning of operational will continue to enable the Alliance to in 2014, he led the College during a time success in future missions. carry out its three core tasks with success: of immense world change and significant collective defence, crisis management, and challenge for NATO, despite which he helped We prepare the Alliance leaders of tomorrow cooperative security. Success not just as a create greater Alliance unity by establishing for the challenges of the emerging strategic venerable institution, but distinguished by numerous initiatives that have improved environment, while at the same time the skills and values of its graduates. If we the College – such as implementing the creating individual bonds which add unity to are to be successful in this, it will only be recommendations of the 2014 NDC Review; the Alliance. In fulfilling our long-standing because we act in unity. I look forward very creating greater scope for e-learning; purpose to “provide an opportunity for much to being a part of this great team and expanding access to civilian university selected Alliance personnel, and individuals in promoting this unity. It is the core of the degree-granting programmes; integrating from partner nations, to learn about NATO, Alliance. the Senior Course and the NATO Regional its policies and concepts, current challenges Cooperation Course; and executing a facing the Alliance, the global strategic Lieutenant-General flawless 65th/50th Anniversary Celebration, environment, and provide an opportunity Chris Whitecross amongst others. Overall, his efforts have to hone English and French language Royal Canadian Air Force truly raised the profile of the College while skills,” I intend to promote accomplishment NDC Commandant at the same time providing higher quality of this through teamwork, upholding a research papers, and creating greater requirement to foster mutual understanding, incentive for academic excellence. and ensuring respect of each other. This will
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NATO, Russia, and the Warsaw Summit: The Return of Deterrence
Jeffrey A. Larsen
The two years following 2014 were challenging for European security and for NATO. Russia’s behaviour on the international scene changed the nature of the debate about the future of European relations with Moscow. At the same time, a new and dangerous threat known as the Islamic State arose in the deserts south of NATO. This article offers an introductory overview of NATO’s adaptation measures in response to this changed security environment. Several modest initiatives were taken at the Wales Summit in September 2014 to deal with these challenges, but these measures were just a first step. The July 2016 Warsaw Summit agreed to a much tougher set of force goals that reflect a return to thinking about deterrence and making collective defence NATO’s first priority.
NATO’s Adaptation to the New Threat Environment
The events of 2014 forced NATO to reconsider its 20 years of emphasis on out- of-area expeditionary operations and its focus on the crisis management and cooperative security pillars of the 2010 Strategic Concept, at the expense of the Dr Jeffrey A. Larsen is Director of the core responsibility of collective defence. With the rise of surprising new threats on Research Division at the NATO Defense two flanks, member states realized they would have to reassess the importance College in Rome. His recent publications and centrality of collective defence and deterrence.1 include On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stanford University NATO’s initial reaction to the events of 2014 was modest. Russia’s foreign policy Press, 2014) with Kerry Kartchner, and behaviour in Crimea, in Ukraine, and in public statements attacking the Alliance NATO’s Responses to Hybrid Threats came as a shock to most member states. NATO had grown to think of Russia as a (NATO Defense College, 2015), with strategic partner, not an adversary. Obviously, the hoped-for ‘peace dividend’ that Guillaume Lasconjarias. Portions of had been expected to follow the end of NATO’s military mission in Afghanistan, this paper are forthcoming in NATO and scheduled for December 2014, could no longer be expected. With Russian Collective Defense in the 21st Century: behaviour in the East and the rise of a new threat to the South, the Alliance would An assessment of the Warsaw Summit, ed. have to respond in some way—it could not sit still. The threat had returned, but by Karsten Friis, et al (London: Routledge most NATO members were not immediately prepared to deal with it, militarily or Press, 2017). psychologically.
The opinions expressed in this article The most difficult concept to come to grips with was the clear, growing, and are the author's own and must not be dangerous military imbalance in Eastern Europe that could potentially be attributed to the NATO Defense College or exploited by Moscow. This had to be addressed, and much of the Wales Summit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Declaration did just that.2 Nevertheless, NATO policy toward Russia in the first two years after Crimea remained relatively cautious: modest conventional force enhancements in the region, cessation of all practical cooperation with Russia, economic sanctions imposed by the EU and the USA, and so on. The debate within the Alliance was on whether to emphasize defence or dialogue. By 2016, however,
1 "Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon,” 19 November 2010, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/official_texts_68580.htm. 2 “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” 5 September 2014, para. 22, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
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Ph: NATO website
the return of Russia as a potential threat to NATO interests had the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), and were meant to provide become obvious to all members. assurance to member states that felt exposed to rising threats, and simultaneously to adapt the Alliance to the new security That said, not all members agree on the degree of the threat environment. Measures included the creation of a Very High from the East. Some look first to the South when considering Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a brigade-size joint force their security situation, and would prefer to see either multiple that can be deployed within a few days of activation; a defence strategies that address each flank, or a single strategy that investment pledge, whereby each member would, within could balance NATO’s response to threats coming from any a decade, dedicate 2 per cent of its gross domestic product direction. This debate threatens NATO cohesion, risking the to defence spending, and 20 per cent of that amount toward creation of a fissure between four groupings of states: those research, development, and long-term investment in military with borders shared with Russia, who fear any appearance of equipment; more exercises; enhanced air policing of the weakness; those who are more concerned with Mediterranean Baltic states; an enlarged and reinvigorated NATO Response issues, such as migration, maritime security, and ungoverned Force; eight new NATO Force Integration Units to act as small spaces in North Africa and the Middle East; those who prefer to headquarters for exercises or reinforcements coming to the see a balanced approach with a 360-degree threat assessment; region; the creation of a Joint Logistics Support Command and those that are not sure which approach is best. Headquarters; development of a series of graduated response plans; forward deployment of some military equipment to Wales Summit north eastern Europe; and agreement on a strategy, developed jointly with the EU, on combatting hybrid warfare. At the Wales Summit in September 2014 and in follow-on meetings of NATO Defence Ministers over the following six These all made NATO stronger, providing some measure of months, various initiatives were developed, meant to serve reassurance to Allies in the East, and presumably some measure as a conventional counter to Russian threats on NATO’s of deterrence vis-à-vis the Russian military. Some of these eastern flank. These were all included under the umbrella of measures were short-term fixes, whereas others will require
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longer-term adaptation. Nearly all were focused on the eastern emphasis identified at the Wales summit included missile flank. As a result, criticism arose that NATO was ignoring the defence, cyber defence, joint intelligence, surveillance and growing threat from the South, and that it had no policies reconnaissance, and nuclear deterrence. for dealing with two immediate threats: illegal migration and terrorism. Both of these were addressed two years later in Institutional issues are central to the success of all political Warsaw, but only to a small degree. and military initiatives. These include ongoing NATO reform measures—the possible reorganization of the Alliance’s Officially NATO is ‘adapting’ to the new world. The issues in this operational structure; budgeting and the Defence Investment adaptation can be placed in three categories: military, political, Pledge; and relations with the EU. To achieve its security goals, and institutional. In the political basket, Russia dominates NATO needs to maintain or enhance its relationship with other current thinking. Policy areas demanding adaptation include multinational organizations, including the EU, the UN, the crisis management, NATO’s partnership policy, enlargement Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, the African and the Open Door policy, the Defence Capacity Building Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the League of Arab initiative, support to Ukraine, NATO’s future role in Afghanistan, States. and the Interoperability Initiative with partners. There is also discussion brewing over whether to revise NATO’s current Warsaw Summit Strategic Concept, which was approved in Lisbon in 2010. Most of the Wales initiatives were noted at the Warsaw Summit Military issues centre on implementation of the Readiness as either successfully implemented or nearing completion. The Action Plan, including all its various elements described above. July 2016 meeting had two major outcomes: putting enhanced Equally important is the issue of hybrid warfare, and how to security measures in place, with a focus on the eastern flank, respond to threats on the lower end of the conflict spectrum— and greater emphasis on exporting stability to regions along for instance, economic measures and strategic communication NATO’s southern flank. Key agenda items at Warsaw concerned campaigns. Military programmes and plans for enhanced developing an ‘enhanced forward presence.’3
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Mr Petro Poroshenko Ph: NATO website
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With respect to Russia, the summit considered how best to deal Europe beginning in 2017, with headquarters in Poland. with Moscow. Following debate, it was decided not to restore NATO will support the creation of a multinational brigade in more normalized relations, including exchanges and regular Romania. The USA will also pre-position equipment in Germany dialogue. But it left the door open to greater dialogue. for an armoured brigade, one artillery brigade and a division headquarters.4 Regarding Ukraine, NATO member states agreed to continue providing non-lethal military support to Ukraine, and to help NATO re-stated its commitment to the Open Door policy on Kiev modernize its forces. Further, a new NATO strategy on enlargement. Montenegro is set to join in 2017, and other hybrid threats, written in cooperation with the EU, provides European nations that share the same values as NATO are guidance when dealing with challenges which are lower on welcome to apply for membership when they are ready.5 the conflict spectrum. As regards collective defence, there is to be a permanent rotational presence of four battalion-size NATO does not have an official role to play in the area of multinational battle groups in the Baltic States and Poland. These migration, but public demands for controls against embedded will be provided beginning in early 2017 by four framework terrorists may lead to a reconsideration of its hands-off policy. nations: Britain in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, Germany in For example in 2016, NATO agreed to contribute maritime assets Lithuania, and the United States in Poland. All will fall under the to international efforts to stem the flow of illegal migration in command of a new NATO multinational division headquarters the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, and to work with the EU in Poland. In addition, the United States will provide bilateral and Libya to provide enhanced intelligence, surveillance and support via regular rotations of armoured brigades to eastern reconnaissance assets to build regional capacity.6
3 ”Warsaw Summit Communique issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016,” NATO Press Release (2016) 100, 9 July 2016, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. See also Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO and the Tale of Two Summits,” Fair Observer online, 19 September 2016, at http://www.fairobserver.com/ region/europe/the-future-of-nato-international-security-news-73884/, and Artur Kacprzyk, “Conventional Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank after the Warsaw Summit,” PISM Bulletin No. 48 (898), 3 August 2016, at http://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-48-898.meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” 5 September 2014, para. 22, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. 4 Warsaw Summit Communique, paras. 38-45. 5 Warsaw Summit Communique, paras. 109-110. 6 Warsaw Summit Communique, paras. 92-93.
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NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and President of Poland Andrzej Duda, at the Warsaw Summit Experts' Forum
Countering terrorism has never been a core mission for NATO, Other main decisions taken at the Warsaw summit included which has generally seen such activities as criminal in nature, funding Afghan security forces through the year 2020 and leaving responsibility for dealing with terrorism to civilian keeping NATO troops in Afghanistan after 2016 to train Afghani authorities. But, with the increasing number of attacks by non- forces; providing support to the EU’s military mission off the state terror groups on cities in Europe and North America, NATO Libyan coast to crack down on smugglers; and declaring may have to revise its views on this issue. interim operational capability of the US-built ballistic missile defence system in Europe (known as the European Phased NATO must ensure that it remains a military Alliance of ‘all for Adaptive Approach). In addition, NATO and the EU have signed one and one for all’, avoiding potential rifts over what threats it a cooperation pact to work more closely on a range of issues, faces, which of those are most important, and how to respond including maritime patrolling and cyber-attacks. in a balanced and appropriate manner. For political reasons it will adopt a 360-degree threat assessment, but it must also The Return of Deterrence face reality: NATO does not have enough resources to deal with every contingency. It must prioritize. If every threat becomes a At Warsaw, the Alliance took a public stance on the continued priority, then nothing is. importance of deterrence and nuclear weapons as one of
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the foundations for its security, with some of the strongest Alliance. For example, it has already led to the decision to words seen in a NATO communiqué in over twenty years. The increase its military presence in the most-threatened parts Alliance asserts that deterrence rests on an appropriate mix of its periphery, with multinational combat forces. NATO of conventional, nuclear, and missile defence forces, and that will have to strengthen its force structure, including ground “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear forces, airpower, and other long-range strike capabilities, Alliance.”7 The importance of nuclear deterrent forces has been and enhance its graduated reinforcement planning, all with made apparent through Russian behaviour over the past two a credible nuclear deterrent as a backstop. This may require years, leading to renewed interest in the subject by military improvements to existing command structures. And it will most and civilian leaders. Consensus was achieved at the Warsaw certainly be expensive, requiring all member states to abide by Summit, reflecting discussions in three Nuclear Planning Group their defence investment pledge. meetings over an 18 month period leading up to the summit. The declaration contained language that made it clear that NATO remains the ultimate guarantor of European security. NATO was responding to Russian provocation. Today, it is once again placing increased emphasis on its core mission of collective defence: as a political and military Alliance In the Warsaw declaration, the Alliance clearly stated that “The charged with defending its member states’ territory, people, and greatest responsibility of the alliance is to protect and defend vital interests, this is NATO’s primary mission. All other missions our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in added since the end of the Cold War are secondary to this. At Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. And so renewed emphasis the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO members reminded the has been placed on deterrence and collective defense.”8 The world, including potential adversaries and their own publics, Summit declaration emphasized the importance of America’s of this responsibility. This new emphasis on collective defence partners in nuclear sharing, saying that “NATO’s nuclear seems set to continue for many summits to come. deterrence posture also relies, in part, on United States nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. These Allies will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrence remain safe, secure, and effective.”9 Shortly after the Summit, Great Britain reaffirmed its commitment to a nuclear deterrent through a parliamentary vote to renew the UK’s Trident missile submarine system.
Conclusions
At Warsaw, NATO reinforced its credibility as a strong, formidable military machine in the eyes of its Allies, partners, and antagonists. At the same time, it must bear in mind that it is also a political organization with responsibilities deriving from the founding Washington Treaty that range beyond military defence. NATO's long-term adaptation to the new security environment will require steps that harken back to the days of the Cold War. Some member states may be uncomfortable with those decisions. But as a military Alliance charged with defending its members against threats to Europe and North America, it is incumbent upon the Allies to act to meet that responsibility. The world is unlikely to see a quick return to the comfortable way things were only a few years ago. Accepting this reality will have consequences for the North Atlantic
7 ”Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,” NATO Press Release (2012) 063, 20 May 2012, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm; repeated in Warsaw Summit Communique, para. 53. 8 Warsaw Summit Communique, para. 6. 9 Warsaw Summit Communique, para. 53.
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Implementing the Alliance Maritime Strategy in the Mediterranean: NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian
Alessandra Giada Dibenedetto
In February 2016, NATO decided to deploy its Standing NATO Maritime Group Two in the Aegean Sea as a measure against illegal crossings and migrant traffickers. After three years of uncontrollable migrant flows to European coasts and seven months of activity in the Aegean, NATO then decided to join forces with the European Union (EU) in the wider Mediterranean Sea, given that both organizations (albeit working with different means and partnerships) face the same security challenges from their southern borders.
Alessandra Giada Dibenedetto works During the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Alliance decided to deploy a flexible with the Research Division of the new maritime security mission in the Mediterranean Sea. The operation, named NATO Defense College. She is currently Sea Guardian, started on 9 November 2016 and represents the operationalization, involved in many projects at the College: for the very first time, of one of the tasks assigned by the March 2011 Alliance participating in conferences and Maritime Strategy (AMS) to NATO’s maritime forces – maritime security operations: briefing the public, organizing events in cooperation with both the Research “We have transitioned Operation Active Endeavour, our Article 5 Division and the Public Affairs Office, maritime operation in the Mediterranean, which has contributed and providing research support. Ms to the fight against terrorism, to a non-Article 5 Maritime Security Dibenedetto holds two Master’s degrees, Operation, Operation Sea Guardian, able to perform the full range of one in International Relations from Maritime Security Operation tasks, as needed.”1 LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, and the other in Intelligence and International Security Maritime (in)security in Mediterranean waters from King’s College London. The Mediterranean area is, increasingly, a challenge to most European countries. The views expressed are the responsibility The number of migrants and refugees crossing it remains extremely high: as of mid- of the author alone and do not necessarily September 2016, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that reflect the opinions of the NATO Defense about 302,000 migrants and refugees had attempted to cross the Mediterranean College or the North Atlantic Treaty to reach Europe this year alone.2 Despite a 58% decrease from 2015, the migration Organization. A longer version of this flow is still a major concern, as are its direct and indirect consequences: instability, article was originally published as NDC Research Paper no. 134, December 2016.
1 NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué”, para. 91, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169. htm#jisr 2 The data refers to the total number of crossings utilizing all three Mediterranean routes. For details see IOM, “Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 298,474; Deaths at Sea: 3,213”, Press Release, 20 September 2016, available at: https://www.iom.int/news/ mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-298474-deaths-sea-3213
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a sense of insecurity, and potential acts of terror. There is the of the European Council came quickly and in a totally different risk of more and more foreign fighters entering Europe, as form: in July 2015 European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Hungarian intelligence sources have recently shown. Most of MED, later re-named Operation Sophia, started its mandate. the Islamic State militants involved in the attacks carried out in Launched to disrupt the business model of human smuggling Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 entered networks in the southern-central Mediterranean and prevent the EU by crossing the Mediterranean Sea hidden among Syrian further loss of life at sea, the operation is currently tasked with refugees. In addition, smuggling networks are linked to other identifying, capturing and disposing of the high seas vessels criminal activities like drug trafficking. used – or suspected of being used – by migrant traffickers.
The worst refugee and migrant crisis since the Second World War NATO’s engagement in the Aegean Sea is being handled mainly by the EU. This is due to the widespread perception of the emergency as concerning only Europe. NATO’s involvement in the fight against illegal migration and Following the closure of the Italian operation Mare Nostrum,3 the trafficking arose at the request of the German, Greek and European Commission launched, in November 2014, a mission Turkish governments. In February 2016, the Alliance deployed much more limited in mandate, scope and capacity: Frontex Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) in the Aegean Joint Operation (JO) Triton, which focuses on border controls Sea for reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal in the central Mediterranean. The limits of the operation soon crossings, sending the information collected to the two became clearly visible: the waters of the Mediterranean were coastal states and Frontex, which launched the new assistance witnessing more and more drownings. This time the response operation “Poseidon Rapid Intervention” in December 2015
Figure 1. Map of operational areas, showing NATO’s deployment in the Aegean Sea, EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia and Frontex JO Triton4
3 Mare Nostrum was launched by the Italian government on 18th October 2013, with a mandate that includes search and rescue operations and bringing human smugglers to justice. 4 The EU-Turkey statement, agreed on 18 March 2016, provides for the return to Turkey of irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands and establishes that, for every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU.
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to surveil Greece’s external borders in the Aegean. The real- time information that NATO fleets share contains details on the location of migrants’ boats and on the modus operandi of smugglers. Besides monitoring and surveillance, SNMG2, led by a German flagship and typically composed of seven vessels, is also ready to perform search and rescue operations in accordance with the legal obligations stated in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. NATO’s presence in the Aegean Sea also helps support the EU-Turkey agreement.5 The area of NATO’s deployment completes the European territorial reach. Both JO Triton and Operation Sophia operate in the southern-central Mediterranean, while Operation Poseidon in the Aegean Sea has access only to Greek territorial waters; on the contrary, SNMG2 fully covers the stretch of sea between Greece and Turkey, with access to both countries’ territorial waters in critical areas.
Genesis: from Operation Active Endeavour to Sea Guardian
Operation Sea Guardian was born out of its predecessor Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). The latter was launched after the attacks of 9/11 – invoking the collective defence clause of the Washington Treaty – with the aim of deterring and disrupting terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. Assigned forces, with NATO Standing Naval Forces on a rotating basis, have been monitoring, collecting information, controlling and boarding merchant ships in the Mediterranean for almost 15 years. Surface units, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and two high-readiness frigate forces are available for counter-terrorism activities. Such a long experience in the Mediterranean Sea has given the Alliance valuable expertise in the field of deterrence against maritime criminal and terrorist Ph: LT Jeremiah Lyons (NATO MARCOM) activities. This knowledge will be put to good use by Operation Sea Guardian in a mission that will build on the work of its predecessor, while considerably expanding its scope: Operation Sea Guardian. Additional tasks could be performed at the request of Allies – e.g., checks on suspect vessels, actions “Operation Sea Guardian is a standing Maritime against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protective Security Operation (MSO) aimed at working with measures for critical infrastructure and freedom of navigation. Mediterranean stakeholders to deter and counter terrorism and mitigate the risk of other threats to Operation Sea Guardian will also work in tandem with security.”6 EUNAVFOR’s Operation Sophia. On 8 July 2016, the Presidents of the European Council and Commission and the NATO Secretary Providing maritime situational awareness, countering terrorism General signed a Joint Declaration aimed at strengthening and human trafficking and contributing to regional capacity cooperation, considering that “a stronger NATO and a stronger building have been identified as the three core missions of EU are mutually reinforcing.”7 The three leaders recognized
5 The EU-Turkey statement, agreed on 18 March 2016, provides for the return to Turkey of irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands and establishes that, for every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU. 6 Allied Maritime Command, “Operation Sea Guardian”, factsheet, available at: http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Documents/OSG%20FactsheetV1.pdf 7 NATO, “Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, Press Release, 8 July 2016, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm
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this sort is aimed at making local forces more autonomous and improving the security of Libyan territorial waters – which no EU or NATO fleets can patrol.
Regarding the assets used in maritime operations, it is worth noting that, according to the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, NATO’s Standing Naval Forces will no longer be used for “protracted operations or for operations with low-end tasks”.8 NATO’s Aegean activity can actually be included in the category of “low-end tasks”, in that SNMG2 monitors migrant flows. In addition, it is equally logical to consider Operation Sea Guardian a “protracted operation”. Therefore, despite the Wales Summit Declaration and the commitment of having NATO Standing Naval Forces “aligned with NATO's enhanced NATO Response Force” as in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué,9 there is still a question mark as to whether the Alliance’s maritime forces will discontinue their engagement in protracted low-end missions. The answer is no, at least for now. However, a major change from OAE is that the new Operation Sea Guardian is separately resourced from the surface units, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft that constitute NATO’s Standing Naval Forces on a rotating basis. On the one hand, this allows Sea Guardian units to focus on their core tasks and to be free from NATO Response Force responsibilities; on the other hand, it allows the Standing Naval Forces to concentrate on deterrence activities and high- end training.
In the longer term, the assets Operation Sea Guardian will be using – NATO’s Standing Naval Forces or separate forces – will show whether NATO’s new stance will be challenged or endorsed by nations. Equally interesting, in the long run, will be the likelihood of NATO’s deployment in the Aegean Sea continuing. So far, NATO Defence Ministers have decided it will. the need to broaden and deepen collaboration on migration Expectations and Prospects for Success in the Mediterranean Sea. The Alliance will complement Operation Sophia’s efforts in the Mediterranean Sea by NATO’s involvement in dealing with the migration crisis, and providing information, surveillance and logistic support – e.g., securing the Mediterranean Sea in general, can be considered an providing tankers which can fuel all naval ships and escorting impressive achievement for the states shouldering the burden. vessels engaged in suspicious activity. Operation Sea Guardian By the same token, the Alliance has proved not only its willingness might also complement Operation Sophia in implementing and readiness to take action when Allies face challenges, but the Libyan arms embargo on the high seas, as provided for in also its ability to render approved strategies (the AMS in this UNSC Resolution 2292. Furthermore, the Alliance has declared case) operational. Nevertheless, Operation Sea Guardian is its readiness – solely at the explicit request of the Libyan going to raise many expectations. Realistically, we can expect Government of National Accord – to help EUNAVFOR train the NATO’s cooperation with the EU in the Mediterranean to be Libyan Navy and Coast Guard. Regional capacity building of valuable. The Alliance’s assets will enable a more comprehensive
8 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration”, para. 71, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales 5 September 2014, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm 9 NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué”, para. 48.
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Panoramic view aboard the Italian frigate ITS Aviere during a Replenishment at Sea (RAS) with the Spanish naval oiler ESPS Cantabria in the central Mediterranean on Nov. 15. ITS Aviere, Bulgarian frigate BGS Verni, and Turkish frigate TCG Gemlik are the first three NATO ships conducting patrols in the Mediterranean for NATO standing Operation Sea Guardian. (NATO MARCOM) picture of smuggling networks and SAR operations. More will strategy. Secondly, insofar as Operation Sea Guardian mostly be known about human traffickers’ business and chains of consists of separate forces and SNMG2 is an urgent stop-gap command, and more lives will be saved at sea. In general, safety in the Aegean, the Alliance will be in line with both the Wales will be better guaranteed in the Mediterranean. Despite these and Warsaw declarations. The new operation will also represent positive assumptions, however, what has been a pending issue the very first testing ground for the NATO-EU Joint Declaration. since the beginning for Operation Sophia will soon limit what Finally, NATO’s presence in the central Mediterranean and Operation Sea Guardian can achieve: EUNAVFOR is dealing with its efforts to provide stability in Libya – most notably by an uncooperative Libyan Government of National Accord. The offering training to local forces – demonstrate its continuous latter, headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, is still struggling to impose its engagement in the country five years after the conclusion of authority and reunite the country. Allowing Western forces into Operation Unified Protector.10 its territory might make this process even harder. But to change the dynamics in the Mediterranean, NATO needs a partner in Conclusion Libya that not only enjoys full power in the country but is also ready to share intelligence collected on the ground. By launching Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean, NATO is operationalizing the AMS and in particular, for the Operation Sea Guardian will also be a relevant test case for first time in five years, implementing the full range of maritime the Alliance in a number of areas. Firstly, the new mission security operations. The mission will also fulfil the task of provides the opportunity to demonstrate to public opinion the crisis management by responding to the emergency in the relevance of the AMS: Sea Guardian can prove the adequacy of Mediterranean and by providing logistic support to the EU’s the Alliance’s posture in the maritime domain and endorse its Operation Sophia. Operation Sea Guardian will thus enhance cooperative security, promoting dialogue in the region. Maritime security will also be ensured, with suitable provision for surveillance and freedom of navigation.
To conclude, Operation Sea Guardian appears to be an updated and much expanded version of its predecessor OAE. Within the framework of the AMS, the new mission will contribute to maritime security and stability in the Mediterranean Sea by identifying crisis developments and tackling migrant and arms trafficking, as well as maritime terrorism.
Ph: Ben Shread If stability is guaranteed in the Middle East and North Africa https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages region, security will be ensured in Europe.
10 In March 2011, following UNSC Resolution 1973, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector, tasked with enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone and protecting civilians from the threat of attack in Libya under the Gaddafi regime. NATO, “NATO and Libya (achieve)”, updated 09 November 2015, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm#
14 Volume XIVXI A Deep Insight
The Libya Intervention of 2011: Why NATO, not the EU?
Antonio Calcara
Introduction
In a context of multiple threats and financial austerity, an important debate exists at the political and academic level on the urgency to improve defence capabilities in an integrated European Union (EU) framework. This growing debate on Europe's role as a credible military player internationally derives, in part, from the failure of the EU in dealing with the North Africa regional crisis after 2010.
In particular, the Libyan crisis in 2011 can be a considered as a baptism by fire for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)1, and it showed that the EU's capacity to mount a significant military mission in its own backyard was inadequate. Despite the reluctance of the US and of some NATO allies to intervene militarily in Libya, the option for a CSDP mission was never considered. The EU's handling of the Libyan crisis has been depicted as “too slow, too weak, too divided and essentially incoherent”.2 Why was the EU unable to pursue an effective intervention in the Libyan crisis? What are the main institutional, operational and strategic problems of the CSDP?
Antonio Calcara is a Ph.D. candidate at My argument is that there were two reasons for the EU's failure in Libya: first, the the LUISS “Guido Carli” Department of institutional structure of CSDP makes it unable to address this type of complex Political Science , in Rome. international crisis; second, CSDP – apart from its institutional deficiencies – is simply not designed for high-intensity military interventions. This is confirmed by The opinions expressed in this article are the fact that NATO was, in a way, “constrained” to bear the burden of the military his own and must not be attributed to the operation, despite political doubts among many of its members. NATO Defense College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This article is divided into three main parts. In the first part, I will describe the main elements of the Libyan crisis in 2011, and how the EU intervened in the areas concerned. In the second part, I will present my argument on the institutional problems of intergovernmental decision-making in EU security and defence policy. Finally, I will focus on CSDP's main operational and strategic shortfalls in tackling high-intensity military crises.
1. Case Study: the Libyan Crisis in 2011
In February 2011, violent protests began in Lybia against Muhammar Al Gaddafi's regime; in parallel, similar political turmoil took place in other Arab countries3. In little more than a week, insurgents seized control of several areas in the eastern part of the country around Benghazi, as well as on the western side, including the city of Misrata. Gaddafi’s regime swiftly set about militarily repressing the rebellion: by mid-March, government troops had recovered many of the areas
1 Brattberg (2011). Opportunities lost, opportunities seized: the Libya crisis as Europe’s perfect storm. Policy Brief, June. 2 Koenig (2011). The EU and the Libyan crisis–in quest of coherence?. The International spectator, 46(4), 11-30 (ref. to pp.12-13). 3 Adler-Nissen & Pouliot (2014). Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya. European Journal of International Relations, p. 897.
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strikes on Gaddafi's operational headquarters, in order to enforce the UN principle of “responsibility to protect”. Two weeks after the first bombing, NATO assumed the command of what came to be known as “Operation Unified Protector”, which began officially on March 31st under a UN mandate. Thanks to the essential air power of the US and some European states (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden), the pro-Gaddafi forces were massively hit.8 OUP, which officially ended on 31st October 2011, finally enabled the rebels to defeat Gaddafi's troops.9
Despite the new institutional machinery of the Lisbon Treaty, https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo the impact of the EU as a single entity was marginal and the response of the EU was depicted as incoherent and incapable.10 Libyan Protesters Demand Security in Tripoli. A CSDP military operation was never an option on the table, because some member states opposed this possibility from governed by rebels and were preparing to attack Transitional the beginning. As noted by one expert in EU foreign policy: National Committee (TNC) strongholds. Gaddafi was using all “If a clear majority of EU member states do not consider Libya a possible means to suppress the rebellion, threatening to “clean fit subject for discussion as a possible CSDP mission, then what up” the rebel-occupied areas “house by house”.4 exactly is CSDP for?"11
Meanwhile, the Libyan crisis had become an international The Libyan scenario was a perfect test for the post-Lisbon issue: a number of multilateral and international organizations institutional architecture. The Lisbon Treaty contains very convened meetings to discuss the Libyan scenario, including ambitious and specific provisions on CSDP: a mutual assistance the Arab League and the United Nations, the EU and NATO.5In and solidarity clause, the expansion of the Petersberg tasks, the the first few months of 2011, the United Nations Security Council introduction of “Permanent Structured Cooperation” and the (UNSC) reacted to the violence and massive human rights creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), under violations in Libya by adopting two Security Council resolutions the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs (no. 1970 and no. 1973), authorizing a no-fly zone and the use and Security Policy. However, in contrast with the rationale for of “all means necessary” to protect civilians in Libya6. After the these ambitious mechanisms as set out by the Lisbon Treaty, Security Council resolutions, a wide-ranging debate began in the role of the High Representative was marginalized by the Europe about the best strategy for handling the Libyan crisis. strong diplomatic stance of the two strongest military powers France and Britain pushed for the launch of a military mission to in Europe. The EEAS had yet to be fully institutionalized when restabilize the country. Germany and Italy, for domestic reasons, the Libyan crisis erupted, and the establishment of Permanent were more cautious about a possible military intervention in Structured Cooperation was never considered during the North Africa. diplomatic and political discussions at EU level.
France and Great Britain, thus, were the two decisive players in 2. “Dilemmas of Intergovernmentalism” the European response to the Libyan crisis. France unilaterally recognized the TNC as the sole legitimate representative of the In order to explain the EU's failure in Libya, Fabbrini argues that Libyan people, while the UK’s diplomatic activism was decisive the institutional structure of CSDP makes it unable to solve in the drafting of UNSC resolutions on Lybia7. In March 2011, basic dilemmas of collective action in the fields of foreign and France and the UK, quickly followed by the US, launched air security policy.12 In particular, the intergovernmental logic
4 Bellamy (2011). Libya and the responsibility to protect: The exception and the norm. Ethics & International Affairs, 25(03), 263-269. 5 Adler Nissen and Pouliot 2014: 898 6 Du Plessis & Louw (2011). Justice and the Libyan crisis: the ICC’s role under Security Council Resolution 1970. Institute for Security Studies briefing paper, www. issafrica. org/pgcontent. Php.. 7 Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014. 8 Howorth (2011). Libya, the EU and NATO: A Paradigm Shift in European and Trans-Atlantic Security Arrangements? Unpublished, Yale University. p. 3. 9 Coticchia (2011). The “Enemy” at the Gates? Assessing the European Military Contribution to the Libyan War. Perspectives on Federalism, 3(3), 48-70. 10 Menon 2011. 11 Howorth 2011. 12 Fabbrini 2014.
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that governs CSDP decision-making has been unable to solve give up sovereignty in such a secretive and sensitive area. CSDP four basic structural and institutional dilemmas with regard to is subject to the unanimity rule, because each member state collective action. seeks to defend its “national interest” during negotiations.16 This is an obstacle when there are actors with different preferences The first structural dilemma concerns resource allocation. about the role of the EU in the world.17 Twenty years after the launch of a defence policy at EU level, the EU is still unable to assume an autonomous and credible role as a Finally, the last dilemma is related to the question of global military power. This is due to three fundamental reasons: “democratic accountability”. In the EU, decisions taken by the disparities in operational capabilities between France, the UK European Council on foreign affairs and defence issues are not and the rest of the Europe; austerity measures that impose cuts subject to the approval of any legislative institutions. Some in defence spending at EU level; and, even more important, scholars have emphasized that EU foreign policy actually “persistent division between EU member states regarding the very has a “double democratic deficit”, in that both the European concept of EU security. The abstaining position of Germany, in a Parliament (EP) and its national counterparts fall short of being EU where there is an active coalition of neutralist, pacifist and free- able to scrutinize the EU’s security and defence activities.18 This riders member states, has further complicated the discussion on lack of accountability means that the smaller states can feel how and under which condition to use military force”.13 overwhelmed by the decision-making power of their larger fellow-members – and specifically, in the case of Libya, that of The second dilemma concerns “preference formation” at the Franco-British directoire.19 national and EU level. In this case, international decisions were constrained and shaped by domestic and national The intergovernmental framework of CSDP and the different considerations. The behaviour of the Italian government and its positions of the EU member states explain the European shift from a neutral to an interventionist position in Libya under failure in Libya. First, the EU's external action is problematic Berlusconi's leadership are telling in this regard.14 because of its essentially collective nature; as such, it should be analysed by taking into account the interests not only of the The third dilemma is based on institutional concerns about how most powerful states, but also of the small and medium-sized effective the EU’s decision-making process is. The “Cerberus-type actors that free-ride on defence-related cooperation. Second, organization”15 of the CFSP/CSDP is inefficient in addressing the the broader institutional structure of the CSDP is an obstacle challenges of complex, high-intensity international crises. This to cooperation in the security and defence field. Of particular is because the most powerful member states are unwilling to interest is the role of the High Representative, in theory the
https://www.flickr.com/photos/metziker
13 Fabbrini 2014: 189. 14 Lombardi, B. (2011). The Berlusconi government and intervention in Libya. The International Spectator, 46(4), 31-44. 15 Fabbrini 2014: 190. 16 Moravcsik, A. and Katzenstein, P.J. (1998). The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Vol. 1. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 17 Howorth 2014. 18 Rosén, G. (2014). Secrecy versus accountability: Parliamentary scrutiny of EU security and defence policy. ARENA Working Paper. 1/14: p. 1. 19 Sjursen, H. (2011). The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: the quest for democracy. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(8), 1069-1077.
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“voice” of the Union in foreign affairs, but in practice hampered by having to play the double role of Commission Vice-President (at supranational level) and spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Council (an intergovernmental function) without the necessary political and bureaucratic resources. In addition, the European Council, which has de facto monopolized the decision-making process in these issues, has become the “coordinator of the French and UK governments rather than the role of the promoter of an autonomous EU policy”.20
However, two important questions remain unexplored. First of all, why has the EU been able to conduct successful missions in civilian crisis management under the CSDP umbrella, but not Ph: Lars Magne Hovtun, Norwegian Air Force at the military level? Seventeen out of a total of twenty-five ESDP missions were civilian in nature, while the others included both civilian and military components.21 Second, despite the reluctance of the US and other NATO allies, why was the Libya The only player that pushed towards a NATO-led solution was mission finally conducted under the operational command Britain, which was able to use the right arguments to guide its of the Atlantic Alliance? Why did France and the UK not push partners towards a solution. As emphasized by Adler Nissen for permanent structured cooperation in CSDP, in a sort of EU and Pouliot:28 “British diplomats established creative leadership by “coalition of the willing”? Why did they need to operate under skilfully devising the criteria that could pave the way for a military the NATO umbrella, particularly in view of the traditional French engagement by NATO”. Britain presented the choice to pass reluctance to participate in operations with a clear US imprint? under the umbrella of NATO as a “non-choice”, because CSDP is simply not designed for high-intensity military operations. 3. Why NATO, not CSDP? Only NATO had the operational planning facilities and precision strike capabilities to cope with the scale of the problem. As After only two weeks of air strikes by France and Britain, military emphasized by all the accounts on the diplomatic activities operations over Libya were placed under NATO command. during the Libyan crisis, CSDP was never considered an option. The “handover” was controversial, because a number of major This is not only because of the unanimity vote obstacle, players did not want NATO to be the lead agency.22 The US, but because European diplomats and civil servants were engaged strategically in its Asia-Pacific “pivot”, was reluctant to aware of the structural deficiencies in the CSDP’s operational intervene militarily in Libya, particularly in view of the Obama arrangements. administration’s non-interventionist policy in the Middle East.23 Even in Europe, there was little support for a NATO operation In particular, there were three main problems that deterred EU in Libya: Germany, for domestic reasons, was against the member states from using CSDP institutional structures in order operation from the beginning;24 Poland saw no fundamental to tackle the Libyan crisis. First, EU member states fail to address national strategic interests in the region;25 France has always the requirements of modern warfare, which is increasingly had an ambiguous relationship with the Atlantic Alliance and expeditionary and multinational.29 Around 70% of EU land pushed for an exclusively European military solution.26 Turkey, forces cannot operate outside their own national territory, and a NATO country and crucial asset in the region, opposed the most of them have obsolete logistic systems and equipment. operation because it did not want new Western involvement in Second, Europe has long been faced with the problem of its own backyard.27 declining defence budgets and most EU member states spend
20 Fabbrini 2014:190. 21 Bulut, Clément, Dura, Fischer, Franke, Gowan, Keohane (2009). European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009). The European Union Institute for Security Studies. 22 Howorth 2011: 7. 23 Dalacoura, K. (2012). The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications. International Affairs, 88(1), 63-79. 24 Miskimmon, A. (2012). German foreign policy and the Libya crisis. German politics, 21(4), 392-410. 25 Gros-Verheyde (2011), “Pourquoi la Pologne ne voulait pas intervenir en Libye”, Bruxelles-2 26 September, accessed at: http://www.bruxelles2.eu/afrique/maghreb/pourquoi-la-pologne-ne-voulait-pas- intervenir-en-libye.html 26 Menon (2016). France, NATO and the limits of independence: The politics of ambivalence. Springer. 27 Howorth 2011: 7. 28 Adler-Nissen & Pouliot 2014: 904-905. 29 Menon 2011: 79.
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less than 10% of the total on Research and Development. Third, CSDP has to rely on NATO operational facilities, along the strategic lines of the Berlin Plus Agreements.30 As noted by Howorth:31 “It was the lack of such a facility which, in part, made it impossible for CSDP to assume ownership of the Libyan mission. All the signs are that a significant majority of EU member states are now determined to create a European OHQ which would (at least initially, but see below) be autonomous of its NATO equivalent, SHAPE”. However, European states have not yet come to a common agreement on this point".
The Berlin Plus mechanisms were successfully used in “Operation Concordia” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, and in the EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia Herzegovina. However, in the case of Libya, the EU-NATO ambassadorial meeting on 6th May 2011 was a failure. Turkey insisted that the meeting be designated as “informal”, meaning that no formal decision could be taken.32 Moreover, in the unstable Libyan context, it was necessary to operate rapidly. The implementation of the Berlin-Plus Agreements in Operation Concordia took eighteen months; by contrast, the EU proposed nothing in military terms as the Libyan crisis broke, while NATO had already prepared four different operational plans.33
Fourth, the EU's inertia as a defence actor is also due to the lack of a common “strategic culture”.34 As noted by Faleg,35 “strategy-making in Europe today shows a dangerous lack of clarity and method in the way member states define their strategic interests”. In particular, we have to consider the substantial difference between countries that want to rely on strictly humanitarian intervention (Germany is the most prominent example) and others, especially those with imperial histories such as Britain and France, that favour intervention to secure geopolitical and economic interests in regional or international contexts.
Conclusions
The military intervention in Libya in 2011, while seen as a success for NATO36, was definitely a failure for the CSDP. As shown in this brief essay, the EU's failure in Libya can be related to two main causes: CSDP’s institutional inability to address international crises, together with its lack of operational and strategic capacities for high-intensity interventions. Despite the innovative features of the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP was never considered as an option during the military operation over Libya.
Institutional and operational shortfalls within the EU’s security and defence framework make CSDP unsuitable for complex high-intensity military crises, severely limiting any potential for an autonomous EU stance at the international level.
(*) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
30 Haine (2007). Berlin Plus. Paris: Institute for Security Studies. 31 Howorth 2011: 5. 32 Marchi Balossi-Restelli, L. (2014). The Common Security and Defence Policy in a State of Flux? The Case of Libya in 2011. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 15(1), 88-105. 33 Koenig 2011: 12. 34 Biehl & Giegerich (2013). Strategic Cultures in Europe. Springer VS. 35 Faleg (2013). The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence.CEPS Policy Brief: 310. 36 Michaels (2011). NATO after Libya: Alliance Adrift?. The RUSI journal,156(6), 56-61
Sunset over Tripoli Ph: Ben Suthherlan (https://www.flickr.com/photos/ bensutherland)
19 Life At The College Vox Collegii
NDC Anniversary
Italian President Sergio Mattarella and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg open the anniversary celebrations.
On 25th April 1951 General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander the NDC has trodden a path which has coincided with NATO’s of the Allied Forces, said: “There is a high priority requirement to history and life. develop individuals both on the military and on the civilian side who will have a thorough grasp of the many complicated factors On 13th and 14th October 2016, the NATO Defense College which are involved in creating an adequate defense structure for celebrated these important anniversaries. the North Atlantic Treaty area”. The College is particularly proud that the President of the Italian His aim was to train the future leaders of the Alliance, both Republic, H.E. Sergio Mattarella, was able to join in celebrating military and civilian. this unique occasion, thus marking Italy’s outstanding contribution to NATO and, in particular, to the College. For this The intent immediately became reality: General Eisenhower – special moment in the College’s history, the College was also and NATO – moved very quickly, because they knew that this honoured by the presence of NATO Secretary General H.E. Jens facility had an indispensable role to play. On 19th November Stoltenberg; the Italian Minister of Defence, Ms Roberta Pinotti; the NATO Defense College opened its doors to Course 1, in the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Petr Paris. When, in 1966, the French President Charles De Gaulle Pavel; the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, as announced that all foreign forces and NATO facilities had to be well, as other dignitaries. removed from French territory, the College was relocated to Rome. On 13th October, the ceremony began with a flag-raising ceremony in the presence of the entire North Atlantic Council, Sixty-five years have passed since Eisenhower’s statement, the NATO Military Committee and Chiefs of Defence Forces, and fifty since the relocation of the College. Over the decades, as well as Senior Course 129 and NRCC-16 Course Members,
20 Volume XIV A Deep Insight
other guests and College personnel. A special moment was the & Intelligence, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C; Mr J. unveiling of a commemorative stone by H.E. Sergio Mattarella Appathurai, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political and H.E. Jens Stoltenberg. Affairs and Security Policy and NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia; In conjunction with this unique event, NDC alumni (known as and Prof Abdennour Benantar, Associate Professor (Maître de the College’s ‘Anciens’) held their 63rd Conference and Seminar conférences) at Université Paris 8, France. on 14th October. The College maintains a permanent and exclusive relationship with its alumni, many of whom have Both panels, moderated by international broadcaster Mr Nik served with honour and distinction at the highest levels in the Gowing, gave participants the opportunity to reflect on the Alliance. main challenges the Alliance and the College are facing.
The annual Anciens’ meeting was honoured by the presence of Another important moment was the signing of a Memorandum high-ranking guests; this year, in consideration of the Alliance’s of Understanding with the University of Leicester (UK), a global concerns, the overarching theme was “NATO and its partnership that confirms the high quality of our educational Partners”, with a particular focus on the MENA region. endeavour.
The panellists for the first high-level panel of the day, entitled “NATO cooperation with partners in the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, were: H.E Jens Stoltenberg; Mr Paolo Gentiloni, then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Royal Highness Prince Rashid Bin El Hassan of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; H.E. Sheikh Thamer Ali Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, President of the National Security Bureau of Kuwait; and the President of the Italian delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Mr Andrea Manciulli.
During his address, H.E. Jens Stoltenberg highlighted the importance of political dialogue with individual countries in the MENA region. “This has always been important”, he said, “but I guess it is even more important now because we see more instability, more turmoil and therefore the importance of having close political contacts, dialogue, cooperation with all these countries is of great importance for the whole Alliance.”
Following the first panel, H.E. Jens Stoltenberg and Mr Paolo Gentiloni gave a short press conference, during which the NATO Secretary General stressed once again the important role that Italy plays in the Alliance, participating in and contributing to so many different NATO missions and operations. During the press conference, he stated that Italy would send about 140 troops to join a NATO mission in Latvia – an announcement that had a certain media resonance. Minister Gentiloni reassured Panel: “NATO cooperation with partners in the Mediterranean and Middle East” the audience by saying “This is not part and parcel of a policy of aggression against Russia, but it’s part of a policy of reassurance and defence of our borders as the Atlantic Alliance.” The College and NATO share a common history. It is a history The second panel of the day, entitled: “NATO and its Partners: of evolution and improvement that began during the Cold Strengthening ties to address contemporary security challenges”, War. Year by year, with the new members of the Alliance and took place later in the morning. Panellists were: Gen (ret) J. the birth of new Partnerships, NATO and the NDC continue to Allen, Co-Director of the Center for 21st Century Security grow together. Of course, the curriculum has been adapted to
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21 Life At The College Vox Collegii
include new areas of interest, including the Middle East, the Far has achieved over the last 65 years as a centre of education, East, the former Soviet Republics, and various NATO partners. study and research, playing a critical role in fostering strategic- Quoting H.E. Jens Stoltenberg, the NDC has made a lasting level thinking on political and military matters. contribution, not only enhancing NATO’s ability to keep up with changing threats and challenges, but also helping the Alliance After 65 years of serving NATO and 50 years in Rome, the College to stay ahead of the curve and to adapt as early as possible to maintains its ability to adapt, and will continue to play its role as changing circumstances. This has been – and will continue to NATO’s premier academic institution. Over the last few decades be – key to maintaining peace and protecting our freedoms. the College has changed, but its most important trait remains unaltered: its educational purpose. As the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee stated during the anniversary celebrations, NATO is proud of what the NDC
22 Volume XIV Highlights
Our Courses Senior Course 129
ALGERIA GERMANY MAURITANIA SPAIN
Col O. KHELLAF CAPT. T. BOBZIN LtCol A. KHAIRY LtCol J. CHOZAS MONFORTE Mr S. CONTZEN LtCol F. GARCIA-ALMENTA ALONSO ARMENIA Col J. HAHN REPUBLIC OF LtCol S. GIMENO NAVARRO Mr J. RINK MOLDOVA LtCol J. PLANET GUERRERO LtCol J. RODRIGUEZ DE LABRA Ms L. HARUTYUNYAN Ms T. ANTON GREECE AUSTRIA MONGOLIA TURKEY Cdr G. BARAKOS Col Dr A. KALTENBACHER LtCol C. NTIKOUDIS Col T. CHIMEDGOCHOO Mr D. DEMİRCİ Col E. OIKONOMOU AZERBAIJAN NETHERLANDS UKRAINE Maj. A. ABDULLAYEV HUNGARY Cdr L.G.J. VAN DEN BERG Brig.Gen. Ph.D. I. POGÁCSÁS LtCol I. SERHEIEVA BELGIUM LtCol W. VAN DER VELDE
Col L. DUFOUR ITALY NORWAY UNITED ARAB EMIRATES CANADA Cdr G. ETTORRE LtCol H. BERG-OLSEN Col M. ALMANSOORI LtCol D. MASTROBERTI Mrs B. DREYER Col P. DITTMANN LtCol F. PELLEGRINI LtCol J.E. HAUG Col W. WOOD Cdr M. PETRICCA UNITED KINGDOM Cdr E. PIERONI PAKISTAN FRANCE LtCol J. SLANGEN Col L. SWINYARD Maj. F. TONON CAPT. A. SHOUKAT WgCdr G. WALKER LtCol N. LEROY LtCol Dr P. VERDE CAPT. B. MISTLER Col S. PION QATAR JORDAN UNITED STATES CAPT. L. RAYNAL Col M. AL-HABABI Col O. WACHÉ LtCol S. BASCO Mr R.W. SADI LtCol M. AL-QAHTANI Col C. YOUCHTCHENKO LtCol J. BASS Cdr S. BOGART GEORGIA KUWAIT SLOVENIA LtCol J. CONDREY LtCol J. DOOLEY Mr G. DOLIDZE LtCol A. ALASQAH Col P. STARC LtCol V. GRIZZLE
23 Highlights Vox Collegii
NRCC 16 Our Courses
AFGHANISTAN IRAQ PAKISTAN
Col M.D. SARBAZ LtCol Pilot Y.A.R. AL-BAZI LtCol M. ARFAN ALI Mr A. WARSAJI Col Q.K.R. AL-MUTTAIRI LtCol M. ARSHAD GHANI Col Y.M.H. AL-RUBAYE Col A.K.K. KADHIM ALGERIA QATAR
Col D. BENAMAR Third Secr. M. AL MUHANNADI ITALY Col M. SOUKHOU Mrs D. TALANTIKITE LtCol G. MALVI SAUDI ARABIA Col G. MASSIMETTI Col S. STARO Brig.Gen. M. R. A. ALENAZI EGYPT
Third Secr. A. ABOUALGHEIT SPAIN Col A.I.A. EL-SAHARTY JORDAN First Secr. A.M. ELSOUKKARY First Secr. Q. BILTAJI Cdr R. MARIA IZQUIERDO Col A. BTOUN Col A. SHEHALTOUGH TUNISIA FRANCE CAPT. A. ABDI Col M. FROMAGET KUWAIT Col F. YOUSFI
Col N.S. MAARAFI GEORGIA UNITED KINGDOM
Maj. G. TVAURI Miss K. LUMBY MAURITANIA
GERMANY Col E. HEIBA UZBEKISTAN Cdr A. M'BOIRICK Col D. JORDAN Cdr I. NEBEGHA Mr D. MAKHMUDOV
24 Volume XIV Highlights
Our Courses
Modular Short Course 129-1 Modular Short Course 129-2
Modular Short Course 129-3
Modular Short Course 129-4 Modular Short Course 129-5
Modular Short Courses form part of the five-month Senior Course. Since the Senior Course is divided into several Study Periods on specific themes, these can be attended by military officers and civilian officials who are not able to join the Senior Course for its entire duration. To make this possible, the NDC offers five Short Modular Courses during every Senior Course: each MSC is designed to provide participants with an opportunity to update and improve their knowledge of key political, military, defence-related, economic and socio-cultural questions with implications for the Alliance.
25 Highlights Vox Collegii
Our Courses
IPOC 2016/2
The Integrated Partner Orientation Course (IPOC 2016/1) on “NATO Present and Future” was held at the College from 17 to 21 October 2016, in conjunction with Senior Course 129 and Short Modular Course 129/3. This edition brought together 17 participants from 14 Partner Countries. The Course is designed to analyse the nature of NATO as an organization, examining its activities and policies, as well as its contribution to the field of security. Within this framework, it was possible to focus on the changing nature of the security environment and the relevant steps and adaptations NATO must undertake over the next few years.
The Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors' Course (GFOAC gfoac 2016/2 2016-2), “NATO following the Warsaw Summit”, took place from 7 to 11 November 2016, at the NATO Defense College in Rome, and from 14 to 16 November in Brussels. GFOAC 2016-2 brought together 41 high-level civilian and military participants from 23 countries, including NATO, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and Global Partner countries.
GFOAC is a high-level course aimed at one- to three-star officers and civilians of equivalent rank from the member countries of NATO, the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Global Partners. The course seeks to promote mutual understanding of contemporary security challenges and NATO’s interests and capabilities.
NEDP 8 The NDC hosted the 8th NATO-wide Executive Development Programme (NEDP), a one-week resident module from 9 to 13 January 2017.
The NEDP is a prestigious nine-month professional development programme, designed specifically for NATO civilians at mid- management levels drawn from across the Alliance. It is comprised of a series of residential modules, hosted at the NATO Defense College (‘Know the World’), Allied Command Transformation (‘Know the Future’) and NATO Headquarters. In addition, on a weekly basis, participants engage in distance learning modules covering a wide range of topics such as leadership, human resources management, financial resources management and change management.
26 Volume XIV Highlights
Our Main Guests
22 July 20 September Graduation Ceremony of SC 128, in the presence of Air Visit by a delegation from the Omani National Defense Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, Director General of NATO College, led by BGen Mohammed Majid Al Saifi and International Military Staff accompanied by the Ambassador of the Sultanate of Oman to Italy, H.E. Dr Ahmed Bin Salim Bin Mohamed Baomar and H.E. Ambassador Khalid Sulaiman Abdulrahman Ba Omard
26 September Inauguration of NRCC-16, with Deputy Commander LANDCOM LtGen Paolo Ruggiero as guest speaker
13 - 14 October 50th anniversary of the NDC’s move to Rome and 65th anniversary of its foundation and 63rd Annual Conference and Seminar of Anciens
Guests of honour on 13 October were the President of the Italian Republic, H.E. Sergio Mattarella; NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg; the Italian Minister of Defence, Roberta Pinotti; the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Petr Pavel; the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, as well as other dignitaries.
On 14 October, the NDC hosted high-level panels with H.E. Jens Stoltenberg; the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Paolo Gentiloni; H.R.H. Prince Rashid Bin El Hassan of Jordan; H.E. Sheikh Thamer Ali Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah of Kuwait; the President of the Italian delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Mr Andrea Manciulli; Gen (ret) J. Allen; Mr J. Appathurai; and Professor Abdennour Benantar.
27 Highlights Vox Collegii
Our Main Guests
29 November NDC Change of Command.
11 November The Chairman of the Military Committee General Petr Pavel General John W. Nicholson, Commander Resolute Support presided over the NDC Change of Command Ceremony, as and United States Forces – Afghanistan, visited the NDC and Major General Janusz Bojarski handed over to Lieutenant- addressed participants to GFOAC 2016-2. General Christine Whitecross.
01 December The NATO Middle East Faculty 8th Academic Advisory Board was held at the NATO Defense College. The Board, consisting of subject matter specialists, academics and senior government officials, convened at the conclusion of the 16th NATO Regional Cooperation Course (NRCC-16) to discuss the curriculum and lecture content.
02 December The Mauritanian Minister of Defence H.E. Mr Mamadou Diallo Bathia was the guest of honour when he delivered the graduation address to the 16th NATO Regional Course.
Photo: NRCC-16 photo with the Mauritanian Defence Minister Mamadou Diallo Bathia as guest of honour, Ambassadors and distinguished guests, Commandant, Dean, Middle East Faculty and Staff.
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Our Publications
Research Paper Series October 2016 RR 08/16 - The Determinants of Recent Russian December 2016 Behaviour: What do these Mean for NATO RP 134 - Implementing the Alliance Maritime Decision Makers? Strategy in the Mediterranean: NATO's John FOREMAN Operation Sea Guardian Alessandra Giada DIBENEDETTO
November 2016 Conference Report Series RP 133 - When Hybrid Warfare Supports Ideology: Russia Today October 2016 Vira RATSIBORYNSKA CR 03/16 - Rethinking Deterrence and Assurance: Russia’s Strategy Relating to July 2016 Regional Coercion and War, and NATO's RP 132 - “The Framework Nations' Concept and Response NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era Cristina VARRIALE or Missed Opportunity? Diego A. RUIZ PALMER
Fellowship Monograph Series
Eisenhower Paper Series November 2016 Fellowship Monograph 9 - Une Stratégie de October 2016 Sécurité de l’OTAN pour le Sahel : Avec Qui et EP 6 - Free of Charge, Straightforward, and Comment? Policy-Oriented: An Alternative to Academic Battiss SAMIR Journals Giuseppe VITIELLO and Désirée LEONARDI September 2016 Fellowship Monograph 8 - Handbook of Russian Information Warfare Keir GILES Research Report Series
November 2016 RR 09/16 - Why NATO Needs a New Strategic Concept Karl-Heinz KAMP