Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate: a Review of Recent Literature
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Discussions and Reviews Cold War origins and the continuing debate: a review of recent literature NORMAN A. GRAEBNER Department of History, University of Virginia More than twenty years have passed since and statesmen choose to disagree. And the scholars and journalists began their exam- resolution of the quarrel is nowhere in sight. ination of the Cold War to explain its Since 1945 the great confrontation be- existence. Despite the ensuing flood of tween the United States and the USSR has literature, much of it excellent by any been the central fact of international life, standards, the Cold War remains the most perhaps no less so than the British-French enigmatic and elusive international conflict struggle for world leadership in the Second of modern times. Writers differ in their Hundred Years War. But any historic con- judgments of causation and responsibility in flict between two giants, always diplomat- 1968 as greatly as they did when the exam- ically unsettling and potentially disastrous, ination began; twenty years of scholarship would of necessity separate those who view have produced no consensus. Nor are those such struggles as fundamental, even inevi- who have committed themselves along the table, from those who prefer to dwell on way inclined to alter their assumptions and the immediate issues and the possibilities conclusions. The record of national behavior of their avoidance or solution. Those who has been clear enough. But beyond the accept the Cold War as an historic con- recognition of day-to-day events the quest frontation which always pits any two nations, for meaning leads to a realm of secrecy and recently elevated to prominence, in a confusion where national purposes and indi- struggle for power can find respectability vidual motivations are reduced to conjec- for their view in the prophecies of Alexis ture. This absence of certainty encourages de Tocqueville. This French traveler wrote many who are attracted to the Cold War, over a century ago that one day the United as actors and students, to hold fast to estab- States and Russia would each sway the lished intellectual preferences. It is not destinies of half the globe; and it is doubtful strange that scholars, editors, politicians, that the two nations could have reached 124 such positions of primacy except as rivals. the Second World War produced the Cold If the struggle for power and prestige be- War. On April 25, 1945, Russian and tween the United States and the USSR is American forces met along the Elbe in the the logical product of modern history, its middle of Europe. &dquo;This symbolic event,&dquo; significance far transcends what is known John Lukacs has written (1961, p. 3), as the Cold War. Those who interpret the &dquo;marks the supreme condition of contem- Cold War as an imperial struggle might, porary history.... That supreme condition as does Desmond Donnelly (1965), find its is not the Atomic Bomb and not Com- inception in the British-Russian conflict munism ; it is the division of Germany and across Central Asia in the nineteenth cen- of most of Europe into American and Rus- tury. Or, according to Walter LaFeber sian spheres of influence. The so-called cold (1967), the historian might find the origins war grew out of this division.&dquo; Even those in the Russo-American rivalry over Man- writers who find the Soviet-American con- churia at the turn of the century. frontation more thoroughly grounded in Those who attribute the Cold War to history agree that the struggle entered a ideology-be it the Soviet-based doctrines new stage of intensity with the rise of Russia of Communist expansion and revolution or to predominance on the European continent the anti-Soviet attitudes which such doc- after the battle of Stalingrad. trines produced-discover the origins of the Russia’s penetration of Europe to the Cold War in the Second Russian Revolution Elbe in April 1945 upset Western calcula- of 1917. John F. O’Conor (1961), who tions on two fronts. Germany’s total destruc- attributes the Cold War to Soviet expan- tion, the high purpose of Allied wartime sionism, began his study of origins with the policy, had permitted the Red Army to murder of the Romanov family in July, challenge the traditional European balance 1918. Similarly Andr6 Fontaine, in his more of power. Secondly, Russia’s military dom- recent History ofthe Cold War, 1917-1950 inance of Slavic Europe, the result not of ( 1967 ) , attributes Soviet aggressiveness to aggression but of victory, gave the Soviets Communist ideology which, he believes, the power, if not the intention, to impose might have been uprooted by a more con- their will on the states of eastern Europe. certed military effort against the Red Army What is more, Stalin had made clear in 1918 and 1919. For Frederick L. Schu- throughout the war years that Russia would man (1962) and D. F. Fleming (1961), interfere in the postwar politics of Slavic two critics of American policies, the Cold Europe to the extent of insuring pro-Soviet War indeed began in 1918, not in any governments along Russia’s western periph- Bolshevik declaration of ideological warfare ery. Thus the Kremlin gave the United against the West, but in the Western inva- States and Britain the ultimate choice of sion of Russia and the international ostra- recognizing Soviet political and strategic cism of the Bolshevik regime which fol- interests in eastern Europe or accepting the lowed. postwar disintegration of the Grand Alliance Still, most students of the Cold War find as the price of clinging to their principles its origins in the events of the Second World of self-determination. It is in these Soviet War. If to some degree the Great War of demands and their fundamental rejection 1914 was the cause of the Second, many by the Western world that such writers as historians would consider it even truer that Herbert Feis (1957), William H. McNeill 125 (1953), Martin F. Herz (1966), Norman parties, caught, as they are, in a situation A. Graebner (1962), and even Frederick of irreducible dilemma.&dquo; L. Schuman (1961) find the origins of the Those charged with the formulation of Cold War. American policy toward Europe from 1945 Was this giant political and military con- until 1947 created the intellectual founda- frontation across Europe in 1945 avoidable? tions of orthodoxy. They rejected as im- Did it result from unacceptable Soviet moral, and thus diplomatically unjustifiable, behavior or from the West’s refusal to Soviet actions in eastern Europe, the Soviet recognize the results of its neglect of eastern refusal to permit free elections or accept and central Europe during the months fol- the principle of four-power agreement on lowing Munich? Were military strategies German reconstruction, the Soviet failure available to the Western allies which might to disarm or withdraw forces to the old Rus- have disposed of Nazi power without plac- sian border, the Soviet rejection of any ing Slavic Europe under direct Soviet con- agreement on the control of atomic energy, trol ? Or was the division of Europe the and eventually the Soviet resort to the veto necessary price of victory? Judgments on to prevent action in the United Nations. such questions are crucial to any interpreta- What was the significance of this Russian tion of the Cold War. Despite their com- behavior beyond a rejection of the Western plexies, those judgments are basically three. blueprint for the postwar world? In defend- Those who are concerned less with Soviet ing their policies the Soviets claimed no power than with Soviet behavior quite more than the right to manage the political logically place the burden of wartime and evolution of liberated Europe in terms of postwar disagreement on the Soviet Union. their own security interests. From the Schuman, on the other hand, recalls that beginning, however, American officials Munich gave Hitler a free hand in eastern interpreted Soviet defiance as evidence of Europe and permitted him to invade Russia a more sinister design, aimed not alone at in June 1941 with ample preparation and the protection of Soviet commitments in on his own terms. The West, in abdicating eastern Europe, but also at the extension its responsibilities in 1938, concludes Schu- of Soviet power and influence beyond the man, had no right, after 20,000,000 Russian regions of direct Soviet control. George F. deaths, to demand equal rights in liberated Kennan warned from Moscow in May 1945 Europe seven years later. Placing his em- that Russia was an imperialistic nation, now phasis on the realities of a divided Europe, in possession of great power and time, Louis B. Halle, in The Cold War as History already determined &dquo;to segregate from the (1967), eschews moral judgment and views world economy almost all the areas in which the Soviet-American confrontation in 1945 it has been established&dquo; (quoted in Kennan, as a tragic and unavoidable condition 1967, p. 537). The Soviets, wrote Kennan, created by the war itself, not unlike that were determined to gain Western recogni- which faces a scorpion and a tarantula in tion of their security interests in eastern a bottle, each compelled to protect itself by Europe. By standing firm in rejecting the seeking to kill the other. &dquo;This,&dquo; writes Soviet position the West would exert pres- Halle (1967, p. xiii), &dquo;is not fundamentally sure on Soviet control and prevent any a case of the wicked against the virtuous ... further Russian advances toward the west. and we may properly feel sorry for both During April 1945, Ambassador Averell 126 Harriman returned from Moscow and re- would it remain in Iran or reach Japan.