Discussions and Reviews

Cold War origins and the continuing debate: a review of recent literature

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER Department of History, University of Virginia

More than twenty years have passed since and statesmen choose to disagree. And the scholars and journalists began their exam- resolution of the quarrel is nowhere in sight. ination of the Cold War to explain its Since 1945 the great confrontation be- existence. Despite the ensuing flood of tween the United States and the USSR has literature, much of it excellent by any been the central fact of international life, standards, the Cold War remains the most perhaps no less so than the British-French enigmatic and elusive international conflict struggle for world leadership in the Second of modern times. Writers differ in their Hundred Years War. But any historic con- judgments of causation and responsibility in flict between two giants, always diplomat- 1968 as greatly as they did when the exam- ically unsettling and potentially disastrous, ination began; twenty years of scholarship would of necessity separate those who view have produced no consensus. Nor are those such struggles as fundamental, even inevi- who have committed themselves along the table, from those who prefer to dwell on way inclined to alter their assumptions and the immediate issues and the possibilities conclusions. The record of national behavior of their avoidance or solution. Those who has been clear enough. But beyond the accept the Cold War as an historic con- recognition of day-to-day events the quest frontation which always pits any two nations, for meaning leads to a realm of secrecy and recently elevated to prominence, in a confusion where national purposes and indi- struggle for power can find respectability vidual motivations are reduced to conjec- for their view in the prophecies of Alexis ture. This absence of certainty encourages de Tocqueville. This French traveler wrote many who are attracted to the Cold War, over a century ago that one day the United as actors and students, to hold fast to estab- States and Russia would each sway the lished intellectual preferences. It is not destinies of half the globe; and it is doubtful strange that scholars, editors, politicians, that the two nations could have reached 124 such positions of primacy except as rivals. the Second World War produced the Cold If the struggle for power and prestige be- War. On April 25, 1945, Russian and tween the United States and the USSR is American forces met along the Elbe in the the logical product of modern history, its middle of Europe. &dquo;This symbolic event,&dquo; significance far transcends what is known John Lukacs has written (1961, p. 3), as the Cold War. Those who interpret the &dquo;marks the supreme condition of contem- Cold War as an imperial struggle might, porary history.... That supreme condition as does Desmond Donnelly (1965), find its is not the Atomic Bomb and not Com- inception in the British-Russian conflict munism ; it is the division of Germany and across Central Asia in the nineteenth cen- of most of Europe into American and Rus- tury. Or, according to Walter LaFeber sian spheres of influence. The so-called cold (1967), the historian might find the origins war grew out of this division.&dquo; Even those in the Russo-American rivalry over Man- writers who find the Soviet-American con- churia at the turn of the century. frontation more thoroughly grounded in Those who attribute the Cold War to history agree that the struggle entered a ideology-be it the Soviet-based doctrines new stage of intensity with the rise of Russia of Communist expansion and revolution or to predominance on the European continent the anti-Soviet attitudes which such doc- after the battle of Stalingrad. trines produced-discover the origins of the Russia’s penetration of Europe to the Cold War in the Second Russian Revolution Elbe in April 1945 upset Western calcula- of 1917. John F. O’Conor (1961), who tions on two fronts. Germany’s total destruc- attributes the Cold War to Soviet expan- tion, the high purpose of Allied wartime sionism, began his study of origins with the policy, had permitted the Red Army to murder of the Romanov family in July, challenge the traditional European balance 1918. Similarly Andr6 Fontaine, in his more of power. Secondly, Russia’s military dom- recent History of the Cold War, 1917-1950 inance of Slavic Europe, the result not of ( 1967 ) , attributes Soviet aggressiveness to aggression but of victory, gave the Soviets Communist ideology which, he believes, the power, if not the intention, to impose might have been uprooted by a more con- their will on the states of eastern Europe. certed military effort against the Red Army What is more, Stalin had made clear in 1918 and 1919. For Frederick L. Schu- throughout the war years that Russia would man (1962) and D. F. Fleming (1961), interfere in the postwar politics of Slavic two critics of American policies, the Cold Europe to the extent of insuring pro-Soviet War indeed began in 1918, not in any governments along Russia’s western periph- Bolshevik declaration of ideological warfare ery. Thus the Kremlin gave the United against the West, but in the Western inva- States and Britain the ultimate choice of sion of Russia and the international ostra- recognizing Soviet political and strategic cism of the Bolshevik regime which fol- interests in eastern Europe or accepting the lowed. postwar disintegration of the Grand Alliance Still, most students of the Cold War find as the price of clinging to their principles its origins in the events of the Second World of self-determination. It is in these Soviet War. If to some degree the Great War of demands and their fundamental rejection 1914 was the cause of the Second, many by the Western world that such writers as historians would consider it even truer that Herbert Feis (1957), William H. McNeill 125

(1953), Martin F. Herz (1966), Norman parties, caught, as they are, in a situation A. Graebner (1962), and even Frederick of irreducible dilemma.&dquo; L. Schuman (1961) find the origins of the Those charged with the formulation of Cold War. American policy toward Europe from 1945 Was this giant political and military con- until 1947 created the intellectual founda- frontation across Europe in 1945 avoidable? tions of orthodoxy. They rejected as im- Did it result from unacceptable Soviet moral, and thus diplomatically unjustifiable, behavior or from the West’s refusal to Soviet actions in eastern Europe, the Soviet recognize the results of its neglect of eastern refusal to permit free elections or accept and central Europe during the months fol- the principle of four-power agreement on lowing Munich? Were military strategies German reconstruction, the Soviet failure available to the Western allies which might to disarm or withdraw forces to the old Rus- have disposed of Nazi power without plac- sian border, the Soviet rejection of any ing Slavic Europe under direct Soviet con- agreement on the control of atomic energy, trol ? Or was the division of Europe the and eventually the Soviet resort to the veto necessary price of victory? Judgments on to prevent action in the United Nations. such questions are crucial to any interpreta- What was the significance of this Russian tion of the Cold War. Despite their com- behavior beyond a rejection of the Western plexies, those judgments are basically three. blueprint for the postwar world? In defend- Those who are concerned less with Soviet ing their policies the Soviets claimed no power than with Soviet behavior quite more than the right to manage the political logically place the burden of wartime and evolution of liberated Europe in terms of postwar disagreement on the Soviet Union. their own security interests. From the Schuman, on the other hand, recalls that beginning, however, American officials Munich gave Hitler a free hand in eastern interpreted Soviet defiance as evidence of Europe and permitted him to invade Russia a more sinister design, aimed not alone at in June 1941 with ample preparation and the protection of Soviet commitments in on his own terms. The West, in abdicating eastern Europe, but also at the extension its responsibilities in 1938, concludes Schu- of Soviet power and influence beyond the man, had no right, after 20,000,000 Russian regions of direct Soviet control. George F. deaths, to demand equal rights in liberated Kennan warned from Moscow in May 1945 Europe seven years later. Placing his em- that Russia was an imperialistic nation, now phasis on the realities of a divided Europe, in possession of great power and time, Louis B. Halle, in The Cold War as History already determined &dquo;to segregate from the (1967), eschews moral judgment and views world economy almost all the areas in which the Soviet-American confrontation in 1945 it has been established&dquo; (quoted in Kennan, as a tragic and unavoidable condition 1967, p. 537). The Soviets, wrote Kennan, created by the war itself, not unlike that were determined to gain Western recogni- which faces a scorpion and a tarantula in tion of their security interests in eastern a bottle, each compelled to protect itself by Europe. By standing firm in rejecting the seeking to kill the other. &dquo;This,&dquo; writes Soviet position the West would exert pres- Halle (1967, p. xiii), &dquo;is not fundamentally sure on Soviet control and prevent any a case of the wicked against the virtuous ... further Russian advances toward the west. and we may properly feel sorry for both During April 1945, Ambassador Averell 126

Harriman returned from Moscow and re- would it remain in Iran or reach Japan. ported to President Harry Truman that the Beyond setting the limits of Soviet expansion Soviets, having broken the Yalta agreements, in a divided world, American spokesmen would proceed to create additional pressures recognized the need to create some new on world diplomacy. Harriman feared, international equilibrium that would offset moreover, that Stalin was prepared to Russia’s military preponderance on the exploit the devastation and economic dis- European continent. This would demand a location of western Europe to extend Soviet new balancing role, one formerly conducted influence into that region. Several weeks by Britain, for the United States. Such later Harriman complained that Hitler had cabinet spokesmen as Secretary of the Navy opened &dquo;the gates of Eastern Europe to James V. Forrestal and Secretary of War Asia.&dquo; Similarly State Department official Henry L. Stimson had no interest in ideo- Joseph M. Jones declared that the USSR logical policies. For Stimson the issue in &dquo;had demonstrated beyond any doubt that Soviet-American relations was not self- it was aggressive and expanding, and that determination as much as the established its immediate design for dominion included limits of power and change. Finally, West- as much of Europe and Asia and North ern leaders recognized in past Soviet actions Africa as it could get away with short of no threats to Western security which re- war with its Western allies&dquo; (Jones, 1955, quired any specific settlements of major p. 41). By 1947 many United States issues or any resort to force. These decisions spokesmen no longer limited the Soviet established the character of the Cold War. challenge to an imperialistic design but On the one hand the positions taken and the rather to a Moscow-centered ideological interests at stake eliminated any concessions crusade aimed at the total destruction of to Soviet demands through diplomatic the Western traditions of government and negotiation. To gain objectives not achiev- society. They viewed Stalin’s ruthless trans- able through the normal devices of diplo- formation of the eastern European nations macy, the contestants would exert pressure into Russian satellites, following the Truman on the will of their opponents by every Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, as proof means available short of war. In practice less of Soviet insecurity than of the un- such behavior would comprise a tacit admis- limited ambitions of Soviet Communism, sion by Western leaders that both the demanding after 1948 a Western policy of political price of recognizing the status quo military containment in Europe. and the military price of undoing it ex- What policy choices were available to ceeded by far the cost of sustaining the Western leaders in the formulation of an diplomatic, economic, and military policies allegedly defensive policy designed to blunt of the Cold War. Soviet expansionism? The simplest decision, Historians of the fifties tended to accept one overwhelmingly acceptable to concerned the Cold War orthodoxy laid down by United Americans and confirmed at Potsdam in States and British officials in speeches, July-August, 1945, was the refusal to recog- writings, memoirs, communications, and nize the Soviet sphere of influence. Western recorded conversations between 1945 and leaders, secondly, made it clear that Soviet 1950. Such writers accepted the notion of expansion would not extend beyond the Soviet aggressiveness as valid and of West- region of Soviet control in Europe; nor ern firmness as necessary. They accepted 127 the logic of US containment policy and not be prevented. Then why were they not regarded it generally as the most successful accepted? E. H. Carr, the British historian, of the nation’s postwar decisions, both in raised the question of Soviet behavior in concept and in execution. Feis, in his The Times of London on November 6, 1944. judicious volume Between War and Peace, Denying that Russia had any greater expan- recognized the failures of Western purpose sionist designs toward Europe than England, at Potsdam, but he accepted the orthodox he warned not only that the Soviets would position that the Soviets must bear the seek security guarantees in eastern Europe responsibility for the breakdown of Allied but also that &dquo;it would be foolish, as well unity. &dquo;The western allies,&dquo; ran his con- as somewhat hypocritical, to construe insist- clusion, &dquo;were standing out against both ence on this right as the symptom of an Soviet expansionism and Communist social aggressive policy.&dquo; This theme-that a post- ideals&dquo; (Feis, 1960, p. 322). From the war Russian sphere of influence was a challenge of Soviet aggressiveness there logical expression of the times and no danger could be no retreat. &dquo;The survival of free- to Western security-Walter Lippmann de- dom was dependent solely upon the United veloped fully in The Cold War (1947). States,&dquo; wrote John W. Spanier in 1960 Lippmann recognized the existence of a (p. 33). More recently such students of Russian problem but rejected the official postwar United States foreign policy as concept. Permitting the record to speak Charles Burton Marshall (1965), Dexter for itself, assigning no blame or assigning Perkins (1967), and David Rees (1967) it equally, a number of writers have ac- have continued in the sixties to view the cepted both a more limited view of the Soviet Union as an expansive force and Soviet challenge and the need for policies have regarded Stalin as the exponent, not of which reflect the limited choices which have Russian security, but of the Communist confronted the West since 1944. For it was program. This is not to say that any of quite clear from the outset that the mere these writers laud every American decision rejection of Soviet behavior in eastern or accept the rationale of every official Europe would in no way influence the utterance. They do, however, agree that course of events in the regions under Rus- the nation’s general reaction to a divided sian control. Europe in 1945 and thereafter-both in In varying degrees such writers as Hans J. rejecting any agreement on spheres of influ- Morgenthau (1951), John Lukacs (1961), ence and in creating a countering strategy Isaac Deutscher (1966), Louis B. Halle -was the proper one. (1967), Paul Seabury (1967), Charles O. Those who have rejected one or more Lerche (1965), Marshall Shulman (1966), aspects of the official, or orthodox, inter- and Wilfrid Knapp (1967) have questioned pretation of the Cold War are not of one the fears and the ideological assumptions mind. Their disagreement with official which guided the evolution of United States doctrine is not over the nature, or even the policy in the postwar years.’ Seabury, for in The Rise and Decline morality, of Soviet behavior, but over its example, of the meaning. Soviet policies in eastern Europe 1 following Yalta had been anticipated by In this connection see Luard (1964), an- other valuable study of the Cold War. The both British and American leaders as early essays in this volume were prepared by British as 1943 with the knowledge that they would scholars. 128

Cold War, traces the development of many national executive to extend United States American Cold War attitudes and questions commitments into Asia and the Pacific their usefulness as the bases of policy. From under the doubtful assumption that the writings such as these Stalin emerges less West faced, not a limited if powerful antag- an expansionist than a realist, determined onist in Europe, but rather an international to pursue a spheres of influence policy as conspiracy emanating from the Kremlin and the surest guarantee of Russian security. designed to establish Soviet influence over Most would agree with Deutscher that the the entire world. Western dread of Soviet expansionism was During the sixties another group of mistaken. Employing a different analysis, scholars has rejected the precepts of ortho- Morgenthau, in The Defense of the National doxy completely. Beginning with the as- Interest, separated the issue of imperialism sumption that a war-battered Soviet Union from that of world revolution and insisted had the right to demand friendly buffer that the USSR represented the former and states as a defense against Western encircle- not the latter threat. George F. Ken- ment, these revisionists have charged US nan’s official communications of 1945-1947 policy with provoking and sustaining the warned official Washington of Soviet bel- Cold War. They argue that the USSR ligerence toward the outside world and emerged from the war weak and insecure, suggested the countering policy of contain- that it desired an accommodation with the ment. His Memoirs, 1925-1950, published West based on the minimum acceptance of in 1967, restated his underlying assumptions a Soviet sphere of influence. It was the of the postwar years. But he made it clear repeated British and American protests that he did not, either in 1947 or afterward, against the imposition of a Soviet hegemony approve of the intensity, the militarization, in eastern Europe that inaugurated the suc- or the crusading zeal which came to charac- cessive responses which led to the Cold terize the American response to the Soviet War. The United States, charge the revi- challenge. This criticism of containment- sionists, was not powerless to prevent the that it embodied no clear, precise objectives Cold War. Lippmann had argued the revi- and thus eliminated any genuine effort at sionist case in The Cold War (1947). The negotiation-characterized the views of British physicist, P. M. S. Blackett, stated it many writers who nevertheless have insisted differently a year later in his Military and that the power and the ambitions of the Political Consequence of Atomic Energy. USSR, even if limited, necessitated some The USSR, declared Blackett, had a right Western response. not only to defend her western frontiers but Kennan’s dissatisfaction with United also to extend her frontiers as far as possible States policy increased with the passage of in response to the Baruch Plan for the time. Indeed, many whose writings have control of atomic energy. That plan, the praised the Truman Doctrine and the Russians believed, would have rendered Marshall Plan, as prudent and necessary them vulnerable to Western military power. reactions to the Soviet presence in central K. Zilliacus, a British official and writer, and eastern Europe, believe that the United carried the revisionist cause forward another States soon lost its balance and restraint. step with the publication of his book, I After 1950, and especially after the Korean Choose Peace ( 1949) . Zilliacus argued that war, a new globalism encouraged the British wartime and postwar policy, from 129

Munich to Churchill’s Fulton speech of than &dquo;counterexpansionary.&dquo; The purpose March 1946, had been as much anti-Soviet of American policy since 1945, writes Horo- as anti-German. It was the anti-Communist witz (p. 423), is to crush any movement bias of Churchill and Bevin in 1945 that anywhere in the world that threatens radical made agreement with the Kremlin impos- change against the will of the United States sible. government. To prevent change, the nation In large measure the American revisionism has employed the concept of containment of the sixties found its inception in D. F. and has built up vast excesses of power in Fleming’s The Cold War and Its Origins, order to force a showdown with the USSR 1917-1950 (1961). Critics have termed and thereby terminate the processes of Fleming’s book as little more than a collec- revolution elsewhere in the world. It was tion of contemporary comments. In large this purpose that led to the extension of measure the charge is true. But Fleming’s American power and American commit- massive Cold War studies illustrate, as have ments into Asia and Latin America after no other published volumes, the extent to 1950. Thus Horowitz, no less than Fleming, which every fundamental American decision sees the United States in the role of the after 1944 created doubts in the nation’s aggressor and demonstrates, as do others, intellectual community, especially among that Stalin’s disturbing policies of 1947 and leading members of the press. Much of that 1948-the rejection of the Marshall Plan, early criticism followed a pattern, suggesting the establishment of the Cominform, the conceptual weaknesses in policy that would Czech coup, and the Berlin blockade-were become more obvious, embarrassing, and the result rather than the cause of US costly with the passage of time. Employing containment policy. a succession of unilateral (purely American) William A. Williams, in The Tragedy off explanations for the origins of the Cold War, American Diplomacy (1959, revised edition Fleming consistently attributes Soviet sus- 1962), likewise finds a single and persistent picion and misbehavior to Western aggres- motive in American Cold War policy-the siveness. &dquo;From the first,&dquo; he writes (1961, determination to compel the Kremlin to p. 31), &dquo;it was the West which was on the accept this nation’s concept of itself and offensive, not the Soviets.&dquo; If Fleming’s the world. This purpose, writes Williams, detailed and often disturbing catalogue of comprises especially the expansion of the American editorial, official, and semi-official open door principle of trade and investment opinion offers some explanation of United into areas under Soviet control. The Mar- States policy, it avoids any analysis of Soviet shall Plan as originally conceived, he purpose and ignores the anti-American believes, would have given the United polemics of Soviet officials. Fleming traces States considerable influence over the inter- forty years of American opposition to Soviet nal and external affairs of the USSR. Soviet ideas and actions, but he makes no effort rejection, therefore, should have been antic- to account for it except in the general terms ipated. When the Marshall Plan failed to of anti-Communism. open eastern Europe, the Truman adminis- But David Horowitz, in his Free World tration adopted both the concept of negotiat- Colossus (1965), explains the unity of ing from strength and the build-up of Amer- American policy in the Cold War by charac- ican power to achieve the dismantling of terizing it as &dquo;counterrevolutionary&dquo; rather the Iron Curtain. In their ultimate failure, 130

Washington officials underestimated the Europe. Secondly, he believes that this strength and determination of the Soviet change to a tough policy occurred because opposition (Williams, 1962, pp. 205-209). of Truman’s assumption that the atomic More recently Walter LaFeber has bomb, then being developed, would adopted the concept of the open door to strengthen his diplomacy with the Kremlin, explain United States aggressiveness vis-a- making the desired settlement possible with- vis the Soviet Union in 1945 and the years out war. Thirdly, Alperovitz attempts to that followed. Opposed to the formation explain why Truman delayed the Potsdam of political blocs, writes LaFeber, the United Conference, attending ultimately only with States government, led by Secretary of State reluctance, and then used the atomic bomb James F. Byrnes, attempted to use its pre- against Japan long after he knew of the dominant economic power to penetrate Japanese premier’s willingness to surrender Europe. Whereas that policy, culminating provided its emperor were retained. While in the Marshall Plan, triumphed in western admitting that such questions cannot be Europe, it failed to penetrate the Iron answered with complete confidence for lack Curtain. Meanwhile the United States, with of evidence, he suggests that Truman its vast economic power, might have ex- delayed his trip to Potsdam until the bomb tended credit to the Soviet Union in 1945 had been fully developed and then used it, to relieve its economic plight. Instead the not to end the war in the Pacific, but to Truman administration cancelled Lend- demonstrate this new power to the Soviet Lease abruptly and without explanation; in Union. As one American official explained March 1946 Stalin announced another five- in May 1945, &dquo;Mr. Byrnes did not argue year plan to rebuild Russian industry and that it was necessary to use the bomb assure the technological and financial in- against the cities of Japan in order to win dependence of the Soviet Union. Again the war.... [His] view [was] that our the quest for the open door failed to achieve possessing and demonstrating the bomb the breakdown of anything except diplo- would make Russia more manageable in macy (LaFeber, 1967, pp. 6-20). Europe.&dquo;2 Still, if the President hoped to If American economic could not power exert diplomatic pressure on Stalin he failed the Soviet another penetrate sphere, perhaps to exploit the bomb either at Potsdam or force was available in 1945 to turn the thereafter. Indeed, the bomb had no appre- Russians out of eastern Europe. Gar Alpero- ciable effect on Soviet policy whatever. vitz, in his Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima The showdown over eastern Europe never and Potsdam has discovered the (1965), came. origins of the Cold War in the atomic Late in 1966 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., diplomacy which led to Potsdam and the wrote a letter to the New York Review off decision to use the bomb against Japanese Books: &dquo;Surely the time has come to blow targets. Alperovitz develops three specific themes. First, he argues with Flem- along 2 Alperovitz, 1967, p. 242. Feis (1961) has ing, Horowitz, and Williams that US policy challenged this interpretation of the use of the toward Russia changed precipitously under atomic bomb against Japan. He believes that Truman ordered its employment against Hiro- Truman in April, 1945, when the new shima as another weapon, however destructive, administration to impose an im- sought to terminate the war promptly and thus save mediate settlement on Russia over eastern American and Japanese lives. 131 the whistle before the current outburst of REFERENCES revisionism the of the Cold regarding origins ALPEROVITZ, GAR. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiro- War goes much further.&dquo; Then in the shima and Potsdam. New York: Simon and autumn of 1967 Schlesinger published a full Schuster, 1965. article in Foreign Affairs in which he argued DEUTSCHER, ISAAC. "Twenty Years of Cold for greater orthodoxy and insisted that War." In Ironies of History, London, 1966. DESMOND. the World: Stalin’s paranoia and rigidity were sufficient DONNELLY, Struggle for The Cold War and Its Causes. London: to explain the failure of postwar accom- St. Martin’s Press, 1965. modation. Still the revisionist attack on US FEIS, HERBERT. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: Cold War has tended to become policy The War They Waged and the Peace They increasingly pronounced with the passage Sought. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univer- of time.3 As long as much of the American sity Press, 1957. and most of the Russian evidence remains —. Between War and Peace: The Pots- dam hidden from view the final judgment on Conference. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Cold War origins will remain elusive. But University Press, 1960. —. Subdued. the publication of British and American Japan Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961. memoirs and documents over the past FLEMING, D. F. The Cold War and Its Origins, decade reveals both an inflexible opposition 1917-1950. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, to Soviet behavior and an illusion that some- 1961. how the postwar Soviet dominance in GRAEBNER, NORMAN A. Cold War Diplomacy, Europe could be undermined without the 1945-1960. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Uni- 1962. price of war. Revisionist studies, moreover, versity Press, LOUIS B. The Cold War as have traced the descent into the Cold War HALLE, History. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. a series of cause-and-effect relation- through HERZ, MARTIN F. Beginnings of the Cold ships in which key Soviet decisions through- War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, out the postwar era appear to be reactions 1966. to, not the causes of, Western demonstra- HOROWITZ, DAVID. The Free World Colossus: tions of power and determination. After A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War. New York: Hill and 1965. more than twenty years of Cold War, the Wang, JONES, JOSEPH MARION. The Fifteen Weeks. quest for understanding raises one funda- New York: Press, 1955. mental and still unanswered Viking question: Why KENNAN, GEORGE F. Memoirs, 1925-1950. did the United States after 1939 the permit Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. conquest of eastern Europe by Nazi forces, KNAPP, WILFRED. A History of War and presumably forever, with scarcely a stir, but Peace, 1939-1965. London: Oxford Univer- refused after 1944 to acknowledge any sity Press, 1967. WALTER. and the primary Russian interest or right of hegem- LAFEBER, America, Russia, the Cold War, 1945-1966. New York: Wiley, ony in the same on the heels of a region 1967. Russian the closely-won victory against LASCH, CHRISTOPHER. "The Cold War, Re- German invader? When scholars have an- visited and Re-Visioned," New York Times swered that question fully the historical Magazine, January 14, 1968. debate over Cold War origins will be largely LERCHE, CHARLES O., JR. The Cold War and resolved. After. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice- Hall, 1965. 3 For a popular defense of revisionism, see LUARD, EVAN (ed.). The Cold War: A Re- Lasch (1968). appraisal. New York: Praeger, 1964. 132

LUKACS, JOHN. A History of the Cold War. REES, DAVID. The Age of Containment: The Rev. edn. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Cold War, 1945-1965. London: St. Martin’s 1962. Press, 1967. MARSHALL, CHARLES BURTON. The Cold War: SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L. The Cold War: Ret- A Concise History. New York: Franklin rospect and Prospect. Baton Rouge: Loui- Watts, 1965. siana State University Press, 1962. McNEILL, WILLIAM H. America, Britain, and SEABURY, PAUL. The Rise and Decline of the Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, Cold War. New York: Basic Books, 1967. 1941-1946. London: Oxford University SHULMAN, MARSHALL D. Beyond the Cold Press, 1953. War. New Haven: Yale University Press, MORGENTHAU, HANS J. In Defense of the 1966. National Interest. New York: Knopf, 1951. SPANIER, JOHN W. American Foreign Policy O’CONOR, JOHN F. The Cold War and Libera- Since World War II. New York: Praeger, tion. New York: Vantage Press, 1961. 1960. PERKINS, DEXTER. The Diplomacy of a New WILLIAMS, WILLIAM A. The Tragedy of Amer- Age. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, ican Diplomacy. Rev. edn. New York: 1967. World Publishing, 1962.