The Power of Pretext: Religious Justification in Science Fiction, Scientology, and Society By Lilith Claire Acadia A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Daniel Boyarin, Chair Professor Marianne Constable Professor Niklaus Largier Summer 2018 1 Abstract The Power of Pretext: Religious Justification in Science Fiction, Scientology, and Society by Lilith Claire Acadia Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric University of California, Berkeley Professor Daniel Boyarin, Chair The justification a speaker offers for a given action, stance, or identity may serve the discursive purpose of veiling motivating reasons or rhetorically appealing to the audience. This dissertation defines such speech as ‘pretext,’ presenting ten tests for identifying pretext rhetorically rather than psychologically, then demonstrates through the example of religion the stakes of treating such justifications as reflecting motivating reasons rather than constituting a rhetorical trick. I argue that the naturalized concept we call ‘religion’ is a modern European construct with ten identifiable characteristics; this ‘religion’ enjoys epistemic privilege that makes it a potentially dangerous basis for pretext. Examples from social, legal, and literary texts show that audiences tend to evaluate ‘religiously’ justified actions and ethical stances as valid or incontrovertible, even when those justifications fall into the discursive category of pretext. Chapter One, “Fallacy of Justification: ‘Pretext,’” bridges rhetoric, epistemology, and linguistics to define pretext. Diverging from past scholarship, I define pretext rhetorically, by how that category of justification functions in spoken and written texts, rather than analyzing a speaker’s psychology. I design ten tests for identifying pretexts in discourse, conduct a discourse analysis of how scholars use the term in relevant literature, and read pretext against core rhetorical theory. Chapter Two, “The Privileged Space of ‘Religion,’” responds to discourses of religion scholarship in arguing that the epistemically privileged world that ‘religion’ creates for itself is a historical and conceptual mistake with dangerous ethical implications. Beginning with evidence that what we call ‘religion’ is an Enlightenment European construct, I identify ten common characteristics of the construct, then proceed to argue that ‘religious’ justifications for imperialism are fallacious, the concept’s epistemic privilege is undeserved, ‘religious’ pretexts can have dangerous implications, and there are strong reasons to be suspicious of ‘religious’ pretexts. Chapter Three, “Religious Pretext for Imperialist Violence in Science Fiction,” systematically applies the previous two chapters’ theoretical interventions to two objects of science fiction literature: Mary Doria Russell’s The Sparrow (1996) and Octavia Estelle Butler’s Lilith’s Brood trilogy (1987-1989). For each text, I analyze the discursive construction of a ‘religion’ with 2 reference to my ten characteristics of ‘religion,’ then examine how these constructed ‘religions’ serve as sources of pretext for imperialism. Chapter Four, “Clearing up Pretext and ‘Religion’ through Scientology,” echoes this methodology with a border case between ‘religion’ and science fiction: the Church of Scientology. In conversation with scholarship on New Religious Movements, science fiction studies, and American studies, I systematically trace the discursive construction of Scientology as a ‘religion.’ Presenting evidence of how Scientologists use the institution’s status as a ‘religion’ pretextually, and their ‘religion’ as a basis for pretexts for imperialism and other violence reinforces the dissertation’s overarching argument. The conclusion suggests how readers can generalize the four chapters’ analyses and apply this dissertation’s central theoretical contributions that critique how audiences think about ‘religion’ and pretext. i Dedicated to Pamela Sue Anderson ii Table of Contents I. Introduction iii A. Defining Terms iii B. Objects vi C. Objectives viii II. Acknowledgements xii III. Chapter One: Fallacy of Justification: ‘Pretext’ 1 D. An Argument for ‘Pretext’ 2 E. Testing ‘Pretext’ 7 F. Reading ‘Pretext’ Interdisciplinarily 13 G. Reading ‘Pretext’ through Rhetoric 25 H. Post-text 37 IV. Ten Tests of Pretext 46 V. Chapter Two: The Privileged Space of ‘Religion’ 47 I. ‘Religion’ Isn’t What You Think 47 J. Fallacious Imperialism 59 K. Religion’s Fallacious Privilege 67 L. Religion’s Undeserved Justificatory Weight 72 M. Potent ‘Pretexts’ 74 N. Should You Accept that ‘Religious’ ‘Pretext?’ 75 VI. Ten Characteristics of ‘Religion’ 82 VII. Chapter Three: Religious Pretext for Imperialist Violence in Science Fiction 83 O. Science Fiction as a Social Text 86 P. Why a Literary Object 86 Q. Human-initiated Contact 89 R. Alien-initiated Contact 100 S. Conclusion: Construction of ‘Religion’ as ‘Pretext’ 114 VIII. Chapter Four: Clearing up Pretext and ‘Religion’ through Scientology 126 T. From Dianetics To Scientology 128 U. Scientology as Science Fiction and ‘Religion’ 131 V. Scientology’s Imperialism and Violence 139 W. Scientology’s ‘Pretexts’ and Applying the Plausible Motive Test 142 X. Discursive Solutions 151 IX. Conclusion 162 Y. Summary 163 Z. Enactment 168 X. Bibliography 171 iii Introduction “The philosopher was seated on the lawn. He said: ‘signs form a language, but not the one you think you know.’ I realized I had to free myself from the images which in the past had announced to me the things I sought…” —Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities.i The philosopher in Calvino’s passage reveals language’s illusory signification, awakening in his listener the realization that finding meaning requires abandoning presumptions. So too, my dissertation aims to denaturalize the significations of two signs we take for granted, justification and religion, revealing their discursive construction and power. Presumptions impede knowledge, because the thinker jumps directly from recognition to knowledge production, skipping any interpretive stages to simply reproduce rather than develop knowledge. Presuming that a justification reflects a motive ignores the ways in which certain kinds of justifications function discursively; presuming that an institution is a religion overlooks the problems with privileging and defining religion as a category. Recognizing the discursive constructions of pretext (as a form of justification) and religion are important because religious pretexts are powerful justifications for violence. Or, to summarize the theoretical thrust of my dissertation in 50 words: what we call ‘religion’ is a construct that enjoys epistemic, legal, and social privileges making it a dangerous source of pretext, a discursive category of justifications (for actions, stances, and identities) that do not reflect the speaker’s motives but seek to veil the motives or rhetorically appeal to the audience. Defining Terms Particularly since this dissertation is interdisciplinary, I do not assume that my readers are familiar with any of the academic discourses with which I am in conversation. For the sake of orientation, here are definitions of the significant terms appearing in the following chapters. Chapter 1 presents ‘pretext’ in a new, and I believe more precise and productive way than past scholarship. Here, pretext is a discursive category encompassing justifications (for an action, stance, or identity) that do not reflect the speaker’s motivations and serve instead to veil those motives or rhetorically appeal to the audience. As a discursive category, pretext refers to the space in communication that the speaker, audience, and construction of meaning around the exchange all help delineate. It does not necessarily indicate bad faith on the part of the speaker, since it refers to the discursive role of the phrase rather than the speaker’s psychology. Pretext is not a temporally nor culturally universal linguistic form, but rather a kind of speech dependent on the way humans communicate in that milieu. I view discourse as an abstract text akin to a conversation yet extending beyond the spoken to encompass writing, visual material, actions, and the assumptions and epistemologies shaping how agents understand and interact with those texts. Justifications are explanations a speaker offers to validate a proposition. I emphasize justifications for actions, stances, and identities owing to their relevance to my central thesis. iv Distinguishing pretexts as justifications that do not reflect the speaker’s motives indicates the role of the justification rather than purporting to make psychological judgments. As such, pretexts have the purpose not of reporting motivations, but rather of veiling the motivating reasons (even without intent) or rhetorically appealing to the audience. I propose 10 tests to identify pretexts precisely to designate pretext as a discursive rather than psychological category, a rhetorical device beyond a mere lie. Rather than simply being a false statement, pretexts are a version of rhetorical appeal that a speaker makes. The tests point to how the justification functions in the discourse, rather than analyzing the speaker’s psychology, intent, or conscious choices of expression. This framing of pretext means that it is irrelevant whether the motives are for example, selfishly, irrationally, or religiously motivated.