Armed Struggle and Democracy the Case of South Africa
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DISCUSSION PAPER 20 Martin Legassick Armed Struggle and Democracy The Case of South Africa Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2002 Indexing terms Armed struggle Democracy Liberation ANC Historical analysis Political culture South Africa The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Language checking: Peter Colenbrander ISSN 1104-8417 ISBN 91-7106-504-0 © The author and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002 Printed in Sweden by Elanders Digitaltryck AB, Göteborg 2002 Contents Preface .................................................................................. 5 Introduction......................................................................... 7 PART I A Strategy of Rural Guerrillaism? 1961–75 ............................................................................. 11 PART II What Strategy for the Armed Struggle? 1976–87 ............................................................................. 32 Conclusion ......................................................................... 60 Preface The Nordic Africa Institute established a research network on “Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa” (LiDeSA) during 2001. An initial workshop in Cape Town (organised jointly with the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the Uni- versity of Cape Town in December 2001) initiated first discussions with and among scholars in the Southern African region. Some of the papers submitted then have since been published in this Discussion Paper series (nos. 18 and 19). An international conference on “(Re-) Conceptualising Democracy and Liberation in Southern Africa” took place as a follow-up in July 2002 in Windhoek. It was orga- nised in collaboration with two local civil society agencies, the Legal Assistance Centre and the Namibia Institute for Democracy. Most of the 20 contributions presented then will be published in different ways during 2003. This paper was originally drafted for and submitted to this conference and was subsequently slightly revised. A much shorter version will be included in another conference-related publication. Since this long version has merits in itself, it is also being made available separately as a Discussion Paper. It will, in addition, contrib- ute as a substantial chapter to a forthcoming monograph in preparation by the author, in which he combines his current analytical assessment with a number of earlier articles written during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The monograph is to be published during 2003. The separate publication of this paper now aims to achieve a maximum degree of access to the text. Given the personal background and experiences of the author, his analysis is entitled to claim relevance to the debate around issues of lib- eration and democracy in South(ern) Africa. Suspended and finally expelled from the ANC as an activist in exile for his publicly articulated political ideology and conviction, he returned to South Africa in the 1990s to continue his career as a scholar. This paper uses the author’s own experiences and commitments as a point of departure for a necessary discussion. It thus offers hitherto unknown insights into a controversy with direct impact on the political culture within the ANC and South Africa today. In this regard it is a fascinating piece of contemporary history and a personal account resulting from direct involvement, which hopefully will provoke both politically as well as academically inspired and oriented debate on related issues. Henning Melber Uppsala, October 2002 5 Introduction It would be possible to draw a line from the founding leaflet of Umkhonto We Sizwe, issued on 16 December 19611 (and from the 1962 SACP programme, The Road to South African Freedom)2 to the Harare Declaration of 19893—and to the eventual outcome—and state that the strategy of the ANC was always for a nego- tiated settlement to achieve democracy in South Africa, based on a “change of heart” by the whites. That indeed is more or less the idea which Allister Sparks in Tomorrow is Another Country attributes to Nelson Mandela: “I started Umkhonto We Sizwe … but I never had any illusions that we could win a military victory; its purpose was to focus attention on the resistance movement.”4 However, that standpoint is contradicted by the decisions of the 1969 ANC conference at Morogoro (25 April 1 May 1969) and by countless other ANC doc- uments. Strategy and Tactics of the ANC, adopted at Morogoro, for example, writes of “the overthrow of White supremacy through planned rather than sponta- neous activity” (p. 8), and of developing conditions “for the future all-out war which will eventually lead to the conquest of power” (p. 6).5 The National Execu- tive Committee of ANC (NEC ) referred in 1973 to “a struggle such as ours which pursues the strategic objective of seizure of power and not reforms or a negotiated transfer of power” and added that “the conscious and purposive participation of 1. Pamphlet issued by command of Umkhonto We Sizwe, 16 December 1961 in T. Karis and G. Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge: Documents of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, III, pp. 716–17. Especially: “We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both Govern- ment and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate stage of civil war.” 2. While stating that “The Nationalists are forcing a solution upon South Africa in which patriots and democrats will take up arms to defend themselves, organize guerrilla armies and undertake various acts of armed resistance, culmi- nating in a mass insurrection against White domination,” The Road to South African Freedom also stated that “the Party does not dismiss all prospects of non-violent transition to the democratic revolution. This prospect will be enhanced by the development of revolutionary and militant people’s forces,” SACP, South African Communists Speak (London, 1981), pp. 31–45. In 1959 party leader Michael Harmel had written “revolution need not involve violence. There have been plenty of examples in history where a combination of factors have been compelling enough to make a ruling class give way for urgent and overdue changes, without dragging the people through the agony of civil war. We can only hope this may also be the case in South Africa.” “Revolutions are Not Abnormal,” Africa South, III, 2, Jan–March 1959, p. 17. 3. “Declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa,” reprinted in Sechaba, October 1989. See also “ANC Statements” in Sechaba, November 1989. 4. Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, (Struik, Sandton, 1994), p. 26. That this was indeed Mandela’s position is supported by Neville Alexander. “In one of the first political discussions we had with the ANC leader- ship in prison [on Robben Island] Nelson Mandela told us in 1964 that they had never believed, and did not believe, that it was possible to overthrow the apartheid state by military means. Their strategy was to force the regime to negotiate on terms that would be acceptable, that is, not humiliating to the government.” (An Ordinary Country, U of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 2002, pp. 179–80). 5. ANC, Forward to Freedom: Strategy, Tactics and Programme of the ANC, SA (ANC, Morogoro, nd, 1969?). This document—henceforth referred to as Strategy and Tactics—was written by Joe Slovo: see the version of it titled “The Strategy and Tactics of the Revolution and the Role of the Various National Groups and the Revolutionary Forces in the Revolution” (typescript, dated March 1969, 24 pp.) in Mayibuye Centre, UWC, Dadoo papers 2.6. 7 Martin Legassick the masses in the struggle, on their own behalf and relying on their own strength, is of decisive importance.”1 In 1979, the SACP Central Committee (CC) stated that “the system of exploitation and oppression in SA cannot be defeated without revolutionary violence involving the whole people.”2 In the same year, a Political- Military Strategy Commission of the ANC declared that the aim was seizure of power and that this meant “the dismantling by the popular power of all the politi- cal, economic, cultural and other formations of racist rule and also necessitates the smashing of the state machinery of fascism and racism and the construction of a new one committed to the defence and advancement of the people’s cause.”3 An article by Alex Mashinini in the ANC organ Sechaba in April 1985 spelled the idea out more precisely and at length: For the ideals enshrined in the Freedom Charter to be realised, that is, for full national liberation and social emancipation of the oppressed majority of our coun- try and also to make this emancipation complete and meaningful, there is one and only one condition which has to be satisfied. That is the violent revolutionary over- throw of the present system, the armed seizure of power by the revolutionary masses, the destruction of the present state power and transfer of that power into the hands of the democratic majority. This, as a strategic principle, is absolute. ... Put in a nutshell, no other methods of struggle short of an insurrection will succeed in ensuring the meaningful, complete and total liberation of our people from the obnoxious, fascist regime in SA.4 The ANC conference at Kabwe (16–23 June 1985) resolved to pursue “the aim of seizure of power by the people through a combination of mass political action and armed struggle … to overthrow the apartheid regime.”5 In 1986, the SACP CC re- emphasised that “genuine liberation will come when they [the masses] seize power, relying on their own strength and refusing to succumb to illusions spread by ene- mies of our revolution that the Botha regime will, in the near future, be willing to surrender power to the democratic majority.”6 Certainly the overwhelming viewpoint in the factories, townships, schools and the countryside in South Africa in the 1980s was that the struggle for democracy would culminate in a revolutionary armed seizure of power by the masses.7 This was what the members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) fought and died for, and what their families believed they died for.