Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions
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Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions
Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions Henry B. Hogue Specialist in American National Government March 11, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21308 Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions Summary Under the Constitution (Article II, §2, clause 2), the President and the Senate share the power to make appointments to high-level policy-making positions in federal departments, agencies, boards, and commissions. Generally, the President nominates individuals to these positions, and the Senate must confirm them before he can appoint them to office. The Constitution also provides an exception to this process. When the Senate is in recess, the President may make a temporary appointment, called a recess appointment, to any such position without Senate approval (Article II, §2, clause 3). This report supplies brief answers to some frequently asked questions regarding recess appointments. Additional information on recess appointments may be found in other CRS reports: CRS Report R42329, Recess Appointments Made by President Barack Obama, by Henry B. Hogue and Maureen O. Bearden; CRS Report RL33310, Recess Appointments Made by President George W. Bush, by Henry B. Hogue and Maureen O. Bearden; and CRS Report RL33009, Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview, by Vivian S. Chu. This report will be updated as events warrant. Congressional Research Service Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions Contents What Is the Purpose of a Recess Appointment? ....................................................................... -
The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in Advice and Consent
Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 54 Issue 4 Article 17 2004 The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in Advice and Consent Laura T. Gorjanc Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Laura T. Gorjanc, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in Advice and Consent, 54 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1435 (2004) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol54/iss4/17 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. THE SOLUTION TO THE FILIBUSTER PROBLEM: PUTTING THE ADVICE BACK IN ADVICE AND CONSENT INTRODUCTION Today, hostility reigns in Washington. This is so, less than three years after a period of virtually unparalleled national unity following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Now, with Congress and the nation almost evenly divided politically, rela- tions between the Republicans and Democrats in Washington are as discordant as ever. As one pundit put it, "[c]ynicism is back in full force. Extraordinary political partisanship and acrimony are back."' This "extraordinary political partisanship and acrimony" is best evidenced by the recent wranglings over several nominees for prestigious and powerful federal courts of appeals appoint- ments. In the past year, Democrats successfully filibustered six of President Bush's nominees 2 and the Republicans responded with an all-night "talkathon" meant to publicly condemn the Democ- rats' filibusters. -
Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority
Common Legislative Encroachments On Executive Branch Authority This memorandum lists and briefly discusses a variety of common provisions of legislation that are offensive to principles of separation of powers, and to executive power in par ticular, from the standpoint of policy or constitutional law. July 27, 1989 M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n for t h e G e n e r a l C o u n s e l s ’ C onsultative G r o u p * This memorandum provides an overview of the ways Congress most often intrudes or attempts to intrude into the functions and responsibili ties assigned by the Constitution to the executive branch. It highlights ten types o f legislative provisions commonly included in proposed legislation that weaken the Presidency. It is important that all of us be familiar with each o f these forms of encroachment on the executive’s constitutional authority. Only by consistently and forcefully resisting such congression al incursions can executive branch prerogatives be preserved. Of course, the methods o f intruding on executive power are limited only by Con gress’s imagination; thus, our ten examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. This Office is always pleased to assist in reviewing legislation for any possible encroachments on the President’s authority. 1. Interference with the President’s Appointment Power The Appointments Clause is an essential aspect of separation of pow ers. By permitting the President or his direct subordinates to appoint the officials within the executive branch, the Appointments Clause helps ensure that those who make policy are accountable to the President. -
Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection
Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection David M. Primo University of Rochester Sarah A. Binder George Washington University and the Brookings Institution Forrest Maltzman George Washington University The salience of judicial appointments in contemporary American politics has precipitated a surge of scholarly interest in the dynamics of advice and consent in the U.S. Senate. In this article, we compare alternative pivotal politics models of the judicial nominations process, each capturing a different set of potential veto players in the Senate. We use these spatial models to guide empirical analysis of rejection patterns in confirmation contests for the lower federal courts. Using data on the outcomes of all nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the U.S. District Courts between 1975 and 2006, we show that models incorporating the preferences of the majority party median and the filibuster pivots best account for confirmation patterns we observe at the appellate and trial court levels, while advice and consent for trial courts has more recently been influenced by home-state senators. tudents of American politics have applied consider- federal bench, formal and informal rules dictate that able energy in recent years to explaining the politics nominees must secure the consent of multiple potential Sof advice and consent under the U.S. Constitution. veto players—including committee and party medians, Spatial models of advice and consent have offered an ana- as well as home-state senators for the court vacancy and lytically precise way to think about the impact of senators’ the senators capable of sustaining a filibuster against and presidents’ policy preferences on the selection and confirmation. -
Adding Recess Appointments to the President's “Tool
Political Research Quarterly Volume XX Number X Month XXXX XX-XX Adding Recess Appointments © University of Utah 10.1177/1065912907307541 http://prq.sagepub.com to the President’s “Tool Chest” hosted at http://online.sagepub.com of Unilateral Powers Ryan C. Black Anthony J. Madonna Ryan J. Owens Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri Michael S. Lynch University of Kansas, Lawrence In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appoint- ment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess appointments to impor- tant policy-making positions, namely, major independent agencies. The authors compiled a data set of every civilian nomination and recess appointment between 1987 and 2004. After controlling for other factors, the authors find strong support for their theory. Keywords: recess appointments; presidential powers; Congress-presidential relations; unilateral presidency; sepa- ration of powers n June 15, 2005, the Federal Elections Commis- reservations about the BCFRA, through a grueling Osion (FEC) published a press release announcing hearing and possible rejection in the Senate, the pres- the resignation of Commissioner Bradley Smith. ident waited for the Senate to recess. Then he Smith’s departure meant that four of the six sitting appointed three candidates to the commission, using commissioners had either resigned or were serving his constitutionally granted power to fill vacancies expired terms. President George W. -
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. -XXXX In the Supreme Court of the United States NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PETITIONER v. NOEL CANNING, A DIVISION OF THE NOEL CORP., ET AL. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR. Solicitor General Counsel of Record STUART F. DELERY Acting Assistant Attorney General SRI SRINIVASAN Deputy Solicitor General BETH S. BRINKMANN Deputy Assistant Attorney General CURTIS E. GANNON Assistant to the Solicitor LAFE E. SOLOMON General Acting General Counsel DOUGLAS N. LETTER CELESTE J. MATTINA SCOTT R. MCINTOSH Deputy General Counsel MARK R. FREEMAN JOHN H. FERGUSON SARANG V. DAMLE MARGERY E. LIEBER MELISSA N. PATTERSON Associate General Counsels BENJAMIN M. SHULTZ JOSHUA P. WALDMAN LINDA DREEBEN Deputy Associate General Attorneys Counsel Department of Justice National Labor Relations Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 Board [email protected] Washington, D.C. 20670 (202) 514-2217 QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” Art. II, § 2, Cl. 3. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether the President’s recess-appointment pow- er may be exercised during a recess that occurs within a session of the Senate, or is instead limited to recesses that occur between enumerated sessions of the Senate. 2. Whether the President’s recess-appointment pow- er may be exercised to fill vacancies that exist during a recess, or is instead limited to vacancies that first arose during that recess. -
Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions
Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions Updated March 11, 2015 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS21308 Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions Summary Under the Constitution (Article II, §2, clause 2), the President and the Senate share the power to make appointments to high-level policy-making positions in federal departments, agencies, boards, and commissions. Generally, the President nominates individuals to these positions, and the Senate must confirm them before he can appoint them to office. The Constitution also provides an exception to this process. When the Senate is in recess, the President may make a temporary appointment, called a recess appointment, to any such position without Senate approval (Article II, §2, clause 3). This report supplies brief answers to some frequently asked questions regarding recess appointments. Additional information on recess appointments may be found in other CRS reports: CRS Report R42329, Recess Appointments Made by President Barack Obama, by Henry B. Hogue and Maureen O. Bearden; CRS Report RL33310, Recess Appointments Made by President George W. Bush, by Henry B. Hogue and Maureen O. Bearden; and CRS Report RL33009, Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview, by Vivian S. Chu. This report will be updated as events warrant. Congressional Research Service Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions Contents What Is the Purpose of a Recess Appointment? ........................................................................ 1 How Often Have Recent -
Ideology, Qualifications, and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations
OWENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014 10:48 AM IDEOLOGY, QUALIFICATIONS, AND COVERT SENATE OBSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL COURT NOMINATIONS Ryan J. Owens* Daniel E. Walters** Ryan C. Black*** Anthony Madonna**** Scholars, policy makers, and journalists have bemoaned the em- phasis on ideology over qualifications and party over performance in the judicial appointment process. Though, for years, the acrimony be- tween the two parties and between the Senate and President remained limited to appointments to the United States Supreme Court, the mod- ern era of judicial appointments has seen the so-called “appointments rigor mortis” spread throughout all levels of judicial appointments. A host of studies have examined the causes and consequences of the growing acrimony and obstruction of lower federal court appoint- ments, but few rely on archival data and empirical evidence to exam- ine the underlying friction between the parties and the two branches. In a unique study, the authors examine archival data to deter- mine the conditions under which Senators obstruct judicial nomina- tions to lower federal courts. More specifically, the authors examine one form of Senate obstruction—the blue slip—and find that Senators use their blue slips to block ideologically distant nominees as well as unqualified nominees. More importantly, however, the authors find that among nominations to federal circuit courts, Senators block highly qualified nominees who are ideologically distant from them just as often as they block unqualified nominees who are ideologically distant from them. That is, stellar qualifications do not appear to mit- igate the negative effects of ideological distance. The fact that blue slips occur in private, away from public view, allows Senators to block nominees entirely on ideological grounds without fear of indi- * J.D., Ph.D.; Lyons Family Faculty Scholar, Associate Professor of Political Science, and Honorary Fellow, Institute for Legal Studies University of Wisconsin-Madison. -
Recess Appointments: a Legal Overview
Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview Vivian S. Chu Legislative Attorney August 29, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33009 c11173008 . Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview Summary The U.S. Constitution explicitly provides the President with two methods of appointing officers of the United States. First, the Appointments Clause provides the President with the authority to make appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate. Specifically, Article II, Section 2, clause 2 states that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law.” Second, the Recess Appointments Clause authorizes the President to make temporary appointments unilaterally during periods when the Senate is not in session. Article II, Section 2, clause 3 provides: “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” While the Recess Appointments Clause enables the continuity of government operations, Presidents, on occasion, have exercised authority under the Clause for political purposes, appointing officials who might otherwise have difficulty securing Senate confirmation. This constitutional provision is not without its ambiguities, and the President’s use of his recess appointment power in light of these ambiguities has given rise to significant political and legal controversy since the beginning of the republic. -
Defining Recess Appointments Clause "Vacancies"
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-2\NYU204.txt unknown Seq: 1 19-APR-13 14:57 NOTES DEFINING RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE “VACANCIES” AMELIA FRENKEL* The Recess Appointments Clause gives the President the power to “fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.” Throughout Amer- ican history, the Clause has been the subject of intense constitutional focus, as well as political jockeying between the legislative and executive branches. The recess appointment of Richard Cordray as the first Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in January 2012 brought new attention to the issue, raising novel constitutional questions about the propriety of modern uses of the recess appoint- ment power. This Note addresses the question of whether the President is constitu- tionally empowered to make recess appointments to newly created offices and concludes that he is not. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 730 R I. THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE GENERALLY ..... 735 R A. The Adoption of the Recess Appointments Clause . 736 R B. A Preliminary Controversy ......................... 737 R 1. Vacancies That “Happen to Arise” .............. 738 R 2. Vacancies That “Happen to Exist” .............. 739 R II. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE “VACANCIES” ................. 740 R A. The Constitutional Text ............................. 741 R B. The Washington Administration ..................... 744 R C. The Adams Administration ......................... 747 R D. The Madison Administration ........................ 749 R E. The Monroe Administration ........................ 751 R III. RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE “VACANCIES” TODAY . 754 R A. Judicial Review of the Recess Appointment Power . 756 R B. The Policy Benefits of a Narrow Interpretation ..... 759 R CONCLUSION ................................................... 761 R * Copyright 2013 by Amelia Frenkel. J.D. -
“Nuclear” Option
Order Code RL32684 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Changing Senate Rules: The “Constitutional” or “Nuclear” Option Updated May 26, 2005 Betsy Palmer Analyst in American National Government Government and Finance Division Congressional Research Service ô The Library of Congress Changing Senate Rules: The “Constitutional” or “Nuclear” Option Summary Reports indicate possible attempts to curtail the use of filibusters in the Senate, perhaps in the 109th Congress. Some have suggested that proponents of this idea may invoke something called the “nuclear” or “constitutional” option in Senate floor procedure to try to end a filibuster without the need for 60 votes or to amend the cloture rule (Rule XXII) itself. No set definition exists for the term “nuclear” or “constitutional” in this context. Because the point of using such an option is to achieve a goal by means lying outside the Senate’s normal rules of procedure, it would be impossible to list all the different permutations such maneuvers could encompass. Several likely scenarios that fall into this category are described in this report, followed by a discussion of the possible advantages and disadvantages of using such an approach. Opponents (and some supporters) of this kind of plan typically refer to it as the “nuclear” option because of the potentially significant result for Senate operations that could follow from its use. The Senate relies heavily on unanimous consent to get its legislative work accomplished. It may be more difficult to achieve unanimous consent in an environment where the minority feels it has lost some of its traditional rights. -
The Kill Switch: the New Battle Over Presidential Recess Appointments
Copyright 2012 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 107, No. 1 THE KILL SWITCH: THE NEW BATTLE OVER PRESIDENTIAL RECESS APPOINTMENTS Jeff VanDam ABSTRACT—Presidential recess appointments have strained relations between Congress and the Executive Branch since the Administration of George Washington. But in 2007, Congress began using a procedure to prevent such appointments from happening at all. By sending one member to stand in front of an empty chamber while the rest of the Senate took vacation, Congress claimed it was in “pro forma” session, not at recess, and that the President could therefore not make recess appointments. While Presidents Bush and Obama acquiesced to this tactic and declined to make appointments during such pro forma sessions, Obama changed course in early 2012. In so doing, this Comment argues, Obama’s appointments were on solid constitutional footing. Not only did the pro forma sessions deactivate an enumerated power of the President, but they did so by explicitly involving the House of Representatives in the appointments process, an event the Framers specifically sought to guard against. Indeed, by putting an end to recesses (and thus recess appointments), Congress defied a procedural assumption of the Framers written into the Constitution and practiced by legislatures for millennia. From a policy standpoint, blocking presidential appointments perpetuated a harmful glut of unfilled offices, but was in some cases self-defeating. The President, through the Appointments Act, has the power to fill certain positions with acting heads who carry out his policy goals. AUTHOR—J.D.