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Exploring the Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban: Afghanistan’S Long Road to Peace

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Exploring the Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban: Afghanistan’S Long Road to Peace FEBRUARY 2019 ISSUE NO. 279 Exploring the Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban: Afghanistan’s Long Road to Peace SHUBHANGI PANDEY ABSTRACT The unguarded optimism about reconciliation with the Taliban may seem misplaced, but the proponents of the concept are increasing in number. The success of a negotiated peace deal with the Taliban, however, will hinge on the sustainability of the power-sharing arrangement that emerges as a result of conciliatory talks. Whether the Afghan government, or the international community will be able to devise an effective peace-building strategy in the current environment of ever-escalating conflict, is a prospect worth analysing. This brief explores past efforts at integrating anti- government militias in the peace-building process in Afghanistan, to arrive at an understanding of the prospects for a negotiated political settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government in the near future. (This brief is part of ORF’s series, ‘Emerging Themes in Indian Foreign Policy’. Find other research in the series here: https://www.orfonline.org/series/emerging-themes-in-indian-foreign-policy/) Attribution: Shubhangi Pandey, “Exploring Afghanistan’s Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban”, ORF Issue Brief No. 279, February 2019, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN 978-93-88262-88-0 © 2019 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. Exploring the Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban: Afghanistan’s Long Road to Peace INTRODUCTION Afghanistan has been suffering one of the unsurprising that the future of Afghanistan is world’s deadliest insurgencies for 17 years once again a matter of serious global concern. now. In 2018, 8,260 civilian casualties were According to the Special Inspector General for reported by Resolute Support, the mission run Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Report by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) published in January 2019, the territory that in Afghanistan.1 Spearheaded by the Taliban, the Afghan government exercises control over the Islamist movement that began in 1994 as a is home to 63.5 percent of the Afghan reaction to the depredations of warlords and population, which is 1.7 percent lower than the local commanders, and the conflict between previous quarter; the Taliban’s territorial gains, rival mujahideen groups, eventually developed meanwhile, have translated to control over transnational terror linkages with other 10.8 percent of the population.6 In other words, radical Islamist entities such as the al-Qaeda, the government controls just over half of the and transformed into a full-blown insurgency total inhabited area in Afghanistan, with the by the early 2000s.2 Despite the continued remaining territory being either in Taliban presence of US troops and the NATO-led hold or is contested (See Graphs 1 and 2, and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Map 1.). Although the Taliban have faced in Afghanistan, the Taliban have established political rifts among its senior leaders in 2012 control over 12.3 percent of the country’s total that resulted in the dismissal of insubordinate 407 districts as of October 2018. Moreover, commanders, and a crisis of leadership in 2015 they have remained steadfast in their after the death of Taliban chief Mullah Omar demands, primary of which are the exit of all two years earlier became public news, the foreign troops from Afghanistan, and the group has remained largely cohesive.7 It establishment of strict Islamic law that would continues to be a grave threat to the people and dictate all manifestations of governance in the the socio-political institutions of Afghanistan, country.3,4 Even with foreign assistance, the and to the larger geopolitical calculus that Afghan government has failed not only to Afghanistan is an integral part of.8 curtail the influence and operations of the Taliban, but also in negotiating peace with the Considering the current debilitating militant outfit. Yet, it insists on sitting at the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan, negotiating table, holding that any viable reconciliation with the insurgents seems to be peace process would require the Afghan the necessary but difficult step towards government at the helm.5 achieving some semblance of peace in the country. Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special The recent rise in terrorist violence leading Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, to the growing number of casualties has is tasked to lead and coordinate US efforts to provoked a new sense of urgency for a bring the warring parties to the negotiating negotiated deal, especially in light of the table, while working in concert with the Trump administration’s desperation to Afghan government.9 A rapprochement with disengage from Afghanistan. It is therefore the Taliban, however, is no guarantee for 2 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 278 l FEBRUARY 2019 Exploring the Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban: Afghanistan’s Long Road to Peace Graph 1. Control of Afghan Population: Government, Taliban, Contested (Aug. 2016 - Oct. 2018) 80% HISTORICAL POPULATION CONTROL OR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN (%) 69% 70% 66% 64% 65% 64% 64% 65% 65% 65% 64% 60% Insurgent 50% Contested Afghan Government 40% 29% 30% 25% 25% 26% 23% 24% 24% 23% 23% 24% 20% 11% 11% 12% 12% 12% 11% 11% 9% 9% 10% 8% 0% May-16 Aug-16 Nov-16 Mar-17 Jun-17 Sep-17 Dec-17 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Source: SIGAR Report (January 30, 2019)10 Graph 2. Control of Afghanistan Districts: Government, Taliban, Contested (Nov. 2015 - Oct. 2018) HISTORICAL DISTRICT CONTROL OR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN (%) 80% Insurgent 72% 71% Contested 70% 66% Af ghan Government 63% 60% 60% 57% 57% 57% 56% 56% 56% 56% 54% 50% 40% 34% 33% 32% 29% 29% 30% 30% 30% 29% 30% 30% 25% 23% 21% 20% 15% 13% 13% 14% 14% 11% 12% 12% 9% 10% 10% 8% 7% 6% 0% Jul-15 Jan-16 Aug-16 Mar-17 Sep-17 Apr-18 Oct-18 Source: SIGAR Report (January 30, 2019)11 enduring peace, and seems an unlikely the Taliban are part of a carefully thought out outcome in the first place. Moreover, it seems strategy to exit the country without having to that US efforts to facilitate negotiations with endure the humiliation of admitting defeat.12 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 278 l FEBRUARY 2019 3 Exploring the Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban: Afghanistan’s Long Road to Peace Map 1. Who controls what? Source: Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF as national political institutions, leading to RECONCILIATION the collapse of the government.14 The Geneva Accord of 1988, which comprised three In the history of negotiations with insurgent bilateral agreements signed between the groups in Afghanistan, it is difficult to find governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in even a single period of sustained peace. Even the presence of representatives from the US in the 1980s, much before the emergence of and USSR as guarantors, also failed to end the the Taliban as a separate entity, the Afghan war in Afghanistan.15 For one, the mujahideen mujahideen were regularly holding peace were not directly involved in the negotiations negotiations with the Soviet-backed Afghan and felt that the diplomatic exercise was a g o v e r n m e n t , u n d e r t h e N a t i o n a l strategy to systematically marginalise them, Reconciliation Policy (NRP) of the Najibullah by pushing them to the periphery of the 13 government, initiated in 1986. However, in decision-making process.16 Moreover, the the absence of financial and military aid from Accord failed to calibrate a potential power- the USSR, Najibullah failed to maintain sharing agreement that would take into control over the Afghan armed forces, as well account the interests and participation of all 4 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 278 l FEBRUARY 2019 Exploring the Prospects for a Negotiated Political Settlement with the Taliban: Afghanistan’s Long Road to Peace possible domestic stakeholders, including the enumerating respective political and various militias.17 administrative jurisdictions.22 One such important agreement was the protocol signed What followed was a state of anarchy, as between Ahmed Shah Masood’s Shura Nizar the groups that were collectively referred to as and the Afghan government, which signaled the mujahideen, began vying for political and truce in the Panjshir Valley in 1984.23 administrative control of Afghanistan.18 Reacting to the civil war initiated by the The distribution of arms and local currency mujahideen outlaws, a small group of among opposition forces—a move mastered by students led by Mullah Omar, created the the Najibullah regime from 1989-1992, in Taliban, a movement that vouched to unify order to coopt the insurgents into accepting the country, rid the Afghan soil of all “vices”, the status quo—yielded better results than and act as a formidable opponent to the arming government supporters against the warring mujahideen.19 Not only did the militias.24
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